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AMERICAN OPINION TOWARDS ISRAEL AND JEWS

By

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Close relationships between Israel and the United States have existed since the beginning of the Jewish state. Although the record of the United States in support of Jewish persecutees before and during World War II was not good, the United States was the first country to recognize the independence of Israel. President Truman announced recognition within 12 minutes of the formal declaration of independence.

The ties between the two countries have, of course, not been without strain. At times, particularly immediately before and during the Suez Crisis and War of 1956, the United States put great pressure on Israel not to take a bellicose stand vis-a-vis the Arabs. The U.S. forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai and Gaza strip. But that period apart, it may be said that Israel's closest supporter and ally in the international community has been this country.

During the 1970's, however, Israel has become increasingly isolated in the international community. The strong position of the Arabs, derivative from their control of oil supplies and their ability to use their monies as aid to various Third World countries, has led a number of countries, both in the Third World and in Europe, which had previously been strong public supporters of Israel, to either break diplomatic relations with it, or to take up an "even handed" policy.

Israel's position has also suffered because of its increasing identification, among left-of-center groups in the West, Communist states, and Third World nations, as a part of the international "have," conservative, imperialist, or anti-revolutionary bloc led by the United States. In spite of the strength of socialist parties (a majority in every Israeli election until 1977 which the non-socialists won), of labor and collectivist institutions (the strongest labor federation in the world, the Histadruth, a massive producer cooperative sector of the economy including the Kibbutz (collective farms), a large public

sector, and one of the most egalitarian income distributions in the world), left-wing groups which once enthusiastically supported Israel, now condemn it. This change in part reflects the identification of the Arabs with the Third World, and in particular, the African bloc, sympathy on the part of younger leftists in the West with the plight of the Palestinian Arabs, seen as oppressed refugees, and increased antagonism to the United States linked to the Vietnam War, which is transferred to its allies and client states. It is contended by some that the support and sympathy generated for Israel in reaction to the Nazi holocaust, and its resistance to British imperialism has declined because it has had little meaning for those who have come of age and political consciousness since these events. Israel, particularly since its overwhelming victory and occupation of Arab populated territories in 1967, is seen by many, who are disposed to sympathize with the weak, as a powerful militarist nation able to trounce its Arab neighbors. Conversely, conservative groupings, particularly in Western countries, presumably impressed by Israel's military prowess and ability to defeat communist backed foes, have become more supportive of Israel.

These changes in attitude toward Israel have had less impact on foreign policy and public opinion in the U.S. than elsewhere. But "less" is a comparative term and does not mean none. There is some indication that important sectors of the business community, involved in or hoping to do business with the oil-rich Arab states, elements within the American military impressed with the strategic importance of the Arab countries, "New Politics" Democrats and Independents, the small radical groupings, and the more liberal Protestant denominations, increasingly have moved to favor a more even-handed or even a pro-Arab position. Such forces, as yet, tend, for the most part, to be covert about their views on the Middle East and have had little impact on the dominant thrust of

American Middle East policies. The United States, both administration and Congress, remain more or less steadfast in support of Israel both with respect to material aid and in international forums.

These comments, and almost all of the opinion data presented in the paper, apply to the situation prior to the May 1977 Israeli elections in which the more conservative Likud movement led by a significant plurality of the votes. The program of this movement and its principal coalition partner, the National Religious Party (NRP), would retain the territories of preindependence Palestine for Israel.

← Whether the new government will continue to emphasize such views, or will compromise significantly remains to be seen. Meanwhile, however, the public abroad, including the American, is exposed to the view of an Israeli government which rejects past policies which placed primary emphasis on securing a full-fledged peace treaty which included normal state relations with all the Arabs and the premise that most of the occupied territories would be part of an Arab state linked to Jordan. It would seem evident the image projected by the new regime may further weaken, perhaps greatly, support for Israel among liberal-left opinion, while possibly strengthening it with conservative groups. The public reaction of the Carter administration and Congressional leaders will do much to structure the terms in which a Likud dominated Israel is viewed. It should be clear, therefore, that a period in Israel's relations to America and the world has ended, while a new one is beginning. The rules governing that new period may be quite different from the past.

In this report we report and explore the state of American public opinion with regard to Israel and Middle East events from the 1940s to 1977. We also deal with the extent of anti-Semitic feeling in the United States and seek to relate attitudes towards Jews to those toward the State

of Israel. One of the classic assumptions of the Zionist movement prior to the creation of the State, was that the "normalization" of the Jewish situation, the existence of a Jewish state, one like all other states, would help to regularize the situation of Jews abroad. It was suggested that non-Jews would see their Jewish fellow citizens in a more natural light if they could relate them to an existing nation, much as one may relate Polish-Americans to Poland or German-Americans to Germany. The existence of a Jewish state presumably would also serve to challenge stereotypes suggesting that Jews could not be or would not be farmers or manual workers, or that they could or would not fight in the military. Hence, it was argued that the existence of an independent, largely Jewish state would have the effect of weakening anti-Semitism abroad, on the presumption that attitudes toward Israel and Diaspora Jews are interlinked.

The considerable body of public opinion data dealing with the opinions about Jews and Israel collected in the United States permits an examination both of the sources of such sentiments, and their relationship to each other. The data that we use are the reports from opinion polls dealing with American attitudes towards the Middle East and Israel which have been gathered since the 1940's and the studies of attitudes towards Jews, which have been completed since the 1930's. The results of these studies allow us to estimate trends in both sets of opinions. In addition, we have available for detailed analysis a rather extensive study of attitudes towards Israel and American Jews which was collected by Louis Harris and Associates in December of 1947. That study examined the views of 3377 Americans.^{FN}

Attitudes towards a Jewish State and Israel: Trends, 1944-1967

In December 1944, as the war in Europe was drawing to an end, and as the world became aware of the Holocaust, of the way in which the Germans had tried to eliminate the entire Jewish population of Europe, the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago (NORC) inquired of a national sample of Americans whether they believed that the British, who then controlled Palestine, "should do what some Jews ask and set up a Jewish state there, or should do what some Arabs ask and not set up a Jewish state?" NORC repeated this question a year later, in November 1945. At both times many more Americans favored setting up a Jewish state than opposed it, by 36 to 22 percent in December 1944, increasing to 42 to 17 percent in November 1945. Although the percentages giving pro-Jewish or pro-Israel responses, as compared to pro-Arab ones, have varied over the years, the pattern set in these first polls taken 3 to 4 years before the creation of the state of Israel, has persisted. Many more Americans respond in support of Israel than of the Arabs.

Support for Jewish settlement in Palestine in the 1940s was even stronger than sentiment for the establishment of a Jewish state. Thus, in December of 1945, the Gallup Poll found that 76 percent favored Jews being allowed to settle in Palestine, while only 7 percent were opposed. In October 1947, as discussion grew concerning the future of the Palestinian mandate, Gallup reported that 65 percent of a national sample favored the idea that Palestine be divided into two states--one for the Arabs and the other for the Jews--while only 10 percent opposed this solution. When the situation reached the point of actual war, the proportions supporting the Jews declined considerably. Six different surveys taken between February 1948 and March 1949 by NORC indicated that slightly more than a third said that they sympathized with the Jews

in the fighting, while between 11 and 16 percent said that they favored the Arabs. A somewhat differently worded question asked by Roper in September 1945 as to which side, the Jews or the Arabs has "has the most right on its side" found 29 per cent saying the Jews and 16 percent the Arabs.

A second pattern emerged in the early period which also has continued down to the present, namely that Americans, while much more sympathetic to Israel than to the Arabs, have been much less disposed to support costly assistance to Israel, particularly the involvement of American troops. Thus, in January 1946, only 7 percent said they favored sending United States troops to help maintain the peace in Palestine, while 48 percent disapproved. Three months later when asked whether the United States should help England keep order in Palestine, 28 percent agreed that it should and 61 percent said it should keep out of the situation. When the question was put in terms of sending troops to help England keep order, the percentage approving declined to 21 percent while those disapproving rose to 74 percent.

American opinion was even more ambivalent during the early and mid-fifties. NORC inquired in five surveys between 1950 and 1956 as to how important it was "for the United States to cooperate closely with (countries named)....." Those who chose the "very important" option for Israel ran between 31 percent in 1950 to 34 and 35 percent in 1952-56. The range of those who felt the same way about the Arab countries was from 30 to 46. In two years, 1950 and 1955, the proportions of respondents who said that it was very important to cooperate closely with the Arab countries was greater than those saying the same for Israel. Both sides in the Middle East conflict ranked lower in importance to Americans than other countries, including those that

to 34 for the Arab countries and 31 for Israel. In 1952, 42 percent were in favor of close cooperation with Iran, while only 34 percent had the same feeling about Israel. In the same survey, a majority, 55 percent, chose the "very important" option for West Germany, and 26 percent strongly backed close cooperation with Titoist Yugoslavia. The limited importance of Israel during the early and mid-fifties may also be seen in the fact that NORC found that only 19 percent thought that "the United States should supply arms to Israel at the present time" while 63 percent were opposed.

Given the lack of clear-cut positive support for Israel, there was good reason for supporters of the Jewish state to feel anxious about American public opinion when the situation worsened in the mid-fifties, leading up to the Sinai War of 1956. Egypt had intensified its anti-Israeli policies with respect to the use of boycott, embargo, and blockade. Egypt had also concluded an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia and a mutual assistance pact with various Arab countries to be used against Israel. Ultimately, Egypt launched commando raids against Israel. Until the actual war broke out, the opinion polls indicated that most Americans did not know which side was to blame. Pre-war surveys by NORC in 1955 and 1956 found that 5 to 10 percent were saying that Israel was responsible for the trouble between Egypt and Israel, while 15 to 20 percent said that either the Arabs or Egypt was to blame. In November of 1956, following the October 29th Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai, the proportion saying that Israel was responsible for the conflict rose to 19 percent, while that blaming Egypt grew to 29.

In spite of the fact that the war actually followed on an Israeli attack, many more Americans chose to hold Egypt responsible for the conflict than Israel. A supplementary survey by NORC indicated that those who blamed Egypt saw the conflict arising out of pre-conflict hostile actions by the Arabs or Egypt, rather than flowing

specifically from Israel's attack. On the other hand, it should be noted that when asked whether "Israel was justified or not in sending arms into Egyptian territory," 43 percent replied that Israel was not justified, while 26 percent said that it was. In a Gallup survey, also taken in November 1956, only 10 percent said that they approved of "Israel's action in Egypt," while 47 percent disapproved. It is clear that in 1956 many people who were pro-Israel did not think that Israel should have gone to war. Israel was, of course, forced by the United States to evacuate the territories which it had taken over. Six months after the war, Gallup found that more Americans, 36 percent, felt that war was likely to flare up again than though it unlikely, (34 percent.) But when asked which side was more likely to start up renewed trouble, 33 said Egypt, as against 26 percent saying Israel-another indication that Americans tended to see Israel more as the victim than as the aggressor. The differences, of course, were not large.

Curiously, in the eleven year period between the Suez War of 1956 and the Six Day War of 1967, almost no one inquired as to the attitudes of Americans toward the still unresolved Middle East conflict. Seemingly, neither the commercial nor academic survey organizations thought that there was much interest in or significance to the issue. Some indication that they were right may be found in one national survey, primarily concerned with domestic anti-Semitism, which was conducted by NORC in 1964 for a research project at the University of California at Berkeley.^{FN} Two questions dealing with the Middle East were included in this study, and revealed that a large proportion of the respondents had little interest or knowledge about the conflict.

^{FN}. The survey was used in two books, Gertude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), and S.M. Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

Thus, when asked: "Suppose there were a war between the Arab nations and Israel. Which side do you think you would probably sympathize with?", less than a third stated a preference-25 percent for Israel and 7 for the Arabs. Slightly over two-fifths of those interviewed gave a "don't know" response, while 28 percent said they supported neither. Even more revealing is that fully three-quarters of all those interviewed said that they had not "heard or read about the relations between the Jews in Israel and the Arab refugees there" or, if they had heard of the issue, that they did not know how the refugees were treated (11 percent).

It is evident that three years before the renewed outbreak of hostilities, there was no groundswell of sympathy for Israel among the American public. It is worth noting, however, that in 1964 support for the Jewish state was correlated with higher educational and economic attainments, and that blacks were more likely to give pro-Arab responses (percent) than whites (percent) in some measure because of their lower education and economic attainments.

The Six Day War: Growth in Support for Israel

The events leading up to the Six Day War were largely a repetition of those which preceded the 1956 crisis. Once again, the Egyptians escalated their efforts against Israel, blockaded the Red Sea, and publicly made various preparations suggesting that they were about to go to war. As in 1956, however, Israel initiated military action by attacking Egypt, and again was victorious, capturing the Gaza Strip and the Sinai and also defeating Jordan and Syria, taking all the remaining territories that had once been Palestine, plus the Syrian Golan Heights. American public opinion was much more favorable to Israel than in 1956 or during the inter-war period. According to a Gallup Poll taken during the Six Day War, 48 percent said their sympathies lay more with Israel than with the Arab

states as compared to only 4 percent who replied that their sympathies lay with the Arabs. Harris' findings during the same period were 41 percent sympathetic to Israel and only 1 percent to the Arabs.

The overwhelming expression of sympathy for Israel by those willing to voice sentiments did not, however, extend to a willingness to use American troops in the Middle East. When Harris inquired "Suppose the U.S. were asked to send troops and military supplies to back the Israeli government in the war in the Middle East. Would you favor or oppose our sending troops and supplies to Israel?", only 24 percent supported such an action, while 54 percent opposed it.

In the months following the Six Day War, the American public seemingly shifted to an even more pro-Israel attitude as indicated by their answers to the questions dealing with the future of Jerusalem. Harris found that the percentage saying, let Israel keep control of Jerusalem increased from 10 in July to 43 in September, while those favoring the option of making it an "international city" dropped from 70 to 33. On the other hand, when asked in September whether the United States should send military aid to Israel, send aid won out by a slim margin, 42 percent in favor to 36 against, while the percentage supporting the sending of U.S. troops dropped to 22 with the opposition mounting to 54. Clearly many Americans continued to be reluctant to translate their sympathies with Israel into a mandate for American military involvement in the Middle East.

The preponderant expressions of "sympathy" for Israel were not a short-lived or temporary response to the Six Day War. A year and a half afterwards, in February 1969, Gallup repeated the sympathy question and found a very comparable pattern of reply: 43 percent for Israel and 4 percent for the Arabs. Twelve months later, February 1970, the response to Gallup's query was 38 percent for Israel and 2 percent for the Arabs. In August of the same year, the Harris survey reported a breakdown of 47 to 6.

Harris again found a similar distribution in July of 1971, 46 percent for Israel and 7 percent for the Arabs. Thus, in the years before the Yom Kippur War, those Americans who had opinions on the issue were overwhelmingly in favor of Israel.

Such opinions, of course, varied with education and socio-economic status. Different surveys taken in 1967, 1969, 1970, and 1971 by Gallup and Harris, which differentiated respondents according to their level of education, invariably reported that those who had attended college were much more favorable to Israel than those whose education was limited to high school, who, in turn, were more supportive than those who had never gone beyond grammar school. In 1967, Gallup's college interviewees were 67 percent for Israel, high school respondents 45 percent, and grade school 40 percent. In 1969, these figures read 58,43,28. In 1971, they were 58,42, 33. It should be noted that the drop-off in support for Israel among those with lesser education did not reflect increased backing for the Arabs. Rather, it was largely a function of the fact that many of those with less education indicated that they were uninformed on the issue, ("don't know"). Not surprisingly, since educational and economic achievements are correlated, data reported by Harris in 1967, 1970 and 1971 reveal that higher income was associated with sympathy for Israel. In July 1971, for example, 53 percent of those earning 15,000 dollars or more had positive views, compared to 34 among those whose income was under 5,000 dollars a year. As with education, however, lower attainments were associated with not having an opinion on the conflict, rather than with pro-Arab attitudes. These data suggest that effective public opinion, therefore, was in fact much more pro-Israel than the 8 to 1 figures for the total population would indicate. Those individuals who were knowledgeable and interested in the Middle East situation were even more overwhelmingly for Israel.

Two other characteristics differentiating opinion on the Middle East were religion and race. Two Gallup surveys taken in February in 1969 and 1970 found Catholics and blacks less supportive of Israel than Protestants and whites. In the second survey, 39 percent of all Protestants reported sympathizing with Israel as contrasted with 30 percent of Catholics and 21 percent of blacks. Fully 39 percent of the Catholics backed neither (34) or the Arabs (5). Black opinion (54 percent), however, was more likely to be uninterested or uninformed than unsympathetic to Israel.

1967,
Harris surveys taken in/1970 and 1971 reported similar variations. White Protestants were consistently more likely to report being more sympathetic to Israel than white Catholics, who in turn were much more favorable than blacks. In June 1971, for example, the range of opinion reporting pro-Israeli sentiments ran from 49 percent for the white Protestants to 40 for white Catholics and 30 for blacks. The Catholics were most disposed to indicate lack of sympathy with both sides (24), while the blacks had a higher proportion (14 percent) Arab sympathizers than did whites (7).

As in earlier years, the American public was much readier to express sympathies for Israel in the abstract than to approve specific forms of aid. In mid-1968, the Gallup Poll inquired of a sample of Americans what the United States ought to do if a full-scale war broke out between the Israelis and the Arabs within the next five years. Asked whether the United States "should or should not supply arms and materials to Israel" only 24 percent favored supplying arms as against 59 who opposed. It should be noted, however, that only 3 percent favored supplying arms to the Arabs as compared to 79 percent who were against. When the question was posed as to whether the U.S. should send troops to help Israel, not

surprisingly only 9 percent favored sending troops as against 77 percent who were opposed. A year later, Harris asked what the United States should do if as a result of invasion Israel were "in danger of being overrun." A plurality, 44 to 39 percent, supported aid short of military force; only 9 percent backed the sending of troops. On these questions, as on those dealing with general sympathy, the college educated were much more likely to be supportive of Israel. Gallup noted that 38 percent of the college educated favored sending arms and materials compared to 15 percent of those who had not gone beyond grammar school. Gallup was to ask three times--in 1968, 1969, and 1970--what the United States should do if full-scale war broke out in the next five years. In these surveys, the interviewees were not asked to react to specific options, but rather to volunteer responses to open-ended questions. By far the largest percentage of respondents, ranging from 44 to 61, said that we should "stay out of the conflict." Only one-tenth in each of these three surveys mentioned support for any concrete form of aid.

Americans exhibited much stronger support for Israel when pollsters questioned them about the Middle East issues in the context of the larger East-West conflict. Thus in various surveys taken in the early seventies the proportion favoring aid to Israel increased sharply whenever the question mentioned the fact that Arabs were being backed by the Russians or the Communists. In 1971, Gallup asked what action the respondent would want to see us take if Israel were to be attacked by "Communist-backed forces." In response to such a wording, 11 percent said send troops, another 44 percent, send military supplies, and only 33 said we should refuse to get involved. In 1970 and 1971, Harris also asked a number of questions linking the Arabs to Russian backing and found similar increases in support for Israel. In July 1970, he asked respondents to react to the statement: "If it looked as though Israel were going to be taken over by the Russians and the Arabs, the U.S. would have to do everything to save Israel, including going to war." Surprisingly, precisely the same percentage,

38, favored this bellicose proposal as opposed it. Six months later in January, he inquired: "Suppose it looked as though the Arabs, with the help of the Russians, were going to take over Israel in the Middle East. Would you favor or oppose sending U.S. troops to keep Israel from being taken over?" When the question was put this way, 39 percent of the respondents favored sending troops as compared to 44 percent who opposed it. Curiously, a repetition of this question in July 1971, just six months later, yielded a much smaller percentage in favor of sending troops to prevent Israel from being taken over, 25 percent, while 52 percent indicated their opposition. This "decline" may have resulted from the fact that in July Harris included this question with a number of others in which the respondents were given the opportunity to support less stringent ways of aiding Israel such as "giving high-powered anti-aircraft missiles to Israel to match the missiles Russia had given Egypt." This question produced 39 percent in favor of giving such aid to Israel as compared to 40 percent opposed. It also should be noted that in this same survey, the public agreed by 61 to 26 percent with the statement "the U.S. has achieved little by going to war to save other countries, and in the future should let other countries defend themselves." Such pacifist sentiments had increased from 54-31 percent in January. Seemingly, they reflected reaction to the Vietnam fiasco.

The Yom Kippur War

Surveys conducted during and after the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 again elicited extremely high percentages sympathizing with Israel. In a poll taken from October 6 to 8, Gallup found that 47 percent supported Israel, while 6 percent backed the Arab states. He reported the same distribution of opinion two weeks later in a poll taken October 19 to 22. A Roper survey carried out in November 1973 revealed 48 percent indicating that

their sympathies were more with Israel, as compared to 7 percent supporting the Arab states. Just one month later, in December, Roper reported 41 percent sympathetic to Israel, 6 percent to Arab nations. Gallup's figures for the same months were 50 percent backing Israel as compared to 7 for the Arabs. Some indication that there may have been more support for the Arabs than the small percentages expressing sympathy for them indicates was suggested by the fact that a Harris poll taken shortly after the war found 24 percent in agreement with the Arab argument that they were "justified in fighting this war to try to get back the territory Israel has occupied since 1967," while 49 percent rejected the contention.

The predominant sympathy for Israel, however, did not translate into overwhelming support of military or financial assistance. Thus in a poll taken during the war by the Harris organization, a plurality, 46 percent said that the U.S. "was right in sending planes or other military supplies to Israel," while 34 percent thought that we should have taken an unspecified different course. Such pro-Israeli sentiment, however, was much greater than it had been seven years earlier at the time of the Six Day War, when Harris found that only 35 percent agreed that the U.S. was right to send aid, while 39 percent favored a different course. Gallup and Yankelovich, however, reported less support for aid during the Yom Kippur war. Gallup, in a poll conducted during the war, found 37 percent endorsing "arms and materials to Israel" with 49 percent against. A retrospective question asked in March 1974 by the Yankelovich organization inquired whether, at the time that war broke out in the Middle East in October, the respondents had been "in favor or opposed to the U.S. giving Israel financial aid? How about military equipment?" The percentages for financial aid were 41 for and 43 against, virtually the same percentages as for the military aid. Again it may be noted that

breakdowns among the respondents indicated that increased levels of education were correlated with sympathy for Israel and with support for various concrete forms of assistance. Thus the Yankelovich survey reported that 56 percent of college graduates favored military aid to Israel as compared to 44 percent of those with some college, and 43 among high school graduates, and only 32 of those with less than 12 grades of schooling.

Current Attitudes Toward the Middle East

Various surveys taken since the Yom Kippur War continue to find considerable support for Israel. In July 1974, Yankelovich reported that 74 percent said that the continuance of Israel as a Jewish state is important to our country and to people like themselves, as against 24 percent who said it is not that important. Roper queried seven national samples at various times from June 1974 to March 1977 asking whether people find themselves "more in sympathy with Israel, or more in sympathy with the Arab nations." In all of the surveys, sympathy for the Arabs has held constant between 5 and 7 percent. Support for Israel, on the other hand, has fluctuated between the 36 percent and 47 percent figure. The two 1977 surveys taken in January and March yielded 47 and 43 percent for Israel and 6 and 5 for the Arabs. Gallup and Harris also reported comparable findings for very similar questions. Thus in 1975 Gallup reported a 44 to 8 distribution, while Harris' results were 52 to 7. And Yankelovich, a year later in January 1976, found that 56 percent said they would identify with Israel in another war as compared to 9 percent for the Arabs. In March 1977, a private poll asked a more general question, not specifically tied to a new war, "Which side do you personally support in the Middle East conflict...?" and reported that 45 percent said Israel, 2 the Arabs, 41 neither one and 12 percent not sure.

A somewhat different and more extreme question was presented earlier by Harris, who inquired in December 1974 whether "If there were another war

in the Middle East and Israel were overrun by the Arabs, would you be very upset, mildly upset, mildly pleased, or very pleased?" His findings were 44 percent very upset, 34 percent mildly upset, 2 percent mildly pleased, 1 percent very pleased and 19 percent not sure. Another poll also touched on similar sentiments when it inquired in March 1977 : "If Israel were destroyed by the Arabs and ceased to exist as an independent state, would this leave you indifferent, sorry but not personally affected, or feeling a deep sense of personal loss?" Only 13 percent replied "indifferent," 27 said they would feel "a deep sense of personal loss," and the remaining 60 indicated "sorry but not personally affected." Many of the latter group, however, clearly were quite pro-Israel, since 66 percent of those queried in the same survey agreed that "the continuation of Israel as a Jewish state is important to our country and people like yourself," while only 21 percent replied "not important."

A somewhat different striking indication of the preferences of the public was suggested by a national sample interviewed by Pat Caddell's Cambridge Survey in the summer of 1975. He gave respondents a list of images and asked them "Does each word apply more to the Arabs or more to the Israelis?" The replies are given in Table I below.

Table I
Images of Israelis and Arabs

Does each word apply more to the Arabs or more to the Israelis?	<i>More to Israelis</i>	<i>More to Arabs</i>	<i>To both equally</i>	<i>To neither</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Peaceful	41%	7%	9%	24%	19%
Honest	39	6	13	18	25
Intelligent	39	8	26	5	21
"Like Americans"	50	5	8	17	21
Friendly	46	6	15	11	23
Backward	6	47	7	15	25
Underdeveloped	9	47	10	10	25
Poor	21	34	9	15	22
Greedy	9	41	20	77	23
Arrogant	11	37	19	7	26
Moderate	31	8	10	21	30
Developing	33	20	21	3	24
Barbaric	4	38	8	23	28

There is some indication in recent surveys that Americans are more likely to express sympathy for "the Palestinians" than for "the Arabs." In December 1974, Harris inquired: "In the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more--Israel or the Palestinians?" Israel lead 33 percent to 14. Harris presented respondents with a very similar question at another place in the interview, except that the word Arabs was substituted for Palestinians. This formulation increased support for Israel by 20 percent, to 53, while only 7 percent expressed sympathy for the Arabs as distinct from the 14 percent who backed the Palestinians. Another pollster in March 1977 found similar differences. Thus a majority, 52 percent, agreed that "The Palestinians have a right to a homeland as much as the Jews do." But only 16 percent felt the same way about the statement "The Arabs have a strong moral case against Israel which deserves more attention than we give it." Presumably the term "Palestinians" involves the image of refugees or of a people denied their claim to a nationhood. Some evidence that this is so is contained in the two surveys. Almost as many of Harris' respondents, 29 percent, agreed with the statement that "Israel has mistreated the Palestinian refugees and that is wrong," as disagreed (30 percent), while 41 percent said they were not sure or did not know. Among the 61 percent of those polled in March 1977 who had heard about the PLO, 55 percent thought "that the Palestinian refugees have legitimate claims against Israel," while 18 percent disagreed.

Sympathy for the Palestinians, however, does not appear to carry over to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Questions posed by surveyers in 1975, 1976 and 1977 which asked respondents to make a number of comparative evaluations of Israel and the PLO revealed overwhelming preference for Israel. People were asked to react separately to a number

of statements about each. In the most recent survey, 88 percent felt that "we can get along" with Israel but only 23 percent said the same for the PLO. Almost three quarters thought that we "will not be able to get along with" the PLO compared to a tenth feeling the same way about Israel. Four fifths felt that the PLO was "anti-U.S." while only a tenth had comparable opinions about Israel. Over seven-tenths believed that Israel was "democratic", only 7 percent thought the same about the PLO. Israel has steadily bettered its positive image, while the PLO has fallen in all the comparative questions in the three studies. Similarly, American opinion, relatively unsympathetic to Israel's refusal to negotiate with the PLO in 1975, had turned more favorable by 1977. When asked by Yankelovich whether "Israel is doing the right thing in refusing to negotiate with PLO," in January 1975, only 29 percent said Israel was right, 36 percent felt it was wrong, while 35 percent were not sure. A year later, the responses were slightly more positive from Israel's point of view, with 31 percent saying right, 31 wrong, and 38 not sure, and in 1977 a pollster produced a plurality in Israel's favor with 40 percent saying it is right in not negotiating as compared to 21 percent who think this policy is wrong.

Variations in Question Wording and Response

As noted earlier, the pattern of responses to questions asked by different surveys with respect to the character of the American involvement in the Middle East has varied greatly, depending on the form of the question, such as whether or not it identifies the opponents of Israel with the Russians or the Communist-backed forces. In a six month period between November 1974 and April 1975, Harris, Gallup and Yankelovich reported sharply different ^{percentages} in favor of the U.S. sending military supplies to Israel in five surveys. In November 1974, a Yankelovich poll found only 31 percent in favor of the United States sending arms to Israel, while 57 percent were against. A month and a half later, Harris found that 65 percent said the United States was

right to send military supplies to Israel, as compared to 21 percent who said it was wrong to do so. In January 1975, Yankelovich found 45 percent in favor of military aid to Israel in response to one question, a figure which declined to 28 percent when the question was formulated differently in the same survey. And a Gallup poll also taken in January found that only 16 percent supported military aid of various types for the Jewish state, with another 7 percent urging general support. Over half the respondents, 55 percent, gave Gallup interviewers responses which were coded under the heading, "stay out of the conflict." In February, however, Gallup found that 29 percent backed supplies to Israel, while 10 percent favored military aid to the Arabs. A couple of months later, however, Gallup reported that 54 percent favored sending either military supplies (42 percent) or American troops (12 percent), while only 37 percent opposed American aid to Israel in a renewed Middle East conflagration.

Presumably, these drastic variations resulted from the very different way the questions were formulated in the five studies. In January, Harris ^{elicited} interviewers / a 65 percent positive response for military aid to Israel when they asked: "As you know, the United States has sent planes, tanks, artillery, and other weapons to arm Israel. The Russians have sent similar military supplies for Egypt and Syria. In general, with the Russians arming Egypt and Syria, do you think the United States is right or wrong to send Israel the military supplies it needs?" Yankelovich found a 31 percent figure in November in reply to a question about military aid to Israel in the context of queries about a number of countries: "The United States sends arms and military equipment to a number of foreign countries. Do you personally feel that the United States should or should not send arms to [country A, B, C, Israel]?" His 45 percent favorable response to military aid in January was in reply to the question: "In view of the situation in the Middle East, do you feel that United States should increase its present

aid to Israel, continue it at the same level as now, or cut it back."

The much lower 28 percent figure in the same survey was in response to the question: "Do you favor selling arms and military equipment to both Israel and the Arabs, just Israel, just Arabs, or neither." Fourteen percent said, "Both"; another 14 percent, "Just Israel"; and almost two thirds (63 percent) opposed selling arms to either. Gallup's findings of 29 percent favorable to aid to Israel and 10 percent to the Arabs came in response to a similar question posed in February when he asked: "Should the U.S. supply military aid to Israel? To the Arabs?"

Gallup's low report of ^{only} 16 percent ^{favoring aid to Israel} was obtained in January in reply to an open-ended question: "What should the United States do if a full-scale war breaks out in the Middle East?" His high estimate of 54 occurred in April in answer to the query: "In the event a nation is attacked by Communist-backed forces, there are several things the United States can do about it. What action would you want us to take if Israel is attacked-- send American troops, or send military supplies but not send American troops, or refuse to get involved?"

Harris also found heavy support for aid to Israel when he asked in the January 1975 survey: "If war broke out again in the Middle East between the Arabs and Israel, would you favor or oppose the United States continuing to send military supplies, but not troops or personnel, to help Israel?" Two-thirds favored continued military supplies while only 24 percent were opposed.

These eight questions produced responses of 66 percent, 45 percent, 31 percent, 28 percent, 29 percent, 16 percent, 67 percent and 54 percent in favor of sending or selling arms and/or troops to aid Israel. And finally, it must be reported that a Harris survey of February 1975 found the public opposed to "selling military equipment to [all] nations" by 53 percent to 35 percent.

Questions seeking to find out how the American public reacted to Arab control of oil also yielded varying results. In January 1974, they agreed, 65-20 percent, that they do not "resent being cold this winter because this country is supporting Israel in the Middle East." Harris reported that in four surveys, taken between October 1973 and January 1977, Americans rejected by lopsided majorities the argument that "we need Arab oil for our gasoline shortage here at home, so we had better find ways to get along with the Arabs even if that means supporting Israel less." The distributions were 58-26 percent in October 1973, 61-23 in January 1974, 68-20 in January 1975, and 60-24 in January 1977. In January 1975, Harris also asked whether if the only way we could "get Arab oil in enough quantity and at lower prices were to stop supporting Israel with military aid, would you favor or oppose such a move by this country?" and found that only 18 percent favored cutting off aid to get oil at lower prices, as compared to 63 percent who opposed it.

Less support for Israel was indicated by Caddell's Cambridge Survey which found only slightly more people, 44 percent, linking a need to be more friendly to the Arabs to get their oil, than opposed such a policy, 40 percent, when in the summer of 1975 he asked people their opinion of the statement "Since the Arab countries have the oil, American policy ought to figure out ways of becoming their friends." More recently a private poll asked respondents for a number of "possible sacrifices" which might be involved in supporting Israel, "whether you think it's a price we should be willing to pay for supporting Israel or whether it's too high a price to pay?" Only a small plurality, 48 to 47 said that they were willing to support Israel though "The Arabs might raise oil prices and our own economy will suffer," while a majority, 55 percent to 41, said that the price for supporting Israel was too high if it meant that "the Arabs might cut off our oil supplies." Surprisingly, given these replies, a similar majority, 51 to 41, stated they were willing to have the U.S. support Israel, even if it meant that "the Arab boycott of United States firms dealing with Israel will cost Americans jobs."

Another example of the way in which the respondents varied in answering different formulations of what appear to be the same subject may be found in the Caddell findings in two polls conducted in the Fall of 1974 and the Summer of 1975. A plurality, 44 percent in the first and 42 in the second agreed with the statement "America's support of Israel in the Mideast is the proper policy and should be continued," compared to 26 percent who disagreed in each. But a majority, 51 percent in both surveys also indicated they felt that America's policy was too pro-Israel by agreeing that "America's policy in the Mideast has been overly pro-Israel and should be changed to be fair to all," while 24 percent in each disagreed. Clearly, cue words such as continue "the proper policy" or change to "be fair to all" can give a different meaning to what on the surface appear to be straight-forward similar questions. Another form of the "even-handed" question asked by a New York Times-CBS poll in April 1976, inquiring whether "in addition to military aid to Israel, the United States should sell arms to Egypt in order to play a more even-handed role in the Middle East?" ^{found that} only 21 percent said that it should, while 59 percent disagreed, precisely the opposite distribution to that reported by Caddell 9 months earlier.

As noted , the very mention of the possibility of sending U.S. troops to the Middle East produces what is apparently a much lower level of support for Israel. Thus, even though in April 1975, Gallup inquired about possible U.S. responses to an attack on Israel by "Communist-backed forces," only twelve percent favored sending troops, 42 said supplies, and 37 percent that we should refuse to get involved. The summer of the same year, Caddell provided his respondents with only two options, favoring or opposing the sending of troops to protect Israel, and found 24 percent for and 57 against. Roper in asking respondents twice in 1975 and once in 1977, what the U.S. should do in the case of a war between Israel and the Arab countries, gave them three options, "take no sides," "support Israel with

economic aid and arms, but without sending U.S. troops even if that should mean Israel would be defeated," and "do whatever is necessary to preserve and save the state of Israel, including sending U.S. troops," found that the largest group, 50 percent in early 1975 and 42 in 1977, chose "take no sides." In the latter poll, 34 percent opted for aid and arms, while 16 percent favored sending troops. And in March 1977, when a different poll asked whether in an effort to bring about peace in the Middle East "the United States should sign a formal treaty with Israel promising to come to her aid with arms and troops in case of aggression by an outside country," 26 percent favored such a commitment, while 45 opposed it.

Public Support for Israel

The orientation of the American public with respect to the Middle East crisis seems fairly clear. From the beginning of the conflict in the late 40s down to the present, many more Americans have been supportive of Israel than of the Arab states. Most noteworthy is the fact that the percentage so supportive reached a much higher level than in any preceeding period, at the time of the Six Day War, when close to half of those surveyed by different pollsters indicated sympathy for Israel. Support has largely remained at this level down to the present, despite the oil crisis which developed in tandem with the Yom Kippur War and the apparent increase in isolationist sentiment following on the American fiasco in Vietnam. This figure is much higher than the 25-35 percent sympathetic to Israel in the late 1940s or the 25 percent reported in 1964. Conversely, backing for the Arabs has declined from the 15 percent figure characteristic of polls taken in the early period to the 5-7 percent ones which have been found by almost all surveys taken from 1967 to 1977. The fears of many that as time went on, distance from the Holocaust and from the events that led to Israel's founding, as well as the increase in opposition to Israel in other countries, would lead to a decline in American sympathy for Israel has not occurred. Instead,

as we have seen, support has greatly increased. It is not a residue of pity or shame over the massacre of six million Jews that has produced support for Israel, but rather admiration for the way in which a small democratic nation, allied to the United States, has been able successfully to stand off and defeat the massive onslaughts of Arab armies. It would seem ^{that it is} admiration of success that underlies the widespread American backing for the Jewish state during the last ten years.

It must be reiterated, however, that the American public has been consistent in its feeling that the United States should not get militarily involved in the Middle East. The percentages favoring the sending of U.S. troops to help Israel against a communist-backed attack, or, in the extreme case, against being overrun in a war, have rarely been above 25 percent. Much larger proportions have opposed the sending of troops no matter what the circumstances. Of course, decisive pluralities of the public, ranging upwards to two thirds have, on occasion, supported the giving or sending of military aid to Israel, particularly if Israel were threatened by a communist-aided enemy or were at war. The increased strength of the Arabs internationally, and their ability to hamper the United States economically through an oil boycott or price increase, have apparently not served to reduce the willingness of Americans to continue to support Israel as an ally.

The characteristics of supporters of Israel reported in the polls over the years have also remained steady. Backing for Israel, both with respect to sympathy and aid questions, has consistently been linked to greater education, occupational status and income. Israel has been strongest with the most knowledgeable and presumably most active and influential segment of the body politic.

Issues in the Middle East Conflict

Some of the polls have inquired as to the public's attitude toward the major political issue dividing Israel and its Arab neighbors since the 1967 war--the occupied territories. A few weeks after the war, Harris reported that the public

disagreed by 62 to 21 percent with the proposition that Israel should withdraw "from the Arab territory before other issues can be settled." About the same time, Gallup asked what should be done with the land Israel had conquered. Only 15 percent favored giving all the area back as compared to 24 percent who said that Israel should keep all the land. The largest proportion, close to half the sample, 49 percent, said that it should keep some of the territories. In July 1970, Harris again found the public rejected by 43 to 24 percent the proposition that "Israel should give back the territory it gained from the war of 1967." In three polls taken after the Yom Kippur War, in December 1973, June 1974 and June 1975, Roper inquired as to what Israel ought to do about the captured regions, offering respondents four options. The reply pattern was remarkably stable over this period. Only 6-7 percent said that Israel should give up all the territories, regardless of circumstances. Another 25 percent in each survey favored yielding all or most, but only "if a satisfactory treaty can be negotiated with the Arabs that will guarantee her [Israel's] existence as a state." The proportion saying that it is now time "for Israel to make some concessions, but it is important that she keep whatever territory is essential for her defense," varied from 27 percent in 1973 to 30 in 1975, while 13-14 percent thought that "Israel should keep all the territory she has won in the last two Arab-Israeli wars."

Harris and Caddell reported different response distributions to questions which gave respondents the simple option of approving or opposing Israel's returning the territories. In January 1975 Harris found 25 percent agreeing and 49 percent disagreeing with the statement "Israel should give back the territory it gained from the war of '67." Caddell, in the Fall of 1974 and again in the Summer of 1975 asked interviewees to react to the proposition "The Israelis ought to give up all the territory they have captured since 1967 if the Arabs agree to peace." Thirty-six percent agreed in both surveys, while 36 disagreed the first time and 34 percent the second.

Seemingly, the difference in the results of the two polls lay in the fact that Harris did not attach any conditions to the return of the territories while Caddell added the requirement that "the Arab states agree to peace."

Clearly, as we have seen repeatedly, different question formats can produce what appear to be divergent, sometimes even contradictory, results. Thus, when a private poll inquired of a national sample in March 1977, whether certain things that have been mentioned are a major or a minor obstacle to peace in the Middle East, it found that 55 percent said "the Israelis' refusal to return to pre-1967 boundaries" was a major obstacle. Conversely, a significantly larger percentage, 73, felt that "The Arabs' refusal to recognize Israel as an independent state" was also a major hurdle. And the same respondents also told their interviewers by 45 percent to 26, that they disagreed with the proposal that "The United States should reduce its support of Israel unless the Israelis are willing to compromise and give back some of the land they took from the Arabs during the recent wars."

It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the reactions of the public to these issues. Yet, it would appear that the bulk of the American public holds the position that Israel should give back a large proportion of the territories in return for a just peace that will guarantee the nation's existence, but that Israel should retain some portion of the territory for security purposes.

The response pattern has been more consistent to queries dealing with which side is the principal source of continued unrest and the most probable aggressor should a new war break out. Americans have been ^{much} more disposed to blame the Arabs rather than the Israelis. Thus in the Summer of 1975, Caddell found that by three to one, 33 percent to 10, more people said that the Arab states were more responsible than Israel for "the continuing crisis in the Middle East." Yankelovich found even more negative judgments concerning the role of the Arabs when in August 1975 he asked "In the current

situation, do you feel that the Arab nations are really interested in making peace with Israel, or do you feel that they are not interested in making peace, but rather in destroying Israel?" Less than a fifth, 17 percent, thought the Arabs were interested in peace while a majority, 53 percent, in the first survey and 56 in the second, said they were out to destroy Israel. A private survey taken in March 1977 found in response to a similar query that 19 percent felt the Arabs wanted peace and 56 percent said they were out to eliminate Israel. In line with the replies to these questions, those interviewed in 1977, when asked which side is "likely to be the main aggressor" if war should break out, said the Arab countries rather than Israel by 59 percent to 16.

It is interesting to note that when questioned in 1975 and again in 1977: "In the current situation, do you feel that the Israelis are doing everything possible to achieve a peace settlement or do you feel that their attitudes and demands are unreasonable?" in 1975, a plurality, 37 percent, felt Israel's demands were unreasonable as contrasted to 23 percent who then said Israel was trying to gain peace. Two years later the plurality shifted. Many more, 39 percent, thought that Israel was doing everything to achieve peace, while the proportion who felt that Israel's demands were unreasonable dropped to 29 percent.

Americans remain pessimistic about the prospects for an end to the conflict, but they have faith in Israel's ability to win a new war and to survive. In 1975, Gallup found that 61 percent thought that "another war between the Israelis and the Arabs is likely to occur this year." Harris inquired in 1974, 1976 and again early in 1977: "How would you rate the chances of working out a total peace settlement in the Middle East...?" and found that the 13 percent figure for those who expected a settlement in 1974 had climbed slightly to 22 percent in 1977, while the percentage of those with pessimistic views dropped from 73 to 65. When asked in another survey in March 1977: "In the end, do you think that lasting peace will come to the

Middle East?" only one third believed that it will, while 45 percent felt that it will not, and 21 percent were unsure. In spite of their expectation of continued conflict, the overwhelming majority said that they "personally expect Israel as a Jewish state to exist 20 years from now," while only 9 percent did not. Twice as many, 44 percent to 21, thought that Israel is more likely than the Arabs to win another war.

Attitudes Toward Specific Countries

The opinions of Americans toward the Middle East conflict may also be evaluated by comparing opinions about Israel and the Arab states with attitudes towards other countries. In January 1975, Harris asked: "Which countries [from a list of 12] do you feel the U.S. has a special stake in seeing that they are not overtaken militarily?" Canada led the list with 49 percent, while Israel was second with 43, and Great Britain third with 34. Backing for Arab nations on the list varied from 13 percent for Saudi-Arabia and 10 for Egypt to 5 for Libya. Less favorable findings for Israel were, however, reported in another Harris survey taken about the same time which inquired: "Suppose there was a danger of a communist takeover of [various countries specifically named], would you favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops?" Not surprisingly, Americans were most disposed to support the use of troops in the defense of Canada, 65 percent in favor as against 24 percent opposed. England was second with 52 percent favorable and 35 percent against. The figures for Western Europe were 42 to 44 and for Australia 39 to 45 percent. Brazil came out just ahead of Israel with 32 percent favorable and 49 opposed, while the figures for Israel were 31 percent willing to send troops as compared to 52 against. The countries for which support was lower than for Israel were Japan, Taiwan, Greece, South Korea, Iran, Thailand, and India. In the case of Greece, for example, only 26 percent favored sending troops as against 55 opposed, while for South Korea the figures were 25 to 59.

Pat Caddell's Cambridge Survey organization also inquired in the Spring of 1975 as to whether respondents felt that "we should sell weapons to" Israel, France, India, Saudi Arabia, Chile, Iran, Mexico and Egypt. More people were opposed to selling arms to each than endorsing/^{doing}so. Israel, however, had the most in favor, 41 percent, and the least against, 43. The figures for France were 37 percent for and and 46 con, while for Mexico, they were 38 to 45. The largest percentages against selling arms, 60, were reported for the two Arab countries on the list, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while slightly over a fifth backed such sales/^{to them}. Sentiment was also quite negative to providing arms for Chile, Iran and India.

Comparative evaluations of American attitudes to various nations have also been reported by the Gallup Poll, NORC, and a/^{recent}private survey. Over the years, the former has asked respondents to indicate on a ten-point scale their opinions of various nations, ranging from very favorable down to very unfavorable. Israel and Egypt were first included in such a survey in 1956, when only 49 percent indicated that they had a favorable opinion of Israel as contrasted to 31 percent for Egypt. A much larger percentage, 68, expressed positive feelings toward England and France. By 1966 favorable opinion for Israel had climbed to 64 percent, in contrast to 46 for Egypt and 79 for England. In 1967, at the time of the Six-Day War, 74 percent were favorable to Israel compared to 85 percent for England, 89 percent for Australia, 74 percent for Argentina, and 76 for Brazil. A 1976 Gallup survey found the percentage favorable to Israel down to a still respectable 65, while Egypt's popularity stood at 49. The corresponding figures for other countries were England 87, Holland 85, Brazil 66, and Taiwan 55.

NORC asked respondents to evaluate eight countries on a ten-point scale ranging from "like very much" to "dislike very much" in two national surveys in 1974 and 1975. The results were similar to those in the Gallup poll. The

percentages favorable to Israel were 68 and 62, while for Egypt, favorability stood at 48 and 44 percent. America's former enemy and current ally, Japan, received slightly better ratings than Israel, 70 and 66, as did Brazil, 68 and 64. The countries closest to the U.S. culturally, Canada and England, were judged most positively of all, 92 and 91 for Canada, and 85 and 84 for England. The two major Communist nations were least popular, 46 and 44 favorable to Russia and 41 and 36 for China.

In March 1977, a major / ^{pollster} asked his respondents to state with respect to eight countries and the Palestinians whether they consider each "to be a close friend and ally of the United States, a neutral country, or a country which is unfriendly to the United States?" As in other surveys, more people were positive about Canada and England, 72 and 71 percent regarded them as friends, while only 2 to 3 percent saw them as unfriendly. Israel was third with 48 percent saying friendly, and 8 percent, unfriendly. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were regarded as a friend by only 12 percent, while 26 and 28 percent identified them as unfriendly. Surprisingly, opinions about the Palestinians were almost as negative as those for the Soviet Union and Communist China. Only 6 percent identified the Palestinians as a friend, while 42 percent regarded them as unfriendly.

These comparative measures of sentiment by six different polling agencies taken between 1974 and 1977 again indicate that Americans have a much more positive feeling for Israel / ^{than towards the Arabs,} but it should be noted that the proportion so supportive is not as large as those for Western Europe or the English-speaking countries, and that close to a third of those queried by NORC said that they disliked Israel. The Arab states and the Palestinians, however, clearly have little popularity.

Social Differences

Analyses of the social characteristics associated with pro-Israeli views in reply to these questions continue to show a relationship with increased education, income and occupational status. The Harris January 1975

survey found 60 percent of those who had attended college sympathetic to Israel, compared to 51 percent for the high school educated and 47 among those who had not gone beyond grammar school. Over half of the college educated, 54 percent, believed that the U.S. has a special stake in seeing that Israel is not overtaken militarily, while only 38 percent of those who had not gone beyond high school and 30 percent of the grammar school educated felt the same way. The 1976 Gallup national rating study indicated that 77 percent of those who had been exposed to higher education rated Israel favorably, 62 percent of the high school population had such opinions, but only 50 percent of those with less education felt this way. In January 1977, Roper reported that 54 percent of those in executive and professional occupations were sympathetic to Israel compared to 50 percent of white collar and 46 percent of blue collar. By income, the range of sympathy for Israel ran from 55 percent among those earning 18,000 dollars a year or more to 41 among those earning less than 6,000 dollars. The March 1977 private poll found that 75 percent of college graduates regarded Israel as a friend and ally of the United States, compared to 46 percent among those with a high school or some college education, and but 34 percent of those with less than high school.

Sympathy for the Arabs on these and other questions varied little by socioeconomic or educational status. All groups were equally unenthusiastic, while the less advantaged were more likely to give "don't know" responses. These variations showed up even more clearly in the responses to Roper's queries concerning the future of the occupied territories. As noted earlier in 1975, only 7 percent thought that Israel should give up all the territories, regardless of circumstances, but 11 percent of those whose education did not go beyond grammar school took this position, compared to 7 percent for the high school educated, and 5 percent for those who had attended college. Caddell's questions concerning the application of different image words to the

Israelis or Arabs generally elicited comparable patterns. Thus when asked about the phrase "like Americans," the percentages saying that the term applies to the Israelis rose from 37 percent for those with some grade school, to 49 for high school graduates, 59 for college graduates and 62 percent for those who attended graduate school.

Religious and racial groupings continued to vary as in earlier surveys. In 1974, Harris found 59 percent of white Protestants sympathetic to Israel, as contrasted to 47 of white Catholics, and 31 of Blacks. The percentage with pro-Arab sympathies ran from 12 percent among Blacks to 8 for white Catholics and 5 for white Protestants. Caddell, asking a number of questions bearing on Middle East issues in the summer of 1975, generally found Protestants somewhat more favorable to Israel than Catholics, and whites much more than Blacks. In January 1977, Roper noted a similar pattern, 48 percent of whites and 34 percent of Blacks sympathized with Israel, as did 49 percent of all Protestants and 39 of Catholics. The results of the 1976 Gallup national ratings survey differed somewhat from previous ones. White Protestants had the most favorable views (67 percent) of the Jewish state, but Blacks showed up as slightly more supportive, 62 percent favorable, than white Catholics, 59 percent. The responses to Roper's questions about the future of the territories varied similarly. In 1975, Protestants were more favorable (15 percent) to Israel's keeping all the occupied land than were Catholics (12 percent), and whites were more favorable (15 percent) than Blacks (6 percent). Blacks were more likely to answer "don't know" than whites, but nevertheless, the proportion of Blacks (13 percent) who said that Israel should give up all the territories was much greater than that of whites (6 percent). There was, however, surprisingly little variation associated with age in these surveys.

Elite Attitudes

These findings reported in various surveys taken at different times consistently showing greater support for Israel among the better educated, the more affluent and those in executive and professional positions, suggest that Israel has strong backing among the elite sectors--those who are more active politically and presumably more influential. The results of a number of such groups of studies confirm this assumption. Thus, in January 1975, Harris compared the opinions of a national sample of 3,377 persons with those of 491 "leaders," selected from among those who "have impact within their community." The leaders' sympathies were more with Israel than the Arabs by a ratio of over eleven to one, 56 to 5 percent, as contrasted with the general public's seven and a half to one, 52 to 7. Three-quarters of the leaders favored sending military supplies to Israel if war breaks out, a position taken by 66 percent of the general public. When asked how they would feel if "Israel were overrun by the Arabs," 44 percent of the general sample said "very upset" in contrast to 65 percent of the leaders. The leaders and the public both overwhelmingly disagreed with the statement that "we need Arab oil for our gasoline shortage here at home, so we had better find ways to get along with the Arabs, even if that means supporting Israel less." The leaders, however, felt this way by a ratio of 78-15 percent, while the public took this view by a somewhat lower one, 68-20.

A separate Harris survey conducted in December 1974 on behalf of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, similarly indicated that leaders are much more effectively supportive of Israel than the general public. The 328 leaders interviewed in this survey were drawn from "Americans in leadership positions with the greatest influence upon and knowledge about foreign relations," from the political world, government officials, business leaders, the media and education, plus various voluntary associations. Both the leadership and public samples were given 12 hypothetical situations, such as

invasions of Canada or Western Europe, a Russian takeover of West Berlin, attacks on the Dominican Republic, South Korea, India, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia, by various adjacent Communist states, and in the case of Israel its "being defeated by the Arabs." In each case, they were asked whether they would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of troops. The leaders were significantly more favorable than the general public to American military intervention in reaction to threats to Canada, western Europe, West Berlin, the Dominican Republic, South Korea and Israel. The public was more supportive than the leaders of Taiwan, Yugoslavia, and Saigon (against a major attack by North Vietnam), while there was no difference between the two with respect to a Chinese attack on India. Specifically, with respect to the Middle East situation, 41 percent of the leaders were willing to use U.S. troops to save Israel from being defeated by the Arabs, while 44 percent were opposed; among the public 27 percent were favorable and 50 percent against. It should be noted among both leaders and public that there was more support for military intervention to help Canada, Western Europe, West Berlin, and the Dominican Republic, than for Israel. Israel, however, had more backing than South Korea, India, Taiwan, Yugoslavia and Saigon.

In response to a general question, as to what the U.S. should do "if friendly countries are attacked," the leaders were much more favorable to America giving military assistance than the general population. Thus, 81 percent of the leaders compared to 60 of the public favored military and economic aid, while 34 percent of the former and 23 of the latter would also send troops. Over a fifth of the public, 22 percent, however, was more likely to say, "economic aid only," an option mentioned by only 6 percent of the leaders, while 9 percent of the public said do "nothing," as compared to but 1 percent of the leaders. These results suggest again that the stronger backing for aid to Israel among the better educated and leadership groups reflects a greater willingness on their

part for the nation's playing an activist role in international affairs, which involves aid and military support for our allies. The public, however, reveals a greater "reluctance actually to get involved in combat, or in steps that could lead to combat--perhaps as an extension of aid commitments."^{fn} The results of this survey suggest, however, that willingness to back other countries against invasion with military assistance applies least to Asian and Third World countries outside of the Americas, perhaps reflecting reactions to the Vietnam War or lesser cultural identification.

Two years later, in a January 1977 survey, Roper found that fully 60 percent of the 12 percent of his respondents who were classified as high on a scale of political and societal activity were sympathetic to Israel, compared to but 47 percent in the sample as a whole. Both showed little sympathy for the Arab cause, 6-7 percent. Similarly, those high on the activity scale were more likely (22 percent) to support whatever measures would be necessary to save Israel in case of war "including sending troops if that should prove necessary" than were the public at large (16 percent). Conversely, the total sample was much more disposed to favor the option "take no sides" than were the active, 29 percent.

Some indication of the differences in the opinions of varying leadership groups may be found in an analysis of the opinions of 2656 leaders in eight areas of American life gathered by the Washington Post and the Harvard Center for International Affairs in 1976. This questionnaire study contained two questions dealing with the Middle East: "The United States has a moral obligation to prevent the destruction of Israel," and "To protect our supply of oil, the United States should be more pro-Arab in the Middle East conflict."

^{fn}. John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1975), p. 17.

Sixty-two percent of the leaders agreed with the first question, 24 percent strongly, while 71 percent disagreed with the second, 27 percent strongly. Since 7 percent of the elite strata were Jewish, over twice the proportion of the general public, some of the greater concern for Israel among leadership groups reflects this fact. Almost all of the Jewish members of these elite groups (93 percent) felt that the United States is morally obligated to prevent the destruction of Israel, a view also held, however, by a large majority, 60 percent of the non-Jews. The eight elite groups sampled varied somewhat among themselves. Those most favorable to Israel were the two most involved in affecting policy and public opinion, the political and media leaders. Fully 70 percent of the former and 67 of the latter were supportive of Israel. The Black elite followed with 64 percent supportive, a surprising finding given the repeated evidence from many surveys that the Black population generally is less sympathetic to Israel than any other identifiable demographic group. The other groups following in descending order of support for Israel were feminists, 63 percent, intellectuals, 62, farm, 59, business, 57, and youth, 54.

The opinions of four elite groups, professors, foreign-policy professionals, "black grass-roots leaders," and trade association executives have been explored in greater depth in various surveys. They indicate the difficulty of locating individuals, strata, or the general public in simple categories of pro or anti-Israel, pro or anti-aid.

A survey of a national sample of 3500 university and college faculty was conducted in the spring of 1975 by Everett Ladd and S. M. Lipset. At first glance, it would appear that as a group American college faculty are among the staunchest supporters of the Jewish state in the country. A solid majority, 57 percent of the respondents, indicated that their "sympathies lie predominantly with Israel," as contrasted to the 8 percent who were pro-Arab. Faculty support for the Jewish state appeared to be about the same or

slightly below the level among the college-educated generally (Harris found them at 60 percent for Israel about the same time), but somewhat above that reported among the general public where, as we have seen, pro-Israel feelings have hovered around 45-50 percent in surveys conducted by Gallup, Harris, Roper, and Yankelovich. Pro-Arab sentiments in the general population were about the same low level as among the professoriate.

Strong pro-Israeli sentiments were apparent in faculty responses to a number of other questions. An overwhelming majority, 76 percent, rejected the Arab contention, advanced in a U.N. resolution that Israel is "a racist and imperialist country." A comparably large percentage of the faculty, 77, asserted that "Israel has a right to keep the city of Jerusalem as its capital." Almost three-quarters, 73 percent, believed that the United States should continue "to supply Israel with weapons and military equipment;" 58 percent, however, would have had us refuse "to sell arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia." Only 13 percent felt that "Guerrilla activities on the part of the Palestinian Arabs are justified because there is no other way for them to bring their grievances to the attention of the world." Yet almost two-thirds, 65 percent, approved of Israel's right "to retaliate against the Arabs whenever Arab guerrillas commit an act of terrorism."

The picture of an intensely pro-Israeli academe suggested by these responses was, however, countered by the clear unwillingness of the majority to have the U.S. do little more to aid the Jewish state than send it arms and equipment. Less than a third, 31 percent, felt that if Israel "were threatened with defeat" that the U.S. should help it with "air support" or "ground troops." The proportion who believed that "If the United Nations were to vote to expel Israel, the U.S. should withdraw from the U.N. in protest" was comparably small, 32 percent. Almost half the professors, 46 percent, did not agree with the statement that the "U.S. has an unquestioned moral obligation to prevent the destruction of the state of Israel."

As of 1975, the majority of the faculty clearly did not see Israel as an American ally who must be protected from destruction, if the price is U.S. involvement in fighting. In spite of their sympathies for the beleaguered state, they favored American pressure on Israel to make major concessions. Overall, almost two-thirds, 64 percent, believed that "The U.S. should pursue a more neutral and even-handed policy in the Middle-East." Half of the respondents agreed that "The U.S. should apply pressure on Israel to give in more to Arab demands." The price that the majority felt Israel should pay was clear: 56 percent said that it should give up "most of the territory it gained from the Arabs" in the Six Day War; 64 percent believed that the "Arabs should be allowed to set up a separate nation of Palestine on the West Bank of the Jordan River."

The response pattern of academe toward the Middle East conflict may appear to be contradictory, much like that of the public. In fact, the seeming confusion is probably typical of public reactions on most issues. Almost all policy matters are invariably more complicated than is suggested by the replies to any one or two questions designed to locate respondents as positive or negative on a specific view or proposal. If issues are complicated, if specific proposals may work under some conditions and not under others, there is clearly no reason to expect or desire the public or academe to have simple unqualified reactions.

If one looks carefully at the responses of the academics, it is possible to detect an underlying syndrome of attitudes of a large number of professors on Middle East and foreign policy questions. On one hand, as indicated in analyses of their opinions published elsewhere, they strongly sought a reduction of international tensions, supported cuts in American military expenditures, favored detente with the Soviet Union, and hoped that America would avoid

foreign entanglements which might involve it in another war, limited or not.^{Fn} On the other hand, many of those who were predisposed this way remained sympathetic to Israel, and hoped the Jewish state will survive and prosper. The first set of preferences, however, appeared to outweigh the second.

These orientations resulted in a majority faculty opinion which wanted the U.S. to do all it can to press the conflicting parties to make peace in the Middle East. Hence, Ladd and Lipset found majority sentiment for a "more neutral and even-handed policy" by the U.S., for American pressure on Israel "to give in more to Arab demands," for Israel to yield territory, and opposition to American direct military intervention even if necessary to avoid the "defeat and destruction" of Israel. But at the same time, a large majority remained much more favorable to Israel than the Arabs, would supply the Jewish state with the weapons to defend itself, while opposed to selling arms to the Arabs, and hoped that Israel can hold on to Jerusalem. Viewed in these terms, these responses are not inconsistent.

In considering the views of American academics to the Middle East and other foreign policy matters, as of 1975, it is important to recall that professors were the first major group in this country to turn against the Vietnam War, even before the majority of college students did. They also are ideologically to the left of other sectors of the non-academic population. Evidence drawn from a variety of opinion surveys suggest that anti-war and anti-militarist sentiments among them were accentuated during the Vietnam War. Since academics tend to be more ideological, that is more consistent in their views than other groups, it is not surprising to learn from the Ladd-Lipset survey that more pacifist views among them are strongly correlated with liberal social and political attitudes, and that left-liberal values within academe are also associated with lessened enthusiasm for Israel, much as they were linked to opposition to South Vietnam. In the table below, we present the Ladd-Lipset finding of the relationship between political beliefs

Fn. Everett Ladd and S.M. Lipset, "War-Shy Professors Divided Over Middle East," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, December 1, 1975, p. 2.

as reflected by position on a liberalism-conservatism scale constructed from attitude items on domestic issues with position on an Israel support scale developed from responses to questions bearing on the Middle East. As is evident from the data in the table, those whose attitudes placed them in the most liberal quintile of the sample were least favorable to support of the Jewish state.

Table II

Position of the Most Liberal and Most
Conservative Quintile on Israel Support Scale
Among Non-Jewish Faculty

<u>Israel Support Scale</u>	<u>Most Liberal</u>	<u>Most Conservative</u>
High	30%	67%
Low	70	33

These findings indicate the possible validity, among the more ideological opinion sectors, of the assumptions mentioned at the beginning of this report that opinion on Middle East issues may be affected by the growing antagonism of the international left to Israel with a corresponding identification with the Palestinian cause, and the strengthening of isolationist and anti-militarist sentiment within the United States. None of the available results of the studies of general public feelings reported earlier, however, revealed any consistent and significant relationships between ideological self-identification ("are you a liberal, moderate, or conservative"), or Republican or Democratic party allegiance, and opinion on the Middle-East issues. The divergence between the Ladd-Lipset findings for a sample of academics and those reported for the public may indicate that academe holds sharply variant opinions in this area as in others, or more likely, in our judgment, be another piece of

evidence that professors are significantly more ideological, more consistent, in their attitudes than other strata. These results, therefore, may anticipate the way in which the public may respond in the future, should American attitudes toward the Middle East begin to become subjects of controversy between main-line conservatives and liberals, or Democrats and Republicans, developments which may follow the formation of a more hawkish government in Israel following the May 1977 elections.

Three surveys of the opinions of Black grass-roots leaders, trade association executives and foreign policy professionals, were conducted by the Yankelovich organization, the first two in February and March 1975, and the latter in March 1976. These cannot be considered random, statistically reliable samples of the special populations from which they were drawn. Each was small, 100 Black leaders, 50 executives, and 78 foreign policy experts. Yankelovich, however, drew the names in a fashion designed to obtain diverse and hopefully representative opinions.

The Blacks ^{interviewed} were people active in leadership roles in eleven communities across the nation. Intensive interviews with them brought quite different sets of attitudes from those reported for the 300 Blacks who answered the two Middle East questions on the Washington Post leadership survey.

A summary report on the Yankelovich survey states:

About Israel, itself, the feeling is ambivalent when not negative. The very people who think it right that there should be a Jewish state can also think of Israel as the aggressor. Blacks are likely to see Israel as the enemy of the dark-skinned Arabs, who are in some sense fellow non-whites. Israel is disliked only a little less than China, South Africa, and the Soviet Union.^{fn}

^{fn}. Geraldine Rosenfield, "The Yankelovich Interviews with Black Grass-Roots Leaders and Trade Association Professionals," The American Jewish Committee Information and Research Service, August 1975, p. 2.

These answers to specific questions point up the lesser support or negative sentiments which these Black leaders had towards Israel early in 1975. About one quarter of them, 23 percent, named Israel as the probable "main aggressor" in a new Middle East war, more than the 16 percent who mentioned the Arabs. They divided into approximately equal thirds in response to a question on support for the PLO or Israel or neither or not sure.

These Black leadership views coincide with the reports from the various general public surveys reported earlier which indicate that Blacks are less supportive of Israel and more likely to express pro-Arab views than any sector of the white population. Seemingly, such Black sentiment is related to identification with Arabs as Third World peoples, or possibly to their greater degree of resentment against American Jews than is found among whites, a matter that is discussed in a later section.

It is difficult to interpret the sharp difference between the sentiments reported in the Yankelovich survey and the Washington Post-Harvard CFIA study. One possibility lies in the different set of Black leaders sampled by each. The Post-Harvard research group largely sampled politicians and officers of civil-rights groups divided equally between national and local leaders, while Yankelovich interviewed local community leaders. The first group, being involved in practical politics, has received considerable assistance from Jewish groups. The second, less concerned with coalition politics, may be a more accurate reflector of community sentiment.

Yankelovich's intensive interviews with 50 professional heads of various trade associations also revealed a community, less pro-Israel than the population in general. They differed, however, from the Black leaders in not exhibiting any significant pro-Arab feelings. In responding to the question who would be the main aggressor in the Middle East, twice as many 42 percent, mentioned the Arabs as Israel, 23 percent. "They take the State of Israel's continued existence

for granted....They feel Israel must make major territorial concessions, they are not committed to the establishment of a Palestinian state, are opposed to Arafat acting as head of the Palestinians, and feel Arabs must recognize Israel as an independent state."^{fn} Their lack of enthusiasm for Israel may be seen, however, in the fact that over half of those interviewed, 52 percent, thought that the United States would have a different policy toward Israel, were it not for pressure from Jewish groups, while only 28 percent disagreed with this point of view. Basically these spokespersons for business did not appear to be interested in the Middle East politically. Their main concerns with the region were economic, particularly oil. "There is no over support for Arab countries, but there is an eagerness to do business with the Arabs and encourage Arab investment in the United States."^{fn} These findings coincide with, and help explain the results of the Washington Post leadership questionnaire survey which indicated lesser support for Israel among larger samples of business and farm leaders.

The Yankelovich sample of 78 foreign-policy experts drawn from executives of foreign affairs groups, government and congressional staffs, media people and academicians in New York, Washington and Cambridge, were much more pro-Israel than the Black and business leaders. In part, this reflects the fact that two-fifths of them were Jewish. But almost all of the non-Jews also felt that the U.S. should "supply military aid to Israel" although they would limit it to not more than enough to guarantee Israel's existence. The PLO was not regarded as a legitimate representative of the Palestinians by any one, but many felt that "since it is the only group and we must deal with Palestinians, the 'realistic' thing is deal with it."^{fn} Some further indication that this group was not heavily tilted towards Israel is suggested in the fact that non-Jewish "pro-Israel respondents feel they are in the minority among their

fn. Ibid., p. 8

fn. Ibid.

fn. Geraldine Rosenfield, "Foreign-policy Professionals on Israel and American Jews," The American Jewish Committee Information and Research Services (Feb. 1977), pp. 3-4.

colleagues."^{fn}

These efforts at analysis of the views on Middle-East issues of diverse elite groups of Americans point up the need to explore opinions in depth, to the possible simplified or erroneous conclusions which may be reached by looking at the responses to a few questions. As noted earlier, the opinions of these groups can not be categorized simply as pro-Israel or pro-Arab. Rather they represent a complex set of views, often in contradiction with one another, involving an effort to react to alternative objectives held by the same individual. People may be very sympathetic to the desire of Jews to have a state of their own which is a secure refuge for the victims of persecution, while also feeling concerned about the plight of the Palestinians, believing that it can only be resolved in a state of their own. Deep commitment to the survival of Israel may run counter to the belief that Americans must place primary emphasis on domestic economic self-interest, and the avoidance of commitments that might lead to overseas military involvements. Clearly, except possibly among sections of the Black community and their leaders, America's support for Israel is not basically challenged, but it is far from the unqualified endorsement which Israeli leaders desire, and it is conditioned on Israel's showing a willingness to actively seek to make peace with the Arabs, a peace that would involve returning most of the territories occupied since June 1967, in return for her total acceptance by the Arab states and the Palestinians as a legitimate national entity entitled to the kind of treatment given to all other states.

Conclusions

This examination of the responses of the American public and assorted leadership groups to Middle East issues over three decades suggests a number of conclusions. First, and most important is the fact that among those who have

fn. Ibid., p. 5.

opinions on these matters, often around 50 percent, sympathy for Israel has always far outweighed support for the Arab cause. Second is the indication that support for Israel cannot be explained as a continued residue of feelings of sympathy or guilt related to the Holocaust and the plight of European Jewry during World War II. As we have seen, the proportions expressing support for Israel have been much greater in all the surveys taken since 1967 than in earlier ones. Conversely, the percentages voicing sympathy for the Arabs in surveys taken from the Six Day War on is less than half that during the Arab-Israeli wars in the late 1940s.

The predominantly pro-Israeli anti-Arab disposition of Americans is also expressed in a variety of polls which have asked respondents to make comparative judgments about Israelis and Arabs, or Israel and various Arab nations. Many more people see Israel in a positive light, as having more favorable traits, as being more like America, or as being more friendly to the United States, than feel positively about the Arabs. The support which the Arabs have received from the Soviet Union and other Communist states is also clearly a liability for them among the American public. The overwhelming majority of Americans are anti-Communist, sentiments which extend to those backed by the Soviets.

The polls taken since the 1973 war suggest that increased awareness of America's dependence on Arab oil, or of the possibilities to gain economically by doing business with the oil-rich Arab states, has not undermined support for Israel among the general public, although it has among business executives. It is questionable, however, whether survey questions which inquire as to whether people think that we should change our Middle East policy to improve our economic relations generally or prospects to buy cheaper oil, secure reliable responses to how Americans might react to a severe economic or energy crisis. These questions, in effect, ask people whether they are willing to sell out Israel for money or for oil. It would be surprising if Americans

would answer, "yes," to such inquires and as we have seen, they do not.

More positively from the Arab perspective is the fact that questions which describe the Middle East conflict, as one between the Palestinians and the Israelis, result in a decline in expressions of support for the Israeli side and a sharp increase in the proportions who are pro-Palestinian as contrasted with pro-Arab. These findings are reinforced by the evidence that there is considerable concern for the plight of the Palestinian refugees and support for the creation of a Palestinian state. It may be suggested that questions dealing with Israel and the Arabs are seen in the context of a small nation, Israel, resisting the onslaught of the Arab world aided by the Soviet Union. Conversely, Israel versus the Palestinians involves for some a contest between the militarily strong and well-to-do Israeli state and the Palestinian population, many of whom are poor refugees, without a state of their own.

The increase in sympathy for the Palestinians, however, does not extend to support for the Palestine Liberation Organization or its leader Yasir Arafat. The P.L.O., seen as a terrorist organization which would deny Israel the right to exist, has little backing among the American public.

But if many more Americans sympathize with Israel against the Arabs, and to a lesser but still considerable plurality, against the Palestinians as well, that support does not extend to a willingness for the United States to get directly involved in the conflict. Relatively few people, rarely more than a quarter, have been willing to send American troops to the Middle East, even in response to questions presenting such action as necessary to prevent the military annihilation of Israel, or to back it up against Soviet troops fighting on the Arab side. More surprising has been the finding in many surveys that the proportion of Americans who support material aid to Israel, particularly the sending of arms, is often smaller than that endorsing such action. Support for armed aid or financial backing to Israel most commonly increases to a positive plurality only during war-time or other crisis periods.

Our discussion of such possibilities obviously moves outside the realm of the analysis of public or group opinion into the domain of practical politics at the governing elite level. Clearly, as has been clear in recent months, factors such as those which affect Congressional views, or the prospects for election or re-election of major office holders, are more important than the opinions of the American public reflected in surveys. The intensity of feelings of key sections of the electorate is probably of more importance in the eyes of political leaders than the attitude of the public at large. And here the evidence would suggest that the pro-Israeli sectors of the electorate feel more deeply and passionately about the Middle East than other segments, a fact which is probably the most important datum produced by the opinion surveys.

Anti-Semitism

The question has frequently been raised as to the relationship between attitudes towards Jews in the United States and towards Israel. How much of the opposition to Israel is linked to anti-Semitic feelings? For example, is the greater antagonism to Israel by Blacks than whites related to greater anti-Semitism found among Blacks, some of which presumably is directed against Jews they see operating in their community. On the other hand, attitudes towards Israel may affect the feelings of non-Jews towards American Jews. As we have seen, a significant segment of those who feel that the United States' support of Israel is against American self-interest often also believe that the United States takes such a position because of the power, influence or lobbying activity of American Jews. Hence, it may be argued that negative reactions to Israel will adversely affect Jews living in the United States. There have been a number of studies of the public opinion taken from the 1930s through the middle 70s which have inquired about attitudes towards Jews. In this section we would like to summarize such materials before turning to an examination of

The reluctance to back Israel with troops or military aid should, however, be placed in the broader context of the fact that Americans are reluctant to do the same for any foreign nation, except possibly for those with whom they have had a close cultural tie, particularly the English-speaking countries, and some western European NATO states, bordering on the Communist world. Willingness to help Israel is generally higher than support for most other allies or dependencies of the United States. The majority of Americans, particularly in recent years, have been extremely reluctant to get involved in overseas conflicts and involvements, and would very much prefer to spend money to deal with domestic problems rather than abroad.

Finding such isolationist sentiments among the majority is hardly surprising. It has long been evident that internationalist views, support for foreign obligations, are much greater among the more educated portions of the population, and particularly among the elite and leadership groups. As we have seen, support for Israel increases with greater education and is highest among the leadership strata. Not surprisingly, they are much more likely to be knowledgeable and concerned about international problems, and to see the need for the United States to aid those nations with which it is allied because of common values or interests.

Given the knowledge that the support for an internationalist foreign policy generally and for active support of Israel, in particular, lies in the opinions of the foreign policy aware, more educated and leadership groups, it would seem evident that a change in the views among such groups as to what policy is in the national interest could result in a shift in Middle East policy, which would not meet with serious resistance among the public, particularly if it was presented in the context of measures to avoid involvement in war.

the inter-relationship between the two sets of attitudes.

To undertake this task we are fortunate in having a book on Jews in the Mind of America, edited by Charles Stember, which reports on various surveys taken between the 1930s and the early 1960s.^{Fn} Some of the questions in these studies have been repeated in later years. In general, the data presented in the Stember volume suggest that a high level of anti-Semitism existed in this country in the 1930s which lasted through World War II. Negative feelings towards Jews began to fall with the end of the war to the point where, by 1962, the last year dealt with by Stember, they ^{had} declined quite considerably. For example, 42 percent felt that the Jews had too much financial power as of March 1938, a figure which rose to 46 by February 1942, and then decreased to 34 percent in March 1945, to 29 percent in February 1946 and to but 18 percent in June 1962. Replies that Jews have too much power in politics and government numbered 34 percent in December of 1942, 33 in March of 1945, 24 in February of 1946, and 12 in 1962. Responses to the general question "Do you think the Jews have too much power in the United States?" showed a similar decline: 42 percent said "too much" in March 1938, 43 percent in April 1940, 51 percent in December 1942, 56 to 58 percent in surveys taken in 1944, 1945 and 1946, but only 17 percent felt this way in June 1962, and in a survey taken by NORC in October 1964, only 11 percent.

This trend, however, which seems to have bottomed out in 1964, varied up and down in recent years. In January 1975 and January 1976, the Yankelovich organization asked "In general, do you feel that [various groups] has too much power in the United States?" In 1975, 37 percent said that American Jews have too much power, a figure which dropped to 26 percent in January a year later. In March 1977 a private study inquired: "Do you feel that American Jews have too much power and influence in our country...?", the percentage saying "too much" was even lower, 19. It should be noticed, moreover, that when Yankelovich asked

Fn. Charles Stember

such questions about a number of groups besides Jews, that the percentage answering "too much power" was larger for every other group except for church interests and Zionist organizations. In January of 1975, 60 percent said organized labor had too much power, and 63 percent felt the same way in January 1976. The largest proportion was critical of business and the oil companies: in January 1975, 80 percent said the oil companies had too much power, while 78 percent thought big business had the same excessive degree of power. The figures a year later were almost the same: 79 percent for the oil companies and 76 percent for big business. Over a third, 37 percent, credited "Arab interests" with too much power in January of 1975, a proportion that went up to 40 percent in January of 1976.

There can be little doubt that anti-Semitic attitudes declined steadily from the late 30s and early 40s to the early 60s, as indicated by answers to surveys which inquired how people felt about Jews as marriage partners, as neighbors, as employees, and in colleges. Thus, the proportion saying that colleges should limit the number of Jews they admit fell from 26 percent in 1938 to 4 percent in 1962. The percentages of those who expressed some objection to Jewish neighbors dropped from 30 in 1950 to 8 in 1962. Those who, in response to an open-end question, listed any objectionable qualities of Jews decreased from 63 percent in 1940 to 22 percent in 1962.

More recent surveys, however, dealing with other negative stereotypes, revealed higher but also declining percentages giving anti-Jewish replies. In 1964, 42 percent of non-Jewish respondents told NORC interviewers that "Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want." Ten years later Harris asked a slightly different question: "Jewish businessmen will usually try/ to pull a shady deal on you." and found that 21 percent agreed with that statement. NORC reported in 1964 that 52 percent agreed with the statement called "Jews stick together too much." But ten years later, in 1974, Harris found 27 percent agreeing with the statement "Jews always stick to their own and never give an outsider a break."

It is difficult to tell from the opinion polls to what extent negative responses to Jews reflect anti-Semitism, or whether there are certain attitude syndromes which apply to other groups as well. In October 1974, Yankelovich inquired about perceptions of the closeness of several American groups to their respective "homelands"--not only the connections between Jews and Israel, but also the links of Irish, Greeks, Italians, Blacks, Poles, Germans, and Spanish-speaking people to their "motherlands." Each respondent was asked to choose among a number of alternatives the one that best represented his attitude toward such ties, whether people having close ties, or not, are good or bad for the United States. "Close ties are bad" ranged from a low of 5 percent for the Irish and the Poles to highs of 10 percent and 13 percent for the Blacks to Africa and the Jews to Israel. The percentages saying that close ties to a home country are good for the United States varied from 31 percent for the Irish, 30 for the Italians, and 29 for the Jews, to a low of 22 percent for Greeks, Blacks and Poles. For Germans and Spanish-speaking people the percentages were 23 and 24. It would seem, therefore, that there are not very serious differences in attitudes towards the overseas ties of Jews and non-Jews.

The number who respond negatively to questions concerning the ties of American Jews to Israel has **not** increased over the years, in spite of the manifest support given to Israel in, during, and following the 1967 and 1973 wars. In 1964, NORC reported 30 percent agreeing with the proposition "Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America." Ten years later, Harris repeated the question and found 26 percent in agreement, and 43 percent rejecting it. In six different surveys between 1974^{and 1977,} Yankelovich asked: "Do you feel that most Jewish people in this country feel closer to the U.S. or Israel?" In the first one, 41 percent said the United States and 34 Israel, in the sixth, the "closer to the U.S." figure was 50 percent, while those saying to Israel had fallen to 27. In each poll, the college educated were much more likely to believe American

Jews were closer to this country, e.g., 60 percent U.S. to 18 Israel in 1976, than those with less education, 44 percent to U.S. and 30 to Israel.

Pat Caddell's Cambridge Survey also probed for anti-Semitic attitudes linked to Jewish support of Israel in the Fall of 1974 and the Summer of 1975. He asked respondents whether they agreed that "It seems that some people forget they are Americans when they rush to defend Israel" One third, 33 percent, agreed in both polls, as contrasted to 42-43 percent disagreeing. One third also felt that Jews have excessive influence on Middle East issues, agreeing in both polls that "Because of Jewish political influence in the U.S., our government has favored Israel when we should have been fairer to the Arabs."

Only 37-38 percent rejected the statement as wrong. Caddell's findings for this statement were quite different from those reported by Harris in a January 1974 survey when the public disagreed by 49-25 percent with the statement "Jewish groups have too much political power and are forcing the U.S. government to be too pro-

It would be wrong to conclude that those who criticize Jewish support Israel" of Israel are necessarily anti-Semitic. Antagonism to Jewish influence on U.S. Middle East policy is not as strong as resentment against the role of other groups.

In four Yankelovich surveys taken from 1974 to 1977, big business, oil companies, Arab interests, and the media were much more likely to be credited with having "too much influence over our country's policies in the Middle East" than American Jews or Zionist organizations. The average of such judgments over the four-year period ran from 78 percent for the oil companies, 68 big corporations, 51 Arab interests and the media, 41 American Jews, 37 organized labor, to 31 for Zionist organizations. Jews were less likely than others to be blamed for domestic economic problems following the Yom Kippur War. In October 1974, when Yankelovich asked "Who or what do you feel is to blame for our economic difficulties at the present time?" 35 percent said big business, 18 labor unions, 14 percent the Arabs, 10 percent even agreed that economists are responsible, but only 3 percent said the Jews. When the question was given a more specific focus in 1975 in the following

terms "Some people have estimated that the national unemployment rate, which is now around 7 percent may go as high as 10 percent in the next few months. If unemployment should hit 10 percent, do you personally feel that [a specific group] will be primarily responsible, partially responsible, or not responsible for the increase in unemployment." The percentage selecting Jews as primarily or partially responsible was lower than for all of the eleven other groups. Over a third, 34 percent, said big business would be primarily responsible and 45 percent indicated partially responsible, for the trade unions the figures were 27 (primarily) and 47 (partially), for the media they were 10 and 33, for the Arab countries they were 19 and 37, for economists and college professors they were 6 and 27, while for Jews they were 4 and 20.

How much anti-Semitism is there in the United States today? This is obviously an impossible question to answer in absolute terms. Surveys taken between 1974 and 1976 do indicate that about one third of non-Jews give anti-Semitic answers, or at least responses in which they are willing to say that Jews differ from other groups in ways that might be interpreted to be negative. Thus, Harris's January 1975 survey of attitudes towards Jews, to be analyzed below, recorded 31 percent saying "Jews are irritating because they are too aggressive," percent indicating their belief that "Most of the slum owners are Jewish," 34 percent agreeing with the statement "When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews still choose money," and the same proportion also agreeing that "Jews feel superior to other groups." In polls administered in 1974, 1975 and 1976, Yankelovich reported that a third of his sample stated that "the election of a Jew as President would not be good for the country.

Perhaps the toughest question asked in a relatively recent survey designed to tap anti-Semitic feelings was contained in the 1974 Harris survey which inquired as to reactions to statements about the Jews made by General George Brown, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All respondents were first asked: "Recently, General George Brown, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that if Americans suffered enough as a result of the Arab oil boycott that they 'might get tough minded enough to stop the Jewish influence in this country and break that lobby'. In general, do you tend to agree or disagree with what General Brown said?". Of these respondents, 22 percent agreed and 46 percent disagreed, while 32 percent were not sure. When non-Jews only were then asked: "General Brown also said that the Jews 'Own the banks and the newspapers in this country. Just look at where the Jewish money is'. Do you tend to agree or disagree with that statement by General Brown?", one fifth, or 20 percent, agreed, 47 percent disagreed, while 33 percent said they were not sure. These responses may be looked at in two ways. One is that only one fifth agreed with these statements even when they were given the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the other hand, it may be more important to note that less than half of the non-Jewish respondents disagreed with the statement. Those who said they were not sure presumably included many who thought that there was some possibility that the statement was true but were unwilling to endorse it.

The decline in anti-Semitic attitudes reported from 1946 down to the present could conceivably reflect the transfer of positive attitudes from the state of Israel towards Disapora Jews, a development anticipated by some Zionists. Although the existence of such a process cannot be ruled out, the evidence with respect to changing attitudes toward other minorities, particularly Blacks, argues against it. Prejudice against various minorities, Jews, Blacks, and Orientals dropped steadily from the end of World War II on a variety of

issues. The younger cohorts and the better educated who become more numerous each year are invariably more accepting of minorities.^{FN} As Angus Campbell, the long-time head of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan notes, summing up data through 1970: "It cannot be doubted that since World War II there has been a massive shift in the racial attitudes of white Americans...[T]here has been a current in white attitudes, away from the traditional belief in white's supremacy...toward a more equalitarian view of the races and their appropriate relations."^{FN}

These changes in attitudes do not mean, of course, that racism directed against Blacks or anti-Semitic feelings have been eliminated or that social crises cannot revitalize them. The opinion surveys clearly indicate the persistence among many Americans of bigoted beliefs about Blacks and Jews. The rate of improvement in attitudes toward Blacks slowed down considerably in the late 60's and the 70's. As noted in our review of attitudes toward Jews, some anti-Semitic stereotypes have actually increased in strength during this latter period. The appeal of George Wallace in elections and primaries from 1964 to 1976 suggests that racism can still form the basis for a mass political movement.^{FN}

^{FN} Mildred A. Schwartz, Trends in White Attitudes Toward Negroes (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1967); Paul B. Sheatsly, "White Attitudes Toward the Negro," Daedalus, 165 (Winter 196) pp

^{FN} Angus Campbell, White Attitudes Toward Black People (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1971), p. 159; Sandra K. Schwartz and David C. Schwartz, "Convergence and Divergence in Political Orientations Between Blacks and Whites: 1960-1973," Journal of Social Issues, 32, No. 2 (1976), p. 156; Louis Harris, The Anguish of Change (New York: Norton, 1973).

^{FN} S.M. Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1970), pp. 338-516.

The parallel improvement in sentiments about Blacks and Jews, however, suggest that the existence of the state of Israel has had little to do with the way Gentile Americans feel about their Jewish bretheren.

In succeeding sections of this paper, we shall attempt to analyze some of the characteristics of those who give anti-Semitic responses. It may be reiterated here for those who fear that attitudes towards Jews can contribute to an anti-Semitic political movement in the future or to opposition to support for Israel, that all the data suggest that Americans are much more likely to see other groups as the source of their difficulties.

