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A COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

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FOR ISRAEL

From the Communications Advisory Committee

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	3
NEEDS	1.1
Arab threat Present efforts invaluable Crisis response Continuity, comprehensiveness	14
STRUCTURE	23
In Israel In Washington In New York Coordination	24 28 29 30
PROGRAMS	
I. High visibility projects	33
Crossroads World Fund Global conferences Solar energy project Film festival TV spectaculars Pioneer Caravan Advertising campaign	34 36 39 40 42 45
II. People to people	48
Influentials to Israel Enlist visitors' help Recruit Israeli speakers Friendship forums Sister Cities	48 49 51 53 54
III. Special audiences	55
YouthJournalists	55 58

Page

1.5

CONTENTS (Continued)

	Sabbaticals Ethnics, nationality groups Grass roots	60 61 64
IV.	Service	66
	News, features Israel Minutes Fact-finding center Commentators, talk shows Hometown press service Trade press service	66 68 69 70 71 72
ν.	Monitoring	74
	Evaluating media performance Surveying media needs Analysis of opinion Trend identofication Feedback	74 76 77 78 79
VI.	Other projects in brief	80
CONCLUSION] eu	83
APPENDIX A	6	
"A Stat	ement of Key Issues"	

Appendix B'

Funding

1,5

Summary of Recommendations

This report urges a continuing, comprehensive program designed to win favorable American opinion for Israel.

The program includes:

- * A system to bring a measure of order and rationality to information in ¹srael's behalf.
- * Some major projects that, in themselves, convey the most advantageous impressions, that are fountains of good will and publicity.
- * A mechanism by which all communications materials, such as printed literature, films, TV and audio tapes, can be reviewed by the most experienced professionals in the communications business.
- * A resource to enable Israeli government leaders to obtained skilled advice before visiting the United States or making major policy statements affecting American public opinion.

This program does <u>not</u> suggest political or international decisions to the government but rather the means of presenting policies --- whatever their nature --- to obtain the most positive reception for them.

Recommended is the creation of three professional staffs that would work together: a communications unit in Israel, manned

Summary

by American-trained communications executives, which would be subcontracted by the Foreign Office and would be responsible to the Deputy Director General for Information; communications professionals added to the embassy staff in Washington; and professional resources made available to the Israel Task Force.

The report includes a detailed projects to be carried out by these three units and explains how their activities would be coordinated.

The proposal recommends the allocation of two separate budgets to implement the overall program: \$1 million by the Israel government to cover staff costs and expenses; and \$3 million by the American Jewish community to cover staff time and expenses plus an advertising fund.

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Israel's public relations abroad has long been a subject of controversy.

Jewish leaders and other friends of Israel in this country, as well as Great Britain and other nations around the world, have complained regularly that government officials in Israel are insensitive to the impact of their published statements and policies on U.S. public opinion. The pattern of criticism is well-known.

Whenever the government is censured abroad, Israel's friends are upset. Whenever the government is responsible for some heroic action which wins the plaudits of the world, Israel's friends tend to take the achievement for granted and wonder why the same level of enthusiastic support cannot be maintained at all times.

Government leaders, on the other hand, grow weary at the constant complaint that they should <u>do</u> something about their public relations. They accuse the so-called experts abroad of wanting Israel to be "driven into the sea" in order to improve public opinion polls. Security considerations come before public relations,

Introduction

they insist, and they are convinced that most of those who offer unsolicited advice in this respect simply do not recognize the realities of Israel's security needs.

Whether or not one agrees with Woodrow Wilson's observation that "opinion ultimately governs the world," certainly few would deny that opinion in the United States, affects the security and well-being of Israel. American presidents and legislators watch the polls sharply.

The factors that shape public attitudes must be a continuing concern. A group of us who are professionals in this field have, as volunteers, to devised a comprehensive communications plan for Israel's cause. The word, "comprehensive, " in this context is not intended to mean exhaustive. The listing of proposed projects is neither encyclopedic nor rigidly prescribed.

What we believe are important are the processes involved in effective communication.

This committee was created by the Israel Task Force, which, in turn, is an arm of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council. NJCRAC comprises nine national organizations:

American Jewish Committee American Jewish Congress B'nai B'rith Anti=Defamation League Jewish Labor Committee Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A. National Council of Jewish Women Union of American Hebrew Congregations Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America United Synagogue of America.

It includes also about 100 local Community Relations Councils.

TASK FORCE FUNCTIONS

NJCRAC set up the Task Force in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israel war. The latter's purpose is to maximize United States military, moral and economic support of Israel. Made up of leaders of its member agencies and selected councils, the Task Force seeks to foster a climate of public opinion which will not press Israel to accept conditions that jeopardize her independence and security.

The Task Force's immediate goal was to counter negative propaganda which at the time was exploiting the energy crisis to link the oil embargo to U.S. policy vis-a-vis Israel. A number of projects were suggested by Jewish community leadership; and because some of these were beyond the budgetary resources of the agencies, special funding was allotted for a stipulated time.

Task Force programs did sensitize American opinion to the dangers of making energy problems appear to be an

aspect of the Arab-Israel conflict. Strategy of this group is also credited with encouraging the enactment of a landmark federal law forbidding Americans from participating in an Arab boycott. 6

The Israel Task Force supported and strengthened some existing programs and initiated many others, identified emerging problems, devised strategies and the most effective ways to implement them, sponsored a number of opinion surveys and analyses, developed films suitable for groups and television, as well as radio and TV material on the Middle East.

A trade union project conducted in Louisiana and Arkansas interpreted Israel to segments of the public , that normally have little or no contact with Jewish organizations.

The Task Force had interpretive advertisments placed in leading newspapers.

Local programs have been expanded through community visits, memoranda, telephone consultation and other services. The list could go on

CAC ASSIGNMENTS

The Task Force asked the Communications Advisory Committee to:

 --identify, through public opinion data and other research, relevant subgroups or special audiences within the general American public to determine whether all of these are being reached through the media.
-recommend media through which to address particular audiences. Latroducillos

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answered, to do this by examining public reactions or otherwise.

- -suggest more effective ways of working with and through the media.
- participate with the Task Force and its member agencies in development of long range strategies for Israel's public relations in the U.S. and of recommendations for implementation by the Israel Task Force and its member agencies.
- consult with the Israel Task Force, conduct additional programs through firms of Communications Advisory committee members, supplement programs of NJCRAC member agencies.

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One of the CAC's first projects was to commission the Moshe Decter report, "The American Jewish Community and Israel ... A Survey of Communal Action to Mold Public Opinion." For this, intensive interviews were conducted with scores of top-level professionals in all national organizations and in several local communities. Masses of documentary materials were perused. The result in February 1976 was a 75-page report on this subject.

A Wider Task Assumed

Our group, has studied the Israel - to - U.S. information flow in its entirety, from origin

of events and statements abroad to reaction to their communication - or non-communication in the United States.

As each day seemed to bring new strains on the attitudes of the American public towards Israel, it appeared likely that, at the very least, guidelines of some kind were needed so that friends of Israel would not so often be in the position of underreacting, over-reacting or mis-reacting to each new situation as it occurred.

One of our first needs was for some reliable, up-to-date information on the attitudes of Americans towards Israel and the Middle East. Accordingly, a survey on this subject was done in March, 1977, by Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc. This poll found that public support for Israel then and over the previous two years --- while strong --- had certain weaknesses.

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Introduction

In the nine months that followed a whole series of polls conducted by others but monitored and analyzed by Yankelovich showed support for Israel to be declining in American public opinion.

To a certain extent, the less committed segments of opinion on Middle East issues can be expected to be volatile, swaying with events. President Sadat visited Israel on November 18 and 19, 1977. A Louis Harris and Associates survey had asked the question in October of that year: "Do you feel Israel really wants a just peace in the Middle East, reluctantly wants a just peace or does <u>not</u> want peace?"

At that time 55 per cent responded "yes" to "really wants a just peace." By the year's end the figure dropped to 51 per cent. In the same period, the number of people who thought Israel "reluctantly" wanted peace rose from 20 to 27 per cent, while those who thought _______ did not want a just settlement edged from 6 to 8 per cent.

Conversely, the same question about Egypt turned up 37 per cent, who believed that nation really wanted peace in October. By late December and early January, the figure had climbed to 52 per cent.

A national sample polled by Gallup found that the 46 per cent of Americans who were more with Israel than the Arab nations before President Sadat's peace initiative had shrunk to 33 per cent afterwards.

During this period and afterwards, of course, the media were responding negatively on the issue of new settlements and Israel's interpretation of U.N. Resolution 242.

Five Key Concepts

On the basis of the original Yankelovich survey and of a continuing analysis of ongoing polls, it is clear that there are five key concepts that a communications program for Israel should convey:

- 1. Israel as a peace-loving country.
- 2. The affinity of culture between Israel and the U.S.
- 3. The practical benefits to the United States from having a strong Israel.
- 4. The dangers to all from an independent Palestine state.
- 5. The territorial aspects of Israel's security needs.

A statement on these key issues appears as Appendix A. The first priority should be given to countering beliefs that Israel is not committed to peace. This suspicion . is corrosive because the nature of public support in the United States is moral, not practical.

Opinion surveys show that an excellent base exists in America on which to build more support. While day to day events do affect public attitudes and do require attention, the longer term task is to work steadily at strengthening the underlying foundation of good will for and identification with Israel.

Conveying the valid impression that, after all, "these are the same kinds of people that live next door," will solidify this base. It will provide insurance against a critical

loss of support when events take an untoward public relations turn.

Our studies of public opinion provided the starting point of a comprehensive examination of communications by and for Israel. We brought to bear on this

our own expertise as communications professionals, our experience in Jewish affairs, and the insights and observations of many others.

Scope of Research

Twenty-six people from the staffs of Ruder & Finn and Harshe-Rotman & Druck participated in the project which required more than four months to complete.

We interviewed leaders and public relations officials of Jewish organizations, and studied the programs currently being undertaken by these groups --- excellent work that represents an enormous public relations asset.

We reviewed the whole range of relations with the press, publications, radio and TV, community relations and other communications efforts carried on by the Embassy and consulate staffs in the U.S. Their performance can be described as tremendously effective, out of all proportion to the very limited staff and budgets available.

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Introduction

We interviewed selected individuals from the following groups: Washington, state and local political figures, business and finance, religion, media, foreign relations and defense, academia, veterans, labor, entertainers, authors, speakers, artists and minority group leaders.

In this process, we, of course, consulted prominent non-Jews sympathetic to Israel,

We studied communications programs of other governments, including those of Japan and the United Kingdom.

Of special interest was Inter Nationes, a quasi-governmental communications organization established by the Federal Republic of Germany. With funds supplied by both the government and private donations Inter Nationes employs a staff of 200 specialists. Their most impressive program involves arranging visits by foreign journalists and dignitaries. Their other activities include publishing books, distributing films, producing teaching programs, supplying information to scientists, artists and community leaders, and providing press service and pictorial reports. <u>Recommendations</u>

As a result of this research, our findings are broadly based and they reflect the thinking of a wide range of observers.

We propose a systematized, continuing and comprehensive information program ~ one that will build on the excellent work already being done. It will not duplicate efforts. It will not require creation of a new organization.

This program will initiate high visibility projects that will enhance Israel's image as a cultural center and a peace-loving nation. It will set up a system that will be of invaluable help tos Israel in winning favor for national policies ~ or, if they are unpopular, at least blunting criticism of them. by explaining them in the most understandable way. In doing so, it will also provide a more effective capability for crisis response-an immediate and effective countering of potentially damaging events.

Our overriding concern is with the <u>quality</u> of communications rather than just quantity.

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The report that follows describes: Needs, structure and programs. Budget recommendations are to be found in Appendix B.

NEEDS

To assert that an expanded communications program to enhance support for Israel in American public opinion is urgently needed would raise eyebrows in some quarters. Many other nations, for example, look with envy on Israel's unique opportunities for wielding influence in the United States.

Nevertheless, no other country's fate hangs as closely on U.S. backing as does Israel's. Favorable public opinion here is critical to continuing economic, military and moral support for Israel.

This need will continue, whatever political development, may occur.

- In the event of a comprehensive settlement, social and economic difficulties will persist. A nation that for 30 years has lived in a state of siege is bound to face serious problems when confronting peace.
- 2) Should only a partial accord be reached, in the shortlived euphoric aftermath, concern for Israel in the United States would diminish.

3) If negotiations break down completely and a long period of tensions ensues, events may -- as they have in the past -cast Israel in the role of seeming intransigence. This exacts a heavy toll in public good will. Arab leaders are not hampered by the constraints of western-style democracy, they, to some extent, have the advantage of free-wheeling.

 Certainly, should full-scale warfare erupt, Israel's need to have a concerted information program already in place is obvious.

Also, it would be a mistake to assume sympathy for Israel automatically translates itself into support for U.S. military aid. Ten polls taken by the Gallup, Harris and Yankelovich organizations between 1967 and 1977 show opponents of military aid outnumbering supporters in six polls and supporters outnumbering opponents in four. In most cases the two sides were almost evenly balanced.

An NBC poll November 29 and 30, 1977, asked what this country should do if Israel were attacked by a neighbor. Of the options suggested, only 4 per cent of the respondents would give all-out military assistance. Twenty-four per cent would furnish supplies and equipment but no troops; but the largest number, 39 per cent, would give no help to either side.

The Arab Threat

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One factor that needs to be weighed in considering communications requirements for Israel's is the Arab

Needs

petro-presence in the United States. Without losing perspective on this, we nevertheless must be alert to the fact that through their wealth and increasing commercial involvements and investments here, Arab interests are gaining every broader access to U.S. power centers.

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Their billions of dollars are already influencing bank policies. It was reported recently that four wealthy Arab investors from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had bought a total of 20 per cent of Financial General Bank Shares, Inc, subject to SEC approval. This Washington-based bank holding group has assets of \$2.2 billion.

Banks wield great clout. A Senate study showed the power to vote stock in the nation's largest corporations is concentrated in fewer than two dozen institutional investors, most of them banks. Morgan Guarantee, for example, is the major stock voter in 27 large corporations.

There is no evidence yet of a concerted Arab propaganda programin this country. But the Arabs have been quick to learn that their money will buy American technology and financial expertise. They are learning, too, that it can buy communicating skills.

In recent months the governments of Jordan, Auwait and Saudi Arabia reportedly have been negotiating with American public relations firms. What, if anything, comes of this remains to be seen. But the Arabs have the resources at any time to turn on a massive public information campaign. Neels

As our research progressed and in the light of the five key goals we had identified, certain communications needs became increasingly evident.

For example, nobody has yet examined the American "pyramid of influence" to see how can work within that structure in a planned way. This pyramid has the President at the top, below that the cabinet, the Security Council, then Corgress, governors, key labor leaders and other politically potent groups throughout the country.

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Also, with all the dedicated, highly talented persons working for the Israeli government and for the Jewish organizations in America, there is need for more-and better trained communicators. The advice of professionals should be available in any step which has an impact on the American public.

As a corollary to this, there should be set up the type of structure that will enable top officials in Israel to have the counsel of senior communications professionals, both American and Israeli. Other specific needs included:

- * More major events that project the concept of Israel dramatically as a peace-loving country.
- * More major projects that demonstrate the affinity of cultures and democracy between our two nations.
- * More person-to-person programs that cultivate mutual understanding.
- * Better U.S. media access to Israel information and better information at the source.
- * A communications structure linking Israel and the United States that will oversee, systematize

and expand operations without impinging on the independence of Jewish organizations here.

Present Efforts Invaluable

To cite the need for a central sustained program is in no way a derogation of the vast amount of outstanding work already being done. All involved in Israel communications are constantly surprised at the number and range of activities that are going on at any given time.

The organized Jewish community's conscientious, unremitting efforts to create a favorable climate of opinion here for Israel are of incalculable value.

The Foreign Ministry in the United States does a superb job deploying and using its very limited manpower and resources. Relations of the Israel embassy in Washington with the American media are excellent. Arrangements are routinely

made for any minister or other Israeli dignitary who arrives here to confer with top publishers or newspaper columnists and to appear on television programs.

The results of all these labors have been obvious. Since 1967, questions concerning sympathy in the Middle East conflict have been asked regularly by pollsters.

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Needs

In 27 national polls sympathy for Israel has ranged between 35 and 56 per cent, and sympathy for the Arabs between 1 and 9 per cent, with the remainder saying, 'neither side,' 'both sides,' or 'don't know.' It was not until late in 1977 and early in 1978 that an erosion of support took place ... due to circumstances beyond the control of Israel's backers.

While the efforts of the traditional Jewish organizations in America have been invaluable, it must be kept in mind that all of them have different constituencies and diverse functions. Of their many operations, helping promote Israel's image is only one.This has made the communications process intrinsically haphazard.

Crisis response --- the highest priority One of the most crucial of all needs is for what might be called crisis response capability. Events with a potential for adversely affecting public opinion --- such as the American-Soviet communique, the visit of Egypt's President Sadat, the Vance statement on settlements, the southern Lebanon military action --- often take place without much

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warning. Yet if the impact is not countered at once, important ground is lost. Some of this ground may be recovered eventually but a cumulative negative effect can linger and create increasing problems for Israel.

What is needed is the means to marshal the best expertise immediately for the best possible response on behalf of Israel. The resources must be in place. Not to have them there is a handicap.

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Activity for the sake of activity alone is, of course, futile. Whenever there is a crisis,well-meaning, influential Jews around the world descend on Israel's Prime Minister with advice. But the element that is missing, and necessary for <u>effective</u> crisis response, is communications expertise.

The response, itself, may take any number of forms. It may be by public statements by leading non-Jews or government officials, or through speeches to major national audiences arranged on short notice, or through Op-Ed Page articles by prominent citizens, or through advertisements, when these are practical. Or by way of some combination of these and/or other activities.

The skills for doing this exist now. What needs to be set up and supported is the mechanism to bring those skills to bear on short notice and in a systematic way. The structure we are recommending will do this.

Continuity and Comprehensiveness

Communications efforts cannot be fully effective if they are erratic. For that reason, a comprehensive program must see to it that Israel's points of view on the major

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issues are given a high level of continuing exposure. The sustained program must be so conceived that responses to specific crises can be quickly superimposed on it.

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To maintain this high profile, it is imperative that an ongoing and major advertising program be conducted in the U.S. on appropriate themes identified by surveys and other means. Advertising specialists should be told the policies to be stressed and then permitted to execute the ads creatively.

We believe that had such a continuing program been under way during the 1977 visit of President Sadat, for example ads on the settlements issue could have been run that would have provided at least a measure of counterbalancing effect.

The press must also be served on a more consistent and intensified basis in order to be sure that Israel's story is continuously and positively reported. The media in this country are especially receptive to newsworthy reports from Israel.

That country is probably one of the most fascinating nations in the world from a news and feature point of view because what has happened there in the past 30 years is unprecedented anywhere in modern times. Everyone who has ever looked at Israel from a communicator's vantage knows there are numberless human interest stories that have never been told.

Foreign correspondents tend to concentrate almost exclusively on the fast-breaking and dramatic political and military events. The Defense,

Needs

Foreign Ministry and Prime Minister's office are well-worn beats. But active steps have to be taken to encourage coverage of cultural, business-industry, agricultural and other less exploited sources of news and features. Correspondents need a variety of services including help in identifying good material and assistance in curing through red tape.

Also, a great potential exists for the

dissemination of Israeli audio visual information to radio and television stations in the United States. In this area, as in so many others, much has been already done. It is estimated that in 1977 alone TV films about ¹srael reached an aggregate audience of about 160 million, but on a sporadic basis.

What is badly needed is a consistent and comprehensive program to supply audio reports and film and video tape stories for the U.C. on a regular basis. An

audio information center

has been set up at the

Israel consulate in New York. It distributes

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news audio clips to the networks and audio wire services. But more material is needed. For television, as well, not enough Israel newsfilm is arriving. The communications structure which we recommend will fill this need.

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STRUCTURE

The task of bringing order and coordination to the myraid communications that affect Israel's cause is complicated by the fact that an enterprise responsibile for bettering Israel's image must depend on, and work with, autonomous groups that have multiple other jobs to do.

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For the purposes of this report, we recommend what would seem essential -- a coordinated structure with three parts: in Israel, Washington and New York.

In Israel

A professional organization should be established and be subcontracted by the Foreign Office in Jerusalem. Responsible to the Deputy Director General for Information, this group would be headed by an American. trained communications executive. He would know how to recruit the best possible staff for his office in Israel and how to take advantage of the resources of members of the Communications Advisory Committee in the United States.

Thus the Israel communications unit would be knowledgeable about American media and public opinion. It would also be equipped to meet U.S. media needs.

To the extent that deliberations of Israeli leaders take into account the impact of decisions on American public opinion, the expertise of the unit will be invaluable and should be listened to. The staff will anticipate U.S. public reactions to policies under consideration, and will relay from the United States feedback on trends in public opinion and the opinions of important leadership groups as well 'as editorial comments. (Details on the subject of feedback are to be found elsewhere in the report.)

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The staff will also provide the resources for practical day-today public relations needs. Ccaching political leaders for public appearances ... particularly with "dry runs" for television ... should become an established practice.(Not long ago an Israeli leader interviewed on the MacNeil-Leher Report on American TV referred to and pointed to a map which was never shown on camera. This was the kind of

technical slip that the assistance of professional communicators would have avoided.)

The Communications Unit would offer guidance on trips to the United States to help assure that, for example, the right audiences are addressed at the right times and places. with the right speeches.

Other specific functions for the Israel office should include: analyzing long-range communications needs and developing plans to deal with them; providing feature services on all aspects of Israel for the press; insuring that national government, religious, historic, cultural and industrial events are planned in such a way that maximum favorable publicity in the United States will result from them; seeing that all publications of value in Israel are read, translated and made available; and that government publicity releases, brochures and other materials are of uniformly high quality, in both writing and graphics.

It is essential that information unit personnel, as well as other selected government public relations people, be originted to what is achievable with American media, the materials and devices they need and the most effective ways to work with American journalists.

To this end, seminars should be conducted for these people, preferably in New York. The program[®] could be conducted in cooperation with the Boston University School of Communication or some other appropriate institution.

The course' should include the following:

- * Discussion of Israel-to-U.S. information goals.
- * Lectures and discussions on the various media.
- * Mechanics of publicity operation (developing the story, dealing with journalists, supplying newsworthy material.)
- * Tours of key media facilities with talks by newscasters, PR people,etc.

instructural discipline included in the basic training of all foreign affairs officers.

The quarters of the Communications Unit in Israel should

be an address to which all good information ideas flow. There should be liaison with all Israel institutions that offer news and feature potentials.

Photographs, films, articles and TV reports for American media will be channeled through this unit, which will also serve foreign correspondents by providing leads and other help in obtaining unusual features.

It is inevitable that various departments and bureaus in ¹srael have seemingly conflicting missions. Fund-raising objectives require a stress on deprivation and social needs, while tourism emphasizes posh hotels and peaceful beaches, The Investment Authority talks about long range stability and security at the same time the Defense Department may need to warn of imminent armed threat.

These diverse programs have to co-exist with one another, each with different objectives. The United States Information Unit program will cut across some of these categories but will have a goal of its own --- that of telling the continuing Israel story to the United States.

Often programs will supplement or continue those handled by cultural, religious, investment, trade or tourist bureaus.

Tourism has a budget primarily for advertising, brochures, posters and working with travel agents.⁵ It does not have much money for public relations.

If it appears necessary for instance to increase the number of Chistian pilgrimages to Israel from the Bible Belt, the ministry of tourism might commission the effort. If, however, it were determined that strictly from a tourism advantage, other projects had to take precedence, that ministry might elect not to do this.

From the point of view of the Communications Unit's broader goals, bringing influential evangelicals to Israel might be eminently worthwhile. If so, the would continue the program on its own.

To sum up, the importance of Israel as the point of origin for much of the communications program makes it essential that this branch of the three-part structure be a strong one. It must have topnotch American-oriented direction, ample personnel and adequate facilities and equipment.

In Washington

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A strengthening of the staff and facilities at the Embassy is required. Assistance is needed for the consulates as well.

One primary need: a drafting unit of two or thre'e skilled people who can write pamphlets and reaction papers and help with speeches. Another requirement is for additional staff to handle press briefings. Still another function which is already being performed but should be enlarged is interpreting government policy to a wider range of Jewish organizations and friends of Israel.

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Part of the Embassy communications staff's responsibility should be to make sure that, even though the United Nations staff is reduced, the press corps there is adequately covered during the Middle East deliberations of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The Embassy by its nature often has to function in a crisis environment. The communications staff there must be expanded to include trained specialists, and the best professional resources must be readily available to them so that when policies are announced, they can be presented simultaneously, on very short notice, most effectively to the American public at key points across the U.S.

In New York

Here the Israel Task Force with the assistance of the Communications Advisory Committee will be responsible for devising major communications projects, advertising campaigns and handling the liaison with Jewish organizations. The Task Force will coordinate its activities with the existing roof organizations in a way to be elaborated later. And Jewish organizations not belonging to the Task Force will be invited to join this effort.

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Structure

Task Force will not, of course, compete with groups already active but rather bolster the good work they are doing. It will find out from them what activities they would be willing to initiate, or expand. It will be necessary to make sure no new project infringes on current ones. The office here will provide a center to which ideas can be

brought and evaluated. At present there is no single such clearing house and many worthwhile proposals never come to function.

Coordination

As a tripartite group, the head of the Israel communications unit, the minister of information as delegated by the ambassador in Washington, and the Task Force communications **Inead in New York will meet frequently and confer regularly by** telephone. They will review decisions, appraise needs,

monitor ongoing programs and allocate tasks. There is every reason to believe that the spirit of

cooperation and good will that has infused relations between American Jews and the State of Israel in other joint enterprises will make this one successful, too. ... However, without a unifying structure of this kind, no comprehensive, systematized program can operate at the high level of effectiveness that is so urgently required. PROGRAMS

"If there is one earnest, even urgent, recommendation that could be heard from virtually every sophisticated professional leader, it is this: that the public informational effort on behalf of Israel should cease being on the defensive, should cease focusing on being merely responsive to events and to crises and adverse accusations. That it should go over to a more assertive and positive posture, not only in political • terms but in broader cultural and humanistic terms. That is to say that greater emphasis should be placed upon Israel as a free society, a normal people, a creative nation with democratic institutions making major contributions to the quality of human life at home and for humanity in general"

> " Moshe Decter February 27, 1976 <u>The American Jewish Community</u> <u>And Israel " A Survey of</u> <u>Communal Action To Mold Public</u> <u>Opinion</u>

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Our committee has identified a wide variety of projects, programs and activities that we believe should be either initiated or enlarged. Following is a limited and selected list of such programs.

The three-member executive group should, as the need is indicated from time to time, call together ad hoc gatherings of experts in specific fields who are friends of Israel to obtain their advice. This will particularly necessary in fields where our people are laymen and must have the benefit of inside knowledge and help.-How to get a TV series started, for example, or how best to stimulate increased support by more evangelicals.

For the purposes of organization, the programs we have identified are divided into the following categories: High visibility, people.to.people, special audiences, service, surveillance, and other projects in brief.

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Programs

1. I High visibility projects

A comprehensive Calendar of Events of key happenings in Israel will be maintained and continuously updated, so that fully adequate public relations planning and execution can be carried out. The calendar will expecially flag occurrences that deserve public visibility in the United States. At present there are a variety of different calendars

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The tourism ministry has one. So do other government departments as well as universities, museums, associations and organizations.

This master listing will include holiday observances, government events, music, theater, painting, sculpture, seminars, symposiums, conventions.

A great variety of groups convene in Israel. For example, for May, 1978, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism report lists:

> Tel-Avis International Art Fair the First International Colloquium on Advances in Intensive Psychotherapy 21st Biennial Congress of the International College of Surgeons,

"Modern Living" International Trade Fair

Fourth International Beilinson Symposium on

"Nutrition and the Diabetic Child" International Seminar on the Latest Advancements in Proctology 19th World Congress of the World Federation of Diamond Bourses the International Diamond Manufacturers Association the Eight International Congress of the World Confederation of

Physical Therapy.

Seminars and conventions, of course, add to national stature and offer a wide range of news and feature opportunities. Programs

This schedule will be used to identify projects that merit publicity and promotion. The sponsors of events may not always have the facilities for doing this. But the calendars will also be analyzed to make sure there is enough going on in areas of main concern, important events that dramatize the key themes. Where high visibility events do not occur spontaneously, they will be created --- for their intrinsic impact and as the basis for U.S. publicity.

'Crossroads' A major exhibit

This proposal and the one that follows are big, . ambitious projects certain to have a dramatic impact on public opinion. Yet both, we believe, are well within the realm of feasibility.

"Crossroads," a major traveling museum exhibit on the order of <u>Tutankhamen</u>, would depict Israel as a hub of many civilizations.

Dr. Thomas P.F. Hoving, former Metropolitan Museum of Art director, believes such a project would be possible for 1980-81.

"The whole country is archeological. Various levels would depict Arab civilizations other cultures, the Crusaders and so on," Dr. Hoving says. "Israel is the hub of the wheel, the center of the world."

If the Knesset-given sufficient advance time and the proper conditions -- will permit showing the Dead Sea Scrolls, this, of course, would be a tremendous attraction.

The exhibit should open in the National Gallery in Washington, go to six museums around the country, spending three months in each city, and possibly also touring the world. The project could be largely self; liquidating through the sale of replica printed

Proplins

In the past, governments and, indeed, corporations viewed an investment in sponsorship of an art exhibition as a simple contribution to culture and scholarship. The only return that was expected by a country was an increase in good will, a better familiarity with the nation's history, and a **boost** in tourism spurred by the public's desire to see similar relics and art <u>in situ</u>.

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Today, we are happily in an era in which museums are being more receptive to the idea of allowing investors to recoup their money and, indeed, to share the profits made on an exhibition. While the ongoing work of museums is conservation, archival jobs and research, the sale of books, gifts and educational materials has become a multi-million dollar business.

Profits on such items as catalogues, posters, reproduction of artifacts can produce significant income. Also a "<u>Crossroads</u>" major television series would be a natural spinoff.

It is possible, too, to obtain U.S. government support for an exhibition of this size. A bill has been passed which allows the federal government to indemnify traveling international art exhibitions. This allows the risk involved in transporting objects to the United States to be borne almost in its entirety by the government. The only requirement is that the show must be sponsored by a museum in this country. If this can be arranged, the largest expense item involved --- insurance cost-would be virtually eliminated.

A project of this nature can have a tremendous impact. It is ex ected that by the time the Tutankhamen exhibit leaves this country in April, 1979, million people will have visited the museums in the six cities displaying the "King Tut" treasures. Already, Egyptian culture has become virtually a fad in the United States. Mrs. Sadat, the prime ministers wife, when she was here mentioned that seeing the show was way to get to know her, country. Egyptian officials say Tutankhamen is promoting tourism and helping their nation in other ways, as well. They are, in fact, so impressed with the results that they are already planning another traveling exhibition --a general survey of Egyptian art--- for 1980.

'World Fund for Humanity'

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A project that would have even greater and continuing global impact would be a "World Fund for Humanity." ... a Jerusalem award program with the dimensions of the Nobel prize.

Funded by Jews of many lands, it would be perceived as as a gift to the world from Israel to honor those who have contributed to the betterment of mankind. It would focus global attention on the commitment of Israel and the Jewish people to peace and the dignity of man. It would appeal to the pride of the Jewish community.

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To set up the World Fund program, a one-year planning effort would be required the government should appoint a commission with leading similars of inter and and eminence convered in Israel for this purpose.

It should be noted that in 1975 the Knesset with \$10 million dollars capital from anonymous donors set up the Wolf Foundation. This honors outstanding scientists for their contributions in agriculture, mathematics, chemistry, physic: and medicine. The Wolf Prize carries a \$100,000 cash grant for each of the five fields. This a great project and a beneficial one.

It does not, however, command the worldwide attention of the Nobel prizes which get front page coverage all over the globe.

This is in part because the Wolf project has not been as aggressively promoted and publicized as it should have been. It deserves more attention than it receives. It would get this through the communications program we envision. Nevertheless, it would still not have a stature commensurate with Nobel, which the World Fund would have.

Nobel Prizes are given from the Nobel Foundation, a fund established by Alfred Bernhard Nobel in his will in 1896. The original value of the fund was \$8 million. The prizes are given from the income of the fund. In 1977 each prize totaled about \$145,000.

Suggestions for awards are accepted only from designated individuals: former Nobel Prize winners, members of award-giving bodies, persons on faculties of specified universities and insitutions, and individuals in certain governments.

Gaining possession of a Nobel Prize brings acclaim and recognition far beyond the monetary value of the award, itself. A World Fund presentation would bestow comparable prestige.

Some states

Dr. Hams

Conferences of global importance

We believe forums should be established on such pressing issues as food shortages, water desalination, the energy crisis. Israel's contributions to research in these areas and such others as drip irrigation, electronics and health care could be discussed and possibly shared with other nations at appropriate gatherings.

Organizations such as the U.S. Conference Board, highly regarded by business should be encouraged if possible, to hold international seminars on the Middle East. If these could highlight Israel-American cultural affinity, they would strengthen business support for 'srael.

A conference of top theologians of all faiths could introduce new directions of dialogue and insight. The need in America to seek allies for political positions from among Protestants and Catholics makes it important wherever possible to resolve differences that generate hostility.

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A conference of leading scientists on a subject that could warrant world attention, another of the great artists of our time, still another of outstanding social thinkers --- all taking place in Israel, would give high visibility to Israel's role as a major intellectual center, providing leadership for a variety of efforts to improve the condition of man.

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Solar Energy Project

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A joint conspicuous solar energy project should be undertaken that would include a major conference in the United States with leading Israeli and American scientists ' participating. They would:

- * Launch a study to determine where the Israelis might best help America with her solar energy problem.
- * Designate a visible promotable project in the United States to be worked on --- and funded --- jointly by the Israelis and the Americans,
- * Initiate a mutual exchange program for students and scientists to study solar energy in Israel and the United States.

There is already a precedent for such cooperation. Gershon Grossman of Haifa's Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, in conjunction with an American professor at the University of Colorado, is making rapid advances in solar energy use.

The memory of the OPEC oil squeeze is still fresh in the minds of Americans. Israel, by making available its knowledge of solar energy, helps America solve what President Carter has called its "number one priority," the energy shortage. This will demonstrate to Americans how aid is not a one-way street.

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International Features

A major film festival, focusing on such themes as peace and brotherhood, would be a logical extension of similar events already staged or planned. An event of that sort was held in 1976 and another was scheduled for November 5 to 11, 1978.

The first World Jewish Film and ¹elevision Festival was attended by about 600 delegates, including 300 Israelis and an equal number of others from 20 different countries.

Melville Mark, former UPI bureau chief and Geneva and a specialist in mass communications, originated and directed the project. The '76 event was designed to bring together film directors, producers and distributors from around the world to screen films on Jewish subjects and to encourage Is raeli and Jewish institutions to produce high quality films about themselves.

The second festival is not Jewish but has a universal theme, "Who speaks for Man?," with human rights overtones. The festival includes a contest of film and television programs with special awards; a symposium; and an exhibition.

Walter Eytan, chairman of the Israel Broadcasting Authority, says, "The humanistic concept of this second event is one which we wholeheartedly endorse, and for which we feel that Jerusalem is an ideal setting."

The festival Committee of Honor is headed by Professor Ephraim Katzir, president of the State of Israel.

Events of this kind should be encouraged so that they will fill needs and become continuing institutions. An international music festival and an international tennis tournament are other examples.

The Israel Tennis Center costing more than \$1 million was built recently at Ramat Gan, a suburb of Tel Aviv. Other such centers are being planned for major cities in Israel and fund-raising is under way. The Ramat Gan facility would lend itself well to an international ourney that could be covered by Wide World of Sports or CBS Sports or one of the other network shows on American television.

Television Spectaculars

The three communications administrators should work to assure that at least one television spectacular a year of the order of <u>Holocaust</u> is shown that helps to advance, even

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An example is the television special celebrating the 30th anniversary of the State of 'srael. The all.star show is .scheduled to be performed April 30, 1978 in the Opera House of Kennedy Center for later telecast by . ABC network. Vice-President Mondale is chairman of the committee in charge.

In some years such a program will happen along more or less spontaneously. At other times, the communications unit itself must take the initiative to generate one.

TV programs come into being in a variety of unpredictable ways. Here the help of friendly television industry people is essential. They can offer basic ideas with suggestions on how to develop them. A number of books and/or topics can be discussed with network executives. Writers who are sensitive to fsrael can be selected to write the scripts.

The programs need not, and probably should not, focus on topical Middle East tensions and politics. They might, instead, for example, offer fresh insights into other interesting and important aspects of life in Israel.

Wcll done, such programs can generating greater understanding for Israel among all segments of the population and further communicate the five key issues.

Pioneer Caravan

An effective way to communicate Israel's story to the neglected medium-sized cities --- such as in parts of the South

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Program

and West where the Jewish populations are small --- would be by a Pioneer Caravan. Three or four 60-foot trailer trucks would feature an exhibit, a spokesperson for Israel, artifacts, folk dancing, all communicating Israel culture and contributions to America. The project would link the pioneer traditions of the two countries, celebrating İsrael's 30th anniversary and extending that nation's appreciation for American help.

Each car could be decorated with a commissioned mural, perhaps based on the familiar "four freedoms" themes. The exhibits might also show how Israel has dealt with these freedoms successfully.

We suggest a one-month 10-city trip in May --- perhaps longer --ending in New York or Washington. Leading dignitaries should be present from Israel and the United States for the send-off.

As the caravan arrives in each city, the local mayor might proclaim that date American/Israeli Friendship Day. Activities might include:

- * A cultural event (visit from an İsraeli dance company, traveling theater show, boys'choir).
- * Speakers' programs (Jewish and non-Jewish influentials addressing local women's, ethic, civic, fraternal groups.)
- * Appropriate school activities.
- * Local stores with israel themes and flags.
- * Film shorts on Israel distributed to motion picture theaters in each city.

The caravan might have on display some holy artifact or replica to attract the Christian population. The spokesperson, who must be an 'sraeli notable, would be available for special print and broadcast interviews. He or she might be teamed with a designated non-Jewish person well-known in each city, with the two appearing together on local TV and radio shows.

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A news film and audio tape on a general American/Israeli theme might be prepared for distribution to broadcasters. Also there might be a modest gift from the Israeli people to the American people in each city. This could take the form of a physical present of some kind or an offer of assistance or cooperation on a local project (to be worked out in advance) such as a sister city project.

This, like other suggested projects, is one around which major national and local broadcast and print media could be mobilized.

Advertising program

Any comprehensive communications program for Israel's cause would have to include advertising as a key component. Ads have some inherent advantages. For example, they assure control of the editorial content of messages, thus allowing no distortion. Also, they can be placed in major publications in a way to guarantee high visibility across the nation.

Our continuing campaign should include: substantive, factual pieces dealing head-on with controversial issues; ads supporting and publicizing other specific segments of the communications program, such as the Crossroads exhibit or Pioneer Caravan; still others of a more general nature that strengthen personal identification with İsrael.

The following, we believe, are important considerations:

- * Media selected shoul provide a high level of continuing exposure to key target groups.
- * Issue advertisements explaining Israel's points of view should start as soon as possible.
- * Media selected should, wherever possible, provide crisis response capability «-permitting last-minute placement or change of ads.
- * Fast-close, high-frequency media should be suitable for reaching multiple targets.

Programs

* Full U.S. coverage of influentials, with some concentration in power centers, is needed.

It was pointed out earlier in this report that getting crisis response capability for ads is difficult, if not impossible, when it is attempted on an ad hoc basis. It can be done, however, when the proper mechanism is in place and continuously operating.

Among the general circulation magazines with the power to influence opinion nationally, the fastest closers are the weekly newsmagazines <u>--- Time, Newsweek</u> and <u>U.S. News</u> <u>and World Report</u>. In any particular week, if their advertising people know in advance that material will be coming, it is possible to submit copy on Thursday or even Friday for appearance on Monday. Even daily newspapers are only a shade better in this respect.

The latter are excellent for zeroing in on the major urban power centers like New York and Washington, but for trying to blanket the country, the news magazines are far cheaper. Also getting advertising copy promptly, to many distant newspapers can be a problem.

Generally speaking, it is necessary to use print media for dealing with controversial issues --- rather than radio and TV. Otherwise the "fairness doctrine" and equal time demands come into play.

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Programs

It is important that once policies and themes have been determined by the communications unit, the advertising professionals be left free to implement these creatively.

The possibilities are almost limitless. For example, a series of educational advertisements to help Americans understand how Israel's geography has changed since the Balfour Declaration. These ads could include an order form for booklets expanding on the topics. The mailing could perhaps be handled by a Jewish organization.

Aside from the news magazines, other multi-target publications with a fast close base that would be suitable vehicles include: <u>Business Week</u> (W), <u>New York Times</u> (D), <u>Washington Post</u> (Sun), <u>Wall Street Journal</u> (D), <u>Los Angeles Times</u> (D) <u>Chicago Tribune</u> (D) <u>Atlanta Constitution-Journal</u> (D), <u>Ghristian</u> <u>Science Monitor</u> (D).

Other opinion leader publications: <u>New Yorker</u> (W), <u>Saturday Review</u> (Bi~W), <u>Atlas</u> (M) (Digest of foreign news); <u>Foreign Affairs</u> (Q), <u>National Review</u> (BiW), <u>New Republic</u> (W), <u>N.Y. Review of Books</u> (BiW), <u>Science</u> (W), <u>Ms</u>. (M), <u>New Times</u> (BiW), <u>Psychology Today</u> (M), <u>Politics Today</u> (BiM), <u>Harpers</u> (M), <u>Atlantic</u> (M), <u>Human Events</u> (W), <u>Conservative Digest</u> (M) <u>Scientific American</u> (M) and <u>Crisis</u> (NAACP) (M).

We have identified 25 other publications suitable for specific target audiences. These range from <u>More</u> (M) for journalists and <u>Christian Life</u> (M) for fundamental Protestants to <u>Rotarian</u> (M), <u>Lion Magazine</u> (M), <u>Kiwanis</u>, (M) and <u>Future</u> (Bi-M) (Jaycees) for civic leaders. The East four magazines would also be logical outlets for advertising the availability of Israel films and speakers.

Programs starts New garde

2. People-to-People

These of activities are the most important of all in building mutual understanding: And of these, nothing seems to work better than

Bringing non-Jewish influentials to Israel

Much of this is, of course, already being done. The Embassy has brought over 500 American leaders over the past 3 years. The Ministry of Tourism and El Al have intensive programs. The Committee on Israel regularly subsidizes tours to that country for selected media persons. And under the aegis of the American Zionist Federation, each year between 30 and 40 press, radio and television representatives spend up to two weeks in Israel. The AZF also brings 40 or so clergymen to seminars there every year.

But the effort needs to be greatly broadened and better organized so as to reach more editors, business leaders, government officials, legislators and other key figures in target audiences, and to provide meaningful follow-up.

What has not been done is an overall analysis ... of who has gone over in the past year. Were there enough from the student groups? Or enough Blacks, for example? Important targets should be identified so that El Al or the Ministry or the Jewish organizations can make the most effective use of their programs. Also additional funds might be provided as needed.

Those who visit on their own need to be identified either through the Tourism Bureau, El Al or hotels.

Enlist the help of friendly visitors

This, too, is being donenot nearly extensively enough. Whole programs should be developed around key persons and followed up in their own communities so they explain their impressions as widely as possible.

A person, or group of people, within the Communications Unit should be charged with contacting and gaining the support of influential Americans in different fields of activity. Individuals to be contacted might include labor leaders, university presidents, a businessmen, scientists, artist^s, farmers, students, spokesmen for Blacks. For greater credibility, mostly, non-Jews should be included.

Many of the outstanding Americans who have visited Israel and become good friends are well known. To name a few -- Father Theodore He sburgh, president of the University

of Notre Dame; Clark Kerr, chairman of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies at Berkeley, Calif.; Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen; Rev. James Morton, dean of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York; from evangelicals, Johnnie Cash: ethnic 's influentials, Geno Baroni, assistant secretary of Housing and

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Urban Development, Joseph Alioto, former mayor of San Francisco, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., executive director of the National Urban League, Vilma Martinnez, president of the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund; business, Thomas M. Macioce, Allied Stores, Inc.; Literature, James Michener; foreign policy, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt; labor, George Meany.

Too often prominent visitors to Israel return to American and speak only to Jewish organizations, "converting the converted."

Instead, volunteers would be asked to speak before important non-Jewish or mixed audiences, also to be interviewed on TV or radio. Statements might also be used in print advertising programs.

Non-Jewish American influentials should be encouraged to work with our communications specialists in developing and submitting pro-Israel bylimed op-ed page articles.

Story ideas could cover a wide scope of topics ranging from solar energy developments at Hebrew University's Scientific Research Facilities to woman's rights progress in Israel.

(1) To major national newspapers on an exclusive -- in -- the -- nation basis. Articles will be offered to editors first by telephone, then sent with a cover letter.

(2) In the case of regional newspapers, they will be offered on an exclusive=to-region basis.

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(3) Articles would go to smaller papers exclusive to that city, town or area, <u>mailed by the communications staff without</u> any preliminary contact.

This project will continue throughout the year on an intensive basis. At least one op-ed editor at a national paper will be contacted each month. Regional and smaller papers will be reached on a quarterly basis.

Success of the project will be monitored by clipping services and follow-up phone calls. The number and importance of the mewspapers using the articles will be continually reviewed to determine which topics or kinds of articles are most successful.

Recruit prominent Israelis to speak here

Israel's story should be told not just by American friends but by Israeli specialists in various fields --- from fashions to finance.

We realise that work pressures and hectic schedules create problems but, to the extent that it is possible, important Israeli citizens who would have an interested audience in this country should get used to the idea of " devoting perhaps 10 per cent of their time in America to communications for Israel. A mechanism needs to be created that would alert our staff to the fact that the president of a university or the director of a museum is coming to the United States. Then it would be possible for our people to see up a small stint of missionary duty.

Possible forums for the presentation of ¹srael's viewpoint should be identified by means of a calendar of appropriate events in the U.S. This would include: national and major state trade and professional conventions --- medical, manufacturers, realtors, bankers, bar, insurance, for example; commencements at major universities; National Press Club functions; international forums.

Israeli influentials could be brought together with their counterparts at annual meetings and seminars of such groups as the Academy of National Sciences, American Machine Tools

Distributors' Association, Soil Conservation Society of America, the Dismond Dealers Club, Sigma Delta Chi (for journalists).

The new TS. communications unit will:

- * Obtain appropiate Israeli speakers.
- * Make bookings for them.

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- * Write position papers and brochures backgrounding Israel's capabilities in a particular subject area. These would be useful in mailings to association memberships and as press kit materials.
- * Develop with the ^Israeli government and El Al special work-play affinity-group travel packages to Israel open to Americans in particular trades or professions through their association.
- * Investigate the feasibility of U.S. association representatives reciprocating with visits to Israel.

News releases will be prepared that will include profiles of visiting Israelis and releases on speeches and seminars. Appropriate vertical publications will receive in-depth articles on Israel's capabilities, prospects and new developments these pieces to lead with quotes from the visiting Israeli spokesmen.

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Establish monthly Friendship Forum dinners Lastitutionalizes

Here the person to person theme would be even more explicit.

At these, Americans and guests from ¹srael who have common interest areas can exchange ideas and develop better understanding of each other.

Speakers should be selected from the Speakers Bureau of the sraeli Government, the UJA, Israel Bonds and other organizations that maintain an Israeli speakers service.

To maximize the effectiveness of these forums, those invited should be largely non-Jewish. A new forum could be set up each month for a different target audience, But additional forums for each audience should be scheduled as needed, semi-annually or annually.

Topics would have to be carefully selected if these events are to attract non-Jews who do not already have an interest in Israel.

Activities of this general nature are already being conducted on a limited basis by the Israel-American Friendship League. The program must be expanded. Possibly sponsorship

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of these forums by corporations might defray their cost. Associations within each of the target audiences should be contacted to stimulate interest in the idea.

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The Friendship Force, an Atlanta-based organization, including spensors exchange visits abroad. Their first trip was to Scotland including this carler, and their second to Frael. Americans spent five days with Israeli families on a reciprocal basis. This, of course, should be encouraged and infra-structure created to make sure that the program is working successfully.

Expand the Sister City Program

A program exists that links some communities in Israel with ones of similar size and interests in the United States. But it is modest in scope and needs enlargement.

Lists should be prepared of doctors, lawyers, engineers and those of other occupations and interest categories so that people in both cities with common concerns can contact one another. There is an organization of American communities which has initiated sister city programs. This group would be helpful in developing the Israel project to its full potential. "

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PROGRAMS

Special audiences

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-The Yankelovich survey identified youth as one of the audiences Israel communications programs must reach. Observers of the college scene say that as a result of the U.N. Zionism vote many students equate Israel with such racist nations as South Africa, Rhodesia and Chile. Arab propaganda has heightened this misconception also the fact that Israel and South Africa have trade relations, Areas that require the most intensive work are the South, the Southwest and the Bible Belt.

It should be hoted that Israel fares poorly in many college newspapers compared with media elsewhere. A Manhattanville College news commentary , for example, recently contended that the "exaggerated nationalism" of Israel was one of "the most pressing international issues... The most intransigent party to peaceful negotiation, aside from the radical P.L.O., is Israel. Jadaism shares with Islam and Christiantity the belief that Jerusalem is a holy city; and yet a majority of its residents live as a conquered people."

The Bodoin College Orient reported not long ago on the attendance of a professor and five students at a conference in Washington on "The Palestinians: Their Place in the Middle East."

One of the students, whole concluding that the whole cohferences was pro-Palestinian said he "thought "the PLO was actually respresentative because it is composed not only of guerillas, but it is also made up of poets, scholars, artists and people of all stations of life." Contraction of the second second

Among the groups and organizations on American campuses that are sympathetic to Israel is the American Professors for Peace in the Middle East (APPME). It puts out publications,

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arranges conferences and engages speakers for the college circuit. It Ments and should receive more Pro help and other resources@Its office should be p[Hillel, a student organization with faculty advisors, office should be eaching only a frection of them. It directs itself primarily towards Jewish students, but does

Also on many campuses Jewrsh faculty luncheon groups gather periodically for non-political social occasions. They sometimes have speakers who address Middle East issues.

Although all of these groups can be called upon during a crisis to speak up for Israel, most of their members are busy with other matters and either cannot, or are reluctant to, organize programs to educate the local community about Israel.

When these groups do do something of this sort, it is usually on a one-time basis.

What is needed here, is a cadre of field people who will work full time arranging educational programs on campuses and otherwise developing support in the academic community.

We recommend a program that will:

- * Set up a central office headed by a communications professional experienced in dealing with the university world.
- * Arrange campus speaking tours for prominent Israelis
- * Prepare a monthly calendar of college conferences and seminars where Israelis might speak.

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* Develop a presentation on study and travel opportunities for non-Jewish American in Israel, featuring films or slides and a lecture. Emphasis should be placed on reaching religious-affiliated schools where interest in the holy places of Israel is great.

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* Prepare material --- articles, editorials, letters, etc. --- to go to campus newspapers and radios.

After one academic year of such activities, the effectiveness will be reviewed to consider whether or not these particular efforts should be continued and in what direction they should go.

Hillel members need to be trained to make better use of local media and to properly communicate program thomes. The communications unit should arrange for two-day seminars to be conducted either at the Hillel National Convention or regionally.

The main purpose of these will be to map a byief publicity campaign for each college town or city.

The course would cover:

- (1) The goals of our program.
- (2) Why it needs Hillel's help.
- (3) Working with the local media.
- (4) The mechanics of publicity.
- (5) Capitalizing on guest speakers.
- (6) Speaking out yourself.
- (7) Making use of press conferences.

Brograms

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(8) Tour of local media with commentary.

(9) Dealing with spot news and attacks.

Kits with sample public relations materials --- suggested speech topics and speakers, press releases, press conference checklist --- should be made available. 58

The follow=up to this should include periodic checks by telephone and letters to Hillel presidents and rabbis.

Journalists

Journalists, of course, have long been an audience of special concern. A great many have gone to Israel but more should do so.

One kind of activity to be fostered is represented by the "Jerusalem Program" of the Journalism Department of Boston University's School of Public Communication. This is being around in cooperation with Hebrew University.

The program's ultimate goal is to establish a permanent course of foreign correspondence studies based in Jerusalem. F

Students will be required to cover spot news and file their stories in the manner of a wire service or radio network or newspaper reporter. They will gather material for and write in-depth reports, feature stories and follow a realistic routine. But students will be given opportunities to travel, with the proviso that their journeys produce copy.

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The program anticipates placing student articles and broadcast in campus media. Students will be expected also to contact and offer stories to their hometown papers and radio stations.

Each year the American Zionist Federation subsidizes a tour of Israel for up to two weeks for 35 or so people in the press and mass media, chiefly from outside the New York area. These guests are exposed to people and places that will have the greatest potential impact on their subsequent attitudes towards Israel. The program seems to work well.

There is, however, increasing resistance among the larger and more respected newspapers, magazines, TV and radio stations to allowing their employees to take "junkets" for obvious reasons.

We believe, however, that legitimate, cooperative type enterprises for working editors and reporters, similar to the Nieman fellowships in the United States, have an attractive potential.

The Lucius W. Nieman Fellowships are offered at Harvard University to provide mid.career opportunities for journalists to study and broaden their intellectual horizons. About 12 fellowships are awarded annually. Their value includes a weekly stipend plus tuition charges at Harvard form one academic year. Journalists who work full time for newspapers, magazines, ress services, television or radio are eligible. They may select their own studies with all departments open to them. 60 3

That it is impossible to expose too many journalists to Israel is a truism. Fellowships are one of the more effective ways of doing this.

Sabbaticals for Professionals

The Nieman concept should, however, be broadened to include selected American professionals whose careers are involved with land management, community planning and development, agricultural and soil research. Examples: economists, architects, agronomists, engineers, geneticists and eminent journalists who specialize in these subjects; also government planners and administrators.

The program would provide:

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- * Three-month sabbaticals to working professionals in the form of fellowships from Israeli institutions of higher learning.
- * Study and participation in seminars concerning land use, planning, securing water, improving soil and other topics relating to building homes, communities and agricultural enterprises --- what Israel has learned that can be applied to improvement or renovation of existing communities.
- * The opportunity to meet and learn from Israeli counterparts and experts from around the world.
- * Field trips to locations of in-progress settlements, new building projects, construction and research facilities.

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* Publication by sponsorial university of seminar discussions, papers, lectures in books that will be disseminated to American universities, professional associations, government organizations. \$0 61

- * Farewell dinner and certificates ceremony.
- * Announcement of the establishment of the fellowships as an annual event --- and tradition --- of modern Israel.

The objective of this program would be to demonstrate to the United States through the reports of expert American witnesses, the rapid modernization of Jsrael, the country's sophistication in planning and developing new communities and her rapid progress in cultivating what were wastelands. This will help position Israel as an innovative nation very much in the 20th Century.

The program would provide a windfall of favorable ' communications opportunities: announcement of awards to the recipients, in-progress reports, farewell dinners, feature story follow-ups.

Ethnic and nationality groups

Largely neglected as special audiences in the United States are the many ethnic and nationality groups with considerable voting power: Hispanics, Italians, Poles, Greeks, Chinese, Japanese. Studies of ethnicity in this country indicate that certain themes have a special appeal to such

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groups. These should be put to effective use to win added support for the Israel cause

Opinions among the 25 million Blacks in the United States are, by and large, split on the subject of Israel. But then eve more negative than those of the Composite U.S. population. With support from the Israel Task Force the American

Jewish Congress has been administering the Black Media Project. Its objectives are (1) to follow the black press in America closely and to respond promptly and effectively to hostilities and inaccuracies and (2) to supply the black press with material on the Middle East and Israel targeted at their readership.

The success of this project in distributing numerous favorable articles that received wide coverage underscores the opportunities for an even more broadly-based effort. (V July.

An appeal needs to be made to the powerful Japanese-Americans, stressing common bonds between Israel and Japan. Other ethnic groups include about 20 million Hispanics; 20 million Italians; 14 million Poles; 800,000 Greeks.

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Among themes that appeal to various ethnic segments of the population are these:

* Israel as a small country surrounded by potential allies of world communism, acting according to a master plan of encirclement.

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- * Israel as peaceful but strong and ready to protect itself from terrorists and invaders.
- * Israel as the guardian of Christian shrines, traditions, beliefs

In many ethnic communities it is not necessary to strive for mass support but rather for leadership backing. One way to obtain this is by the following approach: "We are a small country with complex problems, only 30 years old, struggling against tremendous odds. You understand this. Come and help us. Study our problems and we will find common interests."

The communications unit can turn for counsel in planning its campaign to Irving Dovince of the American Jewish Committee's Institute for Pluralism and Ethnic Identity.

Other groups studying ethnicity in the United States that may be of help are: Center on Urban Ethnic Affairs (Catholic); Center for American Pluralism of the ^National Opinion Research Center; Center for Migration Studies, Staten ¹sland, N.Y.; and

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Center for Immigration Studies, University of Minnusota.

An expert who knows the leaders of ethnic groups is a leading sociologist, Michael Novak, Syracuse University.

<u>Secondary-cities</u> Chross rools

Jewish organizations in the United States have traditionally placed a strong emphasis on community activities. It is at this "grass roots" level that public opinion is formed. Here Jewish laymen and professionals meet most often and most comfortably with their non-Jewish peers. It is in the local communities, too, that relationships with clergy, industry and labor leaders, editors and other molders of opinion are most readily established.

With all of this in mind, NJCRAC has an extensive community consultation service. The Task Force recently strengthened this program further with the employment of three visiting consultants to intensify local counseling for pro-Israel programming. Metrophic areas but Much has been accomplished in Metrophic areas but Metrophic areas but influence the populations of cities outside the 50 major markets. We recommend developing publicity on a wide range of topics related to the key issues with the hundreds of small daily and weekly newspapers serving the nation's secondary cities.

Our communications unit will generate timely and and broad ast index (3/, interesting ideas for feature stories on Israel. Cultural and seasonal subjects will be heavily stressed. Examples of stories: "Jerusalem at Easter," "American Students at Archeological Dig is Israel, " "Excavations Uncover St. Peter's House at Capernaum."

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The communications staff will contact appropriate authorities who could write 500-750 word stories on proposed topics. The articles will be distributed, often with an illustration, to a broad range of secondary city editors ---- travel, art, etc. These pieces will be distributed regularly from four to six times a year.

Clipping services and follow-up phone calls to a cross-section of papers receiving the stories will help determine which topics are most popular. Pointlarly reduce out television method (will be developed and distributed of

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4. Service

News, features

Print, radio and television media in the United States welcome interesting and newsworthy reports from Israel. The reception given the projects undertaken so far shows the demand to be great.

The government via its audio-visual center in New York has supplied hundreds of films and tapes. For the past two years there has been more emphasis on distribution so that the materials after they are produced do not just lie on the shelf. Jewish organizations have funded a wide variety of media features. Some of those are described in the Israel Task Force report of June, 1977, "Fostering Understanding of the Situation in the Middle East."

Despite the success of the programs, these activities ought to be synchronized with others and enlarged. At present, facilities do not exist for a more comprehensive effort.' These are needed in order to take advantage of an unparalleled opportunity to get the message we want to the American public.

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The staff we propose will have professionals in Israel with a good sense of what will make news here. They

will tape record interviews and phone them at once to the United States. Taking the initiative to produce features, as well as news coverage, they will be responsible for renting a film crew and shooting the necessary footage. These representatives in Israel should generate one radio feed a day and at least one film clip a week.

Costs there would include staff salaries plus operating expenses --- such as equipment rental, travel, trans-Atlantic calls. In the United States, the Israel consulate in New York's present audio feed system is effective. Once the material is supplied, these broadcasts could become a daily feature for millions of listeners.

Film distribution to television would be more complicated. To edit one film a week, possibly cut it into several shorter pieces and distrbute it nationally, requires two full-time staff members and two part-timers. A modest film editing lab is also necessary.

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You yours

The Israeli and American operatives will remain in daily contact with each other to discuss stories the media would find appealing. This relationship will ensure maximum exposure for whatever material is sent.

Israel Minutes

In addition the communications staff should arrange to have drafted a series of one-minute TV spots, "Israel

Minutes, " focusing on progress in Israel. These,

concern themselves with

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historic events, important Israeli contributions to the world and the affinity of culture between the two nations. The communications unit would be responsible for:

- * Preparing lists of non-Jewish influentials in a wide range of fields, such as labor, the arts, religion, to serve as gedible narrators for these spots.
- * Gathering and cataloguing existing films and still photos appropriate for use.
- * Having the spots prepared and shot.
- * Contacting major foundations or corporations in the United States to solicit sponsorship for the series.
- * Devising a complementary series of radio and print ads to reenforce the impact of the "Minutes."

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Fact .- Finding Center

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The lack of one centralized source of information about all aspects of İsrael should be remedied.

Needed is a data bank (computerized center) that would help journalists, corporate executives, educators, scholars, authors and the general public obtain information. It would also help them identify the appropriate organizations and individuals to contact for more detailed facts about any aspect of Israeli life.

Access to this center could be made convenient by terminals in New York. Washington and other regional cities.

The program could be implemented as follows:

After the location and affiliation of the center is determined, it would be possible either to buy a computer or to share an existing one. A research team would establish a basic pool of information about Israel that should be fed into the computer. This would have to be done on a continuing basis.

At present, there is no such comprehensive repository of knowledge.

In addition to the establishment of a data bank, we recommend that the communications unit buy access to <u>The New York Times</u> Information Bank.

Helping newscasters and talk show hosts acquire a better understanding of Israel can be done in a number of ways.

One of these would be by developing Middle East specialists who can serve as commentators and consultants for news programs, appear on talk shows and host special reports. This would require finding prominent individuals with well-established credentials, giving them an organizational base from which to work, providing them with up-to-the minute information and promoting their availability to important audiences. They would be in great demand.

Talk shows should be encouraged to broadcast one, or a series, of their programs from Israel. The government has already brought over Merv Griffin, ... Dinah Shore and others.

Important TV program hosts should be invited to tour Israel on a planned itinerary. And both TV and radio commentators of stature should be given the chance to discuss issues with top Israeli officials.

Hometown press service

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This, we believe, would pay tremendous dividends for the cost involved.

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Questionnaires would be given to incoming visitors immediately on arrival.

The tourist would be asked whether or not he or she would be willing to be interviewed by a journalist for material to be sent back to his home community. The questionnaire would record the home address, the occupation and where the person could be reached by phone in Israel.

Questionnaires would be screened. Tourists coming from areas where Israel's cause needs the greatest promotion would be looked at with special interest. Also, occupations would be scrutinized for roles of community leadership or acceptance.

Depending on this information and an on-the-spot assessment of the visitor's speaking voice and poise, a determination would be made as to whether the subject might be a good candidate for tape or film ... or even a possible speaking assignment ... or whether he would just be briefly interviewed for a photograph and caption (at some scenic or historic site) the picture to be sent to his home town newspaper.

One week after the return to the U.S. of the more prominent tourists, each of the media that might have received a tape, film or photograph would get a letter from the New York communications office reporting that the visitor had come home and might be a good subject for interview.

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Meanwhile, if the more prominent visitor had indicated a willingness to speak to his local fraternal, civic or professional club, that organization would be alerted as to his possible availability.

The tourist follow-up letters from the U.S. office would have reply cards attached so that it could be learned whether follow-up contacts had been made and whether or not they were successful.

Among other advantages this system would provide a means of getting to the heart of Middle America -- Kansas, bwa, Missouri, Nebraska where people have few opinion leaders from whom they

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develop basic attitudes But the project would by no means be limited to one area.

A basic objective would be to strengthen cultural identification with Israel.

Trade press service

A subsidized trade press service has been established in Israel. It operates as a commercial journalistic enterprise, selling copy at modest rates to specialized publications in the U.S.

As successful as this has been considering its modest scope, the venture does not come close to fully achieving the potential.

Trade, industrial, technical, professional and other specialized publications number in the thousands in this country and their need for appropriate material'is great.

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The central communications office in the United States should be staffed by professionals who receive and review regular input on Israel's business and industry. This staff should maintain continuing contact with America's leading trade press editors to develop interest in writing feature stories on Israel's business.Leading American executives should be contacted to produce by-lined articles on their companies' operations in Israel, on opportunities there, etc.

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The communications staff should also write and distribute press releases, placing particular emphasis on U.S. businesses in Israel. They should also seek to interest top business writers and editors in Israel-sponsored tours of important industrial firms there.

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PROGRAM'S

5. Monitoring

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Communications involves not just creativity but management, as well. Public relations requires the same test of performance as do other functions.

AT&T in 1976 began a comprehensive program to develop measurements of public relations programs for its Bell System Companies. Other large corporations, too, are becoming increasingly concerned with measuring information needs and results.

Key functions of the tripartite executive group of our communications structure will be monitoring media performance; surveying media needs; analysis of opinion; identifying long-term trends; and feedback.

Evaluating Media Performance

Some aspects of this are to a limited degree already being done. Periodically, the Anti-Defamation League surveys editorial opinion published in the 50 largest cities, on matters related to Israel and the Jewish people. The results are distributed to Jewish national and local organizations, as an aid to them in their efforts to influence public opinion. The surveys also form the basis for news releases disseminated to the media.

One of the functions of the Black ^Media Project, assigned to the American Jewish Congress by the Israel Task Force, has been to monitor these daily and weekly newspapers, weekly and monthly magazines, radio stations and programs, for

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material on Israel and on Jews, in general. Replies are made to hostile or erroneous paublished and broadcast material. Also, the program supplies to these media articles and columns primarily relating to Israel, which will have a special interest to Blacks.

I.L. Kenen, former executive vice president of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, has long kept an eye on the Washington press, including columnists and commentators based there. Since his retirement from AIPAC and the editorship of <u>Neir East Report</u>, he writes a weekly 600-word column which is printed on the back page of that publication.

The column deals with the media, primarily in Washington but throughout the United States. Mr. Kenen writes commentaries on favorable and unfavorable statements about ¹srael which appear in the press.

This "monitor" column reaches about 35,000 people who are regular a readers of <u>Near East Report</u>. In addition, the column is available to any Anglo-Jewish we'ekly that wishes to reprint it or any part of it. Three major 'Jewish weeklies reprint it the tax religiously --- reaching about 100,000 people every week.

When it comes to monitoring Congress and looking after Israel's interests in Washington, the American ¹srael Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has no peer.

Program S

Started in 1954 as an offshoot of the American Zionist Council, AIPAC has on its board representatives of every other major Jewish organization and draws on their considerable resources. A recent article in <u>Atlantic</u> described AIPAC's research library as "one of the best in town on the subject of the Middle East; many journalists and even the State Department regularly call upon it for assistance."

Registered to lobby, this organization watches every piece of legislation that could even remotely affect Israel's interest. It has the facilities, as the <u>Atlantic</u> article points out, to "put a carefully researched, well-documented statement of its views on the desk of every senator and congressman and appropriate committee staff within four hours of a decision to do so."

The Israel embassy in Washington carefully scrutinizes leading media and regularly sends key editorials, excerpts and digests to its government leaders to keep them informed.

All of this work is excellent.

Its scope should , be enlarged and its many facets more fully coordinated.

Surveying media needs

What is required is a systematic, periodical nationwide scrutiny.

Community Councils in 100 cities can assist by questionnaires and phone calls, they can query editors and electronic media people as to whether or not their information needs are being met. This is particularly important for publications and broadcast units that do not have correspondents in Israel. We must know the kinds of information that would be useful.

Analysis of Opinion

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We propose that the communications unit be responsible for instituting a formal and continuing analysis and evaluation of American public opinion and interpretation of the effects of specific events.

> This research program should meet the following criteria: RELIABILITY and VALIDITY: It must be designed to provide reliable data on relevant attitudes. The results must be projectable to the total United States population --and based on a sample large enough to provide information on critical groups such as Blacks and young people. REGULARITY: It must provide for regular planned readings which will enable users of the information to keep on top of changes in the public climate --- and equally important, a means for tracking over time, thus providing safeguards against over or under reacting to single events as they occur.

FLEXIBILITY: The program must be flexible enough to react to any major event, such as the U.N. resolution on Zionism, even when it does not fit the schedule. CLARITY: In order to avoid ambiguity, the research should focus solely on the issues relevant to Israel and United States policy in the Middle East.

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Trend identification

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Built into the communications operation should be a system of looking at future trends that may affect policy-making. Major corporations have long been making use of this kind of early warning device. The employ "think tanks" to predict social and psychological trends, that could, for example, affect buying habits.

There is, of course, a whole industry working in this field for corporations and governments. It identifies patterns and develops scenarios to try to help decision-making. These include the Institute for the Future, the Futures Group, Hudson İnstitute and Stamford Research, among others.

The Communications Advisory Committee should, as the need arises assemble a group of sociologists, political analysts, psychologists and representatives of other disciplines to give us their insights into the complex and critical communications issues ahead.

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Feedback

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At present the embassy in Washington compiles daily reports on the national media. It summarizes poll results and reactions of Senators and Congressmen. Somewhat less frequently it monitors regional newspapers. All of this information goes to the government in Israel.

We propose a _____ more extensive operation, a monthly report on the "state of the union" as regards communications. The results of the various monitoring projects we are recommending would go in summary form to key lay and professional Jewish leaders in this country and ¹srael.

This comprehensive feedback would have these purposes: to establish criteria for success or failure of various ITSA programs; to establish correct themes in relation to what is needed; to insure efficiency; to provide a common framework order for Israeli and American Jewish organization efforts; to supply information to the Israeli government; and to afford a basis for evaluating the impact of events.

The results of the monitoring process will provide intelligence for appraising and directing the entire communications operation. By indicating areas of weakness, such as, for example, the Biblle Belt or the business community or the campuses, the feedback will enable efforts to be redirected more effectively. 6. Other projects in brief

Program -

'Contemporary Israel' -- a new magazine

- a beautifully designed,

magazine

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to be sent free to a controlled list of influentials in the United States. This would include Congressmen, academics, corporate heads, religious leaders and others. The magazine would talk about what is happening now in Israel ... and also in the United States as it reflects on Israel. American relationships. Typical subjects: the Israeli Philharmonic tours the U.S.; the "rags to riches" saga of an Įsraeli entrepreneur; the disco scene in ^Tel Aviv; an Israel Calendar, of Events./

'There has been a long history of attempts to establish a viable magazine of this sort. Most have not succeeded because they were developed as commercial enterprises. Therefore, this project may require a subsidy to get it started, at least. It would probably also need top American magazine talent. The <u>Smithsonian</u> in the United States is a prime example of how the right kind of, support and know-how can make what might otherwise seem a marginal venture succeed

Costs for this could be a stumbling block. We would not give this program a priority unless private funding could be obtained.

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Celebration of Israel's values

Commission a series of statements by the finest writers of our time articulating the values for which Israel stands --- such as peace, justice, freedom and human dignity. These statements can be used as part of an advertising program in print and on television. The employment of top writers who carry weight with the American public would make positive impressions that would be well worth the effort. 81

Shopping center exhibitions

Shopping mall exhibits have become a new and highly effective communications medium in the United States ... an excellent public relations outlet. A tour of these centers would go to smaller communities and supplement the effort of the Pioneer Caravan. A prominent graphic artist might be commissioned to do a history wall to be set up for a few days at a time at shopping malls around the country. Photos, documents, newspaper headlines would be assembled as a mural. Handcrafts, festive flags, bunting and live performances by Israeli artists could be added to enhance the viewing. The Mall Association would help set up the tour.

Poster program

Six Israeli artists could be commissioned to create a poster series based on a theme such as: "The High Quality of Life In Israel," "The Beauty of the Land," or "The Diversity of the People."

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Posters would be distributed as a series through established commercial poster outlets, Jewish community organizations to libraries, cultural centers and schools in the United States. Posters might also lend themselves to miniaturized reproduction as greeting cards.

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CONCLUSION

The recommendations of this report should be considered less as a definitive set of projects than as a generative process. It is the process itself that should be maintained on a permanent basis. It will develop the best procedures and respond flexibly to events and needs.

It will build upon the unbelievably effective base already created by Jewish organizations and the Embassy.

The measures we propose are of themselves no guarantee of popularity, but they will assure that the best case possible is made, of whatever situations present themselves. And they will assure that all available resources will be utilized to disseminate that case most effectively.

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We have every confidence

that the programs we have outlined in this report can significantly contribute to increased support for Israel in the United States. We recognize, of course, that events will change the nature of this support from time to time and that there will always be swings in public opinion. However, Our underlying assumption **i**s that well-organized communications cán continually strengthen and sustain the basic American goodwill toward Israel.

The program we have recommended is ambitious. It will cost at least \$4 million a year.

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It is desperately needed, and it is our profound hope that the Jewish leadership in the U.S. and the Israeli government itself will decide to move forward.

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Appendix "A"

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A STATEMENT ON KEY ISSUES

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This statement has been prepared by the Israel Communications Advisory Committee

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1. Preface

This document was prepared by the Communications Advisory Committee as a guide to all the staff working on the comprehensive communications project. It seeks to articulate as clearly as possible Israel's points of view regarding the five key issues identified from opinion studies, namely:

* Israel as a peace -loving country.

- * The affihity of culture between Israel and the U.S.
- * American interests in a strong Israel.

* The dangers to all from a Palestine state.

* The territorial aspects of Israel's security needs.

The memorandum is based on extracts from official statements made by the Israel government and publications of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, The American Jewish Committee, The American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League and other organizations.

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Israel as a peace-loving country.

From its earliest beginning -- and even before the UN formally voted the New State into existence -- Israel and its leaders declared their hope of establishing peace and a relationship of cooperation with their Arab neighbors. In 1947, Ben-Gurion stated Israel's position:

"We must now strive more than ever before, and with even greater energy for peace between us as equals... to develop our country to the full we need reciprocal relations with the neighbouring countries --I mean economic, political and cultural relations... Let us therefore not despair at the declarations by the present Arab leaders -- they do not express the fundamental historic interests of the Arab peoples."

This position that real peace means more than the signing of a non-belligerency pact and the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries, that it requires the opening up of borders to free trade, tourist travel and the cultural exchange between Israel and her neighbors, has been asserted repeatedly by the Israeli leaders. As part of this position, the Israelis have always maintained that peace is only possible when there is a real incentive and when all parties involved truly want peace. Accordingly, the Israelis believe that coercion can play no part in the peacemaking process.

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Until recently nome of the Arab leaders were willing to accept this definition of peace. In response to Prime Minister Begin's and President Carter's call for a full peace President Sadat has in the past stated:

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"I cannot accept a peace treaty, a peace agreement simply means we are going to end the state of war."

Recently, President Sadat has shown signs of moving towards the conception of peace which has been constantly reiterated by the Israeli government since 1947.

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3. The Cultural Affinity Between Israel and the United States

The United States and Israel have in common a democratic way of life which encourages free enterprise and invites inquiry and self-expression. As in the U.S., all citizens have the right to vote and to run for political office. In addition, the two countries share a pioneering experience and the accomplishment of building a nation out of immigrant groups. Like the U.S., Israel is a meeting ground for different cultures. This cross-fertilization encourages a free flow of ideas and an enrichment of the social and intellectual atmosphere.

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The environment in Israel is one in which the arts and the sciences flourish. It is a country with a dynamic cultural life very much like our own. There are numerous worldaward winners -- such as S.Y. Agnon who won the Nobel Prize for literature -- who have been recognized for their outstanding contributions to the arts and sciences. Great Israeli performers such as Itzhak Pearlmen and Pinchas Zuckerman are known to American audiences. Yaacov Agam is one of the founders of Kinetic art. Artist colonies

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thrive in Jaffa, Safad and Ein-Hod. Some of the world's great museums are located in Israel. Americans have played an important role in helping this environment to thrive. Leonard Bernstein conducted the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra for many years. Other great western figures have made contributions to Israel's flourishing art community. Marc Chagall, for instance, made a series of stained glass windows for the Hadassah Hospital and tapestries for the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) building.

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 Israeli scientists are working closely with Americans to help solve some major world problems. Gershon Grossman of Haifa's Technion, The Israel Institute of Technology, in conjunction with an American professor at the University of Colorado, is making great strides in the use of solar energy. Israelis are also working on the world food shortage and have developed a number of important breakthroughs -- drip irrigation being only one of them. Israel's highly advanced electronics industry made a contribution to America's space pioneering by providing parts for the Viking Mars spacecrafts. Israel's health care is among the best in the world and there are more doctors per capita there than in any other country.

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Consequently, the life expectancy in Israel is 73, the highest in the world.

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- In the field of education Israel is among the most advanced in the world. Primary and secondary education is compulsory. Israel's seven universities are on a par with American universities and there are regular exchange programs for both American and Israeli students.
- Israel's democratic social structure, and its great advances in the arts, sciences and education, are among the elements which tie Israel and the U.S. together. In this respect, as in so many others, Israel is more like the U.S. than any other country in the Middle East.

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4. Why A Strong Israel Is In America's Best Interest

a. American Strategic Interests:

At the present time, Israel is one of the handful of countries around the world which is totally commited to America as an ally. Furthermore, it is an ally which does not depend upon America to protect it. Since its inception, Israel has protected itself against its neighbors and it will continue to do so without the aid of foreign forces. Israel does not want to be totally dependent on the U.S. Rather, it prefers to be a strong and independent friend.

Most importantly, Israel is the only ally of the United States in the strategically crucial Eastern Mediterranean whose affinity with the Vest is not dependent on the survival or caprice of an autocratic ruler. While there are some pro-American Arab states in the area, they are all susceptible to the sudden radical coup d'etats which characterize the volatile history of the Arab countries. (Since 1948, there have been thirty successful revolutions in the Arab countries, and at least forty-four unsuccessful ones.) As the only dependable U.S. ally in the area, Israel is the single key to balancing Soviet imperialism in the Mediterranean. It is vital to the American global interests that our ally -- Israel -- be powerful; a strong Israel is a strategic set for the United States; a weak Israel is a liability.

b. Maintaining American Credibility:

Israel is a strong and vital democracy. Backing Israel now would mean the strengthening of world belief in our desire to protect such governments. Any American action supporting its well-known

commitment to Israel in response to Arab pressure would have immediate and far-reaching favorable effects in the world. All United States defense treaties, including the vital NATO alliance, are based on the American commitment to defend its allies against external aggression. Keeping its pledge

would inevitably strengthen the credibility of the other commitments and hence the underpinnings of the entire Western alliance system.

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5. The Palestinean Problem

- a. Why Israel will not and cannot negotiate with the PLO:
 - No state can be expected to negotiate with a group whose single and unbending purpose is to wipe that state off the face of the earth. The covenant of the Palestinian National Council which was drawn up in 1964, and revised in 1968, leaves no doubt as to the PLO's claim to exclusivity in the area and its uncompromising intention to dismember Israel and expel it from every inch of the territory it now holds -- including those lands designated for the Lewish state by the partition plan of 1947. The covenant states:

<u>Article 19</u>: The partitioning of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel is fundamentally null and void, whatever time has elapsed.

<u>Article 21</u>: The Palestinian Arab people, in expressing itself through the armed Palestinian revolution, rejects every solution that is a substitute for a complete liberation of Palestine and rejects all plans that aim at the settlement of the Palestine issue or its internationalization.

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The PLO continually reguses to amend its covenant on these important points.

• The PLO has proved to be a destructive force wherever it has operated. The brutal involvement of the PLO in the Lebanese tragedy is a prime example of the destructive nature of the organization. This side of the PLO is further revealed by its worsening of the international terrorist situation through its own terrorist activities and its support for and training of several terrorist groups such as the Baeder-Meinhoff gang and the Japanese Red Army.

b. Why Israel objects to a separate Palestinian State on the West Bank:

- A Palestinian State on the West Bank would not answer the need of the Arab refugees in Lebanon, the Gaza District and elsewhere, for it would be physically and economically impossible to settle them within the limits of the West Bank. But, within a combined Jordanian-Palestinian periphery, there is enough infrastructure of geography and economy to take in all the refugees wishing to be relocated in the Jordanian-Palestinian unit. All parties involved agree that the Palestinian problem must be dealt with and solved within the framework of a peace agreement.
- A Palestinian Arab State consisting of the West Bank and possible the Gaza District, would be likely to come under extremist PLO-type domination. Because of the PLO's claim to exclusivity in the area, a Palestinian state would continue to

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harbor irredentist claims to the rest of "Palestine", and be a base for terrorist attacks across the border. The members of the PLO who have accepted the idea of a separate Palestinian State on the West Bank see it as only the first part of a "two-stage" program aimed at the liquidation of Israel. This was made clear in the Transitional Program of the PLO accepted in the 1974 Palestine National Council meeting in Cairo. That document states:

> "The Palestine National entity, after it comes into existence, will struggle to achieve a federation of the confrontation states in order to complete the liberation of the entire Palestinian soil and as a step on the road to complete Arab unity."

Any hope of compromise on this point is smashed by a statement made by George Habbash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a member organization of the PLO:

> "In the last analysis, the 'Rejection Front' would be prepared to take up arms against its fellow Palestinians if the authorities in any Palestinian West Bank State set up under a peace settlement tried to prevent the continuation of guerilla action against Israel."

It is clear that a separate Palestinian state would be a focus of instability and tension in the area. That danger would be compounded if it eventually became tied to the Soviet Union, which is the main political and ideological supporter as well as arms supplier of the PLO. Israel's objections to a separ. Palestinian state on the West Bank are also based on the position which has been expressed by King Hussein that the Palestinians and Jordanians have become one people, inextricably linked economically and socially. Jordan now includes four-fifths of the territory of the historic Palestine and almost half of the Jordanian population as well as half of the principal officers of government in Jordan, including cabinet members, are Palestinians. In a very real sense Jordan is a Palestinian state.

Israel's readiness to withdraw from territories in the West Bank will be contingent not only on security borders, but also on demilitarization of the West Bank or far-reaching limitations of any deployment of Arab military forces west of the River. It is not easy to conceive of a new Palestinian State - if one is established at all - agreeing to demilitarize its entire area. It is more reasonable to assume that a Jordanian-Palestinian State would be likely to display a greater readiness to demilitarize its western segment.

6. The Indefensibility of Israel's 1967 Borders

Because Israel is such a small country, one lost battle in its heartland could mean the end of its existence. Such a battle would also take a high toll in human life -- a penalty which the Jewish people cannot afford to pay. And since 1948 many Arab leaders have stated that Israel's demise is their primary foreign policy objective.

If the 1973 War had taken place within the 1967 cease-fire lines, much of Israel's heavily populated area would have been overrun and demolished within a matter of hours. Israel cannot put itself in a geographical position where the threat of a surprise first strike by the Arabs could jeopardize its very existence by cutting the country in two.

o The Golan Heights

Prior to 1967, the Syrians controlled the Heights. Soldiers routinely opened fire on Israeli farmers in the valley below. The Syrians also launched a plan to divert the head-waters of the Jordan River and thereby cut off the water flowing to Lake Kinneret which supplies Israel with one-third of its water.

In the Six-Day War, the Israelis pushed the Syrians back 15 miles to positions which no longer allowed them to

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bombard Israeli villages. As a result, the Syrians were prevented from cutting off the marrow neck of eastern Galilee when they launched their surprise attack in October 1973 - even though they were able to thrust some 10 miles into Israel-held territory (nearly the width of the Golan Heights). Presently the Syrians have no clear view into Israel or Israel-controlled territory.

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o The 'West Bank'

Prior to 1967, central Israel was subject to the constant threat of attack and invasion. At its narrowest, the distance from Jordan to the sea was only 9 miles. The distance from the armistice line to Tel Aviv, the largest city in Israel, was a mere 13 miles. All the Government buildings in West Jerusalem (Israel's capital), were within gunfire range of Jordanian forces in adjacent East Jerusalem. The time needed for an enemy armored column to reach the sea and cut the country in two was a mere 20 minutes! Before 1967, terrorist bands often struck Israel under the protection of Jordanian gunfire. Since 1967, the West Bank has been administered by the Israel Government and terrorist activities directed against Israelis have steadily declined.

o The Gaza District

The Gaza District is a narrow piece of coastal land 40 miles long and 5 miles wide which runs along the Mediterranean and cuts into the heartland of Israel like a finger. Historically, it has been the principal route for invasions into Israel from the South. Armies and planes based in the District can attack the heartland of Israel within minutes and without warning.

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Between 1949 and 1967, the Gaza District was ruled by an Egyptian military government and became the launching pad for terrorist and artillery attacks on nearby Israeli villages. Egyptian battle plans captured in the Six-Day War of 1967 reveal that Egypt intended, once again, to invade Israel through the District.

Since 1967, Israel has administered the Gaza District. Control of the Gaza District is essential for the safety of central Israel.

o The Sinai Corner

Eilat is Israel's major southern port. Nearly all of Israel's oil supply and many other essential goods comes in through the port of Eilat, while Israeli ships carry exports to Africa, Asia and the Far East. Lilat is within walking distance of the Sinai peninsula on the west and Jordan on the east. Prior to 1967, Egypt and Jordan were a mere 7 miles apart at this point. Due to its proximity to both Jordan and Sinai, Eilat has always been an extremely vulnerable target for a hostile power wishing to close down the port. Battle plans captured from the Egyptians in 1967 show that Egypt intended to invade the Southern Negev and cut off Eilat.

Since 1967, Israel has occupied the Sinai peninsula. In the war of 1973, Egypt - for the first time in a major offensive against Israel - was not able to block the Straits of Tiran or cut off Eilat. Any peace will, in effect, have to keep Egyptian military forces out of the entire peninsula east of the passes.

o Sharm el-Sheikh

Sharm el-Shiekh is a point at the southernmost tip of the Sinai peninsula overlooking the Straits of Tiran, a narrow channel of water which ships must pass through in order to enter the Gulf of Eilat from the Red Sea. Prior to 1967, the Egyptians controlled the coastal land around Sharm el-Sheikh and set up intermittent blockades in this area. In two instances in 1956 and again in 1967 - the lbockades led to major conflicts

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
between Egypt and Israel. Sume 1967 Israel has controlled Sharm el-Sheikh and the Straits have remained open to ships passing to and from both Israel and Jordan. Closing the Straits of Tiran in the future would lead to another war.

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- · BETTER RELATIONSHIPS WITH 4.5. MEDIA

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D CREATO FAVORABLE NEWS

AMERICAN OPINION TOWARDS ISRAEL AND JEWS

By

Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider

Close relationships between Israel and the United States have existed since the beginning of the Jewish state. Although the record of the United States in support of Jewish persecutees before and during World War II was not good, the United States was the first country to recognize the independence of Israel. President Truman announced recognition within 12 minutes of the formal declaration of independence.

The ties between the two countries have, of course, not been without strain. At times, particularly immediately before and during the Suez Crisis and War of 1956, the United States put great pressure on Israel not to take a bellicose stand vis-a-vis the Arabs. The U.S. forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai and Gaza strip. But that period apart, it may be said that Israel's closest supporter and ally in the international community has been this country.

During the 1970's, however, Israel has become increasingly isolated in the international community. The strong position of the Arabs, derivative from their control of oil supplies and their ability to use their monies as aid to various Third World countries, has led a number of countries, both in the Third World and in Europe, which had previously been strong public supporters of Israel, to either break diplomatic relations with it, or to take up an "even handed" policy.

Israel's position has also suffered because of its increasing identification, among left-of-center groups in the West, Communist states, and Third World nations, as a part of the international "have," conservative, imperialist, or anti-revolutionary bloc led by the United States. In spite of the strength of socialist parties (a majority in every Israeli election until 1977 which the non-socialists won), of labor and collectivist institutions (the strongest labor federation in the world, the Histadruth, a massive producer cooperative sector of the economy including the Kibbutz (collective farms), a large public

sector, and one of the most egalitarian income distributions in the world), left-wing groups which once enthusiastically supported Israel, now condemn it. This change in part reflects the identification of the Arabs with the Third World, and in particular, the African bloc, sympathy on the part of younger leftists in the West with the plight of the Palestinian Arabs, seen as oppressed refugees, and increased antagonism to the United States linked to the Vietnam War, which is transferred to its allies and client states. It is contended by some that the support and sympathy generated for Israel in reaction to the Nazi holocaust, and its resistance to British imperialism has declined because it has had little meaning for those who have come of age and political consiousness since these events. Israel, particularly since its overwhelming victory and occupation of Arab populated territories in 1967, is seen by many, who are disposed to sympathize with the weak, as a powerful militarist nation able to trounce its Arab neighbors. Conversely, conservative groupings, particularly in Western countries, presumably impressed by Israel's military prowess and ability to defeat communist backed foes, have become more supportive of Israel.

These changes in attitude toward Israel have had less impact on foreign policy and public opinion in the U.S. than elsewhere. But "less" is a comparative term and does not mean none. There is some indication that important sectors of the business community, involved in or hoping to do business with the oil-rich Arab states, elements within the American military impressed with the strategic importance of the Arab countries, "New Politics" Democrats and Independents, the small radical groupings, and the more liberal Protestant denominations, increasingly have moved to favor a more even-handed or even a pro-Arab position. Such forces, as yet, tend, for the most part, to be covert about their views on the Middle East and have had little impact on the dominant thrust of

-2-

American Middle East policies. The United States, both administration and Congress, remain more or less steadfast in support of Israel both with respect to material aid and in international forums.

These comments, and almost all of the opinion data presented in the paper, apply to the situation prior to the May 1977 Israeli elections in which the more conservative Likud movement led by a significant plurality of the votes. The program of this movement and its principal coalition partner, the National Religious Party (NRP), would retain the territories of preindependence Palestine for Israel.

Whether the new government will continue to emphasize such views, or will compromise significantly remains to be seen. Meanwhile, however, the public abroad, including the American, is exposed to the view of an Israeli government which rejects past policies which placed primary emphasis on securing a full-fledged peace treaty which included normal state relations with all the Arabs and the premise that most of the occupied territories would be part of an Arab state linked to Jordon. It would seem evident the image projected by the new regime further weaken, perhaps greatly, support for Israel among liberalmay left opinion, while possibly strengthening it with conservative groups. The public reaction of the Carter administration and Congressional leaders will do much to structure the terms in which a Likud dominated Israel is viewed. It should be clear, therefore, that a period in Israel's relations to America and the world has ended, while a new one is beginning. The rules governing that new period may be quite different from the past.

In this report we report and explore the state of American public opinion with regard to Israel and Middle East events from the 1940s to 1977. We also deal with the extent of anti-Semitic feeling in the United States and seek to relate attitudes towards Jews to those toward the State

-3-

of Israel. One of the classic assumptions of the Zionist movement prior to the creation of the State, was that the "normalization" of the Jewish situation, the existence of a Jewish state, one like all other states, would help to regularize the situation of Jews abroad. It was suggested that non-Jews would see their Jewish fellow citizens in a more natural light if they could relate them to an existing nation, much as one may relate Polish-Americans to Poland or German-Americans to Germany. The existence of a Jewish state presumably would also serve to challenge sterotypes suggesting that Jews could not be or would not be farmers or manual workers, or that they could or would not fight in the military. Hence, it was argued that the existence of an independent, largely Jewish state would have the effect of weakening anti-Semitism abroad, on the presumption that attitudes toward Israel and Diaspora Jews are interlinked.

The considerable body of public opinion data dealing with the opinions about Jews and Israel collected in the United States permits an examination both of the sources of such sentiments, and their relationship to each other. The data that we use are the reports from opinion polls dealing with American attitudes towards the Middle East and Israel which have been gathered since the 1940's and the studies of attitudes towards <u>Jews</u>, which have been completed since the 1930's. The results of these studies allow us to estimate trends in both sets of opinions. In addition, we have available for detailed analysis a rather extensive study of attitudes towards Israel and American Jews which was collected by Louis Harris and Associates in December of 1947. That study examined the views of 3377 Americans.^{FN}

-4-

Attitudes towards a Jewish State and Israel: Trends, 1944-1967

In December 1944, as the war in Europe was drawing to an end, and as the world became aware of the Holocaust, of the way in which the Germans had tried to eliminate the entire Jewish population of Europe, the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago (NORC) inquired of a national sample of Americans whether they believed that the British, who then controlled Palestine, "should do what some Jews ask and set up a Jewish state there, or should do what some Arabs ask and not set up a Jewish state?" NORC repeated this question a year later, in November 1945. At both times many more Americans favored setting up a Jewish state than opposed it, by 36 to 22 percent in December 1944, increasing to 42 to 17 percent in November 1945. Although the percentages giving pro-Jewish or pro-Israel responses, as compared to pro-Arab ones, have varied over the years, the pattern set in these first polls taken 3 to 4 years before the creation of the state of Israel, has persisted. Many more Americans respond in support of Israel than of the Arabs.

Support for Jewish settlement in Palestine in the 1940s was even stronger than sentiment for the establishment of a Jewish state. Thus, in December of 1945, the Gallup Poll found that 76 percent favored Jews being allowed to settle in Palestine, while only 7 percent were opposed. In October 1947, as discussion grew concerning the future of the Palestinian mandate, Gallup reported that 65 percent of a national sample favored the idea that Palestine be divided into two states--one for the Arabs and the other for the Jews--while only 10 percent opposed this solution. When the situation reached the point of actual war, the proportions supporting the Jews declined considerably. Six different surveys taken between February 1948 and March 1949 by NORC indicated that slightly more than a third said that they sympathized with the Jews

-5-

in the fighting, while between 11 and 16 percent said that they favored the Arabs. A somewhat differently worded question asked by Roper in September 1945 as to which side, the Jews or the Arabs has "has the most right on its side" found 29 per cent saying the Jews and 16 percent the Arabs.

A second pattern emerged in the early period which also has continued down to the present, namely that Americans, while much more sympathetic to Israel than to the Arabs, have been much less disposed to support costly assistance to Israel, particularly the involvement of American troops. Thus, in January 1946, only 7 percent said they favored sending United States troops to help maintain the peace in Palestine, while 48 percent disapproved. Three months later when asked whether the United States should help England keep order in Palestine, 28 percent agreed that it should and 61 percent said it should keep out of the situation. When the question was put in terms of sending troops to help England keep order, the percentage approving declined to 21 percent while those disapproving rose to 74 percent.

American opinion was even more ambivalent during the early and mid-fifties. NORC inquired in five surveys between 1950 and 1956 as to how important it was "for the United States to cooperate closely with (countries named)..... " Those who chose the "very important" option for Israel ran between 31 percent in 1950 to 34 and 35 percent in 1952-56. The range of those who felt the same way about the Arab countries was from 30 to 46. In two years, 1950 and 1955, the proportions of respondents who said that it was very important to cooperate closely with the Arab countries was greater than those saying the same for Israel. Both sides in the Middle East conflict ranked lower in importance to Americans than other countries, including The

-6-

to 34 for the Arab countries and 31 for Israel. In 1952, 42 percent were in favor of close cooperation with Iran, while only 34 percent had the same feeling about Israel. In the same survey, a majority, 55 percent, chose the "very important" option for West Germany, and 26 percent strongly backed close cooperation with Titoist Yugoslavia. The limited importance of Israel during the early and mid-fifties may also be seen in the fact that NORC found that only 19 percent thought that "the United States should supply arms to Israel at the present time" while 63 percent were opposed.

Given the lack of clear-cut positive support for Israel, there was good reason for supporters of the Jewish state to feel anxious about American public opinion when the situation worsened in the mid-fifties, leading up to the Sinai War of 1956. Egypt had intensified its anti-Israeli policies with respect to the use of boycott, embargo, and blockade. Egypt had also concluded an arms agreement with CzechoslQvakia and a mutual assistance pact with various Arab countries to be used against Israel. Ultimately, Egypt launched commando raids against Israel. Until the actual war broke out, the opinion polls indicated that most Americans did not know which side was to blame. Pre-war surveys by NORC in 1955 and 1956 found that 5 to 10 percent were saying that Israel was responsible for the trouble between Egypt and Israel, while 15 to 20 percent said that either the Arabs or Egopt was to blame. In November of 1956, following the October 29th Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai, the proportion saying that Israel was responsible for the conflict rose to 19 percent, while that blaming Egypt grew to 29.

In spite of the fact that the war actually followed on an Israeli attack, many more Americans chose to hold Egypt responsible for the conflict than Israel. A supplementary survey by NORC indicated that those who blamed Egypt saw the conflict arising out of pre-conflict hostile actions by the Arabs or Egypt, rather than flowing

-7-

specifically from Israel's attack. On the other hand, it should be noted that: when asked whether "Israel was justified or not in sending arms into Egyptian territory," 43 percent replied that Israel was not justified, while 26 percent said that it was. In a Gallup survey, also taken in November 1956, only 10 percent said that they approved of "Israel's action in Egypt," while 47 percent disapproved. It is clear that in 1956 many people who were pro-Israel did not think that Israel should have gone to war. Israel was, of course, forced by the United States to evacuate the territories which it had taken over. Six months after the war, Gallup found that more Americans, 36 percent, felt that war was likely to flare up again than though it unlikely,(34 percent.) But when asked which side was more likely to start up renewed trouble, 33 said Egypt, as against 26 percent saying Israel-another indication that Americans tended to see Israel more as the victim than as the aggressor. The differences, of course, were not large.

Curiously, in the eleven year period between the Suez War of 1956 and the Six Day War of 1967, almost no one inquired as to the attitudes of Americans toward the still unresolved Middle East conflict. Seemingly, neither the commercial nor academic survey organizations thought that there was much interest in or significance to the issue. Some indication that they were right may be found in one national survey, primarily concerned with domestic anti-Semitism, which was conducted by NORC in 1964 for a research project at the University of California at Berkeley.^{FN} Two questions dealing with the Middle East were included in this study, and revealed that a large proportion of the respondents had little interest or knowledge about the conflict.

^{FN.} The survey was used in two books, Gertude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, <u>The Tenacity of Prejudice</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), and S.M. Lipset and Earl Raab, <u>The Politics of Unreason</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

-8-

Thus, when asked: "Suppose there were a war between the Arab nations and Israel. Which side do you think you would probably sympathize with?", less than a third stated a preference-25 percent for Israel and 7 for the Arabs. Slightly over two-fifths of those interviewed gave a "don't know" response, while 28 percent said they supported neither. Even more revealing is that fully three-quarters of all those interviewed said that they had not "heard or read about the relations between the Jews in Israel and the Arab refugees there" or, if they had heard of the issue, that they did not know how the refugees were treated (11 percent).

It is evident that three years before the renewed outbreak of hostilities, there was no groundswell of sympathy for Israel among the American public. It is worth noting, however, that in 1964 support for the Jewish state was correlated with higher educational and economic attainments, and that blacks were more likely to give pro-Arab responses (percent) than whites (percent) in some measure because of their lower education and economic attainments.

The Six Day War: Growth in Support for Israel

The events leading up to the Six Day War were largely a repetition of those which preceded the 1956 crisis. Once again, the Egyptians escalated their efforts against Israel, blockaded the Red Sea, and publicly made various preparations suggesting that they were about to go to war. As in 1956, however, Israel initiated military action by attacking Egypt, and again was victorious, capturing the Gaza Strip and the Sinai and also defeating Jordon and Syria, taking all the remaining territories that had once been Palestine, plus the Syrian Golan Heights. American public opinion was much more favorable to Israel than in 1956 or during the inter-war period. According to a Gallup Poll taken during the Six Day War, 48 percent said their sympathies lay more with Israel than with the Arab

-9-

states as compared to only 4 percent who replied that their sympathies lay with the Arabs. Harris' findings during the same period were 41 percent sympathetic to Israel and only 1 percent to the Arabs.

The overwhelming expression of sympathy for Israel by those willing to voice sentiments did not, however, extend to a willingness to use American troops in the Middle East. When Harris inquired "Suppose the U.S. were asked to send troops and military supplies to back the Israeli government in the war in the Middle East. Would you favor or oppose our sending troops and supplies to Israel?", only 24 percent supported such an action, while 54 percent opposed it.

In the months following the Six Day War, the American public seemingly shifted to an even more pro-Israel attitude as indicated by their answers to the questions dealing with the future of Jerusalem. Harris found that the percentage saying, let Israel keep control of Jerusalem increased from 10 in July to 43 in September, while those favoring the option of making it an "international city" dropped from 70 to 33. On the other hand, when asked in September whether the United States should send military aid to Israel, send aid won out by a slim margin, 42 percent in favor to 36 against, while the percentage supporting the sending of U.S. troops dropped to 22 with the opposition mounting to 54. Clearly many Americans continued to be reluctant to translate their sympathies with Israel into a mandate for American military involvement in the Middle East.

The preponderant expressions of "sympathy" for Israel were not a shortlived or temporary response to the Six Day War. A year and a half afterwards, in February 1969, Gallup repeated the sympathy question and found a very comparable pattern of reply: 43 percent for Israel and 4 percent for the Arabs. Twelve months later, February 1970, the response to Gallup's query was 38 percent for Israel and 2 percent for the Arabs. In August of the same year, the Harris survey reported a breakdown of 47 to 6.

-10-

Harris again found a similar distribution in July of 1971, 46 percent for Israel and 7 percent for the Arabs. Thus, in the years before the Yom Kippur War, those Americans who had opinions on the issue were overwhelmingly in favor of Israel.

Such opinions, of course, varied with education and socio-economic status. Different surveys taken in 1967, 1969, 1970, and 1971 by Gallup and Harris, which differentiated respondents according to their level of education, invariably reported that those who had attended college were much more favorable to Israel than those whose education was limited to high school, who, in turn, were more supportive than those who had never gone beyond grammar school. In 1967, Gallup's college interviewees were 67 percent for Israel, high school respondents 45 percent, and grade school 40 percent. In 1969, these figures read 58,43,28. In 1971, they were 58,42, 33. It should be noted that the drop-off in support for Israel among those with lesser education did not reflect increased backing for the Arabs. Rather, it was largely a function of the fact that many of those with less education indicated that they were uninformed on the issue, ("don't know"). Not surprisingly, since educational and economic achievements are correlated, data reported by Harris in 1967, 1970 and 1971 reveal that higher income was associated with sympathy for Israel. In July 1971, for example, 53 percent of those earning 15,000 dollars or more had positive views, compared to 34 among those whose income was under 5,000 dollars a year. As with education, however, lower attainments were associated with not having an opinion on the conflict, rather than with pro-Arab attitudes. These data suggest that effective public opinion, therefore, was in fact much more pro-Israel than the 8 to 1 figures for the total population would indicate. Those individuals who were knowledgeable and interested in the Middle East situation were even more overwhelmingly for Israel.

-11-

Two other characteristics differentiating opinion on the Middle East were religion and race. Two Gallup surveys taken in February in 1969 and 1970 found Catholics and blacks less supportive of Israel than Protestants and whites. In the second survey, 39 percent of all Protestants reported sympathizing with Israel as contrasted with 30 percent of Catholics and 21 percent of blacks. Fully 39 percent of the Catholics backed neither (34) or the Arabs (5). Black opinion (54 percent), however, was more likely to be uninterested or uninformed than unsympathetic to Israel.

Harris surveys taken in/1970 and 1971 reported similar variations. White Protestants were consistently more likely to report being more sympathetic to Israel than white Catholics, who in turn were much more favorable than blacks. In June 1971, for example, the range of opinion reporting pro-Israeli sentiments ran from 49 percent for the white Protestants to 40 for white Catholics and 30 for blacks. The Catholics were most disposed to indicate lack of sympathy with both sides (24), while the blacks had a higher proportion (14 percent) Arab sympathizers than did whites (7).

As in earlier years, the American public was much readier to express sympathies for Israel in the abstract than to approve specific forms of aid. In mid-1968, the Gallup Poll inquired of a sample of Americans what the United States ought to do if a full-scale war broke out between the Israelis and the Arabs within the next five years. Asked whether the United States "should or should not supply arms and materials to Israel" only 24 percent favored supplying arms as against 59 who opposed. It should be noted, however, that only 3 percent favored supplying arms to the Arabs as compared to 79 percent who were against. When the question was posed as to whether the U.S. should send troops to help Israel, not

-12-

surprisingly only 9 percent favored sending troops as against 77 percent who were opposed. A year later, Harris asked what the United States should do if as a result of invasion Israel were "in danger of being overrun." A plurality, 44 to 39 percent, supported aid short of military force; only 9 percent backed the sending of troops. On these questions, as on those dealing with general sympathy, the college educated were much more likely to be supportive of Israel. Gallup noted that 38 percent of the college educated favored sending arms and materials compared to 15 percent of those who had not gone beyond grammar school. Gallup was to ask three times--in 1968, 1969, and 1970--what the United States should do if full-scale war broke out in the next five years. In these surveys, the interviewees were not asked to react to specific options, but rather to volunteer responses to open-ended questions. By far the largest percentage of respondents, ranging from 44 to 61, said that we should "stay out of the conflict." Only one-tenth in each of these three surveys mentioned support for any concrete form of aid.

Americans exhibited much stronger support for Israel when pollsters questioned them about the Middle East issues in the context of the larger East-West conflict. Thus in various surveys taken in the early seventies the proportion favoring aid to Israel increased sharply whenever the question mentioned the fact that Arabs were being backed by the Russians or the Communists. In 1971, Gallup asked what action the respondent would want to see us take if Israel were to be attacked by "Communist-backed forces." In response to such a wording, 11 percent said send troops, another 44 percent, send military supplies, and only 33 said we should refuse to get involved. In 1970 and 1971, Harris also asked a number of questions linking the Arabs to Russian backing and found similar increases in support for Israel. In July 1970, he asked respondents to react to the statement: "If it looked as though Israel were going to be taken over by the Russians and the Arabs, the U.S. would have to do everything to save Israel, including going to war." Surprisingly, precisely the same percentage,

-13-

38, favored this bellicose proposal as opposed it. Six months later in January, he inquired: "Suppose it looked as though the Arabs, with the help of the Russians, were going to take over Israel in the Middle East. Would you favor or oppose sending U.S. troops to keep Israel from being taken over?" When the question was put this way, 39 percent of the respondents favored sending troops as compared to 44 percent who opposed it. Curiously, a repetition of this question in July 1971, just six months later, yielded a much smaller percentage in favor of sending troops to prevent Israel from being taken over, 25 percent, while 52 percent indicated their opposition. This "decline" may have resulted from the fact that in July Harris included this question with a number of others in which the respondents were given the opportunity to support less stringent ways of aiding Israel such as "giving highpowered anti-aircraft missiles to Israel to match the missiles Russia had given Egypt." This question produced 39 percent in favor of giving such aid to Israel as compared to 40 percent opposed. It also should be noted that in this same survey, the public agreed by 61 to 26 percent with the statement "the U.S. has achieved little by going to war to save other countries, and in the future should let other countries defend themselves." Such pacifist sentiments had increased from 54-31 percent in January. Seemingly, they reflected reaction to the Vietnam fiasco.

The Yom Kippur War

Surveys conducted during and after the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 again elicited extremely high percentages sympathizing with Israel. In a poll taken from October 6 to 8, Gallup found that 47 percent supported Israel, while 6 percent backed the Arab states. He reported the same distribution of opinion two weeks later in a poll taken October 19 to 22. A Roper survey carried out in November 1973 revealed 48 percent indicating that

-14-

their sympathies were more with Israel, as compared to 7 percent supporting the Arab states. Just one month later, in December, Roper reported 41 percent sympathetic to Israel, 6 percent to Arab nations. Gallup's figures for the same months were 50 percent backing Israel as compared to 7 for the Arabs. Some indication that there may have been more support for the Arabs than the small percentages expressing sympathy for them indicates was suggested by the fact that a Harris poll taken shortly after the war found 24 percent in agreement with the Arab argument that they were "justified in fighting this war to try to get back the territory Israel has occupied since 1967," while 49 percent rejected the contention.

The predominant sympathy for Israel, however, did not translate into overwhelming support of military or financial assistance. Thus in a poll taken during the war by the Harris organization, a plurality, 46 percent said that the U.S. "was right in sending planes or other military supplies to Isræl," while 34 percent thought that we should have taken an unspecified different course. Such pro-Israeli sentiment, however, was much greater than it had been seven years earlier at the time of the Six Day War, when Harris found that only 35 percent agreed that the U.S. was right to send aid, while 39 percent favored a different course. Gallup and Yankelovich, however, reported less support for aid during the Yom Kippur war. Gallup, in a poll conducted during the war, found 37 percent endorsing "arms and materials to Israel" with 49 percent against. A retrospective question asked in March 1974 by the Yankelovich organization inquired whether, at the time that war broke out in the Middle East in October, the respondents had been "in favor or opposed to the U.S. giving Israel financial aid? How about military equipment?" The percentages for financial aid were 41 for and 43 against, virtually the same percentages as for the military aid. Again it may be noted that

-15-

breakdowns among the respondents indicated that increased levels of education were correlated with sympathy for Israel and with support for various concrete forms of assistance. Thus the Yankelovich survey reported that 56 percent of college graduates favored military aid to Israel as compared to 44 percent of those with some college, and 43 among high school graduates, and only 32 of those with less than 12 grades of schooling.

Current Attitudes Toward the Middle East

Various surveys taken since the Yom Kippur War continue to find considerable support for Israel. In July 1974, Yankelovich reported that 74 percent said that the continuance of Israel as a Jewish state is important to our country and to people like themselves, as against 24 percent who said it is not that important. Roper queried seven national samples at various times from June 1974 to March 1977 asking whether people find themselves "more in sympathy with Israel, or more in sympathy with the Arab nations." In all of the surveys, sympathy for the Arabs has held constant between 5 and 7 percent. Support for Israel, on the other hand, has fluctuated between the 36 percent and 47 percent figure. The two 1977 surveys taken in January and March yielded 47 and 43 percent for Israel and 6 and 5 for the Arabs Gallup and Harris also reported comparable findings for very similar questions. Thus in 1975 Gallup reported a 44 to 8 distribution, while Harris' results were 52 to 7. And Yankelovich, a year later in January 1976, found that 56 percent said they would identify with Israel in another war as compared to 9 percent for the Arabs. In March 1977, a private poll asked a more general question, not specifically tied to a new war, "Which side do you personally support in the Middle East conflict...? and reported that 45 percent said Israel, 2 the Arabs, 41 neither one and 12 percent not sure.

A somewhat different and more extreme question was presented earlier by Harris, who inquired in December 1974 whether "If there were another war

-16-

in the Middle East and Israel were overrun by the Arabs, would you be very upset, mildly upset, mildly pleased, or very pleased?" His findings were 44 percent very upset, 34 percent mildly upset, 2 percent mildly pleased, 1 percent very pleased and 19 percent not sure. Another poll also touched on similar sentiments when it inquired in March 1977 : "If Israel were destroyed by the Arabs and ceased to exist as an independent state, would this leave you indifferent, sorry but not personally affected, or feeling a deep sense of personal loss?" Only 13 percent replied "indifferent," 27 said they would feel "a deep sense of personal loss," and the remaining 60 indicated "sorry but not personally affected." Many of the latter group, however, clearly were quite pro-Israel, since 66 percent of those queried in the same survey agreed that "the continuation of Israel as a Jewish state is important to our country and people like yourself," while only 21 percent replied "not important."

A somewhat different striking indication of the preferences of the public was suggested by a national sample interviewed by Pat Caddell's Cambridge Survey in the summer of 1975. He gave respondents a list of images and asked them "Does each word apply more to the Arabs or more to the Israelis?" The replies are given in Table I below.

	More to Israelis	More to Arabs	To both equally	To neither	Don't kncw
Peaceful	41%	7%	9%	24%	19%
Honest	39	6	13	18	25
Intelligent	39	8	26	5	21
"Like Americans"	50	5	8	17	21
Friendly	46	6	15	11	23
Backward	6	47	7	15	25
Underdeveloped	9	47	10	10	25
Poor	21	34	9	15	22
Greedy	9	41	20	77	23
Arrogant	11	37	19	7	26
Moderate	31	8	10	21	30
Developing	33	20	21	3	24
Barbaric	4	38	8	23	28

Table I Images of Israelis and Arabs

Does each word apply more to the Arabs or more to the Israelis?

-17-

There is some indication in recent surveys that Americans are more likely to express sympathy for "the Palestinians" than for "the Arabs." In December 1974, Harris inquired: "In the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more--Israel or the Palestinians?" Israel lead 33 percent to 14. Harris presented respondents with a very similar question at another place in the interview, except that the word Arabs was substituted for Palestinians. This formulation increased support for Israel by 20 percent, to 53, while only 7 percent expressed sympathy for the Arabs as distinct from the 14 percent who backed the Palestinians. Another pollster in March 1977 found similar differences. Thus a majority, 52 percent, agreed that "The Palestinians have a right to a homeland as much as the Jews do." But only 16 percent felt the same way about the statement "The Arabs have a strong moral case against Israel which deserves more attention than we give it." Presumably the term "Palestinians" involves the image of refugees or of a people denied their claim to a nationhood. Some evidence that this is so is contained in the two surveys. Almost as many of Harris' respondents, 29 percent, agreed with the statement that "Israel has mistreated the Palestinian refugees and that is wrong," as disagreed (30 percent), while 41 percent said they were not sure or did not know. Among the 61 percent of those polled in March 1977 who had heard about the PLO, 55 percent thought "that the Palestinian refugees have legitimate claims against Israel," while 18 percent disagreed.

Sympathy for the Palestinians, however, does not appear to carry over to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Questions posed by surveyers in 1975, 1976 and 1977 which asked respondents to make a number of comparative evaluations of Israel and the PLO revealed overwhelming preference for Israel. People were asked to react separately to a number

-18-

of statements about each. In the most recent survey, 88 percent felt that "we can get along" with Israel but only 23 percent said the same for the PLO. Almost three quarters thought that we "will not be able to get along with" the PLO compared to a tenth feeling the same way about Israel. Four fifths felt that the PLO was "anti-U.S." while only a tenth had comparable opinions about Israel. Over seven-tenths believed that Israel was "democratic", only 7 percent thought the same about the PLO. Israel has steadily bettered its positive image , while the PLO has fallen in all the comparative questions in the three studies. Similarly, American opinion, relatively unsympathetic to Israel's refusal to negotiate with the PLO in 1975, had turned more favorable by 1977. When asked by Yankelovich whether "Israel is doing the right thing in refusing to negotiate with PLO," in January 1975, only 29 percent said Israel was right, 36 percent felt it was wrong, while 35 percent were not sure. A year later, the responses were slightly more positive from Israel's point of view, with 31 percent saying right, 31 wrong, and 38 not sure, and in 1977 a pollster produced a plurality in Israel's favor with 40 percent saying it is right in not negotiating as compared to 21 percent who think this policy is wrong.

Variations in Question Wording and Response

As noted earlier, the pattern of responses to questions asked by different surveys with respect to the character of the American involvement in the Middle East has varied greatly, depending on the form of the question, such as whether or not it identifies the opponents of Israel with the Russians or the Communist-backed forces. In a six month period between November 1974 and April 1975, Harris, Gallup and Yankelovich percentages reported sharply different/in favor of the U.S. sending military supplies to Israel in five surveys. In November 1974, a Yankelovich poll found only 31 percent in favor of the United States sending arms to Israel, while 57 percent were against. A month and a half later, Harris found that 65 percent said the United States was

-19-

right to send military supplies to Israel, as compared to 21 percent who said it was wrong to do so. In January 1975, Yankelovich found 45 percent in favor of military aid to Israel in response to one question, a figure which declined to 28 percent when the question was formulated differently in the same survey. And a Gallup poll also taken in January found that only 16 percent supported military aid of various types for the Jewish state, with another 7 percent urging general support. Over half the respondents, 55 percent, gave Gallup interviewers responses which were coded under the heading, "stay out of the conflict." In February, however, Gallup found that 29 percent backed supplies to Israel, while 10 percent favored military aid to the Arabs. A couple of months later, however, Gallup reported that 54 percent favored sending either military supplies (42 percent) or American troops (12 percent), while only 37 percent opposed American aid to Israel in a renewed Middle East conflagration.

Presumably, these drastic variations resulted from the very different way the questions were formulated in the five studies. In January, Harris elicited interviewers / a 65 percent positive response for military aid to Israel when they asked: "As you know, the United States has sent planes, tanks, artillery, and other weapons to arm Israel. The Russians have sent similar military supplies for Egypt and Syria. In general, with the Russians arming Egypt and Syria, do you think the United States is right or wrong to send Israel the military supplies it needs?" Yankelovich found a 31 percent figure in November in reply to a question about military aid to Israel in the context of queries about a number of countries: "The United States sends arms and military equipment to a number of foreign countries. Do you personally feel that the United States should or should not send arms to [country A, B, C, Israel]?" His 45 percent favorable response to military aid in January was in reply to the question: "In view of the situation in the Middle East, do you feel that United States should increase its present

-20-

aid to Israel, continue it at the same level as now, or cut it back." The much lower 28 percent figure in the same survey was in response to the question: "Do you favor selling arms and military equipment to both Israel and the Arabs, just Israel, just Arabs, or neither." Fourteen percent said, "Both"; another 14 percent, "Just Israel"; and almost two thirds (63 percent) opposed selling arms to either. Gallup's findings of 29 percent favorable to aid to Israel and 10 percent to the Arabs came in response to a similar question posed in February when he asked: "Should the U.S. supply military aid to Israel? To the Arabs?"

Gallup's low report of/16 percent/was obtained in January in reply to an open-ended question: "What should the United States do if a fullscale war breaks out in the Middle East?" His high estimate of 54 occurred in April in answer to the query: "In the event a nation is attacked by Communist-backed forces, there are several things the United States can do about it. What action would you want us to take if Israel is attacked-send American troops, or send military supplies but not send American troops, or refuse to get involved?"

Harris also found heavy support for aid to Israel when he asked in the January 1975 survey: "If war broke out again in the Middle East between the Arabs and Israel, would you favor or oppose the United States continuing to send military supplies, but not troops or personnel, to help Israel?" Two-thirds favored continued military supplies while only 24 percent were opposed.

These eight questions produced responses of 66 percent, 45 percent, 31 percent, 28 percent, 29 percent, 16 percent, 67 percent and 54 percent in favor of sending or selling arms and/or troops to aid Israel. And finally, it must be reported that a Harris survey of February 1975 found the public opposed to "selling military equipment to [all] nations" by 53 percent to 35 percent.

-21-

Questions seeking to find out how the American public reacted to Arab control of oil also yielded varying results. In January 1974, they agreed, 65-20 percent, that they do not "resent being cold this winter because this country is supporting Israel in the Middle East." Harris reported that in four surveys, taken between October 1973 and January 1977, Americans rejected by lopsided majorities the argument that "we need Arab oil for our gasoline shortage here at home, so we had better find ways to get along with the Arabs even if that means supporting Israel less." The distributions were 58-26 percent in October 1973, 61-23 in January 1974, 68-20 in January 1975, and 60-24 in January 1977. In January 1975, Harris also asked whether if the only way we could "get Arab oil in enough quantity and at lower prices were to stop supporting Israel with military aid, would you favor or oppose such a move by this country?" and found that only 18 percent favored cutting off aid to get oil at lower prices, as compared to 63 percent who opposed it.

Less support for Israel was indicated by Caddell's Cambridge Survey which found only slightly more people, 44 percent, linking a need to be more friendly to the Arabs to get their oil, than opposed such a policy, 40 percent, when in the summer of 1975 he asked people their opinion of the statement "Since the Arab countries have the oil, American policy ought to figure out ways of becoming their friends." More recently a private poll asked respondents for a number of "possible sacrifices" which might be involved in supporting Israel, "whether you think it's a price we should be willing to pay for supporting Israel or whether it's too high a price to pay?" Only a small plurality, 48 to 47 said that they were willing to support Israel though "The Arabs might raise oil prices and our own economy will suffer," while a majority, 55 percent to 41, said that the price for supporting Israel was too high if it meant that "the Arabs might cut off our oil supplies." Surprisingly, given these replies, a similar majority, 51 to 41, stated they were willing to have the U.S. support Israel, even if it meant that "the Arab boycott of United States firms dealing with Israel will cost Americans jobs."

-22-

Another example of the way in which the respondents varied in answering different formulations of what appear to be the same subject may be found in the Caddell findings in two polls conducted in the Fall of 1974 and the Summer of 1975. A plurality, 44 percent in the first and 42 in the second agreed with the statement "America's support of Israel in the Mideast is the proper policy and should be continued," compared to 26 percent who disagreed in each. But a majority, 51 percent in both surveys also indicated they felt that America's policy was too pro-Israel by agreeing that "America's policy in the Mideast has been overly pro-Israel and should be changed to be fair to all," while 24 percent in each disagreed. Clearly, cue words such as continue "the proper policy" or change to "be fair to all" can give a different meaning to what on the surface appear to be straight-forward similar questions. Another form of the "even-handed" question asked by a New York Times-CBS poll in April 1976, inquiring whether "in addition to military aid to Israel, the United States should sell arms to Egypt in order to play a more found that even-handed role in the Middle East?"/only 21 percent said that it should, while 59 percent disagreed, precisely the opposite distribution to that reported by Caddell 9 months earlier.

As noted , the very mention of the possibility of sending U.S. troops to the Middle East produces what is apparently a much lower level of support for Israel. Thus, even though in April 1975, Gallup inquired about possible U.S. responses to an attack on Israel by "Communist-backed forces," only twelve percent favored sending troops, 42 said supplies, and 37 percent that we should refuse to get involved. The summer of the same year, Caddell provided his respondents with only two options, favoring or opposing the sending of troops to protect Israel, and found 24 percent for and 57 against. Roper in asking respondents twice in 1975 and once in 1977, what the U.S. should do in the case of a war between Israel and the Arab countries, gave them three options, "take no sides," "support Israel with

-23-

economic aid and arms, but without sending U.S. troops even if that should mean Israel would be defeated," and "do whatever is necessary to preserve and save the state of Israel, including sending U.S. troops," found that the largest group, 50 percent in early 1975 and 42 in 1977, chose "take no sides." In the latter poll, 34 percent opted for aid and arms, while 16 percent favored sending troops. And in March 1977, when a different poll asked whether in an effort to bring about peace in the Middle East "the United States should sign a formal treaty with Israel promising to come to her aid with arms and troops in case of aggression by an outside country," 26 percent favored such a commitment, while 45 opposed it.

Public Support for Israel

The orientation of the American public with respect to the Middle East crisis seems fairly clear. From the beginning of the conflict in the late 40s down to the present, many more Americans have been supportive of Israel than of the Arab states. Most noteworthy is the fact that the percentage so supportive reached a much higher level than in any preceeding period, at the time of the Six Day War, when close to half of those surveyed by different pollsters indicated sympathy for Israel. Support has largely remained at this level down to the present, despite the oil crisis which developed in tandem with the Yom Kippur War and the apparent increase in isolationist sentiment following on the American fiasco in Vietnam. This figure is much higher than the 25-35 percent sympathetic to Israel in the late 1940s or the 25 percent reported in 1964. Conversely, backing for the Arabs has declined from the 15 percent figure characteristic of polls taken in the early period to the 5-7 percent ones which have been found by almost all surveys taken from 1967 to 1977. The fears of many that as time went on, distance from the Holocaust and from the events that led to Israel's founding, as well as the increase in opposition to Israel in other countries, would lead to a decline in American sympathy for Israel has not occurred. Instead,

-24-

as we have seen, support has greatly increased. It is not a residue of pity or shame over the massacre of six million Jews that has produced support for Israel, but rather admiration for the way in which a small democratic nation, allied to the United States, has been able successfully to stand that it is off and defeat the massive onslaughts of Arab armies. It would seem/admiration of success that underlies the widespread American backing for the Jewish state during the last ten years.

It must be reiterated, however, that the American public has been consistent in its feeling that the United States should not get militarily involved in the Middle East. The percentages favoring the sending of U.S. troops to help Israel against a communist-backed attack, or, in the extreme case, against being overrun in a war, have rarely been above 25 percent. Much larger proportions have opposed the sending of troops no matter what the circumstances. Of course, decisive pluralities of the public, ranging upwards to two thirds have, on occasion, supported the giving or sending of military aid to Israel, particularly if Israel were threatened by a communist-aided enemy or were at war. The increased strength of the Arabs internationally, and their ability to hamper the United States economically through an oil boycott or price increase, have apparently not served to reduce the willingness of Americans to continue to support Israel as an ally.

The characteristics of supporters of Israel reported in the polls over the years have also remained steady. Backing for Israel, both with respect to sympathy and aid questions, has consistently been linked to greater education, occupational status and income. Israel has been strongest with the most knowledgeable and presumably most active and influential segment of the body politic.

Issues in the Middle East Conflict

Some of the polls have inquired as to the public's attitude toward the major political issue dividing Israel and its Arab neighbors since the 1967 war--the occupied territories. A few weeks after the war, Harris reported that the public

-25-

disagreed by 62 to 21 percent with the proposition that Israel should withdraw "from the Arab territory before other issues can be settled." About the same time, Gallup asked what should be done with the land Israel had conquered. Only 15 percent favored giving all the area back as compared to 24 percent who said that Israel should keep all the land. The largest proportion, close to half the sample, 49 percent, said that it should keep some of the territories. In July 1970, Harris again found the public rejected by 43 to 24 percent the proposition that "Israel should give back the territory it gained from the war of 1967." In three polls taken after the Yom Kippur War, in December 1973, June 1974 and June 1975, Roper inquired as to what Israel ought to do about the captured regions, offering respondents four options. The reply pattern was remarkably stable over this period. Only 6-7 percent said that Israel should give up all the territories, regardless of circumstances. Another 25 percent in each survey favored yielding all or most, but only "if a satisfactory treaty can be negotiated with the Arabs that will guarantee her [Israel's] existence as a state." The proportion saying that it is now time "for Israel to make some concessions, but it is important that she keep whatever territory is essential for her defense," varied from 27 percent in 1973 to 30 in 1975, while 13-14 percent thought that "Israel should keep all the territory she has won in the last two Arab-Israeli wars."

Harris and Caddell reported different response distributions to questions which gave respondents the simple option of approving or opposing Israel's returning the territories. In January 1975 Harris found 25 percent agreeing and 49 percent disagreeing with the statement "Israel should give back the territory it gained from the war of '67." Caddell, in the Fall of 1974 and again in the Summer of 1975 asked interviewees to react to the proposition "The Israelis ought to give up all the territory they have captured since 1967 if the Arabs agree to peace." Thirty-six percent agreed in both surveys, while 36 disagreed the first time and 34 percent the second.

-26-

Seemingly, the difference in the results of the two polls lay in the fact that Harris did not attach any conditions to the return of the territories while Caddell added the requirement that "the Arab states agree to peace."

Clearly, as we have seen repeatedly, different question formats can produce what appear to be divergent, sometimes even contradictory, results. Thus, when a private poll inquired of a national sample in March 1977, whether certain things that have been mentioned are a major or a minor obstacle to peace in the Middle East, it found that 55 percent said "the Israelis' refusal to return to pre-1967 boundaries" was a major obstacle. Conversely, a significantly larger percentage, 73, felt that "The Arabs' refusal to recognize Israel as an independent state" was also a major hurdle. And the same respondents also told their interviewers by 45 percent to 26, that they disagreed with the proposal that "The United States should reduce its support of Israel unless the Israelis are willing to compromise and give back some of the land they took from the Arabs during the recent wars."

It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the reactions of the public to these issues. Yet, it would appear that the bulk of the American public holds the position that Israel should give back a large proportion of the territories in return for a just peace that will guarantee the nation's existence, but that Israel should retain some portion of the territory for security purposes.

The response pattern has been more consistent to queries dealing with which side is the principal source of continued unrest and the most probable aggressor should a new war break out. Americans have been/more disposed to blame the Arabs rather than the Israelis. Thus in the Summer of 1975, Caddell found that by three to one, 33 percent to 10, more people said that the Arab states were more responsible than Israel for "the continuing crisis in the Middle East." Yankelovich found even more negative judgments concerning the role of the Arabs when in August 1975 he asked "In the current

-27-

situation, do you feel that the Arab nations are really interested in making peace with Israel, or do you feel that they are not interested in making peace, but rather in destroying Israel?" Less than a fifth, 17 percent, thought the Arabs were interested in peace while a majority, 53 percent, in the first survey and 56 in the second, said they were out to destroy Israel. A private survey taken in March 1977 found in response to a similar query that 19 percent felt the Arabs wanted peace and 56 percent said they were out to eliminate Israel. In line with the replies to these questions, those interviewed in 1977, when asked which side is "likely to be the main aggressor" if war should break out, said the Arab countries rather than Israel by 59 percent to 16.

It is interesting to note that when questioned in 1975 and again in 1977: "In the current situation, do you feel that the Israelis are doing everything possible to achieve a peace settlement or do you feel that their attitudes and demands are unreasonable?" in 1975, a plurality, 37 percent, felt Israel's demands were unreasonable as contrasted to 23 percent who then said Israel was trying to gain peace. Two years later the plurality shifted. Many more, 39 percent, thought that Israel was doing everything to achieve peace, while the proportion who felt that Israel's demands were unreasonable dropped to 29 percent.

Americans remain pessimistic about the prospects for an end to the conflict, but they have faith in Israel's ability to win a new war and to survive. In 1975, Gallup found that 61 percent thought that "another war between the Israelis and the Arabs is likely to occur this year." Harris inquired in 1974, 1976 and again early in 1977: "How would you rate the chances of working out a total peace settlement in the Middle East...?" and found that the 18 percent figure for those who expected a settlement in 1974 had climbed slightly to 22 percent in 1977, while the percentage of those with pessimistic views dropped from 73 to 65. When asked in another survey in March 1977: "In the end, do you think that lasting peace will come to the

-28-

Middle East?" only one third believed that it will, while 45 percent felt that it will not, and 21 percent were unsure. In spite of their expectation of continued conflict, the overwhelming majority said that they "personally expect Israel as a Jewish state to exist 20 years from now," while only 9 percent did not. Twice as many, 44 percent to 21, thought that Israel is more likely than the Arabs to win another war.

Attitudes Toward Specific Countries

The opinions of Americans toward the Middle East conflict may also be evaluated by comparing opinions about Israel and the Arab states with attitudes towards other countries. In January 1975, Harris asked: "Which countries [from a list of 12] do you feel the U.S. has a special stake in seeing that they are not overtaken militarily?" Canada led the list with 49 percent, while Israel was second with 43, and Great Britain third with 34. Backing for Arab nations on the list varied from 13 percent for Saudi-Arabia and 10 for Egypt to 5 for Libya. Less favorable findings for Israel were, however, reported in another Harris survey taken about the same time which inquired: "Suppose there was a danger of a communist takeover of [various countries specifically named], would you favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops?" Not surprisingly, Americans were most disposed to support the use of troops in the defense of Canada, 65 percent in favor as against 24 percent opposed. England was second with 52 percent favorable and 35 percent against. The figures for Western Europe were 42 to 44 and for Australia 39 to 45 percent. Brazil came out just ahead of Israel with 32 percent favorable and 49 opposed, while the figures for Israel were 31 percent willing to send troops as compared to 52 against. The countries for which support was lower than for Israel were Japan, Taiwan, Greece, South Korea, Iran, Thailand, and India. In the case of Greece, for example, only 26 percent favored sending troops as against 55 opposed, while for South Korea the figures were 25 to 59.

-29-

Pat Caddell's Cambridge Survey organization also inquired in the Spring of 1975 as to whether respondents felt that "we should sell weapons to" Israel, France, India, Saudi Arabia, Chile, Iran, Mexico and Egypt. More doing people were opposed to selling arms to each than endorsed/so. Israel, however, had the most in favor, 41 percent, and the least against, 43. The figures for France were 37 percent for and and 46 con, while for Mexico, they were 38 to 45. The largest percentages against selling arms, 60, were reported for the two Arab countries on the list, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while slightly over a fifth backed such sales? Sentiment was also quite negative to providing arms for Chile, Iran and India.

Comparative evaluations of American attitudes to various nations have recent also been reported by the Gallup Poll, NORC, and a/private survey. Over the years, the former has asked respondents to indicate on a ten-point scale their opinions of various nations, ranging from very favorable down to very unfavorable. Israel and Egypt were first included in such a survey in 1956, when only 49 percent indicated that they had a favorable opinion of Israel as contrasted to 31 percent for Egypt. A much larger percentage, 68, expressed positive feelings toward England and France. By 1966 favorable opinion for Israel had climbed to 64 percent, in contrast to 46 for Egypt and 79 for England. In 1967, at the time of the Six-Day War, 74 percent were favorable to Israel compared to 85 percent for England, 89 percent for Australia, 74 percent for Argentina, and 76 for Brazil. A 1976 Gallup survey found the percentage favorable to Israel down to a still respectable 65, while Egypt's popularity stood at 49. The corresponding figures for other countries were England 87, Holland 85, Brazil 66, and Taiwan 55.

NORC asked respondents to evaluate eight countries on a ten-point scale ranging from "like very much" to "dislike very much" in two national surveys in 1974 and 1975. The results were similar to those in the Gallup poll. The

-30-

percentages favorable to Israel were 68 and 62, while for Egypt, favorability stood at 48 and 44 percent. America's former enemy and current ally, Japan, received slightly better ratings than Israel, 70 and 66, as did Brazil, 68 and 64. The countries closest to the U.S. culturally, Canada and England, were judged most positively of all, 92 and 91 for Canada, and 85 and 84 for England. The two major Communist nations were least popular, 46 and 44 favorable to Russia and 41 and 36 for China.

In March 1977, a major / asked his respondents to state with respect to eight countries and the Palestinians whether they consider each "to be a close friend and ally of the United States, a neutral country, or a country which is unfriendly to the United States?" As in other surveys, more people were positive about Canada and England, 72 and 71 percent regarded them as friends, while only 2 to 3 percent saw them as unfriendly. Israel was third with 48 percent saying friendly, and 8 percent, unfriendly. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were regarded as a friend by only 12 percent, while 26 and 28 percent identified them as unfriendly. Surprisingly, opinions about the Palestinians were almost as negative as those for the Soviet Union and Communist China. Only 6 percent identified the Palestinians as a friend, while 42 percent regarded them as unfriendly.

These comparative measures of sentiment by six different polling agencies taken between 1974 and 1977 again indicate that Americans have a much more positive than towards the Arabs, feeling for Israel/ but it should be noted that the proportion so supportive is not as large as those for Western Europe or the English-speaking countries, and that close to a third of those queried by NORC said that they disliked Israel. The Arab states and the Palestinians, however, clearly have little popularity.

Social Differences

Analyses of the social characteristics associated with pro-Israeli views in reply to these questions continue to show a relationship with increased education, income and occupational status. The Harris January 1975

-31-

pollster

survey found 60 percent of those who had attended college sympathetic to Israel, compared to 51 percent for the high school educated and 47 among those who had not gone beyond grammar school. Over half of the college educated, 54 percent, believed that the U.S. has a special stake in seeing that Israel is not overtaken militarily, while only 38 percent of those who had not gone beyond high school and 30 percent of the grammar school educated felt the same way. The 1976 Gallup national rating study indicated that 77 percent of those who had been exposed to higher education rated Israel favorably, 62 percent of the high school population had such opinions, but only 50 percent of those with less education felt this way. In January 1977, Roper reported that 54 percent of those in executive and professional occupations were sympathetic to Israel compared to 50 percent of white collar and 46 percent of blue collar. By income, the range of sympathy for Israel ran from 55 percent among those earning 18,000 dollars a year or more to 41 among those earning less than 6,000 dollars. The March 1977 private poll found that 75 percent of college graduates regarded Israel as a friend and ally of the United States, compared to 46 percent among those with a high school or some college education, and but 34 percent of those with less than high school.

Sympathy for the Arabs on these and other questions varied little by socioeconomic or educational status. All groups were equally unenthusiastic, while the less advantaged were more likely to give "don't know" responses. These variations showed up even more clearly in the responses to Roper's queries concerning the future of the occupied territories. As noted earlier in 1975, only 7 percent thought that Israel should give up all the territories, regardless of circumstances, but 11 percent of those whose education did not go beyond grammar school took this position, compared to 7 percent for the high school educated, and 5 percent for those who had attended college. Caddell's questions concerning the application of different image words to the

-32-

Israelis or Arabs generally elicited comparable patterns. Thus when asked about the phrase "like Americans," the percentages saying that the term applies to the Israelis rose from 37 percent for those with some grade school, to 49 for high school graduates, 59 for college graduates and 62 percent for those who attended graduate school.

Religious and racial groupings continued to vary as in earlier surveys. In 1974, Harris found 59 percent of white Protestants sympathetic to Israel, as contrasted to 47 of white Catholics, and 31 of Blacks. The percentage with pro-Arab sympathies ran from 12 percent among Blacks to 8 for white Catholics and 5 for white Protestants. Caddell, asking a number of questions bearing on Middle East issues in the summer of 1975, generally found Protestants somewhat more favorable to Israel than Catholics, and whites much more than Blacks. In January 1977, Roper noted a similar pattern, 48 percent of whites and 34 percent of Blacks sympathized with Israel, as did 49 percent of all Protestants and 39 of Catholics. The results of the 1976 Gallup national ratings survey differed somewhat from previous ones. White Protestants had the most favorable views (67 percent) of the Jewish state, but Blacks showed up as slightly more supportive, 62 percent favorable, than white Catholics, 59 percent. The responses to Roper's questions about the future of the territories varied similarly. In 1975, Protestants were more favorable (15 percent) to Israel's keeping all the occupied land than were Catholics (12 percent), and whites were more favorable (15 percent) than Blacks (6 percent). Blacks were more likely to answer "don't know" than whites, but nevertheless, the proportion of Blacks (13 percent) who said that Israel should give up all the territories was much greater than that of whites (6 percent). There was, however, surprisingly little variation associated with age in these surveys.

-33-

Elite Attitudes

These findings reported in various surveys taken at different times consistently showing greater support for Israel among the better educated, the more affluent and those in executive and professional positions, suggest that Israel has strong backing among the elite sectors -- those who are more active politically and presumably more influential. The results of a number of such groups of studies/confirm this assumption. Thus, in January 1975, Harris compared the opinions of a national sample of 3,377 persons with those of 491 "leaders," selected from among those who "have impact within their community." The leaders' sympathies were more with Israel than the Arabs by a ratio of over eleven to one, 56 to 5 percent, as contrasted with the general public's seven and a half to one, 52 to 7. Three-quarters of the leaders favored sending military supplies to Israel if war breaks out, a position taken by 66 percent of the general public. When asked how they would feel if "Israel were overrun by the Arabs," 44 percent of the general sample said "very upset" in contrast to 65 percent of the leaders. The leaders and the public both overwhelmingly disagreed with the statement that "we need Arab oil for our gasoline shortage here at home, so we had better find ways to get along with the Arabs, even if that means supporting Israel less." The leaders, however, felt this way by a ratio of 78-15 percent, while the public took this view by a somewhat lower one, 68-20.

A separate Harris survey conducted in December 1974 on behalf of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, similarly indicated that leaders are much more effectively supportive of Israel than the general public. The 328 leaders interviewed in this survey were drawn from "Americans in leadership positions with the greatest influence upon and knowledge about foreign relations," from the political world, government officials, business leaders, the media and education, plus various voluntary associations. Both the leadership and public samples were given 12 hypothetical situations, such as

-34-

of Canada or Western Europe, a Russian takeover of West Berlin, invasions attacks on the Dominican Republic, South Korea, India, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia, by various adjacent Communist states, and in the case of Israel its "being defeated by the Arabs." In each case, they were asked whether they would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of troops. The leaders were significantly more favorable than the general public to American military intervention in reaction to threats to Canada, western Europe, West Berlin, the Dominican Republic, South Korea and Israel. The public was more supportive than the leaders of Taiwan, Yugoslavia, and Saigon (against a major attack by North Vietnam), while there was no difference between the two with respect to a Chinese attack on India. Specifically, with respect to the Middle East situation, 41 percent of the leaders were willing to use U.S. troops to save Israel from being defeated by the Arabs, while 44 percent were opposed; among the public 27 percent were favorable and 50 percent against. It should be noted among both leaders and public that there was more support for military intervention to help Canada, Western Europe, West Berlin, and the Dominican Republic, than for Israel. Israel, however, had more backing than South Korea, India, Taiwan, Yugoslavia and Saigon.

In response to a general question, as to what the U.S. should do "if friendly countries are attacked," the leaders were much more favorable to America giving military assistance than the general population. Thus, 81 percent of the leaders compared to 60 of the public favored military and economic aid, while 34 percent of the former and 23 of the latter would also Over a fifth of 22 percent, send troops. Athe public, / however, was more likely to say, "economic aid only," an option mentioned by only 6 percent of the leaders, while 9 percent of the public said do "nothing," as compared to but 1 percent of the leaders. These results suggest again that the stronger backing for aid to Israel among the better educated and leadership groups reflects a greater willingness on their

-35-

part for the nation's playing an activist role in international affairs, which involves aid and military support for our allies. The public, however, reveals a greater "reluctance actually to get involved in combat, or in steps that could lead to combat--perhaps as an extension of aid commitments."^{fn} The results of this survey suggest, however, that willingness to back other countries against invasion with military assistance applies least to Asian and Third World countries outside of the Americas, perhaps reflecting reactions to the Vietnam War or lesser cultural identification.

Two years later, in a January 1977 survey, Roper found that fully 60 percent of the 12 percent of his respondents who were classified as high on a scale of political and societal activity were sympathetic to Israel, compared to but 47 percent in the sample as a whole. Both showed little sympathy for the Arab cause, 6-7 percent. Similarly, those high on the activity scale were more likely (22 percent) to support whatever measures would be necessary to save Israel in case of war "including sending troops if that should prove necessary" than were the public at large (16 percent). Conversely, the total sample was much more disposed to favor the option "take no sides" than were the active, 29 percent.

Some indication of the differences in the opinions of varying leadership groups may be found in an analysis of the opinions of 2656 leaders in eight areas of American life gathered by the <u>Washington Post</u> and the Harvard Center for International Affairs in 1976. This questionnaire study contained two questions dealing with the Middle East: "The United States has a moral obligation to prevent the destruction of Israel," and "To protect our supply of oil, the United States should be more pro-Arab in the Middle East conflict."

^{fn.}John E. Rielly, ed., <u>American Public Opion and U.S. Foreign Policy</u> (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1975), p. 17.

-36-

Sixty-two percent f the leaders agreed with the first question, 24 percent strongly, while 71 percent disagreed with the second, 27 percent strongly. Since 7 percent of the elite strata were Jewish, over twice the proportion of the general public, some of the greater concern for Israel among leadership groups reflects this fact. Almost all of the Jewish members of these elite groups (93 percent) felt that the United States is morally obligated to prevent the distruction of Israel, a view also held, however, by a large majority, 60 percent of the non-Jews. The eight elite groups sampled varied somewhat among themselves. Those most favorable to Israel were the two most involved in affecting policy and public opinion, the political and media leaders. Fully 70 percent of the former and 67 of the latter were supportive of Israel. The Black elite followed with 64 percent supportive, a surprising finding given the repeated evidence from many surveys that the Black population generally is less sympathetic to Israel than any other identifiable demographic group. The other groups following in descending order of support for Israel were feminists, 63 percent, intellectuals, 62, farm, 59, business, 57, and youth, 54.

The opinions of four elite groups, professors, foreign-policy professionals, "black grass-roots leaders," and trade association executives have been explored in greater depth in various surveys. They indicate the difficulty of locating individuals, strata, or the general public in simple categories of pro or anti-Israel, pro or anti-aid.

A survey of a national sample of 3500 university and college faculty was conducted in the spring of 1975 by Everett Ladd and S. M. Lipset. At first glance, it would appear that as a group American college faculty are among the staunchest supporters of the Jewish state in the country. A solid majority, 57 percent of the respondents, indicated that their "sympathies lie predominantly with Israel," as contrasted to the 8 percent who were pro-Arab. Faculty support for the Jewish state appeared to be about the same or

-37-

slightly below the level among the college-educated generally (Harris found them at 60 percent for Israel about the same time), but somewhat above that reported among the general public where, as we have seen, pro-Israel feelings have hovered around 45-50 percent in surveys conducted by Gallup, Harris, Roper, and Yankelovich. Pro-Arab sentiments in the general population were about the same low level as among the professoriate.

Strong pro-Israeli sentiments were apparent in faculty responses to a number of other questions. An overwhelming majority, 76 percent, rejected the Arab contention, advanced in a U.N. resolution that Israel is "a racist and imperialist country." A comparably large percentage of the faculty, 77, asserted that "Israel has a right to keep the city of Jerusalem as its capital." Almost three-quarters, 73 percent, believed that the United States should continue "to supply Israel with weapons and military equipment;" 58 percent, however, would have had us refuse "to sell arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia." Only 13 percent felt that "Guerrilla activities on the part of the Palestinian Arabs are justified because there is no other way for them to bring their grievances to the attention of the world." Yet almost two-thirds, 65 percent, approved of Israel's right "to retaliate against the Arabs whenever Arab guerrillas commit an act of terrorism."

The picture of an intensely pro-Israeli academe suggested by these responses was, however, countered by the clear unwillingness of the majority to have the U.S. do little more to aid the Jewish state than send it arms and equipment. Less than a third, 31 percent, felt that if Israel "were threatened with defeat" that the U.S. should help it with "air support" or "ground troops." The proportion who believed that "If the United Nations were to vote to expel Israel, the U.S. should withdraw from the U.N. in protest" was comparably small, 32 percent. Almost half the professors, 46 percent, did not agree with the statement that the "U.S. has an unquestioned moral obligation to prevent the destruction of the state of Israel."

-38-

As of 1975, the majority of the faculty clearly did not see Israel as an American ally who must be protected from destruction, if the price is U.S. involvement in fighting. In spite of their sympathies for the beleaguered state, they favored American pressure on Israel to make major concessions. Overall, almost two-thirds, 64 percent, believed that "The U.S. should pursue a more neutral and even-handed policy in the Middle-East." Half of the respondents agreed that "The U.S. should apply pressure on Israel to give in more to Arab demands." The price that the majority felt Israel should pay was clear: 56 percent said that it should give up "most of the territory it gained from the Arabs" in the Six Day War; 64 percent believed that the "Arabs should be allowed to set up a separate nation of Palestine on the West Bank of the Jordan River."

The response pattern of academe toward the Middle East conflict may appear to be contradictory, much like that of the public. In fact, the seeming confusion is probably typical of public reactions on most issues. Almost all policy matters are invariably more complicated than is suggested by the replies to any one or two questions designed to locate respondents as positive or negative on a specific view or proposal. If issues are complicated, if specific proposals may work under some conditiona and not under others, there is clearly no reason to expect or desire the public or academe to have simple unqualified reactions.

If one looks carefully at the responses of the academics, it is possible to detect an underlying syndrome of attitudes of a large number of professors on Middle East and foreign policy questions. On one hand, as indicated in analyses of their opinions published elsewhere, they strongly sought a reduction of international tensions, supported cuts in American military expenditures, favored detente with the Soviet Union, and hoped that America would avoid

-39-

foreign entanglements which might involve it in another war, limited or not.^{Fn} On the other hand, many of those who were predisposed this way remained sympathetic to Israel, and hoped the Jewish state will survive and prosper. The first set of preferences, however, appeared to outweigh the second.

These orientations resulted in a majority faculty opinion which wanted the U.S. to do all it can to press the conflicting parties to make peace in the Middle East. Hence, Ladd and Lipset found majority sentiment for a "more neutral and even-handed policy" by the U.S., for American pressure on Israel "to give in more to Arab demands," for Israel to yield territory, and opposition to American direct military intervention even if necessary to avoid the "defeat and destruction" of Israel. But at the same time, a large majority remained much more favorable to Israel than the Arabs, would supply the Jewish state with the weapons to defend itself, while opposed to selling arms to the Arabs, and hoped that Israel can hold on to Jerusalem. Viewed in these terms, these responses are not inconsistent.

In considering the views of American academics to the Middle East and other foreign policy matters, as of 1975, it is important to recall that professors were the first major group in this country to turn against the Vietnam War, even before the majority of college students did. They also are ideologically to the left of other sectors of the non-academic population. Evidence drawn from a variety of opinion surveys suggest that anti-war and anti-militarist sentiments among them were accentuated during the Vietnam War. Since academics tend to be more ideological, that is more consistent in their views than other groups, it is not surprising to learn from the Ladd-Lipset survey that more pacifist views among them are strongly correlated with liberal social and political attitudes, and that left-liberal values within academe are also associated with lessened enthusiasm for Israel, much as they were linked to opposition to South Vietnam. In the table below, we present the Ladd-Lipset finding of the relationship between political beliefs

-40-

Fn. Everett Ladd and S.M. Lipset, "War-Shy Professors Divided Over Middle East," Chronicle of Higher Education, December 1, 1975, p. 2.

as reflected by position on a liberalism-conservatism scale constructed from attitude items on domestic issues with position on an Israel support scale developed from responses to questions bearing on the Middle East. As is evident from the data in the table, those whose attitudes placed them in the most liberal quintile of the sample were least favorable to support of the Jewish state.

Table II

Position of the Most Liberal and Most Conservative Quintile on Israel Support Scale Among Non-Jewish Faculty

Israel Support Scale	Most Liberal	Most Conservative
High	30%	67%
Low	70	33

These findings indicate the possible validity, among the more ideological opinion sectors, of the assumptions mentioned at the beginning of this report that opinion on Middle East issues may be affected by the growing antagonism of the international left to Israel with a corresponding identification with the Palestinian cause, and the strengthening of isolationist and anti-militarist sentiment within the United States. None of the available results of the studies of general public feelings reported earlier, however, revealed any consistent and significant relationships between ideological self-identification ("are you a liberal, moderate, or conservative"), or Republican or Democratic party allegiance, and opinion on the Middle-East issues. The divergence between the Ladd-Lipset findings for a sample of academics and those reported for the public may indicate that academe holds sharply variant opinions in this area as in others, or more likely, in our judgment, be another piece of evidence that professors are significantly more ideological, more consistent, in their attitudes than other strata. These results, therefore, may anticipate the way in which the public may respond in the future, should American attitudes toward the Middle East begin to become subjects of controversy between main-line conservatives and liberals, or Democrats and Republicans, developments which may follow the formation of a more hawkish government in Israel following the May 1977 elections.

Three surveys of the opinions of Black grass-roots leaders, trade association executives and foreign policy professionals, were conducted by the Yankelovich organization, the first two in February and March 1975, and the latter in March 1976. These cannot be considered random, statistically reliable samples of the special populations from which they were drawn. Each was small, 100 Black leaders, 50 executives, and 78 foreign policy experts. Yankelovich, however, drew the names in a fashion designed to obtain diverse and hopefully representative opinions.

The Blacks /were people active in leadership roles in eleven communities across the nation. Intensive interviews with them brought quite different sets of attitudes from those reported for the 300 Blacks who answered the two Middle East questions on the <u>Washington Post</u> leadership survey. A summary report on the Yankelovich survey states:

About Israel, itself, the feeling is ambivalent when not negative. The very people who think it right that there should be a Jewish state can also think of Israel as the aggressor. Blacks are likely to see Israel as the enemy of the dark-skinned Arabs, who are in some sense fellow non-whites. Israel is disliked only a little less than China, South Africa, and the Soviet Union.^{fn}

^{fn.}Geraldine Rosenfield, "The Yankelovich Interviews with Black Grass-Roots Leaders and Trade Association Professionals," <u>The American Jewish Committee</u> Information and Research Service, August 1975, p. 2.

-42-

These answers to specific questions point up the lesser support or negative sentiments which these Black leaders had towards Israel early in 1975. About one quarter of them, 23 percent, named Israel as the probable "main aggressor" in a new Middle East war, more than the 16 percent who mentioned the Arabs. They divided into approximately equal thirds in response to a question on support for the PLO or Israel or neither or not sure.

These Black leadership views coincide with the reports from the various general public surveys reported earlier which indicate that Blacks are less supportive of Israel and more likely to express pro-Arab views than any sector of the white population. Seemingly, such Black sentiment is related to identification with Arabs as Third World peoples, or possibly to their greater degree of resentment against American Jews than is found among whites, a matter that is discussed in a later section.

It is difficult to interpret the sharp difference between the sentiments reported in the Yankelovich survey and the <u>Washington Post</u>-Harvard CFIA study. One possibility lies in the different set of Black leaders sampled by each. The <u>Post</u>-Harvard research group largely sampled politicians and officers of civilrights groups divided equally between national and local leaders, while Yankelovich interviewed local community leaders. The first group, being involved in practical politics, has received considerable assistance from Jewish groups. The second, less concerned with coalition politics, may be a more accurate reflector of community sentiment.

Yankelovich's intensive interviews with 50 professional heads of various trade associations also revealed a community, less pro-Israel than the population in general. They differed, however, from the Black leaders in not exhibiting any significant pro-Arab feelings. In responding to the question who would be the main aggressor in the Middle East, twice as many 42 percent, mentioned the Arabs as Israel, 23 percent. "They take the State of Israel's continued existence

-43-

for granted....They feel Israel must make major territorial concessions, they are not committed to the establishment of a Palestinian state, are opposed to Arafat acting as head of the Palestinians, and feel Arabs must recognize Israel as an independent state."^{fn} Their lack of enthusiasm for Israel may be seen, however, in the fact that over half of those interviewed, 52 percent, thought that the United States would have a different policy toward Israel, were it not for pressure from Jewish groups, while only 28 percent disagreed with this point of view. Basically these spokespersons for business did not appear to be interested in the Middle East politically. Their main concerns with the region were economic, particularly oil. "There is no over support for Arab countries, but there is an eagerness to do business with the Arabs and encourage Arab investment in the United States."^{fn} These findings coincide with, and help explain the results of the <u>Washington Post</u> leadership questionnaire survey which indicated lesser support for Israel among larger samples of business and farm leaders.

The Yankelovich sample of 78 foreign-policy experts drawn from executives of foreign affairs groups, government and congressional staffs, media people and academicians in New York, Washington and Cambridge, were much more pro-Israel than the Black and business leaders. In part, this reflects the fact that two-fifths of them were Jewish. But almost all of the non-Jews also felt that the U.S. should "supply military aid to Israel" although they would limit it to not more than enough to guarantee Israel's existence. The PLO was not regarded as a legitimate representative of the Palestinians by any one, but many felt that "since it is the <u>only</u> group and we <u>must</u> deal with Palestinians, the 'realistic' thing is deal with it."^{fn} Some further indication that this group was not heavily tilted towards Israel is suggested in the fact that non-Jewish "pro-Israel respondents feel they are in the minority among their

fn. Ibid., p. 8

fn. Ibid.

fn. Geraldine Rosenfield, "Foreign-policy Professionals on Israel and American Jews," <u>The American Jewish Committee Information and Research Services</u> (Feb. 1977), pp. 3-4.

-44-

colleagues."^{fn}

These efforts at analysis of the views on Middle-East issues of diverse elite groups of Americans point up the need to explore opinions in depth, to the possible simplified or erroneous conclusions which may be reached by looking at the responses to a few questions. As noted earlier, the opinions of these groups can not be categorized simply as pro-Israel or pro-Arab. Rather they represent a complex set of views, often in contradiction with one another, involving an effort to react to alternative objectives held by the same individual. People may be very sympathetic to the desire of Jews to have a state of their own which is a secure refuge for the victims of persecution, while also feeling concerned about the plight of the Palestinians. believing that it can only be resolved in a state of their own. Deep commitment to the survival of Israel may run counter to the belief that Americans must place primary emphasis on domestic economic self-interest, and the avoidance of commitments that might lead to overseas military involvements. Clearly, except possibly among sections of the Black community and their leaders. America's support for Israel is not basically challenged, but it is far from the unqualified endorsement which Israeli leaders desire, and it is conditioned on Israel's showing a willingness to actively seek to make peace with the Arabs, a peace that would involve returning most of the territories occupied since June 1967, in return for her total acceptance by the Arab states and the Palestinians as a legitimate national entity entitled to the kind of treatment given to all other states.

Conclusions

This examination of the responses of the American public and assorted leadership groups to Middle East issues over three decades suggests a number of conclusions. First, and most important is the fact that among those who have opinions on these matters, often around 50 percent, sympathy for Israel has always far outweighed support for the Arab cause. Second is the indication that support for Israel cannot be explained as a continued residue of feelings of sympathy or guilt related to the Holocaust and the plight of European Jewry during World War II. As we have seen, the proportions expressing support for Israel have been much greater in all the surveys taken since 1967 than in earlier ones. Conversely, the percentages voicing sympathy for the Arabs in surveys taken from the Six Day War on is less than half that during the Arab-Israeli wars in the late 1940s.

The predominently pro-Israeli anti-Arab disposition of Americans is also expressed in a variety of polls which have asked respondents to make comparative judgments about Israelis and Arabs, or Israel and various Arab nations. Many more people see Israel in a positive light, as having more favorable traits, as being more like America, or as being more friendly to the United States, than feel positively about the Arabs. The support which the Arabs have received from the Soviet Union and other Communist states is also clearly a liability for them among the American public. The overwhelming majority of Americans are anti-Communist, sentiments which extend to those backed by the Soviets.

The polls taken since the 1973 war suggest that increased awareness of America's dependence on Arab oil, or of the possibilities to gain economically by doing business with the oil-rich Arab states, has not undermined support for Israel among the general public, although it has among business executives. It is questionable, however, whether survey questions which inquire as to whether people think that we should change our Middle East policy to improve our economic relations generally or prospects to buy cheaper oil, secure reliable responses to how Americans might react to a severe economic or energy crisis. These questions, in effect, ask people whether they are willing to sell out Israel for money or for oil. It would be surprising if Americans

-46-

would answer, "yes," to such inquires and as we have seen, they do not.

More positively from the Arab perspective is the fact that questions which describe the Middle East conflict, as one between the Palestinians and the Israelis, result in a decline in expressions of support for the Israeli side and a sharp increase in the proportions who are pro-Palestinian as contrasted with pro-Arab. These findings are reinforced by the evidence that there is considerable concern for the plight of the Palestinian refugees and support for the creation of a Palestinian state. It may be suggested that questions dealing with Israel and the Arabs are seen in the context of a small nation, Israel, resisting the onslaught of the Arab world aided by the Soviet Union. Conversely, Israel versus the Palestinians involves for some a contest between the militarily strong and well-to-do Israeli state and the Palestinian population, many of whom are poor refugees, without a state of their own.

The increase in sympathy for the Palestinians, however, does not extend to support for the Palestine Liberation Organization or its leader Yasir Arafat. The P.L.O., seen as a terrorist organization which would deny Israel the right to exist, has little backing among the American public.

But if many more Americans sympathize with Israel against the Arabs, and to a lesser but still considerable plurality, against the Palestinians as well, that support does not extend to a willingness for the United States to get directly involved in the conflict. Relatively few people, rarely more than a quarter, have been willing to send American troops to the Middle East, even in response to questions presenting such action as necessary to prevent the military annihilation of Israel, or to back it up against Soviet troops fighting on the Arab side. More surprising has been the finding in many surveys that the proportion of Americans who support material aid to Israel, particularly the sending of arms, is often smaller than that endorsing such action. Support for armed aid or financial backing to Israel most commonly increases to a positive plurality only during war-time or other crisis periods.

-47-

Our discussion of such possibilities obviously moves outside the realm of the analysis of public or group opinion into the domain of practical politics at the governing elite level. Clearly, as has been clear in recent months, factors such as those which affect Congressional views, or the prospects for election or re-election of major office holders, are more important than the opinions of the American public reflected in surveys. The intensity of feelings of key sections of the electorate is probably of more importance in the eyes of political leaders than the attitude of the public at large. And here the evidence would suggest that the pro-Israeli sectors of the electorate feel more deeply and passionately about the Middle East than other segments, a fact which is probably the most important datum produced by the opinion surveys.

Anti-Semitism

The question has frequently been raised as to the relationship between attitudes towards Jews in the United States and towards Israel. How much of the opposition to Israel is linked to anti-Semitic feelings? For example, is the greater antagonism to Israel by Blacks than whites related to greater anti-Semitism found among Blacks, some of which presumably is directed against Jews they see operating in their community. On the other hand, attitudes towards Israel may affect the feelings of non-Jews towards American Jews. As we have seen, a significant segment of those who feel that the United States' support of Israel is against American self-interest often also believe that the United States takes such a position because of the power, influence or lobbying activity of American Jews. Hence, it may be argued that negative reactions to Israel will adversely affect Jews living in the United States. There have been a number of studies of the public opinion taken from the 1930s through the middle 70s which have inquired about attitudes towards Jews. In this section we would like to summarize such materials before turning to an examination of

-49-

The reluctance to back Israel with troops or military aid should, however, be placed in the broader context of the fact that Americans are reluctant to do the same for any foreign nation, except possibly for those with whom they have had a close cultural tie, particularly the Englishspeaking countries, and some western European NATO states, bordering on the Communist world. Willingness to help Israel is generally higher than support for most other allies or dependencies of the United States. The majority of Americans, particularly in recent years, have been extremely reluctant to get involved in overseas conflicts and involvements, and would very much prefer to spend money to deal with domestic problems rather than abroad.

Finding such isolationist sentiments among the majority is hardly surprising. It has long been evident that internationalist views, support for foreign obligations, are much greater among the more educated portions of the population, and particularly among the elite and leadership groups. As we have seen, support for Israel increases with greater education and is highest among the leadership strata. Not surprisingly, they are much more likely to be knowledgeable and concerned about international problems, and to see the need for the United States to aid those nations with which it is allied because of common values or interests.

Given the knowledge that the support for an internationalist foreign policy generally and for active support of Israel, in particular, lies in the opinions of the foreign policy aware, more educated and leadership groups, it would seem evident that a change in the views among such groups as to what policy is in the national interest could result in a shift in Middle East policy, which would not meet with serious resistence among the public, particularly if it was presented in the context of measures to avoid involvement in war.

-48-

the inter-relationship between the two sets of attitudes.

To undertake this task we are fortunate in having a book on Jews in the Mind of America, edited by Charles Stember, which reports on various surveys taken between the 1930s and the early 1960s. Fn Some of the questions in these studies have been repeated in later years. In general, the data presented in the Stember volume suggest that a high level of anti-Semitism existed in this country in the 1930s which lasted through World War II. Negative feelings towards Jews began to fall with the end of the war to the point where, by 1962, the last year dealt with by Stember, they/declined quite considerably. For example, 42 percent felt that the Jews had too much financial power as of March 1938, a figure which rose to 46 by February 1942, and then decreased to 34 percent in March 1945, to 29 percent in February 1946 and to but 18 percent in June 1962. Replies that Jews have too much power in politics and government numbered 34 percent in December of 1942, 33 in March of 1945, 24 in February of 1946, and 12 in 1962. Responses to the general question "Do you think the Jews have too much power in the United States?" showed a similar decline: 42 percent said "too much" in March 1938, 43 percent in April 1940, 51 percent in December 1942, 56 to 58 percent in surveys taken in 1944, 1945 and 1946, but only 17 percent felt this way in June 1962, and in a survey taken by NORC in October 1964, only 11 percent.

This trend, however, which seems to have bottomed out in 1964, varied up and down in recent years. In January 1975 and January 1976, the Yankelovich organization asked "In general, do you feel that [various groups] has too much power in the United States?" In 1975, 37 percent said that American Jews have too much power, a figure which dropped to 26 percent in January a year later. In March 1977 a private study inquired: "Do you feel that American Jews have too much power and influence in our country...?", the percentage saying "too much" was even lower, 19. It should be noticed, moreover, that when Yankelovich asked such questions about a number of groups besides Jews, that the percentage answering "too much power" was larger for every other group except for church interests and Zionist organizations. In January of 1975, 60 percent said organized labor had too much power, and 63 percent felt the same way in January 1976. The largest proportion was critical of business and the oil companies: in January 1975, 80 percent said the oil companies had too much power, while 78 percent thought big business had the same excessive degree of power. The figures a year later were almost the same: 79 percent for the oil companies and 76 percent for big business. Over a third, 37 percent, credited "Arab interests" with too much power in January of 1975, a proportion that went up to 40 percent in January of 1976.

There can be little doubt that anti-Semitic attitudes declined steadily from the late 30s and early 40s to the early 60s, as indicated by answers to surveys which inquired how people felt about Jews as marriage partners, as neighbors, as employees, and in colleges. Thus, the proportion saying that colleges should limit the number of Jews they admit fell from 26 percent in 1938 to 4 percent in 1962. The percentages of those who expressed some objection to Jewish neighbors dropped from 30 in 1950 to 8 in 1962. Those who, in response to an open-end question, listed any objectionable qualities of Jews decreased from 63 percent in 1940 to 22 percent in 1962.

More recent surveys, however, dealing with other negative steroetypes, revealed higher but also declining precentages giving anti-Jewish replies. In 1964, 42 percent of non-Jewish respondents told NORC interviewers that "Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want." Ten years later to pull a Harris asked a slightly different question: "Jewish businessmen will usually try/ shady deal on you." and found that 21 percent agreed with that statement. NORC reported in 1964 that 52 percent agreed with the statement called "Jews stick together too much." But ten years later, in 1974, Harris found 27 percent agreeing with the statement "Jews always stick to their own and never give an outsider a break."

-51-

It is difficult to tell from the opinion polls to what extent negative responses to Jews reflect anti-Semitism, or whether there are certain attitude syndromes which apply to other groups as well. In October 1974, Yankelovich inquired about perceptions of the closeness of several American groups to their respective "homelands" -- not only the connections between Jews and Israel, but also the links of Irish, Greeks, Italians, Blacks, Poles, Germans, and Spanish-speaking people to their "motherlands." Each respondent was asked to choose among a number of alternatives the one that best represented his attitude toward such ties, whether people having close ties, or not, are good or bad for the United States. "Close ties are bad" ranged from a low of 5 percent for the Irish and the Poles to highs of 10 percent and 13 percent for the Blacks to Africa and the Jews to Israel. The percentages saying that close ties to a home country are good for the United States varied from 31 percent for the Irish, 30 for the Italians, and 29 for the Jews, to a low of 22 percent for Greeks, Blacks and Poles. For Germans and Spanish-speaking people the percentages were 23 and 24. It would seem, therefore, that there are not very serious differences in attitudes towards the overseas ties of Jews and non-Jews.

The number who respond negatively to questions concerning the ties of American Jews to Israel has not increased over the years, in spite of the manifest support given to Israel in, during, and following the 1967 and 1973 wars. In 1964, NORC reported 30 percent agreeing with the proposition "Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America." Ten years later, Harris repeated the question and found 26 percent in agreement, and 43 percent rejecting it. In six different surveys between 1974/Yankelovich asked: "Do you feel that most Jewish people in this country feel closer to the U.S. or Israel?" In the first one, 41 percent said the United States and 34 Israel, in the sixth, the "closer to the U.S." figure was 50 percent, while those saying to Israel had fallen to 27. In each poll, the college educated were much more likely to believe American

-52-

Jews were closer to this country, e.g., 60 percent U.S. to 18 Israel in 1976, than those with less education, 44 percent to U.S. and 30 to Israel.

Pat Caddell's Cambridge Survey also probed for anti-Semitic attitudes linked to Jewish support of Israel in the Fall of 1974 and the Summer of 1975. He asked respondents whether they agreed that "It seems that some people forget they are Americans when they rush to defend Israel" One third, 33 percent, agreed in both polls, as contrasted to 42-43 percent disagreeing. One third also felt that Jews have excessive influence on Middle East issues, agreeing in both polls that "Because of Jewish political influence in the U.S., our government has favored Israel when we should have been fairer to the Arabs." Only 37-38 percent rejected the statement as wrong. Caddell's findings for this statement were quite different from those reported by Harris in a January 1974 survey when the public disagreed by 49-25 percent with the statement "Jewish groups have too much political power and are forcing the U.S. government to be too pro-It would be wrong to conclude that those who criticize Jewish support Israel".

U.S. Middle East policy is not as strong as resentment against the role of other groups.

In four Yankelovich surveys taken from 1974 to 1977, big business, oil companies, Arab interests, and the media were much more likely to be credited with having "too much influence over our country's policies in the Middle East" than American Jews or Zionist organizations. The average of such judgments over the four-year period ran from 78 percent for the oil companies, 68 big corporations, 51 Arab interests and the media, 41 American Jews, 37 organized labor, to 31 for Zionist organizations. Jews were less likely than others to be blamed for domestic economic problems following the Yom Kippur War. In October 1974, when Yankelovich asked "Who or what do you feel is to blame for our economic difficulties at the present time?" 35 percent said big business, 18 labor unions, 14 percent the Arabs, 10 percent even agreed that economists are responsible, but only 3 percent said the Jews. When the question was given a more specific focus in 1975 in the following

-53-

terms "Some people have estimated that the national unemployment rate, which is now around 7 percent may go as high as 10 percent in the next few months. If unemployment should hit 10 percent, do you personally feel that [a specific group] will be primarily responsible, partially responsible, or not responsible for the increase in unemployment." The percentage selecting Jews as primarily or partially responsible was lower than for all of the eleven other groups. Over a third, 34 percent, said big business would be primarily responsible and 45 percent indicated partially responsible, for the trade unions the figures were 27 (primarily) and 47 (partially), for the media they were 10 and 33, for the Arab countries they were 19 and 37, for economists and college professors they were 6 and 27, while for Jews they were 4 and 20.

How much anti-Semitism is there in the United States today? This is obviously an impossible question to answer in absolute terms. Surveys taken between 1974 and 1976 do indicate that about one third of non-Jews give anti-Semitic answers, or at least responses in which they are willing to say that Jews differ from other groups in ways that might be interpreted to be negative. Thus, Harris's January 1975 survey of attitudes towards Jews, to be analyzed below, recorded 31 percent saying "Jews are irritating because they are too aggressive," percent indicating their belief that "Most of the slum owners are Jewish," 34 percent agreeing with the statement "When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews still choose money," and the same proportion also agreeing that "Jews feel superior to other groups." In polls administered in 1974, 1975 and 1976, Yankelovich reported that a third of his sample stated that "the election of a Jew as President would not be good for the country.

-54-

Perhaps the toughest question asked in a relatively recent survey designed to tap anti-Semitic feelings was contained in the 1974 Harris survey which inquired as to reactions to statements about the Jews made by General George Brown, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All respondents were first asked: "Recently, General George Brown, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that if Americans suffered enough as a result of the Arab oil boycott that they 'might get tough minded enough to stop the Jewish influence in this country and break that lobby'. In general, do you tend to agree or disagree with what General Brown said?". Of these respondents, 22 percent agreed and 46 percent disagreed, while 32 percent were not sure. When non-Jews only were then asked: "General Brown also said that the Jews 'Own the banks and the newspapers in this country. Just look at where the Jewish money is'. Do you tend to agree or disagree with that statement by General Brown?", one fifth, or 20 percent, agreed, 47 percent disagreed, while 33 percent said they were not sure. These responses may be looked at in two ways. One is that only one fifth agreed with these statements even when they were given the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the other hand, it may be more important to note that less than half of the non-Jewish respondents disagreed with the statement. Those who said they were not sure presumably included many who thought that there was some possibility that the statement was true but were unwilling to endorse it.

The decline in anti-Semitic attitudes reported from 1946 down to the present could conceivably reflect the transfer of positive attitudes from the state of Israel towards Disapora Jews, a development anticipated by some Zionists. Although the existence of such a process cannot be ruled out, the evidence with respect to changing attitudes toward other minorities, particularly Blacks, argues against it. Prejudice against various minorities, Jews, Blacks, and Orientals dropped steadily from the end of World War II on a variety of

-55-

issues. The younger cohorts and the better educated who become more numerous each year are invariably more accepting of minorities.^{FN} As Angus Campbell, the long-time head of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan notes, summing up data through 1970: "It cannot be doubted that since World War II there has been a massive shift in the racial attitudes of white Americans...[T] here has been a current in white attitudes, away from the traditional belief in white's supremecy...toward a more equalitarian view of the races and their appropriate relations."^{FN}

These changes in attitudes do not mean, of course, that racism directed against Blacks or anti-Semitic feelings have been eliminated or that social crises cannot revitalize them. The opinion surveys clearly indicate the persistence among many Americans of bigoted beliefs about Blacks and Jews. The rate of improvement in attitudes toward Blacks slowed down considerably in the late 60's and the 70's. As noted in our review of attitudes toward Jews, some anti-Semitic stereotypes have actually increased in strength during this latter period. The appeal of George Wallace in elections and primaries from 1964 to 1976 suggests that racism can still form the basis for a mass political movement.^{FN}

^{FN}S.M. Lipset and Earl Raab, <u>The Politics of Unreason</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1970), pp. 338-516.

-56-

15

^{FN}Mildred A. Schwartz, <u>Trends in White Attitudes Toward Negroes</u> (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1967); Paul B. Sheatsly, "White Attitudes Toward the Negro," Daedalus, 165 (Winter 196) pp

^{FN}Agnus Campbell, <u>White Attitudes Toward Black People</u> (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1971), p. 159; Sandra K. Schwartz and David C. Schwartz, "Convergence and Divergence in Political Orientations Between Blacks and Whites: 1960-1973," <u>Journal of Social Issues</u>, 32, No. 2 (1976), p. 156; Louis Haris, The Anguish of Change (New York: Norton, 1973).

The parallel improvement in sentiments about Blacks and Jews, however, suggest that the existence of the state of Israel has had little to do with the way Gentile Americans feel about their Jewish bretheren.

In succeeding sections of this paper, we shall attempt to analyze some of the characteristics of those who give anti-Semitic responses. It may be reiterated here for those who fear that attitudes towards Jews can contribute to an anti-Semitic political movement in the future or to opposition to support for Israel, that all the data suggest that Americans are much more likely to see other groups as the source of their difficulties.

-57-

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