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## Mussolini on Fascism and Foreign Policy

From "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism"

in International Conciliation, No. 306

... And above all, Fascism, the more it considers and observes the future and the development of humanity quite apart from political considerations of the moment, believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. It thus repudiates the doctrine of Pacifism - born of a renunciation of the struggle and an act of cowardice in the face of sacrifice. War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. All other trials are substitutes, which never really put men into the position where they have to make the great decision - the alternative of life or death. Thus a doctrine which is founded upon this harmful postulate of peace is hostile to Fascism. And thus hostile to the spirit of Fascism, though accepted for what use they can be in dealing with particular political situations, are all the international leagues and societies which, as history will show, can be scattered to the winds when once strong national feeling is aroused by any motive - sentimental, ideal, or practical. This anti-pacifist spirit is carried by Fascism even into the life of the individual; the proud motto of the Squadrista, "Me ne frego," written on the bandage of the wound, is an act of philosophy not only stoic, the summary of a doctrine not only political - it is the education to combat, the acceptance of the risks which combat implies, and a new way of life for Italy. Thus the Fascist accepts life and loves it, knowing nothing of and despising suicide: he rather conceives of life as duty and struggle and conquest, life which should be high and full, lived for oneself, but above all for others - those who are at hand and those who are far distant, contemporaries, and those who will come after.

This "demographic" policy of the régime is the result of the above premise. Thus the Fascist loves in actual fact his neighbor, but this "neighbor" is not merely a vague and undefined concept, this love for one's neighbor puts no obstacle in the way of necessary educational severity, and still less to differentiation of status and to physical distance. Fascism repudiates any universal embrace, and in order to live worthily in the community of civilized peoples watches its contemporaries with vigilant eyes, takes good note of their state of mind, and, in the changing trend of their interests, does not allow itself to be deceived by temporary and fallacious appearances...

... In 1929, at the first five-yearly assembly of the Fascist régime, I said:

"For us Fascists, the State is not merely a guardian, pre-occupied solely with the duty of assuring the personal safety of the citizens; nor is it an organization with purely material



aims, such as to guarantee a certain level of well-being and peaceful conditions of life; for a mere council of administration would be sufficient to realize such objects. Nor is it a purely political creation, divorced from all contact with the complex material reality which makes up the life of the individual and the life of the people as a whole. The State, as conceived of and as created by Fascism, is a spiritual and moral fact in itself, since its political, juridical and economic organization of the nation is a concrete thing: and such an organization must be in its origins and development a manifestation of the spirit. The State is the guarantor of security both internal and external, but it is also the custodian and transmitter of the spirit of the people, as it has grown up through the centuries in language, in customs, and in faith. And the State is not only a living reality of the present, it is also linked with the past and above all with the future, and thus transcending the brief limits of individual life, it represents the immanent spirit of the nation. The forms in which States express themselves may change, but the necessity for such forms is eternal. It is the State which educates its citizens in civic virtue, gives them a consciousness of their mission and welds them into unity; harmonizing their various interests through justice, and transmitting to future generations the mental conquests of science, of art, of law and the solidarity of humanity. It leads men from primitive tribal life to that highest expression of human power which is Empire: it links up through the centuries the names of those of its members who have died for its existence and in obedience to its laws, it holds up the memory of the leaders who have increased its territory and the geniuses who have illumined it with glory as an example to be followed by future generations. When the conception of the State declines, and disunifying and centrifugal tendencies prevail, whether of individuals or of particular groups, the nations where such phenomena appear are in their decline."

... The Fascist State is an embodied will to power and government: the Roman tradition is here an ideal of force in action. According to Fascism, government is not so much a thing to be expressed in territorial or military terms as in terms of morality and the spirit. It must be thought of as an empire - that is to say, a nation which directly or indirectly rules other nations, without the need for conquering a single square yard of territory. For Fascism, the growth of empire, that is to say the expansion of the nation, is an essential manifestation of vitality, and its opposite a sign of decadence. Peoples which are rising, or rising again after a period of decadence, are always imperialist: any renunciation is a sign of decay and of death. Fascism is the doctrine best adapted to represent the tendencies and the aspirations of a people, like the people of Italy, who are rising again after many centuries of abasement and foreign servitude. But empire demands discipline, the coordination of all forces and a deeply felt sense of duty and sacrifice; this fact explains many aspects of the practical working of the régime, the character of many forces in the State, and the necessarily severe measures which must be taken against those who would oppose this spontaneous and inevitable movement of Italy in the twentieth century, and would oppose it by recalling the outworn ideology of the nineteenth century - repudiated wheresoever there



the courage to undertake great experiments of social and political transformation: for never before has the nation stood more in need of authority, of direction, and of order. If every age has its own characteristic doctrine, there are a thousand signs which point to Fascism as the characteristic doctrine of our time. For if a doctrine must be a living thing, this is proved by the fact that Fascism has created a living faith: and that this faith is very powerful in the minds of men, is demonstrated by those who have suffered and died for it.

Address to the Italian Senate, 14 May 1935

Honorable Senators, you have heard just now a clearly documented exposition by the Under-Secretary for the Colonies, who has given you in exact terms the picture of our colonial situation as regards Lybia.

I have nothing to add to it. Instead, I believe it opportune to add a declaration concerning East Africa.

The problem of Italo-Ethiopian relations is the order of the day, and not only in Italy. Much of what is said and written is not worth the trouble of being corrected, even less being confuted in this hall. But one rumor abroad in some foreign circles is to be denied formally immediately - a rumor, that is, of Franco-English diplomatic steps in Rome.

The very word "step" is extremely distasteful, and although some persons beyond the frontier would have desired it, the truth is that no step has been taken up to now. And owing to the Italo-Franco-British relations it is most probable that there will not be any, even in the future, because there is no need for diplomatic proceedings in the nature of a step in order to obtain from us (whenever one desires it and along simple lines of cordial reciprocal relations) an exposition of our point of view amply documented.

In the meantime, a word of heartfelt thanks is to be addressed to those who seem to preoccupy themselves in more than a fraternal manner about military efficiency. This efficiency, according to them, could be weakened by an eventual conflict in East Africa.

One might reply to these zealous disinterested counselors who consider our presence in Europe indispensable, that we also are of the same opinion. But it is precisely in order to be tranquilly secure in Europe that we intend to be well guarded in Africa.

East Africa is a distance of about 4,000 kilometers (2,484 miles) from Rome if one thinks of Eritrea, and almost double that if one thinks of Somaliland. Because of these distances the precise categorical duty of the government is to be fore-



sighted and decisive.

On the other hand it is worthwhile to point out that up to this time the number of workmen sent out surpasses the number of soldiers. But I wish to add immediately in the most explicit and solemn manner that we will send out all the soldiers we believe necessary. And no one can take upon himself the intolerable presumption to dictate to us concerning the character and volume of our precautionary measures.

No one can judge this most delicate matter except Italy who has in her history a dramatic, sanguinary and not forgotten experience in this regard. I prefer to be removed tomorrow for doing too much rather than for doing too little when it is a question of the safety of our colonies and the life of even a single one of our native or metropolitan soldiers.

With regard to the diplomatic development of the controversy it is known that we have not refused to confer with representatives of the Ethiopian Government. We have already for some time communicated with Addis Ababa that we were disposed on our side to name two representatives for Italy on the conciliations committee.

But it is our duty not to harbor any dangerous illusions, in view of the noteworthy Ethiopian armaments and the advanced preparations for Ethiopian mobilization, and above all else the state of mind dominating Addis Ababa, especially among the minor chieftains who are hostile to any accord whatsoever with Italy.

As to Europe, and her regrettable imminent eventualities that might come about, I desire to reconfirm to the Senate that we will maintain under arms for all the time necessary the three classes of 1911, 1913, 1914. Moreover, another class, that of 1912, is in reserve and ready.

I believe a total of 800,000 to 900,000 soldiers is sufficient to guarantee our security. They are men perfectly trained, with morale that it is no exaggeration to say is superb.

They are equipped with the most modern weapons made in our war industries, which - I am revealing no secret - have been working full time for some months.

Relying on this gathering of forces on land, sea and in the sky, we will continue to practice a policy that will be full of decisive and concrete cooperation with all European powers, large or small, far or near, with the purpose of realizing those equilibriums and understandings without which the world and our Continent would go to ruins.

Our military machine, to which we are dedicating and will continue to dedicate our most vigilant attention, threatens no one, but assures peace.

Honorable Senators, I believe these, my declarations, interpret your thoughts.



Speech to the People of Italy March, 1935

Black Shirts of the Revolution! Men and women of all Italy! Italians all the world over - beyond the mountains, beyond the seas. Listen!

A solemn hour is about to strike in the history of the country. Twenty million Italians are at this moment gathered in the squares of all Italy. It is the greatest demonstration that human history records. Twenty millions! One heart alone! One will alone! One decision!

This manifestation signifies that the tie between Italy and fascism is perfect, absolute, inalterable. Only brains softened by puerile illusions, by sheer ignorance can think differently because they do not hear what exactly is the Fascist Italy of 1935.

For many months the wheels of destiny under the impulse of our calm determination move toward the goal. In these last hours the rhythm has increased and nothing can stop it now. It is not only an army marching toward its goal, but it is 44,000,000 Italians marching in unity behind this army because the blackest of injustices is being attempted against them, that of taking from them their place in the sun.

When, in 1915, Italy threw in her fate with that of the Allies how many cries of admiration, how many promises! But after the common victory, which cost Italy 600,000 dead, 400,000 lost, 1,000,000 wounded, when peace was being discussed around the table, only the crumbs of the rich colonial booty were left for us to pick up.

For thirteen years we have been patient while the circle tightened around us at the hands of those who wish to suffocate us. We have been patient with Ethiopia for forty years - it is enough now.

Instead of recognizing the rights of Italy, the League of Nations dares talk of sanctions. But until there is proof to the contrary, I refuse to believe that the authentic people of France will join in supporting sanctions against Italy.

The 6,000 dead at the action of Boligny - whose devotion was so heroic that the enemy commander was forced to admire them - those fallen would now turn in their graves.

And until there is proof to the contrary, I refuse to believe that the authentic people of Britain will want to spill blood and send Europe to its catastrophe for the sake of a barbarian country unworthy of ranking among civilized nations.

Just the same, we cannot afford to overlook the possible developments of tomorrow. To economic sanctions we shall answer with our discipline, our spirit of sacrifice, our obedience. To military sanctions we shall answer with militarism. To acts of war we shall answer with acts of war.

A people worthy of their past and their name cannot and never will take a different stand. Let me repeat, in the most categorical manner, the sacred pledge which I make at this moment before all the Italians gathered together today, that I should do everything in my power to prevent a colonial



conflict from taking on the aspect and weight of a European war.

This conflict may be attractive to certain minds which hope to avenge their disintegrated temples through this new catastrophe. Never, as at this historical hour, have the people of Italy revealed such force of character, and it is against this people, to which mankind owes its greatest conquest, this people of heroes, of poets, of saints, of navigators, of colonizers, that the world dares threaten sanctions.

Italy! Italy! Entirely and universally Fascist! The Italy of the Black Shirt revolution, rise to your feet, let the cry of your determination rise to the skies and reach our soldiers in East Africa. Let it be a comfort to those who are about to fight. Let it be an encouragement to our friends, and a warning to our enemies.

It is the cry of Italy which goes beyond the mountains and the seas out into the great big wall. It is the cry of justice and victory.

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זכר אלה יעקב וישראל



Address to Chamber of Deputies, 25 May 1935

...Together with the budget of foreign affairs there has been submitted for your approval the Franco-Italian accords of January last. Such accords represent systemization of some questions connected with an article of Pact XIII of London, an article written in the form of excessive conditions, as every one can see by rereading it.

With these accords, which in their totality can be considered satisfactory, a page of post-war relations between Italy and France is closed. Also, there were created premises of effective collaboration between the two countries, as expressly indicated in a general communiqué.

Some one asked why such accords were concluded only seventeen years after the end of the war. I answer that this is owing to the complexity of interests in play, to new situations determined in Europe, and also to the fact of pitiful illusion, not less pitifully cultivated by some French circles, in regard to the stability of the Fascist régime.

The duty of objectivity compels me to add that such illusions seem definitely to have gone up in smoke. So I desire to underline that the atmosphere between the two peoples for some time has been greatly bettered, and we hope that no fact can once more becloud it.

Following the Franco-Italian accord in January the governments of France and England met in London in February and fixed some fundamental points in regard to the political reconstruction of Europe.

One can consider the Franco-English conference in London as a projection of the Franco-Italian one in Rome. Optimists were led to foresee a normal development of the European situation, when on March 16 this normal development was suddenly cut in two by the unilateral denunciation on the part of Germany of Part 5 of the Treaty of Versailles, regarding disarmament.

The world was placed before an accomplished fact, which was annotated by three diplomatic protests. That happened during a series of explorations. Every one was immediately convinced that such an accomplished fact was not revokable.

At this point it is of some interest, however, retrospective, to make known that in January, 1934, Germany was ready to accept a realization infinitely more limited of her parity rights. This realization consisted of an army of 300,000 men with armament, at least for a certain period of years, defensive control, along the lines of the Italian memorandum.

But that which has not happened is not material for history. To make recriminations is useless, even as it is useless to speak again of disarmament. It is extremely difficult for us to believe in the possibility of the limitation of armaments or in the prohibition of some methods of warfare. Nevertheless, if something concrete should be done it is not from our side that difficulties will



The waters were still very agitated, even as was the spirit of the people, when the conference at Stresa was convoked in April. Without exaggerating its importance, this conference was sufficiently conclusive, inasmuch as it determined, in the face of some urgent problems, the unified position of three Western powers.

It is a positive fact that, with such effective, constant and omnipresent solidarity, political action of the grand style is possible, tending to eliminate the principal obstacles that opposed the pacific living together of European peoples. This solidarity is evermore necessary for the existence in the future of our Continent.

At Stresa there was decided the convocation of another conference to face the problems of the Danubian Basin. This conference cannot be held at the beginning of June, as announced. I add it will not be convoked before it shall have been very, very diligently prepared.

The Italo-Austro-Hungarian conference in Venice had to, and did, serve toward that end. I wish also to say that the Austro-Hungarian requests are not such as to place an obstacle in the way of reaching the hoped-for objective, which the Danubian conference proposes to reach.

As to Germany, it is our intention, already communicated to Berlin, to invite her [to the conference] and keep her posted on the successive phases of preparation.

Following the Franco-Russian and the Russo-Czechoslovak convention, a convention which has shifted the equilibrium of forces, the speech of the German Chancellor was keenly awaited.

His thirteen points cannot either be accepted or rejected as a whole. The preferable method is to clarify and sound them out. If it is not to be excluded, diplomacy will set about this task in the next few weeks.

In regard to Italo-German relations it is true that one sole problem comprises them - that of Austria - but this problem is of fundamental importance. It will not be inopportune, therefore, once arrived at this argument, to dedicate some words to those who would like to petrify us at the Brenner Pass in order to hinder our movements in any other direction.

Also in this regard it is necessary to say, once and for all, in the most explicit manner that the problem of Austrian independence is an Austrian and a European problem, and inasmuch as it is European it is also particularly Italian, but not exclusively Italian.

In other words, Fascist Italy does not intend to circumscribe her historic mission to one sole military sector, such as is that of the defense of a frontier, even such a very important one as that of Brenner, since all our frontiers, metropolitan and colonial, are indiscriminately sacred and must be guarded and defended against any one, even only a potential menace.



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- Willoughby, W. W.: The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations Baltimore 1935
- Wilson, Sir Arnold T.: The Suez Canal, its Past, Present, and Future London 1933
- Work, Ernest: Ethiopia, a Pawn in European Diplomacy New Concord, Ohio 1935



## REFERENCE WORKS AND PERIODICALS

In addition to the titles listed in the main bibliography for the course, you will find the following reference series and periodicals of constant assistance. This is by no means a comprehensive list as many noteworthy journals in English and other languages are not given. It contains, however, those to which reference is most often made in assignments.

Survey of International Affairs. Published annually by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. 1924 to date. Covers period from 1920. Will be found at West end of Main Reading Room and in stacks (2 sets).

Call number: Ozb60  
Su7

Documents on International Affairs. Published annually by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. Companion volumes to the Survey. Main Reading Room and Stacks.

Call number: Ozb60  
Su7b

Survey of American Foreign Relations. Published annually by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. 1929 to date. Covers period from 1928. Main Reading Room and Stacks.

Call number: Ozb65  
392

The United States in World Affairs. Published annually by the Foreign Policy Association, New York. 1932 to date. Covers period from 1931. Current year in Main Reading Room. Set in Linonia and Brothers Library.

Foreign Affairs. "An American Quarterly Review". Published by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. Periodical Room. Bound Volumes in Stacks or on Reserve.

International Conciliation Pamphlets. Published monthly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1907 to date. In Stacks or on Reserve.

Call number: Oxd10  
As76

Foreign Policy Reports. Published on the 1st and 15th of each month by the Foreign Policy Association, New York. At desk in Periodical Room.

Foreign Policy Bulletin. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, New York. At desk in Periodical Room.

International Affairs. Published every two months by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. Section 11, Periodical Room.



Sept. 28

### Conceptions of present world:

1. Idealistic - new world of intl govt, peace, etc. This shattered by attacks of aggressive powers, but this is only stage of relapse and eventually the League will triumph. (W. doesn't subscribe to this.)  
Heaven to intl anarchy than ever before - are not today in progressive age of intl govt and cooperation (short-term point of view - emphasizing today).
2. Pessimistic - nothing but anarchy in world. Even 19th century, with Concert of Europe, etc., wasn't complete anarchy. This also is extreme view.

Emphasis to be laid on Big Powers. League is instrument in hands of Big Powers - not necessarily for bad, often for good - but still League is merely instrument of foreign policy for Big Powers. Small states are secondary despite equal vote, other democratic checks and balances.

There is hierarchy of power, with countries rising into and falling from ranks of Big Powers. Austria-Hungary Empire fell - Soviet Union has reestablished itself, as has Germany, which was recognized even by enemies as being worthy of Big Power position.

There must be conflict when there are ten centers of independent action. Also because of the different objectives there will be conflict. These two reasons lead to present dangerous situation.




World, then, today is dynamic - with every little change in one of the units affecting all the others. Person in U.S. cannot understand why a country is so worried about others - but that is because they are so closely connected, and always in a position of possible conflict. Every neighbor is an enemy unless an intimate ally - and the neighbor of the neighbor, etc. (see Spykman). Thus it is of interest to see that the power of your ally is maintained, etc. Many things, compose power and prestige might depend on that power.

Some power is temporary - rising and falling (rise of Japan, etc.) There is, however, some permanency in the world - despite fact that constant and frequent change make this seem impossible. The world has returned to pre-war status, with same Big Powers (except for A-H Confid), and same technique, (with balance and Concert of Powers) - This return to the pre-war status occurring despite revolutions, wars, depression, all sorts of changes. This indicates permanency to certain degree - old order of 19th century seems stronger than the war and all post-war ~~dislocations~~ dislocations. Again, there is some permanency due to presence of some conditioning factors.

Characteristics of empire-building due to competitive struggle in world. Also, prestige drives nations to empire-building, for they wish to "keep up with the Joneses." Nation and race do not determine empire-building - Japs, Italians all alike in wanting empire. Then there develops conflict between those who wish to maintain



The status quo and those who are trying to reach higher level. Thus at top of the hierarchy of power there is group of Big Powers, who think in terms of empire-building and empire-holding. In this characteristic there is similarity between pre- and post-war worlds.





Sept. 30

## Conflict in the post-war world

Power is not an objective - it is simply a means. What, then, are the objectives? ① Some countries (Poland) may want to recapture a power position once held. There are no economic or population reasons for Italy's wanting an empire, except for a possible gain in power. This fact agrees with a concept of human nature - one has a higher social standing in the family of nations if one is a great power. Italy has no economic incentive in Spain - at least her intervention is not due mainly to economic considerations. ② A strong power position will also strengthen the domestic position of the ruling government. A victory in the colonial field, for instance, has been known to give a govt an increased position at home. ③ Of course, there is always the economic motive - the desire for markets which leads to colonial expansion. ④ Security is the predominant objective. This term may simply mean the status quo (for France) or to retain territorial integrity (small country like Switzerland). The French can say they are not secure unless they have control of the Danube. Germany cannot feel secure unless she has a strong army, even though this makes the French insecure. Thus the term is relative. ⑤ Missionary zeal or a crusade to spread a certain type of govt is often an objective. This campaign may be no more than a supernaturalism. Germany uses anti-Bolshevism as a slogan to gain allies and advance the cause of Germany as the strong leader of some coalition, perhaps. Again, it may be sincere or only a spread of the ideology which is the objective. This is increasingly



⑥ also objective of racial unity within territorial borders. all Germans in Germany, etc.

2

time today. ⑦ Again, some countries feel it is their duty to give their benefit to the world - England brings civilization to the native through her Empire; France keeps democracy alive in a totalitarian Europe; America was destined to save the world for democracy. If a whole nation is imbued with such an ideal, then it may go to war for it.

If there are these several nations pursuing these objectives, there must be conflict - especially when a country seeks power for its own sake, for then some other country must lose power, and a conflict is created. There is a psychological question involved in whether nations would take things as a gift - would Germany feel satisfied if she were given colonies or would she rather fight for them and show the world she can carve an empire? Probably Germany would get satisfaction because she wouldn't get a gift unless the nations felt she was powerful enough to take the colonies anyhow. Thus her power is attributed to.

It is extreme to suppose that the world is completely embroiled in endless conflict. In western Europe, the boundaries are fairly well settled after centuries of conflict. French and English difficulties have been solved in Europe and Africa all conflicts could be theoretically solved. Conflict of minorities is difficult, but could be worked out. If one goes back to the base of resentment then an explosion might be prevented. Economic problems are always solvable - population pressure can be alleviated without infringing on anyone else.



Conflicts

- 1) boundaries
- 2) economic
- 3) colonial
- 4) specific reasons

3

But if immigration is not allowed, if tariff walls are built so that industry cannot expand, then the pressure gets terrific and governments take courses of action to distract feeling from social problems. (Fascist technique).

Colonial conflicts are serious among imperialist powers. There is not much territory left to be divided up and when Mussolini took Ethiopia, he said that either he had to take some colony which already belonged to somebody else or conquer an independent country, and the latter was a lesser evil for it might not provoke a European war, which it did not. Belgium & Holland have colonies only because they were once big powers, and now have the protection of the Big Powers (England, France).

There are, lastly, irrational elements of conflict, specific reasons for conflict, such as the taking of revenge, etc. They may not lead to war themselves, but they provoke and poison the atmosphere. This reasoning also applies to the "incident" which always occurs. No country will be drawn in because of the sinking of some ship, etc. - but these incidents are simply signposts of the conflict which is existing. Something beyond a simple incident must occur.



Oct. 7

## EUROPE

Europe has turned from concept of universe of parts to concept of regional parts and systems. Of course league may be unwilling, and anyhow the Big Powers bear the brunt of any action to be taken. Many factors tend to take center position, which she held before war, away from Europe. World was governed from European centers - European war became world war - but this is changed. America, Japan, etc. have risen. Again, European powers no longer exclusively European. Center of economic activity and interest now in Far East, while there is African expansion. Germany is only truly European power left, and she accuses others of sacrificing interests of Europe to those elsewhere in world. Ever larger percentage of world trade is between non-European centers (Australia - Japan; N. S. America). Ideologically, Europe is breaking up into various groups - which is a contrast to the ideological unity of the 19th century. Nevertheless, we can still speak of Europe.


Three zones of Europe - the East, Soviet Union, state capitalism in practice, with a totalitarian rule; Central Europe, practically entirely under dictatorship, with exception of Czechoslovakia; the West, which is democratic, with Spain in only exceptional position. Does this division go back further than the war? Yes, it is an item of permanency in Europe. The East was feudal, both in govt and economic system, with landed aristocracy dominant. Central European countries were semi-feudal, with some industrialization, but still with a hierarchy of aristocracy - Germany, Austria. There was an element of parliamentarism. The West was definitely bourgeois in govt and business. Labor had no freedom in the feudal land; more ~~to~~ liberty in the semi-feudal (the great Social Democratic Party in Germany), although they were forced to become more radical than they did in the democratic countries, because they were excluded from the governing groups; while in the democratic countries labor given up into trade union, etc., and was much less revolutionary than in Germany or Russia.

During war East and West met against Central Europe. In 1917 Russia turned into a Bolshevik govt and again separated Europe. Thus the Bolshevik revolution ~~and~~ changed Russia, but split up Europe again into the familiar divisions. After 1918 there was much fighting for and against communism, and when democracy succeeded, there was a wave of democratic government in Europe, with the executive weakened, checks + balances, etc. The new nations also accepted democratic constitution. In the succeeding years, these democracies all collapsed (except for Czech.) - because it was against tradition and social structure of these countries to be other than monarchical, strongly-led.

Central Europe again holds compromise between <sup>eastern</sup> ~~western~~ communism and



western democracy, with their programs combined of nationalist frenzy and a sort of state socialism, since the state interferes in every economic activity. The fascist dogma has not spread to the democratic countries - that's why the crisis in France last year, when she appeared to be turning Fascist, was important for the whole world, since that would have upset the western, democratic group.





Oct. 12

FRANCO-GERMAN PROBLEMS

F-G still the main conflict in Europe. Other conflicts (Mediterranean) have their ground elsewhere - France needs life-line to get supplies against German threat. It is strong only because F is occupied with G. The Russo-German conflict goes back to time when R joined F in combination to keep down G. Before F-R pact, there was peaceful relation between R and G.

F-G conflict is old (1870 year) and pathetic. It has led to constant war and fear. Why should they be enemies? There is no main economic conflict - small issues over resources, etc., but still good customers of each other. Colonial problem (except for Morocco) has not estranged them. Col. prob is between E and G. Pop. pressure in Ger never sought relief toward west - has been directed to Ukraine but not to F. Ethnic is not acute problem - Alsace is clearly German. Strategic or power relationship has been the main problem. Each is convinced of the other's ulterior motive - do not trust each other - fear the other's preponderance in controlling Europe - goes back to time when first one and then other did actually dominate.

Line of F policy toward G has been very constant. G lays emphasis on period before 1870, while F stresses 19th cent. It has not been simple picture of steady



G aggressive. In Middle Ages G very weak; F  
 conflict was with Austro-Spanish Empire, which encircled  
 her. Richelieu (Catholic) got Protestant part of G to keep  
 him against Austria. This is policy of divide and conquer,  
 balance of power. L<sup>th</sup> pushed on to Rhine frontier and  
 altho' G was too weak (feudal interests of barons) to retaliate,  
 here was born the conflict. During Napoleonic wars, F  
 came into conflict with all powers, invaded Prussia on her  
 way toward R. In 1813 war of emancipation from F started,  
 and Prussia played large part in coalition against F.  
 In 1815, Prussia given Rhineland. All this is not  
 purely F-G conflict, however. The settlement of 1815 left  
 F and G dissatisfied, for other powers split up land  
 between them so neither could get the story. After  
 1815 Europe dominated by Holy Alliance, but G was  
 pretty weak, with Austria predominant. F eager to recover  
 Rhineland - but unification of whole of G made F worry.  
 Bismarck's unification under Prussian leadership - when Austria  
 and Prussia came to terms - made F tremble, when she was  
 faced with Big Power on other side of Rhine. They mistrust  
 each other, feeling that the one has frustrated the other, opposed  
 the other, interfered with vital interests of each other.  
 G has firm conviction that F has never wanted a  
 strong G and would do anything to weaken G.



F lost Alsace-Lorraine in 1870 and was weakened. She made up strength by building colonial empire (in course of which they conflicted with E [England]). Then F sought revanche and fostered national feeling. After 1870 G satiated, which meant G was interested in status quo and attempt to prevent F from getting alliances for future revenge. Bismarck willing to let F have colonies, since it kept her from Europe. Successors started to have colonial aspirations, etc. and Europe started to look askance at new power. G was taking aggressive military policy and supporting A-H Empire, since G had a very predominant military position over F. This led to Triple Entente and stage set for war. Peace policy of G was aggressive and this aggravated F and Europe. Many Germans felt that it was wrong to become military power, but should have remained gentle, philosophical country. But history (sweeping nationalist movement of 1848) decided otherwise, and a centralized unified nation was formed. Industrialization of G has given her a greater war-strength potential than F; G people are more military minded; G. man-power is stronger. F was invaded and defeated many times, and even in the World War, her territory was invaded, she was almost defeated, her lands were destroyed. This is weak spot on F consciousness,



and makes her fear invasion. G has a memory of several hundred years of weakness - and only thanks strong nationalism for saving her from complete subjugation by Napoleon. F only waiting for chance to dismember G and make her weaker. G feels that F would have dismembered her had she been allowed. The Ruhr invasion proves to G that what F wanted was to cripple war potential and strip resources.

Other powers did not try to bring F and G together, because their own interests were aided by keeping F and G concerned with themselves - the balance of power. Rather has there been constant tendency to draw F and G apart. England could never stand peaceful F-G bloc.



Oct. 13

VERSAILLES TREATY - FOURTEEN POINTS

Germans accepted armistice with understanding that a peace treaty was to be based on Wilson's Fourteen Points

Wilson said, in regard to reparations, that Germany must pay for Belgium, northern France, and Serbia, Montenegro. The Allies said Germany must <sup>also</sup> pay for any civilian damage by land, sea, or air. Allies later added cost of pensions and if Lloyd George had his way the cost of the war would have been added to the bill. The war guilt clause was put under reparations so that Germany should be responsible for the debts. Treaty did not set figure for reparations, but ordered Commission to investigate Germany's capacity to pay.

No figure was set, although Germany was to begin payment immediately, because the home fronts had great expectations, and also a too-high figure would make it impossible to pay. Germany offered 100 million gold marks, but it was refused. Eventually 132 billion was set. Dawes plan reduced to 45 billion; Young plan 35 billion with series of payments, etc.

A base of 9 billion marks was demanded for the amount <sup>already</sup> paid for reconstruction of northern France - and the remainder of the figure arrived at was the Inter-Allied Debts which was added in the Young Plan. When Hoover Moratorium was called, the French wanted to exclude the 9 billion, but America said all payments must stop for the year. After that the Inter-Allied Debts pretty well stopped because the French ~~felt~~ <sup>felt</sup> that their claim was negated, and thus the American claim must also be negated.

Wilson called for removal of economic barriers, which hadn't been



carried out.

Wilson said wishes of colonial people were to be ascertained in regard to colonial redistribution, and in Treaty this was upheld, but in application of mandate system under the League this was disregarded. Wilson called for "impartial adjustment" of colonies, and Germany claimed that all her colonies would be taken under this stipulation. It was decided that Germany was not capable of ruling colonies and was to be excluded from list of powers to whom colonies were to be distributed.

Most perfectly carried over Point to Treaty was the one establishing the League of Nations, which Wilson said should preserve territorial integrity and provide mutual guarantees for the maintenance of peace.


Wilson came out in 14 points for disarmament, saying it should be limited to point of domestic safety (policing). League calls for disarmament down to national safety. There was violation in application, and Germany says it is inconceivable that she should need only 100,000 men for national safety while France should need a million. Treaty calls for general limitation and Allies have not disarmed - so Germany feels that she can now rearm, since they have not kept their promise. The Germans came to Disarmament Conference as nation already disarmed and demanding general promised limitation.

Points fairly well carried into Treaty, but Treaty has been violated.



Which of Treaty Provisions seem to be most in line with  
Wilson's Fourteen Points?

Which of the provisions and which of the points seem to be useful  
or unjustified in the light of succeeding events?





GOVERNMENT 37

1937-1938

The Treaty of Versailles

The following is the reading assignment for the discussion on the Treaty of Versailles on Wednesday 13 October. All books will be found on Mr. Wolfers' Reserve.

Allied and Associated Powers: The treaties of peace 1919-1923

The Treaty of Versailles:

Preamble (p 3)

Part II - Part V inclusive

Part VII

Part VIII thru Art. 244 (omit annexes)

Art. 245-247

Part IX

Art. 440

Latané, J. H.: History of American foreign policy pp 606-8

Temperley, H. W. V.: A history of the peace conference of Paris, 1920-1924

Vol. I pp 273-278

Vol. II pp 1-20

Vol. VI pp 391-421

Toynbee, A. J.: The world after the peace conference  
pp 24-44

Read also one of the following:

Benns, F. L.: Europe since 1914 pp 252-281

Dawson, W. H.: Germany under the treaty pp 58-84



At Versailles, F envisaged a future in which G still existed as a dangerous neighbor, with great potential resources. F felt that G must be kept down, either by coalition against her or by artificial restraints, etc. F tried to get other Allies to agree to plans for security - they wanted Alsace-Lorraine (with iron ore), wanted Poland to be as strong as possible (since they could no longer count on Russia), wanted to prevent Austria from joining G, and wanted Little Entente to be strong. This was not enough - F wanted physical security and provided for demilitarization of Rhineland and reduction of army to 100,000. Occupation of Rhineland and occupation of bridgeheads were military elements necessary for F security. To satisfy all these demands - Rhine nor bridgeheads could be occupied indefinitely - plan for 15 years set up - Britain didn't want to stay in Europe longer than necessary. They offered temporary occupation and permanent demilitarization (in violation of which G remilitarized in 1935). Again, G was disarmed and Lloyd-George felt that this was complete security. F felt this was not enough - for G might rearm secretly. Thus F was not satisfied. Also promise of Triple (U.S. - Brit. - F) Defensive Alliance was broken, by refusal of U.S. Senate to ratify and subsequent withdrawal of Brit.

Seeking security, F made military alliance with



Poland and Belgium; crippled her economically by reparation; and applied sanctions through occupation of her territory - biggest example being Ruhr. They provoked separatist movements in Rhineland.

Britain was helping G back on her feet - because Lloyd George was constantly afraid that she would go Bolshevik. Again, if G were crippled she could not pay reparations. F did not worry about these things, and thus conflict grew and continued between F and Eng.

after Ruhr invasion, F was not so well off - they got no money, they had antagonised Eng, and the passive resistance left them no alternative but to withdraw. Then Briand and MacDonald came into power respectively - and together with Dawes Committee they reached agreement with Germany, which led to Locarno, Germany's entrance into the league, and a renewed feeling of cooperation. The mutual guarantee, the removal of reparation from political to reasonable economic sphere, the recognition of G by other Powers in league all made for hopeful future.

1924 - spirit of cooperation - desire to solve problems

Why did this not last? There was prosperity in G and not so strict an attitude in F. The disharmony began to appear in 1927 - and when Stresemann died in 1929, there was feeling that no real solution had been found. World depression and rise of Nazi party.



1. Briand group felt that by signing Locarno voluntarily G was re-signing Versailles, was giving up her revisionist aims, was in a mood of pacification. 1. G, however, signed with idea that if F were secure of herself in the west, she would become amenable to peaceful change which would give to G some of the things promised her, i.e. gradual F disarmament. 2. On other side, G says that F simply wanted Dutch signature to aid F when G violated Rhineland or some other provision. 2. F says that G only made peace in west so that she could be free to expand in east (since G refused to sign eastern Locarno).

Thus there are both friendly and unfriendly explanations of motives of both countries - with various groups interpreting differently.

F set up cry for more security - while G said that after making concessions, she was getting nothing. She had demit., given up A-L, etc., and had not gotten satisfactory reparations arrangements, ~~and~~ F disarmament, etc. Stresemann died under increasing pressure and Brüning led strong nationalist feeling into active foreign policy. ~~But~~

Disarmament Conference was called and failed - G demanded the nations reduce to point promised. F wouldn't unless she got definite Brit. promise of military support, which Brit. wouldn't give.



G prospect was artificial - based only on foreign loans - and when these dropped off, she could not meet payment of new Young Plan, just made. Nothing done until whole financial structure broke down in 1931.

Breunig agitated for customs union with Austria, as outlet for nationalist feeling and also as economic attempt. F and Little Entente said this meant war. The defeat which Breunig suffered made him feel that in nothing would G get a favorable decision - she must take what she wanted.

Fail for within  
in being understood  
perhaps fully

During period 1924-34, reparation payments were given up, G was promised equality in armaments within a range of permit - but these concessions were too late. The Nazis came into power in 1933 and a new aggressive foreign policy was adopted. She made armament demands, was refused, and then proceeded to leave League and rearm herself. By 1934 the Locarno period was at end.

After that F and G each took the case into his own hands. Old technique was employed again and a coalition of allies was sought. F went after Ital, Russia and England. They got Soviets, got Mussolini - local pact (which was broken by unfortunate accident of Ethiopian war), got alliance with Eng. under certain conditions only.



G got permanent; F got Soviet pact.

G got semi-militarism; F got stronger English promise.

Whether there is equal compensation is not certain. F alliances not so water-tight. Every internal Soviet and Eng. incident is of great F concern. Italian swing to G is great loss.

F again faced by strong power, again with something like Triple Entente, again worried. G too has allies and friends. Alignments today not as clear as 1914, however. Treaty of Versailles gone in most provisions - chaos looms.



Oct. 19

FRENCH SECURITY POLICY

War proved there was not enough security, and after war systems of collective guarantees were sought. League was most prominent instrument - with Article 10 as cornerstone. Revolutionary change of mind toward faith in new policy of intl cooperation did not occur practically in minds of statesmen. Realistic efforts were adopted.

Idea of French security is not intl but for their state alone - A. attitude of F toward application of League force against Ethiopia. Countries willing for security believe they are faced with specific danger - not general world fears. F believe she is faced with special danger - G. who is aggressive, etc.

Countries ① prepare themselves through armaments, etc. ② secure allies willing to aid, ③ make general agreements under collective guarantee. Second involves specific promises from an ally, either through mutual assistance or unilateral treaties, while third simply means joining organization which can bring pressure to bear on anyone aggressing against you. Negatively, you can strengthen yourself by weakening your enemy through disarmament, economic strangulation, sabotage, demilitarization of borders, stirring up of trouble between enemy and her neighbors so that she can have no allies, etc. By conciliation, a country can meet an enemy half-way, can reconcile differences between them, etc. But this is neglected, even in discussions of collective security. The League

attempt to bring power against an aggressor, to repress any country which has the reputation of being militaristic. Peace societies discuss war and with force at great length.

At Versailles there were alliances with US + GB and treaties with Belgium, Poland, Czech all under League protection.

F security not helped by collective system of League security, because it is too general. Need to supplement Covenant to aid security.

Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance - general defensive agreement for immediate assistance on prearranged plans. How keep plans secret? Again many countries (Scandinavians) refused to commit themselves. Geneva Protocol - to promote disarmament. Tried to get covenant to work automatically against act of aggression. Trouble over definition of last word. F feels that armies along Rhine is just as much aggression as invasion. If Protocol had been accepted, F could have asked for supervising body over Rhineland. Aggressor was defined as one who refused to settle through conciliation and mediation. Each country should donate the military strength to back up the Protocol. Protocol failed.

Locarno Treaties - which were supposed to give F security, did not make up for amount of disarmament asked. G security (in Ruhr) also provided for. In this agreement there were guarantors - and thus two potential enemies settle conflict.



in conciliation under eye of other powers. Locarno type of treaty: mutual non-aggression between neighbors guaranteed by other powers. Disarmament Conference - occupied with new security problems, indicating that all previous action not sufficient to compensate for arms reduction. F really measure as long as G would be reconciled - for she is potentially weaker and could not absolutely depend on large power allies. (except possibly Russia today). This conference failed because nobody wanted to give F security requested - GB would not commit herself.

Attempt to make real solid alliance then began. Italy agreed to cooperate militarily with F, and latter withdrew all troops from Italian border and thrown to German border - this was Laval - Mussolini Pact. Soviet treaty no real military alliance, as F hesitated, since many felt F would be dragged into Russian wars.

Collective security now propagated by England - an emphasis on collective cooperation as against military blocs

1.  
ARBITRATION TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY

Locarno Treaty - Part I

Provides for peaceful settlement of dispute between France and Germany.

Sets up Permanent Conciliation Commission, with 1 F and 1 G and 3 outside commissioners, which must arrive at a decision, by a majority, within 6 months, and which has access to information and aid in investigation from both governments.

If PCC reaches no amicable agreement, dispute may be brought to Permanent Court of International Justice or any arbitral tribunal chosen by two countries; or else to Council of League which will adjudicate.

SIMILAR TREATIES BETWEEN GERMANY AND BELGIUM, POLAND, CZECH.

TREATY OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE BETWEEN GERMANY, BELGIUM, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, ITALY

Provides for maintenance and inviolability of territorial status quo established at Versailles.

Germany, Belgium, France agree not to war on each and to settle all disputes peacefully.

Contracting parties agree to help any party against whom the Council has decided aggression has taken place, either in form of arms, remilitarizing forbidden zones, etc.

FINAL PROTOCOL


Representatives at Conference feel that treaties will relieve tension and help solve political and economic problems for the general betterment and increasing peace and security of Europe.



TREATY OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE BETWEEN FRANCE AND POLAND

If France or Poland suffer from the failure of Germany to observe the obligations assumed at Locarno, they agree to come to each other's aid, especially if Germany has recourse to arms. In case the Council is not able to make its report on the matter acceptable, then France and Poland can help each other under Article 15, par 7 of the Covenant.

SIMILAR TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA



GERMANVIEW POINT

HITLER'S SPEECH TO THE  
REICHSTAG, MARCH 7, 1936.

"The Germans believed in those 14 points with all the force of a people who were in despair both in regard to themselves and the world at large. These theses ... endeavored to formulate new laws for international relations ... and develop that institution ... which would unite them (the Nations) not merely externally, but would, above all, bring them closer together in mutual respect and understanding."

"The Peace ... has turned out to be the dragon seed of new wars." "Instead of feeling the consolation of a gradual betterment in human controversies we are confronted with a condition of unrest which is not diminishing but rather on the increase."

"We are not responsible for this development" because we were weak when the laws which led to this development were prescribed. "This development originated with that unhappy Treaty which will one day stand in history as the leading example of human short-sightedness and unreasonable passion. The Treaty drew frontiers along impossible lines, put the vanquished nations in a category of no rights (which is against the theory of the League) and instilled hatred instead of understanding. People (the French) gloat over the fact that we are having a trial to make a living."

There was a lack of reason in cutting off a nation of 67 million from the rest of the world. (i.e. economically). "I am convinced that mankind will never have real peace unless there is a change of spirit in the way international problems are regarded."



"A reasoned foreign policy cannot have for its purpose or aim the establishment of conditions which would of necessity cry out to be changed immediately afterwards." Thus Germany gives up attempt to recover Polish Corridor.

Talks about Europe as a family - and says wise statesmen should curb internal tension lest it explode and upset all the closely linked units - he has rebuked Germany.

The "German Question" consists in the fact that Germany has been held responsible for a war she didn't want, and has had to put up with an inferior position, although she is an industrious, honorable, intelligent nation. Also, the deliberate attempts of some countries to keep Germany economically crushed is part of the question. The nations in the interest of world trade should see to it that Germany has enough to eat. "The German nation needs no special aid to help it in following out its own way of life. But it will not be content with the possession of opportunities which are inferior to those granted to other people."

(Probably talking about colonies here)

An effort to meddle her economic question "can be made only if the German nation feels itself on a footing of political equality with other nations, and thus politically secure." The moral censure of the war

guilt accusation has a tremendous effect. "The re-establishment of German equality of rights has had no harmful effect on the French people...", but since the idea of keeping unequal positions has become so rooted in the French mind, we cannot convince them of it.

"In these three years I have again and again endeavored... to throw a bridge of understanding across to the people of France." The two nations should be friends - should replace strife with rule of reason. "My earnest desire has been to increase the feeling of responsibility for the necessity of mutual consideration and collaboration in Europe." He hates Bolshevism and it is tragic that France, whom he wishes to understand, should ally with Russia.

He has made concrete proposals for cooperation but they have not been accepted. "I have expurgated from the German press all expressions of hatred against the French people." He bore the loss of territory and did not make an issue of the restoration of 1914 frontiers because he wanted, by observing the Locarno Treaty, to create a better political atmosphere between France, England, and Germany. "We look upon this Treaty as the only possible basis on which a concrete attempt can be made for the establishment of a European peace."

France broke the pact by her alliance with Russia, for this new Agreement was a threatening military force. Again, we must face the political question that this is an alarming Bolshevik



bloc "This gigantic mobilisation of the East against Central Europe is opposed not only to the letter but above all to the spirit of the Locarno Pact." "The repeatedly friendly offers and peaceful assurances of Germany have been met by France with a military pact with the Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany and in violation of the Locarno Pact. The Locarno Pact has thereby lost its significance and practically ceased to be."

Now that we have achieved equality by assuming sovereignty over our complete territory (i.e. remilitarization of Rhineland) we are ready to join the League, to enter anew cooperative attempts to find mutual security.

## Bruce Williams on "The Locarno Agreements"

Great Britain objected to the Geneva Protocol on many grounds, but the essence of Sir Austen Chamberlain's criticism was that it destroyed the balance and altered the spirit of the Covenant. "The fresh emphasis laid upon sanctions, the new occasions discovered for their employment, the elaboration of military procedure, insensibly suggest the idea that the vital business of the League is not so much to promote friendly cooperation and reasoned harmony in the management of international affairs as to preserve peace by organizing war, and (it may be) war on the largest scale."

The British suggested "special arrangements in order to meet special needs" - i.e. regional pacts, which idea the German Ambassador had communicated to Herriot some months before. The French accepted this idea with five stipulations:

- ① Germany should assume the obligation of the Covenant;
- ② Belgium should be included in the proposed Rhineland pact;
- ③ There should be no modifications of the existing peace treaties;
- ④ Germany should conclude pacts with her neighbors, signature to Versailles, even though not parties to the proposed pact;
- ⑤ There should be joint guarantee of peaceful settlement of conflict by the Powers participating in the pact.



Essential elements in this regional system of national security:

- ① guarantee of territorial integrity
- ② guaranteed process of arbitration

These are same two methods by which Covenant approached problem of state security. The Locarno Mutual Guaranty Treaties only represent a stiffening of these original principles.

"The real antecedents of these treaties lie in the Covenant, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and the Geneva Protocol. Territorial guarantee, demilitarized zones, provisions for mutual assistance, immediately available, and guaranteed processes of arbitration - all of these devices have evolved from security proposals which have been put forward during the past six years, and all are utilized in the Locarno system."

1937 - 1938

The Locarno Treaties

The following is the reading assignment for the discussion on the Locarno Treaties on Wednesday, the 20 October. All books will be found on Mr. Wolfers' reserve.

Study carefully and intensively:

Harley, J. E.: Documentary textbook on international relations pp 413-426

Study also:

Survey of international affairs 1925 Volume II pp 1 - 78 (another copy will be found in the Main Reading Room)

Or

Williams, Bruce: State Security and the League of Nations pp 206-226

And study:

Berber, Fritz: Locarno; a collection of documents as follows:

Document 41. p 198, Document 43. p 230, Document 46. p 239 (German viewpoint)

Or

Document 42. p 228, Document 44. p 232, Document 45. p 233 (French viewpoint)

Or

Document 47. p 241, Document 55. p 274, Document 58. p 284, Document 60, pp 299-301 (British viewpoint)



Oct. 21

GERMAN ATTITUDES

Great German slogan was for Equality and Revision of established treaty structure. She wants equality of power, etc. All countries seek equal naval power - Italy wants equality with F., etc. G. wants equality of power with F., which brings up question of equality with F alone or also with F allies. G. wants equality only with strongest unit in F bloc (i.e. with F herself) - only wants 35% of naval strength of England. Even if G. ever got back colonies she would still stick to this ratio with England. Could G. accept unilateral demilitarized zones, which was moral as well as military? If G. got something in return (either disarmament of F or reduction of her alliances) she would accept this unilateral demilitarization.

History of French to make equal concessions

In regard to economic power, does it mean equal opportunity to take part in riches of world, or economic self-sufficiency, or equal distribution of colonies, or what? It means all these.

Equality of honor - abandonment of distinction between victor and vanquished, of discrimination against vanquished (when victors made programs and forced them on the others). War guilt clause is dishonorable, a fact that G. is said to be incapable of administering colonies. Implication in Treaty that G. is to be penalized for her action as if she were criminal is hard to bear. Idea of peace treaty should be to grant amnesty - to make gesture of friendship.

Peaceful change of treaties or revision is objective and there is objection to anything which stabilizes status quo. They hate laws which make the system more inflexible - Versailles was to be eternal

which displeased S. The attitude of countries toward suggestions of revision, toward discussions of possibility of change is antagonistic and unsatisfactory to S. Lately the little Entente powers are coming around to idea that there might be chance to revise minority or arms features - and this revision might lessen possibility of explosion. Allies worried how far S. was going to go in regard to revision and change - would S. accept territorial provisions at least? Standing firm in the way of change leads to explosion, the Allies can now see, and are willing to compromise.

Soviet strategy at first was passive resistance, continually calling on public opinion of world to see how Wilson's Points had been violated. This legal position, this right which she felt had been promised her was valuable in allowing her to get away with some of the things she did (rearmament, etc.)

Second method was that of increasing her own power - either through fait accompli or making allies or building an army. Whatever ends have been accomplished, S. can say she got what she wanted without bloodshed - and is fearful change in that sense. F says much of it has not been negative and acceptable change. There has been end of F occupation of S. territory - end of reparations payments - end of unilateral disarmament - end of all moral discrimination, with possible exception of clause in regard to administrative responsibility for colonies. There has been no territorial revision, <sup>and</sup> but there



has been the offering of the idea that S accepts the fact that she cannot have Alsace-Lorraine, etc. There is a new factor of reconciliation in this regard. The neutrality of Belgium has been restated. Thus, several big problems in world peace to be settled. There is also offer of settlement of other questions (S. offered to enter league and discuss colonial problem afterwards - offered to make non-aggression pact for 10 years with Czechoslovakia - offer of air pact in west - offer for reduction of armaments all around, with curious contradiction of wanting Russia to disarm and yet insisting that she will have no negotiations with Russia).

There is demand that F give up alliance with Russia, demand that League be revised if S is to enter, demand that she have the right of intervention in favor of her nationals in other countries, against the spread of Bolshevism, etc.

Oct. 26

ENGLAND

She is not continental power, altho' exerting supreme influence in Europe. She must also consider several of dominions as independent units. Also must look after her own security in regard to neighbors on continent - this is prime principle of foreign policy. Has strong fleet, air defense, and protection of lowlands, Rhine - which brings land force into play. Isolation for E is out of question - and this has been accepted. Her isolation was different from U.S. anyhow - not indifference like U.S. but maintaining balance on continent so that she need not be tied to any group.

Maintenance of hold in India involves the "life-line". India must be protected as center of empire. Countries on the route are important to the safety of the life-line.

Other colonial possessions and economic interest - China, Africa, etc.

Co-operation with Dominion - hard to say how far E would go to keep bond of unity; made many sacrifices to keep bond and many concessions to Dominion in regard to foreign entanglements. Little sympathy between interests of both sides.

Difficult to formulate foreign policy because: (1) of necessity of compromise with Dominion; (2) of rise of new powers whom she cannot keep in check by her naval power as she once could; (3) of stronger differences in opinion at home, between labor and conservative




There is movement in England toward policy in which F would be champion of collective system under League Covenant

Principles of foreign policy :- (1) Maintenance of balance of power on continent, & else choice of one nation to acquire a hegemony and protect British interests in exchange for British support. France should be England's soldier on the continent - and F gets promise of E protection against ? (Germany). If F is made so strong and given such assurances, then other aspects of F policy affect E. If F were "bigger Belgium" all would be well, but she has own colonial policy, own Disarmament policy, etc. There is conflict between E and F attitude toward these things, and if F is given great power, E must bow to her. The principle is, then, a great deal of balance, with some form of commitment to F.


She failed to get a (2) Concert of Power - Does not want alliance balanced against each other. British attempted to negotiate with Germany, and was first after explosion to pacify relations with Italy. Concert must include all powers. If France in, & out of concert. Round Table discussions don't work now because of opposing ideologies, but it may be a return to the Concert, since the influence of F and E get the opposing parties at least to come together, if not to accomplish anything.

Find four principles of British foreign policy, with at least two quotations to prove each principle.





1. Mediterranean
2. League + collective security
3. maintenance of terr. inty. of Spain
4. Rearmament
5. Position of leader :
6. Open to mutual non-exclusive alliances (meaning also Germany.)  
No enrichment of Germany.



(12)

Eden's Reference to Spain - Oct. 16, 1937

1. Intervention accomplishes nothing in a civil war.
2. Glad that Britain favored non-intervention. Still distinction exists between non-intervention and indifference. "We are not indifferent to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Spain. We are not indifferent to vital British interests in the Med." Spain med.
3. Speaking of peace, he said: "We shall continue to be watchful to see that those interests of ours in the Med. - and in the maintenance of our line of communications with the Near East and India are not endangered." Med.

Feb. 25, 1936

1. "I can assure the House that it remains the policy of H.M.G. to maintain steady and collective resistance to aggression, and that they will be guided in their task by the spirit of the Covenant itself. There will be neither weakness nor wavering in this course until peace is signed." Support League and  
(Talking about Ethiopian war)
2. "H.M.G. and this country will take their full part with others in the imposition of sanctions." (Altho' they wish to see peace in Africa.) Collective security
3. Whichever course events may take the one element which appears as essential for every course is that Great Britain must be strong." Permanent  
"regard this as essential for any foreign policy which we can pursue with any hope of success in the near future. (over)"



"We have to return because of lack of confidence and goodwill among nations and because of the obsession of fear. Fear of unprovoked aggression can only be eliminated, and it must be eliminated, by a gradual strengthening of collective security until every nation is convinced that under no circumstances an aggression be made to pay. Our final objective must be a world-wide system of collective security which embraces all nations and the authority of which is unchallenged and unchallengeable."

3. In that respect (of leading world to peace) the  
under country has a special responsibility.

Jan. 20, 1937

1. "Yet there are British interests in this Spanish conflict and they are twofold - first, that the conflict should not spread beyond the boundaries of Spain, and second, that the political independence and territorial integrity of Spain shall be preserved."

2<sup>a</sup> "This ~~(our objective)~~ remains the negotiation of a European settlement and the strengthening of the authority of the League."

3. "HMG are at present engaged in the active prosecution of the re-equipment of their three fighting services. Though we are convinced that this is an indispensable means to our objective, it is not our objective."

med. 3. "For us the Med. is not a short cut but a main arterial road. Freedom of communication in these waters is of vital interest in the full sense of the word to the British Commonwealth of Nations."



Nov. 6, 1936


1. "We desire Germany's cooperation in the economic as well as the political sphere, and there can be no question on our part of the encirclement of Germany in either."  
*Initiation to Germany.*
2. "I repeat the assurance that we have no desire to threaten or intention to attack any Italian interest in the Med. It should be possible for each country to continue to maintain its vital interests in the Med without conflict."  
*Med.*
3. "The future peace of Europe very largely depends on the part that we play. It (a certain speech) is interpreted as this country resolve once again to take the lead. That is precisely our intention." A European settlement firm and secure based on a vital British interest.  
*Lead*
4. "The strength of the armaments of this country is of paramount importance to the preservation of peace."  
*Paramount*

Three elements:

1. Strengthening of the League
2. Negotiation of a European settlement
3. Re-armament.

Speech by Hoare, Sept, 1935 to 16th Assembly

League "The recent response of public opinion shows how completely the nation supports the Government in the full acceptance of the obligation of League membership, which is the Sept-proclaimed key-note of British policy."





1937 - 1938

British Foreign Policies

The following is the assignment of speeches by leading British statesmen for the discussion of British foreign policies on Wednesday, the 27 October.

Speech by the right honourable Sir Samuel Hoare, September 11, 1935 at the Sixteenth Assembly of the League of Nations  
Documents on international affairs 1935 Vol I  
pp 234-242

Debates in the House of Commons on British foreign policy, June 18, 1936 and June 23, 1936  
International Conciliation Document No. 322 for  
September, 1936

Speech by the right honourable Anthony Eden, February 24, 1936 before the House of Commons  
New York Times February 25, 1936

Speech by the right honourable Anthony Eden, November 6, 1936 before the House of Commons  
The Times, London November 6, 1936 p 7 col 5

Speech by the right honourable Anthony Eden, January 19, 1937 before the House of Commons  
New York Times January 20, 1937

Speech by the right honourable Anthony Eden, October 11, 1937, before the House of Commons  
New York Times October 12, 1937

Documents on international affairs will be found on Mr. Wolfers' Reserve; additional copy in the Main Reading Room. Newspapers will be found in the basement in the Newspaper Room.



Oct. 28

British Foreign Policy from point of view of contradictions. The members of foreign office say there are no principles - that the foreign policy is opportunistic and may be reversed whenever need arise. Only looks like contradiction - Tradition of conservatism in E is important and basic drives can be seen.

Post-war history, containing few periods where definite policies can be seen - . Soon after Versailles, Britain became sympathetic to Germany, and in Ruhr invasion there was almost rift with France. When France conceded, Britain had chance to effect reconciliation on Rhine and in Locarno we see this reconciliation guaranteed by Britain, who occupied strong mediating position. They closed their eyes to fact that Locarno did not solve real problem - and were optimistic. Slogan of day became to make a business-like situation out of the economic ruin (reparation) instead of political situation. They cooperated in Young Plan, etc. They continue to pursue today hope that new Locarno can be created. In 1933, when Four Power Pact was signed, they almost approached it again. Not same, however - four powers are considered equal, a consultative body, a little Council of Europe, with Mussolini hoping that it would take up affairs again as disturbed by the war and League, which gave little countries too much power. This was watered down and actual Pact was ineffectual. British still hope for new Locarno, but Four-Power Pact would be different since France



would not be in stronger position any longer.

(Accusation of Russia that Locarno was directed against her was reversed in 1933)

By 1931 England came to realization that Locarno was not enough to keep European disorder from erupting. In disarmament conference England was active and willing to cooperate with G if F was agreeable. The world looked to be coming to a new agreement - but the F were not willing to make concessions and the conference failed.

All through 1933 there was negotiation with Hitler over plan for disarmament. Germany left league, proposals for compromise were rejected - British were most active for they felt that if effort failed, G. would begin to rearm, and crisis would go to worst. They sought to force F to compromise with G, but always realized that in a pinch they would have to side with F, since G rearmament was threat to E also. This is contradictory position. When effort failed, E became suspicious of G - not blaming G but F for failure - but once it happened, they began to feel danger.

Since 1934 British decided they must rearm, and bring opinion to agree with idea of rearmament. They have used argument of fight against fascism and for the League, and



gotten labor people to agree on basis of collective security to be strengthened with increased strength of arms.

In 1934-35 E naturally driven closer to F alliance, and for first time she was open to suggestion that F should guarantee her security. They have become continental powers, threatened by air forces, and seeking security, not only giving it.

① Problem of western security arose when Locarno was broken.

F wanted to bring in Russia to effect of rearmament. There was some sort of air pact, details never disclosed. Difference from old Locarno would be that England would be guaranteed by new Locarno. ② Guarantee against German aggression in East.

F concerned with east ~~with~~ while E not. In 1935 F offered new plan to E - a western air pact, (a defense of Austria) and an eastern Locarno. E said she was sympathetic to eastern Locarno, but would not commit herself. She cannot remain aloof, however, since she will be drawn in, in the event of F action. The only F action would be a pact with Russia in the east - and E agreed to this if the pact were agreeable to G. F agreed. These two exceptions of the plan led to stalemate, with Poland and Germany refusing eastern Locarno. This ~~was~~ resulted in failure of E attempt to provide eastern Locarno without splitting Europe into



antagonistic camps. F made alliance with Russia anyhow, which is technically open to agreement by G.

All British fears have been realized - treaty structure disappeared and opposing systems of alliances seem to be developing. Regional facts come to naught also. E policy in future will try to bring about agreement in west (either Locarno or 4-Power Pact) to avoid commitment in central Europe; to be inclined to accept R as a factor in any eastern combination, since they are so concerned with F seeing that they must be willing to help R as a factor in Europe, since F is too weak alone to keep whole east intact.

Of course, there are tendencies in other directions (i.e., against Bolshevism - or pro-Japan) but the above are the main lines.

Nov. 4

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

1. Trade between nations - obstacles to, and commercial policies of governments in regard to
2. Capital movements and debts
3. Raw materials
4. Monetary policies

1. Trade - obstacles in form of tariff. Control of foreign exchange by refusing money to importers. Devaluation to restrict imports. Quotas - quantitative restrictions - same effect as tariff but not tax - hence less <sup>retaliation</sup> desire for reciprocation. Tariff raises domestic price, and quota does same by limiting supply of import. Quotas allow country to know exact amount of supply coming in - which is helpful to producers in home country. This is method of planning, which England uses in agricultural field. Quota is inflexible system when market rises and there is increased demand which cannot be met because of quota.

\* Why are these obstacles put on imports?

Export surplus paid in gold or in credits. Fear that these bills will never be paid, causes Beard, for instance, to say that we should cut down the export surplus, for we are simply sending billies of goods which we get no money. Most European countries attempt to increase exports to get more gold, to build up credit abroad so they can import (particularly raw materials).



to strengthen currency. England can afford import surplus, paid for by shipping services and interest + dividends paid on British capital abroad. Countries (Germany) often subsidize exports to increase them - U.S., Gr. Brit., Fr. subsidize shipping. Hull increases exports by trade agreements. Preferential arrangements are made with countries in the most-favored-nation clause, and discrimination thus mitigated. Duties obviate the good effect of the above.

\* ① Thus, in general the conclusion is reached that it is harder to increase exports than to decrease imports, so the latter method is used.

② On the whole, reason for protective tariffs is for benefit of established home producers. Also protection of infant industries.

③ Another reason for reduction of imports is to develop and maintain a sense of national self-sufficiency.

Nov. 9

World trade still in direction of more restriction.  
 Tariffs<sup>in agricultural field</sup> due not only to economic reasons, but also to military considerations and social and political factors (lobbies of farmers, etc.) Contradiction here is that these countries are also industrial as well as agricultural - and, by tariffs, are cutting themselves off from markets.

Heavy industries are main proponents of high tariffs, because they desire protection of home industries. Each country has built up own heavy industries for military reasons - and thus have held on government, which must listen to them. After getting protection at home, the heavy industries form into international cartels and divide up remaining world markets.

Old industries, afraid of newer competition at lower prices, also seek protection. Industries producing substitute products, which couldn't exist when open to competition, are protected and subsidized by government.

Trade Agreements sought and signed all along, however. Multi-lateral treaties for reduction of tariffs. Danubian countries try to come to agreement. On the whole, it's been bilateral.

Monetary considerations affect world trade problems. Problem of getting enough foreign exchange to pay for



imports and for debts. According to orthodox economics,  
 in the long run two countries will balance off imports  
 and exports of each other, through change in price level,  
 flow of gold, increase of services, etc. Before war, this  
 equilibrium worked pretty well. Short term credit took  
 care of temporary discrepancies in balances. Since war,  
 particularly since 1931, this is no longer the case. In  
 1931 there was sudden withdrawal of funds from <sup>from Germany + Austria</sup> short term loans, which were all called in when  
 the crisis occurred. These countries would have to  
 increase exports or deflate price level in order to pay.  
 Internal debts increased by amount of decrease in price  
 level, and this causes trouble. Brüning got Germany  
 into crisis in 1932 by trying to ~~deflate~~ deflate price  
 level. Nazis in 1933 decided to stop this policy.  
 German exports didn't go up, but her imports did  
 not go down as they should have. German prices  
 were high and prices abroad were low. Instead  
 of deflating, Nazi party spent public sums on works  
 and armaments. Schacht tried to reduce debts and  
 cancel them, export balance didn't rise, imports didn't fall  
 because they needed materials for rearmament program,  
 money spent on this program - messy situation is obvious.

It was the drying up of the short-term credits which started this. Instead of getting new credits, they were forced to pay the old ones. They are short of capital, have no gold reserve, need more credits, but hard to say how they can get them unless they pay old debts. Vicious circle.

If country does not have export balance, then imports fall under regulation and restrictions. Central Banks get complete control over imports, since no importers can get foreign exchange except from it. Employment is affected - for if the raw materials do not come in, the factories are hit. If food does not come in, standard of living is hit.

Trying to stimulate exports is method to increase balance. If one protects by tariff the heavy industries, etc., <sup>however</sup> export costs go up - and this means less exports. Of course, govt can subsidize exports. Devaluation of currency will reduce cost in relation to competitors.

Foreign exchange and gold market have fixed prices between two currencies and both related to gold. Central Banks govern supply and demand of foreign exchange by cutting down credit and by



limiting supply of currency. This system broke down, as no country was willing to sacrifice itself to maintain equilibrium. England not willing to deflate price to increase exports. It was decided in 1931 to bring down the whole currency, which had the effect of making price lower in relation to other countries, so that exports will increase. British haven't fixed new rate of £, simply let it take care of itself.

When whole sterling bloc went down in 1933, European powers were under pressure, since their prices were 30% higher. By 1935 France had devalued down to the brink of ruin, and decided to leave this policy and set a new level. This turned out to be too high, however, and now the franc has no level. Italy, Switzerland, Holland, followed France. Thus gold bloc met Anglo-Saxon bloc. Germany refused to adopt this method of devaluation, for her exports are subsidized to such an extent that her prices are as low as if the currency were devalued. There are several type of marks - official mark is not devalued, but international mark is devalued. There is fear in Germany of inflation. This managed currency does not allow demand & supply to set the level, but set

it artificially. The Reichsbank distributes the available amount of foreign exchange to those able to pay higher price, or those who have a need, or those who are willing to accept a certain proportion, or by other criteria. This managed currency works. France says she would rather let the franc go down, rather than to manage it in this ~~new~~ high-handed manner.

AMERICAN JEWISH  
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"Can Europe Keep the Peace?" - Frank H. Simonds

When the French demand security, therefore, their demand envisages a final dissipation of the challenge which is instinct in German purpose and the danger inherent in Anglo-Saxon policy. The guarantees, which they seek, are for the system which they have established. As a result of the victory of 1918, through the influence of their military power, by the strength of their finance and by the ascendancy of their diplomacy at Geneva, they have position, power, everything except the voluntary submission of Germany, and the equally voluntary association with them of the Anglo-Saxon powers. And they believe, to obtain the latter, would be to insure the arrival of the former.

Such is the French theory and system of security.

Frank H. Simonds.

But the French are not stupid, and know from their own history how transitory are all systems of frontiers. In reality, their policy is not one of status quo, but of balance of power, and, as such, is the traditional French policy, which descends at least from the period of the Thirty Years War.

The Franco-Polish alliance is based on a clear mutuality of interest.

If Poland falls, the whole French system collapses. The Czechs will have no choice but to go to Berlin, the Anschluss will follow automatically.



F.H. Simonds

The nations of the Little Entente are, therefore, bound to France, not only by their common policy, which is the maintenance of the status quo in the Danubian area, created at the expense of both Hungary and Bulgaria, but also by their separate and special circumstances which similarly throw them into the French system. Thus, from the moment of its formation, the Little Entente has been a partner in French policy, as has Poland.

Like the Franco-Polish alliance, therefore, the partnership between the Little Entente and France is also based upon a mutuality of interests, and there is little to suggest the relation between satellite and superior. The position of France in Europe, and in the world, is dependent upon the support of her eastern allies. But even more unmistakable is the fact that the security of France is also conditioned upon this association. French profit from the combination is therefore incalculable, but French responsibilities and French policy are similarly regulated in no small measure by the purposes and perils of her associates.

Summings

All the contrasting genius of the two races is revealed in their prescriptions of peace. For France, the solution is an elaborate and rigid system of law sustained by force. For the British, the answer is found in a series of improvisations and adjustments, proceeding continuously and made possible by enduring common sense. The French insist that the British shall join with them in enforcing the law; the British seek to persuade the French to make compromises which shall render law enforcement unnecessary. In fact, the national policies of the two peoples are, at bottom, no more easily to be reconciled than the French and German.

Not liberty, not unity, not security, the objectives of all other peoples and the basic explanation of their national policies, is at stake in the Italian case, but only power.

Today the basis of Italian policy is opportunism, but in all Italian minds this is but a stage.



## Friends and Enemy

### FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The world of today is organized in accordance with the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the individual state, which doctrine bars the way to ready settlement of characteristic controversies by arbitration. There is a resort to force. Some states have and others have not. The Great Powers run the world.

Reasonable degree of peace with strong force

The key to the policy of a state must be sought in the position of its land (security), the extent and nature of its material resources (prosperity), and ethnic circumstances of its people (unity).

The status quo, since it rests upon existing treaties, constitutes the public international law of the world.

A decent measure of prosperity, a reasonable degree of security, and in addition a fair measure of ethnic unity, these things together constitute the irreducible minimum of an acceptable national existence and therefore the sole basis for a real association between nations to insure peace.

The principle of self-determination envisaged the substitution for the doctrine of the balance of power, which asserted the supreme right of Europe collectively to security, of a system by which the rights of the individual peoples were proclaimed to be absolute. (This became the battle-cry of Hitler in asking for the Anschluss)

AMERICAN JEWISH  
ARCHIVES  
GERMANY

1. Continued denial of the demand for equality in means of self-defense, therefore, inevitably seemed the expression of a deliberate purpose to keep the German people forever helpless politically by holding over their heads the continuing menace of invasion. On that issue, Germany, in the autumn of 1933, quit the League of Nations. At the end of 1934, Germany still found herself denied the right to security.

2. She was deprived of reserves of coal in Alsace-Lorraine; there was poverty in raw materials - she had only coal, potash and nitrate, with sharp competition in all three; monopoly in chemicals and machinery broken because other countries had gotten their own during war; foodstuffs (fat, coffee, tobacco) were lacking - and loss of colonies deprived her of tropical foods as well as market for products. There was some population as



S. &amp; E.

before the war and 30 thousand sq. miles less land.

In 1934 Germany was as little prosperous as she was secure, and, on both counts, her national policy was therefore dynamic.

3. Actually, therefore, in 1934 the question of ethnic unity for Germany came down to the issue of the 350,000 Germans living in the Danzig Free State. The 10 million Germans in the Austrian half of the Empire had not been German subjects before 1911, hence not separated by Versailles.

#### Objectives:

1. Security by the revision of the armament clauses of the Treaty was then the first objective.
2. Prosperity by "Berlin to Bagdad" and also by southward expansion toward Danubian agrarian region. An economic Mittel-Europa could be self-sufficient, prosperous unit.
3. Ethnic desire for Anschluss - also question of security would be solved if Pan-Germanism could be achieved.

Seem to  
be on road  
toward  
complete  
consummation  
May 17, 1938

S. & E.

"Reverie" had become the great cry in the popular appraisal of national policy. It was a psychological factor.

For, at the end of everything, to understand the national policy of a Great Power, it is necessary to see into the soul of its people. Deep in the German soul today is the corroding sense of wrongs remediable only by the force of German arms and constituting in themselves the enduring evidence of the relentless purpose of France and indeed of the whole world.



S. 4 B.

France

Has ethnic unity and economic prosperity. Wants only security - quest for which has shaped western European history since war. See definition of French security on page one.

Great Britain

Security - method was Peace + Balance of Power + Isolation  
 - present methods are League, Continental alliance, and rearmament

Prosperity - preservation of the ties of Empire

Unity - connected with above.

Italy

Security - land frontiers are safest of any Great Power in Europe. On sea, she is weaker than G.B. and hence must avoid war with latter. In air, her strength equal to French, but geographically weaker, since all her large cities open to raids.

Unity - no problem, no Italian incidents.

Prosperity - she is weakest Power economically. No raw materials.

S. + E.

Italian policy is opportunist. Proof:

stood with  
Ger. v. Fr.  
in matter  
of parity

In the matter of disarmament, Italy supported Germany against France, claiming for the Reich the right to parity with France, because were such equality to exist, the Italian army would retain the balance of power on the Continent. In the matter of naval establishments, Italy stood with Great Britain for a reduction of the French navy to limits which would satisfy the requirements of the Anglo-American agreement of London, because such reduction would insure Italian naval equality with France. Finally, in the case of the League of Nations, Italy stood with Germany against both France and Great Britain, because at the bottom of the League conception was the idea of stabilizing the world situation, and for Italy such stabilization involved the loss of its present position as a Great Power and its later prospect of eventual expansion. The very essence of Italian policy, then, is the prevention of the establishment of a system of ordered and permanent peace.

stood with  
Brit. v. Fr.  
in matter of  
naval equality

stood with Ger.  
v. Fr. & Brit.  
in matter of  
League



S. + E.

Italy has some measure of security, has no ethnic problem, solves her economic poverty somehow - Why then should she rebel against the status quo?

The answer to this question must be sought in the ideology of Fascism itself, which assumes that claims to things have their origin in force. The strong nation takes what it needs and keeps what it has taken - Britain did this and Italy soon expects to be strong enough to get away with it too.

Government 37

1937 - 1938

Examination November 9, 1937

In preparation for the test on the 9 November, the following readings are suggested:

Bailey, S. H.: The framework of international society

✓ Balla, Valentin de: The new balance of power in Europe  
pp 51-79, 130-176

Dawson, W. H.: Germany under the treaty pp 372-416

Langsam, W. C.: The world since 1914 pp 139-169, 204-239, 275-303, 344-414, 438-509

✓ Simonds, F. H.: Can Europe keep the peace? pp 125-245

✓ Simonds, F. H. and Emeny, Brooks: The great powers in world politics pp 127-136, 153-276

Williams, J. F.: International change and international peace pp 1-30

Wheeler-Bennett, J. W.: The pipe dream of peace

All these books are on Mr. Wolfers' Reserve.



Nov. 10

"Hot money" is being withdrawn from this country. Rumor has spread over Europe that dollar is going to be devalued. "Hot money" is reinvested funds, kept in banks in this country on call. When foreigners are afraid to keep their money in dollars, they withdraw it and put it in £. If they get afraid of the £, they put it in francs, etc. The reason money is put in foreign countries is to evade taxes. Why should there be fear of devalued dollar? Because of fact that Roosevelt might devalue to stimulate business, as he did in 1933. When this hot money is put into £, as now, the £ goes up, as it has in last 10 days - from 4.85 to 4.99. This is reason for rise of £.

Inflation is when the dollar is worth less in terms of domestic goods. Devaluation means the dollar is worth less in terms of gold, but maintains same value at home. Inflation is an increase in the volume of money. In inflation there is increase of imports and decrease of exports. There will be pressure for foreign exchange, and price of foreign exchange will rise. This results in devaluation. Devaluation, also, leads to inflation, because the government hopes that this will lead to an extended credit & volume of money. Deflation cuts down credit, volume of money, thus lowers prices and better the position on the international exchange.



In deflation, less and less credit is demanded since investment drops. Then there is call for government to spend money. That is happening in this country now.

England has import surplus. Worried about this, but it may indicate a new balance between price level in England and other countries. They think American price level is too low. There is flight of gold to England with which she can pay for her import surplus. ~~also~~ <sup>But</sup> she pays for imports with shipping - and there is competition with other countries. Again, her exports are not rising to meet her imports. Japan offers competition in textile, for instance. This is cause for worry.

France is worried about currency, which does not stay stable. She is in inflationary situation, with large credits and higher prices. This causes worry and currency leaves France. In last 10 days some of it is going back, with fear for it increasing in this country. France may profit by danger in this country. There is effort to foster exports and restrain imports. This is essential contradiction.

German problem is to get foreign exchange. They are deprived of imports they badly need. They must increase exports - classical method to achieve this



is deflation or devaluation. They refuse to do the latter, and can't do the former because government expenditures outruns income, and because they don't want to risk unemployment.

They think devaluation means inflation, so they avoid that. They can't decrease imports, because they are now down to the minimum of necessity. The only solution is to make the most tremendous effort to get new foreign markets - and they can do this in armaments, since they are producing a surplus in certain branches.

Shank Slocombe.

The most important thing to be realized concerning the Corridor is that, ethnographically as well as historically, it is really Polish.

Early in 1934 the policy of rapprochement between Germany (Danzig) and Poland led to a 10 year non aggression pact. Some said this was a break-away from France. Actually, it gave Poland prestige, since she had been relegated to a second rate position by the Allies, was not considered by them in conference - and now, with a pact of full equality, made exclusive of France, she regained diplomatic independence.

Poland was now an ally on equal terms with France, no longer a state merely being protected by France. Barthou went to Warsaw, was reassured that the German pact contained no secret hostile clauses, was purely a declaration of peace. Still it became obvious that Poland was growing stronger and was pursuing an individualistic and solitary foreign policy. The grateful partner of 1921 was replaced by a partner of more solid and more equal prestige and ambition.

The Pact lessened Polish-German tension, but increased Austro-Polish tension, because Austria felt that Poland has acquiesced to the Anschluss in return for the security of the Corridor.



2  
Lengyel

England protested to giving Danzig to Poland, for that would indirectly make France too strong. Also city was predominantly German and wished to remain so. Thus, it was made Free City under League with constitution approved by League.

Danzig doesn't have complete sovereignty. In foreign relations Poland claims she is part of their land, so far as foreign policy goes. Danzig opposes this - says Poland, entrusted with the "conduct" of Danzig's foreign relations, merely should execute orders passed on to it by Danzig Senate. League decided Danzig could sign Part of Paris, waiving Poland's claim that she did not even transmit the invitation to sign because Danzig had no right to sign.

There is friction on Port & Waterway Board (B Polish - 5 Danzig - 1 Swiss) and between two postal authorities: The railway situation in which Poland dominated <sup>(sending children to Polish schools)</sup> the service; Poland saw it not getting complete control, tries to force Danzig to knees. Polish - Danzig relations very poor. Although there is customs union with Poland and Poland bound by League to make full use of Danzig harbor, still she boycotts Danzig by building Odysia on Polish soil. Again, Danzig's agricultural products have no market in Poland.

Poland does not admit that her aim is to shut Danzig aside. Such an admission would strengthen the Free City's request to be returned to the Reich. Poland says she needs two ports. New railroad line built from Silesia to Odysia which avoids



avoids Danzig territory. France subsidized the new road, which <sup>also</sup> gave Czechoslovakia an outlet to the sea without touching Germany, and this increased the Franco-Polish alliance into a partnership.

Danzig took matter to League, which said Poland should make full use of Danzig, but did not have to grant her monopoly. Poland had no right to give preferential treatment to other ports, but still was bound to give Danzig a full share.

(Polonia) Danzig has made complete political as well as economic separation from Poland. Political parties and legislation follow Berlin's example.

### Constitution of Free City

#### A. Organization of the State

I. General (~~Popular Assembly~~)

II. Popular Assembly

III. Senate

IV. Legislation

V. Administration

VI. " of Justice

VII. Communal Organization

#### B. Fundamental Rights & Duties

I. Individuals

IV. Education & Schools

II. Public Servants

V. Economics

III. Religion & Religious Associations



Government 37

1937-1938

The Polish Corridor and Danzig

The following is the assignment on the Polish Corridor and Danzig for the Seminar on Wednesday the 17 November, 1937.

Read:

Temperley, H. W. V.: A History of the Peace Conference of Paris  
Vol. VI pp 233-265

Read also:

- ✓ Simonds, Frank: Can Europe keep the Peace? pp 55-69
- ✓ Slocombe, George: Crisis in Europe pp 112-129

or, instead of these two, read:

Lengyel, Emil: The Cauldron Boils pp 9-63

Read also:

- ✓ Lengyel, Emil: The Cauldron Boils pp 64-102

or Newman, E. W. P.: Britain and the Baltic pp 194-204

Read also:

- ✓ Treaty of Versailles Articles 100-108
- ✓ League of Nations Official Journal  
Vol. 7, special supplement 7; The English translation of the  
constitution of the Free City of Danzig

Optional reading:

- ✓ Machray, Robert: Poland, 1914-1931 esp. Chapters III and IV
- Martel, Rene: The Eastern Frontiers of Germany

All books will be found on Professor Wolfers' Reserve.

- ✓ Documents on International Affairs, 1933, p. 423-425.

Nov. 18

Nobody quite trusts a country which has friends on all sides

Up to 1924, it was Poland the ally of France.

There were military agreements - both countries willing to fight for the status quo. ① They agreed to consult each other, but both broke this.

② Economics. ③ Military aid to each other in case of aggression. ④ Again, consultation clause. This alliance largely directed against Germany. But Poles just as afraid of Russia, with whom she had had a war in 1920. Therefore Poland signed alliance with Rumania against attack from east only. This alliance does not apply to Hungary - only Russia. This means now that Russia can't get through to help Czech. This contradicted French desire, which wanted Russian assistance.

Shift in Polish attitude - She felt France might not support her in crisis (altho' France constantly reassured); also felt she was dependent to France, a protégé instead of a real sovereign power. Her size and internal consolidation made her feel that she was entitled to full position. Pilsudski was great unifying force - his armed forces keep country running and officer caste is ruling group in country. Same situation with Masaryk in Czechoslovakia. With this desire to be recognized as a Great Power, Poland was offended at being left out of Four Power Pact.

They decided to get free of one-sided ties with France by making alliance with Germany, altho' keeping the alliance with



France at the same time. This was in 1934. Also, Poland settled non-aggression pact with Russia, which defined aggression.

In 1934, at height of tension between Poland and Germany over Danzig and Corridor, with Poland feeling irritated and German reacting with nationalism. Poles might have issued ultimatum that Germany stop propaganda in Corridor. Or, Poland might have asked France to fight preventive war against Nazism and when France backed out, Poland got reason to believe France couldn't be relied on. At any rate, Hitler realized conflict with Poland was dangerous and when Poland was willing to make overtures, Germany was willing to make peace. They came to terms in 1934, with a ten-year agreement of peace.

Germany hadn't given up claims in Danzig, Corridor - Poland knows she isn't safe forever. But at least there is promise of non-aggression and consultation. France was amazed, and wondered what was behind Polish move.

Germany was terrified at her isolation, and secondly was afraid of Poland's starting trouble. For the first time, Germany had gained a friend, had broken up the ring around her. In return for this, Germany gave up claims, and these are weakened in course of ten years. Germany might considerably sacrifice to gain a friend, to weaken France.

Poles also made sacrifices - because they inevitably



weakened French feeling toward Poland. She could no longer depend on France with certainty. Also relations with Russia suffered, because Russia fears military agreement between Germany & Poland against her. In return for this, Poland has gained 10 years of consolidation. Also gained liberty of action which makes them increasing & to be taken into account as a Big Power. She can move from one country to another, to her own advantages, in a strong bargaining position. She flouts League decisions about Danzig, etc. She doesn't want anybody interfering in her affairs. She wants to remain neutral as long as possible, then join the stronger group at the last moment. Italy does this too - Poland & Italy may come closer together.

(Poland, in general, pretty evenly tied to both France and Germany.)

Poles feel that if they can keep Germans friendly, the German "Drang nach Osten" will not take the form of another partition of Poland. This situation causes unrest in Danubian countries, since only direction Germany could move would be southeast. Other countries would be willing to sacrifice Czech. to Germany. Poland, too, would like Ruthenian part of Czech, so that she could come close to contact with Hungary. Perhaps for this reason there is continued coolness between Poland & Czech.

ANTI-COMMUNIST PACT - Germany may try to bring Poland in as next signer. A new kind of union of many large powers - Holy Alliance again.



Reasons for Russian change of front to Germany:

1. Hitler philosophy
2. Mein Kampf
3. Polish-German agreement
4. German re-armament
5. Attitude toward Baltic
6. Desire for new ally - France.

There could be no alliance between France & Russia, because France did not want to antagonize Germany and also she was afraid that it would not meet British approval.

So there developed the idea, not of alliance, but of Eastern Locarno.

Advantage to France was that Russia was to join the Western Locarno and guarantee French security.

Advantage to Germany was guarantee of both Russia & France against aggressor. Germany did not trust this. No did she want Russian troops in the land.

This fell and "demilitarized" Eastern Security Pact proposed, which also fell.

Then France made bilateral treaty with Russia. This treaty was in accordance with principle of Locarno & League. Ideal military

plan is where countries could act in minutes. When matter is submitted to League it is weeks. Where, in between these two possibilities, does Pact provide for action?

R + F agree to take joint action to get Council recommendation at once. If no recommendation (within reasonable time - 24 hrs.?) then they act at once. If Council can't come to unanimous decision, they act at once. Thus, this alliance works under all circumstances. There is a chance for England to try to check conflict. Second check is that France will not help Russia if she risks sanctions against her by British. ~~Only differ~~

Only difference between F-R Pact and real alliance is that the military clauses are not quite perfectly automatic.



Slocum

In assuming the obligations towards Germany and Soviet Russia, contemplated under the eastern Locarno, France would practically discard her restricted guarantee to Poland in favour of a collective guarantee.

Poland objects - won't surrender her individual diplomacy with private pledges to a system of collective security. Germany objects - being suspicious that an eastern Locarno is an encirclement. But the fact that England approves of the plan invalidates that suspicion.

(Czechoslovakia, too, loses most favored position with France and becomes part of general system, but she doesn't object - she approves.)

France got England to approve on promise that it would be the initiation of a general disarmament movement. Poland objects to this - she has good army and wants to keep it. Reduction would hurt Polish pride as well as independence. Pilsudski distrusts Geneva and politicians - wants his army.



2.

## Survey of International Affairs <sup>1935</sup> Vol. I - Discussion of Eastern Locarno

France had idea of regional security in east, but gave it up to further more general security schemes - World Disarmament Conference, etc.

M. Barthou in 1934 gave up attempt to get Germany back into Conference, threw energies into system of defensive alliances against Germany, particularly in East.

Little Entente + Czechoslovakia attached to France, but trouble with Poland arose. She had signed no aggression pact with Germany, and France could not get satisfactory commitment about her future policy. Poland spent remained friendly to France, yet insisted on her independence of action.

France collaborated with <sup>Russian</sup> France on tripartite promises of protection in case any one is aggressor. British supported this eastern Locarno, as did Italians. Germany & Poland both cool - insisted they had own alliances. Baltic States agreed to support Pact.

Germany answered in negative - said they would consider nothing while they had inequality in armaments; also that there were no advantages to her of large collective pact while she had bilateral treaties. Poland answered essentially same way.

Laval decided to reopen the attempt and Litvinov & Czechs agreed. These three agreed to go through with treaties of mutual assistance even if Germany & Poland stayed out. Hitler refused again when approached, saying Third Reich could never guarantee military assistance to Communistic Russia. Germany offered Eastern Security Pact along line of



## Survey

Hellogg Pact, i.e. with military clauses excluded - simply promise of no war, etc. They declined even this, however, when Britain asked if other countries (not Germany) could make military clauses. ~~France~~ Russia was eager to conclude the Pact because she felt Germany was planning to expand in East. Russia willing to accept Pact without Germany, as was Czechoslovakia. Poland would not undertake armed conflict with either powerful neighbor.

Therefore Russia & Czech. willing to accept "demilitarized" Pact. if they could have mutual assistance between themselves, but Germany would not agree to this.

At ~~Stresa~~ Stresa Conference, Germany gotten to agree that there could be established Eastern System of Security with all nations offering non-aggression, consultation, etc, and some nations making supplementary assistance guarantees among themselves. Then Germany got sore about League's undermining of her paramountcy, so there arose fresh doubt about whether she'd collaborate.

France felt that German declaration at Stresa opened way for French-Russian agreement, which Pact of Mutual Assistance was concluded in May 2, 1935, and was within framework of Covenant. (See page - for text.) On 16th May similar Russo-Czechoslovak Pact concluded.

Germany objected that the Franco-Soviet Pact violated Locarno, because France claims the right to decide <sup>militarily</sup> in the event of a Russo-

Summary

German conflict, who is the aggressor, and by virtue of her own decision to take military action. France answered that the application of article 16 did not necessarily require a recommendation of the Council. Britain supported the French view, as did the Italian & Belgian governments.

~~The~~ Germany was no longer willing to discuss an Eastern Locarno, and when the French Chamber ratified Soviet Pact in Feb. 1936, Hitler answered by remilitarizing Rhineland - 7th March 1936.



Survey <sup>1935</sup> W.I. Franco-British Communiqué of 3rd Feb. 1935 and German reply.

France had concluded Pact with Italy in Jan. 1935 - wanted similar understanding with England. Obstacle were Britain's tenderness toward Third Reich and unsympathetic attitude toward French East European allies. France promised Russia that she would only give way to Germany in matter of armaments (for that was what the British were expected to press into the French) if Germany upheld Pact for peace in East. An air pact was proposed in the French-British conversation.

Belgium, Italy, France, England agreed to air pact. Russia & little Entente feared these countries were getting security for themselves while tacitly giving Germany a free hand in East. This was justified by Flandin's speech 5th Feb. saying that one point (i.e. - the air pact) must be concluded, if even before the other international agreements caught. But France soon gave up this attitude and placed the air pact in same footing as other projects because of the tenor of Germany's answer to communiqué of 3rd Feb.

Germany procrastinated about general agreements, but was most willing and anxious to conclude the air pact. This displeased France, who did not wish Germany to differentiate. Germany invited England alone to discussions in Berlin. This alarmed Russia as well as France, who also invited England to Moscow - and Poland followed suit with an invitation.

Documents <sup>1935</sup>  
Vol. I

Franco-British Communiqué 3rd Feb. 1935

England approved of Franco-Italian Pact and agreed to consult if the independence & integrity of Austria was threatened.

General settlement is desirable for peace. Mutual assistance in Eastern Europe and maintenance of Central Europe system in Franco-Italian Pact is to be desired.

Air pact.

German Reply - 14 Feb. 1935

Germany approves of plan and will examine it duly with desire for peace predominant. Only free agreement can lead to international settlement of armaments.

Germany welcomes air pact. Would like to consult with British on it - feel it can lead to greater confidence.

Russian Reply - 20 Feb. 1935

Russia feel only way to avoid danger is through reciprocal facts - complete disarmament impossible. Therefore approves plan. Still does not want no agreement (i.e. - air pact) to become predominant. All should be pursued equally.



Government 37

1937-1938

Eastern Locarno and the Franco-Soviet Pact

The following is the assignment for the seminar on Wednesday, November 24, 1937, on the Eastern Locarno and the Franco-Soviet Pact.

Survey of International Affairs 1935 Vol. 1

- pp 58-90 (Eastern Locarno discussed)
- pp 119-127 (Franco-British Conversations, Feb. 1935)
- pp 127-132 (German and Russian Reactions)

Documents on International Affairs 1935 Vol. 1

- pp 25- 27 (Communique on Franco-British Conversations)
- pp 35- 38 (Replies of Germany and Russia)
- pp 116-119 (Franco-Soviet Pact of May 2, 1935)  
(French Text)
- pp 252-253 (Outline of proposed Eastern Pact)

New York Times for May 4, 1935

- Franco-Soviet Pact of May 2, 1935 (English Text)  
p 4 - col. 3

Documents on International Affairs 1933

- pp 230-233 (Russian non-aggression pacts)

Slocome, G. E.: Crisis in Europe pp 190-202

All books will be found on Mr. Wolfers' reserve.

New York Times in Newspaper Room.

Kerensky's liberal democratic revolution in 1917 wished to maintain alliance and continue war. This led to his downfall. Lenin revolutionized army which started peace negotiations. He was brought to Russia by German General Staff to undermine Russian army & he did just that. Trotsky refused to capitulate at Brest-Litovsk because German terms were too harsh, but when Germans started to march again, Lenin went above Trotsky and surrendered.

Allies, scared at betrayal of Soviets, wished to reestablish an eastern front and intervened against Soviet, which intervention later turned to a fight against Bolshevism, with allied support of White Armies. This intervention failed when Whites were defeated.

War with Poland in 1920 over boundary resulted in defeat of Russia at Treaty of Riga. This was beginning of peace era for Russia, but she had no friends or allies. Then entered world affairs.

Played part in Lausanne Conference 1921. Conference of Genoa 1922, leading to Treaty of Rapallo, first rapprochement with Germany, which lasted till 1933. Hard to say how far intimacy went between two - certainly mutual military developments, with Germans training Russian troops and Russia offering training camp for Germans. Will German & Russian Armies return to friendship (not R. & G. governments - but general staffs)?

Obstacle to friendship with France was repudiation of many pre-Soviet debts to France. In general, communism separated Russia from Western Europe - also recognition of Soviet State was problem.



Confiscation of private property (oil) created tensions.

Foreign policy in east was attempt to revolutionize China.

In late 20's Russia became concerned over relations with rest of world, and wanted peace so that internal development could continue. They joined Disarmament Conference, proposed complete disarmament, signed non-aggression pact, defined aggression, etc.

In 1933 came definite threat in Hitler. Italy not antagonistic until just very recently (Rome Berlin axis). Germany main opponent, with Nazi ideology and program of expansion toward east. (Ukraine). This is open danger. Hitler talked of striking while Russia was as yet unconsolidated. Russia saw the need for help and began to distinguish between friend + unfriend capitalist countries, seeking alliances with friend over.

Three plans:

1. United-Revolution - a sort of world league of socialist republics. Propaganda for spread of world communism - with organized strikes, subsidies, army mutinies. Anti-imperialism to arouse Indians, Chinese, Negroes, etc. This policy has degenerated and

Third International separate from

Soviet Government, serves soviet interest of self.

2. Defense against potential invaders - main problem in last 4 years. Resulted in development of friendly relations & alliance with Western Powers, as well as entry into League. This implies a lessening of the World Revolution doctrine, increases idea of anti-fascist united front. Communists becoming more moderate as such - Communists in France are merely nationalist. Main interest is now fighting for state - interest in development of collectivism has decreased.

3. Imperialism - lies dormant since Russia is now on defence. No desire for conquest on west. Yet they do maintain claim to Straits - desire ports to south. This was Tsarist project also. It is economic necessity to have southern ports. In Asia, setting up of Soviet Republic in Outer Mongolia may lead them to old conflict with Japan. Much of what happens depends on how Stalin is doing. Is he still interested in socialization or is he leader of Great Power wishing more power? These are the alternative lines of defence for Russia.



## Class Notes

Russia coming on world market as exporter of goods. Other countries will soon feel competition.

There is doubt as to whether the standard of living has been levelled off. There is 20-fold difference from highest to lowest wage.

This is not so important internationally as fact that the Russian government has monopoly of foreign trade. Political considerations, then, may determine imports - may buy in expensive markets to increase friendship, etc. Dictatorial countries too can force industries to buy in certain places. They were willing to sell below cost to obtain foreign exchange to get primary machinery to start industrialization. This selling below cost, or "dumping", is also for political reasons. In Germany, too, the govt subsidizes the losses incurred by selling below cost.

They export raw materials and also machinery to those countries near them. Their producers goods are not capable of competing in western Europe, but go in Persia. Finished products, too - paper, matches, silk, & rayon.

Currency is controlled - an internal type and a fixed rate for foreign exchange.

This is similar to Germany.

Means of production not controlled by private individuals. Other things, such as interest, taxes, etc. are same as nationalized industries in other countries. They base expansion on demand (or purchasing power) just as other countries. Of course, they do produce some things (electric power on farms) and sell them at loss, but that is the unique communist idea, to give things to people.



"Our creed is fraternity of people. Various nationalities within Union allowed self-determination - no attempt made to assimilate. There should be similar situation in world. - free states cooperating. Hostility, nationalism, domination can have no part in Soviet foreign policy. "Chauvinist nationalism is an illness."

"Economic nationalism is a stranger to our country." Imperialism would destroy the features of socialism. The real aim of the Union, to build a new social order, does not require conquest.

Country has no desire for isolation, but desires to exchange advantage. (cultural, mechanical, etc.)

Growth in self reliance has increased peace policy. Strength has added weight to this policy. Union constantly sought and worked for peace, at Geneva, all over world. Union made no aggression pact with all neighbors, defied aggression. labored to stem rise of armaments, proposed complete disarmament.

Peace and collaboration are backbone of policy.



Simonds & Enemy

SIVET RUSSIA

Strategically, she is open on both east & west.

Raw materials - she has them, but they are not easily accessible.

Population - she can expand greatly. 3 million yearly.

Russia gave up doctrine of world revolution and entered negotiations with other countries.

Germany & Russia friends at Rapallo in 1922, but this caused wrath of world to fall on Germany. Stresemann decided to make up with France - joined Locarno - and ties between Ger. and Russ. loosened. No real, but drifting apart. When Hitler came, definite enmity. Ukraine marked for German expansion. Shift brought France & Russia together. Mutual advantage to both countries. (Russia & France both wanted peace, security, status quo).

1. World-Revolution
2. Period of friendship with victims of Capitalist World (i.e. Germany - even though she was also capitalist.)
3. Settlement with the "états limitrophes" - Poland, China in respect to Manchuria, etc. Got them all to sign Kellogg Pact and draft defining aggression.
4. Rapprochement with France, culminating in entry into league.  
 Started <sup>in 1932</sup> with discussion of commercial & trade negotiation, inspired by rise of Nazi cloud in Germany. First draft concluded 29 Nov. 1932, was Non-Aggression Treaty. Union had come to hot with France wanted her in as part of Eastern Security Scheme, <sup>France wanted her in as part of Eastern Security Scheme,</sup> and countries assured her of welcome entrance, although there was some struggle (Poland was jealous, Ireland abhorred persecution of Christians, Switzerland did not like repudiation of democracy.) Russia was assured of a permanent seat on the Council as befitting her status as a Great Power. She was admitted on basis of two-thirds majority.

Litvinov's speech of acceptance showed the motives of Russia in joining the league: ① the security of Russia was being imperilled; ② collective system was most effective defence; ③ salvation of the USSR should take precedence over the world-revolution.

Cynics say Russian entrance was only accessory to the renewal of the pre-war Franco-Russian alliance.



Tanem - Foreign Trade in U.S.S.R.

SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Aim of all economic activity is to increase efficiency and produce larger quantity of goods for use by producers.

There is planning in all basic branches of national economy and a coordinated plan for whole Union. There is not useless competition.

National planning is impossible in country where time is not to increase consumption by the masses but rather to increase private profit, which means decrease of wages and consequently for consumption (Contradiction here?)

There was period of industrialization, for Russia was agrarian. She can now produce own equipment, is increasingly independent.

Rising of standard of living will extend home market to practically limitless point.

Russian foreign trade is not for purpose of profit and increase of gold, but merely to get what she needs in way of equipment, etc. She pays her debts promptly. She does not compete for world market, since the home market is enough. She exports only to pay for what she imports. Thus no world conflict, but rather independence.

There is no limit to Soviet requirements, therefore there will be imports for long time, but nature of

imports will change. No longer import factories, but machine to make factories.

There is a monopoly of foreign trade. Exports & imports licensed by State. Planned trade is impossible without this control. Planning can determine exactly what is necessary to buy, what can be expected to pay for it, where is the best place to buy, etc. There is limit to import of consumer goods in favor of production goods.

Whole of foreign trade of Russia has been planned to meet requirements of construction.

Future of Soviet Foreign Trade will continue to be imports of foreign goods, since her demands keep increasing and she can not import. She will not pay the exorbitant prices asked when she first began to buy under First Five Year Plan, however. Thus, the increase of Russian imports depends on increased credit and the acceptance of exports to pay for this credit.



"Private property, except of the most personal kind, has ceased to exist as a social institution." "Private ownership and operation have either completely disappeared or are in the process of destruction." "As important economic categories, both rent and interest have disappeared."

Industry is run so that there will be a profit, but that is either put into another factory or distributed immediately instead of through the "natural laws". Rewards for efficiency in production are great, as are penalties for failure. A good manager can advance to position of great power. Material rewards may not seem great <sup>to us,</sup> but relative they are - for the Russian is not used to much luxury. No chance for graft - control of expenditure is in hands of Party and severe penalties are inflicted.

# Mantel - Eastern Frontiers of Germany

## UPPER SILESIA

Poland started armed agitation in 1919 which led to a general strike. Then Inter-Allied Commission took over control of area. The presence of French troops allowed free play to Polish propaganda - armed secret organizations were subsidized. Second outbreak, put down by the Germans. Korfanty defeated. Plebiscite returned German majority. In 1921 Korfanty formed a third insurrection, which triumphed even over Italian intervention. England protested over this seizure, but eventually the Allies conceded as Denmark had done. The Council recommended a division of the disputed industrial territory. There was a Mixed Commission appointed to govern and a Court of Arbitration to adjudicate.

Polish Minister, in 1928, answers German petitions and charges. He shows that the economic condition is better, almost double in some cases, than it was in 1922. Similarly, no evidence of social or cultural decline. Also, there could be no conflict of nationalities of the Volhynian were not constantly agitating.



Vondracek - Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia

BOUNDARY DISPUTES WITH POLAND

Both claimed Tesin (Teschen), which was divided in Nov. 1918. At the Peace Conference, the dispute was relegated to an Inter-Allied Commission - which recommended division, north to Czech and south to Poland. Czech claimed Duchy could not be split. They reached no decision between themselves by 5 Aug. 1919, so dispute went to Supreme Council, which was apparently moved by vital necessity to Czech of coal in Tesin. Fair plebiscite seemed impossible. Conflict came over matter of sending arms to Poland over Czech territory for use against Russia. Benes proclaimed neutrality. This did not improve relations between Poland and Czech.

Compelled to act, Benes agreed on 28 July 1920 to cede eastern part of Duchy together with most of city of Tesin except for railroad line + station in return for the Karwin (coal) area, the entire railway, and the western suburbs of Tesin. He had hard job convincing his parliament that he had <sup>gotten</sup> ~~done~~ the best bargain.

Government 37

1937-1938

Eastern Europe

The following is the assignment for the seminar on Wednesday, the 1<sup>st</sup> December, 1937 on political and economic problems of Eastern Europe.

Russian Foreign Policy

- |   |    |
|---|----|
| x Harper, Samuel N.: <u>The Soviet Union and World Problems</u> | 19 |
| pp 3 - 22   |    |
| x Simonds and Emeny: <u>The Great Powers in World Politics</u>  | 24 |
| pp 277 - 301  |    |
| x Survey of International Affairs 1934                          | 28 |
| pp 376 - 404  |    |

Soviet Economics and the Capitalist World

- |  |    |
|--|----|
| x Ianson, Iakov D.: <u>Foreign Trade in the U. S. S. R.</u>          | 29 |
| pp 9 - 36, 170 - 172   |    |
| x Hoover, Calvin B.: <u>The Economic Life of Soviet Russia</u>       | 12 |
| pp 1 - 12  |    |
| Connolly, Violet: <u>Soviet Trade from the Pacific to the Levant</u> | 7  |
| pp 118 - 125   |    |

Eastern European Politics

- |  |    |
|--|----|
| x Martel: <u>The Eastern Frontiers of Germany</u>                            | 27 |
| pp 77 - 104  |    |
| x Vondracek, Felix J.: <u>The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia 1918-1935</u> | 11 |
| pp 148 - 159   |    |
| x Slocombe, G. E.: <u>Crisis in Europe</u>                                   | 11 |
| pp 112 - 123   |    |
| x Harrison, E. J.: <u>Lithuania</u>  | 3  |
| pp 42 - 45   |    |

Optional selections:

- |   |              |
|---|--------------|
| Lengyel, Emil: <u>The Cauldron Boils</u>  | pp 123 - 147 |
| Benns, Frank L.: <u>Europe since 1914</u> | pp 497 - 516 |

The following books are recommended on the subject if you wish to carry your reading further:

Machray, Robert: Poland, 1914-1931

Dawson, William H.: Germany under the Treaty

Martel: The Eastern Frontiers of Germany

Harper, Samuel N.: The Soviet Union and World Problems



Jan 4

CENTRAL EUROPE - ORGANIZATION

Before war, most of region was Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was strong and yet weak because of so many different nationalities. Nationalist sentiment in 19th cent. started trouble. Could A-H Empire satisfy all these? Austrians and German and Hungarian were satisfied. Slavs were resentful group - some were satisfied (Czechs) but Czechs felt suppressed. Serbs had their own country to aspire to. Italians in Tyrol were irredentist. Thus several undermining influences, most of which were in Hungary.

During war, Empire held together better than expected. Some sabotage (Geddes) - War propaganda was against Germany more than Austria. Wood took up problem of minorities - Wilson called for autonomy of groups within Empire.

Versailles set up three victorious states in place of Empire - Czechoslovakia, <sup>Rumania</sup> Poland, and Yugoslavia. Each of these had problems of adjustment. These three were natural allies - and set up system of bilateral & tripartite alliances. This developed into Little Entente, a sort of confederation, with regular meetings, a directorial Council of their foreign ministers, and one representative in intl affairs. This Act General was supplemented in 1933 by a definitive pact promising to unify foreign policy. This is particularly significant today when there is threat of disintegration. Little Entente says there should be a Big Entente (England, France, Italy) and then control of Europe would be in hands of

these six.

Little Entente was strong because they had definite aim of maintaining status quo. It is their outstanding principle, their defined policy, in the region in which they are concerned. To be consistent they uphold status quo everywhere - this is reason for strong stand for sanctions in Ethiopian affair. They are completely against all <sup>(1)</sup>revisionism - which means they are commonly against holding down Hungary. They have encircled her and threatened morally. There are irredentist movements in Hungary toward all three of the Entente. The danger to the alliance is that one of them might come to terms with Hungary and break the ring. Secondly, they are united against <sup>(2)</sup>Habsburg monarchy, for royalist propaganda might be more effective than irredentist. There would be loyalty to a restored crown, and a threat would grow. Thirdly, they fear the <sup>(3)</sup>Anschluss - would not like to see Germany enter the Danube. Yet again there is one country which is wavering - Yugoslavia is not so concerned with German threat - does not think it would be bad.

There are positive factors uniting the three countries - economic cooperation (under unusual circumstances).

On the other side there are, of course, decentralizing factors. Each one has its separate problems.



which cannot be completely subordinated for the good of the Entente. For instance, Czechoslovakia finds it difficult to bring other two in line against Germany; while Rumania stands not so strongly supported against Russia; and Yugoslavia's problem is the Italian-Adriatic region which is far from Rumanian support. Thus the Entente, to survive, must force members to make continual concessions to each other. Enemy countries try to work on these conflicting interests so that the Entente shall not be strong in crisis. The Big Powers create disturbance continually.

Jan. 5

DISCUSSION NOTES

First Treaty was between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia - was one of mutual defense, alliance against Hungary, which was more feared than Austria. Also this treaty provided for consultation between these two (C. and Y.) before any agreements made with third powers. This eventually led to Little Entente. There came a similar treaty (April 1901) between Czechs & Rumania.

There was a 1922 Czech - Yugo. renewal which included economic cooperation and political & diplomatic support in foreign relations.

In 1933 there was a tripartite agreement signed in Geneva, known as the Pact of the Little Entente, which said that the three could be represented as one, providing for meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, unanimous consent in policies, etc. This was a Council arrangement with three meetings per year, each year one being in a different country, one being in Geneva at time of meeting of Assembly, and the third being optional.

Whole matter of unitary representation. No one can make treaty with third power without consent of other two. Czech - Russian treaty did not find favor in R & Y. but was consented to because they did not want to break up Entente.

Entente works closely with League because of maintenance of status quo, support of France, and general approval of the big victorious Powers.



Again League protected their regional security they were model League themselves.

Little Entente has created influence over France by creating fear that she will desert her for Germany, for instance, or that she will collapse and leave France unguarded in east. The rise of Germany, the rise of <sup>fascism</sup> nationalism, the fear that France would not come to assistance (because she could not get through Rhineland), the new Rome-Berlin axis now all make the Entente think of shifting loyalty to what might seem a stronger set of powers.

Jugoslavia must remain friendly to Italy in order to maintain Adriatic outlet. There is boundary problem of France, minority problem, and fear of Italian invasion through Albania. But there has been a temporary settling of conflicts. Croats might want to go back to any Habsburg restoration, which Italy is supporting unenthusiastically. There were also Rumanian minorities - but these minor.

Rumania's main problem is Hungarian irredentism, for large part of country was once Hungarian. Next is the Bessarabia dispute with Russia, which has ~~the~~ let the matter rest for awhile, altho' the annexation is pretty complete. Russia really has territorial claim and might do something about it. Dobruja with Bulgaria is also problem.



Czechoslovakia has biggest problems. Sudeten Germans are major threat. There have been press campaigns. There never was as much conflict, before Hitler, as existed between Germany and Poland, for instance, since C. really had no German territory. But now, with the emphasis on the racial question, the conflict is aggravated. Hitler has propagated for ethnic unity. Actually, he has only asked for the autonomy of the Sudeten Germans. This can always lead to annexation, however. Also, other minorities would begin to ask for autonomy. Germany wants C. to be sort of a confederation, like Switzerland, with various groups. Also, if C. concedes this constitutional ~~democratic~~ reform to an outside power she loses prestige. This really prevents her granting autonomy now. If she had done it earlier, when Germany was weak, then she might have been said to be doing it voluntarily. Some say that a non-aggression pact, such as Poland made, would have satisfied Germany, who would have sacrificed minority to gain general <sup>control</sup> friendship of whole country. Thus, German policy may not be to break up Cze. and other countries.



Jan. 6

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF DANUBE

Political interests assume precedence over economic interests.  
 The breaking up of A-H Empire was economically insane, but accomplished because of political reasons. Greatly increased tariff barriers lower standard of living.

The Empire depended on imports but had no exports - thus was a borrowing power. Remittances of their emigrants helped balance, tourist trade also helped. On the whole, things balanced off. Each successor state tried, with nationalist feeling, to stabilize its condition. Czech got some of best assets - bulk of Empire industry was there. Little Austria was very hard hit - with much too large a city (Vienna) to support and no industry. Other countries were the agrarian section of the Empire, but their ambition became to increase industry (for military reasons, due to expansive desires of banks, etc.) This ambition led to high protective tariffs against other states. Within little extent, there was conflict of interest. Each country wanted to be self-sufficient.

Problems - ① Budget - great expenditure in each new state for military purposes, new civil service, subsidizing new industries, general government assistance which is a semi-socialism. Difficult to balance budget - which groups to bear brunt of taxes? Social struggle between upper and lower classes. This problem arose every time a loan was to be floated, when the financiers wanted to be assured of



sufficient taxable potential. Thus many people in these countries blame international bankers. Again, military expenses are very high - 25-35%.

② Balance of payments - some could not import enough even to keep people alive. Austria is always in fringe-tariff problem, because no more remittances, tourist trade, etc. Only way to get imports was through international loans - but there was always difficulty of meeting loans. She has gotten along somehow, mainly by dropping currency, and today is in better position in foreign exchange than Germany. Tourist trade has picked up, industrialization has increased.

In all Danubian countries the balance of payments is taken care of by infl. loans. There has been much political motivation here - France feels it is good investment to keep the little Entente states bound to her through loans. Debt in 1932 for whole region was 5 billion dollars - which is tremendous for them. They are constantly depressed under their economic burden.

③ Trade policy - tariffs was the first resort for each country, but this was dangerous because each was hitting the other. Stuff could not go from one country to another. What group of Powers could remedy this? The successor States should concede to one another, lower tariffs.



5

There was opposition from industrialists in Hungary and agriculturists in Czech. who had grown under protection alone. Proposal for abolishing of tariffs in favor of free customs union opposed because these industries could not exist under free competition.

Poorer those countries get, more population increases (15% increase in last 20 years.) There is constant surplus of agricultural labor, since industry cannot absorb it. The size of land holdings is decreasing because more people need land. There has been agrarian reform in all countries, except Hungary which still has large, feudal holdings. Only remedy to take care of this surplus population is to increase efficiency of agriculture, which is still carried on in antiquated fashion. How can open flows compete with Canadian & Argentinian methods.

Thus it has been suggested that western European countries should give them preference over over-seas countries. But jealousies prevented this. Argentine and Turkey objected. Still Rumania & Jugoslavia have been turning more & more to Germany & Italy as natural customers. They have even been importing as much from Germany as they have exported. They have begun to feel that markets which Germany offers are more valuable than credits which

France offer, since latter must eventually be repaid.  
Thus Germany increases control on Danube.

Solutions are several - with free customs union the best. This does not relieve farmers, but still industrial union would ease them. All possible combinations of union were suggested & rejected. Bi-lateral treaties were next suggestions, with preferences being given only not broadcast. There were returns of tariff duties, etc. Clearing treaties are helpful, in which imports depend on how much Germany buys. No one can object to this because there is no mention of preference or most-favored-nation, yet the effect is very helpful to the succession countries.

Social problems - agrarian reform, what to do with large bureaucratic civil service

Austria & Hungary have begun to pay back debts, but are politically unstable. Czech. is fairly prosperous and has good political outlook - has been able to preserve democracy. Jugoslavia & Rumania are poorer, with depressed peasant population and poor lower middle class which is fascist.

No solution for economic problems has been offered without arousing opposition from some internal political group as well as external



Jan. 11

## AUSTRIA

Question of Austrian independence for which she is not fit economically. Vienna alone is big burden to bear. Secondly, people think in terms of large Empire, which she once was. Thus currents of political spirit are against independence. Italy would not want her to become independent and make alliance of her own - for she serves now as a buffer state between Germany. From German point of view, Austria cannot link up with anyone else (Danubian countries) because that means end of Anschluss and end of pan-Germanism.

Catholicism is playing part in Austria against Nazi influence. Also desire for Hapsburg restoration reacts against Germany. Then anti-Nazi parties work for union with Danubian countries. France supports this entrance of Austria into Danubian federation, for this minimizes Anschluss possibilities. There is, of course, solution of Austria as second Switzerland, a small independent neutrality.

To be such a country, Austria must be internally secure, economically stable, etc. She has a little better outlook in this latter regard, but there is much civil unrest, revolutionary & reactionary currents, etc. Thirdly, there is always the danger of external (German) interference. Thus, compared to Switz., for example, there are great differences.



Anschluss is biggest problem. In 1815 there was loose union. In 1848, under liberal influence, states trend together, but war between Prussia + Austria in 1866. In 1870 Prussia + southern Germany form Germany and leave Austria out. Bismarck wanted only strong domination of Prussia in new Empire and no room for Austria. Pan-Germans still hoped + agitated. Opposed to them, however, were the nationalist Austrians desiring to preserve monarchy. After war, Austrian Empire smashed and socialists worked with German Social Democrats for Anschluss. Versailles prohibited Anschluss. Many plebiscites indicate desire for Anschluss. By 1929 pressure for some kind of union (economic) alarmed France, and Briand's U.S. of Europe was hoped to avoid this. With European union, Austria would not want smaller German union. There was committee to investigate this European union, but in 1931 the depression was so bad that Austria signed customs union with Germany. This hurt Briand so much that he fought it to its death. France took a severe stand and England brought matter to World Court. Was customs union compatible with Austria's other obligations? She had promised in Geneva Protocol #1 not to undertake financial obligations which would threaten her independence. Court decided, 8-7, it was a violation. Austrians gave up plan even before Court decided.



because she needed world support after the failure of the Creditanstalt and could not get it if she persisted in union. This was a shameful defeat for Germany and was one of causes of strong nationalist feeling.

From 1931-33 Austria was under foreign domination because of finances, but with rise of Nazis in Germany, there came renewed propaganda for union, carried on now not by socialists + Catholics but by Nazis. Dollfuss's dictatorship tried to fight Nazis. He got joint declaration from Eng, France, Ital, and then made separate treaties with Mussolini (Rome Protocol). Hungary was in on this, hoping to get Italian support for revision. In next few months Dollfuss was murdered by Austrian Nazis. Successors of Dollfuss were not Nazis but his own followers, and also Mussolini massed in border so that Germany withdrew. In 1935 at Stresa Conference, Mussolini came to terms with France and it looked like Austria was further safe. But Ethiopia war threw Italy toward Germany, and it looked like Austria was to be sacrificed. But Germany withdrew again and has done nothing. Status quo is maintained on basis of Rome-Berlin axis for the present.

Jan. 18

# PEACEFUL CHANGE

Conference last year discussed above in preference to problem of collective security. Big issue in intl affairs. Two problems are mutually dependent. League cannot work for peaceful change, because big controlling nations want status quo. Outside of League there is negotiation, however. Best method to achieve change is elastic diplomacy.

Why should there be change? Conviction has grown that if there is no peaceful change there will be forceful change. England trying to find peaceful settlement over union of Ulster & Ireland. Thus there is lessening tension.

Have and Have-nots. Economic theory of peaceful change, with more equitable distribution of raw materials and population pressure and territory. On basis of pure reason these arguments do not hold - Manchuria did not provide outlet for Jap population; raw materials absent in many prosperous countries (Belgium, Holland). Thus on these bases of reason, the revisionist Powers have no claim. From the point of view of power & prestige, <sup>however,</sup> there is different story. Military and strategic factors and strong bargaining position with strong reputation all operate in this second point of view. But for these reasons, the status quo countries are even less willing to grant change. Much more dangerous to operate on these inational bases. Ethnic unity as an economic advantage to Hungary means nothing, but as military and nationalist advantage, they are important to her.



and she presses for them.

Strong pressure for change has caused many changes. Versailles abrogated, mandates changed, etc. - Dargy, armaments, reparations, conquests, etc. Seems change is strong feature in historical development. There is method of force, in which change is resisted, and the first accompli, in which change not resisted. Latter is better, if we wish to preserve peace. Still a negotiated change is better yet, since these facts set precedents and tempts nations to use that method. Eventually some fact will lead to war, as the practice grows. This country, by policy of non-recognition, refuses to recognize these facts, especial bloody ones (Ethiopia).

Peaceful change must be voluntary - every state is sovereign, no will law to compel country to give up rights or possessions, unless countries have agreed beforehand to allow a court to adjudicate. Main procedure is to get voluntary action. Countries use persuasion or compensation or pressure of third countries.

In between the above voluntary methods and the above forceful methods, there is the threat of force to get change. Germany uses this successfully. Diplomatic negotiation is the technique mostly used. Still this public negotiation presents problem of handling public opinion. Big conferences or league especially useless.

Very difficult also to find compensations today,

since there is no longer any African territory to bargain with and divide up.

Conciliation or mediation by a third power may lead to something if third power is willing to concede for sake of peace. England made gesture to Ethiopia (road to sea) if Eth. would concede to Italy. This is rare, however.

International conference becomes inevitable if many countries are involved. Hungary is told that she can get by negotiation what Germany took by unilateral action (i.e. - rearmament). The nations do not wish a Hungarian fait accompli. Four-Power Pact (return to Concert of Europe) is attempt to negotiate main issues, but Little Entente was afraid of this.

Method of article 18 of Covenant - giving country a legal right to bring before League any treaty which seemed dangerous to its peace or which might embroil it in the future. Treaties might be imposed after a war, etc, and which might be so pressing as to have seeds for another war. Thus, a country gets a chance to bring such a treaty up before the League and have it investigated. But the League has never used this article and the peace treaties have not be amended legally.



Jan. 19

DISCUSSION - STRATEGY

Three points in regard to defense:

1. Vulnerability - position of industries, frontier, etc. Chief cities of Czech within frontier of Germany.
2. Ability to mobilize industrial & military forces - must have cooperation of industry and availability of natural resources.
3. Military force itself - machines & men. Conflict between large & mobile forces. Armies becoming mechanized.

Danubian area only 2 coastlines - 3 landlocked. On Black Sea no ports because no industrial demand for them. Only Rumanian harbor in Constanta. The Dalmatian coast on the Adriatic is also on a closed sea - so Jugoslavia's strategic use of the sea depends on Italy, who would never let her use the sea in a war.

Mountains - Western tip of Czech is ringed by mountains & Bohemia itself is a high plateau. Carpathians protect her on north from Poland. Alps present problem in Austria. Rumania has Transylvanian mts. protecting her eastern part from an attack by the west. Passes thru mts. - Elbe pass is broad valley into Czech. Moravian Gate would allow enemy to cut Czech (stands between Sudetes & Carpathians).

Rivers - Danube, Elbe <sup>valley</sup> avenue for offense against Czech. Roads aren't very good in eastern Danube - somewhat all right in west. R.R. are important. Vienna center. Concentric rings around Budapest, Network in Czech. Not much in Yugo because fronts.

## Armaments

Aus - 25737, front militia, with voluntary forces

Army 35026

Czech 143415, air force 566 planes

Rum 144525, air force 840 (c. 100)

Jugo 116819, air force 552

Czech. could best stand long war, except for her geography

Hungary has coal to export

Austria has iron " " "

Czech. has both

## Treaties

Entente - binding 3 powers

~~Part of 33~~

France + Entente members - military alliances

R + P v. Russia

Rome Protocols



Jan. 20

# BALKANS

Pre-war Days - importance, strife here led to war. Many nationalisms caused discord. Great change brought by peace treaties - Turkey retained Constantinople, Serbia increased into Yugoslavia, Rumania increased, and Greece also gained, but driven from Asia Minor by Turks. Thus she was not completely satisfied, yet must stand for status quo.

Internal Balkan problem was relationship to Bulgaria, who was dissatisfied over failure to get Macedonia, over boundary with Rumania, over boundary with Turkey, with regard to being cut off from seas. These dissatisfactions caused neighbors to join against her. But Greece & Turkey were enemies; Greece & Yugoslavia were strained over question of Yugo. outlet to Aegean; Yugo. & Rum. were members of Entente and did not need further pact. These three things prevented cooperation against Bulgaria.

Late in 20's a movement for Balkan Union arose. Conferences for 4 years - Athens in 1930 - problems ① political reconciliation, boundaries, etc.; ② economic cooperation, organization of whole area in regard to credit agencies, tobacco purchases, tariffs, etc.; ③ communications, continuous R.R. lines & bridges; ④ Chamber of Commerce, for sports, travel, etc.; ⑤ intellectual cooperation; ⑥ non-aggression, etc.

There came a Pact of Agreement and Amity between arch-enemies Greece & Turkey, who were brought together by Italy and who then turned against Italy. Only treaty between previous



enemies which seemed to do any good. Amity reached on problem of population - removal of minorities back to home country.

In 1933 Balkans came to more action, as Hitler came to power and western Powers got tense. The consolidation of the Little Entente was feared - as possibly resulting in decreased interest of Yugo. & Rum. in the Balkans. In Feb. 1934, there came signing of Balkan Pact at Athens, very similar to Little Entente. This Pact was late because Bulgaria was no such threat as Hungary or Austria. And even when Pact was made they tried to get Bulgaria in on a friendly basis. They wanted to come to terms with her and make a strong Balkan unit. But they did not come to terms, and also they did not ask Albania to join. These two things left the Union weaker.

Bulgaria and  
Albania  
excluded

Pact gave mutual guarantees and assistance in the event of a necessity - no action except through joint agreement. Bulgaria protested that Pact was alliance, destroying conciliatory work of many conferences. Also in Greece, Venizelos felt Pact would embolden Greece in European wars. Gradually by interpretation the Pact got watered down, until now it means to apply only to Balkan countries and not war with outside Powers. Still as consultative Pact, it was all right.



In last few years there has been dissolution of strong union. Largely due to recovery of Germany and Rome-Berlin axis. Balkans did not want to be seen as opposed to the axis, they feared its strength. Yugo. had been much in danger of Italy and her ring of friends (Aus.-Hung.-Bul.). Of course, they had little Entente against them and Balkan Pact against Bul, but they weren't sure how far these would protect her if Italy were the enemy - so they tried to make peace with Bulgaria first. And have come to a great understanding. Also Yugo. turned to Italy and came to terms - so that her position was not so dangerous. Yugo. stands now in both camps, have maneuvered into position of being friends with everybody.


Rumania's Titulescu wanted collective security and indivisible peace - and his defeat in 1935 showed the change in trend. This has been leading up to present revolution. She began to move away from Ententes and strengthen her friendship with Poland.

Thus, the above two countries, both links of both Pacts, are both weakening the Ententes. Greece & Turkey now feel that they should withdraw into isolation. They regard themselves as Mediterranean - with no interest in Europe or Germany. If anything Greece could not be counted on against Germany, so much as possibly swinging over toward Germany. Turkey has

turned to the Near East and has does not consider herself in the status quo group. She even has economic ~~and~~ arrangements with Germany. Thus Turkey & Greece are almost similar to Yugo. & Rum. in being friendly to both sides and establishing a running, intermediary zone.

Thus, very little has come out of federating movements in Balkans, and, in contrary, even older groups like Little Entente are becoming dissolved. New combinations (anti-Communist group) are being formed. Old groups formed as confederations for preserving status quo and unilateral disarmament. This view now disappearing, for status quo becomes more difficult to preserve, and old groups are only war alliances or coalitions against enemy. But enemy is now becoming too strong to be kept down and these coalitions are breaking up.





## Czechoslovakian Treaties

- ✓ Italy, 1924, friendship, neutrality
- ✓ Poland, 1921, "
- ✓ Poland, 1925, arbitration
- ✓ Rumania, 1921, alliance
- ✓ Yugoslavia, 1928, "
- France, 1924, consultation, concerted action, conciliation
- ✓ Russia, 1933 (London Agreement)
- ✓ Little Entente, 1933 transformation into closer unit, <sup>permanent</sup> Little Entente Council
- ✓ Poland, 1925, commerce, arbitration
- Austria, 1926, conciliation, arbitration
- Germany, 1930, frontier, exchange of territory
- ✓ Russia, 1933, definition of aggression on Soviet basis, multipartite also for USSR, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Rumania

Poland 21, 25

Russia 33, 35 (M.A.)

Italy 24

Rumania, Yugoslavia, 21, 20 Little Entente 33

France, 24, 35 (M.A.)



Yech. objectives of foreign policy 1918-23

Desire to preserve diplomatic independence

Create a "Western orientation" and yet keep Pan-Slavism.

Maintain friendly relations with Great Powers.

Got on good terms with Germany right away.

Preferred French to Italian friendship.

Welcomed security offered by League.

Had trouble with Bolsheviks, but decided not to intervene further.

Wanted pan-Slavism.

## Slovakia.

Masaryk and Benes agitated for Czech liberation from the Empire - and worked in Paris to avoid arrest. They kept in touch with revolutionaries of Empire, etc. When Allied victory was assured in fall of 1918, they received a Declaration of Independence - and the Slovak National Council voted to join them - so a provisional assembly on Nov. 14 proclaimed the republic. Adopted a democratic parliamentary system constitution with separation of powers - modelled on U.S. & France. Constitutional court to decide validity of laws. 7-yr. pres.

Many parties arose and cabinets came to be based on coalition groupings.

Most pressing domestic problem was land reform. Large estates broken up and resold, which caused quarrel between government and Roman Catholic Church, because much land was church property, but public opinion was not sympathetic to Church. Bohemian Hussites were Protestants, of converted to Catholicism by Habsburg force. Also high Church office were in hands of Germans & Magyars, and schools were monarchist-clerical propaganda agencies. Republic secularized schools and opened new state schools. Quarrel with Church also over use of languages not Czech. and over redrawing diocesan borders to conform with state borders. Dispute ended when Church gave in, had frontiers changed, used native language, had officials take oath of allegiance to republic, had to allow state a voice in selection of bishops, took of Czech. citizens. State would continue to pay for and support Church.

In regard to minorities, Czech. signed treaties in 1919 and constitution provided in 1920, for equality to all, with special schools, religious



freedom, language, etc. Gradually Germans, biggest minority, even came to take part in government. Rise of Hitler caused complications, however.

Problem of Ruthenia, where natives resented Czech domination and finally got autonomous administration. Inroads also arose between Czechs and Slovaks - former more advanced, literate, liberal, less religious fanaticism. Slovaks said they had been promised autonomy. Gradually a reconciliation, with two Slovaks in cabinet in 1924, and finally administrative autonomy in 1929. Then strife revived over matter of Hungarian irredentism.

Czechs accuse Magyars & Slovaks of fomenting secession for ultimate purpose of joining Slovakia to Hungary. Controversy prevents complete unity.

Czech. fortunate economically, because she inherited 80% of industries and most of important railroads from defunct Empire. Also she is self-sufficient in foodstuffs. But population too small to absorb all manufactured goods, so exports must flourish. Enjoyed favorable balance of trade for 10 consecutive years. Establishes treaties wherever possible to keep peace & harmony with foreign countries, because she depends on them for livelihood.

Also desires peaceful relations because of exposed geographic position. Opposes Anschluss. Four lines of policy: ① support of League; ② support of peace treaties; ③ support of British and particularly French policies; ④ united action with Yugo. and Rumania in regard to Hungary. (Little Entente.)

Key to  
Policy

Germany - Europe since 1914

National Assembly consists of Chamber of Deputies, elected for six years, and Senate, elected for eight. Deputies can override Senate, can vote no confidence. President elected for seven years by National Assembly.

Land reform.

Brought in conflict with Church.

Minorities problems: Germans, Ruthenians, Slovaks.

G.D.H. Cole

Must join with other nations to protect her long, land-locked borders.

Little Entente was a close unit. Depends

Depends on Peace Treaties for her outlet to the sea - through Elbe, Oder, Danube and ports of Trieste, Fiume, Danzig.

Because she is industrial, she is interested in removing barriers in the way of external trade, but her agricultural element is large enough so that she does not want to sacrifice it, which she must do if she enters free trade agreements with industrial countries of central and eastern Europe. She has had to force way into world market through mass production & low wages; thus she cannot raise her standard of living.



Came

## II. Consolidation brings on problems.

1. Creation of administrative machinery and constitutional organization.

Only officials trained on hand were Gzechs - which led to abuses.

But as Slovaks trained <sup>their</sup> officials - the friction disappeared. Constitution was democratic, universal suffrage, etc. In regard to type of control, first govt was unitary state at expense of local self-govt - but reforms in 1925 made the 4 provinces integral administrative units under a central government.

2. Establishment of monetary + fiscal system.

Stabilization of currency brought on severe economic crisis, but budget eventually balanced. War expense + new capital outlays also contributed to deficit, but things all right now. Country put on gold currency 1920.

3. Formation of political groupings.

1918-26 National Coalition of five major Czechoslovak parties, with German, Magyar, and Communist parties in opposition. Many swings from right to left within Coalition. Because conservative parties (Clerical + Agrarian) came in in 1926, the voting came to take place on basis of economic class interest rather than national sentiment.

Continual swing of conservatives + socialists, etc. In 1929, there came a sudden return again to the all-party Coalition as above.

Through all this the country has made very noteworthy progress in social reform - land reform, shorter hours, social insurance, public health + education, protection of women + children in industry, etc.

#### 4. Reconciliation of racial minorities.

Magyar not discriminated - has land, good market for produce, etc.  
Same for Slovak, who has assumed new dignity. Ruthenia is also  
being developed along democratic lines, people being given advantages -  
and leaders of both Slovaks & Ruthens have alleged loyalty to the Republic.

Important element in this process of consolidation has been leadership  
of Masaryk and Benes.

#### II. Germany and Anschluss prospects.

Good understanding with Germany, started with the treaty of compulsory  
arbitration at Locarno in 1925, prevented by two things - economic  
problem in guise of commercial penetration policy of Germany and the  
Anschluss. Czech. opposed to Anschluss because of ① strategic reasons  
and ② fear of Bohemian secession.



Parwolsky

## I. Currency Stabilization and the National Bank.

The policy of a return to the pre-war crown parity was given up early in favor of a policy of stabilization at a lower gold value.

The Czechoslovak crown was stabilized at the end of 1922.

The stabilization of the currency was followed by a severe business depression, and over three years later, by the establishment of an independent bank of issue, a National Bank.

The currency was linked with gold, but was not placed on the gold basis.

## II. Progress Toward Budgetary Equilibrium

Total expenditures of the government exceeded revenues up to 1926.

Budgetary deficits have been responsible for the creation of a large govt debt.

Payments on govt debts and the cost of the military establishment are the largest single items of budgetary expenditures.

Taxation system is in process of reform. (Too complicated, and also too great a burden is on industry, and also with new [1928] provincial autonomy, they should pay more.)

Thus, currency stable for several years and National Bank has ample means for maintaining exchange rate.

### III. International Accounts

Between 1920-26, her exports have invariably exceeded her imports. Other service operations bring her a small net income.

But, interest + dividend payments on foreign investments and other foreign debts require large annual outlays.

In general, however, her trade and service income during years 1922-26 was more than sufficient to cover her payments on foreign indebtedness. Her income for 1922-26 was 6 million crowns.

### IV. Trade, Production + Banking

Primarily an importer of raw materials and an exporter of manufactured goods.

Her trade is with countries of western + northern Europe, rather than with Danubian states.

Total area under cultivation is still smaller, but the yield per unit is larger than before the war. She is very nearly self-sufficient in basic food-stuffs.

Her natural resources favor industrial development. Her industrial production is much greater than her domestic requirements. The difficulty of utilizing fully her whole industrial equipment is reflected in her problem of unemployment.

Cost of credit is high. Problem of capital accumulation is very pressing.



## II. Economic Policy

Problem of population renders it difficult to reduce industrial activities.

Growth of industries in Danubian countries represents a serious difficulty, also fact that Danubian countries are now world markets - necessity of reorganization of industrial system.

She began her independent existence with system of very rigorous trade restrictions. Now, in view of above difficulties, she faces a conflict in her customs tariff policy between need of protecting home market and stimulating exports. Has experienced great difficulties in negotiating commercial treaties with her neighbors, altho that has been her method to open up export markets.

She favors establishment among Danubian States of a regional preferential regime.



1937-1938

The following is the general assignment on the Danubian Area for the Examination on January 25, 1938:

Choose one of the Danubian countries and study from selected readings in the works listed below:

- a) the main events in post-war history of particular importance for that country;
- b) the foreign policy of that country as regards treaties, controversies, main objectives;
- c) that attitude of that country towards the future organization of Danubian politics and economics.

The current periodicals listed are suggestions for reading which will bring your picture up to date.

Books:

- Apponyi, Albert: Justice for Hungary  
 Armstrong, Hamilton Fish: The New Balkans  
 Armstrong, Hamilton Fish: Where the East Begins  
 Bethlen, Count: The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace  
 Caloyanni, M.A.: The Balkan Union (in Transactions of the Grotius Society, London - vol. XVIII pp 97-108)  
 ✓ Cole, G. D. H.: The Intelligent Man's Review of Europe Today pp 143-152, 179-208  
 Read Crane, John O.: The Little Entente  
 Gibbs, Philip: European Journey  
 King-Hall, Stephen: Our own times pp 189-220  
 ✓ Langsam, W. C.: The World since 1914 pp 414-458, 545-573  
 Machray, Robert: The Little Entente  
 Padelford, N. J.: Peace in the Balkans es  
 Read Pasvolosky, Leo: Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States  
 Seton-Watson, R. W.: Slovakia Then and Now  
 Seton-Watson, R. W.: Treaty Revision & Hungarian Frontiers  
 Simonds, Frank: Can Europe keep the Peace?  
 Slocombe, George: Crisis in Europe  
 Slosson, P. W.: The Problem of Austro-German Union  
 ✓ Vondracek, Felix, J.: The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia

Periodical articles, recent and current:

Austria

- Benedikt, E.: Austria and Czechoslovakia Contemporary Review 151:538-544. May 1937. RBR  
 Gedye, G.E.R.: The Austrian Pact and Italo-German Cooperation. Contemporary Review 150:280-290. Sep. 1936. RBR  
 Listowel, J.: Austrian Tangle Quarterly Review 269: 74-87 July 1937 PRR  
 Mousset, A.: Austria in Balance Living Age 353: 337-340 Dec. 1937. PRR  
 Redlich, Joseph: German Austria and Nazi Germany Foreign Affairs 15:179-186. Oct. 1936. RBR  
 Wiskemann, Elizabeth: Will Austria become German? Fortnightly Review 146:567-574. Nov. 1936. RBR



## Czechoslovakia

- /Benedikt, E.: Austria and Czechoslovakia Contemporary Review 151:538-544 May 1937 RBR  
/Benn, W.: Impressions of Central Europe Contemporary Review 151:129-136 Feb 1937 RBR  
/Davis, Elmer: Czechoslovakia: Bridge or Barricade? Harper's Monthly Magazine 175:84-93. June 1937. PRR & RBR  
Krofta, Kamil: Europe at the Crossroads International Conciliation No. 323:491-514 Oct. 1936 RBR  
Machray, Robert: Menace to Czechoslovakia Fortnightly Review 147:201-208 Feb. 1937 RBR  
Osusky, S.: Why Czechoslovakia? Foreign Affairs 15:455-471 April 1937 RBR  
Seton-Watson, R.W.: Czechoslovakia in its European Setting Slavonic Review 15:105-120 July 1936 RBR  
In addition there are documentary materials and articles available in Room 214, H.G.S.

## Hungary

- Beazley, R.: The Hungarian Question Contemporary Review 151:545-553 May 1937 RBR  
Benedikt, E.: New Tendencies in Hungary Contemporary Review 152:285-292 Nov. 1937 PRR  
Diplomaticus: Hungarian Quandary Fortnightly Review 148:90-97 July 1937 PRR  
International Conciliation No. 326 Jan. 1937 RBR

## Rumania

- Freund, R.: Russia-Rumania: a symbolic bridge Fortnightly Review 147:725-730 June 1936 RBR  
Rohan, K.A.: Rumania at the Crossroads Living Age 353:340-342 Dec. 1937 PRR  
Also consult newspapers December 1937-January 1938

## Yugoslavia

- Boyle, E.: Towards Balkan Unity: Bulgarian Yugoslav Pact Contemporary Review 151:404-409 Apr. 1937 RBR  
Sforza, C.: Italians and Yugoslavs Contemporary Review 150:319-326 Sept. 1937 RBR  
Sforza, C.: Italy and the Yugoslav Idea Foreign Affairs 16:323-338 Jan. 1938 PRR  
Wolfe, H.C.: Yugoslavia's Design for Democracy Current History 46:50-54 August 1937 RBR

## Danubian Area

- Auer, Paul de: The Problem of Danubian Cooperation, New Commonwealth Quarterly 3:37-56 June 1937 PRR  
Fisher, H.: Cross Currents in Danubian Europe Foreign Policy Reports 13:102-112 July 15, 1937 PRR  
Lengyel, Emile: Rainbow over the Danube Current History 47:48-53 Nov. 1937 PRR  
Melville, C. F.: Danger on the Danube Nineteenth Century and After 119:722-733 June 1936 RBR  
Seton-Watson, R.W.: Danger on the Danube Living Age 352:306-314 June 1937 RBR

All books are on the Reserve Shelf; periodicals are in either the Periodical Reading Room (PRR) or Reserved Book Room (RBR).

*Funny whether  
they can*



1937-1938

Make-Up Test 8 February 1938

- I The recent "cabinet crisis" in Germany has given currency to the reports that Germany will direct a more energetic foreign policy towards the States in the Danubian area.

As a member of the foreign office of one of the Danubian states, you are asked to draft a declaration of policy in this regard. In the draft must be included the following general subjects:

1. The main points in the post-war history of the relations of Germany with your country, and a brief picture of the relations of Germany with the other states of the area. Include in your survey any significant treaties and the political ties;
2. The effects which you believe the German move will have on the Danubian political situation;
3. A positive suggestion of policy for your country to counteract the German intentions or to profit by them.

Make the draft brief and to the point.

- II Second question as on original exam.



Government 37

1937-1938

Examination 25 January, 1938

- I Assume that there is a rumor current that France, in her negotiations with Germany, has promised to withdraw all support from the Danubian countries.

As a member of the Foreign Office of one of the Danubian States, you are asked to draft a declaration of policy in this regard. In the draft must be included the following general subjects:

1. The main points in the post-war history of the relations of France with your country, and a brief picture of the relations of France with the other states of the Area. Include in your survey the significant treaties and the political ties;
2. The effects which you believe the French move will have on the Danubian political situation;
3. A positive suggestion of policy for your country to counteract the French intentions or to profit by them.

Make the draft brief and to the point.

- II Answer two of the following questions:

- a. Why should your country favor or oppose a Danubian Federation? Consider an economic federation, or a political federation, or both.
- b. What methods are available for the solution of the minority problem in the Danubian area?
- c. Give a brief survey of the outstanding political and economic issues between your country and the Big Powers.



Jan. 27

# ITALY

England & Ital in similar geographic position in relation to Europe. This made them friends until interests clashed in Med. Two countries almost same in regard to pop. and land - and even in raw materials, England has superiority only in coal & iron. (This comparison does not include Empire, obvious.)

After their unification, Ital looked for colonies, and was shocked by French seizure of Tunisia. This was natural Italian outlet and seizure of it drove Ital into Triple Alliance. Also English seizure of Cyprus, etc., all led to Italian fear of encirclement. In whole colonial scramble Ital got least of Africa - only Libya, Eritrea, which last was very strange, and showed that she was taking what was left and whatever she could get, regardless of how unadvantageous these remote zones were. They were defeated in this drive on the Red Sea by the Ethiopians at Adowa. Recent war is culmination of this drive.

Concept of Ital is that Med. is natural Italian sea, and no other Power has right therein. In order to keep others out, they had to keep northern border strong. Before war they tied up in Triple Alliance to get Ger. & Aust. help against Fr & Eng. in the colonial struggle. On other hand, they were traditional European enemies of Austria. When war broke out they decided to stay out, and swung over to allies because they were promised satisfaction in colonies and in Europe. At end of war allies satisfied them in Europe at expense of Austria, but in colonial sphere it was different, because that would be



at expense of Fr + Eng. Even European claims not completely satisfied, because creation of new country (Yugoslavia) prevented control of Dalmatian Coast & Adriatic Sea. Also in the secret treaty, the city of Fiume was not claimed by Italy. Pres. Wilson refused to acknowledge secret treaties and Italy was humiliated & defeated, left Peace Conference before other issues <sup>(i.e. colonies)</sup> had been settled - so that no account was taken of Ital when colonies were distributed. All this started grievances in Italian mind.

Problems for Ital after war : ① presence of Yugoslavia which created friction, but eventually came to terms. ② made herself protector of Austria, which was unnatural, but independence of Austria prevented Big Power from settling there. ③ friendship with Switzerland provide further buffer state. ④ France - in 1935 seemed to have been found a basis of agreement. There is not only water conflict - Italy has territorial desires against France (Nice, Savoy, Corsica), but never pushed them. Yet main conflict is Med. One of points is status of Italians in Tunis - also presence of Italians in Spain and Morocco. In this connection, they have supported Germany against France, favored rearmament, etc. In Danube, too, they have tried to weaken Entente & France. Much activity in Jugoslavia.

What do they want in Med.? So to strengthen their hold as to meet the strength of Britain, so that whenever there is chance for

expansion, economic penetration, etc., they will have enough power to carry it through. In essence, they are striving toward equality with Britain. With new Empire in Red Sea, their interest shifts to East - and they control Adriatic and Aegean seas. This latter led to conflict with Turks + Greeks, but difference settled. Turkey + Greece now turning again against Italy and her position in Aegean is not strong. The Near East, as route to Italian possessions, is in hands of England + France, but Italy fosters friendship with Arabia and instigates bad feelings against F. + E. They set themselves up as protectors of Arabia, etc., friends of Muslim, etc. Whether this will result in alliance is indefinite, but they are succeeding in getting friendship of Arabian world.

Today, with Sp. Civil War, she has become interested again in west - really interested in Balkans - so that she has tremendous activity all over whole sea. But Britain controls the opening to the Med. after all. Does Italy seek to fight English? Maybe.



Feb. 1

# ETHIOPIAN WAR

This war was only a part of continual imperial process. 1918 did not stop all African negotiation and imperial designs. Italy simply a bit behind Fr. and Eng.

Italian expansion started at Asseb in Red Sea, was thwarted by France at Tunis. Real struggle began in 80's over Africa. Italians invited by England to participate and they capture Asawa. Menelik signed treaty with Italy in 1889<sup>(Ucciali)</sup>, with Italy receiving protectorate over Abyssinia, according to her interpretation. Aby. did not interpret this way and in '93 Menelik denounced treaty. Italy started war (without support of England or Alliance allies) and was defeated. This was tremendous humiliation - first defeat by a colonial country. Italy then out of picture and Fr. & Eng. get the lion's share. Menelik is now more or less under British supervision - Lake Tana, etc.

In 1906 Eng. invites Fr. & Ital to line out more definitely the interest zones. Ital included to wean her away from Triple Alliance. Three countries agree to abstain from internal control of Ethiopia, to respect boundaries, to preserve integrity, to act together in case of division, to remain confined each to his particular zone of interest. England given Tana, and France given central province and connection from A.A. to Tibuti

Italy given hinterland of Eritrea & Somaliland and connection between them running west of A.A. - this is virtually whole country.



Secret Treaty of London 1915 promised Italy compensation and a fair deal in colonies after war. In 1919 Ital actually got very little satisfaction. She offered to allow England opportunity for works on Lake Tana, which she assumed to be in her control from 1906 treaty. England refused this - as Italians backed France in bringing Abyssinia into league. This is allegedly because they both were afraid England would grab the country if they didn't protect it. Also this may have been effort to come to terms with France, etc.

After Ethiopia admitted, Ital took up again with England the discussions of 1919 and signed agreement with Eng. in 1925, in which Italian R.R. to west of A.A. (see above) was guaranteed by Britain in return for Italian permission to build dam on Tana. Selassie opposed all this - and played one Power off against another. England was willing to recognize an exclusive Italian economic interest and influence. Abyp. brought this matter before League and complained of threat to their integrity. France spoke over this division of Ethiopia where she had many interests herself.

In 1928 he signed Treaty of friendship and arbitration with Ethiopia, which was even more than getting her into league in 1923. This was effort to get by friendly conference what she couldn't get in concert with other Powers. Not much headway.

In 1935 there was Laval-Mussolini Agreement, where she tried by treaty to get influence in western Ethiopia. England



no longer objected to Italian penetration - so now the obstacle was France. This agreement was a bid for French approval, for actually she was given very little in return for concessions she made. She was given small Libyan territory, smaller Tunis territory, and 2,500 shares in A.A.-Tibesti railroad. In return France got such security that she was able to move two armies back from Africa to Rhineland. The real thing that Italy got was the tacit approval of France to proceed in Abyssinia.

At that time the "border" (50 mile inside) incident occurred at Ualul - and then came clear demands from Italy so that it was obvious war would follow. Things had been set since 1933 when De Bono was sent to Ethiopia to scout the territory. In 1935 De Bono declared himself ready. Mussolini may have hoped that great demonstration of power would awe Reges, but on other hand he may actually have wanted war to increase Italian military prestige and to educate army.

There couldn't be any "deal" because the Covenant was opposed to it. French not concerned with application of any but German problem to Covenant - but English public opinion was holding Covenant as something to be upheld. Thus Mussolini found himself suddenly with English opposition on his hands.

He had been fostering German strength - so that the

threat of Germany would keep F.T. Eng. busy. Still he could not help her become too strong. In 1935 he chose the right moment to strike, for Germany was not too strong to be stopped by Italy (as she was <sup>stopped</sup> in regard to Austria in 1934) - but she was still strong enough at that point to cause France to fear and to realize that she must keep Italy as an ally.

AMERICAN JEWISH  
ARCHIVES



זכר אלה יעקב וישראל



Feb. 8

LEAGUE ACTION IN ETHIOPIAN WAR

This war was great test and may determine future of league. Why were not league sanctions effective? Was there something particular in this situation, or is it just that sanctions are not any good? League did not take action in Manchuria, simply condemning Japan as aggressor. In Chaco War, league also drew up report which was accepted by Bolivia but not by Paraguay, which was an act of aggression - yet sanctions not really applied, simply embargo of arms against Paraguay.

League called in Dec. 1934 to act in Ethiopia. In Jan. they applied again under Art. 11. This was few days before Franco-Italian rapprochement, so Laval knew of the trouble. League postponed and new appeal under Art. 15 made in March (1935), for Italy had mobilized. Shortly after, Stresa Conference caused matter to be brought up in May, but again nothing done except discuss Walual incident and not whole story of Italo-Ethiopian relations. Finally in August Italy accepted arbitration on that incident but by that time bigger issues had appeared. Thus for months league efforts were on small issue, while actually the big issue was at stake. The whole reason for this was that Britain & France did not want to fight Italy.



But from beginning of year there had been discussion of his issue outside of League. Britain said only interest was Lake Tana. Why did Britain change face in June?

- ① Maybe they had hoped to settle matter by compromise - recognized by concessions the seriousness of the affair. But these were not accepted. ② Also change of govt in England due to realization of state of public opinion - Peace Ballot.

League became more active, set meeting for Sept. Meanwhile meeting in August of three powers did not get anywhere. Their concessions not enough. Came conflict between League conception of territorial integrity of Ethiopia and spirit of compromise between three powers for some sort of split - if League did not exist three powers would undoubtedly have come to terms and the war, if any, would have been short. If France & Britain thought purely in terms of League they would have fought Mussolini. As it was, nobody got anywhere.

Then League began to pursue contradictory policies - that of seeking compromise and at same time preparing for action. This existed up to Hoare-Laval Agreement. Committee set up to find compromise, as three Powers had done before, but refused, because they could not offer anything in conflict to Covenant - and that meant they could not offer anything.

Italian troops in Libya & Eritrea caused British



to get scared and sent whole fleet into Mediterranean. Thus Britain was out in lead of league. On 3 Oct. 1935, ~~the~~ Italy invaded and there was clear-cut aggression, so that league report included fact of aggression. Council approved. Then what? League should coordinate action of members who were bound by Covenant to act immediately. But this difficult, because nobody wanted to ~~act~~ <sup>act</sup> first. Co-ordinating committee was to decide what each nation was to do and each nation was to contribute. 51 out of 58 accepted Italy as aggressor. Switzerland, as neutral, did not participate. Five sanctions were: embargo on arms, on loans + credits, prohibition of importations from Italy, embargo on key raw materials (oil, steel, etc), help among applying nations if their trade suffered.

Compromise still sought. But France was too hesitant to apply strict sanctions - she did not want war, also doubt if all nations would stick in back of her, and also Germany was sitting on the fence waiting. Thus Britain willing to go as far as public opinion forced her - but Laval had been promised by Hoare that there would be no military sanctions. Also France did not want unfriendly relations with Italy - so both countries were more interested in compromise.

France + Britain persuaded league to allow

them to negotiate on outside. Difficult to compromise because Mussolini knew they did not want war, so he went almost as far as he wanted in his demands. Compromise got nowhere.

Hoare-Laval solution would have been good, if League had not been in existence. Ethiopia was to give up land, in <sup>(60,000 sq m)</sup> return for small corridor to sea thru Italian territory. Also Fr & GB were to attempt to secure Italian zone of influence over 160,000 sq m. in southern part with Italian company in control. This would have left Selassie in throne. This plan, probably acceptable to Ital, was defeated by public opinion in England, for this plan was complete defeat of League sanction. This plan was reason for the League - and Hoare was forced to resign.

After that, nothing accomplished - because nobody trusted anybody, League was lost. England accused, only denoting talks. Oil sanctions were proposed in Jan '36, but not much accomplished and when Germany marched into Rhineland few months later - France lost all interest in Ital, for she had new problem. Italian victory soon after.

Failure of sanction due to Fr & Eng. But compromise failed because of League. Both culpable.



Feb. 9

ROME-BERLIN AXIS

Negative elements: Italy's desertion from Triple Alliance  
Different attitudes toward Austria

Positive elements: Ideology, support of public

: Revisionist aims, altho Italy must defend herself against Austrian irredentism. Thus no support of general revision.

Dynastic, have-not powers, both want colonies.

Italo-German relations from Versailles to 1933.

- 1. Italy opposed Anschluss in 1931.
- + 2. Italy member of Locarno in 1925
- + 3. Italian friction with France.
- + 4. Italy supported Germany in reparations & disarmament.
- + 5. Both had friendly relations with Russia

Thus Italy did not remain strictly with Allies, but switched to intermediary position, more friction with France than Germany, except in question of Austrian independence.

After Hitler, came assassination of Dollfus in 1934 which was breach with Italian troops massed on border. Before that, Hitler had gone to Venice in 1933 - why? Nothing accomplished - but even misunderstanding between two men. What did Hitler hope to get? To find out just how far Mussolini would allow him to go in regard to Austria - also Germany was looking for friends, trying to get out of isolation.



He got answer - not to touch Austria. But this <sup>did</sup> not deter him from attempt to make Nazi coup in Austria. Dollfus put himself in protection of Italy, which <sup>was</sup> ~~then~~ clear anti-German on this issue. Austria became protectorate of Italy in 1934 practically - and after murder of Dollfus Italian troops were ready to fight.

Now necessity came to get someone to stand with her against Germany - and most obvious nation was France. There was attempt to settle differences and Laval came to agreement in <sup>Jan</sup> 1935. This so far-reaching, that France removed troops from Italian border. In Mar. 1935 Germans declared rearmament, because also at this time France preparing pact with Russia.

In April 35 Stresa Conference called to discuss German rearmament - and some say Ital was willing to undergo preventive war. This led to clear-cut alignment of Ital with France & England & ultimately Russia. This great Stresa Front <sup>France, England, Italy, Russia</sup> was Barthou's dream. Italy commissioned to study plan for collective action in regard to independence of Austria.

Between this time and July 36 there was complete <sup>later</sup> switch back to Germany, due mostly to Ethiopian war, and pressure of sanctions against her, and failure of France to recognize the Empire. This last was taken as main excuse for breaking off Laval Agreement of 35. Also Blum Front Populaire anti-fascist led to change of atmosphere. From then on the Spanish war increased tension.



All above time of reparation from England too - and Civil War even almost led to war in Mediterranean between Italy & England.

What did Germany do? abstained from sanctions, which was, practically, a help to Italy. Also her march into Rhineland helped Italy in '36 by diverting attention of Powers & League from Italy and more severe sanctions. Also fact that Germany moved to west meant that she was not going to take advantage in Austria of Italy's absence in Africa. From then on Italy trusted Germany, and dared to antagonize England. Again, fact that Italy was fighting in Africa lessened attention paid to German remilitarization. Thus both countries helped each other.

Then old antagonism based on German claims in Austria was settled when Germany agreed to give up claims. That is very easy way to settle trouble. She did same thing with Poland in regard to Corridor and England in regard to size of navy (sub). But these two were when she was weak. In 1936 she was strong and did not have to be self-denying. Yet reason is that she needed ally against French coalition and was willing to make sacrifice to get ally. In return for this Italy was willing to back German colonial claims. And now that Italy is Germany's friend it is harder for her to resist any gradual German penetration of Austria. Thus, the renouncing of claims in Austria may be only temporary on Germany's part.



Their cooperation has helped both of them in many ways. They have stood together in resisting any treaties which they did not want forced on them, they have increased bargaining power, they stand together in Spain. England is trying to buy one or another away from axis - which in itself is indication of power of axis. Whether England can break it up is doubtful. Also combined military power is strong factor. And their influence in Central Europe increases - so that gradually the countries are drifting toward one member of axis or other. Only Czechoslovakia remains. France can well fear prestige which axis has in Central Europe.



Feb. 10

## LEAGUE SANCTIONS

England hesitated long before deciding course in regard to sanctions. If Italy had understood from beginning that her war of conquest would be resisted, maybe it would have been different - but she was given to understand there would be no sanctions. From France, too, she did not expect stiff attitude. Thus, first value of sanctions, their threat, was not effectively applied.

When England changed her attitude, after breakdown of negotiations, she decided that something must be done to stop Italy. They sent their navy to Med. and secondly, took lead in application of sanctions. Thus, negotiations for compromise had to be within Covenant, British naval display not taken seriously, and thirdly sanctions were only limited. Three negative facts.

Also Franco-British relations were not the best.

There was Franco-Italian understanding early in 1935 and Cavallo's efforts tended toward maintaining this - thereby not helping England to stop Italy. Still a dogma of French policy is to keep England friendly. Conflict here. Secondly, France had constantly supported League, particularly as a coalition against a European aggressor - and now League was acting against their friend (Italy) instead of against its original object (Germany). Another conflict here.

England + France played with each other in not promising definite support to the vital issues of the other. France wanted English support against Germany (re-occupation of Rhineland), while



England wanted French support of English navy in Mediterranean (ports). Neither country got an unqualified answer from the other. This bickering did not lead to strong stand, but each country was afraid, so they finally got together on some basis of solidarity, but still with many conditions and qualifications. This was one of main reasons why they tried to compromise with Mussolini - i.e. that they were not in harmony between themselves.

England was quite willing to satisfy Italian appetite in Abyssinia by conceding as much land as their general staff thought Italy could conquer. Why didn't England become anti-sanctionist and continue attempting to compromise. They could always blame France for not supporting sanctions, too. Only explanation is attitude of British public opinion, which had been worked up for many years to point of belief in league and collective action. Imagine resentment of Britain when French let them down after their building up of league for years. People felt this was betrayal. Peace Ballot in England showed how opinion stood - they favored even military measures against aggressor, and this was even before <sup>(1934)</sup> Italy moved. When Italy moved, even more people swung around to sanctions. Eden believed in it, Hoare was willing to try it out, and thus policy of England shifted to demand application of sanctions. Also, there was election coming up, and Conservatives might have been out if they had not



listened to public opinion as shown in the Peace Ballot.

France could have chosen between complete break with England (which she could not afford to do) (especially in view of current British-German naval treaty) and, on other hand, avoiding war with Italy at all costs. France could not get into war with anyone except Germany, because then her enemies might become her allies (i.e. Germany might move with her against Italy as means of getting Austria & Danube.)

Sanctions are beautiful ideal if nations act in common. If nations don't act together, then there is much irritation and dangerous and possible friction. Sanctions is too big a machine, to act in best interests - and may not be able to be stopped once started. Still very few big nations have common interests at same time - and it is doubtful if sanctions will ever be organized in complete manner. World solidarity for so dangerous an event as war cannot be counted upon.

Feb. 15

# SPANISH CIVIL WAR

Although internal situation, has international implications. Is it ideological war, or is it really a war between Powers disguised behind this front. Both possibilities are important for other countries. Victory of social group in one country gives strength to similar groups in other countries. People who believe in some type of govt are really anxious to preserve solidarity of that type even in other countries. Also Sp. war shows how to gain victory without war, by allowing other countries to support factions. Japs introduced method of undeclared war, setting up of puppet govt, etc. Sp. war too may set precedent.

Can be no objectivity in civil war - every observer bound to be sympathetic to one side. But certain facts are stable. (1) Historical - Spain thru many revolutions, but essentially a fight against feudalism. Also fight against bourgeois - but why should there be this post-capitalist movement when industry isn't even developed. Only explanation is intensity of feeling between lower & upper classes, which is much greater than in western democracies, where most people have some hope for security. In 1923 monarchy turned into military dictatorship under de Rivera who wished to diminish social tension sincerely. He failed and monarchy called for election which returned a majority of republicanism. King gave up throne as result of vote - might be liberal or simply a concession. Republic under



Azana was in power 1931-33, with left wing powers, but with new election pendulum swung to right in '33. New govt stopped reform measures, not completely but slowed them down. Left arose again with Asturian and Catalan revolts in '34. In '36 new election brought back strong leftist United Front, so that legal govt in '36 was leftist coalition - no doubt q.t. On right were Catholics, Fascists, Monarchists, etc. On left was greater divergence, with less common ideology than on right. Various left groups are always in conflict. Big groups are labor, both agricultural & industrial, including socialists. The anarchists and communists had rise during war. Any compromise with right means left would have to be settled within itself and the issues in which they could agree would certainly not be numerous.

Regime was cracking, there was unrest, revolutionary movements, and right had precedent to operate with force.

Events of July '36 only speeded up the outbreak - in fact were said to force Rightists to start when yet unprepared.

On 12 July Fascists murdered leader of police, who next day murdered leader of right parties. <sup>Sovels</sup> Real revolt started 17 in Morocco. Revolutionary situation was obvious in two murders, when govt could not control and people did as they wished.

Right had most of army as well as officers.

Navy stayed loyal, but 1/10 of troops were in revolt. This allowed large immediate gains for loyalists had no armed resistance. Surprising they were not completely overthrown - but got support from vast popular organizations and worked civilians into army. Defeats at beginning also due to divergence of groups and little coordination. Again, regionalism in Spain caused sections to act independently, i.e. Catalonia, until recently, refused to join in Civil War of Spain, saying she was not concerned, being autonomous. But this federalism prevents extensive national reforms.

Rebels occupied so much territory that they began to be recognized by their friends. Franco got set up in Burgos with administrative set-up, etc. Still question about restriction of monarchy or totalitarian state or what - in event Franco captures whole land. There still exists in Barcelona the legal govt, having moved from Madrid to Valencia to Bar. Also exists Catalan govt.

At beginning control was in hands of most radical groups.

Caballero, socialist, held some control - anarchist activity - proletarian dictatorship in Catalonia. But no democracy anywhere - this only propaganda. Gradual moderation occurred. Govt drove out radical leaders - Caballero. Neguin and Prieto are liberal and republican, have whipped country into shape, stopped terror, created army. Communists are now now working for order and peace - which means opposing nationalization



and collectivization. Have they been taking ideas from Moscow & do they want peace internally so they can win and later go on with radical changes? Anyhow, Communists are way over on the right of the socialists now.

Country today in 2 parts, with each govt not radical in its type, but still mutually opposed. War seems to be at deadlock. Right advances have stopped.



Feb. 17

EFFECTS OF SPANISH WAR ON OTHER COUNTRIES

(Discussion of present Austrian and Central Europe situation.)

Reason that Italy had helped start revolution. This may not be true - but certainly had Italian support. The loyalists had Russian support. It looked like France was going to give tremendous assistance at beginning, but gradually decided non-intervention was necessary. This was backed by England, whose armaments were not ready anywhere. This move was very strange on French part, logically should have supported loyalists, but did not want to antagonize Italy. Fr. + Russia did not want to stop voluntary troops to Spain, so Italy + Ger. sent "volunteers" too. England afraid of this interference - but it is now balanced with about as many Italian troops as Russian raw materials.

① Ger. interests slight - some raw materials. Army opposed to expeditionary force being sent - so experts & planes were sent. No Ger. army. ② Fr. has some participation - slight, because of presence in France of rightist sympathizers. ③ Britain would like a neutral deadlock, but if one side must win, the conservatives would rather not have a loyalist victory. Business men have interests in Spain and would not want collectivism - also they would not like to see France have a Red neighbor for fear of the influence which might spread northward. Yet Britain cannot support fascists - this is her ambiguous position. ④ For Russia this was a test against facism. ⑤ For Italy



their interest is obvious to see Franco win, and they can expect concessions from him if he does win (Majorca).

How can England avoid territorial changes - and also how can she bring the war to an end which will not be extreme. Policy is to cultivate Italy. Best hope is to find compromise - to split Spain in two, etc. Would Italy withdraw troops from Spain? What has England got to offer in return: Recognition of Ethiopia, credits, settlement of some Med. problems - all of which could lead to Anglo-Italian agreements. All this was valid up to yesterday, but in face of Austrian Anschluss what will she do?



Feb. 22

NEAR EAST - TURKEY

Eastern Med. seat of all Big Powers, hence seat of conflict. Only pushed into background because other domains are more intense. Can't ignore importance of Near East - bound to become seat of conflict. S. B. has many vital interests and communication to India. With growing power of Soviet Russia, Straits become important commercially. More Italy is being pushed out of Dardanelles, more she tends toward Med. Also has foothold in Ethiopia which shifts her interest eastward. France has interest in Syria and there is always Germany in background, stretching influence down through Balkans.

All 19th cent. Ottoman Empire was main problem of Concert of Europe. This problem was the raison d'être for the Concert, as matter of fact. When it started to disintegrate, question was who should be heir. Main contender was Russia, whose claim to the control of the Straits as a necessary outlet, gave her position. Control was in hands of Turks - Turkey on both sides. For long time Russia was in struggle with England, later Germany over control. Russian attempts to strengthen influence in Balkans, weaken A-H Empire for purpose of control of Straits - this was no factor leading to war.

England refused to allow Russian control of Straits, since it was potential threat against British line in Med. During war England had to give in to Russia, for purpose of solidarity. Russia promised Constantinople - then after their revolution, Lenin made no demands. Turkey collapsed and driven out of Europe - repudiated Versailles and got a negotiated revised treaty of Montreux. This satisfactory to her, largely due to negotiated character of treaty.



Allies disagreed on division of Turkey - a clear-cut discussion between two main allies. England had been left several times before by France in case of resistance to Turkey, support of Greeks, etc. Hence discussion in 1919 not new.

Treaty of Lusame, preparatory to Montreux, gave back Adrianople and some European land around the city. Now how could the straits be kept open for free intercourse? Proposal to put it under international control - but instead they decided to demilitarize straits zone. Russia didn't like idea of freedom of passage for warships.

Turkey only country to get revised treaty. When Germany stepped into Rhineland Turkey set up claims too. She offered negotiation for revision - no fair accompli. Italy only country refusing to meet Turkey in negotiation - because Turkey was offering full assistance in sanctions. At Montreux in '36 the Turks raised the whole problem of Anglo-Russian relations by talking about passage of warships, not only demilitarization. At this time England was friendly to Russia, having sanctioned Franco-Russian alliance. Yet at conference they treated Russia as enemy on subject of warships. This is historical English attitude toward Russia - and may explain present situation in Conservative government.

Britain wanted reciprocity in passage of warships - if Russian Navy came out, British Navy should be allowed to go into Black Sea. But can England have equal interest in Black Sea that Russia legally has in Med.? Obviously not, unless

they intend to be hostile to Russia. also argument on how limitations on free passage should be worded. What if Turkey were neutral? Could people be allowed through? British capitulated to Russian demand that Black Sea be a Russian lake. She realized that she could not exchange everybody, since all powers at conference were on side of Russia.

Final arrangement was that Russian fleet got complete freedom to pass through and come out in Med. Fleet now not very large, but will be in future. Second, fleet is at disposal for use in Baltic. Straits are same to Russia as Panama Canal is to us. Third, if Turkey forms part of regional agreement, then Russian fleet can operate through Dardanelles against aggressor. The British could not concede completely, i.e. if Turkey were neutral there would be no passage, but did concede that if Turkey were involved, Russian and allied (French, Rumanian) fleets could move.

This was set up at Montreux - not very stable.

It presupposes an alliance of Turkey with Germany, against which the treaty was definitely aimed. No big powers were allowed to send any fleet into Black Sea more than 7/8 size of Russian fleet. Thus Black Sea is Russian retreat and also offensive base of operations. But whole control is in hands of Turkey, and countries are cultivating her friendship. Germany expected to make overtures to Turkey, since conquest of Ukraine would involve Black Sea as main base of operations.



Feb. 24

NEAR EAST - (CONT.) ARABIA

Two considerations - racial and religious - Muslim movement and Arabian nationalist movement - presents complications. Looked as if nationalism was more important - yet Mussolini propaganda, for instance, appeals to Islam also.

Rise of one nationalist leader - Idris Sand - leads to union of Arabic states. Hussein started this under British auspices during war - but he was defeated by Sand & died in exile in 1935. Sand came to terms with Feisal of Iraq, Yemen, Hejaz, gulf chiefs, and now controls large area. He was aggressive, the leader of the intolerant Wahabi sect, and conquered his neighbors, got tremendous authority. Yet his peace treaties were moderate and conciliatory - left no bitterness - reason being that they were all Muslims, so religious tie was important here. Even their attitude toward "third powers" is one of peaceful settlement rather than sanctionist. Also promise to help each other in any internal trouble (revolution, minorities, etc.) In actual practice they have settled many disputes peacefully - particularly border disputes, which were indefinite after collapse of Ottoman Empire.

Apart from England, France is established in Syria, which Arabs regarded as their own. France forced to acknowledge an independent Syrian state, after much fighting and bloodshed. Struggle now is Arab-British over Palestine & Transjordan.

Iraq, Syria, Palestine were A mandates, with understanding this was only transitory situation, capable of change.



into independent countries. Question for England has been whether she can retain enough military control in new independency to protect her life-line over sea and land. This is decisive factor in determining British attitude. In Egypt, they retain troops, in Iraq, an air force. This is embarrassing to independent government. Other problem is economic - oil interests - pipe-line from Mosul to Haifa (Egy.) and Lebanon (Fr.). Major interest to protect pipes, but terrific problem in war to patrol whole line. Iraq gets royalties from oil companies.

In Iraq, Syria, and Egypt independence achieved by certain method. Mandate Commission recommends that state is able to live up to sovereign obligations - minorities, borders, claims with mandate power, etc. Then mandate power makes treaty with country - and country promises League to fulfill obligations. Never know whether they will keep promises (Assyrian massacre right after Syrian independence) (Trouble in Iraq + Egypt altho' promise to keep law + order.) Also must make alliance with mandate power, promise friendship, consultation, concerted action, location of British garrisons, financial agreements. Also League is always present to decide problems which become difficult, especially in future. (20 yrs. <sup>time of independence</sup> from now)



March 1

# PALESTINE

Typical case of growing nationalism causing mandatory Powers to grant greater independence or have incipient revolt in its hands. In Iraq and ~~to~~ Egypt, England was forced to grant independence. Force is not good technique - negotiations better in regard to mandated territories. Royal Commissions usually investigate and make reports containing suggestions for action. There is attempt, in granting independence, to settle internal structure so that self-government will be successful. In India, England says she must stay until Indian constitutional govt gets operating on a sound basis. Egyptian govt does not seem to be able to control people. In August 1936, England-Egypt came to final settlement which now stands: Military occupation ends, but troops can control Suez; alliance is established in military matters; equal control of Sudan; no Egyptian guarantee of British interests, no capitulations, England must look out for them herself; British franchise on airbases and air routes; settlement of problems by reference to Council of League.

Friction in Palestine between Eng. and Arabs mediated by Iraq. Arabs say Eng. promised Jews the land - Eng. denies this. Balfour Declaration 1917 - national home, but no prejudice against Arabs. Zionists, orthodox, religious concept - Revisionists wish Jewish national state. Arabs little organized and had no self-govt in beginning. Gradually got their Moslem institutions. Jewish population rose to half million - unable to maintain quota when Jews came in terror.



from Germany. Much influx of Jewish capital and rise of industrialization. Arab population rose too, so ratio remained constant. Still question of future majority worries Arabs and there is great resistance to further immigration. Disorders as early in 1929 of Arab attacks on Jews. From 1933 Arab revolt has attacked British as well. In general strike of 1936, troops were necessary because of great fighting and murders. In 1937 there were deportations of Arab leaders.

A Royal Commission was appointed and declared that mandate was impossible, because self-govt (which meant Arab rule) and Jewish national state could not operate compatibly. Eng. would have to govern the country. Therefore, they suggested dividing country into 3 units. Jewish state to be completely independent. Arab portion to be linked to Transjordan. Britain would retain small territory - containing Jerusalem and port of Jaffa. Still Haifa + ~~Port~~ Jerusalem would remain under British control and the very small Jewish state would be split by corridor. Very complicated & almost unworkable.



■ - Jews  
 ■ - Arabs  
 ■ - British

British govt accepted report, League has agreed to think about it. Jews, after much pressure & negotiation, accepted idea of partition, but questioned boundaries, which could, of course, be changed. The area will result in economic strangulation and lack of mass absorption of Jews from central Europe. But they do accept idea. Arabs reject completely - saying Jewish state would still contain Arabs 50%. What to do?



## MEDITERRANEAN

1. Canal opened 1869. Britain worried about Russian advance - offered France free hand in Tunis in return for support. France ceded in 1881, for prestige not for strategic value of Tunis.
2. French-British rivalry started in 1882, caused Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 between England & Italy, supported by Bismarck, to preserve status quo in med. & prevent French expansion in North Africa.
3. This Agreement answered by Franco-Russian Alliance of 1891-93.
4. This Alliance led to panic in England, answered by "Spencer building plan" supplementing Naval Defence Act of 1889.
5. But when storm broke at Fashoda in 1898, Russia was diverted in Far East and France had internal turmoil over Dreyfus case. France climbed down.  
(Achilles)
6. Britain got promise of no fortifications on Moroccan coast and neutrality of Tangiers, so Straits and Gibraltar were secure. Got Portugal to refuse to grant Germany port in the Madeiras & Azores, and guaranteed to protect Canaries & Balearics from Germany.
7. Britain aggravated by Italian seizure of Tripoli and base at Tobruk, but more serious was occupation in 1912 of Dodecanese Is. Dangerous strategic spot. General fear about Italy giving naval base over to Germany.
8. French & English tried to get Italy at least to guarantee the present status quo, to prevent her from coming more under sway of Austria & Germany. But this never consummated. Britain wanted islands evacuated and given to neutral Greece, but Italy procrastinated until Britain complained. This drove Italy into arms of Alliance.



9. In Nov. 1912 Germany formed a Med. squadron. France got offer of Spanish support in 1913.
10. When war declared, Spain & Italy neutral, latter because of public dislike for traditional enemy Austria, and certainly because of unpreparedness. This ruined plans for attack on French transports from Algeria. Still Alliance was stronger in battleships.
11. Thus Allies eager to bring in Italy, and in secret Treaty of London even offered her full sovereignty in Dodecanese. This swung balance, and Allied fleet supreme.
12. Mussolini's rise to power brought policy of "more nostro". But he could do nothing standing alone, so Spanish support and possible Spanish secret promises for Italian use of Balearics, caused France to keep bulk of fleet in Med.
13. Today Med. is much more important to Eng. and France because of Near East, oil, troop movements, airways and airbases, etc.
14. Question of strategic defence different now, with airplane.
15. In Ethiopian crisis Britain unprepared and in spring of 1936 many suggested sealing up Med. at both ends and using Cape route instead. Yet this is last resort.
16. Britain building big navy again and not worried in year or so about Italy. But problem of bases. Malta within striking range of Italy (only 20 miles from Sicily). Thus Cyprus being exploited - factor of Famagusta, and promising air base, to protect Haifa, Alexandria, counterbalance Italian position in Dodecanese.
17. Diplomatically, England keeps friendship of Greece, and particularly Turkey.



Also Turkey on good terms with Arabia, so Ibn Saud may be brought under British aegis, to present solid Turkish-Arabian front against Italy in Near East.

15. Anglo-Italian accord of 2 Jan. 1937 assumed mutual interests to be not inconsistent with each other and promised free movement for both. Yet this is negated by Italian policy in Spain and also Italian support of anti-British Muslims.

19. Possibility of Fascist success in Spain with Italy in Balearics and Germany in Canaries presents new problems. Probably not be actual territorial seizures but complete freedom to use the islands as bases, which for airplane & submarine warfare in Med. would be invaluable.

20. Drinachi got Cyprus at the Berlin Congress of 1878, called it "the key of Western Asia."

B.H. Liddell Hart - "When so many heavily armed powers are confined in so narrow a place (the Mediterranean), all with their bases interwoven, and that space is being continually narrowed by the growth of modern weapons, to start a war there would be like shutting up a bunch of mad cats in a cage. The picture, and the uncertainty of any calculations, might deter even the most war-like statesmen."

Government 37

1937-1938

The following is the suggested reading list on the Mediterranean area for the examination on March 3, 1938.

Please note that only a few outstanding titles are given in each case. Use these as a start and read as much more on the subject as you are able.

The examination will be designed to test your knowledge in one of the following five fields. The books mentioned under General are recommended for all.

It is also suggested that the reading for the subject be begun early, as no time extensions will be allowed.

General

- Newbigin, Marion I.: Southern Europe  
Newman, E. W. P.: The Mediterranean and its Problems  
Slocombe, George: The Dangerous Sea

Political Development in the Near East

- Belloc, Hilaire: The Battleground: Syria and Palestine  
Ireland, Philip W.: Iraq  
Main, Ernest: Palestine at the Crossroads  
Main, Ernest: Iraq from Mandate to Independence  
Royal Institute of International Affairs: Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1936

Mandates and the Colonial Question

- Clark, Grover: A Place in the Sun  
The Colonial Problem (A Chatham House Study Report)  
Macaulay, Neil: Mandates: reasons, results, remedies  
Main, Ernest: Iraq from Mandate to Independence  
Royal Institute of International Affairs: Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1936  
Wright, Quincy: Mandates under the League of Nations

Geography and Strategy of the Mediterranean

- Bowman, Isaiah: The New World  
Cole, David.: Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence (R Government 36)  
Newbigin, Marion I.: Southern Europe  
Wilson, Sir Arnold T.: The Suez Canal, Its Past, Present, and Future  
Hoskins, H. L.: The Suez Canal in Time of War in Foreign Affairs October 1935  
Howard, H. N.: The Straits after the Montreux Conference in Foreign Affairs October 1936



Langer, William L.: Tribulations of Empire! the Mediterranean Problem in Foreign Affairs, July 1937  
 Liddel Hart, B. H.: The Strategic Future of the Mediterranean in Yale Review, Winter 1937.

The Conquest of Ethiopia and its International Repercussions  
 Martelli, George: Italy Against the World  
Survey of International Affairs 1935 Vol. I  
 Villari, Luigi: The Expansion of Italy  
 also valuable periodical material

The Spanish Civil War and Its International Repercussions  
The British Year Book of International Law 1937 Article on  
 Spanish Civil War.

A bibliography of other material on this subject will be made available later on request.



March 8

FAR EAST - RISE OF JAPAN

War of 1894-5, defeat of China, who recognized independence of Korea, ceded Port Arthur, and Liaotung Peninsula. This is first move toward entrance into Manchuria. Russia, France & Germany forced Japan to realize these fruits because they did not want new large imperial rival. This was bitter blow to Japan.

Three years later Russia got lease of territory which was denied to Japan (i.e. Port & Peninsula). America then started policy of Open Door, to prevent Russian & European expansion in China. Boxer rebellion put China even more at mercy of foreign Powers, who put troops in Peking & Tientsin. Rivalry between Russia & Japan boiled up, led to war in 1904-5, fought on Chinese soil, Manchuria. Russia defeated - U.S. as mediator. Japan reacquired leaseholds above - and gradually the two countries came to terms through several secret treaties and divided interest zones in Manchuria - north to Russia, south to Japan.

England (for European reasons) swung over to Japan. Could not find European ally to suppress Russia, so found sympathy in Japan. Thus, latter is suddenly tremendously strengthened. Now war on that strength - annexed Korea in 1910 - had strong allied position in war. She began to take advantage of that position. In 1915 Japan made 21 Demands, which Chinese had to accept - got important rights in South Manchurian Railway. Another opportunity



to establish herself militarily and economically on Chinese soil. Thus many "incidents" can occur. Then Japan calls in more troops to protect her position against terrorists, etc., and influence spreads. Confusion of sovereignty leads to friction.

World War ends with Japan victorious - thus position of Big Powers awkward - did not want strong Japan, did not want to give her German land in Far East. Japan almost left Versailles Conference. Alignment of dissatisfied Powers (Italy, Japan, Germany) already seen at Versailles. Japan got Shantung temporarily, must return it to China.

Washington Conference to put checks on Japan; give back Shantung, give up alliance with England, sign Nine-Power Pact of Open Door, accept 5.5:3 ratio of navy. In return she gets promise of no new U.S. fortifications in Pacific, no naval race, position of being consulted by Big Powers which recognizes her prestige, etc. This seemed to satisfy her at time due to rise of liberal forces of country and rise of foreign trade.

In China the Kuomintang Government in Nanking in 1927 solidifies country. Up to that time, there was continued peaceful penetration, with no guns. After that date, militarist powers in Japan get stronger, and about for expansion. In 1931 Japan conquest, establishment of puppet regime, rapid development of aggressiveness. Leave League, Russian conflict, pan-Asiatic factor, etc.



What leads Japan to this aggressiveness? Military and geographic factors to be discussed later. (Presence of big power on mainland right across from her, and lack of ability to expand elsewhere, etc. makes her want to round out her frontier.) But what about population pressure? Only three courses for Japan: birth control, emigration, or conquest of new land. Pop. rising 1 million per year - about 70 million in Japan proper. Have no hope of emigration - settled only 1/4 million in Manchukuo since 1931 - can settle only 5 million in next 20 years. Most Chinese emigration into Man. - 35 million. With preponderance of Chinese, can be no large settlement of Japanese there.

Only solution for Japan is industrialization - this was solution for European countries, and it is what Japan is doing now. Yet has absolutely no raw materials - less than Italy and Germany. No cotton, insignificant coal, no oil, small iron, even insufficient food. People say they should buy by exporting. Yet in Malaya, Jap. goods kept out because England protects own industries. She has made large inroads in some markets, but largest export, textiles, met by tariffs, etc. Main markets are U.S. for silk and Asia for cotton (?) Not getting much from Manchukuo, but rather putting capital in. Still there is gradual trend toward Man. becoming the biggest market. She gets some raw material and



Good and in return supplies the rapidly growing cities there with industrial products. Also, she smuggled goods into North China. Now <sup>(1938)</sup> she has possibility of getting favored position in North China.

Her push southward from Man. into North China is for two reasons - military, for prevention of Russian expansion and influence <sup>into China</sup>; and economic, for control of market in rich Yangtze region. Not definite whether she will remain so far south as Shanghai and Hankow. Her main economic expansion will be in five northern provinces - she wants this to be cotton-growing region - and to get coal + iron in Chahar.

These are rational plans. Yet are they as strong as the irrational plans to enter into competition with the Big Powers, and assert herself as Big also, so they can have prestige, for no other reason than its own sake. Also glorious expansionist programs ease domestic pressure, for they serve as outlet.

March 10

# STRATEGIC PACIFIC GEOGRAPHY

Islands claimed mostly in 18th-19th cent. Vital history dates from around world war or before.

1. Islands - several groups, Hawaiian, Carolines, Marshalls, Bonin, Samsan. Most are of volcanic origin. Strategic center is U.S. (Haw.)
2. Eastern Pacific - defensive strategy plan to protect U.S. has three sections.
  - a.) Coast defenses - not very good harbors, 1100 miles.
  - b.) Secondary line - from Aleutians along coast to Panama - 800 miles
  - c.) ~~Def~~ Third - outer triangle from Aleutians to Midway I. to Panama. The lines are 1, 2, 3 in reverse order.
3. Western Pacific - many nations. A. a.) Japan - dominant b.) Russia - negligible navy, but air base at Vladivostok is threat. c.) Gr. Brit. - trade position.
  - d.) France - oil at Indo-China. e.) Netherlands - East Indies, minor naval power, dependent on Eng. f.) U.S. would be glad to release Philippines in order to get out of western area. Has granted independence in 10 years. Guam and Wake are strategic.
  - B.) Defense lines of Japan - a.) Inner line from Tokyo & Yokohama down to Formosa & Hong Kong. b.) Second line runs out <sup>eastward</sup> in curve through islands, mandated, which have good bases.

## Possible Conflict

- A. Strength - U.S. superior in tonnage, yet Japanese ships are newer, less obsolete. Whether this will balance off is questionable.
- B. Bases - Guam sunk because of treaty of 1922 preventing fortification. On coastline, San Diego, San Pedro, Puget Sound, San Fran.; in center Pearl Harbor is stronger even than Singapore; base at canal zone is ~~key~~;



line from Pearl thru Midway thru Wake is very important, as air bases as well. Dutch Harbor in Aleutians vital - none but ~~common~~ military ships there. Guam (obtained after Sp.-Am. war) is right in second circle of Jap. defense. Very important - yet defenses are nil because of treaty. Jap. forces could seize it immediately. Pago Pago is reconitioning base.

Japan has advantage in conflict in western Pacific because her bases there are within easy cruising distance and U.S. has question of defense of far-flung islands. In war her trade could be cut off by Japan. Japan would seize Guam & Phillip at outbreak. U.S. would be on defensive.

Hard to regain Guam - also operating 4000 miles from Pearl Harbor is difficult. Such attack doomed to failure. Second alternative would be to approach from Pago Pago (south) to avoid flanking movement from Marshalls.

This practically impossible. Third alternative is to come down from Aleutians to Bethapovlovsk and then due south to Japanese islands.

This is shorter route than others. This also is vulnerable point of Japanese defense.



April 12

U.S. in Far East

Precedent plays large role in diplomacy. This dogma is important, because Secy of State usually knows nothing of diplomacy, and relies on experts. Far East especially is remote from our ken, and the precedent maintained by small group of experts controls policy. This dogma indicates value of studying historical background.

1842 - Carney negotiated with governor of Canton and started Open Door - which means equal commercial opportunity by way of most-favored-nation arrangement. Formal treaty in 1844.

Perry's visit to Japan in 1853 led to some development with Japan. Both there were commercial, not political policies.

Simple  
commercial  
policy 1842-50

Up to 1898, we avoided all political crises and entanglements. This was because we were simply unable - not because we were ethical about it. We were small, debt nation.

Competitors in Far East were Fr, Eng, Ger, Russia, who took balance of power between them. They were able to extract from China - we said we would use persuasion and kindness, upholding territorial integrity of China. Thus we got through concessions what Europe fought for.

1894 renunciation of extra-territorial rights in which U.S. took lead.

This was consistent commercial, detached, unpolitical policy up to 1898. In that year, Sp-Amer war, 3 men decided to use



that excuse to penetrate Far East. T.R., Cabot Lodge, and Capt. Mahan. Latter wanted us to have big navy and lots of naval bases to compete with England. T.R. was assis. secy of Navy and put these ideas into practice. He wanted to grab Philippines, and Dewey. Took Manila, but then what - lack of constructive reasoning. Taking of Phill really had no connection with our Far Eastern policy - simply a manifestation of the Mahan thesis. After we got the Phill. they began to see the strategic position and the papers pumped up enthusiasm for this key to the ~~east~~<sup>east</sup>. Yet 8 years later, T.R. wanted to give them up because they are vulnerable, espec. when Japan became great naval power. Also off the commercial lanes.

The 4 European countries were competing - England started looking for allies, got Japan in 1902, started whole series of pre-war alliances. England tried to get us, but was refused. Hay, ambassador to London, was worked on. He wrote Open Door notes of 1899, repeating only commercial items of Carney treaty. No imperialism. Then Boxer rebellion gave Europe opportunity to push further into China. This worried Hay, who saw us being shut out. Wrote second series of Notes, asking for preservation of territorial integrity. This was moral commitment in 1900, although we were not legally bound to protect integrity. This was now a political development, no longer a simple commercial status. We have defended her integrity by peaceful means - not by force.

Around 1903, Russia was big menace in China, and we objected to her advance with sermons. In 1904, Japan was favorite in war, but her overwhelming defeat caused us to get scared and start warning Japan not to expand. Why did we not use Phill. to fight for China's integrity? Because it was not our basic interest - we simply had to defend Phill. once we had them. Didn't want to spend money defending islands, so we came to understanding with Japan over Phill. by recognizing their conquest of Korea. In 1908 another treaty Root-Takahira. Third agreement was Lansing-Ishii, essentially of same nature.

From day that impetuous, impatient plan got us into Phill., we have had trouble with contradictory policies. By antagonizing <sup>China</sup> invading or integrity, we have antagonised possible attacker of Phill.



April 13

The political policy of preserving the territorial integrity of China was ~~an~~ a means to the end of preserving the Open Door. Roosevelt retracted on this to protect the Philippines. His successor, Taft, revived this policy by getting a banking consortium to lend China money to protect herself. This was failure because banks could not float the loans - American public not interested in China. Far East is least important sphere of American investments abroad. Japan then kept on her economic expansion in Manchuria, tried to break into China itself. But Japan is not equal to Europe in economic strength and thus the Open Door meant inequality for her. In 1913 Wilson took us out of the banking consortium partly because he felt it was no good, mostly because the bankers insisted on it.

In 1914 Japan got her opportunity when Europe was in a war. She took Gorman islands, penetrated Shantung while other countries were occupied with the war. In 1917 she made secret treaty with England to recognize each other's possessions. In 1915 China was forced to accept Japan's "21 demands". Since 1912 China had been in civil war. This aided Japan. The secret treaty of 1917, which recognized Japan's conquest, was opposed by Wilson. He even tried a new consortium to get the territories back to China and force Japan out. In the Siberian expedition, our troops were sent to prevent Japan from

grabbing off any territory, Russian or Chinese, during the Russian Revolution and its subsequent confusion.

The Harding Administration of 1920 started thinking in terms of disarmament. In London they were thinking the same way, especially in regard to naval strength, since there was the threat of the new American and Japanese strength. Adolph Ochs was chosen to start negotiations by London. There existed the Anglo-Japanese alliance in which they were committed to each other. Also England had violated China by taking Tibet in 1904 (Young-Husband). America wanted England to give up that alliance when it came up for renewal in 1921, but at an Imperial Conference in 1920, all the Dominions were for a renewal except Canada. The reason was that the alliance might conceivably put England on the other side of a war with us, which would have made Canada the No-Man's Land. Canada prevailed and England decided to give up alliance. Yet they had to find something to mollify the Japanese. They figured to pacify her in the coming naval conference, which they proposed to the U.S. should be preceded by a conference on Far Eastern affairs. Japan was an unwilling member of this conference, because she knew what the real meaning was. We kept refusing to have a Far Eastern conference because Hughes felt arms limitations was primary. Balfour then tried to find a quick substitute for the alliance.



Balfour tried to get us in an alliance, a tripartite affair, but we refused. Hughes suggested 1.) that they agree to respect each other's insular possessions in Pacific 2.) that they consult in case of any trouble. This was a Four-Power Pact, and had the same policy of guarantee and consultation as was the traditional old commercial policy of this country. This came in Dec. 1921 and Japan has never violated it. Then they talked about non-fortification of the area around the Philippines and Japanese islands, and <sup>Japan</sup> agreed to accept the S.S.3 ratio on the basis of this non-fortification. This was the same policy that prompted T. Roosevelt to call the Philippines the Achilles' Heel of the U.S. and never fortify it. The ratio became the basis of the Five-Power Treaty of 1922.

The Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 agreed to respect Chinese integrity. Nobody was going to defend the territory against anyone who wanted to violate it - thus, we were not obliged to fight Japan if she invaded. This was not a collective security pact, rather a self-denying ordinance.

The above three treaties amount to a recognition of the status quo in the Far East and an attempt to maintain this status quo. The potential hidden role of this arrangement was that any attempt to maintain such a status quo as the Chinese was doomed to failure, because of the many conflicts inherent.



April 19

## U.S. Foreign Policy

Inclination on part of America to lay down definite principles - not like Opportunist England. Strength of democracy may be reason for this - executive cannot supersede principles; his hands tied.

Contradictions in regard to isolation v. entanglement. White House would prefer latter - Senate + public opinion favor former.

① Washington called for intimate commercial relations with Europe, but no political relations. This was regional policy. Today some doubt whether commercial relations are not dangerous, because they lead to friction and wars. This is so because governments today back their economic interests. Roosevelt + Hull want to open up trade agreements, but isolationists want us to be self-sufficient.

② Political non-entanglement - this is traditional policy. People doubt whether this can be justified today - relations too complex. Anyhow, is U.S. actually pursuing this policy? No alliances, not even in local war - we were Associated Power not allied. Yet active policy in Far East. We stay outside the rivalries of Europe, do not throw our weight into the balance of power - yet we take part in European policies in Far East, thus really affecting European powers in Europe. (By supporting Russia in Far East, we aid her position in Europe, etc.) Still European countries can't base their policies on expected action of U.S. In general, there has not been strict non-entanglement, for we took part in disarmament conference, for instance. We disregarded the political aspect of shifting the balance of power by reducing the French army, yet such




a thing is hard to disregard, because it is so obvious a political question, and we cannot forget the power relationships involved. In reparation, too, we tried to stand above political issues, simply making it a business matter. Yet there was element that with concessions and plans (Dawes, Young, etc.) Germany was getting stronger. Thus, our statesmen talk in abstract terms in order not to take sides, so we can preserve non-entanglement.

③ Policy of Moral Leadership - desire to get world to become democratic, give up use of force, etc. To do this, we either conquer world or get others to help. Immediately, there are entanglements, then.

④ Policy of Morroe Doctrine - U.S. interested in all Americas, insists on no foreign domination there. Doesn't involve us in Europe, but makes us sensitive to European nations and shifts in balance which might affect S.A. Thus policy of non-entanglement becomes more difficult to maintain. Good Neighbor policy is to get S.A. out of mood of resentment against us, because we certainly cannot <sup>afford</sup> enemies down there.

⑤ Far Eastern Policy - (see Guinold above.) Japan set up in 1934 their own Morroe Doctrine for East Asia. They say they have the commission to take care of things over there - don't want interference. Japan took job of awakening China, and has done so vigorously. This may be blunder for Japanese, since they have antagonized China - how can they get on good terms with her? Hard enough for us to break down resentment of S.A. and we have never invaded them - certainly harder for Japan to be father over China when she has aroused direct hatred by this war.  
(over)

- ⑤ Consistent peace policy - took lead in naval disarmament; strong endeavor to push idea of conciliation and arbitration, peaceful settlement of conflicts; Good Neighbor policy stretches over world; outlawing of war, but maintenance & observation of Kellogg Pact gets us into entanglements; Stimson doctrine of non-recognition based on fact causes bad feeling - too rigid some people say. At any rate this doctrine shows us as status quo power, along with France & Russia. England seizes opportunities for change. We believe in no concessions, as far as practical, to revisionist countries, i.e. Japan, Germany, Italy.





April 27

## U.S. Economic Foreign Policy

Economics are important part of American foreign policy - Hull's trade treaties and investments abroad. Relation between U.S. and S.A. are commercial. Monetary policy in international finance calls for government regulation - no free laissez-faire.

② Commercial policy - protectionism of America has far effects on other lands. Has made it difficult for other countries to pay debts, hence led to flow of gold here, hence depression of foreign currencies. Protection started in Civil War for benefit of northern industrial interests. Only once, Underwood Law of 1913, was there drastic lowering of tariffs - but was obscured this. After war, when countries were all depecate, America raised tariffs, probably contributed much to crisis of 1931. Present Administration (Roosevelt, Hull) wants to reduce tariffs by trade agreements, and second, shifts tariff-making from Congress (where it was in hands of lobbies) to Administration, which consults the interests involved, but makes its own final decisions. Large staff of experts in Civil Service takes care of tariffs now.

There can be no exports without imports - it is impossible only to sell and never to buy. Thus Hull, desiring to restore export markets, must facilitate imports. To do this he had to reduce some of the trade obstacles & barriers. Political implication here is to appease countries by offering them

markets. In this way America does strengthen France, Czech, etc. Tariffs have been reduced - 400 positions out of 3000. 270 of these are non-competitive, so reduction of these simply reduce revenue. Thus actually 130 protectionist tariffs reduced. 17 trade agreements reached. Duties reduced to 60% with Canada. About 14% of America's customers now have agreements. Britain not included yet, because of inter-imperial preferences. But this is being slowly shifted.

Too early to evaluate these agreements - some say exports to agreement-countries have risen over non-agreement - but better able to tell in few more years.

Principles of trade agreements - ① reciprocity, no unilateral action, ② unconditional most-favored-nation clause generalizes concession so that every country (except Germany) gets same benefits as those given to agreement-country. Also, <sup>in</sup> agreements which the other party makes with third nation, U.S. gets favored position also. Works both ways. ③ makes concessions on non-competitive goods as much as possible

Group interests - only 10% of U.S. trade in international trade, but some goods have most of their market in that 10%. Cotton, for instance, has 1/2 crop exported - which means great effect in life of the South. They got subsidies necessary. 17 million farmers producing for export - 1 million in industry. This is not minor



problem -  $2\frac{1}{4}$  millions directly engaged in production for export  
40% of tobacco, 35% of oil, etc. Thus important that exports be  
maintained and increased.

③ Financial policy - depreciation of dollar added protection  
by making American dollar cheap. Increased exports, hurt imports.  
Contrary to commercial policy. Economic Conference of 1933 broken by  
refusal of Roosevelt to stabilize the dollar. Eventually it  
stabilized and other currencies settled, so disequilibrium reduced.  
Depreciation favored farmers and South. Pres. can still  
depreciate dollar another 10% - Britain fears this, says  
dollar is too low now, feels pressure of American competition.  
France, Gr. Brit., and U.S. cooperate with each other for  
stabilization by setting up equalization funds. Steady element  
in relation to gold today is dollar, while pound & franc fluctuate.  
Silver - powerful groups got Treasury to <sup>buy</sup> silver at  
higher than market price - thus silver rose, helped China  
and Mexico. After while Chinese prices got up too high,  
so she got off silver. Thus great repercussions from desire  
of one silver group.

④ Capital policy - up to 1921, great lending to  
whole world - Europe over 4 billion dollars (exclusive of war  
loans). U.S. suddenly became great creditor after being debtor.  
Much of this due to desire of exporters to get markets abroad.

also large accumulation of idle funds looking for investment,  
 with good interest offered abroad. Much of this untidily,  
 because banks didn't have full information, not cautious, etc.  
 When countries started defaulting, there was retrenchment,  
 and people said no more export of capital. This led to  
 flow of gold in, since there were no credits abroad. Also,  
 there was inflow of short-time capital from people abroad  
 who want safe place to keep it. This is "hot money",  
 since if it were withdrawn at once, people might get  
 scared, market get depressed, etc. Not really great worry,  
 though, because there is great amount of gold here - much  
 could go out. Serious effect would be panic, lack of  
 confidence.



April 26

# MONROE DOCTRINE

Circumstances leading to its pronouncement:

1. Threat of European interference to put down revolutions in Hispanic America.
2. American desire for expansion, and fear that European expansion would interfere with ours.
3. Expression of isolationist feeling of U.S.
4. Fundamental feeling of dislike and distrust between England & U.S.

Terms:

1. American continent no longer open to European expansion
2. No extension of European monarchic govt into Latin America.
3. We promise not to interfere in European affairs.
4. Does not confine or restrict us from expanding into Latin America.
5. Would not permit acquisition of Cuba by any power other than Spain. (non-transfer principle)

At time of pronouncement it had little effect, because we had no navy to back it up. Also the Doctrine is not law in any sense, even international - but simply a statement of policy.

Evolution in 19th cent: Polk restricted doctrine to Caribbean area, would not interfere in blockade of Buenos Aires, because it was too far south. Also doctrine not applicable to conflict between S.A. states. When U.S. became imperialist, Doctrine was re-enforced to maintain political independence. Venezuelan Dispute 1895 - and Olney Note threatening England shows full scope of Doctrine.

Application of Doctrine in Caribbean is to protect Panama Canal.

In 1902 U.S. forced Germany to back down from attempted invasion and pacific blockade of Venezuela. Santa Domingo was

This made S.A. feel we were going to be aggressive, and the Doctrine is more healthy today, now that the Corollary has been abandoned.

threatened by European occupation to collect debts. Roosevelt Corollary was proposed - i.e. if interference is necessary, we should be the ones to do it. This no longer in force, however.

In 1911 Japanese fishing co. wanted port in western Mexico.

Resolution proposed to refuse concession to any non-American power in vital area. This spread Doctrine to Asia as well as Europe. Latin American sees Doctrine as policy of our aggression and disavow it, but today American navy allows Doctrine to have some teeth in it.

Did Doctrine prevent splitting up of Latin America during and after World War? Perhaps so.

After War, there was more respect for the Doctrine, since Wilson repudiated any imperialism on our part. Also Covenant recognizes Doctrine. Today it is going back to old meaning - protection of all of S.A. instead of just Lat.A.

Doctrine in no way is denial of European economic rights of expansion.

Good-neighbor policy of F.O.R. and the Doctrine in keeping good feeling, so there will be no conflicts to call for possible interference of Europe.



April 27

## AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY

American traditional interest in sea:

1. Came across sea.
2. Leading shipbuilding country.
3. Geography. - trade on sea.
4. Brought from England an interest in sea power, rather than large army.
5. Length of coastline.

I. Thus always question of what type of fleet.

1. Early leaders planned only defensive fleet - small number of first-class ships, heavily armed. Dependence on large number of merchant vessels to be transformed into privateers. This was parallel to defense of nation by militia instead of large standing army. U.S. refused to accept denial of privateering by Congress of Paris 1856.
2. Civil War produced largest navy, but after war fleet declined because need was over - also nation was in debt, was concentrating on west, was not in fear of Europe. Thus navy declined sharply. In Europe on other hand, iron-clad ships grew, but we were not afraid because they were not very good. By 1875 navy was all obsolete, sailing ships, small guns, wooden, etc. But there was public faith in regard to navy.
3. In 1883 modern navy started. What started renewed interest?
  - a. Virginia affair.



b. Chilean war on Bolivia, Peru 1878. We tried to intervene on side of Bolivia. Chile told us to go to hell because she had two iron-clads which could sink our whole navy.

c. Beginning of French Canal Co. in 1875 - got rights in Colombia. Statesmen here decided only America could command this area - needed strong navy to awe French.

d. In 1882 British moved into Alexandria, shot up Egypt and took Suez Canal. This was lesson of possibility for British invasion here.

Eastern sea-board interests. Republicans pressed for new navy between 1883-90. This navy to be of monitors for aggression for destroying commercial ships - and new fast cruisers with heavy guns to threaten Canada. Policy was to repulse any invader.

1st period  
1883-90

#### 4. Criticisms of this naval policy:

- a.) Before cruisers could be built, transatlantic liners were increasing in speed.
- b.) Using coal, what chance did they have to operate without bases?
- c.) Looked bad to build ships to run away after commercial ships, leaving home ports defenceless - also



too small to meet large ships of other nations.

Thus new type of ship.

2nd period  
1890-98

5. From 1820 on - sea-going coast-line protected-battleships. Several thousand tons less than European ships, limited in coal, but carried heaviest guns, so they could meet first-line ships in American waters. This satisfied everybody.
6. Objectives were: (in time of war):
  - a. Repulse invasion of American waters
  - b. Capture naval bases of foreign powers in American waters.
7. Diplomatic events leading to construction of this second navy, 1890-
  - a. Fear of war with England
  - b. Writings of Mahan on necessity of naval bases.
    1. Sea-power brings a nation foreign trade, which is necessary for progress & prosperity.
    2. Nations with greatest sea-power have always been greatest.
    3. Sea-power means ability to command sea.
    4. Once war is declared, navy must act offensively
    5. Panama Canal, when built, would destroy our isolation and Caribbean would become

cross-roads. Therefore we must dominate  
Caribbeans and seize Hawaii.

6. Our policies in Asia depended on political  
evolution of other countries and their navies.

7. Preservation of British Empire important to  
America, because of threat of Germany.

8. Spanish-American War, consequences:

a. Proved Mahan in regard to control of sea.

b. Naval men became important over military men -  
Roosevelt, Dewey, et.

c. Needed sea-power to defend Philippines.

d. Could now dominate North Pacific - Japan inferior.

Only Germany stood as opposition.

e. Created basis of popular appeal on which naval  
expansion could now be predicated.

9. Naval Expansion would have continued regardless of possession  
of Philippines, however, because we were now industrial nation,  
and needed ships for trade.

10. Diplomatic changes after Sp-Amer war:

a. Strain with Germany. Dewey felt Germany was  
next rival of U.S.

b. With Japan, there was trouble - because she protested  
over Hawaii.



- c. With Great Britain, there was increased cordiality - because she gave in that Panama must be American canal, and she withdrew from both American bases as naval power in 1904.

## 11. Principles of Naval Planning, between 1898-1914

3rd period  
1898 - 1914

- a) Britain necessary for our defence  
b) Germany was the threat.

- a. Build navy of second rank
- b. Policy to maintain navy ahead of any state which had large standing army
- c. Built ships equal to biggest in Europe up to 1906, and after that exceeded European ships. No emphasis at speed, but heavy armor and guns.
- d. Policy of navy to carry out Mahan theory of beating enemy.
- e. Concentration of navy in Atlantic, despite Japan.
- f. Build two large ships per year
- g. Both emphasize German-British naval race, which led to series of British alliances. <sup>1905, 1912</sup> But also there was American-German race, since both wanted second rank. We regarded Germany as greatest threat. Our race was a 14-year program 1903-17, to meet 16-year German program of 1900-16. Navy Board called for 48 capital ships of first-line.

## 12. World War Period

- a. March of Germany across France was threat against us, said navy men. They wanted strong navy. Wilson, idealist, thought war over quickly - did not want to get us into it.
- b. In Jan. 1915 first navy bills came up. These were influenced by Japan's 21 Demands, which would make her large power.
- c. In May 1915 Lusitania was sunk. Col. House said there was no certainty, Allies would win.
- d. In July 1915 Wilson said go ahead with big navy. Navy Board drew up plans of 156 ships, largest fleet in history. Wilson accepted this in toto.
- e. Congress delayed in fall of 1915, and Wilson went on preparedness campaign for big navy in 1916. Also Battle of Jutland in 1916 made British navy look shaky.
- f. When bill was passed, it called for 156 ships within three years, which was nominally equal to Britain, but if completely carried out, would put us ahead.

world war  
building & expansion



### 13. Conferences

a. Washington Conference, 1922 - gave us parity.

b. London Conference, 1930, ditto.

c. 1935 - Eden asked us to keep parity.

d. Since then, British navy has always asked us to keep equal - they in Atlantic, we protecting Pacific.

AMERICAN JEWISH  
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Government 37

1937-1938

The following is the assignment on the Buenos Aires Conference for the Seminar on Wednesday, April 27, 1938. The optional reading is designed to give background material on related subjects for the purposes of perspective. The International Conciliation Pamphlet will be supplied as soon as it arrives and may be obtained at the desk in the Reserved Book Room. Other items are on reserve.

Required Reading:

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in International Conciliation No.328, March 1937. pp 195-289

The Pan American Union and the Pan American Conferences in Pan American Union's Congress and Conference Series No.8 pp 1-15

The Evolution of International American Conferences in Pan American Union's Congress and Conference Series No.11b (revised) pp 1-18

Hull, Cordell: Results and Significance of the Buenos Aires Conference in Special Supplement No.3, Foreign Affairs, April 1937. pp 1-10

Welles, Sumner: The New Era in Pan American Relations in Foreign Affairs, April, 1937. pp 443-454

Optional Reading:

Williams, Benjamin: American Diplomacy Ch. IV, V, VI, VII

Bemis, Samuel F.: A Diplomatic History of the United States pp 754-779



May 3

# AMERICAN NEUTRALITY

Purpose of bills of 1936, '37 was to keep us out of war.

General questions of neutrality:

1. Is it desirable? 2. Is it practical?

1. Should we try to remain neutral? After war great change in regard to neutrality - there was universal feeling that it was immoral, since it was incompatible with collective security, and also since war was illegal, there would be no neutrality. Old idea of neutrality was to keep war (or dual) localized, so there would be peace at least in general community. In post-war period this changed, because impartial neutrality was impossible when aggressor was attacking poor victim.

But since 1935, opinion is changing again back to the old form - and countries with tradition of neutrality picked that up again - Belgium began in 1936, after Germany occupied Rhineland, by declaring herself neutral - and Switzerland did the same, asking for permission to withdraw from economic sanctions. U.S. followed suit. - because she does not want to be drawn into war where victim turns out to be aggressor, or vice versa; also wishes to avoid catastrophe of war and localize illegal wars; also cynical point of view, too bad about victim.

Thus, one vigorous school of thought is that neutrality is desirable - keep out of any war which is not absolutely vital to your interest.

2. Is it practical? Some say we can't stay out even if we want to. We did remain neutral in many 19th cent. wars - but in regard to two big wars, we participated. After 20 years of Napoleonic wars in Europe, we finally came in in 1812. Answer to why we got in is because expansionists wanted fight with England. This was not really test of neutrality, because we avoided conflicts for previous 20 years.

World War looks more serious, though. Doesn't seem as if we could have stayed out. Some say (Clayton) we got in because our neutral rights were violated. Others (Borchard) say we got in because we weren't neutral.

In recent years, opinion has shifted, as witness Panay incident. Nothing in world war was as serious, but no excitement or no war declared. Thus, even Great Power can accept violations. But many neutrals are not touched - such as Hong Kong being safe, although serious impediment to Japan. Also in Spanish war, Franco had power to blockade loyalists, but he hasn't belligerent rights, so he hasn't dared blockade.



The inference here is that even if neutrality is suffered, big nations can shrug them off, and not go to war. (Parey.) The threat of war might stop violations.

What are neutral rights? International Maritime Law.

1. Obligation of neutral govt to remain neutral - not to aid in any operations of either side. Self-restraint.

Other school says that while govt remains neutral, individuals <sup>can</sup> have passions in the matter.

Expression of opinion on part of govt betrays neutrality.

2. Obligation of belligerents not to interfere with neutral privileges, such as economic intercourse, ships of trade, etc.

and ships of passengers, which will bring up matter of civilian airplanes. Neutrals are allowed to trade with other neutrals. Neutrals trade with civilian population of belligerent - and this is difficult, because there is suspicion. However, there is ability to stop neutrals on high seas and investigate destination.

Neutral cargoes, even on enemy ships, cannot be confiscated. Also enemy cargo, if not contraband, carried on neutral ships cannot be confiscated.

(Britain put everything on contraband list, however.)

If violations of neutrality go so far as to make it impossible for any trade, will that bring us into war?

Answer to question #2 is that it is practical because not all neutral rights have gone by the boards - and also we are willing to accept certain violations.

This will be matter of pressure groups.

## Dulles & Armstrong

In regard to neutrality, action will be defined by specific circumstances; consistency not essential or even wise.

Basic & supplementary parts of neutrality legislation.

Basic of 1935 legislation was limiting of travel on belligerent ships.

Supplementary " " was arms embargo, but public opinion will probably make it basic in future. However, operation of it should not work injustice against weak nation, so Pres. should decide. Automatic arms embargo certainly no good - might operate against us, not allow us to make peace in some conflict by offering to throw our weight, etc.

Policy of no loans is difficult to maintain. Johnson Act of 1934, by refusing loans to gov'ts not paying interest on their debts to the U.S., tries to exclude most European countries as future borrowers. In war-time, however, while we might not float any loans for the belligerents, still the question of financing the large volume of trade for them as soon as their credits run out, amounts to the same as giving them loans. Gradually private banking credit is not enough to continue this financing, and a public loan must be called to protect what has already been accomplished.

All the above was experience of last war. To reach that off we should refuse to buy foreign bonds, for the floating of foreign bonds must be registered with the SEC, that puts a Governmental stamp on the transaction, and it is hard to remain neutral.



Suggestion is that commercial banking credits & private loans be extended as far as they'll reach, but that's all.

Mandatory Embargo on Trade no good:

1. Would operate unjustly
2. Would increase desire of other countries for self-sufficiency, which would cut our peace-time exports.
3. Since we have no monopolies it would do no good
4. No reason for <sup>useless</sup> needless sacrifice to be made.
5. Would hurt us very much in unemployment, etc.

Are we trying to keep out of war? Then apply embargo whenever a continuance of trade would get us into the war.

Are we trying to prevent war? Then impose embargo by concerted action of U.S. and all other producers of "instruments of war."

Automatic embargo thus no good - but discretionary power to apply embargo is all right. Pres. should decide whether shipping need be stopped because of threats to it and whether we should <sup>with others</sup> cooperate in making embargo effective. Pres. would be cautious, Congress would enumerate his powers (criticism of time necessary for any action may be valid here). Course pursued should be frankly in our own best interests. Walter Lippman says you cannot have different laws for different situations, that legislation must be drafted in advance - but on

Other hand we should make whole thing as flexible that we can change or shift or retreat, with only the policy of neutrality, not the law remaining rigid.

Roosevelt in Oct. 1935 declared the "Trade at Your Own Risk" policy. Admiral Sims repeated it - said if choice between large profits and peace - we wanted latter. This policy may prevent "incidents". It certainly should be permanent, basic part of neutrality policy. No legislation by Congress required for this - rather within sphere of Executive. However, question remains that we cannot let others think that traders have no govt support in back of them, because then they will all be blasted from sea.

Hull and Roosevelt have attempted to influence traders voluntarily to refrain from trade with belligerents, in situations where the risk would not be enough to influence the traders. This moral persuasion is not very wise, because it throws business to unscrupulous traders who would not adhere to it.

Trade at trader's risk is really best.

Other suggestion is to limit abnormal war trade by saying that exports to belligerents be equal to normal peace-time figures. This is good in theory but hard in practice. Difficult and complicated quota system involving much regimentation would be



necessary to allocate adms among exporters, so that stuff  
was not transhipped, etc.

Some advise "cash and carry folio," to avoid milk  
and also get paid, but objection again is difficulty of administering it,  
so that only neutral ships could get goods, to establish eventual  
destination, to avoid duplicity, etc.

AMERICAN JEWISH  
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זכר אלה יעקב  
וישדאס

Walter Lippman

Says that "Rough-hew them how we will, the destinies control our actions." Thus, the man who condemned Wilson's unneutrality in favor of Britain as having gotten us into the last war, has, in seeking for a formula to keep us out of the next one, created a Neutrality Act (of 1937) which binds us just as closely to Britain. The "cash and carry" policy is certainly to her advantage more than to anyone else's. It seems, then, that we are tied to Britain, that if we are to last, we must preserve her - and in any next big war where she is involved we cannot remain neutral. Our destiny is linked with hers, and we must realize that.



Government 37

1937-1938

Neutrality Legislation

The following is the assignment on neutrality legislation for the seminar on Wednesday, May 4, 1938. It is strongly recommended that the whole of Can We Be Neutral? be read. All items will be found on reserve.

Dulles, A. W. and Armstrong, H. F.: Can We Be Neutral? pp 77-113, and the balance if you have time.

Warren, Charles: Troubles of a Neutral in Foreign Affairs April 1934 pp 377-394.

Buell, Raymond L.: The Neutrality Act of 1937 in Foreign Policy Reports XIII No.14 October 1, 1937. pp 166-180.

Buell, Raymond L.: U. S. Neutrality in the Spanish Conflict in Foreign Policy Reports XIII No.17 November 15, 1937 pp 206-216.

Also either

Warren, Charles: Safeguards to Neutrality in Foreign Affairs January 1936 pp 199-215.

Or

Lippmann, Walter: Rough-hew Them How We Will in Foreign Affairs July 1937 pp 587-594.

And either

Fenwick, Charles G.: Neutrality and International Responsibility in Annals of the American Academy July 1937 pp 51-55.

Or

Jesup, P. C.: Planned Neutrality in Annals of the American Academy July 1937. pp 99-106

Also texts of neutrality bills. (Folder on Reserve)

May 5

## U.S. and Europe

As result of Washington + Jefferson proclamation, this country keeps out of Europe. This led to a neutrality policy in 1914. After we were in war, there was question whether above policy should be discarded. Up to time Senate repudiated Versailles Treaty, we did act as one of Associated Powers and participated. Wilsonian trend in Treaty of negotiation gave Germany lever to tear up Treaty - such as matter of disarmament, when it was promised that everybody would disarm, then distrust. Also Germany takes Austria on principle of self-determination advanced by Wilson. Still these principles allow revision on acceptable grounds - i.e. Anschluss is not simply annexation - and allow excuse for not going to war. This idea of self-determination is revolutionary and may have effects - i.e. Sudeten Germans have basis for argument. Also fifty years from now blacks may cut throats of whites.

All over Europe democracies were established to please Wilson - but most of them have collapsed since - and Wilson may have been harmful. Might have been better if they remained constitutional monarchies, because now there is swing back to absolutism. On other hand, it gave countries democratic precedent for the future.

Having started all this, America withdrew, refused to guarantee France or join league to help bring peaceful



settlement. This lost disappointed Germany. Whole thing is due to difference between Executive + Senate in regard to treaty-making power. Consequences of a treaty go on, even when Senate does not ratify - and a mess results. Thus, we should keep out of multi-lateral treaties. Of course, there has been more cooperation since war than before, even though we withdrew.

Economic problem of war debts, with separate settlements which led to dissatisfaction. In regard to disarmament, we pushed for a conference - but this showed that we could not keep out of political consequences, except in economic matters. Why were we so keen on disarmament? Why meddle with land disarmament? Armaments race was again likely to lead to war - we didn't want to see another war - thus it was against our ideals to have big armies. We wanted to have peace by getting disarmament. But this argument is answered by insisting of our not joining League, which was also working for peace and disarmament. To this they say we will go so far in trying to get peace in Europe, but no so far as to get politically entangled. Third kind of cooperation was Kellogg Pact - a general peace move, growing out of an outbreak of war between France + U.S. alone. Original French plan was bilateral - Briand's idea. France

did not want general military - because that would prevent her from fighting Germany. Only when it was conceded that every country had the right to decide for itself what self-defense was, and was allowed to fight in self-defense - then every country joined because the whole Pact amounted to nothing, was emasculated.

Why are these constant efforts made to bring U.S. into cooperation? Why is every possible type of agreement which the U.S. makes, even currency agreements, interpreted as political entanglement. Two reasons: ① A group within Administration which believes we should cooperate with democracies against absolutism and also feels that we will need European help in Far East, so we must give them help in Europe. For these two facts they feel the whole isolation idea is impossible, since we are a Great Power and have relations all over world. In the past we were disinterested in power relations of other countries because we were so secure, but now things may have changed - and if we should actually be threatened by the potential rise of Japan, we must become interested in power relationships. Thus for sake of holding a certain balance of power in Asia, we become a friend of a certain group in Europe and inevitably become drawn into a system of cooperation and alliances. But this is really



Thinking backward, because people use ~~the~~ threat of Japan as excuse to get into line-up against fascist, which is what they wanted to do in first place, but needed excuse. Present threat from Japan is not so very great. (2) There is also pressure from abroad to get us tangled into Europe - Britain & France very worried over our remaining neutral. They must have us in from the beginning in the next war, will use all possible techniques & propaganda - will use argument of democracy v. dictatorships, preservation of civilization, etc.

May 10

CARIBBEAN POLICY

Contrast between those who say our policy in Car. was manifestation of American imperialism, economic & political, and those who deny that. Bennis says our policy there was dictated by strategic considerations, with Panama Canal as basis, and necessary control of islands and area in Central America around canal. Some say ~~now~~ Mexico is included in strategic area to be controlled, since she may join European bloc & be threat to U.S. Certain smaller countries must be watched.

Second, strong economic interest - either in investments or trade. Quantity of investments might not be important - because even one firm might run a country.

Mexico - main problem is recognition of revolutionary govt. Up to 1913 we recognized all de facto govt. In 1913 reactionary leader Huerta came into power. Taft left recognition to Wilson, who had to decide. At that time Wilson offered new theory, said "just govt rests upon consent of governed"; refused to recognize Huerta. Also latter was acceptable to vested interest, repealed reforms of previous liberal govt - and at that time Wilson stood in favor of liberals. U.S. put an arms embargo against Huerta, shelled Vera Cruz. Whole thing was disturbing to U.S., who gladly accepted arbitration of South America.

Trouble today is one fact that Mexican revolution contains feature of regaining property held by foreigners, which land has oil. Confiscation on basis of refusal of companies to regulate ways of workers according to laws of Mexico. Also high taxation in attempt to



drive out foreigners.

With Cuba there was stronger action. After war of 1898, there was military govt set up with eventual objective of establishing a republican govt. Differs from puppet state set up by Japan in China. U.S. took responsibility of intervention in Cuba for purpose of protecting Spaniards there, as well as Americans. Thus Cuba was not allowed to make treaties with other powers, not allowed to get into debt with other powers - whole theory is that this country interferes so that other countries will not.

Cuba consented that this country can intervene. All this has disappeared with the abolition of the Platt Amendment, when we gave up right of intervention, except for having water & naval stations there. In 1933 there was no interference when revolution. Some say non-intervention is bad for Cuba economically, since it was American capital and market which built up and maintained Cuba, and this is no longer protected. Cuba wants trade agreements with us. Still revolutionaries say the American plantations have not raised the standard of living. Profit goes into absentee landlords' pockets and is spent in U.S. not in Cuba. Social unrest is result of this type of exploitation which takes money out of country and keep down standard of living. Another type of exploitation is to get very shaky govts to go into debt, by ~~having~~ selling lots of things to them at high rates of interest and when they cannot pay, to take control of their revenues.

Mass of people see disadvantage of heavy debt, of control of labor market by foreigners, of interest of capital interests in govt, of their opposition to social reform. On other hand, an upper class feels it wants support of foreigners to keep law & order, to make money, etc. Thus there is conflict and there is much social unrest and revolution in those countries.

The govt of the U.S., however, is doing best to stand on neutral grounds, and not to become spokesman for small group interests. Govt is really interested in seeing advancement in those countries. Thus argument of imperialism may not be exactly correct.



73

Examination 5 October 1936

Answer both questions

I. On page 67 of Gathorne-Hardy's Short History, Sir Austen Chamberlain is quoted as saying that the signing of the Locarno Treaties marked "the real dividing line between the years of war and the years of peace". In the light of events preceeding and following these treaties, do you regard this statement as a valid one? Discuss its implications with the book in mind.

II. Describe, give the significance of, or otherwise define the following in brief:

- a. Wahabism
- b. Twenty-one Demands
- c. Sykes-Picot Agreement
- d. San Remo Conference
- e. Optional Clause
- f. Corfu incident
- g. Leticia
- h. Lausanne Conference 1932
- i. Borodin
- j. The Draft Treaty

1925

S. H. expects  
some new definition  
Today we see world  
heading toward it.

Only idealism can  
account for Chamberlain  
statement.

Peace not to be achieved  
only on regional basis  
Consent of Europe desired  
keep peace.

Different concepts of  
peace today:  
German  
French

Government 37

1937-1938

Examination 11 November, 1937

- I It has been suggested that a new attempt be made to conclude a western pact which would take the place of the Locarno Treaty among Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

90 As a member of the permanent staff of the foreign office of either Great Britain, or France, or Germany you are asked to prepare a report on the subject which the foreign minister can submit to a cabinet meeting. Include in the report the following two elements:

- a. An account of the specific character of a so-called Locarno agreement as opposed to a pact of any other sort.
- b. Should your country favor the calling of a conference to conclude such an agreement, and the reasons.

II Answer two of the following questions:

- a. Has the attitude of Great Britain towards the Continent changed since 1925? If so, in what way?
- b. What were the most important features of the British disarmament plan of March 1933?
- c. Why was the Rhineland demilitarized?
- d. What provisions of the Treaty of Versailles have been carried out, and which are still in force?
- e. Why should Germany object to the League of Nations?

30 - 15 each  
15 each



Government 37

1937-1938

Examination December 2, 1937

- I Attached to this paper you will find extracts from the report by N. Molotov, President of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, January 11, 1936.

Imagine yourself a member of the State Department attached to the Division of Eastern European Affairs. You are asked to make an interpretive commentary of this report for your superior. Interpret or explain all statements and propositions which you regard as needing comment. Enlarge upon allusions and explain references.

For your convenience, the report has been presented with marginal line numbers. Do not bother to repeat any statement you wish to explain; merely cite it by number. Be brief.

- II Answer two of the following questions:

- a. Enumerate the difficulties and conflicts which have arisen since the Treaty of Versailles over the borders of Poland and state how they have been settled.
- b. Under what circumstances is France obliged to come to the assistance of the U.S.S.R. according to existing treaties?
- c. What are the chief issues in the economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the rest of the world? Discuss briefly.



Extracts from Report by M. Molotov

President of the Council of People's Commissars

January 11, 1936 <sup>1</sup>

1 During the past year the relations between the  
2 Soviet Union and other countries have, on the whole, devel-  
3 oped normally. In the majority of cases our relations with  
4 foreign states developed in a direction favorable to the  
5 cause of peace. At any rate, everything that depended on the *Main policy*  
6 Soviet Government was done to strengthen the cause of univer-  
7 sal peace and, primarily, to strengthen peace in Europe and  
8 Asia....

9 Along the whole of our vast land frontiers in the  
10 west, south, and east, a total length of about 20,000 kilo-  
11 metres, there are situated fairly large, middle-sized, and  
12 small States which are not always as friendly towards the  
13 U.S.S.R. as, let us say, Turkey. Throughout all this period *Non-aggression*  
14 not a single one of these States has had any cause for anxiety *policy*  
15 as far as we are concerned.

16 With a view to ensuring peace in Europe, the Soviet  
17 Government and also the Governments of France, Czechoslovakia,  
18 and certain other States attached great importance to the con- *Eastern Europe*  
19 clusion of what is known as the East European Mutual Aid Pact. <sup>1</sup>  
20 However, owing to the counteraction of Germany, and then of  
21 Poland, the East European Mutual Aid Pact fell through. *France - Soviet*  
*Pact*

22 This did not prevent the conclusion last May of a  
23 treaty of mutual aid between France and the Soviet Union.  
24 During the visit paid to Moscow by M. Laval, the present Prime  
25 Minister of France, there was reaffirmed the common desire of the  
26 U.S.S.R. and France to facilitate the conclusion of a regional  
27 East European pact between the States already mentioned, impos-  
28 ing the obligations of non-aggression, consultation, and non-  
29 assistance to an aggressor.

30 Following on this a treaty of mutual aid was signed  
31 between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia.

32 In the report of the conversations which took place  
33 in Moscow with M. Benes, now President of Czechoslovakia, it  
34 was stated that the representatives of both countries at the

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1. Official translation. From Documents on International  
Affairs, 1935, v.1.



35 present time attach exclusive significance 'to the actual real-  
 36 ization of a comprehensive collective organization of security  
 37 on the basis of the indivisibility of peace'. This is the policy  
 38 to which the Government of the Soviet Union adhered and still  
 39 adheres.

*historians  
remark on  
League*

40 I shall also mention the visit paid to Moscow by  
 41 Mr. Eden, now the British Foreign Secretary. The importance  
 42 of this visit will be gathered from the fact that, as a result  
 43 of the conversations between the representatives of the U.S.S.R.  
 44 and Mr. Eden, it was possible to announce that 'at the present  
 45 time there is no conflict of interests between the two Govern-  
 46 ments on any important question of international policy. The  
 47 conditions therefore favour a further development of Anglo-  
 48 Soviet relations.

49 I shall now pass to the relations with Germany which,  
 50 for obvious reasons, attract the particular attention of the  
 51 toilers of our country.

52 I must say quite frankly that the Soviet Government  
 53 would have desired the establishment of better relations with  
 54 Germany than exist at present. This seems to us unquestionably  
 55 expedient from the standpoint of the interests of the peoples  
 56 both of the U.S.S.R. and of Germany. But the realization of  
 57 such a policy depends not only on us, but also on the German  
 58 Government.

*History of the  
unstable ref.  
to 1933  
constrains the*

59 And what is the foreign policy of the present German  
 60 Government? I spoke of the principal trend of this foreign  
 61 policy at the Seventh Congress of Soviets, when I quoted from  
 62 Herr Hitler's book My Struggle, which is in a sense a programme,  
 63 and which is being distributed in Germany in millions of copies.  
 64 In this book Herr Hitler definitely speaks of the necessity of  
 65 adopting a 'policy of territorial conquest'. And in this con-  
 66 nexion Herr Hitler makes no bones about declaring: 'When we  
 67 speak of new lands in Europe to-day we can only think in the  
 68 first instance of Russia and her border States.'

*Ukraine*

69 The German Government has not made any attempt to  
 70 deny these plans of aggrandizement at the expense of the Soviet  
 71 Union, but, on the contrary, has fully confirmed that Herr  
 72 Hitler's statements referred to still retain their validity.  
 73 Carrying their plans to extremes, Messieurs the National Social-  
 74 ists, as we all know, are driving their preparations precisely  
 75 in the direction of such aggrandizement, although not in this  
 76 direction alone. This criminal propaganda for the seizure of  
 77 foreign territory has now found new followers outside Germany.  
 78 All sorts of echoers of the German capital are to be found in  
 79 neighbouring Poland.

*Poland  
would like  
Pantheon*



80 Everybody knows that German Fascism is not merely  
 81 confining itself to elaborating plans of conquest, but is pre-  
 82 paring to act in the immediate future. The German Fascists  
 83 have, in the sight of all, turned the country which has fallen  
 84 into their hands into a military camp, which, owing to its po-  
 85 sition in the very centre of Europe, constitutes a menace not  
 86 only to the Soviet Union.

attempt to secure  
 - France and further  
 secure alliance

87 The development of commercial and economic relations  
 88 with other States, irrespective of the political forces that  
 89 are temporarily ruling those countries, is in conformity with  
 90 the policy of the Soviet Government.

started dealing  
 with other countries  
 to get industrial  
 materials

91 Reports recently appeared of the conclusion of a mili-  
 92 tary agreement between Japan and Germany and of Poland's com-  
 93 plicity in this matter. There is nothing unexpected in this  
 94 for us. It is not for nothing that both Japan and Germany left  
 95 the League of Nations in good time, in order to leave their  
 96 hands free, and, with good reason, are regarded by the whole  
 97 world as the Powers with the most aggressive foreign policy.

Refer to Japan  
 as conquest and  
 annex Germany  
 possible conquest

98 The Fascist rulers of Germany sometimes endeavour to  
 99 divert the attention of naïve people from their plans of con-  
 100 quest with regard to the Soviet Union by referring to the ab-  
 101 sence of common frontiers between Germany and the U.S.S.R. But  
 102 we know, on the other hand, that Germany, encouraged by certain  
 103 foreign Powers, is feverishly preparing to occupy a dominant po-  
 104 sition in the Baltic and has established special relations with  
 105 Poland, which has fairly extensive common frontiers with the  
 106 Soviet Union.

107 The fact that we have joined the League of Nations  
 108 does not mean that there is no longer a fundamental difference  
 109 in principle between Soviet foreign policy and the policy of the  
 110 foreign Powers. The Italo-Abyssinian War shows that the contrary  
 111 is the case.

will not use  
 League as  
 instrument of  
 foreign policy

112 Countries like Japan and Germany, and now Italy, have  
 113 already advanced, or are prepared any day to advance, to the  
 114 foreground in new conflicts between the imperialist Powers of  
 115 the whole world.

116 Whoever launches into a new imperialist war may suc-  
 117 ceed in breaking his neck before accomplishing his plans of con-  
 118 quest. The possibility is not excluded that the calculations  
 119 of the imperialist cliques on the passivity of the masses of  
 120 the people may be upset at the most unexpected moment, as has

Threat does not  
 mean much - look  
 at end of book



121 been the case before. It is not difficult for us, Bolsheviks,  
122 to understand such strivings on the part of the masses of the  
123 people. We also know that the masses of the people in capital-  
124 ist countries have no sympathy for the predatory plans of the  
125 imperialists of all shades, especially of the imperialists in  
126 the Fascist camp.

127 But we, the toilers of the Soviet Union, must rely  
128 for the defence of our cause on our own strength, and on the  
129 defence of our fatherland -- first and foremost on our Red Army. *Statement of*  
130 We shall take every measure to frustrate every possibility of an *Lenin*  
131 external attack on our country by the imperialists. But if they  
132 attack us notwithstanding, we have no doubt that our Red Army  
133 will inflict the repulse they deserve....



Government 37

1937-1938

Examination 5 March 1938

- I The official newly appointed to the position of Secretary of Foreign Affairs in His Majesty's Government is anxious to acquaint himself with the problems which the British Government face in the Mediterranean region. To this end he addresses to experts in the various government departments requests for brief and accurate memoranda on these problems.

Suppose yourself called upon to draft one of these memoranda on one of the subjects listed below. Be sure to include in your statement:

1. the historical background or significant post-war changes;
2. the present problems and conflicts involved;
3. a clear statement of British interests in the question and the line which you believe British policy should follow.

Present a memorandum on one of the following subjects:

- a) Great Britain and its relations with Iraq.
- b) Great Britain and its relations with Palestine.
- c) Mandates; their role in the past and in the future.
- d) The Mediterranean "bottlenecks": the conflicts and problems arising out of their control.
- e) The power situation in the Mediterranean: British cooperation and conflict with the riparian states; strategic and political considerations.
- f) The reasons and objectives of Italy in the conquest of Ethiopia.
- g) A description and criticism of the measures taken by the League of Nations in connection with the Italian war on Ethiopia.
- h) Non-intervention in Spain and its effects on outside powers; how has the policy of non-intervention in Spain served the interests of the outside powers, especially of Great Britain?

II Answer one of the following questions:

- a) Describe the operation of the mandates system.
- b) Enumerate the treaties concerning the Mediterranean region to which Great Britain is party, and give the principle terms of each.
- c) What are the outstanding problems in international law brought out during the course of the Spanish civil war?



YALE UNIVERSITY  
Final Examination

June 8, 1938

Government 37

Contemporary problems  
in International relations

This examination is designed for four hours.

Answer each part.

Part I

1½ hours

- I. The present Administration in Washington has been accused of "plotting intervention in the Sino-Japanese War". A member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations invites you to write a memorandum either
- a) refuting this accusation by describing and justifying the policy of the United States regarding Japan since 1931,
  - or
  - b) substantiating this accusation by describing and criticizing the policy of the United States regarding Japan since 1931.

Part II

1 hour

II. Answer either A or B.

- A. The Council of the League of Nations has granted to Switzerland the right of absolute "neutrality", dispensing her from the duty of participating in any kind of League of Nations sanctions.  
Describe the international problems involved and comment on the importance of this League decision for the future of the League of Nations.
- B. The British Foreign Office is interested in predicting whether, in case of a European war over the question of Czechoslovakia, Italy would be likely to side with France and Great Britain or with Germany.  
Argue in favor of one possibility or the other, basing your judgment upon history and precedent, upon Italian national interests, upon existing pacts and understandings, and upon other significant factors.



III. Answer three of the following five questions.

- A. Why has the League of Nations failed to acquire the characteristic of universality?
- B. To what extent can one regard the present troubled state of international affairs as the outcome of so-called "ideological warfare"?
- C. What has France done since 1918 in order to safeguard her security?
- D. Discuss the effect of the doctrine of national self-determination on present-day world affairs.
- E. Attached to this examination are extracts from the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of Alliance signed in 1930. Interpret the significance of this treaty with regard for the legal and political elements.

Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and His Majesty the King of Iraq. Signed at Baghdad, June 30, 1930.1

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of Iraq, whereas they desire to consolidate the friendship and to maintain and perpetuate the relations of good understanding between their respective countries; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty undertook in the Treaty of Alliance ..., that he would take into active consideration at successive intervals of four years the question whether it was possible for him to press for the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations, and...

Whereas the mandatory responsibilities accepted by His Britannic Majesty in respect of Iraq will automatically terminate upon the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations, and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq consider that the relations which will subsist between them as independent sovereigns should be defined by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance and Amity:

Have agreed to conclude a new Treaty for this purpose on terms of complete freedom, equality and independence which will become operative upon the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

(Names of Plenipotentiaries omitted.)



who having communicated their full powers, found in due form, have agreed as follows:

#### Article 1

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq.

There shall be established between the High Contracting Parties a close alliance in consecration of their friendship, their cordial understanding and their good relations, and there shall be full and frank consultation between them in all matters of foreign policy which may affect their common interests.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or might create difficulties for the other party thereto.

#### Article 2

(Diplomatic representation)

#### Article 3

Should any dispute between Iraq and a third State produce a situation which involves the risk of a rupture with that State, the High Contracting Parties will concert together with a view to the settlement of the said dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of any other international obligation which may be applicable to the case.

#### Article 4

Should, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 above, either of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will, subject always to the provisions of Article 9 below, immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally. In the event of an imminent menace of war the High Contracting Parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures for defense. The aid of His Majesty the King of Iraq in the event of war or the imminent menace of war will consist in furnishing to His Britannic Majesty on Iraq territory all facilities and assistance in his power including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes and means of communication.

#### Article 5

It is understood between the High Contracting Parties that responsibility for the maintenance of internal order in Iraq and, subject to the provisions of Article 4 above, for the defense of Iraq from external aggression rests with His Majesty the King of Iraq. Nevertheless His Majesty the King of Iraq recognizes that the permanent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty is in the common interest of the High Contracting Parties. For this purpose... (technical arrangements).

(The rest is omitted)