

C-7442 to C-7443 Transcriptions

Friedman, Herbert A. Lecture on the Holocaust. undated.

[00:00:00]

FRIEDMAN: On five items -- the first one is that compilation of several points of view, of several worthies in the Jewish intellectual field, whose opinion it is worth reading. Now, one is a guy by the name of Stephen Katz, who gives you his opinion. Richard Rubinstein. Katz's bottom line is the Holocaust is an inscrutable mystery. I think that's remarkable. And (laughs) I can't understand how a guy spends a lot of years to come to that conclusion.

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Sir?

M1: It's like a statue [00:01:00] (inaudible) statue.

FRIEDMAN: Right. He says -- he gives you some pretty good one-liners, by the way. Some good one-liners. He tells you that the Holocaust represents the theodicy, the problem of evil, but it doesn't contribute anything to solving that problem.

F: Who is Stephen Katz?

FRIEDMAN: Stephen Katz is an editor of the Jewish -- of *The Encyclopedia Judaica*, who wrote the leading article giving his own opinions before he condensed the opinions of other

people. And he gives you nine points -- nine opinions. The Holocaust is a modern [*acada?*].

M1: A what?

FRIEDMAN: *Acada*, the sacrifice of Isaac. It's a test of our faith. [00:02:00] (laughter) The Holocaust is an instant --

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: What?

M1: (inaudible) (laughter)

FRIEDMAN: No reaction. Why -- I didn't expect any. (laughter)

F: (inaudible) (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Richard Rubinstein, who is a professor down in Florida -- Richard Rubinstein's opinion is the only honest response to the death camps is the rejection of God. God is dead, and the open recognition of the meaninglessness of existence. Will you put those two together? You will agree God is dead, you will agree that -- that whole thing. (laughter) How about the other half? Do you think that because God is dead, that existence is meaningless?

M1: I don't accept either premise.

F: Oh (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: But you're still being very quiet. OK. (laughs)

F2: I think [Gordon's?] come [00:03:00] a long way.

M1: Really? (laughter)

F2: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: I think Gordon's a little bit tired after two very good explosions earlier. [Fakenheim?] says very simply, "Jews are forbidden to give Hitler posthumous victories."

M1: I believe that.

FRIEDMAN: It's all there is to it, and the way you make damn sure that Hitler doesn't have a posthumous victory is that you build Israel real good, real strong, real permanent, forever in the future of Jewish history. That's going to save a lot of Jews, save a lot of lives. That's going to make up some, and Hitler can never say that he won. All he can say is he killed six million Jews and he destroyed two thousand Jewish communities and three million Jewish books. And you got a statistical chart of the evil that he did. And he wiped out Jewish life in Eastern -- in Central Europe. [00:04:00] That he did. So, Central Europe is never any longer a source of strength to the Jewish people. But that's all he did. So, now you want to give him a posthumous victory by letting him do more? The way you stop him from ever doing more is you make Israel the answer to Jewish strength. Ignatz [Maybaum?] is a great English Jew. He's really a classy man. And he's got a very interesting point of view.

M1: You have a quick point -- back to the other point is -- it really is very personal. It's more than just Israel. It's continuing to live Jewishly yourself.

FRIEDMAN: OK.

M1: That's your own testamentary to the fact that the Jews lived, that Hitler failed.

FRIEDMAN: Maybaum says, [00:05:00] "It's true that one third of world Jewry was destroyed. It's also true that two-thirds survived, and that salvation is a miracle no less great than that at the Red Sea." Is also redemption. So, through this we're redeemed from death. Supposing Hitler'd continued? Who knows? I mean, you know, he made a couple wrong choices. Supposing he made a couple right choices? He made the right choice on where the Normandy invasion was going to be. That was the most serious thing in his whole war. Generals didn't listen to him. Von Rundstedt was asleep, and what's his name -- and the Desert Fox, Rommel, was 500 miles away from the scene. And everybody was doing something else. And only Hitler was screaming that they're going to land in Normandy, Normandy! You know, and everybody [00:06:00] else was -- said, "No, no, no, no, no." (inaudible) that's the shortest distance across from Dover, and if they -- if his own generals had listened to

Hitler, we'd have blown through the invasion. And then he would have turned and jumped to England. What turn would the war have taken then? [Berkovitz -- Eliezer Berkovitz?], who's a modern Orthodox thinker says very simply -- his analysis of contemporary Jewish religious faith after the Holocaust is his passionate Zionism, that's all. Nothing else counts. The rebirth of the State of Israel is contemporary revelation. The rebirth is the voice of God speaking forth from history. [00:07:00] The proof of it is the events of 1967. There's a revelation quality in the Six-Day War, which he links back to '48. So, I think that those -- he says, "There are people who say that at Auschwitz and all the previous Auschwitzes we have witnessed, God's face was hidden. In the rebirth of the State of Israel and its success, we now see a smile on the face of God. That's enough." So, that's Berkowitz. I have an item there on unit two, page two. [00:08:00]

M1: (inaudible)

F: No.

FRIEDMAN: In thinking, studying, reading, teaching about the Holocaust, try to ignore or minimize guilt, shame, rage, hatred. These are all essentially negative emotions. And they cannot really help us to understand, adjust, or plan

for the future. Negative doesn't help you. So, forget it. Don't bother to have any guilt feelings. It's all over a long time ago. Don't bother to be ashamed, what you did do or what you didn't do or what your friends did or didn't do. Forget about rage. Whom are you raging against? Forget about hatred. Whom are you hating? People who are -- whose bones are moldering together with their victims? Nothing negative. Now, once you force yourself to think that [00:09:00] way and you can only start thinking positive thoughts, then your anger is going to turn into what he tells you to do, because that's positive, because that gives you something to do.

M2: So, would you not disagree with the (inaudible) bring Waldheim (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Would I disagree with the attempt to do what?

M2: In the current (inaudible) under Waldheim --

FRIEDMAN: Yeah?

M2: I mean, that's basically a negative campaign.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah.

M2: Do you disagree over -- what (inaudible) congress is doing?

FRIEDMAN: Oh, I think that's a highly overblown -- I think that's a propagandistic effort on the part of an organization to get some mileage for itself.

M1: (inaudible)

M2: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Wiesenthal said that?

M2: He was very much against -- very (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, well, Wiesenthal would never come out with a strong statement against Waldheim. They've tried to get it from him many times. He just doesn't think the [00:10:00] record justifies it. Was the guy a Nazi? Yes. Was he in uniform? Yes. Did he pass papers across his desk? Sure. Did those papers describe the executions of Greeks or Yugoslavs or Jews? Undoubtedly. When he says he quit in 1941, is he lying? Sure, 'cause he probably was in longer -- though he got out as early as '41, that he -- except with some kind of bad wound and he wasn't badly wounded. But when it's all over and done with, you want to bring indictment against the guy? Bring an indictment. Want to find a court in which to have the thing processed? Lot of courts. Take him to the International Court at The Hague. United States will go with you. Take him to the United Nations commission of whatever they call it. They got one of their own -- internal commission [00:11:00] of investigation. In other words, if you think you have an honest to God -- I made a

crack before about that garbage collector or that machinist in Cleveland, Demchunchek or whatever his name is.

M1: (inaudible)

F: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: What is it?

M1: Demjanjuk.

FRIEDMAN: Demjanjuk. (laughter) So he's going to be (inaudible).

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: So, they're going to try him in Israel. So, you know, it'll be boring, and most people won't bother. I remember Eichmann's trial. I sat there 34 mornings watching that trial, 34 mornings, every single morning. Because that guy was talking history. That guy was making a very simple statement. "We preferred to kill the Jews rather than win the war. That's why I got my trains. And if it was a question of trains for troops or trains for Jews, I got more trains for Jews than anybody got for troops."

[00:12:00] It's all on the record, clear as a bell. I mean, they, the Nazis weren't confused. And the Jews were confused, the Christians were confused. Everybody was confused. Nazis weren't confused. Their priorities were very clear. So Mr. Demjanjuk is going to sit there, and it'll be a dumb trial and there's not much sex in it. I



mean, what did he do, the poor old bugger? And when they convict him and they find him -- they won't know what to do with him. I mean, I --

M1: I don't believe you believe two words that you're saying.

FRIEDMAN: I do.

M1: I don't believe it.

FRIEDMAN: Oh!

M1: I mean, you believe that this monster, if he is guilty as accused, because time has passed, because the trial will be boring, should be let free?

FRIEDMAN: Did I say that?

M1: I mean, the trial --

FRIEDMAN: What did I say? Did I say that?

M1: (laughs) Yeah, that's what you --

FRIEDMAN: No!

M1: That's what you said by what you didn't say!

FRIEDMAN: All --

M1: If a man is guilty, he ought to be pursued, justice ought to be (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: That's right. And that's what's happening. And that's exactly my point. And it'll be a dull trial, and it'll be [00:13:00] an unimportant trial. (laughter) It'll be a

nothing trial, and he will be found guilty. And if he's found guilty, he'll be executed.

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: No, because it's the only crime in Israel for which execution is permitted -- is crimes against humanity, that's what they're called from the Nuremburg --

M2: (inaudible) have Yugoslavia in which he was just convicted --

FRIEDMAN: Eh.

M2: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Eh, yeah.

M2: (inaudible) perhaps the guy coming up in France (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: So, what I'm saying is that if Mr. Somebody wanted to convict -- wanted to bring an indictment and bring Mr. --

M2: Waldheim.

FRIEDMAN: -- Waldheim to court, that was the way you do it. This nonsense is -- well, he's no good, we don't want him as the president of Austria, we won't deal with him as the president of Austria -- the government of Israel saying, "Well, when what's-his-name finishes now his term as an ambassador, [00:14:00] by that time, Waldheim will have been elected, then we're not going to appoint a new ambassador." [What the hell are we?] talking about? The

whole thing is cockeyed. It reminds me of a -- it's a political trial. It's a political trial.

M2: (inaudible) when you talk about these warnings, four warnings (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) we talk about the four warning signals -- doesn't the fact that Austria today would elect Kurt Waldheim as their leader --

FRIEDMAN: Yeah?

M2: -- bring up alarm in your head?

FRIEDMAN: Well, if I were the president of the Jewish community of the 12,000 souls of Vienna, I would say to them, "Gentlemen, we now have a nice Nazi as the president of Austria. What would you like to do about it? We've got a lot of money. We could set up a nice township [00:15:00] in Israel and all of us move over and make a commune. All of us can build a house, all of us can share the property. All of us could live very happily and well in our personal lives, and we can contribute to the growth of Israel." I mean, if I were the chairman of the local community, I'd sit down with them and I'd say, "You want to stay here? Then let's all of us shut up and let's, you know, climb into the woodwork and forget about it." If you really can't stand it, if it's a shock and if it's a terrible thing, that's --

M1: What about the rest of the world?

M2: What about us? Americans? I mean, the Vienna community's too old (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: So, what do you mean by what about the --

M1: What about the rest of the world? What about the American Jewish community? What should they (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: What about --

M1: What should their response be?

FRIEDMAN: Not a damn thing. You're not indicting the man.

M1: Well --

FRIEDMAN: So don't tell me -- you're not exercising what legal rights you have.

F: But I think it's good to expose this kind of --

FRIEDMAN: What expose? Been going on for [00:16:00] two months in the press.

F: It's OK, though. I think it's all right to expose the man.

FRIEDMAN: He's exposed, and they're going to elect him. You're saying to me what should the American Jewish community do? And I'm saying nothing.

M2: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: No!

M2: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: No! We're talking about a guy whose record is in the past. You think because --

M1: You're saying either press for indictment or do nothing.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah! The man's guilty or not guilty.

M1: You think he's harmless?

FRIEDMAN: I think he's harmless.

M2: (inaudible) the Jewish community (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: That's correct. I think he's going to spend the next four years of his life eating [schlagzana?] and drinking coffee with every goddamn Jew he can come near in order to clear himself. This will be his way of doing it. He's got two choices. He can either run around kissing Jewish fannies or he can take a very cold, hard, imperious position saying, "Listen, you people [00:17:00] defamed me. You really, scurrilously attacked me. It was libel, it was everything under the sun. But I'm not going to -- I'm going to overlook it. Finished. You are Austrian citizens, I am the president of all Austrians. Don't invite me to any bar mitzvahs."

M2: There won't be any of that anyway.

M1: Technically, who has the -- who is empowered to indict?

FRIEDMAN: To indict?

M1: Yeah. Nobody.

FRIEDMAN: Well, it's like a citizen's arrest. I think anybody  
can bring an indictment.

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: I think the Americans would be --

M1: Who is the guy -- who (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: The World Jewish Congress could have brought an  
indictment.

F: (inaudible)

M1: No, not [Rogers?].

M2: Any --

M1: Who was the guy you mentioned? It was recently (overlapping  
dialogue; inaudible) yeah, wasn't he indicted by  
(overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

M2: Request extradition. That's what you could do with --

FRIEDMAN: A nation?

M2: What?

FRIEDMAN: That's a governmental act. A government can --

M2: [Right?] (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: The United States -- yeah, the United States can ask  
for extradition before an American court because it wishes  
[00:18:00] to bring an indictment against him.

M2: (inaudible)

M1: I'll tell you one thing that we ought to do.

FRIEDMAN: *Nu?*

M1: You're saying (inaudible) the past. I'm saying it's to the present --

FRIEDMAN: All right.

M1: -- in the sense that there is gross negligence on the part of the government of the United States in discharging its due diligence with respect to the approval of Waldheim for the Secretary Generalship of the United Nations.

FRIEDMAN: Fine.

M1: We had veto power and we should have vetoed. We didn't do our homework.

FRIEDMAN: Therefore, what would you want them to do today?

M1: What I want them to do is be aware that they can't be that indifferent and that cavalier in exercising their responsibility --

FRIEDMAN: That's --

M1: -- that there's a Jewish community that's going to raise hell with them.

FRIEDMAN: That's reading them a little *musak*. What do you want them to do? (laughter) What do you want to --

M1: What I want to do right now? (laughter) I want to put that son of a gun on that list that denies him entry into the United States of America.

FRIEDMAN: So, OK.

M1: That's all.

FRIEDMAN: What's his name? This guy -- they have a special prosecutor, whatever his name is.

M2: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: [Dusou?]?

M1: Well, there's an effort underway to do that.

FRIEDMAN: OK.

M1: And I think they --

FRIEDMAN: So, he won't come to the United States. [00:19:00]

M1: That's right (inaudible) Austria feels that (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: I mean, the -- you know -- what?

M2: It's an important statement.

FRIEDMAN: That he can't come to the United States? So, he's in the category of two Baltic seamen (laughter) and four syphilitic sailors and, you know, what the hell (inaudible) so he can't come to -- Jesus, I really don't see it. I mean, you guys really make --

M1: That is a --

M2: No (inaudible).

M1: -- terrible (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) embarrassment (inaudible) (laughter) all over the world (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).



FRIEDMAN: Yeah, Robbie?

ROBBIE: From a practical standpoint, Yugoslavia did examine --  
they (inaudible) others. So, this is not all (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Right.

ROBBIE: -- looked at before the world -- UN congress got into  
it, countries have looked at it. Yugoslavia looked at back  
in '81, and Yugoslavia reviewed it (inaudible) and said  
that it was not (inaudible) and decided not to press --

FRIEDMAN: Right.

ROBBIE: -- for indictment. If they couldn't indict him,  
[00:20:00] it probably -- and I'm not -- I don't know what  
goes on in the Yugoslavian's mind, but it is a comment into  
the many countries that want to indict if Yugoslavia would  
probably have gone ahead and proceeded just to embarrass  
him.

FRIEDMAN: Makes sense. They got them --

ROBBIE: And just did not have enough evidence to do so. I  
don't know what (inaudible).

M1: Although they say that --

ROBBIE: I don't know, I don't know.

M1: -- they say that if you compare the Yugoslavian court  
system with the most crooked court system in any borough of  
this country --

FRIEDMAN: Ladies and gents --

M1: (inaudible) it doesn't even --

ROBBIE: But one other comment, if I could just make --

FRIEDMAN: Yeah.

ROBBIE: -- and then I'll shut up.

FRIEDMAN: No --

ROBBIE: Just the thing about Waldheim and the Secretary General and everything else -- you go back right after the war, it seems like -- and the statement that was just issued by one of the federal -- people in the Justice Department said, "We don't have the resources, we don't have the time, and we don't have the inclination -- and by the way, there are thousands of Nazis who are in this country and are guilty and would be indictable, and might even be more indictable" (inaudible) the United States government has allowed [00:21:00] this because of whatever neglect -- or the national security issues that [Gordy?] raised, all those things -- never pursue it. I don't know why they haven't pursued it -- whatever those reasons are. There are plenty here in this country. We don't have to go after Waldheim. We had the resolve and wanted to do it, we could start right here.

FRIEDMAN: In Huntsville.

ROBBIE: But is that -- I don't know what it proves, but that's where you could start.

FRIEDMAN: So, you know, I really don't know what we're talking about when we're talking about Waldheim. I just don't have any --

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: That's fine! Indict him. Indict him.

F: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Yes, I know. Wiesel's statement -- want you to understand this man. Unit two, page three. Wiesel says, "We've made three mistakes in" --

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Hey, fellas, one at a time.

M1: I don't know (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Wiesel says, "We've made three mistakes.

[00:22:00] One, in regard to our definition of war criminals."

M1: That's right.

FRIEDMAN: The Nazis were not war criminals, regarding the Holocaust. They started murdering the Jews six years before the war. So, don't let the Nazis off by calling them war criminals. That's too easy. Second, he says, "We make a mistake when we speak only of six million Jews and we

reduce the problem to one of Nazis against Jews. I speak of 11 million victims of Nazi racism." Six plus five others. He says, "That's a broader indictment and more accurate historically, and goes down better with more people."

M1: Those are not war killed. These are killed in camps, etc.?

FRIEDMAN: Victims of Nazi racism. Killed in camps.

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Three, "We gave priority to material restitution instead of moral. This gave the Germans that the feeling that the [00:23:00] account was settled." I got some mixed feelings about that one, but I can understand what he's saying. Fact of the matter is, once we decided to take the dough, there was no way that we could avoid the world knowing it and talking about it, and therefore, there was no way that we could avoid going for the jugular vein. And the Jewish people -- has gone for the jugular vein against the Germans time and time again, to extend the restitution payments to individual people and etc., etc. When Gurion made that decision, it was a very tough one. When he confronted his own conscience -- and Adenauer in the Waldorf-Astoria hotel in 1952. And you were very young then.

M1: He was.

FRIEDMAN: He was.

M1: I wasn't even born.

FRIEDMAN: (laughs) I can't believe that. [00:24:00]

F: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: The two old men -- Adenauer was already in his 80s and Ben-Gurion was in his 70s, and that was it. And they looked at each other, and with the wisdom of age they said, "Why should we continue to talk about philosophy and forgiveness and guilt? We're talking about money. (laughter) You need money. I would like to give it to you. The only way I can see to make any moral restitution to you is to help you build that country. I believe it should be built. So, get your people in, I get my people in, we talk about money." And that's what it was. And then [Kiorisosephkal?] got brought in, and [Moe Leavitt?] got brought in and a whole bunch of people, and they started talking. And they decided that they would have a neutral place to meet, and they decided on The Hague. And then the protocol involved in getting that first meeting was totally [00:25:00] incredible. They agreed on coming in through two separate doors from two separate sides of the room -- not to shake hands, the two delegations. Not to. Not to say a word to each other. Just sit down at a group of tables on

respective sides of the room and start reading the papers to each other. And the German delegation had to make the offer. The Israel/Jewish delegation wasn't going to ask. So, all that *macha* -- like, it takes, you know, a lot of time to work out. But then, it's ended up now in -- I don't know what, \$30-40 billion by now, when you add together what the State of Israel got, what individual Jews got for their individual suffering -- days in prison, days as a slave labor for [IG Farbman?]. I mean, everything was documented, and every claim was processed. [00:26:00] It's way up in the high billions.

ROBBIE: Thirty billion? That's 500 million per person.

FRIEDMAN: Maybe -- no, for the State of Israel. The state got most of --

M2: Oh, no, no, no, you blew a decimal point.

ROBBIE: OK.

FRIEDMAN: Probably 40 billion.

M2: And so, 13 million a person.

F: So, I didn't know that the State of Israel received money as well as individuals?

M2: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Oh, come on. The *sheilumeim* -- the Hebrew word *lashaleim*, which means to pay. *Sheilumeim*, payments.

Reparations, payments were made at the rate of \$800 million a year, almost a billion dollars a year to the State of Israel. Now, it came in the form of things -- of goods that -- the Israel delegation would come every year to the counting conference and say, "Well, we need this year 50,000 telephones, 500 miles [00:27:00] of copper cable" --

M1: (inaudible) \$6,000.

M2: Yeah, 6,000 (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: So, etc., etc., and --

F: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: What?

F: For how long?

M2: How many years?

FRIEDMAN: This was a year. Each --

F: For how many --

M2: For how many years?

FRIEDMAN: Fifteen years. And then it was prolonged. I have -- on unit two, page four --

M1: Did anybody negotiate behind the scenes with the Germans on the amount?

FRIEDMAN: No.

F: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: And --

M2: Was there ever any --

FRIEDMAN: And the guy who kept a strong hand on the whole -- on that issue was Nahum Goldmann.

F: What'd he do?

FRIEDMAN: He was the head of the delegation. Claims -- material -- Conference on Material Claims against the German Government. Conference on Material Claims against the German Government. The word material was put right in the title. I mean, you know, obviously. You ain't got moral -- clean hands out of this thing, kid. This is just [00:28:00] material claims. Goldman was the chairman of the committee, and [Josefthal?], Minister of Labor in the Israel government represented them, and Moe Leavitt represented the Jewish people of the diaspora. He was the director the joint at that time. So, you had the joint representing the diaspora. You had Levitt. You had Josefthal representing the Israelis. You had Nahum Goldmann representing the World Jewish Congress. He was the chairman. And you had one guy there for the Canadians. I can just see him, he got a moustache. But, no, there were -- no back channel stuff, no -- no, no, no. There weren't that many people there. There were 10 people around the table. Was a clean [00:29:00] cut



thing. I wrote some notes for that meeting of the survivors, which was held in Jerusalem a couple years ago.

M1: Oh, yeah.

FRIEDMAN: I gave a speech, which was kind of autobiographical to the UJA student mission in 1975. Let's see what the hell else is any good in here. I think that's about it. I think that's about it. And then there's a bibliography at the back. Somebody said I left out -- oh, the abandonment of the Jews. [00:30:00]

M1: Yeah, right.

F: All right.

M1: And (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: You're right.

M1: (inaudible) (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: You're right.

M1: Gurion.

FRIEDMAN: David Wyman, *Abandonment* -- OK, now what I'd like to do is this. I'd like to go over to the audio-visual stuff, and I think in the time available to us, we can see the three items. What I'd like to do before that -- because there's always one thing before another thing, isn't there? (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) I'd like to make sure you understand what's on these two large maps, which were

prepared with a great, great deal of effort and I think should -- are clear right to the back of the room. This map [00:31:00] is based upon the concept that everybody should know that the concentration camps were in Germany. Germany never soiled her soil with a death camp. So, if you look at it this way, Treblinka's over here. That's -- Warsaw's about here. Treblinka was a death camp, Sobibor was a death camp, Majdanek, Belzec, Auschwitz down here near Krakow (inaudible) those were the notorious death camps. Death means gas and burning.

M1: What about (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: No.

M2: (inaudible)

M1: In there?

FRIEDMAN: Mauthausen, some people were killed because they couldn't carry stones up the steps.

M1: What about the gas chamber?

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, so, if the guy wasn't quite killed but he only had one leg [00:32:00] smashed and you had to get rid of him -- so, you put him in the gas chamber. The gas chamber was an incidental way of getting rid of people whom you wanted to kill, but it was not a process. You did not

process. The black camps are set up solely for the murder of Jews.

M1: (inaudible) also (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: So, the operative word is solely. Auschwitz was the bigger one -- the biggest one. Other camps, marked by swastikas, were all over Germany. Germans don't deny that. But that was for discipline, and that was for political unreliaables, and that was for homosexuals, and that was for -- you know, you and me. And what it says down here, "Other camps in which Jews and non-Jews were put to forced labor, and that's [00:33:00] the clue. Most of these camps, the population was taken out of the camp during the day and brought to some neighboring installation and rented -- rented -- for four marks a day. IG Farben rented you from the Gestapo. And they paid the Gestapo four marks a day for your service. Out of that four marks a day, you had to feed the laborer and clothe them or whatever. And there was a very fine financial calculation in every camp. IG Farben made a lot of money out of that person. They paid you four marks a day. On a cost accounting basis, maybe they got 100 marks a day, effective, productive labor out of that man by whatever product he manufactured, which IG Farben in turn sold [00:34:00] back to the German army or whoever needed

it. That was the main purchaser of anything in Germany in those days. So, IG Farben made dough on the laborer, made dough on the product it was selling. When it was all over and done with, anybody who could prove that he was a slave laborer put in a claim to the German government and got paid back his four marks a day. Very precise, very accurate. To this day.

M1: How did people prove it? Were there records kept with name, numbers?

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, there were. And, you know, a large battery of lawyers exist in Germany today. There are about 35,000 Jews living in Germany today, of whom fully 10% are lawyers who process reparations claims. German lawyers, Israeli lawyers who moved over there. [00:35:00] Now, the reason I wanted you to know this is that always there comes up subliminally the argument, "We Germans are not mass murderers. Yeah, we were Nazis. Yes, I'm not trying to deny all that stuff. I'm only trying to deny one point. We did not murder six million Jews. That was done over in the province of Poland. The governor general of Poland was the responsible officer who did that, and this map is the proof of it." And you have to know the answer to it. Obviously, from an administrative point of view, if this was the governor

general of Poland, a Nazi in Berlin headquarters [00:36:00]  
-- where the hell would Berlin be? Right about up here  
someplace -- could say, "We're very well organized, we have  
every department. This is not part of the German  
government's decision. There's nothing in writing." By the  
way, when he was talking about historians finding -- do you  
know there's not one single solitary order in writing out  
of the Wannsee Conference, which took place in February  
1942 -- if you want to know the date when the Final  
Solution, the two words -- *es einlucha ilursu*, the Final  
Solution -- those two words were created and written down -  
- it was, I think, January the 12<sup>th</sup> -- I'm not sure of the  
exact date. But 1942. [00:37:00] And there was a meeting in  
a beautiful villa on the Wannsee Lake -- in which I almost  
drowned once, because I'm not a good sailor. (laughs) That  
was a shocking day. And they were all middle level guys.  
Eichmann was a lousy lieutenant-colonel. There wasn't a  
general in the room! So, you let your third level  
executives sign the order that you are -- that the Final  
Solution of the Jewish people shall be determined by this  
committee of people, dozen people. Nothing about gassing,  
nothing about killing, nothing about nothing. February --  
January '42, for those who like dates. The second map, over

here, is that cruel thing. [00:38:00] And it doesn't matter where you pick it up. Just really doesn't matter -- 1943, the British government rejects the appeal by the Archbishop of Canterbury to abandon the quota system. Quota system meant some Jews would be allowed into England, but they had to prove that they came under the quota of non-enemy aliens. Any German Jew was called an enemy alien, 'cause he was German by British regulations. So, a group of people got the Archbishop of Canterbury to go to the government and say, "Come on!" British government said nothing, won't change the rules -- 1943, here -- Bermuda, that's the one. Secret Anglo-American conference fails to reach agreement on the possibility of an open door policy for refugees.

M1: (inaudible) Alaska [00:39:00] (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Alaska, 1940, U.S. Congress rejects bill to open Alaska to Jewish refugees.

M1: (inaudible)

M2: Read the one on top there, on the 20,000 Jewish children --

FRIEDMAN: Nineteen forty-three, U.S. State Department rejects Swedish proposal for joint rescue of 20,000 Jewish children from Germany.

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: The Swedes. They were neutral, they weren't in the war. They weren't against the Germans, and they had, you know, Wallenberg and they had a lot of good guys. And they said to the U.S. government, "We'll go to the Germans and we'll ask them to let 20,000 Jewish kids come to Sweden. We'll take care of them. We want the U.S. government backing and the U.S. government's support, and we'll need some dough." U.S. government turned it down. I mean, State Department turned it down.

M1: Why? What (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: What why?

M1: -- 1943.

FRIEDMAN: Why were they turning down everything? [00:40:00] What do you mean why?

M2: (inaudible) not to get mad (laughter) (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) down side (inaudible) another bombing raid. (laughter)

FRIEDMAN: The down side is once you open a crack, once you set a precedent, tomorrow morning somebody else is going to come in and ask for something, and you've got no end to this damn thing. Answer is no. And when it was all over and done with, you know what happened. One thousand Jews were allowed into this country, into -- and put in a camp up in

northern New York called Oswego, O-S-W-E-G-O. And that's the sum total of the Jews. Oswego, 1,000.

M1: It's up (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: No, now this is over -- of the whole period of time --

M2: Thirty-three to '45.

FRIEDMAN: From -- yeah, exactly, the 12 years -- 1933 to 1945.

From -- Hitler's whole period.

M1: (inaudible) [00:41:00] (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Yes. At the time, early on in the '30s, when German Jews could get out of Germany and got visas to come into the United States in a big flow, until that stopped in '39.

M2: That was a non-issue. Like, my mother came in '36, my father in '38.

M1: From '40s and '30s --

F: Why would (inaudible)

M1: From '40 to '45, how many Jews in that?

FRIEDMAN: Handful -- '40 to '45, the war was on, the submarines were working. There were no -- there was no shipping. Don't know a number, but it had to be very small.

M1: Less than 50,000?

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, yeah. May '39, Cuban and U.S. governments refuse to admit 900 German Jews on the *St. Louis* -- well, we talked about that.



M2: Out at the port, 1941 (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

German --

F: U.S. flag (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).

M2: -- 20,000 Jewish children --

FRIEDMAN: Nineteen forty-one, U.S. [*Titan's?*] quota system --

Congress rejects proposal to admit 20,000 [00:42:00] German Jewish children above the quota limits. This was an effort to repeat that play two years later.

M1: (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) we'd better watch the video (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: All right. Come look at this thing, and look at it in your [*Gilbert?*] book. The greatest group anywhere was in Shanghai. And in Shanghai, there were 25,000 Jews living very well, in very organized way. Large number of Lubavitcher among them. Many, many Hassidim got out -- most of them got out through Shanghai. Went all the way across Russia. And a guy who was a good friend of ours, Charlie Jordan, lived in Shanghai for five years and was the director of the joint operation there, and ran it smoothly and nicely, and [00:43:00] the 25,000 people --

M1: Now I know why Jews like Chinese food, right? (laughter)  
(overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

M2: Japan who was part of the Axis (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, Japan was there. Didn't touch the Jews. Who would like to put the slides on? Since they're there, let's get them done.

F: We have to move this back to where it was.

M2: We have to put the screen over --

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, move the screen over in front of this thing.

F2: (inaudible) is it possible to get a copy of (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: You have, darling. You have, my dear. (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) It's in your Martin Gilbert book of maps.

M1: Maybe we should have them (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).

F2: The finger in mouth. (laughs) (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Let's pull this thing over in front of --

F2: Don't do it.

FRIEDMAN: OK, dear. (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).

M2: Got to bring it right about there.

F: Right about here.

M2: Right about there.

F: Right where it's (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) right about here? [00:44:00] (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

M1: Little bit towards --

FRIEDMAN: What's what?

M2: (inaudible) Oswego (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Oswego is a camp up near -- about near Syracuse.

(overlapping dialogue; inaudible) You --

M1: Yeah, they took 1,000 --

FRIEDMAN: -- 1,000 Jews and put them in there, yeah.

M2: It's like (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Roosevelt did it through the PWA or WPA or one of those damn things. (laughs)

M1: But was it legally done or something like that?

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, yeah, legally done, legally done. Legally done.

F: OK, it's set up.

M1: We're ready, leader. (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: I don't know. Place might have been empty. Might have been a -- Warsaw ghetto. What you're looking at is a pile of bricks. An occasional wall of a house. That pile of bricks is some number of feet above street level. You'll see a picture which will give you -- make that clearer.

F: So, do you want to sit down? Right here.

FRIEDMAN: Thank you.

F: Behind you.

FRIEDMAN: OK, good. [00:45:00] Inside the one square mile of the city of -- the center of the city of Warsaw, there was

bound to be a church. And that church was left standing by the Nazis. The other stuff is just pieces of ironwork. You know, part of the construction of buildings. Next. There you're getting a look at what street level is. Look right in the foreground of the picture. You know, I'm sorry it's underexposed, but -- next. OK, that gives it to you better. You clear off -- you clear down to street level where trolley tracks were. And the pile of rubble represents the height of the buildings. They were all pretty uniform. They weren't elevated buildings. They were about six or seven story solid brick buildings. Hundreds -- 100, 200 years old. And when they caved and collapsed, they collapsed down to a pile of about [00:46:00] 15 feet high. That path-like strip that you see on the side there is people climbing up to the top of the pile to look for other people or buried treasure. Jews who had buried something and who were lucky enough to be alive and come back were looking. Non-Jews believed that the Jews had billions of dollars of gold which were buried in the ghetto. And there was a constant rummaging of hundreds and hundreds of people, digging little shovels through all the debris.

M1: Buildings were blown up with, like, dynamite?

FRIEDMAN: Blown up one by one, dynamited. Dynamited in the doorway, and that was the easiest way to bring the building down.

M1: And this was after (inaudible) it wasn't part of the (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Both, both, both. Before and after. But mostly before.

After the uprising, the ghetto was totally abandoned by everyone. [00:47:00] Now it's all built over. Next.

M1: Was it selected because of the high Jew population in the first place?

FRIEDMAN: No. It was in the city, it was in the middle of town.

A half a million Poles -- (break in audio)

(pause)

FRIEDMAN: -- that whole uprising was going on while they were meeting there in Bermuda. And they know it, the government leaders.

M1: (inaudible) reasonable (inaudible) what --

FRIEDMAN: Well, there were a couple of strong issues on the table. One was the creation of a Jewish army. One was the question of bombing Auschwitz. Both issues just sloughed aside, which means [00:48:00] decided in the negative. No decision, no vote. Just too tough, can't do it. And then the Rooseveltian doctrine of the day, which he bought to

explain to the Jews in America who were pressing him by now -- because by '43, the Jews in America -- Stephen Weiss was pressing by '43. You know, he was getting fed up that he was getting conned and that he was not getting any kind of answer. And he was getting needled by Abba Hillel Silver and the other guys on the other side, and he went in less politic and less smooth and more desperate and more shrill. Didn't matter to him. They had reached their conclusion. "Gentlemen, we know it's terrible. We know it's tragic. We know your people are being burned up. But so are Allied soldiers. And the Russians are losing people by the millions. [00:49:00] The priority item is to win the war. If we win the war, we will save some Jews. And if we don't win the war, we'll lose everything including Jews -- but including freedom. So, there's no more -- nothing else to talk about. The priority item is winning the war. And don't tell us that our bombers from 8<sup>th</sup> Air Force in [Barre?] in Italy are going by the Ploiesti oil fields in Romania and they're going right past Auschwitz. And we don't want to hear that kind of stuff, because we're not going to divert one." So, you know, there was a shootout, there was an answer, and that was it and that was the end, and that was the last time that any effort was made.

M2: (inaudible) focus the bombers (inaudible) because the Canadians were saying (inaudible) experience, because they have the worst record (inaudible) up until 1948. But, they were active in [00:50:00] protesting. You had Rothman, who was going directly to the prime minister. You had Jewish MPs. And it does seem, no matter what they did -- I mean, they were not quiet. I mean, I think people get a feeling that everybody was quiet and nobody really was -- people were doing what they were doing. But those answers -- they kept on getting stonewalled, and I don't think in those times people knew how to address the stone wall issue. And that really was happening. I don't -- I think there's a tendency of people my generation to blame their parents for not acting and saying, "How could you sit here while people were dying? What were you doing?" Well, these people were going to work. They were trying to feed their families, and they were trying just to live during very trying times. They were also trying to do things. I think today if a boatload of Afghanistans came here, they'd probably say -- I don't know how we would react faster -- but I'm not sure how much faster we would.

FRIEDMAN: Who's we?

M2: I mean, the American public. You know, in how many cities they might have (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: American [00:51:00] public doesn't have to react.

M2: Well, the government, OK.

FRIEDMAN: How many Southeast Asians has the United States government allowed into this country? Over a quarter of a million, without a murmur. And would allow another quarter of a million in --

M2: But there's certain incidences that happen.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah.

M2: But I think what I'm trying to speak to is that there were people who were actively trying to do things, people that were --

M1: But it was the context in which they were doing it that I find so offensive, that --

M2: They were all trying to do it after --

M1: No.

M2: -- out in the open.

M1: They didn't want to offend the goyim. I mean, the bottom line was --

M2: That's (inaudible).

M1: -- that, you know, we're still guests here.

M2: We're not shy.



M1: We really aren't fully accepted, and let's not jeopardize our emerging situation by focusing attention upon ourselves as being different and forcing the government to make a decision that's against the patriotic national duty of this country (inaudible) so I'm going to go in and I'm going to talk to the President. Me and him, privately, [00:52:00] and I'm going to tell him I don't think he's doing the right thing. He's going to say, "I'm going to think about it." I'm going to go out and I'm going to be a nice boy. But there's not going to be a march that's going to take place, and I don't buy the thing that it starts with sit-ins and all that other stuff. What was missing was passionate leadership that was courageous enough to be willing to confront the status quo in terms of Jewish acceptance in this country. The trade-off -- the security of our position for the responsibility to advocate for the Jews who were perishing in Europe, that was missing.

F: Did they have the leverage if they wanted to exercise it?

M1: You don't know that 'til you try.

FRIEDMAN: That's right.

M1: The fact is --

FRIEDMAN: You need --

M1: -- there weren't any -- there weren't enough -- I mean, Stephen Weiss did the best he could do. He was -- I don't criticize him.

FRIEDMAN: He really was alone.

M1: Because he was an independent, courageous force who did within the context of his unique relationship with the President of the United States what he thought he could do to advance the cause. And he was willing to rupture his relationship and the door of access [00:53:00] in order to advocate well. But he was alone.

M2: What we don't know is -- the climate of that time, if it would have allowed the kind of passion that you talk about. If a man gets in -- if, in fact -- I think that --

FRIEDMAN: Whose climate? Jewish climate or general climate?

M2: Talking the general climate.

F: General climate.

FRIEDMAN: What's that got to do with Jewish climate?

M1: I think there's two. I think it's both. I don't think you can separate them.

F: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Are you saying that Jews can't separate their own interests and their own necessary action from the general

climate, should that be opposed, let's say? Let's take the worst case scenario.

M1: No, right now. They'll go historically back -- go to right now, technology for Jews -- the Soviet Union. Right today. And there is a strong national security argument that says do not advance the Soviet economic position by providing technology, because if we do, their 16% of GNP [00:54:00] will create more dollars that'll cause us to have to compete not at six percent of GNP but at seven or eight, and we'll have to make trade-offs, and we can't afford it. So, don't do it.

FRIEDMAN: I say do it. Give them the goddamn oil bits for a quarter of a million Jews!

M1: Right. That's today. And I'm saying that it -- there's no time when you can advocate for your own unique interest, quote-unquote, without coming into conflict with some other generic interest. Now, I can make the case that in the advocacy of the particular (inaudible) supporting the climate that's necessary to support the general -- but that's not the way the press is going to interpret what I'm going to do. And all I'm saying is that when I go back to that period and I study what the leadership -- what the organizational structure did, what -- the whole shtick, I

think it's a shameful period in U.S. history. And secondly, when I say what is the second emerging lesson from it, it was the weakness of that structure, all right? I mean, [00:55:00] the fact was that the structure was weak. In 1939, you formed the UJA.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah.

M1: OK? There wasn't a structure. Maintain a strong organizational structure. Maintain the kind of posturing where there is advocacy politically. Maintain all the other dimensions of the vitality of Jewish life. And then you've got the situation where Sharansky comes with 300,000 Jews, we ought to see him. I mean, that's a different climate than 1938 when the [Evian?] Conference was taking place.

FRIEDMAN: Listen, kiddo, you're awful eloquent tonight. He's really fabulous, isn't he?

F: Real hot. (laughter)

FRIEDMAN: He's going.

F2: Hot button.

F: Yeah.

FRIEDMAN: What he is saying is on unit seven, just -- (laughter)  
(overlapping dialogue; inaudible) (laughter)

M2: No original thoughts (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: We're such good friends here. Now there's a wave of -- the wavelengths. Unit seven, quick. Confusion and failure in the Jewish world to act. Failure. A, non-action by Jews in the West. [00:56:00] Stephen Weiss only one who really tried. Other organizations blunted action. Why? Why? One, fear of making things worse. Two, insecurity of the Jewish position. Three, fear of anti-Semitism in the U.S. Four, masses didn't speak. Five, no strong local or even national organizations. That's the situation of the Jews in the East -- in the West. The situation of the Jews in the East who were stuck behind the Nazi wall of conquest -- difficulty of uniting various resistance groups, to the utter shame of the Jewish people. Do you know how long it took to create the ZOB, which are Polish words which I can't pronounce, but which mean the Jewish fighting organization? Took a year. Took Mordechai Anielewicz a year in the Warsaw Ghetto. He couldn't get the Bundists together with the Zionists together with the [00:57:00] Mizrachi together with -- he couldn't get them together, down in the bunker of [Milla?] 18. They couldn't agree on a common fighting organization. B, the slowness of organizing the revolts in the ghettos. And three, the main thing, the hopes that the Western democracies would send help. And so, while there

was resistance by the Jews, still it was slow and disorganized and -- OK, chow time.

M2: Well, that (inaudible).

MAURICE: Think you have to add one more thing.

FRIEDMAN: Which page, Maurice?

MAURICE: B!

FRIEDMAN: B.

MAURICE: The total, unprecedented nature of the annihilation of the Jews. It had never happened before.

FRIEDMAN: How about (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) what did you say? How did you describe it? The unprecedented --

MAURICE: (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) of [00:58:00] annihilation (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Total unprecedented nature of the mass slaughter.

(overlapping dialogue; inaudible) Nelson, how are you?

NELSON: All right (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Good to see you.

NELSON: How are you feeling?

FRIEDMAN: Lousy. We've got the hematoma thing solved. I mean, it's shrunk down now to --

NELSON: With surgery?

FRIEDMAN: No. So, we're left with a little residual thing. We'll live with it. Start --

NELSON: (inaudible) medical --

FRIEDMAN: Oh, yeah, and 'til he gets me off of that, I'm going to die. I'm on the verge of diabetes. The blood sugar is up to 350, all because of the medicine. I mean, it cures one thing and kill --

NELSON: So, (inaudible) (laughter)

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, four or five weeks, he says I'll be weak [00:59:00] like this, I'll sweat. The edema is so large, I can't button my shirt. However, we'll lick it.

NELSON: Well, it's the best course.

FRIEDMAN: Sure.

NELSON: Well, you had some good news about things.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, I think -- listen, on balance, obviously, sure it is.

NELSON: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: I can eat anything that has no sugar in it. That's the thing I have to worry about. So, I will go up -- (break in audio) familiarity with the subject, so I did not want to be banal. Instead what I did was to be presumptuous. I went through all of the files and folders that I have on the Holocaust, and I pulled out a bunch of stuff. And I compiled it into what I call the package, or a -- yeah, a package. And after I had taken the 10 items that I thought

were important enough to send to you, I kept looking and I found five more. So, I sent you -- second package.

[01:00:00] So, you have those two packages, and in them you have the items which I am perfectly willing and happy to go over with you tonight, which constitute, in my book, the major conclusions that I have reached about the Holocaust after a lifetime of thinking about it. Now, everybody has that same problem coming to his own conclusions about it, so -- and that's the major thing to do discuss about the Holocaust today, after all, isn't it? There's very little additional data that we're going to learn. Almost everybody connected with it is dead. There are a few survivors. There will be some occasional janitor in Cleveland who will show up at age 72 and turn out to be some villain. Trials still go on in [01:01:00] Germany, after a long period in which the Germans said statute of limitations has come to an end. There was an incredible world pressure, whatever it was, 20 years ago. The Germans reopened the whole trial syndrome. But all of that is going to end biologically in the next five years, 10 years, 20 years. So, when I say that there are no new insights that I think anybody is going to find and no new personalities and no new secrets -- and, yes, somebody will find out where the Vatican kept its travel



money by which it smuggled a lot of people to Argentina. And somebody will find out, you know, who is still running the last remnant of the Odessa network, etc., etc. None of that's historically crucial. What's crucial from this point on is for each of us who cares to make his own reconciliation with the subject, [01:02:00] to come to his own understanding of what the basic elements are, and to come to an understanding of what his posture ought to be. Posture. And people's postures differ radically. People who won't buy the German cars still, after 45 years, and the people who go to Germany every year because the Black Forest is one of the most handsome places on Earth to go for a vacation. And there is no hotel such as the whatchamacallit, the -- in Baden-Baden. The Kaiser. So, you know, what's your posture toward the thing? The present generation is guilty, even though 75% of them weren't born when Hitler was in power? What does the Bible say about guilt passing to the sons, unto the 10<sup>th</sup> [01:03:00] generation? Therefore, what these packets represent are nothing more than my personal conclusions. That gives you every single -- except one. One item I have put in here represents the conclusions of four major, major people. Major people. [Eli Ezra Berkovich?] and Emil Fackenheim and

Richard Rubinstein and -- whom else did I put in there? Wiesel. That's their opinion. And you read a couple of pages of each one, and it's important for you to know, because these are seminal figures. Therefore, since most of this stuff in here represents my opinion, that's all it's worth. And that's all the credibility you have to pay or all the attention you have to pay. I would like to recommend to you as an exercise, [01:04:00] which takes a great deal of courage and time -- but I think it will be very useful -- that each of you find some time this summer to write your own attitudes and postures. Write. Write them down. It's a lot easier to talk about them -- you know, some night, you're drinking beer or Coca-Cola and you're sitting around the house and you're chatting with good friends, and you say, "Gee, I think this." And you say it, and it goes off into the wind. Make an exercise for yourself to write three pages. No more. And give them to me before the summer's over, how about that? And we'll put them away, and we'll look at them a year later, just to see whether they came out of your maturity or whether they came [01:05:00] out of your still gropingness. It's a good thing to do. Therefore, what I would like to do tonight is divide into two parts. There are some things I would like to show

you. I've looked at perhaps 100 films on the Holocaust. Never counted them, but it's got to be that many. There's one which I think is the best. It's a film called *Night and Fog*. It was done by the famous French director Alain Resnais. Alain Resnais was working in the '50s. The film is old, it's -- some of it is in sepia, some of it is in black and white. It's 31 minutes. It's in French. The subtitles are in English. It's a philosophical film. It's a film in which the narrator is groping for his own meaning [01:06:00] to the Holocaust. He's filled with fear. He's filled with apprehension that it will happen again. Think of the time in which he's making it, the '50s. And yet, he insists upon putting into it an element of hope, otherwise he couldn't live with it. The second thing I want to show you is a 10 minute film. Polish film. You're smiling. "Ambulance", right. He's not only an expert in the Holocaust, he is an expert in film. (laughs) You know? That's a tough combination, but -- I don't know how many people in America have seen -- "Ambulance" is the name of the film. There's no -- it's a silent. There's no speaking in it. So, if you don't know Polish, it's not important. Nobody speaks Polish. Nobody speaks anything. You just look at that thing for 10 minutes. [01:07:00] And these are two

videotapes. Now, they're old and they're scratchy and I would like not to hear anything about the technical quality. We're lucky we have them. And it was a job to rescue them, and the *Night and Fog* is on 16mm film. This is the first time anybody has it switched and made over into videotape. So, it's now much more accessible. I would like to show you those two. The third thing I would like to show you, if it's working -- and I think Brad in his technical virtuosity has gotten it to work -- are some slides.

BRAD: (inaudible) flashlight.

FRIEDMAN: Use a what?

BRAD: Flashlight.

FRIEDMAN: OK.

BRAD: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: There are two sets of slides. About 30 slides in each set, so they don't take [01:08:00] very long. One is sides of the Warsaw Ghetto. Short introduction. The Warsaw Ghetto was created in October 1941. It ended in the final fight inside the ghetto in the week after Pesach, 1943. April. So, from October '41 until April '43, the Warsaw Ghetto was in existence, and the original intention for which it was created was carried out. The original intention was to pack in to one square mile exactly, by German metric standards,

in the center of the city of Warsaw, and move out whatever [01:09:00] inhabitants occupied that one square mile -- put the Jews in, build a wall around it, introduce typhus, which would kill a certain number of people, and evacuate them, a certain number every day, 70 miles down the railroad track to Treblinka -- in that movie, which some of you saw, called *Shoah* -- and the intention was to put a half a million Jews into that one square mile, which is what the Germans did. Half a million people. High density. More than Hong Kong. The Germans figured it would take them a year and a half to evacuate. They hit it right on the head. October to April. The half million people were destroyed. The *eltistu delyuten*, the *Judenrat*, [01:10:00] the Jewish council that was created inside the ghetto to administer the affairs of the half million Jews on behalf of the German masters, who didn't like to come into the ghetto because of the stink and the typhus and the feces and the sight of these people. And so, they rarely came inside. But the man who was -- Adam [Chernyiko?] was the name of the first -- let's call him the chairman of the federation. That's what he was -- was given an assignment to evacuate 7,000 people per day down to the railroad track, which was called the [Umzinglunzplatz?], the

transfer point. And the first day that he was in office, he wrote on a piece of paper [01:11:00] the number 7,000 and shot himself. Fell forward over the paper, and only when they moved his body back did they see and did they understand why he committed suicide. What he was saying was, "I ain't going to do it. I just ain't going to do it. Even though tomorrow morning, somebody else will be sitting here and somebody else will do it, I'm not going to do it." And so he didn't.

M2: That construction must have come later in his office, because he was in office and had developed, according to the movie, a working relationship with the Germans.

FRIEDMAN: Well, maybe I'm wrong and maybe it wasn't the first day. But it was very quickly -- at the beginning of his administration.

F: It was the first time he was given those orders, and that he (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Well, then, OK. Then it was the first time he was given order --

F: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: -- was not his first day in office.

F: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Correction.

M2: I mean, the German officers spoke almost admirably of --  
admiringly of --

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, because he didn't give them any trouble.

[01:02:00]

F: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: You felt what?

F: I believe he's -- was in office over a year. And you can  
look at his diary (inaudible) and it's very wise. I mean,  
his entry -- every single day. Isn't he the one that  
committed suicide --

FRIEDMAN: I think Miriam has got me on the right track. I think  
that's the correction that's acceptable. Anyway, anyway,  
anyway --

F: Yeah, unfortunately --

FRIEDMAN: -- the Ghetto remained that way from April '83, and  
the stink was there because there were thousands and tens  
of thousands of bodies buried under the rubble. And don't  
forget that it was a very large area, a mile square. The  
area that was occupied towards the very end that April was  
a very small area around [Milastrassen?], number 18, which  
was the bunker headquarters. And that became [01:13:00] the  
subject of one of Uris's books you may remember, so that  
the older buildings that were destroyed earlier -- three

months earlier, six months earlier, year earlier -- all made out of stone and brick in good Middle European style, five, seven, eight stories high, reduced, compacted down. Eight stories of brick might wind up to be 15 feet of brick when it comes down, 15 feet above street level. You have bodies under there, all decomposed for all that period of time. The war ended approximately two years later in May of '45. And I came into that Warsaw Ghetto shortly thereafter. So, I have some slides, and they're rough and they're crude and they're not, [01:14:00] you know, very good. But they show what it looked like. So, if we've got the machine working thanks to Brad, we'll look at some slides of the Warsaw Ghetto. And then I have some slides of Auschwitz. And there's nothing special about any of those. So, I thought what we would do is split the evening into two parts and do the audio-visual part first, and then do the talking second. Now, if that's OK with you -- yes, Norman?

NORMAN: As a personal consideration, I was supposed to be at a meeting in Chicago at four o'clock, because my revered leader -- I (inaudible) but I could only (inaudible) tomorrow. Is there any possibility of switching the order?

FRIEDMAN: OK by me. I don't care.



NORMAN: Not a problem for anybody else? I've got to leave at eight o'clock (inaudible). [01:15:00]

F: (inaudible)

NORMAN: Miriam does, too.

FRIEDMAN: We can do the talking first, if you'd like. I have no objection. Make any difference to anybody else? Then let's do it that way. We can do the talking up to the time that you have to leave or whenever and do the audio stuff, the visual stuff afterwards.

F: Yeah.

FRIEDMAN: I would also like you to understand -- now, you want to see the film, my boy, so you're stuck.

F: Yeah, I was just going to say if this is a thing, he can take the tape with him.

FRIEDMAN: I don't want to spend any time discussing this.

F: OK.

FRIEDMAN: Just take a vote, please. Whatever you guys want to do with each other.

F: Well, why don't you show the film?

M1: No, I've seen the film (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: So, we're easy. So, we're easy. Let's have a discussion. I would like to open the discussion as follows. Like to ask you what you think -- in the first package,

[01:16:00] the first package -- not the first document, where I give you my long thesis about why I think those three years of '45 to '48 were the most important three years in Jewish history, including the giving of the Ten Commandments.

M1: You're talking about (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: I'm talking about the second document --

M1: The (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Unit 1B. I would like to know what you think of the Christian minister's point of view. (break in audio) Let me tell you who the two players are in that document. It was a seminar conducted at the Van Lear Institute in 1978. The subject was God at Auschwitz. The speaker [01:17:00] was a Monsignor [Erstreicher?], who comes from Seton Hall University in New Jersey. The man who introduced and interviewed him is a French Jesuit by the name of Marcel Dubois. Both of these guys live in Israel for a very long time. Both of these guys speak fluent Hebrew. Both of these guys are deep, loyal lovers of Israel. Both of these guys believe that the Jewish people -- is God's chosen people. Both of these guys are the most emancipated kind of Catholics you'll ever find. OK. So, the audience comes to this seminar, obviously expecting to find a very, very

favorable point of view. Let's go quickly. I don't know if everybody read it or not. Erstreicher says, [01:18:00] "It doesn't matter if six million dead, eight million dead, 12 million dead -- let's not get lost in this whole fog of numbers, and people will attack you and say it wasn't six million it was only two million. Forget about that. That's not the important issue here. The important issue is that this Holocaust was an attack against God and against Christ." And I guess people -- the people are (inaudible) -- you killed the people, so you shocked everybody. But what was history really aiming at? Hitler was really aiming at Christianity, and basically Judaism, which gave birth to Christianity. That's what Hitler was aiming at. Hitler gave reasons for his attack. "Eh, too many Jewish doctors, would poison the nice Germans." Or, "Too many Jewish lawyers who would twist society and change the rules." Or, "Too many Jewish intellectuals [01:19:00] who were destroying German purity." All that's nonsense. That's all camouflage. What's the eke out, what's the real substance of the Hitler attack? Point three, Hitler understood that the Jews gave the law to mankind, because the Jews had stood at Sinai, nobody else. And this was against Hitler's doctrine that might makes right, not the reverse. With the instinct of

Cain, Hitler recognized the true nature of the Jew. Hitler said, "We Aryans are the chosen people, not you." Hitler's predecessor was Nietzsche, who said that Christianity sprang from Jewish roots and is anti-Aryan. The Nazis persecuted the Jews because they gave birth to Christ. The Nazis conducted a truly [01:20:00] religious war, that is, against religion. OK, now this is Erstreicher's presentation, and it fits in very well, because people are beginning to accept this. And I told you that story that 35 years ago, a long time ago, a guy came to Yale to lecture. His name was Stanley High. He was a Methodist minister. He was one of the editors of the *Reader's Digest*. This is the important thing. *Reader's Digest*, popular America. And he gave his lecture on the subject -- everyone must understand that the myth of anti-Semitism being based upon the fact that the Jews killed Christ -- it's all wrong. Nobody likes the Jews because they gave birth to Christ, and because they imposed upon a barbarian [01:21:00] civilization this set of ethics and morals, which is transmitted through the mouth of this Jew, Jesus, because people weren't reading the same message coming out of the Jew, Amos or the Jew, Josiah or the Jew, Isaiah. So, they heard about it through the Jew, Jesus. And they didn't like it. Nobody likes it.

There was once a book written about the Ten Commandments, under Hitler. And Hitler says to his kids, "Honor your father and mother? What are you talking about? You hate your father and mother! They twist you, they torment you. The Jew, Freud taught everybody that. So, the best thing to do is get rid of your father and mother. Spy on them. Tell everything that they did wrong. Send them to jail, get rid of them. Shoot them." So, Hitler's Ten Commandments take every single one [01:22:00] of the Ten Commandments and twist them in terms of the Nazi ethic. OK, 35 years ago, Mr. Stanley High was saying it, and 10 years ago, Monsignor Estreicher is saying it. And by now, everybody in the world is saying it, and it is becoming quite banal. Now, Estreicher continues and he says there are two answers to Auschwitz coming out of the rabbinic tradition. One is a challenge. It's unit 1B.

M1: Right.

FRIEDMAN: One is a challenge. Talk back to God and don't let him get away with it. I mean, that's what Job did. Take him to task. Argue with him. Make him prove somehow, [01:23:00] by some means that there was some justification for what happened, or some explanation. And don't let him get away with this business of *ayem myste tarter*, the hidden God who

won't talk and the God who keeps to himself. No, not fair. Smoke him out. And this is the point that Erstreicher likes, because he says, "If you people keep forcing yourselves to fight with him about this, then you're going to come to an answer about it that will be more satisfactory to you, or at least that you'll be able to live with without being tormented." The second approach that you have is like Micah, walk humbly, that's all. What can you do? Give in. God was humble. Leave him alone, don't terrorize him. He spoke from a small bush. [01:24:00] Little bush. Wasn't some big, you know -- when he wanted to speak from the towering mountain, he took only one man up there with him. God suffers with his people. When Israel hurts, God hurts. Be kind to him. Be nice. Don't hit him hard over the head. And for there -- and those are your only two alternatives in regard to how to get at the question about God and Auschwitz. And of the two -- Erstreicher was a tough old nut -- says, "I like the former and that's how I conduct myself in life, and I have thundered against God all my life. You want to go the other way, go the other way. I'm not going to tell you that that's a wrong approach." Now, he says, "The reason that I

believe that I can pummel God is because I believe he was there at Auschwitz." [01:25:00] Now, that's a leap.

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: What?

M1: Was Erstreicher there?

F: No, he believes God was there.

FRIEDMAN: He believes God was there.

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, at one point in the thing, I think he said he was there. Yeah. Yeah, he was talking about [Yanush Korchak?], the -- you know, that Polish -- and he said he felt that he was there. He knew Korchak was there. He felt like Korchak. He felt very sympathetic vibrations with him. God was with the victims. He walked their final path with them. He shared their agony, and this was his victory, because they sang "Shmi Yisrael" at the end. And so, they wouldn't -- they couldn't sing it without his being there. And suddenly, he pulls a switch [01:26:00] and he says, "We should get away from this whole question of pure theology, and we should try to find the real meaning for the Holocaust in today's world." And he writes -- he said those three things at the end, "The State of Israel is the banner of God's fidelity." In other words, the State of

Israel's the only thing that makes God kosher, God's fidelity to his people by helping them or being with them when they fought for and they created the state. That sort of makes God kosher, or makes the question of whether God was at Auschwitz kosher. The State of Israel is the answer to Auschwitz. God is redeemed from Auschwitz --

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Wait a minute. God is [01:27:00] redeemed from Auschwitz by Israel. And the old man sat down, and he had a kind of a tired but satisfied look on his face. I'll come to that in a minute. Now, Dubois got up, and Dubois says, "I am a Christian. I think in Christian terminology, crucifixion and resurrection. So, Auschwitz was crucifixion and the State of Israel is resurrection. And only with that kind of symbolism and with that kind of language are you going to make Christians able to understand what the Holocaust is all about. The minute you use the code words like that, they're going to follow you. [01:28:00] They're going to grasp it. And that is how I recommend that you should try to describe this to Christians." A question period started after that, and I tried to bait Erstreicher -- I mean, I really did -- on the failure of Christianity to do anything about it. I mean, I was obnoxious. I really



-- I took too much time, I was aggressive. I said, "Listen, you people had" -- ya-ya (inaudible) he wouldn't rise to the bait. Erstreicher wouldn't. He ducked my questions. I asked him, "Won't you condemn Christianity in any term whatsoever? Is there nothing about its failure to respond?" [01:29:00] And only now -- we were talking -- this was in '78, did I say?

F: Yeah.

FRIEDMAN: Seventy-eight. I said, "Do you realize how many years have gone by, and this is the first time such a debate, such a seminar, round table thing is taking place in public? You guys have ducked this issue for 30 years." "Yes," he says, "we have. We have to grapple with the more fundamental question of how to relate ourselves to you Jews. This we are doing through the Vatican II and the -- we, we're working this thing through in a way which will be very favorable, and you see it now. So, yes, we're late getting at it, but we're getting at what we think is more important. Our failure to react to the Holocaust is, I think, less important. It's more important for us to act on the question of the deicide, and we are saying -- we are solving that. We are telling -- you are not [01:30:00] guilty. Maybe we'll get to the second question -- that

when we come to the Holocaust, we should say we are guilty. Not terribly important." And I couldn't get any more than that out [of the guy -- just ducked it?]. OK, end of debate. But it was a very significant one, conducted by two heavyweights, and when you look deeply through these few pages of notes, you got the whole Christian position right there -- I mean, on the highest intellectual, theological level, not the guy in the street. Now, Brad, you had a question about --

BRAD: Wiesel gets -- seems so sensitive whenever the issue -  
- that Israel is the answer to the Holocaust.

FRIEDMAN: Wiesel's position on that is quite simple, for him. I can't agree with it at all. Wiesel's position is that the Holocaust is something absolutely mystical. [01:31:00] Metaphysical. Transcendental. And that we cheapen it and we vulgarize it when we try to give it some kind of contemporary political meaning. Can't do that to it. You can't lessen it. You can't lower it from its transcendental, universal plain. Can't do it. There would have been a State of Israel whether there'd been a Holocaust or not. The Jews prayed for it all the -- they pray for it all the time. Pray for it for 2,000 years. So, if you didn't get it in 1948, you maybe get it in 2248.

You'll get it. I mean, any Jew who believes in the Messiah -- you'll get it. To take this Holocaust, which is so absolutely unique, and to make it the [01:32:00] political explanation of why some of the countries in the world had a bad conscience and gave a vote and said, "OK, you can have this little piece of land" -- I mean, who's the United Nations to tell you you can have this piece of land? So, Wiesel says, "Separate the two things. Don't join the two things. It's a fundamental mistake." And he's been fighting this all his life. He fights a second thing, also, in which he's not too wrong, about the cheapening of the word holocaust. So, the word holocaust comes to mean Cambodian people in boats or it comes to mean, I don't know, Nigerian people in that civil war, or -- everything's a holocaust.

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: What?

M1: Afghanistan.

FRIEDMAN: Afghanistan. Everything's a holocaust. What the hell is this? Aren't there other words in the dictionary? And he had fought all of his life, and he's fighting right now [01:33:00] on an issue -- Gordon knows about the -- more about the details of this than I do -- on the United States

Memorial Holocaust Commission, where he's the chairman,  
where there's a big issue about broadening United States  
Memorial Holocaust Commission. Maybe that's not exactly it.  
Should that include the gypsies? Maybe half a million of  
them -- I don't know. Big number. United States government,  
Memorial Holocaust. I mean, the Armenian thing was a  
holocaust, in this very same damn 20<sup>th</sup> century. Does the  
word holocaust cover -- you can see where it goes. So,  
Wiesel is arguing for the pristine position Holocau--  
(break in audio)

(pause)

M3: -- and watching a lot of what's been placed in the  
Holocaust, because I remember -- [01:34:00] you don't have  
-- we can go through the (inaudible) and you'll remember  
forever. I don't think they have the (inaudible) maybe  
(inaudible) but I'm really having a lot of, you know,  
internal -- it's important to me to (inaudible) what I'm  
trying to find is (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Well --

M3: (inaudible) you don't find a meaning in it -- and I don't  
mean a meaning that justifies -- I mean a message that  
helps to understand the fact that it could happen, all  
right? Just the fact that it could happen. If we don't come

to some grasp of that, there's no reason in the world to believe that it won't or couldn't happen again. So the responsibility is more than to remember. The responsibility is to attempt to be able to explain, [01:35:00] and not in terms that are specifically related to Jews, but in terms that are related to man that can give some kind of insight and guidance to what kind of things we need to build to defend man against this enemy from recurring, and what kinds of things if we don't fight we are simply complicating [sic] -- or we are a part of the responsibility for its return?

DENNIS: Yeah, but I see that more in remembering rather than trying to find any --

M3: But remembering is passive. Remembering is an act that doesn't require any kind of action on your part. And I'm saying that there is a moral imperative that comes out of the experience of the Holocaust that is demanding action on the [01:36:00] part of not just you as a Jew, but on the part of any caring human being who wants to preserve the right to be as an independent human force, different than others. So what I --

FRIEDMAN: What are you supposed to remember, Dennis?

DENNIS: Huh?

FRIEDMAN: What are you supposed to remember? You said you wanted

--

DENNIS: Well, I'll tell you what I remember. When I went to the (inaudible) diaspora and I watched a -- you know, what Poland was -- what Warsaw was like and Poland was like (inaudible) New York City, 1980. Columbus, Ohio, 1980. There wasn't any -- there was no difference, all right? We were naïve people --

FRIEDMAN: No difference between what and what? I'm losing you.

DENNIS: What was going on with Jews at that time, living through -- who were intelligent upper middle class, middle class people, educated, you know (inaudible) wealthy, right? Coming from a suburban (inaudible) like me, and involved [01:37:00] -- and allowing that to happen to themselves, OK? I see that, and then all of a sudden, I look at 1983 and I get scared, because I think that 1983, we started getting -- you know, we forget, and we've become complacent and naïve to what's going on today. (break in audio)

M3: (inaudible)

DENNIS: I don't disagree totally what he said. I don't think he's disagreeing -- totally what I'm saying. I just think it's -- I'm (inaudible) I think it's more in remembering --

M2: We're just talking semantics.

DENNIS: -- rather than trying to find a meaning to what was going on.

FRIEDMAN: Well, I'll tell you, it's every -- I think it's every person's individual responsibility to face a major event -- every single year of your life, you sit down at the Passover table and you read the same story. And you read the same story because you are commanded, you are enjoined to tell it as though you'd never heard it before, [01:38:00] to try to understand more in it than you understood a year ago. And the four sons are described, and if you were one of the bad boys, you don't even want to ask the questions anymore. You're bored with it, or you think you know it all. I mean you personally -- I mean, this is what's in the Passover Haggadah, so you keep going back over it every year, Dennis.

DENNIS: To remember.

FRIEDMAN: To remember what? You've got to remember the lesson that you came out of Egypt and you got helped by God. That's what it says. Now, you believe it or you don't believe it. It's important to you or it isn't important to you. And in a lot of families, they don't have Seder anymore and they quit. But there are seminal events in the

life of the Jewish people which are constantly repeated year after year in -- and sanctified in liturgy. And why do you go sing the Yom Kippur every year? My God, aren't you bored with that? And it happens [01:39:00] about some Spanish thing that you didn't -- and you're not even a Sephardic Jew. So, you know, this business of why should I try to find meaning is because it's your obligation to try to understand what happened to you. You. It says, "Though you were there."

M3: But Dennis takes the position that, as a result of remembering, that causes me to take certain actions, steps, certain lessons that have been learned, and he will accomplish the same thing that you're classifying as meaning of the Holocaust.

FRIEDMAN: Fine, that's his opinion. That's his opinion. And since there is no compulsion in Jewish life any longer anyway -- and if they're --

M3: But he's not disagreeing, is my point. I think he's agreeing and just using a different word. He's using remember, and you're using find meaning.

FRIEDMAN: I'm not sure. I'm not sure.

DENNIS: Well, what I --

FRIEDMAN: Anyway, I think we got a lot of -- we --



DENNIS: I --

FRIEDMAN: We got a lot of hands up.

DENNIS: Yeah, but (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) trying to use that word meaning, I'm trying to be -- you know, if there's a meaning behind why Hitler did what he [01:40:00] did. Or, you know, or what happens -- why the German people -- the non-Jewish German people ignored what was going on or weren't aware of what was going on -- by remembering, then it occurs -- why we -- you know, remembering (audio interference; inaudible) and I do that to remember. I want my kids to remember.

FRIEDMAN: Well, OK, it may very well be that we're in some kind of a semantic thing here, which we have to get out of because there's so many other hands up.

DENNIS: Right.

FRIEDMAN: Go ahead, Robbie.

ROBBIE: I had a question of a statement made when we were talking about the Holocaust (inaudible) that could be clarified. So, say we made it the Holocaust -- and I hindered -- possibly hindered the creation of Israel. And I'd just like a clarification on whether that's historical, whether that's political, or whether that's religious. And I'm not disagreeing with the statement, I -- in fact,

everything that you said up to that (inaudible) [01:41:00]

I'm confused on what's (inaudible) (break in audio)

M4: -- because of the onset of World War II (inaudible) before that (inaudible) Israel (inaudible) to be made (inaudible) historians (inaudible) find absolutely no (inaudible) connection (inaudible) but they had a remarkable, incredible -- of the symmetry of the two events. In one decade, the Jewish people suffered the most severe blow, and three years later they claim the Jewish state that's eluded them for 2,000 years (inaudible) speculation, metaphysical, theological speculation [00:42:00] about God, maybe some kind of religious language of crucifixion and resurrection (inaudible) the fact (inaudible) right there (inaudible).

ROBBIE: Right, except that -- my only question, though, was from the standpoint -- from a timeframe standpoint -- we all agree with -- that our intellectuals -- and people who perished and (inaudible) my knowledge of the historical perspective on (inaudible) my knowledge, but I think that -- my only problem is that -- yes, I think we still would have had a State of Israel, but I don't think that that State of Israel would have come in 1948.

FRIEDMAN: Certainly not.

ROBBIE: I think that State of Israel would have come in --  
maybe in 1960, maybe in --

M4: No, no, no.

ROBBIE: -- 1955, and I don't --

M4: That's very (inaudible) because 1947, 1948 was the age of  
(inaudible) was to go back to the United Nations and said  
he wants out, and the United Nations [01:43:00] decided  
that the proper solution was we can divide Palestine into  
an Arab state and a Jewish state.

ROBBIE: But (inaudible)

M4: And then they do that.

ROBBIE: -- that they wanted to -- this is my point, that I  
think -- through the timeframe, historically speaking, my  
knowledge of why -- Britain was decimated. Britain had no  
ability to govern, they had no will to govern. If they  
hadn't been in the war, the question is -- they would have  
probably still hung on, like in India. You know, the  
British colonial mind, the Winston Churchill mind was to  
hold onto India forever. He was still -- you know, World  
War II brought him to the forefront and then destroyed him.  
He was thrown out by his electorate. I believe that there  
would have been a State of Israel, but I think it was the  
timeframe -- I think that what would have happened is that

those institutions -- like South Africa (inaudible) would have lingered, and they just brought it from -- exactly what they said it was going to do, but it brought the timeframe completely -- speeded it up instead of, you know (inaudible) and I'm not sure what would happen (inaudible) but (inaudible) [01:44:00] but I understand everything you say. I say it's correct.

M4: Once again, I agree with what he's saying, but (inaudible) and implication (inaudible) arguing (inaudible) as I said (inaudible) makes sense -- one, to imply that the Holocaust can be compensated for through something else (inaudible) and the other one is that you express (inaudible) in terms of Jewish identity, but in terms of doing something (inaudible)

ROBBIE: Also a question of numbers. What was the (inaudible) what was the incentive for Jews -- I mean, you could immigrate to Israel from 1939 back to when they left and -- is when the Romans (inaudible) no one had initiative to go (inaudible).

M2: (inaudible)

ROBBIE: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Oh, but that accumulated very quickly.

ROBBIE: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Very quickly. That's not a long accumulation.

[01:45:00]

ROBBIE: Over 2,000 years (inaudible).

M4: Well, yeah.

ROBBIE: I guess without the Holocaust, without something so terrible, so hideous -- because things were -- it was never nice in Europe, it was never good in Europe. But (inaudible) without something so intolerable as the Holocaust to come along, there was no reason for all the Eastern Europeans -- the European Jews -- which had a lot to do with (inaudible).

M4: No, no, that's not true. I mean (inaudible) survivors in England is not very hard (inaudible) survivors. You're not talking (inaudible).

ROBBIE: What was (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) in '38?

M4: Nineteen thirty-eight, it was 500-600,000 (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) because the policy was of blocking any immigration (inaudible) 1940, 600,000. In 1951, there were 1.5 million.

ROBBIE: (inaudible)

M4: And you have an addition of 700,000 (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Let's not [01:46:00] get off into anything past '48.

It's irrelevant to this discussion.

M4: I really want to make one more point. It's very important. Again, don't explain Zionism in terms of persecution (inaudible) because those Jews that came to Israel were just (inaudible) of the millions of others who chose to come to America because of anti-Semitism (inaudible) you have to give clear credit to the idea of it and the conviction that the Jews have to have a state and have to rebuild their homeland, and the homeland is at the point (inaudible) all the other things are (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: And I think that is the connection between the creation of the state and the Holocaust. That, right there. No historian will ever prove it. You will never find what you call cause and linkage. You will never find documents. You will never find speeches. You will never find artifacts. You will never find anything which, [01:47:00] in the discipline of the historian he insists upon. Willpower is what did it. Knowledge that you are almost dead, and you better do something to try to stay alive. You got one third of your people killed. You got another third of your people locked into the Soviet Union. You got another third of your people sitting in America, don't give a damn or don't know it or aren't working or don't do anything. My God, if you don't understand that you are

almost finished, and if you don't take your own fate in your own hands and try to do something about it, then you will be finished. A very small handful of people understood that. Ben-Gurion did and Sharett didn't. And Sharett said, "Let's postpone for a while." So, any historian can take and find any example he wants. But underneath it all, when you talk about the spirit [01:48:00] of nationalism -- and it begins in Moses Hess in 1862, 100 years earlier. That was the motivation. That was the motivation. Plus, the recognition that something absolutely unique had happened, which almost killed the whole Jewish people. Now, we are left here, 650, 600 *sh'al yeshu*, and we're going to make our move? We're not going to make our move. It had very little to do, in my opinion, with whether the British would go or stay, with whether the United Nations would vote or not, because I agree with him. If they didn't vote in '47 and there was no war in '48, then the Jews would have fought their own war against the British and the Jews would have fought that -- who -- the ones who understood they wanted a state. And what would have motivated them? This is the whole single -- what I see as the causal [01:49:00] relationship. The motivation was the knowledge that death almost has overtaken us. And we have to make a move. It's

all depending on us. Now, I find that to be a causal link.  
A historian can say, "Oh, well, that's speech making,  
that's poetry, that's what you want to believe, that's" --  
you know?

M3: The numbers support you. If 500,000 came to Palestine  
between 1935 and 1948, the 500,000 of the 600 or 650 came  
as a result of what was --

FRIEDMAN: No, not the --

M3: -- going on in Europe --

FRIEDMAN: -- not that many, not that many. No, not that many.  
Not that many.

M3: We had 150,000 after the Fifth Aliyah, it's 50 years worth  
-- produced 150,000.

FRIEDMAN: Correct.

M3: All right, so 1935 to 1940 --

FRIEDMAN: Thirty-five, you call the Fifth Aliyah coming from  
Germany.

M3: Right.

FRIEDMAN: OK.

M3: So, there were 500,000 Jews who came in the space of --

FRIEDMAN: From '35 --

M3: -- 13 years, [01:50:00] right? And it was because of what  
was going on in Europe. I mean, I'm agreeing with your



position. I think this -- the data supports that in terms of just --

FRIEDMAN: Are those numbers --

M1: Yeah (inaudible) numbers (inaudible) though I still have (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Anyhow, I don't think it's a question of numbers. I think it's a question of trying to understand the will of the Jewish people. Gordy, you have your hand up. Who had their -- his hand up who wanted -- Nathan had his hand up before.

GORDON: I think that there's another aspect, and that is when -- I mean, they start to rewrite history, which is impossible. But there's an assumption that the historian is making that the geopolitical forces that were at play in the world would have been acted out in the same manner and form against Jews as they were being acted out against the rest of the world. There's absolutely nothing in human history, [01:51:00] in their relationship to the Jews that have caused me to make that parallel. I have seen everything that cause me to believe the double standard before Israel, after Israel existed -- and the fact that the British Empire was crumbling in India would give me absolutely no cause to believe that the British would be

willing to give up Palestine and make -- and secondly, whoever thinks that 500,000 Jews could have made war against Britain and won is smoking marijuana. If --

M2: (inaudible)

GORDON: -- Britain had not gone through (laughter) World War II and been as debilitated and sacked as it was -- and the fight against the Arab world is a different fight than the fight would've been against the British world, with all (inaudible) British (inaudible) I -- at the same time, I believe in what you made as a point that the justification for the existence [01:52:00] of Israel must be more than the Holocaust. As [Hartman?] says, it's got to be Sinai. If it isn't Sinai, then can the existence of the state survive all the problems going forward over the next several decades?

FRIEDMAN: I'd like to -- Nathan, you take your shot at it, and then I'd like to go forward.

NATHAN: The problem with the thinking that they're two separate historical events is that ex post facto, we don't see it that way, OK? Ex post facto, when Margaret Thatcher comes to Israel, they take her to Yad Vashem. When the first place you take a foreign visitor, if it's an important person -- because we want to make that connection

in people's minds that the Holocaust is what we are trying to prevent by having Israel, by having a strong Israel. And we're playing on people's guilt. We are. We're playing on people's conscience. We want them to make the historical connection. [01:53:00] But, you know, this really brings us full circle to the point -- what's the difference? I mean, why are we trying to connect the Holocaust and Israel? What's it -- it's an important -- you know, what this Christian guy said or not and, you know, what's the final -- what's the kind of point of it all? So, let me throw it back to him.

M4: I have (inaudible) comment (inaudible) I think what's happening with us here -- and I've been student of the Holocaust for maybe 10 years -- is that the attitude towards the Holocaust is no longer as a mere historical event, but as a formative experience, and as such (inaudible) impact on psychology and motivation, on -- and I think the difference is (inaudible) I think you -- where I -- really concerned about intellectualizing that and then offering some kind of explanation that will, you know, flatten it out. And I (inaudible) the Holocaust (inaudible) and so it's a -- really more a [01:54:00] semantic (inaudible) certainly matters as much, but I agree with it,

and I think that's (inaudible) we do consider the Holocaust as a critical formative event (inaudible) in terms of Jewish history and (inaudible) people (inaudible) I have to leave, I'll be back.

FRIEDMAN: Thank you for coming.

M4: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Thank you for coming.

M1: Thank you.

F: Yes, thank you (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: I would like you to take a quick look at unit five, and just look at those four words. I tried to figure out the shortest, sharpest way to condense how a fascist enemy would function. And I put the four words down. [01:55:00] First you isolate. So, you people are -- you know, Jews are isolated by virtue of the fact that they're always very visible, and it's not trouble to isolate them from the rest of the population. You put a yellow star on the front door, or you take a mezuzah off a front door, and every front door that's got a little hole gouged in the lintel, everybody knows a Jew lived there. So, whichever way you want, you isolate the Jews and you mark them. This --

M1: But before you talk about isolation, I've got to make one observation about that Christian theologian that just

rankles me. (laughter) When he's talking about the fact that Jews were singing while they're going to the gas chamber and that proves the existence of God in Auschwitz, I am absolutely outraged and offended by that. I just couldn't let that comment pass, and --

FRIEDMAN: Well, he's alive and kicking, and if you want to talk to him about it, you get him at the [01:56:00] Seton Hall -

M1: I mean, I must tell you that on the -- that --

F: (inaudible)

M1: Pardon?

F: (inaudible)

M2: No, it's right (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: A convert.

M1: Very relevant, very relevant (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: A convert to Christianity -- a Jew -- an original Jew.

M1: If he sees anything that happened to the Jews in theological terms -- and it's very relevant, because there's conversions with a theological affirmation, and therefore a person who was born of Jewish parents -- converts to Christianity, we (inaudible) kind of (inaudible) confrontations that you described them -- I think with -- before, even if you weren't confronted with

it verbally -- but I think confronts himself in his own (inaudible) with the Holocaust, he has to say either my whole life as a convert to Christianity is an act of -- based on moral and spiritual bankruptcy, or else there's a transcendent [01:57:00] meaning to what happened to the Jews, which will permit me still to affirm my Christian faith.

FRIEDMAN: He says that.

M1: Therefore, my Christian faith must be affirmed by saying that what happened was an attack on God and not -- and the Jews were only the crux in the target, in order to save his whole life, he has to affirm God and Christianity and deny that Christianity was spiritually and morally bereft in the moment of crisis when mankind was confronted with the option of Christian morality versus the morality of barbarism, the morality of barbarism was affirmed and Christianity had no impact on the behavior of Western nations in Europe. The Christian issue --

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, I may have been talking out of that background.

That may have -- what -- he may have just had to stick with that position because he couldn't really adopt any other.

That's a possibility. [01:58:00] But he's not a nobody, and you want to meet him, you talk to him. I want you to look

at those four words. I want you to think about them. I want you to change them if you ever want to change them. But if somebody says to you, "How do we know that we're under attack?" Remember how often I revert to that theme. How do you know and when is the time to start to resist? The system that worked was first you isolate it. Then you concentrated. You put everybody in [Bexley?].

F: (inaudible) (laughter)

FRIEDMAN: And then you segregated them from the rest of the population by putting a wall around Bexley. And then you eliminate them by taking them out of Bexley, down the railroad [01:59:00] tracks to, I don't know where, and you eliminate them. So, it's a kind of a rubric which might be too pat, because I tried to find an easy way of remembering a sequence of words, mnemonically. And so, anyway you want to change it is OK by me. But historically, it's accurate, and conceptually, you have to think of it that way.

Isolate, concentrate, segregate, eliminate. Yes, Nelson?

NELSON: I was just thinking that the analysis of Hitler attacking religion is too abstract for what went on. I think what occurred what was a political formula that enjoyed popular support and rose to power. And it was the -  
- and with many political -- the glue that held Germany

together for 12 years under his rule -- and then -- but  
then, that doesn't account, then, for [02:00:00]  
sacrificing the war effort --

FRIEDMAN: (inaudible)

NELSON: -- to kill Jews.

FRIEDMAN: You said it, that's it.

NELSON: So, what I don't -- but I realize that --

FRIEDMAN: The ladder was --

NELSON: -- he was a fanatic who carried with him a lifelong  
hatred of Jewish society, Jewish values, Jewish people.

FRIEDMAN: He was not, or he was?

NELSON: Was.

F: Was.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah.

NELSON: He was.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, OK.

NELSON: And thinking in terms of attacking religion, I think  
it's just -- almost dignifying it, that --

FRIEDMAN: No, wasn't dignifying it at all. It was an institution  
he had to get rid of.

NELSON: Yeah, religion (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).

M2: -- his own rule --



FRIEDMAN: Do you know that Dachau was established in 1938. Was one of the earliest camps. In the records, which were meticulously kept there, 700 Catholic priests -- don't forget Bavaria, where Dachau is located -- was a major -- was Protestant. I don't know if there were 700 Catholic priests in all of Bavaria. I mean, the northern part [02:01:00] of Germany's Catholic. Southern part of Germany -- 700 Catholic priests were killed in Dachau the first year of its existence. They weren't Jews.

NELSON: Well, when you talk about identifying -- you know, when you see these four things happen, you know (inaudible) you always get to those four points. I wasn't on your trip to Europe, but the point that several people there made was how Hitler could have been stopped --

FRIEDMAN: Sure.

NELSON: -- at the bridge.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah.

NELSON: And you know, the other -- before you even get to these four places -- as leaders, as (inaudible) to identify your enemies with that, identify the people who can really harm you and who can be potentially dangerous -- is more important than getting to that point.

FRIEDMAN: Well, one is a rubric that I created to try to describe [02:02:00] a process. There was no timeliness to the process. When you talk on the other level of action oriented designed to stop a potential tyrant, OK? Lot of people said the time to do it was in the Spanish Civil War, and they went and they fought Hitler in 1936 in Spain. They went there to fight Hitler. Some of them went there to support the communists, but some of them went there as anti-fascists, to -- OK? So, you make your decision as to where and under what circumstances you're going to take a stand! If somebody had gone into the Spanish Civil War with a unit of 20 people whose intention it was to target 50 top Nazi officers who were sent to the Spanish [02:03:00] Civil War for training, you could have killed 50 top Nazi officers who may, 10 years later, have been Nazi generals. So, do you want to stop them then, 1935, in Spain? Decisions have to be made, if you think along those lines, by individual groups or paramilitary groups or secret groups, even operating without the cover of a government, or against the cover of a government. I don't know whether the United States government would have approved of a secret group of 20 guys going to Spain in order to kill 50

Nazi officers. I don't know whether the -- there was no CIA in 1935.

M2: You wouldn't then report it publicly, right?

FRIEDMAN: (laughs) Turn to the next page for one --

GORDON: Herbert, before you get off [02:04:00] on that --

because it seems to me that the threats that we have to protect against come in many different configurations. One is a human -- a Hitler. And the other is the breaking down of the institutional structure that provides defense and security to the Jew living wherever the Jew lives, and that when you look and say, you know, among other things that happened out of the Holocaust was the total breakdown of the institutional structure that provided any kind of protection to the individual against the tyranny of the state.

M2: You mean prior to --

GORDON: In the whole process of Hitler coming to power. And then --

FRIEDMAN: Well, that's why I wanted to --

GORDON: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: You're right on target. I wanted to get you to the next page, unit six. I wanted to make sure you understood exactly what happened at these [02:05:00] four crucial

episodes, 'cause they're just what he says, the breakdown of an infrastructure of societal recognition of evil and defense of individual people.

M3: Who are not just Jewish.

GORDON: That's right. Not just Jews.

FRIEDMAN: The first thing that happened was that Hitler made a concordat with the Pope in 1933. I mean, there are four items on that page. Can you believe it? He wasn't in office a quarter of a year -- two, three, four months when he sat down and he made a deal with the Pope, and the essence of the deal was very simple. "You don't attack me, you don't call me immoral, don't preach at me, don't make sermons from the goddamn balcony there that I am an antichrist or whatever you want to call me. Nothing doing. You keep quiet about me and I will not attack the church and I will allow the church to function and, I don't care, even [02:06:00] flourish, what do I care? You can keep your churches going, you can keep your dough, your income coming from the churches." Of course, he always broke his word, which is why 700 priests were killed. But by and large, in all of conquered Europe -- France is a Catholic country, Belgium is a Catholic country -- country after country that he conquered, he never destroyed church buildings, he didn't

destroy the church hierarchy, he didn't prevent archbishops from administering hundreds of churches in Poland. Nothing. He made a deal with the Pope.

M2: Herbert, but just -- in regard to what Gordon's saying (inaudible) say it all when you talk about institutions that broke down (inaudible) when they came to take (inaudible) about the trade unions, the (inaudible) "he took the Jews, he took the Catholics, and when they came to take me, there was nobody left" --

M1: That's right.

M2: -- "to defend me." And his feeling [02:07:00] was Hitler felt that once you took away -- with those institutions -- and one of those institutions being religion, there was nobody to fight against him. He had (inaudible) he had all the internal opposition that he needed, so he -- and when he wrote *Mein Kampf*, I mean, he spelled it out --

FRIEDMAN: Yeah.

M2: -- who he was going to attack.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah.

M2: I mean, it was right there. We just never took it seriously.

FRIEDMAN: Right.

M2: One of those institutions was religion. But he was going to break that infrastructure down, piece by piece, and he identified it when he wrote it back in '23.

FRIEDMAN: Correct.

M2: So, I think that Gordy's point is right, but I think that that statement (inaudible) at all. And when they grabbed him, they really did grab the infrastructure, the last of the infrastructure that could have stopped him.

FRIEDMAN: That was the Protestant infrastructure, which was the weakest. Well --

M2: What was left of it.

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, that's right.

M2: Because he grabbed the -- he took the strongest first.

FRIEDMAN: That's right.

M2: (inaudible) trade union, and he got rid of the communists -

FRIEDMAN: He sure did.

M2: Got rid of everybody else first, and they were the weakest, but they were still there.

FRIEDMAN: How smart that was, by the way. [02:08:00]

M2: Right.

FRIEDMAN: Don't we always, when we're confronted with a problem, decide that we will bite off the easiest piece first? He

bit off the toughest pieces first. Point B. I want to make sure you understand what happened at that Évian Conference in 1938. Évian is a small city in Geneva -- in Switzerland, on the edge of the lake. It's gorgeous. It has marvelous restaurants, a casino.

M3: Good water.

FRIEDMAN: Havana cigars, good water, lovely ladies of the night.

(laughter) Good water. (laughs) (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

M3: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: And Évian -- yeah, right. And that Évian Conference lasted for three weeks. I think there were 30-something countries there. I'm not sure how many were there. The purpose of the conference was -- look at the date. July '38. [02:09:00] No war yet. The purpose of the conference was to see if any of the countries of the world wanted to do anything to solve this Jewish problem, which Germany kept insisting was not a German problem. "If you people are all so het up about the Jews, what would you like to do about it?"

M3: What year was that, Herb?

FRIEDMAN: Thirty-eight.

M2: He knew exactly when it happened.

FRIEDMAN: He thought he knew, and he was waiting for that bottom line. To take you through all of the peregrinations of that would be terribly painful. Terribly painful. The chairman of the conference -- because the United States was the one that was yelling the loudest about human rights -- the chairman of the conference was an American. His name was James G. MacDonald. He later on was the first American ambassador to Israel. [02:10:00] He was put into the chairmanship of that conference by President Roosevelt with one single instruction. Don't offer a single visa, OK? Well, that's in his autobiography. So, poor James G. MacDonald, who was a Quaker, I think, and an -- oh, what a decent -- oh, nice, nice, tall, lanky Scotchman. Just really a lovely man. He lived in the Ramat Aviv Hotel on the shore of Tel Aviv, and I sat with him there on his balcony watching the *Altalena* getting sunk. And he is saying, "Jeez, Ben-Gurion has got nerve." And, "My God, who knows what's going to happen now?" And it was all so dicey. Well, that was '48. Ten years earlier, he sat there in that chair, under instructions, [02:11:00] and they toe danced, all these countries, 30 of them, with each other. And at the end of it, when it was all over and done with,



there was one offer on the table. Dominican Republic, 2000 visas.

M1: Trujillo.

FRIEDMAN: Trujillo, yeah. Dictator. The whole three weeks produced an offer of 2,000 visas. Totally incredible. Hitler then knew that he had the green light. There wasn't a country in the world --

M1: Was no Jewish advocate there?

FRIEDMAN: No.

M3: How did they justify, you know, turning the --

FRIEDMAN: You mean, like World Jewish Congress or --

M1: Somebody!

FRIEDMAN: No, nobody. Nations. Nations were all represented. How -- what?

M3: How did they justify turning their back on the Jewish --

FRIEDMAN: Justify?

F: And, well, was this publicized?

FRIEDMAN: What do you mean --

F: Well, not with the -- did the public know (inaudible).

M2: At the time.

FRIEDMAN: Certainly. It was an open conference, [02:12:00] in a well (overlapping dialogue; inaudible).

F: It was on the front page of *The New York Times*.

FRIEDMAN: In a well-known conference center -- the Évian conference center was one of the biggest in Europe. Everybody met there. It's like, I don't know, the Greenbrier.

M3: But my question -- if you convene a conference (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) for this purpose, then you go with an expectation that you would -- either going to decide to do something or not to do something, as opposed to saying, "I'm busy that week," you know, "I can't go."

FRIEDMAN: No, you go.

M3: So, if you go and you say no, you must have some sort of a justification, so these --

M2: To the other 29 people around the table.

FRIEDMAN: Everybody says no.

M1: (inaudible) there's no Sharansky --

M3: Well, right.

M1: -- protesting --

F: There's no one there.

M1: -- in front of the (inaudible) nobody's making noise. It was a reverse psychology that operated -- the Jews as the -  
- whitewash. Publicly (inaudible) we deplore what's happening to the Jews in Germany. And because we want the  
[02:13:00] Germans to change their policies, we don't want

to give them the out of (inaudible) you know, opening our doors, because --

F: (inaudible)

M1: -- we want to force them to change their policies by keeping our doors shut. I mean, this was said in all kinds of ways --

FRIEDMAN: Oh, well, sure.

M1: (inaudible) language.

FRIEDMAN: I mean, [sha-sha?] will get us farther than if we confront the Germans. Forcing the Germans to do something because we won't do anything will embarrass them and put them on the spot. I mean, if you want to know the reasons that -- the rationalizations -- let's not use the word reasons -- rationalizations --

M3: That --

FRIEDMAN: -- you got three --

M3: (inaudible) my question though --

FRIEDMAN: -- weeks worth. Read the protocol. It's in any library.

M1: And there was no noise.

FRIEDMAN: Well, there was a loud chuckle of joy from Hitler.

M1: Yeah, but I mean, there was -- no --

FRIEDMAN: Bit --

M1: -- joke (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) there was no noise from the American Jewish leadership.

FRIEDMAN: No.

M1: There was no protesting in the streets. There was nobody making any kind of a demonstration.

F: (inaudible) point, you can't even find it in the minutes of a [02:14:00] congregation (inaudible).

M1: Nobody talked about it, so --

F: No one (inaudible)

M1: -- I mean, why -- if nobody gave a damn, there's no political pressure to do anything.

F: That's right.

M2: (inaudible)

M1: Why do (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

M2: -- feelings about Jews --

FRIEDMAN: After --

M2: Not going to be positive anyway.

FRIEDMAN: After that episode in the summer of '38, the next major episode, which gave Hitler a great deal of joy -- and when I say he knew he had a green light -- look, remember the canniness. He took a shot of going into the Rhineland in 1936. Crossed a bridge. French could have blown him off that bridge. He won his shot. Every shot that he took where

he had to gamble on the response of the Western powers was -- he confronted appeasement and he knew that that was going to be their standard practice -- so that he had a set-up here. I mean, there was no way he could lose.

[02:15:00] Dominican Republic (inaudible) supposing a couple other countries had offered 1,000, 5,000, what the hell's the difference? He could turn around and say to the world, "Nobody cares. So don't bug me about this anymore." Well, within -- a few months later, in the spring of --

M1: Well, in a sense, he feels he's got the blessing to go (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, you got a green light, boy! Wanna chop up a few Jews?

M1: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: So, then that thing -- that *St. Louis* episode occurred, that ship -- [Haptag Lloyd?] German line ship. Friendly, favorable captain. Norman, take your supper, you got to run.

NORMAN: Yeah.

FRIEDMAN: We're going to quit in five minutes.

NORMAN: (inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: We're going to take a break in five minutes. And I don't have to tell you the story of that thing. That you

know perfectly well. Couldn't land in Cuba, couldn't land in Florida. Couldn't land in Norfolk. Up the [02:16:00] coast it came. I mean, Norfolk was the worst of all, because here was this huge American naval port, for God's sake. They could have got swallowed up in some little tiny side dock there.

M1: Did the newspapers report that, that the *St. Louis* had come and then it was turned away?

FRIEDMAN: Yeah, because the Secretary of State was what's his name? Oh, come on, you know. Shucks, it's on my tongue. I can see him.

M3: Oh, oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, the (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)

FRIEDMAN: Cut his hair like you.

F: [Cordon?] --

M3: Yeah, Cordon.

F: Cordon [Cologne?] (overlapping dialogue; inaudible)  
(laughter)

FRIEDMAN: No, I know. One of the old aristocratic New Englanders, close to Roosevelt. OK, somebody will think about it.

M3: Cabot.

FRIEDMAN: And then -- who?

M3: Cabot.

FRIEDMAN: No. [02:17:00]

F: No.

M2: Got to be a Democrat.

FRIEDMAN: And then, the Captain of the ship simply said, "The hell with it." He obviously wasn't going to be able to dump the 900 and something people in North America, and he went back to Europe. Some of them were allowed off in England and were saved. Others were taken back to Bremerhaven and were not saved. But there, the whole world -- when you talk about was something on the front page of *The New York Times* -- I mean, the story of the *St. Louis* was a worldwide, well-known story. That was not an isolated episode in the dark. But one more shot occurred --

BRAD: American Jewish leadership didn't say a thing?

FRIEDMAN: Well, I don't know, let --

BRAD: They didn't say anything?

FRIEDMAN: You know, Brad, when you say didn't say a thing, if you want to go to the minutes of the American Jewish Committee, I'm sure they had a meeting in the month of May 1939, and I'm sure there are minutes there. And I'm sure that the minutes will say how distressful [02:18:00] this is, and how -- "Is there nothing we can do about it?" And

somebody will say, "Yes, Mr. Marshall went to talk to Mr. So-and-So." Or, "Yes, Mr. Warburg went to talk to So-and-So." And there will be something in the minutes to show that somebody tried to do some -- but you heard what he said before. The style and the method of protest -- I mean, you know, today, you want to put 50,000 people in Sharansky Plaza in front of the U.N., you got all the Jewish day schools in Long Island to draw from, and they come out gladly for the day with flags and banners and everything, you know? And everybody knows it. Everybody in the world knows it. It's in the Los Angeles paper and it's in the Washington paper and it's in the Miami paper. Don't have to say just *New York Times*. It's everywhere. That didn't exist then.

M2: Pre-sit-in, '60s sit-in.

FRIEDMAN: Pre-sit-in.

M2: People (inaudible) streets not there (inaudible).

FRIEDMAN: Vietnam [02:19:00] War, in certain irony, didn't do us too badly in this matter of people being sensitized to public protest. There was one more shot at the thing, in Point D. There was a conference held on the island of Bermuda in the middle of the war. Middle of the war! And you know what the hell it took to organize that thing? And



I'm not kidding. Took a year to organize Roosevelt's visit to the Casablanca Conference or the visit to the Yalta Conference. These things are stupendous things to organize logistically. Submarines and God knows what. And in April of 1943, a conference was called in order to see if there was anything possible that could be done at this juncture [02:20:00] to help rescue any number of Jews and save any number of lives. No specific plan was on the table. There was just a twisted bad conscience of -- [02:20:18]

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END OF AUDIO FILE

