



THE JACOB RADER MARCUS CENTER OF THE
AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

MS-763: Rabbi Herbert A. Friedman Collection, 1930-2004.

Series I: Wexner Heritage Foundation, 1947-2004.

Subseries 1: General Files, 1949-2004.

Box
61

Folder
3

Alumni Retreat. "Intermarriage." 1989-1990.

For more information on this collection, please see the finding aid on the
American Jewish Archives website.



The Wexner Heritage Foundation

ALUMNI RETREAT

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

INTERMARRIAGE

M A Y

18 *through* 20

1 · 9 · 9 · 0

Woodlands Inn

HOUSTON, TEXAS



PROGRAM

FRIDAY, MAY 18TH, 1990

Meeting Room

10:00 - 2:30 pm	Alumni Members Registration	Lobby
2:30 - 3:30 pm	Plenary I Welcome and Introduction: Rabbi Nathan Laufer Vice President The Inter marriage Crisis: Communal Implications Speaker: Dr. Egon Mayer	Lakeside
3:45 - 5:15 pm	Workshop I The Inter marriage Crisis: Family Implications Rabbi Ramie Arian Dr. Tsvi Blanchard Dr. Ronald Brauner Rabbi Lavey Derby Ms. Ellyn Geller Ms. Lydia Kukoff Rabbi Irwin Kula Rabbi Daniel Landes Rabbi David Nelson Ms. Esther Perel Dr. Charles Raffel Dr. Bernard Steinberg	Willow Mexico States Texas Travis Sycamore Oak Persimmon Hawthorne Magnolia Cypress Evergreen
5:15 - 6:15 pm	Free Time to Prepare for Shabbat	
6:15 - 6:30 pm	Candle Lighting	Spanish/ Republic
6:30 - 7:15 pm	Services Orthodox Conservative Reform	Confederate San Felipe States

7:30 - 9:00 pm	Shabbat Dinner	Rio Grande
9:00 - 10:00 pm	Evening Program Speaker: Mr. Leslie Wexner Chairman	Rio Grande
10:15 - 12:00 pm	Oneg Shabbat	Spanish/ Republic

SATURDAY, MAY 19TH, 1990

7:00 - 9:00 am	Breakfast	Rio Grande
8:00 - 10:45 am	Orthodox Services	Confederate
	Conservative Services	San Felipe
9:15 - 10:45 am	Reform Services	States
10:45 - 11:00 am	Kiddush	Foyer
11:15 - 1:00 pm	Plenary II Alternative Communal Responses to Intermarrieds Speakers: Rabbi Jack Simcha Cohen Ms. Lydia Kukoff Moderator: Dr. Egon Mayer	Lakeside
1:15 - 2:15 pm	Shabbat Lunch	Rio Grande
2:30 - 4:00 pm	Workshop II Alternative Family Responses to Intermarrieds Rabbi Ramie Arian Dr. Tsvi Blanchard Dr. Ronald Brauner Rabbi Lavey Derby Ms. Ellyn Geller Ms. Lydia Kukoff	Willow Mexico States Texas Travis Sycamore

Rabbi Irwin Kula
 Rabbi Daniel Landes
 Rabbi David Nelson
 Ms. Esther Perel
 Dr. Charles Raffel
 Dr. Bernard Steinberg

Oak
 Persimmon
 Hawthorne
 Magnolia
 Cypress
 Evergreen

4:00 - 7:00 pm

Free Time

7:00 - 7:30 pm

Orthodox Mincha Services
 (optional)

Confederate

7:30 - 8:45 pm

Dinner

Rio Grande

8:40 - 8:55 pm

Orthodox Ma'ariv Services
 (optional)

Confederate

8:55 - 9:00 pm

Havdalah

Rio Grande

9:15 - 10:30 pm

Evening Program
 Speaker: Rabbi Herbert Friedman
 President

Rio Grande

10:30 - 12:00 pm

Cocktails and Piano Bar

Spanish/
 Republic

SUNDAY, MAY 20TH, 1990

7:00 - 7:30 am

Orthodox Services
 (optional)

Confederate

7:00 - 8:00 am

Breakfast

Glass
 Menagerie

8:15 - 9:45 am

**Workshop III
Family Strategies For The Future**

Rabbi Ramie Arian
Dr. Tsvi Blanchard
Dr. Ronald Brauner
Rabbi Lavey Derby
Ms. Ellyn Geller
Ms. Lydia Kukoff
Rabbi Irwin Kula
Rabbi Daniel Landes
Rabbi David Nelson
Ms. Esther Perel
Dr. Charles Raffel
Dr. Bernard Steinberg

Willow
Mexico
States
Texas
Travis
Sycamore
Oak
Persimmon
Hawthorne
Magnolia
Cypress
Evergreen

9:45 - 10:00 am

Evaluations
(to be filled out in Workshops)

10:15 - 11:15 am

Plenary III
Communal Strategies For The Future
Introduction:
Rabbi Ramie Arian
Associate Director of Programs
Speaker: Rabbi Shlomo Riskin

Rio Grande

11:15 - 11:30 am

Closing Remarks: Rabbi Nathan Laufer

11:30 - 1:00 pm





Brunch & Departures

**Spanish/
Republic**

WEXNER HERITAGE FOUNDATION

ALUMNI RETREAT MAY 18 - 20, 1990
WOODLANDS INN

4/27/90

DAY	TIME	SESSION	ROOM	SET UP	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Thur 5/17	9:00 am	Tie Down Mtg			
	11:00-2:00 pm	Faculty Registration	Lobby	6 foot table 4 chairs	Rooms pre-assigned Keys available Light snack available
	2:00-3:30 pm	Faculty Meeting	Hawthorne	Hollow  for 20 around Perimeter of rm + 20 chairs in circle in middle of hollow Square	Flip Chart/Markers 1/2 VCR & Monitor
	3:30-3:35 pm	Coffee Break			
	3:45-5:15 pm	Faculty Meeting	Hawthorne	Hollow  for 20	Flip Chart/Markers
	5:15-6:30 pm	Free Time			
	6:30-7:30 pm	Dinner	Willow	Rounds of 8 for 28	1 washing station
	7:45-9:15 pm	Faculty Meeting	Hawthorne	Hollow  for 20	Flip Chart/Markers
Fri 5/18	8:00-9:00 am	Breakfast	Rio Center	Rounds of 8 for 28	1 washing station
	9:00-Noon	Faculty Mtg Cont.	Hawthorne	Hollow  for 20	

DAY	TIME	SESSION	ROOM	SET UP	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Fri 5/18	Noon-1:00 pm	Lunch	Rio Center	Rounds of 8 for 28	1 washing station
	10:00-2:30 pm	Alumni Member Registration	Lobby	2 - 6 ft tbls 4 chairs	Rooms pre-assigned Keys available Sandwiches/Snack avail
	2:30-3:35 pm	Opening Session	Lakeside	Classroom for 165	Podium/Mike on Platform dais for 2
	3:45-5:15 pm	Workshop I		Chairs only in a Circle for 13	Flip Chart/Markers 4 ft table near door with pads/pencils pitchers of water and glasses 1/2 VCR & monitor per room (This workshop only)
		Ramie Arian	Willow		
		Tsvi Blanchard	Mexico		
		Ronald Brauner	States		
		Lavey Derby	Texas		
		Ellyn Geller	Travis		
		Lydia Kukoff	Sycamore		
		Irwin Kula	Oak		
		Daniel Landes	Persimmon		
		Nathan Laufer	Hawthorne		
		David Nelson	San Felipe		
		Esther Perel	Magnolia		
		Charles Raffel	Cypress		
		Bernard Steinberg	Evergreen		
	5:15-6:30 pm	Free Time			
	6:30-6:45 pm	Candle lighting	Republic/ Spanish	Hollow U No Chairs	4 ft table by door

DAY	TIME	SESSION	ROOM	SET UP	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Fri 5/18	6:45-7:30 pm	Services			
		Orthodox 48" curtain	Confederate	Theatre for 50	4 ft table at frnt&bck of room
		Conservative	San Felipe	Theatre for 50	4 ft table at frnt&bck of room
		Reform	States	Theatre for 40	4 ft table at frnt&bck of room
	7:30-10:00 pm	Dinner Meal completed by 8:45 pm	Rio Grande	Rounds of 10 for 165	4ft table outside door for seating cards/ 4 washing stations inside platform/podium/mike
	10:15-12:00 pm	Oneg Shabbat	Spanish/ Republic	Cocktail tables	Open ⁿ Bar/Chips Cookies/Coffee/Tea
Sat 5/19	7:00-9:00 am	Breakfast	Rio Grande	Rounds of 10 for 165	2 washing stations
	8:00-10:45 am	Services			
		Orthodox	Confederate	Theatre for 50	4 ft table at frnt&bck of room
		Conservative	San Felipe	Theatre for 50	
	9:15-10:45 am	Reform	States	Theatre for 40	
	10:45-11:00 am	Kiddush	Hallway outside of services	Coffee Break Style	Wine, crackers, pound cake, coffee, tea
	11:15-1:00 pm	Plenary 2	Lakeside	Classroom for 165	podium/mike/platform dais for 3
	1:15-2:15 pm	Lunch	Rio Grande	Rounds of 10 for 165	4 washing stations inside entrances 4 ft table outside

DAY	TIME	SESSION	ROOM	SET UP	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Sat 5/19	2:30-4:00 pm	Workshop 2		Chairs only in Circle for 13	Flip Chart/Markers 4 ft table near door with pads/pencils pitchers with water & glasses
		Ramie Arian	Willow		
		Tsvi Blanchard	Mexico		
		Ronald Brauner	States		
		Lavey Derby	Texas		
		Ellyn Geller	Travis		
		Lydia Kukoff	Sycamore		
		Irwin Kula	Oak		
		Daniel Landes	Persimmon		
		Nathan Laufer	Hawthorne		
		David Nelson	San Felipe		
		Esther Perel	Magnolia		
		Charles Raffel	Cypress		
		Bernard Steinberg	Evergreen		
	4:00-7:00 pm	Free Time			
	7:00-7:30 pm	Mincha Services	Confederate	Theatre for 50	4 ft table at frnt&bck of room
	7:30-8:45 pm	Dinner Fully served by 8:40 except dessert	Rio Grande	Rounds of 10 for 165	4ft table outside door for seating cards/4 washing stations inside * large screen/vcr front of room * $\frac{1}{2}$ " Platform/Podium/Mike

DAY	TIME	SESSION	ROOM	SET UP	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Sat	8:40-8:55 pm	Ma'ariv Services	Confederate	Theatre for 50	
	8:55-9:00 pm	Havdalah	Rio Grande		candles/spice/matches and wine on tables
	9:15-10:30 pm	Soviet Jewry Video	Rio Grande		
	10:30-12:00 pm	Cocktails & Piano Bar	Spanish/ Republic	Cocktail tbls around room Piano in back center of room	Open Bar/Desserts at front corner of room
Sun 5/20	7:00-7:30 am	Orthodox Services	Confederate	Theatre for 40	4 ft table at frnt&bck of room
	7:00-8:00 am	Breakfast	Glass Menagerie	Rounds of 10 for 165	Platform/Podium/Mike 2 washing stations
	8:15-9:45 am	Workshop 3		Chairs only in Circle for 13	Flip Chart/Markers 4 ft table near door with Pads/pencils pitchers of water & glasses
		Ramie Arian	Willow		
		Tsvi Blanchard	Mexico		
		Ronald Brauner	States		
		Lavey Derby	Texas		
		Ellyn Geller	Travis		
		Lydia Kukoff	Sycamore		
		Irwin Kula	Oak		
		Daniel Landes	Persimmon		

DAY	TIME	SESSION	ROOM	SET UP	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Sun 5/20		Nathan Laufer	Hawthorne		
		David Nelson	San Felipe		
		Esther Perel	Magnolia		
		Charles Raffel	Cypress		
		Bernard Steinberg	Evergreen		
	10:00-11:00 am	Plenary III	Rio Grande	Classroom for 165	Platform/Podium/Mike Dais for 3
	11:00-11:10 am	Concluding Remarks	Rio Grande		
	11:10-11:30 am	Evaluations	To be filled out in Plenary		
	11:30-1:00 pm	Brunch	Spanish/ Republic	Rounds of 10 for 150	Platform/Podium/Mike 2 washing stations
	Noon	Departures begin	Lobby		Buses leave for Airport

INTERMARRIAGE AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN JEWRY

Plenary #1 The Implication of Inter-marriage for the American Jewish Community
(Egon Meyer)

Workshop #1 The Implications of Inter-marriage on Your Family.
(use trigger films)

Plenary #2 What can the Community Salvage From Inter-marriage?
(Lydia Kukoff and Jack Simcha Cohen with Egon Meyer as moderator)

Workshop #2 How can Your Family Cope With Inter-marriage?

Plenary #3 What Policies can the Community Implement to Reverse the Inter-marriage Trend For the Future? *Riskin*

Workshop #3 What Can You do To Prevent Inter-marriage in Your Family?

Workshop Leaders:

Option #1 Hire professionals around the country
and (psychologists, rabbis and educators) who deal heavily with these issues. (e.g. Esther Perel, Michael Wasserman, Joy Levitt and Joel Krone.)

Option #2 Use selected faculty members of WHF who either have experience in this field or are good at group process and social dynamics. (e.g. Kula, Brauner, Derby, R. Cowan, Chernick, A. Rosenfeld, Tsvi Blanchard, B. Steinberg, Telushkin, Gampel). Have faculty "trained" by inter-marriage professionals in day-long workshop prior to retreat.

ALUMNI RETREAT

4/6/90

MAY 18 - 20, 1990

T E N T A T I V E A G E N D A

THURSDAY, MAY 17TH, 1990

11:00 - 2:00 pm	Faculty Registration
2:00 - 3:30 pm	Facilitator Training
3:30 - 3:45 pm	Coffee Break
3:45 - 5:15 pm	Facilitator Training cont.
5:15 - 6:30 pm	Free Time
6:30 - 7:30 pm	Dinner
7:45 - 9:15 pm	Facilitator Training cont.

FRIDAY, MAY 18TH, 1990

8:00 - 9:00 am	Breakfast
9:00 - 12:00 noon	Facilitator Training cont.
10:00 - 2:30 pm	Alumni Members Registration
12:00 - 1:00 pm	Faculty Lunch
2:30 - 3:30 pm	Opening Plenary
3:45 - 5:15 pm	13 Workshops
5:15 - 6:30 pm	Free Time to Prepare for Shabbat
6:30 - 6:45 pm	Candle Lighting
6:45 - 7:30 pm	Services
7:30 - 9:00 pm	Kiddush & Dinner
9:00 - 10:00 pm	Evening Program Speaker: Mr. Leslie Wexner
10:15 - 12:00 pm	Oneg Shabbat

SATURDAY, MAY 19, 1990

7:00 - 9:00 am	Breakfast
8:00 - 10:45 am	Orthodox & Conservative Services
9:15 - 10:45 am	Reform Services
10:45 - 11:00 am	Kiddush
11:15 - 1:00 pm	Plenary
1:15 - 2:15 pm	Lunch
2:30 - 4:00 pm	13 Workshops
4:00 - 7:00 pm	Free Time
7:00 - 7:30 pm	Mincha Services
7:30 - 8:45 pm	Dinner
8:40 - 8:55 pm	Ma'ariv Services
8:55 - 9:00 pm	Havdalah
9:15 - 10:30 pm	Evening Program - <i>show Russian video</i>
10:30 - 12:00 pm	Cocktails and Piano Bar

SUNDAY, MAY 20, 1990

7:00 - 7:30 am	Orthodox Services (optional)
7:00 - 8:00 am	Breakfast
8:15 - 9:15 am	Plenary
9:30 - 11:00 am	13 Workshops
11:00 - 11:30 am	Evaluations (to be filled out in Workshops)
11:30 - 1:00 pm	Brunch
Noon	Departures Begin



NEWS RELEASE

COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT / FRANK STRAUSS, DIRECTOR

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT:
LINDA PEARLMAN
212-475-5000

INTERMARRIAGE TO BE FOCUS OF CJF SATELLITE NETWORK BROADCAST

AMERICAN JEWISH

NEW YORK, NY--"Responding to the Challenges of Intermarriage: The Roles of Jewish Communal Leaders, Professionals and Agencies" will be the focus of a CJF Satellite Network broadcast on Monday, March 12, 1990, from 4:00 -5:00 PM (EST). Jewish Federation, Jewish Family Service and Jewish Community Center leadership will meet to discuss the issue of intermarriage within the Jewish community and the role of Jewish community leaders in dealing with it.

Dr. Egon Mayer of the Intermarriage Research Institute of the City University of New York (CUNY) will moderate the program and be joined by Dr. Barry Kosmin, Director of the CJF Research Department and the 1990 National Study of American Jews; David Bellin, Center for Jewish Outreach to the Intermarried; Rabbi Rachel Cowan, Author and Director of the 92nd Street 'Y' programs of Outreach to Intermarrieds; and Esther Perel, Family Therapist and Psychological Consultant on Intermarriage.

. . . more . . .

Specific issues to be addressed include a discussion of the current facts, the type of help available to families and the challenges facing families in the years to come.

The CJF Satellite Network, which became operational in January 1988, currently has 59 participating Federations, each of which has installed the necessary satellite receiving equipment.

To find out the satellite receiving site closest to your community, contact the executive at your local Federation. For further information on this meeting as well as upcoming broadcasts on the CJF Satellite Network, contact Frank Strauss, Director, CJF Satellite Network, Council of Jewish Federations, 730 Broadway, New York, NY 10003.

The Council of Jewish Federations is the continental association of 200 Jewish Federations, the central community organizations which serve nearly 800 localities embracing a Jewish population of more than 6.1 million in the United States and Canada.

Established in 1932, CJF helps strengthen the work and the impact of Jewish Federations by developing programs to meet changing needs, providing an exchange of successful community experiences, establishing guidelines for fund raising and operations and engaging in joint planning and action on common purposes dealing with local, regional and international needs.

#

January 30, 1990
90-300-10

The Wexner Heritage Foundation

551 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Huntington Center Suite 3710
41 South High Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215

212 355 6115 New York
614 464 2772 Ohio

March 9, 1990

Ms. Dana Ryan
The Limited, Inc.
25 East 78th Street
New York, N.Y. 10021

Dear Dana:

Pursuant to our phone conversation, please check to make sure that Les is aware of the week-end Retreat being held for alumni on May 18-20 at The Woodlands Conference Center, near Houston.

The alumni groups invited are from Columbus, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, Milwaukee, Chicago, St. Louis and Indianapolis. Our guesstimate is 250 persons total, including faculty. The theme of the week-end is devoted to Intermarriage.

We would love to have Les speak at Friday night or Saturday night dinner, 18th or 19th, whichever is more convenient for him. He is not expected to speak on the theme, but any subject he chooses.

Incidentally, please check his book also for the dates of the Summer Institute, July 1-8, which will be held at Snowbird, Utah.

Thanks,



Herbert A. Friedman

HAF/jf

**Proposal 2: Three Workshops on Inter-marriage
for the Wexner Heritage Foundation**

Esther Perel
Michael Wasserman
March 4, 1990

I. Introduction to Inter-marriage

- a. Free association on inter-marriage
- b. Working in Pairs: "A dilemma that I face, personally or professionally, in connection with inter-marriage is. . ."
- c. Responses and summing up.

II. Couple and Family Dynamics in Interfaith Relationships

- a. UAHC film
- b. Discussion questions: "If I were Evelyn's parents/boyfriend, my reaction would be. . ." "If I were leading a group like that in the film, my goals would be. . ."
- c. Lecture/discussion on
 - life-cycle events ("time bombs") and their effect on couple and family dynamics
 - the marriage as an evolving (as opposed to static) entity
 - difficulties in communicating about religious/ethnic attachments, lack of vocabulary
 - dilemmas raised by parenthood

III. Identity and Family

- What is identity (as opposed to identification)
- Identity definition as an open-ended process
- continuum exercise
- sentence completion or scenarios
- lecture/discussion, summing up the issue of religious/ethnic identity

**Proposal 1: Academic Topics to Accompany Workshops
on Intermarriage for the Wexner Heritage Foundation**

Esther Perel
Michael Wasserman
March 4, 1990

History of Jewish communal responses to intermarriage

Texts on intermarriage


History of conversion to Judaism

Texts on conversion to Judaism

Patrilineal vs. matrilineal descent: sources and contemporary debates

Demographics of intermarriage in the American Jewish community

Jewish family values: What is a Jewish family?



BEHIND THE HEADLINES:**HOW INTERFATH COUPLES FACE
THE DECEMBER HOLIDAY DILEMMA**

By Allison Kaplan

NEW YORK, Dec. 14 (JTA) -- The Christmas holidays, which symbolize warmth and togetherness for Christians, are often a source of stress and discomfort for Jews.

But for the ever-growing number of households with intermarried partners, and even for those in which one partner has converted to Judaism, the holidays can be no less than a time of crisis.

Popularly known as the "December dilemma," the problem of dealing with the celebration of Christmas and Chanukah often marks a turning point in such couples' overall approach to religion, both for themselves and for their children.

While intermarriage is considered a deeply disturbing trend for most in the Jewish community, it is an undeniable reality.

According to research by sociologist Egon Mayer, about 35 to 40 out of 100 Jewish marriages now include a non-Jewish partner. Approximately 25 percent to 30 percent of intermarriages involve conversion to Judaism, with an estimated 5 percent converting to Christianity.

For intermarried couples, the holidays are "the annual test of how they handle their differences the rest of the year," Mayer said.

"It brings to a head differences that are there all year 'round but cannot be avoided during this time of year because of the high awareness that Christmas and Chanukah arouse."

Those involved agree. "The December dilemma intensifies and highlights what happens during the rest of the year," Roberta, a non-Jewish woman with a Jewish husband, said at a workshop on the issue at Manhattan's 92nd Street Y.

'Fellow Berkeley Radicals'

Wed during the 1960s when they were self-described "fellow Berkeley radicals," Roberta and her husband did not find the issue of religion troubling during the first 11 years of their marriage.

She said she had always assumed their home would be a potpourri of religious and cultural traditions. She had happily participated in Passover seders and assumed that her husband would accept her traditions just as tolerantly.

After their first child was born, she said she hoped that their family traditions might now include a Christmas tree.

She was utterly unprepared for her husband's reaction. He said the tree would not only disturb him but deeply threaten him.

"It's like having the boot of the oppressor in my own home," he told her.

The Christmas tree debate led Roberta to rethink the role religion should play in her home and resulted in a growing involvement in Judaism for the entire family.

They joined a progressive synagogue on Manhattan's Upper West Side, which attracts many intermarried couples. Their two daughters have attended religious school and the eldest is now preparing for a Bat Mitzvah. The daughters converted to Judaism, though Roberta has not.

Despite the family's growing Jewishness, Roberta's reluctance to surrender her cultural heritage is symbolized in the small Christmas tree that still stands in her home.

Roberta's case is typical in that it is usually

the Jewish partner who feels most threatened by celebration of Christmas.

With the weight of American society's stress on the Christmas holiday, Jews fear that if they allow signs of Christmas inside the home, their Jewishness will be eroded.

"Jewishness has been such a threatened identity for so long," said Rabbi Rachel Cowan, who directs interfaith programs for the 92nd Street Y. "The paradox for them being involved with someone non-Jewish is that their Jewish identity is threatened in an intimate way."

Non-Jews do not feel an equal threat, Cowan said, and are usually much more open to Jewish symbols and traditions. Therefore, it is usually the non-Jewish partner who feels the family should celebrate both religions, and the Jewish partner who resists it.

Worst Time Of Year

Neil Jacobs, another workshop participant, said that "Christmas was unquestionably the worst time of year" when he was growing up. As a young boy attending yeshiva in an Italian neighborhood, he did not directly experience anti-Semitism, but said he "felt more vulnerable" in addition to feeling left out and alienated.

He is adamant in wanting his home with his wife of five months free of Christmas symbols, and has gone as far as to oppose having a poinsettia plant in his home during the holidays.

He has, however, agreed to celebrate Christmas with his new wife's parents at her childhood home in Vermont, and will learn, he said, to "force the words 'Merry Christmas' through my teeth."

"Joan is my wife," Jacobs said, "and these are her parents. To cut them off and not show respect for their traditions is not correct."

Lina Romanoff, who heads the Philadelphia-based Jewish Converts Network, said that even in homes where a partner has chosen Judaism as his or her religion, it is often difficult for the person to give up treasured childhood symbols of family holidays.

One convert Romanoff counseled was active in Jewish life, but had such an emotional attachment to the symbol of the Christmas tree, that she actually kept a fully decorated tree hidden inside a closet during the holiday season.

"Every year, she would sit in a closet with a Christmas tree and cry," Romanoff said. "She called herself a Christmas tree junkie. On the outside, she was a model Jew, but she had a deep, dark secret."

Patience Advised

In cases where the non-Jewish or converted partner feels it is impossible to give up a Christmas symbol, Romanoff advises patience. She points to the example of another convert she counseled who felt she could not give up a Christmas tree.

Romanoff told the woman's Jewish husband to be patient and advised her to go ahead and put up the tree.

"A year later, the tree was smaller," Romanoff said. "As time went on, it got smaller and smaller. Eventually, she said she didn't have to have it anymore. As her comfort level with Judaism increased, she didn't need it."

When it comes to children, Romanoff takes a harder line. Couples "should agree to raise the child in one faith," she said. "When they are raised with both religions or nothing, they are confused, angry and resentful later in life."

DEFENSE LAWYER IN FINTA NAZI TRIAL CHALLENGES EXISTENCE OF GAS CHAMBERS

By Susan Birnbaum

TORONTO, Dec. 14 (JTA) -- The attorney defending Imre Finta, on trial here for Nazi crimes, challenged in court Wednesday the existence of gas chambers.

Douglas Christie questioned an expert witness from the City University of New York on whether the extermination chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau did, in fact, exist.

He used a controversial book written by a Jewish historian to substantiate what he called documented evidence that facts about the gas chambers had been grossly exaggerated.

Cross-examining Professor Randolph Braham while brandishing the book "Why Did the Skies Not Darken?" by Professor Arno Mayer of Princeton University, Christie said that Braham must "recognize that historians now hold there is little evidence for the gas chambers."

Mayer's book questions the numbers of Jews who died during the Holocaust and the manner in which they died.

In the courtroom, Christie's contention drew snickers from about five non-Jewish Hungarians who have been regularly attending the trial and who have previously locked horns with the Jewish Holocaust survivors in attendance. The groups sit on opposite sides of the courtroom.

Wednesday's attack on Braham's testimony was in line with Christie's attempt last week to discredit the testimony of two Hungarian Holocaust survivors from Israel.

Christie said Wednesday that based on Braham's one visit to Auschwitz, Braham "didn't know what a gas chamber is."

At this, there was some laughter from the jury, which often appears mesmerized by Christie.

'A Deal To Save Their Lives'

Braham refuted Christie's charge, saying he based his information on survivors' accounts. Christie contended that "there were no written orders for the gas chambers."

Braham, who responded quietly and somewhat haltingly to Christie's brash assertions, testified that "many Hungarian Jews ended up in the gas chamber at Auschwitz-Birkenau," including "many of those found unsuitable for labor."

Wednesday was Braham's third day of testimony at the trial of Finta, who was a captain in the Nazi-controlled Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie during World War II.

Finta, 77, a retired Ontario restaurateur, has pleaded not guilty in Ontario Supreme Court to eight counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including manslaughter, forcible confinement and robbery. He is charged with the forcible confinement of 8,617 Jews in the ghetto of Szeged, Hungary, in June 1944.

During the cross-examination, Christie also elicited an acknowledgment from Braham that Jewish leaders in Szeged, as members of the Jewish Council, compiled lists of Jews to be deported. Those Jews who cooperated with the Nazis were permitted to go to Switzerland and were not charged after the war, Christie stated.

Braham, saying he was "morally torn here," admitted it had, unfortunately happened, but that they had "entered into a deal to save their lives."

Christie replied, "So Hungarians entered into a deal with the Germans to save their lives."

Christie tried to draw an analogy to the American and Canadian internment of Japanese-origin citizens of the two countries.

Braham replied that given the disparate conditions, Jews "would have loved to be in the shoes" of the Japanese.

JEWS IN LATIN AMERICA WILL THRIVE ONLY IN DEMOCRACY, BBI LEADER SAYS

By David Friedman

WASHINGTON, Dec. 14 (JTA) -- The Jews in Latin America cannot afford to be neutral in the struggle to preserve democracy in that region, a Latin American Jewish leader warned last week.

There is a future for Jews in Latin America only if they maintain "a very strong commitment to strengthen democracy, to help it flourish, to take care of social problems, to help those who suffer," said Alfredo Neuburger, B'nai B'rith International's assistant executive vice president for Latin America.

Neuburger, who lives in Buenos Aires, spoke at a day-long symposium on "What Economic Measures Will Advance Democracy in Latin America?" sponsored by the International Council of B'nai B'rith.

The last decade has brought a rapid growth in democratic governments to a majority of Latin American countries, and as a result, the region's population now has great expectations, he said.

But, he cautioned, "this massive return to democracy came at the same time as the worst economic crisis that Latin America has endured in this century."

The deteriorating economic situation throughout much of Latin America has affected Jews no differently than others, he said. Most Latin American Jews are middle class. But in Argentina, for example, the middle class has been "pushed down" by the economy and there are now many Jews in poverty along with other Argentines, Neuburger explained.

Call For A 'Strong Hand'

Since the democratic governments of Latin America have been unable to solve their social and economic problems, some people, Jews among them, are calling for "a strong hand," he warned.

He underlined that Jews, just like many other Latin Americans, have no experience with democracy. Where there is no tradition of pluralism or dissent, democracy "is not part and parcel of everybody's life."

He added that he is "disturbed" by Jewish self-centered concerns. "I have heard those who have said there are some dictatorships that are not so bad because they don't affect the Jewish community," he said.

Neuburger stressed that Jews become second-class citizens in dictatorships, just like everyone else.

Now, as economic turbulence grows alongside democracy, anti-Semitic forces have begun to appear.

Neuburger said this is now happening in Argentina, a country with an anti-Semitic legacy, and in Brazil, where neo-Nazi groups have begun to raise their heads publicly.

Despite these dangers, Neuburger predicted that there will be no mass emigration of the some 500,000 to 600,000 Jews in Latin America. He said the various Jewish communities of the region are integrated into their individual countries and are committed to the destinies of these lands.

THE
WEXNER
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION

Herbert A. Friedman
President

SEPT. LECTURES 1989

- 19th - WASHINGTON
20th - ATLANTA
21st - BOCA RATON

Inspirational -

WHY BE JEWISH
WHY NOT INTERMARRY
WHAT IS SO SPECIAL ABOUT JUDAISM
WHAT DOES "CHOSEN" MEAN?

WOODLAND RETREAT - FEB. 1990

Possibly use this as
theme

8/15/89

NL

What about meeting with
Prof. Steven Cohen (Queens? CUNY?)
who did that book on American
Jewish Assimilation or Transformation.

He deals with all the subjects
we do — Inter-marriage; conversion;
assimilation; changing forms of religious
observance, etc, etc

What about using him (if we think
he has the personality) for the Honason
retreat, or a retreat we might be
planning for the Shumai, or even Year III
on Issues?

Let's discuss

Steven Bayme

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

McTher-

see exp.

pp. 5-10,
29

כ"ה ח' אלול

Handwritten signature

זכר אלה יעקב וישראל




The American Jewish
Committee

Institute of Human Relations, 165 East 56 Street, New York, NY 10022-2746 • 212 751-4000

THE WILLIAM PETSCHER

NATIONAL JEWISH FAMILY CENTER




AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES
**ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES
IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY**

**Singles, Single Parents,
Childless Couples, and
Mixed-Marrieds**

Steven M. Cohen



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, Institute of Human Relations, 165 East 56 Street, New York, NY 10022-2746



**AMERICAN JEWISH
ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES
IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY**

**Singles, Single Parents,
Childless Couples, and
Mixed-Marrieds**

Steven M. Cohen



FOREWORD

AMERICAN JEWISH

In recent years the Jewish community has expressed mounting concern about the growth of alternative family structures and constellations. Although most Jews continue to marry at some point in their lives and to have one or more children, many are passing through prolonged periods of singlehood and voluntary childlessness. Jews who do marry enjoy a divorce deficit relative to the non-Jewish population, but the numbers of failed marriages and single-parent homes have been increasing in absolute terms. Most importantly, intermarriage without the conversion of the non-Jewish spouse has become an increasingly legitimate option for almost a third of American Jewry.

The Jewish community is worried about these subpopulations for two reasons: First, each represents a departure from traditional Jewish norms, which define family in terms of marriage and children. The Jewish community, of course, always reached out to and accommodated those who pursued alternative living patterns whether out of choice or necessity. However, it simultaneously upheld marriage and parenting as vehicles both of self-fulfillment and of preserving Jewish continuity. The increasing numbers of Jews found in alternative family constellations threaten to undermine traditional ideals and replace them with a family value system in which all alternatives become equally valid.

Second, on a pragmatic level, Jewish communal affiliation has been heavily correlated with married couples who have children. Conversely, Jews living in alternative family settings manifest declining rates of participation in communal activities, thereby threatening future Jewish continuity.

Given these communal concerns, the American Jewish Committee's William Petschek National Jewish Family Center commissioned Steven M. Cohen to develop a portrait of contemporary Jews living in alternative families, utilizing the population studies of seven Jewish communities reflective of 3 million Jews, or over half of America's Jewish population. To be sure, the report does not reflect western Jewish communities, particularly Los Angeles, where rates of communal affiliation and participation are even lower than those described here, and therefore far more disturbing to communal leaders than the data for eastern Jewish communities.

Many of Cohen's findings sound familiar; others are surprising. Jews continue to marry in overwhelming numbers. The change lies in the later age of marriage, which may lead to decreased fertility. Moreover, since communal affiliation correlates so closely with the presence of children in the home, prolonged periods of singlehood and/or childlessness may create patterns of nonaffiliation that might prove unbreakable.

An even greater concern are the large numbers of mixed-marrieds, who participate even less than do singles in organized Jewish life. Surprisingly, Cohen here refutes the conventional wisdom that higher education means greater intermarriage. Those who pursue graduate degrees are actually less likely than others to find themselves in mixed marriages, probably because the heavy concentration of Jews in elite graduate programs increases the opportunities for endogamous Jewish marriages.

Similarly, Cohen refutes the popular perception that Jewish women with children are most likely to be pursuing full-time occupations and professions. One quarter of Jewish women with children are indeed working full time, but as many are engaged in part-time employment, and 50 percent prefer to stay out of the work force entirely until their children are older. Conversely, the single Jewish mother is twice as likely to work full time than is her married counterpart.

Finally, Cohen underscores how strongly Orthodox Jews have been preserving traditional family patterns. Orthodox Jews tend to marry early, have three or more children, and are the least likely to experience marital breakup. In New York City, children of Orthodox parents reported virtually no incidence of intermarriage. Of particular significance in this respect is the low incidence of intermarriage among alumni of Jewish day schools. Conversely, those with no Jewish education were the most likely to marry non-Jews. To be sure, Jewish day schools are serving children of the most committed homes and therefore have a built-in advantage in terms of countering intermarriage. Nevertheless, Cohen's findings should challenge those who perceive the reality of intermarriage as so overpowering that nothing can be done to counteract it. The value of day schools to the community ought to be especially recognized at a time when the cost of quality day-school education may be outstripping the ability of middle-class parents to pay for it.

Cohen discusses the demonstrated effectiveness of trips to Israel in building and maintaining Jewish identity. The Orthodox, as is well known, visit Israel more often and in proportionately greater numbers than do other Jews, although such visits are not required by their ideology. They are, in fact, desirable for all American Jews, irrespective of religious affiliation. An extended period spent in Israel might well be made a vital component of every teenager's Jewish education.

Cohen's analysis of his data suggests several possible directions for targeted and focused communal initiatives. Particular attention, for example, ought to be paid to the economic and psychological vulnerability of the single-parent home. Single parents express considerable desire to participate in communal programs since they often require Jewish communal services -- day care, for example. Such linkages to the Jewish community can serve as a powerful stabilizing force for children of divorce. However, single parents often face stiff economic barriers to utilizing communal services and may not be aware of the availability of scholarships and other forms of assistance. Communal policymakers ought to ensure the universal availability of services, especially to those who lack the means to pay their full cost.


Similarly, Cohen notes how policy might be targeted to well-educated Jewish women in their 30s, who are most at risk of never marrying. These women may be drawn to the Jewish community by cultural programs such as those pioneered in New York City by the 92nd Street YM-YWHA.

For working parents, the report highlights the need for surrogate child care. Public debate thus far has centered primarily on full-time day care. Given the preference of many married women for some part-time employment, the Jewish community ought to consider providing alternatives to full-time day care, including part-time child care and training of Jewish "nannies" for in-home child care. Moreover, the community should consider increasing the availability of part-time employment within Jewish communal organizations.

The report repeatedly underscores the success of Orthodox families and urges that attention be given to extending these models to non-Orthodox households. Orthodox families generally have three or more children, invest heavily in quality Jewish education, and enjoy very low rates of divorce. These facts should not be attributed to religious prohibitions against birth control and divorce, which are either minimal or nonexistent in traditional Judaism. Rather Orthodox successes testify to the close interrelationship between family and community. Strong families build strong Jewish communities. Conversely, vital Jewish communities create a public climate conducive to healthy family life. This latter aspect has been particularly evident in the case of the modern Orthodox Jewish experience in America -- a fact that should not be ignored by those who question how public norms can affect private behavior.

Steven Bayme, *Director*
Jewish Communal Affairs Department





ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, rapid social change revolutionized the American family. More women entered the labor force and professions; young adults married later and postponed having children; and they divorced (and remarried) more often. As a result, many Americans were spending smaller fractions of their lives in families consisting of married couples with children.

Not surprisingly, these changes affected Jews as well, with significant, largely adverse, consequences for the Jewish involvement of families. Like Christians, Jews' involvement in Jewish activities is highest in conventional two-parents-plus-children families (Nash and Berger 1962; Nash 1968; Sklare and Greenblum 1979; Cohen 1983, 1988). Married parents with school-age children exhibit the highest rates of religious observance and communal affiliation.

The several years around 1970 saw dramatic increases in the number of unconventional or alternative families among Jewish young adults: singles, childless couples, intermarrieds, and single parents. Such alternative families participate less frequently in Jewish life than do conventional families.

In an analysis of changes in Boston Jewry between 1965 and 1975 (*American Modernity and Jewish Identity*, 1983), I concluded that almost all the declines in measures of Jewish involvement during the ten-year period could be attributed to the rise of alternative families. Two processes were operating. First, there were many more singles, single parents, childless couples, and intermarrieds in 1975 than there were in 1965. The proportion of conventional families -- the type given to higher levels of Jewish involvement -- had declined, causing some of the declines in several measures of Jewish activity.

But there was another process at work as well. Not only were there more alternative families but, by 1975, these sorts of families had grown more distant from Jewish life than their counterparts in 1965. Since the conventional families' Jewish-involvement levels had held constant, the gap in Jewish involvement between the Jewishly stable conventional families and the Jewishly declining alternatives widened considerably between 1965 and 1975.

In the 1970s, professional and volunteer leaders of organized Jewry came to recognize the challenges to Jewish life posed by the expanding numbers of young adults in alternative family situations and their lack of involvement in things Jewish. With a fair measure of alarm, Jewish

agencies sponsored conferences, issued press releases, and launched community programs to address the problems they believed inherent in the growth of the young singles population, in declining birthrates, in expanding intermarriage, and in rising divorce.

Organizational leaders sought to enhance the Jewish involvement of Jews in alternative family statuses through programs of "containment" and "recruitment." Containment meant efforts to curtail the growth of singlehood, childlessness (or postponed or reduced childbearing), intermarriage, and divorce. Recruitment endeavors took a different tack, accepting the existence of large numbers of alternative-family Jews but trying to increase their involvement in conventional Jewish life. Among such "outreach" initiatives were special programs for Jewish singles, mixed-marrieds, and single parents.

Today, the search for ways to contain the number of alternative families and for ways to bring them into Jewish life continues. Unfortunately, there has been little social-scientific study of young Jewish adults in conventional and alternative family configurations. This paper addresses that gap in our knowledge. By analyzing data collected recently in seven major Jewish communities, it provides some basic information on the family patterns of Jewish young adults and their implications for Jewish involvement.

The analysis first focuses on rates -- that is, the frequency in various sex and age groups -- of singlehood, divorce, and intermarriage. It then proceeds to examine how parents' religiosity and education may have affected these rates. Finally, the heart of the analysis asks how marriage, childbearing, divorce, and intermarriage affect each of numerous sorts of Jewish religious and communal activities. By identifying the patterns of Jewish identity change over the course of the family life cycle, policymakers can better appreciate the dimensions of the challenge posed by Jews in alternative families. In addition, they may gain some idea of what sorts of policies and programs may enhance the Jewish involvement of young adults, particularly those in alternative families.

Jewish communal policymakers and the Jewish rank and file react differently to singlehood, childlessness, divorce, and intermarriage. Policymakers differ among themselves as to the validity and acceptability of each of these statuses; they also tend to assign greater or lesser degrees of "blame" or merit to those who happen to be, or choose to be, single or childless or divorced or intermarried. This analysis makes neither normative judgments, explicit or implied, as to the worthiness of these statuses, nor any assumptions about how individuals come to occupy them. As a group, the four statuses simply represent the most frequently observed departures from the conventional Jewish family.

THE DATA: JEWISH POPULATION STUDIES FROM SEVEN METROPOLITAN AREAS

The data for this study, provided by the North American Jewish Data Bank, were derived from population studies sponsored by local Jewish federations in seven metropolitan areas: New York (1981), Chicago (1982), Cleveland (1981), Miami (1982), Washington (1983), Philadelphia (1984), and Boston (1985). About 3 million Jews were living in these areas, over half the total American Jewish population (estimated at 5.8 million in the 1986 *American Jewish Year Book*). In all, these surveys comprised 10,306 respondents, of whom 2,937 were in the 25-39 age range.

The seven surveys are not completely representative of American Jewry, being confined to Jewish communities east of the Mississippi. While these encompass the vast majority of American Jews, Jews from smaller and western communities are not represented in the data. With its 600,000 Jews, the Los Angeles metropolitan area is the most notable omission.

The analysis is restricted to those 25-39 years old for several reasons. Survey data of adults under 25 are particularly unreliable. Many of these youngest adults live in temporary housing, on campuses, or with their parents, and are typically undersampled by telephone interviewers. And since this inquiry focuses upon the younger generation of American Jews and how their family choices affect their Jewish involvement, extending the analysis to those older than 39 would have diluted this aim.

The analysis often distinguishes between the New York area and elsewhere. Since the New York area contains more Jews than the other six cities combined, failure to separate out New York would have generated results that reflect a disproportionate New York influence. For the most part, though, the important substantive conclusions are the same for New York as for other communities.

WOMEN MARRY EARLIER THAN MEN;
ALMOST ALL JEWS EVENTUALLY MARRY;
DIVORCE RATES CLIMB WITH AGE

Among Jews 25-39 years old, about a third of the men and a slightly smaller proportion of the women were single (table 1). "Single" embraces all the currently unmarried -- that is, the never-married as well as the divorced and widowed. About a quarter of the men and a fifth of the women had never married.

As one might expect, the rates of both singlehood and never-married varied considerably with age. Among those 25-29, about half the men but only about a third of the women had never married. But by the late 30s, the proportion of never-married men and women had dropped to about 10 percent. (If roughly 10 percent of those 35-39 were never-married, it is reasonable to conclude that more than 10 percent of the 35-36-year-olds and fewer than 10 percent of the 38-39-year-olds were never married.)

These results suggest two things: first, women marry earlier than men; second, almost all Jews (well over 90 percent) get married at some time. Although almost all Jews marry by the beginning of middle age, increases in divorces leave large numbers of Jews under 40 single. That is, as age increases, rates of singlehood decline, but they decline neither as rapidly nor as deeply as do the proportions who never married. Among those in their late 30s, about a quarter of men and women (both in New York and elsewhere) were single. As age increases, the chances of having been married at least once go up, but so do the chances of having experienced a divorce. By the time they reach their late 30s, about a fifth to a quarter of those ever-married have been divorced (of whom some have remarried).

These trends in marriage and divorce mean that the reason for singlehood changes over the years. Among those 25-29, almost all singles are never-married; among those ten years older (35-39), about two-thirds of the singles have been married before, have been divorced, and have not yet remarried.

Although the vast majority of the currently unmarried will eventually marry, there is no escaping the fact that the median age at marriage is probably higher now than it has been at any time since the end of World War II. And it is the later age of marriage that has sparked concern, if not alarm, among parents who worry that their children may never marry and Jewish policymakers who worry about the effect of delayed marriage on the size of the Jewish population.

THE MORE RELIGIOUSLY TRADITIONAL MARRY EARLIER
AND DIVORCE LESS OFTEN

In general, Americans who are more religiously involved display what may be called more traditional family characteristics. They marry younger, more frequently within their group, have more children, and divorce less often.

Among Jews, traditionalism (sometimes measured by religious-service attendance, sometimes by observance, and sometimes by movement affiliation) has been linked to higher fertility, lower intermarriage, and lower divorce rates (Broadbar-Nemzer 1984, 1986; Cohen and Ritterband 1981; DellaPergola 1980; Goldscheider 1973; Cohen 1988; Massarik and Chenkin 1973; Sherrow 1971; Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983).)

One question that the literature on Jewish traditionalism and family patterns leaves unresolved is whether the repeated and clear differences between the Orthodox and the other Jewish denominations are to be found between the less traditional denominations. Simply put, while we know that the Orthodox have more traditional family patterns than the non-Orthodox, we do not know whether those raised in Conservative homes display more traditional family patterns than those raised in Reform homes and whether the Reform, in turn, have more traditional family patterns than those raised by nondenominational parents.

To address these questions, table 2 presents the percentages of single, never-married, and ever-divorced (of those ever-married) by parents' denomination, broken down into age and sex groupings. For the most part (and there are indeed exceptions), the results support the idea that the Orthodox do indeed have more conventional (or traditional) family patterns than the non-Orthodox. With less consistency, they provide limited support for the idea that those from Conservative backgrounds exhibit more traditional family patterns than do Reform Jews. (It should be emphasized that the table examines parents' and not respondents' denomination; presumably, the association between conventional family patterns and one's own denomination are stronger than those involving parents' affiliation.)

The table contains six age/sex groupings, providing six comparisons between Orthodox and non-Orthodox respondents. In four of these, the Orthodox married more often than those in all the other denominations. The two exceptions to this generalization occur among the youngest men (who have the lowest ever-married rates) and the oldest women (who have the highest ever-married frequencies). Moreover, among the oldest men, almost as many of those from Conservative homes had been married as those from Orthodox homes. It appears that the Orthodox "advantage" in marrying early takes effect only when substantial numbers of a particular age-and-sex group start getting married, and it evaporates when almost all members of the group have had the chance to marry. In other words, the Orthodox marry earlier but, in time, they probably do not marry more often than the non-Orthodox.

Those brought up Orthodox also divorce less frequently. Orthodox-raised respondents who had been married at least once were considerably less likely than non-Orthodox of the same age and gender to have experienced divorce. This gap is all the more impressive when we recall that the most traditional tend to marry earlier. Thus, for any given age group, the Orthodox have been at risk of divorce far longer than have the non-Orthodox. Clearly, family traditionalism extends to a lower probability of divorce as well as a greater probability of early marriage.

Are the Orthodox/non-Orthodox differences replicated in parallel differences between Conservative and less traditional Jews? While the comparisons between offspring of Conservative and Reform parents yield more ambiguous and less consistent results, they do point in the direction of greater family traditionalism among the children of Conservative parents. Within age/sex

groupings, rates of never-married for Reform offspring either exceed or match those of respondents raised in Conservative homes. These patterns suggest a somewhat earlier timing of marriage among children of Conservative parents. In the six comparisons of divorce rates, three show the Reform children exceeding the Conservatives, two are the reverse, and one is a virtual tie. Over the entire age range (25-39), the children of Conservative families report less frequent divorce than those of Reform families. These results, a muddy picture at best, lend weak support to the idea that the relationship between religious traditionalism and family traditionalism extends beyond the Orthodox to the two other major denominations as well.

One possible policy implication to be drawn from these findings is that singles programs should be devised to appeal to non-Orthodox adults. The far lower rates of singlehood among younger Orthodox Jews suggests that the Orthodox are generally successful in finding eligible and compatible mates. The "problem" of singlehood, then, is largely limited to the non-Orthodox 90 percent of American Jewry. If so, then insofar as singles programs have a denominational slant, it may be wise to direct limited funds and resources to programs under Conservative, Reform, or non-denominational auspices such as the Jewish community center.

The other implication to emerge from these findings is to focus on the familism of the Orthodox. In terms not only of early marriage and low divorce rates but also (as we shall see) of low intermarriage rates and higher birthrates (reported in other studies), the Orthodox exhibit family patterns that Jewish communal policymakers tend to applaud. We may want to ask what it is about the Orthodox that leads to such ostensibly positive family patterns. Can, and should, Orthodox familism be emulated by or "exported" to non-Orthodox Jews? How do the Orthodox succeed in promoting marriage, in-marriage, stable marriage, and higher birthrates?

DAY SCHOOL ALUMNI:
EARLIER MARRIAGE, LESS DIVORCE

As one might expect, the family differences between the Orthodox and the others resemble those found between graduates of full-time Jewish schools and those with other sorts of childhood Jewish schooling. That is, for the most part, day-school and yeshiva alumni reported far earlier marriage and far less divorce than did others (table 3). To take one example, among women 30-34 years old, just 8 percent of the day-school alumnae were single compared to over a quarter of the afternoon-school and Sunday-school graduates; similarly, only 7 percent of ever-married day-school alumnae had experienced divorces, a rate less than half as large as that found among those with other Jewish-school backgrounds. However, the relationship between Jewish educational intensiveness and family traditionalism does not extend to other forms of Jewish schooling. That is, there is no clear pattern of differences in timing of marriage or frequency of divorce distinguishing those with afternoon-school, Sunday-school, or no Jewish education.

The traditionalist marriage and divorce patterns among the full-time alumni ought not be seen as necessarily reflecting the effects of full-time Jewish schooling per se. Rather, as the research literature on a variety of outcomes documents, what at first blush appears to be a sizable impact of yeshiva and day-school training is, in fact, attributable to parents' religiosity (Cohen 1974, 1988; Bock 1976; Himmelfarb 1974, 1977). Day-school and yeshiva graduates often appear different later in life largely because their parents were highly observant. Day-school students are a self-selecting group. Applying this reasoning to the present case, the traditional family pattern of alumni of full-time Jewish schools probably owes more to the traditionalism of their upbringing (i.e., their parents) than to the educational impact of attendance at a yeshiva or day school. These results do, however, confirm the inference that traditional upbringing leads to traditional adult family patterns.

THE IMPACT OF HIGHER EDUCATION: MUCH LATER
MARRIAGE FOR THE MOST EDUCATED WOMEN

American women with higher levels of education tend to marry later. Since the demands of building a family still fall more heavily upon the wife/mother than upon the husband/father, professional women probably (correctly) see marriage and childbearing as conflicting with their careers, especially in the early stages. Education may also impede women's chances of marrying young in another way. Men seem to marry "down," that is, they marry women no more educated than they are; on the other hand, most women marry "up," that is, they marry men as educated or more educated than they are. To the extent this pattern is widespread, the higher a woman's education, the smaller is the pool of men who are educationally suitable marriage partners.

Table 4 reveals the very strong adverse impact of Jewish women's educational status upon their likelihood of ever having been married. No such relationship exists for the men. Neither does there seem to be any consistent relationship between education and the probability of divorce, for either men or women.

The relationship between women's education and their chances of marrying is apparent at all age levels. Taking the 30-34-year-olds as one example, we find that only 6 percent of women with some college were never married, as were 12 percent of those with a B.A. degree, 24 percent of those with a low-status master's degree (e.g., M.A. or M.S.W.), and an astounding 43 percent of those with a high-status graduate degree (e.g., Ph.D., M.D., M.B.A., law degree, etc.). Even at age 35-39, the differences were pronounced: of women with a B.A., 9 percent were never married; of those with a high-status graduate degree, 21 percent had never married. In all three age groups, more women with high-status graduate degrees were unmarried than were those with just college degrees.

Moreover, the prospects of well-educated single women finding equally educated Jewish men to marry are quite slim. Among Jews aged 30-39 with a high-status graduate degree, women were single twice as often as men. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these single, highly educated Jewish women in their late 30s are either quite anxious about their prospects of getting married or else resigned to the probability of never marrying.

Whether the goal is to decrease singlehood among Jewish young adults, or to increase the involvement of single Jews in Jewish life, the highly educated single woman in her 30s ought to concern Jewish policymakers. Of course, synagogues, federations, and Jewish community centers are not in a position to restrict singles' programs to holders of high-status graduate degrees aged 30 and over. But they are able to target certain industries or professions in their recruitment and advertising. Moreover, they can plan programs that will appeal to the highly educated. Travel programs are one example, as are lectures conducted at a fairly sophisticated level.

MIXED MARRIAGE: LOWER IN NEW YORK,
HIGHER AMONG MEN, STABLE OVER TIME

Since the late 1960s, intermarriage has been a central concern of Jewish communal leaders. But despite widespread interest in the topic, social-scientific investigation of the phenomenon has been fairly limited. We still are not quite certain about the rates of Jewish-gentile intermarriage, how and why they vary across communities or for different categories of Jews, or what are its consequences for the individuals' Jewish involvement, for the Jewish community, and for Jewish population size. On these issues, the research literature, sparse as it is, contains a good measure of inconsistent if not downright contradictory pieces of evidence and interpretations (Sherrow 1971; Farber and Gordon 1982; Mayer and Sheingold 1979; Mayer 1983a, 1983b, 1985; Cohen 1980, 1988; Lazerwitz 1980, 1981; Goldscheider 1986).

This report's limited analysis cannot definitively answer the many pressing questions regarding intermarriage. But neither can it ignore the topic entirely. Rather, the meager evidence available from the seven-city data set should be seen as a small contribution to our very limited collective understanding of Jewish-gentile marriage.

To some readers, the rates of mixed marriage reported here may seem lower than expected. Aside from the sampling problems described in the Appendix, one reason for this is the geographic location of the seven surveys. Much of the "headlines" associated with intermarriage rates have come from studies of communities with unusually high rates, places of relatively newer Jewish settlement west of the Mississippi. In contrast, the New York and Miami studies (two of the seven used here) reported the lowest rates of intermarriage of any recent major Jewish population study. The other five surveys were conducted in communities with well-established Jewish populations where Jewish density exceeds that found in the West or in newer areas of settlement.

The rates reported below may seem low for another reason. Intermarriage rates may be reported in four different ways. They may be computed either for couples or for individuals; and they may be based on religion before marriage (such as at time of birth or in childhood) or after marriage (when conversion may have already taken place). Couple rates are always higher than individual rates, and rates calculated on the basis of current (postmarital) religion are lower than those based on premarital religion.

To illustrate the difference between couple and individual rates, suppose that thirty Jews marry; ten marry non-Jews and the remaining twenty marry each other. These thirty Jews then would be involved in twenty marriages, ten of which would be intermarriages. In other words, the couple rate (proportion of couples with at least one Jew who are intermarried) would be 50 percent but the individual rate would be only 33 percent. The rates reported below are (the lower) individual rates (proportion of Jews intermarried); in contrast, most population studies report (the higher) couple rates.

Several previous studies have reported that about one-sixth of born-gentiles convert to Judaism after marriage to a Jew; the rate is about four to five times higher for gentile women than it is for gentile men (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983; Cohen 1988). A far smaller number of Jews (no study provides an accurate estimate) abandon their Jewish identity after marrying a non-Jew. As a result of these conversions, the outmarriage rate (computed on the basis of religion some time before marriage) is higher than the mixed-marriage rate (computed on the basis of religious identity of the marriage partners at the time of marriage). The rates below are the (lower) mixed-marriage rates.

The rates are confined to those who were married at the time of the survey. Since intermarried couples have a higher divorce rate, exclusion of the currently divorced yields a lower mixed-marriage rate than would otherwise be the case. Finally, the mixed-marriage rates reported below are computed on the basis of religion reported by the Jewish respondent. Some respondents might regard their spouses as Jewish, while the spouses themselves would report otherwise.

With these qualifications in mind, we can proceed to examine the rates of mixed marriage by location (New York area versus non-New York), gender, and age (table 5). The male mixed-marriage rate is about double the female rate; moreover, the rate outside New York is about double that found in the New York area. The rates vary little by age. Contrary to reports of rapidly rising intermarriage, among those 25-39 the younger respondents report rates that are almost identical with those of their elder counterparts.

Consistent with the foregoing, mixed-marriage rates are lowest among New York women (6 percent), highest among men outside New York (22 percent), and intermediate among New York men and women outside New York.

LESS MIXED MARRIAGE AMONG
CHILDREN OF THE ORTHODOX

Religious Jews are less likely to marry gentiles (Sherrow 1971; Massarik and Chenkin 1973; Cohen 1988). One reason is that the more religiously traditional are more ethnically segregated; another is that they tend to be more deeply committed to Jewish continuity and involvement. Thus they are less likely than the more secular even to meet non-Jewish prospective marriage partners, and, should they do so, they are less likely to have an interest in pursuing intimate relationships with them. Moreover, in the event that a Jew and gentile do marry, the gentile is more likely to convert where the Jew is deeply committed to Judaism.

It therefore comes as no surprise to find (table 6) that the children of the Orthodox are the least likely to report marriage to non-Jews. In New York, mixed marriage among children of Orthodox parents is almost totally absent. Outside New York, only a small number of sons of the Orthodox report mixed marriages, but (inexplicably) a hefty proportion of daughters of Orthodox parents said their husbands were non-Jewish.

The higher rates of mixed marriage among the Orthodox outside New York than among those in New York suggests two differences between New York and other Jewish communities. First, the lesser Jewish density outside New York raises the chances of intermarriage among all Jews, even the Orthodox. Second, Orthodox self-identification outside New York connotes a less thoroughly traditional orientation than it does for the New York Orthodox. (A separate computer run -- data not shown -- demonstrated that the New York Orthodox were somewhat more ritually observant than their counterparts outside New York.)

Within New York, aside from the Orthodox/non-Orthodox distinction, religious traditionalism had no consistent impact upon mixed marriage. But outside New York, among the men, the children of the nondenominational had the highest rates of mixed marriage, closely followed by the children of Reform parents, whose mixed-marriage rates vastly exceeded those of the offspring of Conservative Jews.

Apparently, the expected relationship between parental traditionalism and children's mixed marriage among the non-Orthodox emerges only when intermarriage is as frequent as it is among men outside New York. In New York, the opportunity to meet a highly educated white non-Jew is slimmer than elsewhere, even for the non-Orthodox. Outside New York (at least in the six major Jewish population studies under investigation), Jewish women did not out-marry with great frequency. But among the men outside New York, the intermarriage rates are high enough to allow the parents' denomination to exert a noticeable impact upon the likelihood of mixed marriage.

LESS MIXED MARRIAGE AMONG DAY-SCHOOL ALUMNI,
MORE AMONG THOSE WITH NO JEWISH SCHOOLING

Consistent with the results presented just above, day-school and yeshiva alumni reported the lowest rates of mixed marriage (table 7). At the same time, those with no Jewish schooling generally reported the highest levels of mixed marriage. The results are particularly clear-cut for men outside New York, the group with the highest rate of mixed marriage. Among those with a full-time Jewish education, just 7 percent were mixed-married; of those with an afternoon- or Sunday-school education, the rate jumps threefold to 21 percent; and of those with no formal Jewish schooling, as many as 42 percent were married to non-Jewish wives.

As was noted earlier, Jewish schooling reflects the parents' commitment to their children's Jewish upbringing. The alumni of the most intensive forms of Jewish education were raised by the

most Jewishly intensive parents, while those who never received any formal Jewish schooling probably had the least Jewishly committed parents.

FOR SOME, HIGHER EDUCATION IS LINKED
WITH LESS FREQUENT MIXED MARRIAGE

Historically, religious traditionalists -- Jewish and otherwise -- have viewed higher secular education with suspicion, often assuming that academic values undermine traditional religiosity. Science, rationality, universalism, and cultural relativism all appear to be in tension, if not in conflict, with the religious worldview. Among the Orthodox, anxiety about higher education has been so pronounced that major streams within Orthodoxy could be distinguished by the extent of their hostility toward higher learning in secular universities.

This traditional understanding of higher education leads one to expect a strong direct relationship between university attendance and the likelihood of marrying a non-Jew. By sabotaging commitment to traditional Judaism and by bringing the student into contact with large numbers of non-Jews, the university experience is supposed to promote marriage of Jews to gentiles.

The findings for New York, where mixed marriage is so uncommon, are ambiguous, and no conclusion can be drawn. However, in the six major cities outside New York, the results are precisely the reverse of what the traditional perspective would anticipate (table 8). Higher education is associated with lower rates of mixed marriage, and this association is stronger for men than for women. (Similar findings were reported for an analysis using a very different sort of sample in Cohen 1986a.)

Outside New York, among men who have never attended college, over 40 percent were mixed-married; of those who began but did not complete college, the rate dropped to 32 percent; of those with a B.A., just 18 percent were mixed-married; of those with a low-status M.A., the rate rose again to 27 percent; but the rate was lowest among those with a high-status graduate degree (16 percent). Among women, almost a third of those who never attended college were mixed-married; just 13 percent of those with some college (but no degree) reported a gentile husband; and of those with a B.A. or higher degree, between 5 percent and 9 percent were mixed-married. In other words, with some qualification, outside New York more education appears to lead to less intermarriage.

To understand these counterintuitive results, we need to recall that the vast majority of young adult Jews go to college; in this sample, 92 percent of the men and 86 percent of the women had at least some higher education. Moreover, Jews tend to concentrate in higher-quality four-year colleges and universities in cities and regions with larger Jewish populations.

Attending college and graduate school actually thrusts Jews into contact with one another and, it seems, improves their chances of meeting prospective Jewish marriage partners. Moreover, the Jew who fails to attend (and complete) college, especially a young man, is something of a "social deviant" within Jewish society, both in statistical and normative terms. (That is, Jewish college dropouts are both statistically rare and lacking in social status within the Jewish community.)

Higher education may diminish the chances of mixed marriage in yet another way. Sociologist Egon Mayer has speculated on the factors that affect the probability of the gentile -- particularly the woman -- converting to Judaism when an out-marriage is contemplated or has occurred. Mayer suggests that where the Jewish husband is of especially high social status and where the gentile wife is of especially low status, the chance that the wife will want to join the religious community of her husband and his family increases. Thus higher education may not only reduce the chances that Jews will meet and marry born-non-Jews; it may also improve the likelihood that the non-Jewish spouses

will convert. Obviously, either eventuality (marrying a Jew or marrying a gentile who converts) results in an "unmixed" or, in technical terms, an endogamous marriage.

EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

The employment patterns and incomes of Jews in different sorts of family configurations may have implications for those planning Jewish outreach programs for singles, marrieds, single parents, and other sorts of young-adult Jews.

No matter what their family status, the vast majority of young-adult men work full-time (table 9). The only significant deviation from this pattern occurs among single men, a notable minority of whom were working part-time, were students, or were unemployed at the time of the surveys.

As women change their family status, they experience far more variation in work status than men. While almost all men 25-39 were working full-time, fewer than half the women were so employed. Full-time employment was highest among single women and among married women with no children, although in both cases fewer worked at full-time jobs than did comparable men. In contrast, only about a quarter of married women with children were working full-time, and, among mothers married to Jewish husbands, another quarter were working in part-time jobs.

In sharp contrast with their married counterparts, most single mothers were working full-time and another quarter were working part-time. Thus not only are single mothers deprived of the emotional support and assistance in parenting often provided by a husband, but they are also compelled to work outside the home far more often than married mothers to support themselves and their children.

The financial pressures on the single mother are further illustrated in the figures for median household income (table 10). (These figures have not been adjusted for inflation, and so can provide only a very general understanding of income variation over the several family statuses. The New York figures, which have been separated from the combined figures for the other six cities, appear lower in part because the New York survey was one of the earliest conducted.) As might be expected, married couples reported higher incomes than did one-adult households. In the six cities outside New York, married couples reported earnings almost double that of their single counterparts (about \$42-45,000 versus \$20-30,000). Among the unmarried, single men earned more than single women (\$30,000 versus \$22,000), but single mothers earned even less (\$20,000) than single women without children at home. The New York area results show similar patterns: married couples, for the most part, earned the most; single men reported an intermediate level of income; and single women (with or without children) reported the lowest median income.

In terms of the Jewish income distribution, single mothers are as a group living in relative poverty. The large gaps in average income suggest that policymakers would not frequently err if they presumed that single mothers are financially hard pressed.

DENOMINATIONAL AFFILIATION

Denominational affiliation -- identifying as Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, or something else -- generally indicates intensity of Jewish involvement. Many measures of Jewish activity are highest among the Orthodox, intermediate among Conservative Jews, low among the Reform, and even lower among the nondenominational (Cohen 1983).

In New York and elsewhere, the singles (never-married men and women, and single mothers)

most frequently declared themselves "nondenominational," choosing such options as "just Jewish" or "something else" in response to questions about their denominational identification (table 11). About a third of the singles outside New York and an even larger minority in New York provided such responses. In a sense, these responses testify to the unconnectedness to organized Jewry felt by many singles.

Both marriage and having children tend to reduce the proportions of nondenominational individuals. Among childless couples, nondenominational responses were offered by roughly a quarter of the respondents; among the married parents, the proportion was even lower, about one in six.

The transition from singlehood to marriage to parenthood is associated with an apparent marginal increase in the percentage of Reform Jews and a larger increase in the percentage of Conservative Jews. Among married parents, the percentage of Orthodox is especially high. Outside New York, about 8 percent of the in-married parents said they were Orthodox, as opposed to hardly any of those in the other family statuses. In New York, over a fifth of in-married parents identified as Orthodox, as opposed to very small percentages of the other family groups. As noted earlier, Orthodoxy promotes early marriage, in-marriage, and parenting, although, to some extent, the experiences of marriage and childbearing may prompt some formerly non-Orthodox to declare themselves Orthodox.

Variation in the levels of Conservative, Reform, and nondenominational Jews as the family life cycle unfolds suggests that marriage and parenting do spark changes in denominational identification. We cannot be sure, but the data suggest that marrying a Jew and having children cause some nondenominational Jews to think of themselves as Reform or Conservative, and some one-time Reform Jews to identify as Conservative.

As might be expected, the mixed-married display the least traditional denominational distributions. None of them claimed to be Orthodox; about half were nondenominational; and of those with a denominational preference, most chose Reform. Institutionally, Reform congregations are most welcoming of the mixed-married; moreover, the low religious-observance levels of many Reform Jews are closer to those of most mixed-married Jews than are those of the more traditional denominations.

If denomination can be seen as an indicator of Jewish intensiveness, then the mixed-married are the least affiliated or least Jewishly intensive. By this reasoning, somewhat more intensive are the three groups of single-adult households (single men, single women, and single mothers); next are those who were married but not yet parents; and finally, married couples with children are the most active in conventional Jewish life. These inferences are confirmed by the data on religious observance and communal affiliation.

THE IMPACT OF MARRIAGE AND CHILDREN ON RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE

On almost all the religious-observance and communal-affiliation measures, the in-married had the highest rates of Jewish involvement and the mixed-married the lowest; singles and childless couples reported intermediate rates. While the ordering of the family groups may be almost always identical, the sizes of the gaps between one sort of family status and another differ for different measures of Jewish involvement. Even as marriage and childbearing promote almost all sorts of Jewish involvement, marriage seems to affect certain measures far more deeply than others.

Understanding just which sorts of Jewishness measures are most influenced by family-status

changes -- and which are least affected -- can help illuminate how the transitions from singlehood to married parenthood (and other transitions as well) affect the expression of Jewishness. In addition, such a focus can also tell us something about the character of different ways of expressing Jewish involvement. As we shall see, some religious observances or ways of affiliating with the Jewish community are particularly frequent among (and, presumably, meaningful to) people in conventional families.

We begin with religious observances and then examine a group of affiliation measures. It should be clear that the meaning of these items, to the respondents or to the analyst, is not always clear. While 90 percent of the respondents claimed to attend a Passover seder, the seders they attend vary considerably in traditional religious content and form, as well as in familial and social dimensions. While a third of the respondents claimed that Sabbath candles were lit in their homes, what their answers imply for the meaning they attribute to the Sabbath is unclear. For example, what sort of sense of obligation -- to God, to family, to Torah, and to the Jewish people -- do the Sabbath candle lighters bring to their act? What memories, what connotations, and what sentiments are aroused or symbolized by the lighting of Sabbath candles? These and other questions like them cannot be answered by the available survey data, although one could certainly imagine studies that would probe deeper into such matters. Here we can only claim that these items provide approximate indicators of some commitment or involvement in certain aspects of Jewish life, but we cannot expect or demand much precision about what these items signify.

We do know that the frequencies with which the religious observances are performed vary considerably. They vary across practices and they vary by family status (table 12). Most respondents reported performing four of the items: attending a Passover seder (90 percent); lighting Hanukkah candles (79 percent); fasting on Yom Kippur (66 percent); and having a mezuzah on the front door (63 percent). Only a third or less reported performing practices connected with *Shabbat* and *kashrut*: lighting Sabbath candles (34 percent); buying only kosher meat (28 percent); having separate sets of dishes for meat and dairy (23 percent); and following a strict Sabbath prohibition such as handling money or not riding (9 percent).

To get a clearer picture of how the several religious observances vary by family status, table 13 presents the results of a Multiple Classification Analysis that expresses the frequencies as deviations from the mean. To take an example, we may focus on the second column, top panel of table 13. The overall mean frequency of Hanukkah candle lighting is 79 percent. The figure for single men (-23) means that they lit Hanukkah candles 23 percent less frequently than the mean (79 percent - 23 percent = 56 percent), while those who were married parents (+16) lit them 16 percent more often than the mean (79 + 16 percent = 95 percent). This table, then, permits ready comparisons of the effects of the several family statuses upon the several observances.

To truly isolate the effect of family status, we need to control for other variables that may obscure or exaggerate its impact. For example, one reason married couples with children may score so high on certain observance variables is that so many of them had an Orthodox upbringing. The bottom panel, then, controls for several possibly confounding variables: parents' denomination, intensiveness of childhood Jewish schooling, city, and whether they had experienced a divorce. In other words, the bottom panel reports the differences in religious observance between one family status and another assuming that all the family status groups had the same distributions of parents' denomination, Jewish schooling, and so forth.

For three observances, approximately 30 percentage points separate the low frequencies among singles from the far higher rates among married parents. These items are: lighting Hanukkah candles, posting a mezuzah on the front door, and lighting Sabbath candles. Two items undergo a smaller but still substantial change: attending a Passover seder (which increases by about 15 percentage points in the passage from singlehood to married parenthood) and having a Christmas

tree (which declines by about 20 percentage points in the same transition). The four remaining items show a far smaller impact of family status: Yom Kippur fasting, having two sets of dishes, buying kosher meat, and strict observance of the Sabbath.

The larger changes in some practices over the course of the family life cycle are fairly understandable. For about a third of the population, it seems that certain observances take on meaning only in a conventional family context. Lighting Hanukkah candles is often undertaken by the entire family gathered around the menorah. Lighting Sabbath candles is traditionally associated with the woman of the house fulfilling her traditional roles as wife and mother. Affixing a mezuzah on one's door symbolizes a sense of domestic permanence, one apparently achieved particularly when one is married and even more so when one has children. Interestingly, these three practices are made much more frequent both by marriage and by the arrival of children.

Passover seder attendance may rise somewhat less than these other practices because seders are often intergenerational affairs. While single adults living on their own may feel little need to light Hanukkah or Sabbath candles, they can (and do) join their parents or other family members for an annual seder.

Some single Jews apparently enjoy having Christmas trees in their homes. But it seems that the phenomenon almost disappears with marriage to another Jew. (Of course, mixed marriage, especially with children present, is a vital spur to the erection of Christmas trees. Almost all mixed-married Jewish respondents with children home reported the presence of a Christmas tree.)

Of the four behaviors that undergo rather small changes in the transition from singlehood to parenthood, three reflect the most traditional dimension of Jewish ritual life: the two concerning *kashrut* and strict observance of the Sabbath. One reason their practice increases so little is that, for many who practice them, these activities flow from a deep commitment to Jewish tradition. In many cases, this commitment was developed in childhood and maintained even in the years of singlehood. Since some religious young-adult singles may never abandon *kashrut* or Sabbath observance, marriage and parenthood (for them) should have little impact on these practices.

Fasting on Yom Kippur is the only other practice where the singles' rates come close to those of their counterparts who are married with children. As on Passover, many young-adult singles spend Yom Kippur with their families where, it may be presumed, the expectation of fasting is more keenly felt than were they home alone. In addition, many American Jews in the statistical middle range of religious commitment conceive of Yom Kippur as the one holiday when they ought to make an all-out effort to link themselves to Jewish spirituality and tradition. The structure of meaning surrounding the Yom Kippur holiday may also provide a certain legitimation to its observance in isolation from close family. Although often observed by attending synagogue with hundreds of other worshipers, Yom Kippur emphasizes personal introspection and atonement.

Conventional imagery suggests that Western women, including Jewish women, are more disposed to religiosity than men. The results are inconsistent and ambiguous. Controlling for background variables, the single women do tend to outscore the single men on most, but not all ritual measures. In some cases, their lead is narrow and statistically insignificant. In short, the proposition that Jewish women are more religious than men finds limited support in the data, but the evidence is far from conclusive.

Do single mothers behave ritually more like single women or more like married parents? With respect to seder attendance, Hanukkah candle lighting, affixing the mezuzah, and rejecting the Christmas tree, the single mothers' rates of religious observance approximate the higher frequencies of married parents rather than the lower levels of single women. Their Sabbath candle lighting rate is intermediate between those of the two other groups. Factoring out their more nontraditional

Jewish upbringing, by and large, single mothers' religious observance more resembles that of married parents than it does that of single and childless women.

Last, we can focus on the mixed-married. How do their religious activities differ from those of the in-married, and how do those of the mixed-married without children differ from those who have children? While the mixed-married consistently report lower rates of religious observance, majorities did report at least attending Passover seders and lighting Hanukkah candles. About a third even fasted on Yom Kippur. However, hardly any of the mixed-married observed the Sabbath or *kashrut* in any way. The vast majority (especially when children are present) reported having Christmas trees in their homes.

Surprisingly, the mixed-married with children reported slightly lower rates of religious observance than those without children. One would think that, as with in-married parents, religious observance would rise with parenthood. Moreover, the presence of Christmas trees is higher among mixed-married parents than among childless mixed-married, while the celebration of Passover and Hanukkah is slightly lower. In other words, the mixed-married parents are "less Jewish" and "more Christian" than the childless mixed-married.

One explanation for this apparent anomaly is that the arrival of children may provoke some gentile spouses to convert to Judaism. As a result, the more Jewishly inclined households move from mixed marriage to in-marriage. Those who remain mixed-married even after parenthood, then, may simply be less Jewishly inclined than the initial group of intermarrieds.

THE POWERFUL IMPACT OF CHILDREN UPON COMMUNAL AFFILIATION

How do marriage and parenthood influence communal affiliation and activity? The communal activities found in the seven studies include religious-service attendance (a third claim to attend more often than the High Holidays), belonging to a synagogue (37 percent), belonging to another Jewish organization (31 percent), belonging to a Jewish community center (13 percent), having mostly Jewish close friends (83 percent), and having traveled at least once to Israel (31 percent).

The difference between singles and childless marrieds in rates of synagogue attendance and of organization membership (synagogues, organizations, and JCCs) is not all that great (tables 14 and 15). In other words, marriage alone does not seem to provoke any sharp and consistent increase in involvement in formal Jewish life.

However, consistent with the research literature on both Christians and Jews, the impact of parenthood is much more significant and widespread (Nash and Berger 1962; Nash 1968; Sklare and Greenblum 1979; Cohen 1983, 1988). Controlling for religious upbringing and other factors, we note the following jumps in affiliation rates between childless couples and married parents: synagogue attendance (19 percentage points); synagogue membership (33 points); and Jewish organization membership (19 points). While the gap in JCC membership is only eight percentage points, we ought to note that only 13 percent of the sample claimed JCC membership compared to about a third who had other affiliations. On a proportional basis, the eight-percentage-point difference between childless couples and parents is quite significant.

Formal organizational affiliation is far more affected by parenthood than by marriage alone, but the reverse is the case for the Jewish composition of one's closest friends. Overall, five respondents out of six (83 percent) reported that most of their closest friends were Jewish. However, the rate is about twelve percentage points lower than that for single adults and about ten percentage points higher for in-married parents. Clearly, between singlehood and parenthood, the frequency of those

with mostly Jewish friends appears to climb over twenty percentage points.

Upon closer examination, we learn that most of this jump is associated with marriage rather than parenthood. In the move from singlehood to marriage, the adjusted percentage reporting mostly Jewish close friends climbs by over twenty-five percentage points, while the difference between in-married couples with and without children is a meager two percentage points.

We can only speculate on why changes in Jewish friendship coincide so closely with the transition from singlehood to marriage. One factor is undoubtedly a self-selection process in which the more Jewishly involved marry other Jews and the more Jewishly remote marry gentiles. (Here we need to recall that we are comparing all singles -- regardless of their Jewish commitment -- with people who are not simply married but married to other Jews.) Beyond self-selection, there is probably an impact of marriage per se. Marriage often leads people to move to homes in neighborhoods where they intend to raise their children. There they also begin to make friends, many of whom are married couples. Since most Jews have Jewish spouses, the tendency of married couples to associate with other couples increases the probability that married Jews will make friends with other Jews.

Combining these results with those reported earlier for patterns of formal affiliation, we may have the outlines of the process by which young adults come to formally affiliate with agencies of the Jewish community. In the early years of marriage, Jewish couples may learn from their married friends of choices in synagogues, community centers, other organizations, and schools for their unborn (or preschool) children. When children reach school age, the parents begin to formally affiliate with a synagogue and perhaps other institutions as well. Affiliation also mounts when children approach the bar/bat mitzvah years.

Since the late 1960s, travel to Israel has become more and more routine for American Jews. Many travel there for the first time during their teen years. Indeed, a recent survey suggested that about a fifth to a quarter of college-age Jewish youngsters had traveled to Israel; among the Orthodox, the rate was over double that of the non-Orthodox (Cohen 1986b). Israel travel is empirically related to other dimensions of Jewish identification. The more involved -- those who are Orthodox, or who are connected to Jewish young groups or adult Jewish organizations -- are more likely to be motivated to spend time in Israel. In turn, the trip to Israel elevates certain measures of Jewish involvement, at least in the short term.

Most surveys asked whether the respondent had ever traveled to Israel (about a third of the sample had done so). In contrast with other forms of Jewish communal involvement, the rates for singles were close to those of married parents. The crucial difference between Israel travel and other forms of involvement is that the Israel-travel question refers to any time in the past, while the others measure current activity.

Single mothers reported relatively high rates of synagogue attendance and organizational affiliation. Their synagogue-membership rates were between those of the singles and the married couples with children, although closer to the latter; and their levels of in-group friendship were also between the low rates of the singles and the higher rates of the in-married. They reported by far the highest rate of Jewish-community-center affiliation and the lowest rate of Israel travel (as low as that for the mixed-married).

The portrait of single mothers that emerges here is consistent with the one we began to draw earlier. Single mothers appear to have as much motivation as married parents to participate in Jewish life. However, their incomes are relatively low. Where an activity is free or nearly free (as are most religious observances or synagogue attendance or even joining most Jewish organizations), single mothers participate about as frequently as married parents. Where cost is a factor, as it is

to some extent with synagogue membership and to a great extent with Israel travel, their participation rates fall off. Single mothers' extraordinary utilization of Jewish community centers may well derive from their urgent need for child-care services (such as summer camps) and, possibly, from their need for opportunities to socialize with other Jewish adults.

Consistent with their low rates of religious observance, mixed-married Jews are virtually absent from organized Jewish life. However, while their formal affiliation rates are low and their rates of friendship with other Jews is also well below average, mixed-married respondents still reported that most of their closest friends were Jews. In other words, at least in terms of the most widely observed Jewish holidays and informal Jewish networks, mixed-married Jews are still very much a part of the Jewish community.

THE LIMITED IMPACT OF DIVORCE UPON JEWISH INVOLVEMENT

Jewish life -- its rituals and modes of affiliation -- are very much tied to the conventional Jewish family. The experience of divorce obviously disrupts that family and, quite possibly, the ties of its members to Jewish life. Moreover, as we have seen, divorce is more frequent among those raised in less traditional religious environments. For all these reasons, and more, we might expect those who have experienced divorce to distance themselves from various aspects of Jewish communal life. Alternatively, one could argue they may act no differently from people of similar family status. Those who remain divorced may participate as much (or as little) as others their age who are single; those who remarry may act like other married individuals who have never experienced divorce. Consistent with this second model, the data above for single mothers (almost all of whom were divorced) suggest very little residual impact of divorce except for the consequences of diminished family income.

To examine the impact of divorce per se, a Multiple Classification Analysis compares the religious observance and affiliation levels of those who have been divorced (remarried or not) with the levels of those who are currently married but have never been divorced (table 16). The results indicate that the ever-divorced undertake several Jewish activities far less often than those who have never divorced. Differences on the order of thirteen to eighteen percentage points separate the two groups with respect to lighting Hanukkah candles, lighting Sabbath candles, buying kosher meat, fasting on Yom Kippur, posting a mezuzah on the front door, and having separate dishes for meat and dairy. Smaller differences, generally in the expected direction (where the Jewish-involvement rates for the never-divorced exceed those for the ever-divorced), characterize most of the other measures.

Before concluding that divorce dramatically depresses Jewish observance and affiliation, we need to recall that the divorced derive disproportionately from non-Orthodox homes. Hence, it is by adjusting for differences in parental religiosity, Jewish education, and other background factors that we can truly understand the net impact of divorce upon various forms of Jewish involvement. The second column of table 16 presents the adjusted scores. Here we learn that divorce appears to have only an inconsistent impact on religious observance. The differences are small and in both directions. In other words, from a statistical point of view, holding background constant, divorce is sometimes associated with slightly higher rates of religious observance and sometimes with slightly lower rates. In fact, almost all the affiliation rates are higher for the divorced than for the nondivorced.

It appears, then, that divorce, in and of itself, has little if any long-range impact on Jewish activity. Rather, those who were divorced behave much like the never-divorced of similar family status.

CONCLUSION AND COMMENTARY

Changes in family patterns in the late 1960s and early 1970s prompted concern among Jewish communal policymakers and others committed to Jewish community and continuity. They feared that the rise of singles (occasioned by later marriage, nonmarriage, and divorce), single parents, childless couples (primarily the result of later marriage), and intermarriage would severely curtail participation in conventional Jewish life, both at home and in the community.

This analysis of data from seven major Jewish population studies investigated some of the processes that have helped generate a rise in alternative family configurations as well as the consequences for Jewish identification that flow from them. When measured against the alarmist response of many communal leaders, the findings tend to offer some reassurance. Although the data are not complete and convincing on this point, the emergence of singles, single parents, childless couples, and mixed-marrieds seem both more understandable and more limited than the alarmist perspective would suggest. More critically, the unconventional families do not seem to pose severe dangers for Jewish continuity, although they do constitute a challenge to an organized Jewry that to this day is built largely around the conventional two-Jewish-parents-with-children family. To make this point more vividly, we should recall from the analysis that singles do not seem permanently alienated from Jewish life; rather, much conventional Jewish activity is undertaken after one marries another Jew and has children. Divorce does not seem to exert a long-term impact on Jewish connectedness; rather, divorced singles act like other singles, and remarried people are as Jewishly active as other married Jews. Parenthood does seem to inspire institutional attachments, and childlessness is associated with lower levels of communal affiliation and activity.

The organized community has responded to the rise of alternative households by enacting diverse programs to limit the expansion in their number. Put simply, the implicit and often rudimentary policy of synagogues, Jewish community centers, federations, and family agencies is to convince Jews to marry each other early in life, stay married, and have children. Although this research did not directly address the effectiveness of this policy, it does seem safe to say that "demographic jawboning" can have only limited impact on the rates of Jewish singlehood, divorce, mixed marriage, and childbirth. After all, demographers dispute whether governments have been able to achieve significant impacts upon such decisions; it is unlikely that a voluntary community in a free society can directly influence family-formation behavior. On the other hand, the Orthodox population in this sample did manifest higher rates of early marriage, intact marriage, endogamy, and childbearing (although the fertility data here are incomplete, other evidence substantiates higher birthrates among the Orthodox). The Orthodox data suggest that a traditionally oriented community with high levels of commitment among its members can indeed influence family behavior. Thus, not all efforts to affect the family choices of young adult Jews ought to be seen as impractical.

Even if the organized Jewish community cannot directly influence its members, it may be able to influence family-related policies of the larger society and polity. In light of Jews' extraordinary achievements in academia, cultural life, politics, and the economy, they may well be able to influence the larger society in ways that will indirectly affect Jewish family behavior in beneficial ways.

In any event, assuming that the number of singles, single parents, childless couples, and mixed-married families will remain significant and large in the near future, organized Jewry clearly has an opportunity to enhance the Jewish participation of these alternative households. To varying extents, the data seem to indicate an interest in Jewish life among all these types of Jews, albeit one accompanied by low to very low rates of communal affiliation. This pattern, in turn, suggests that a combination of factors is operating. To some extent, Jews in alternative family situations probably feel unwelcome in conventional public Jewish life. To some extent they are less visible, that is, they are less often connected to the informal networks that recruit people to synagogues, Jewish

community centers, organizations, and philanthropic campaigns. To some extent, they feel less of a need for the services provided by these institutions. And to some extent, they may indeed feel less committed to Jewish involvement. Further research needs to clarify the extent and nature of the factors operating to alienate such individuals from Jewish institutions. However, the very existence of substantial gaps in affiliation between conventional and alternative families suggests that the institutions themselves could identify programs and policies that may well attract greater participation on the part of singles, single parents, childless couples, and mixed-marrieds. The purpose of this paper is not to specify the nature of those policy or programmatic efforts; rather, it can merely serve to educate and encourage those many practitioners -- rabbis, educators, communal workers, and others -- who are actively engaged in efforts to extend Jewish communal life to all sorts of young-adult Jews beyond those who are found in conventional Jewish families.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. Jews may be marrying later, but the vast majority marry at some point. While substantial proportions of younger-adult (age 25-39) Jews have never married, only just under 10 percent of those in their late 30s have never married.
2. Men marry later than women.
3. Of those who have married, up to a quarter have been divorced by age 35-39.
4. The religiously traditional marry earlier, divorce less often, and intermarry less frequently. There is a greater difference between Orthodox and non-Orthodox than between Conservative and Reform or nondenominational Jews.
5. Higher education adversely affects the likelihood of women getting married. The rates of singlehood are particularly high among Jewish women in their 30s with "high-status" graduate degrees.
6. High education reduces the chances that married Jewish men will have a gentile spouse. Apparently, less well-educated Jewish men marry gentile women more often and, of those who out-marry, their lower social status may make it less likely that their wives will convert.
7. While almost all men work full-time no matter what their family status, women's full-time participation in the labor force fluctuates dramatically with marriage and childbearing.
8. Single mothers work full-time more than twice as often as married mothers.
9. Single mothers have the lowest income of any family status.
10. Certain religious observances rise dramatically with marriage and/or with children. Those most sensitive to family changes include: lighting Hanukkah candles, affixing a mezuzah on the doorpost, lighting Sabbath candles, and, to a lesser extent, attending a seder and fasting on Yom Kippur.
11. The religious observances of the mixed-married are less frequent than (even) those of the singles, although most mixed-marrieds attend seders and light Hanukkah candles.
12. Patterns of observance of single mothers resemble more closely those of in-married parents than they do those of singles.
13. Singles score far lower than others on most measures of communal affiliation.
14. Marriage to a Jew seems to elevate the rate of friendship with other Jews but has a small effect on affiliation with Jewish institutions.
15. Parenthood has a substantial positive impact on rates of formal Jewish affiliation.
16. Single mothers are especially active in Jewish community centers, but score low on costly activities.
17. Divorce does not seem to have a major enduring impact on most measures of Jewish religious observance or affiliation.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

The Data

Merging the seven data sets proved to be a difficult task. Not all seven surveys asked the same questions; few of the questions on similar issues were worded the same; and rarely did similarly worded questions use the same answer codes. Thus, in order to construct a single data set, I needed to engage in extensive recording, recomputing, and transferral of data from the several data sets to a common master data set. Many times I had to make reasoned judgments as to whether to accept as parallel two (or more) versions of similar questions from the studies.

Once constructed, the master data set permitted analyses across the several cities simultaneously. There are at least two virtues to analyzing the merged data set rather than the seven individual surveys. First, except for the unusually large New York survey ($N = 4,505$), no single Jewish population study contains enough cases of a particular young-adult family configuration (such as single men age 25-39) for reliable analysis. The typical Jewish population study, which has about 1,000 cases in all, might contain no more than a few score young-adult single men. Thus, only by aggregating several studies could we obtain samples of specific family subgroups large enough for this study.

Second, at this stage in our collective understanding of Jewish young adults, knowledge of broad national patterns is more policy-relevant than is information specific to any one community. By aggregating several studies, we "smooth over" the peculiarities found in one or another locality and obtain a more generalized picture applicable to several communities. The analysis utilized the weights assigned the respondents by the original survey researchers in each city. These generally take into account the problematics entailed in sampling from merged Jewish organizational lists, Distinctive Jewish Names, or Random Digit Dialing (the three major sources of Jewish respondents). They also correct for the intentional under- or overrepresentation of certain towns, neighborhoods, or regions within the survey area. Another level of weights was added to accurately reflect the population sizes of the seven communities. That is, respondents from cities with larger Jewish populations were weighted so that they, in effect, would count for more, while those from smaller communities were down-weighted so that they would count for less. A third set of weights took into account the number of adult Jews in the household. In practice, this meant that a Jewish respondent married to another Jew was given a weight of about 2.0 (to represent the respondent and his/her spouse), a single Jewish respondent received a weight of about 1.4 (not all Jewish singles live alone), and mixed-married Jewish respondents received a weight of about 1.0.

*Rates of Singlehood and Divorce:
Methodologically Problematic, Substantively Useful*

For several reasons, the data on the rates of singlehood, divorce, and intermarriage are probably more unreliable than the results on relationships between these phenomena and other variables (such as parents' religiosity or current religious observance). One reason to be more skeptical about rates than about relationships is that the seven studies probably varied considerably in their ability to secure the cooperation of potential respondents found in several alternative-family situations. Singles (be they never-married or divorced) spend much of their leisure time out of the home and are therefore somewhat difficult for telephone interviewers to reach. Some of the mixed-married may be wary of cooperating with a survey sponsored by a Jewish federation. In contrast, Jews married to other Jews with children at home probably stand the greatest chance of being included in a random-sample survey conducted under Jewish auspices. The completeness of coverage of those in alternative families no doubt varies both by community and by the quality of interviewers and sampling techniques. Taken together, these problems mean that the studies probably understate the numbers of singles, single parents, divorcees, and mixed-marrieds; but the extent to which they do

so is both unknown and unknowable.

Although singles, single parents, divorced, and mixed-marrieds may be underrepresented in the surveys, there is no reason to believe that this affects the relationship of these family statuses with other variables (particularly other dependent variables) in this study. To take a simple example, we may consider the relationship of Sabbath candle lighting with family status. The report demonstrated that singles and mixed-marrieds light candles less often than conventional families. The underrepresentation of singles and mixed-marrieds should have absolutely no effect upon this relationship. That is, even though there may be fewer singles and mixed-marrieds in the sample than in the population, the gap in rates of candle lighting between conventional families and the singles or mixed-marrieds should still closely approximate that in the population.

New York Versus Elsewhere

For the most part, the results for the New York area and elsewhere were similar. New York respondents did report larger numbers of strict Sabbath observers as well as homes with two sets of dishes. But the frequencies of the other ritual items were very close to those in the other cities, as were the relationships between ritual practices and family statuses. Preliminary analyses that separated the New York data from the other data sets generated very similar substantive conclusions. For these reasons, the multivariate analysis combined the New York area data with those from the other seven cities.

REFERENCES

- Bock, Geoffrey. 1976. "The Jewish Schooling of American Jews: A Study of Non-Cognitive Educational Effects." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
- Brodbar-Nemzer, Jay. 1984. "Divorce in the Jewish Community: The Impact of Jewish Commitment." *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 61: 150-159.
- , 1986. "Divorce and Group Commitment: The Case of the Jews." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 48: 89-98.
- Cohen, Steven M. 1974. "The Impact of Jewish Education on Religious Identification and Practice." *Jewish Social Studies* (October): 316-326.
- , 1980. *Interethnic Marriage and Friendship*. New York: Arno.
- , 1983. *American Modernity and Jewish Identity*. New York and London: Tavistock.
- , 1986a. "Education & Inter-marriage," *Moment* (November): 17-20.
- , 1986b. *Jewish Travel to Israel: Incentives and Inhibitions Among U.S. & Canadian Teenagers & Young Adults*. Jerusalem: Jewish Education Committee of the Jewish Agency.
- , 1988. *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?* Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.
- , and Paul Ritterband. 1981. "Why Contemporary American Jews Want Small Families." In P. Ritterband, ed., *Modern Jewish Fertility*. Leiden: Brill.
- DellaPergola, Sergio. 1980. "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility." *Demography* 17 (August): 261-273.
- Farber, Bernard, and Leonard Gordon. 1982. "Accounting for Jewish Inter-marriage: An Assessment of National and Community Studies." *Contemporary Jewry* 6 (Spring/Summer): 47-75.
- Goldscheider, Calvin. 1973. "Childlessness and Religiosity: An Exploratory Analysis." In U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1969*. Jerusalem: Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University.
- , 1986. *Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in America*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Himmelfarb, Harold. 1974. "The Impact of Religious Schooling: The Effects of Jewish Education Upon Adult Religious Involvement." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

- , 1977. "The Non-Linear Impact of Schooling: Comparing Different Types and Amounts of Jewish Education." *Sociology of Education* 50 (April): 114-129.
- Lazerwitz, Bernard. 1980. "Current Jewish Inter marriages in the United States." In *Papers in Jewish Demography 1977*. Jerusalem: Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University.
- , 1981. "Jewish-Christian Marriages and Conversions." *Jewish Social Studies* 54, no. 1 (Winter): 31-46.
- Massarik, Fred, and Alvin Chenkin. 1973. "United States National Jewish Population Study: A First Report." *American Jewish Year Book* 73: 264-306.
- Mayer, Egon. 1983a. "Jews by Choice: Some Reflections on Their Impact on the Contemporary American Jewish Community." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Rabbinical Assembly, Dallas.
- , 1983b. *Children of Intermarriage*. New York: American Jewish Committee.
- , 1985. *Love and Tradition*. New York: Plenum.
- , and Carl Sheingold. 1979. *Intermarriage and the Jewish Future: A National Study in Summary*. New York: American Jewish Committee.
- Nash, D. 1968. "A Little Child Shall Lead Them: A Statistical Test of an Hypothesis that Children Were the Source of the American Religious Revival." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* (Fall): 238-240.
- , and P. Berger. 1962. "The Child, the Family, and the Religious Revival in the Suburbs." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* (October): 85-93.
- Schmelz, U.O., and Sergio DellaPergola. 1983. "Population Trends in U.S. Jewry and Their Demographic Consequences." *American Jewish Year Book* 83: 141-187.
- Sherrow, Fred S. 1971. "Patterns of Religious Intermarriage." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, Department of Sociology.
- Sklare, Marshall, and Joseph Greenblum. 1979. *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier*, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.



Table 1

PERCENT SINGLE, NEVER-MARRIED, AND EVER-DIVORCED
(OF THOSE EVER-MARRIED) BY CITY, SEX, AND AGE

	Single	Never-married	Ever-divorced
Total	34	25	16
OUTSIDE NEW YORK	32	22	22
Male	35	25	18
25-29	54	40	05
30-34	31	23	13
35-39	23	09	27
Female	30	20	22
25-29	43	33	34
30-34	25	17	15
35-39	23	09	21
NEW YORK	35	27	14
Male	43	37	25
25-29	61	58	09
30-34	32	28	12
35-39	25	12	21
Female	28	19	13
25-29	41	37	01
30-34	21	13	14
35-39	25	10	20

Note: "Single" includes those never married and those previously married who were divorced or widowed.

Table 2

PERCENT SINGLE, NEVER-MARRIED, AND EVER-DIVORCED (OF
THOSE EVER-MARRIED)
BY PARENTS' DENOMINATION, AGE, AND SEX

	Single	Never-married	Ever-divorced
Total	34	25	16
25-29	50	44	12
MALE	59	55	08
Orthodox	67	67	00
Conservative	45	43	05
Reform	76	69	06
Other	57	51	15
FEMALE	42	35	15
Orthodox	10	08	02
Conservative	31	28	02
Reform	46	34	28
Other	56	48	24
30-34	26	19	14
MALE	31	25	12
Orthodox	18	18	00
Conservative	36	31	17
Reform	36	33	10
Other	29	20	14
FEMALE	23	15	14
Orthodox	16	03	08
Conservative	17	13	14
Reform	18	15	08
Other	32	19	22
35-39	24	10	22
MALE	24	11	24
Orthodox	26	06	22
Conservative	32	08	16
Reform	36	22	41
Other	16	09	23
FEMALE	24	10	21
Orthodox	20	11	08
Conservative	21	09	16
Reform	26	09	20
Other	27	11	32

NOTE: "Single" includes those never married and those previously married who were divorced or widowed.

Table 3

PERCENT SINGLE, NEVER-MARRIED, AND EVER-DIVORCED
(OF THOSE EVER-MARRIED) BY TYPE OF JEWISH SCHOOLING, AGE, AND SEX

	Single	Never-married	Ever-divorced
Total	34	25	16
25-29	50	44	12
MALE	59	55	08
Full-time	63	61	09
Part-time	56	52	07
Sunday school	62	55	07
None	68	65	15
FEMALE	42	35	15
Full-time	16	13	05
Part-time	49	45	10
Sunday school	37	35	26
None	43	32	19
30-34	26	19	14
MALE	31	25	12
Full-time	15	12	00
Part-time	35	29	17
Sunday school	35	32	06
None	27	11	10
FEMALE	23	15	14
Full-time	08	04	07
Part-time	26	19	18
Sunday school	32	19	18
None	18	10	11
35-39	24	10	22
MALE	24	11	24
Full-time	16	06	19
Part-time	27	11	25
Sunday school	22	13	22
None	24	09	25
FEMALE	24	10	21
Full-time	10	08	01
Part-time	27	13	15
Sunday school	28	08	35
None	23	09	24

Note: "Single" includes those ever married and those previously married who were divorced or widowed.

Table 4

PERCENT SINGLE, NEVER-MARRIED, AND EVER-DIVORCED
(OF THOSE EVER-MARRIED) BY EDUCATION, AGE, AND SEX

	Single	Never-married	Ever-divorced
Total	34	25	16
25-29	50	45	12
MALE	59	55	08
Hi school	65	60	15
Some college	69	61	12
B.A.	48	44	09
M.A.	65	60	07
Grad degree	62	61	01
FEMALE	42	36	15
Hi school	33	10	17
Some college	31	22	14
B.A.	47	44	23
M.A.	44	42	03
Grad degree	76	68	18
30-34	26	19	14
MALE	31	25	13
Hi school	25	22	05
Some college	31	21	30
B.A.	28	22	19
M.A.	41	35	07
Grad degree	26	20	04
FEMALE	23	15	14
Hi school	07	02	09
Some college	20	06	12
B.A.	21	12	13
M.A.	28	24	18
Grad degree	58	43	29
35-39	24	10	22
MALE	24	11	24
Hi school	23	10	15
Some college	16	04	30
B.A.	39	16	31
M.A.	20	08	22
Grad degree	22	12	22

FEMALE	25	10	21
Hi school	20	08	11
Some college	24	06	24
B.A.	18	09	22
M.A.	30	13	24
Grad degree	42	21	26

Note: "Single" includes those never married and those previously married who were divorced or widowed. "M.A." includes so-called low-prestige graduate degrees such as the M.A. or M.S.W. "Grad degree" refers to all other degrees.



Table 5

PERCENT MIXED-MARRIED BY
AGE, SEX, AND LOCATION

	Men	Women
Total	14	08
OUTSIDE NEW YORK	22	11
25-29	22	11
30-34	21	09
35-39	24	12
NEW YORK AREA	10	06
25-29	07	07
30-34	10	05
35-39	11	06

Note: Base is all those who currently identify as Jews who are married.

Table 6

PERCENT MIXED-MARRIED BY PARENTS'
DENOMINATION, SEX, AND LOCATION

	Men	Women
Total	14	08
OUTSIDE NEW YORK	22	11
Orthodox	04	17
Conservative	06	08
Reform	27	09
Other	31	12
NEW YORK AREA	10	06
Orthodox	00	01
Conservative	11	06
Reform	07	08
Other	15	07

Note: Base is all those who currently identify as Jews who are married.

Table 7

PERCENT MIXED-MARRIED BY TYPE OF JEWISH
SCHOOLING, SEX, AND LOCATION

	Men	Women
OUTSIDE NEW YORK	22	11
Full-time	07	00
Part-time	21	13
Sunday school	21	12
None	42	13
NEW YORK AREA	10	06
Full-time	01	01
Part-time	11	06
Sunday school	02	05
None	19	09

Note: Base is all those who currently identify as Jews who are married.
"Type of Jewish Schooling" refers to the most intensive schooling ever
attended.




Table 8

PERCENT MIXED-MARRIED BY EDUCATION, SEX,
AND LOCATION

	Men	Women
OUTSIDE NEW YORK	23	11
Hi school	42	31
Some college	32	13
B.A.	18	05
M.A.	27	08
Grad degree	16	09
NEW YORK AREA	10	06
Hi school	04	10
Some college	08	02
B.A.	14	05
M.A.	08	06
Grad degree	09	16

Note: Base is all those who currently identify as Jews who are married.
"M.A." includes so-called low-prestige graduate degrees such as the M.A.
or M.S.W. "Grad degree" refers to all other degrees.

Table 9

EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY FAMILY TYPE AND SEX

Men							
	Single man	Married, no kids	Married, parents	Mixed, no kids	Mixed, parents	Total	
Full-time	83	90	96	96	89	90	
Part-time	06	05	01	02	00	04	
House	01	00	01	00	00	00	
Student	05	01	01	01	03	03	
Unemployed	04	02	01	01	08	03	
Other	01	01	00	00	00	00	
AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES							
Women							
	Single woman	Single mother	Married, no kids	Married, parents	Mixed, no kids	Mixed, parents	Total
Full-time	76	58	66	23	75	28	45
Part-time	11	23	11	23	00	11	17
Retired	00	00	01	01	00	00	01
House	01	07	14	47	23	40	28
Student	04	04	03	01	00	03	03
Unemployed	08	07	05	04	02	17	06
Other	01	01	00	01	00	01	01

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, parents" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, parents" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.

Table 10

MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME BY FAMILY TYPE AND LOCATION
IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS

OUTSIDE NEW YORK	43
Single man	35
Single woman	25
Single mother	28
Married, no kids	50
Married, kids	54
Mixed, no kids	43
Mixed, kids	32
NEW YORK AREA	38
Single man	35
Single woman	26
Single mother	23
Married, no kids	37
Married, kids	45
Mixed, no kids	46
Mixed, kids	28




Table 11

DENOMINATIONAL IDENTIFICATION BY FAMILY TYPE AND LOCATION

OUTSIDE NEW YORK								
	Single man	Single woman	Single mother	Married, no kids	Married, parents	Mixed, no kids	Mixed, parents	Total
Orthodox	02	01	00	01	08	00	00	04
Conserv	34	27	20	38	38	28	13	34
Reform	34	50	46	35	38	31	29	38
Other	31	22	35	26	17	42	58	25
NEW YORK								
	Single man	Single woman	Single mother	Married, no kids	Married, parents	Mixed, no kids	Mixed, parents	Total
Orthodox	08	03	07	04	22	00	00	12
Conserv	23	25	33	42	31	01	15	30
Reform	27	29	29	31	32	60	29	31
Other	42	43	31	24	15	39	56	27

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, parents" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, parents" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.

Table 12

RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES BY FAMILY TYPE AND LOCATION

	Seder	Han	YomK	Mez	2Dish	Koshr	Candl	Sabth	Xmas
Total (all cities)	90	79	66	63	23	28	34	09	20
Total (non-New York)	87	81	65	62	14	18	32	05	20
Single man	83	61	64	42	09	14	12	01	12
Single woman	78	66	60	46	12	14	23	02	23
Single mother	97	77	60	61	11	29	48	05	14
Married, no kids	88	85	66	66	13	18	32	03	16
Married, kids	94	97	74	83	21	23	45	08	13
Mixed, no kids	74	58	38	27	00	00	00	01	80
Mixed, kids	66	57	37	18	01	01	07	03	91
Total (New York)	92	78	66	64	28	32	34	13	
Single man	84	53	53	55	23	22	17	10	
Single woman	88	60	58	37	16	18	13	04	
Single mother	93	88	48	65	20	16	22	04	
Married, no kids	93	81	70	67	26	31	32	06	
Married, kids	97	94	77	79	38	44	52	22	
Mixed, no kids	80	65	30	33	00	23	21	00	
Mixed, kids	76	56	36	15	04	00	04	00	

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, kids" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.

Key to ritual abbreviations: Seder = attends Passover seder. Han = lights Hanukkah candles. YomK = fasts on Yom Kippur. Mez = mezuzah is posted on front door. 2Dish = has two sets of dishes for meat and dairy products. Koshr = buys meat only from a kosher butcher. Candl = lights Sabbath candles Friday night. Sabth = observes the Sabbath in a highly traditional way (e.g., will not ride or will not handle money). Xmas = has a Christmas tree.

Table 13

RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES BY FAMILY TYPE AND LOCATION
ADJUSTED FOR PARENTS' DENOMINATION, TYPE OF JEWISH SCHOOLING,
EDUCATION, AND INCOME

	Seder	Han	YomK	Mez	2Dish	Koshr	Candl	Sabth	Xmas
Mean	90	79	66	64	23	28	34	09	20
<i>Unadjusted deviations</i>									
Single man	-06	-23	-08	-13	-05	-08	-18	-03	-08
Single woman	-07	-17	-07	-23	-08	-11	-17	-06	04
Single mother	05	06	-14	-00	-06	-09	-06	-05	-06
Married, no kids	01	03	02	03	-02	-01	-02	-05	-04
Married, kids	06	16	10	17	09	10	16	07	-07
Mixed, no kids	-12	-17	-32	-33	-23	-08	-16	-09	60
Mixed, kids	-20	-22	-30	-46	-21	-27	-29	-07	71
<i>Adjusted deviations</i>									
Single man	-09	-22	-06	-16	-04	-03	-18	-02	03
Single woman	-07	-12	-02	-18	-02	-01	-12	-01	12
Single mother	08	11	-06	09	-01	-02	-01	-04	-11
Married, no kids	02	01	01	04	01	01	01	-02	-11
Married, kids	07	14	06	16	04	03	12	03	-12
Mixed, no kids	-12	-18	-33	-32	-12	-02	-10	-03	59
Mixed, kids	-16	-21	-28	-41	-13	-21	-23	-03	73

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, kids" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.

Key to ritual abbreviations: Seder = attends Passover Seder. Han = lights Hanukkah candles. YomK = fasts on Yom Kippur. Mez = mezuzah is posted on front door. 2Dish = has two sets of dishes for meat and dairy products. Koshr = buys meat only from a kosher butcher. Candl = lights Sabbath candles Friday night. Sabth = observes the Sabbath in a highly traditional way (e.g., will not ride or will not handle money). Xmas = has a Christmas tree.

Table 14

MEASURES OF JEWISH COMMUNAL ACTIVITY BY TYPE OF
FAMILY AND LOCATION

	Attend	SynMem	Org'n	JCC	Friends	Israel
Total	33	38	31	13	83	31
Total (non-New York)	39	37	22	18	81	27
Single man	31	17	12	08	65	28
Single woman	35	22	16	15	69	29
Single mother	33	44	19	49	61	16
Married, no kids	35	30	16	14	92	35
Married, kids	50	58	35	23	90	27
Mixed, no kids	14	07	07	09	68	11
Mixed, kids	22	07	04	02	65	12
Total (New York)	30	37	37	11	84	33
Single man	24	20	22	07	74	30
Single woman	19	13	20	11	73	34
Single mother	39	38	51	36	83	10
Married, no kids	19	19	27	06	88	41
Married, kids	41	60	52	14	95	35
Mixed, no kids	04	04	21	06	59	15
Mixed, kids	19	14	16	02	33	12

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, kids" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.

Key to communal affiliation abbreviations: Attend = attends religious services more often than High Holidays. SynMem = synagogue member. Org'n = member of a Jewish organization other than synagogue or JCC. JCC = member of a Jewish Community Center. Friends = most closest friends are Jewish. Israel = visited Israel at least once.

Table 15

MEASURES OF JEWISH COMMUNAL ACTIVITY BY TYPE OF FAMILY AND
LOCATION ADJUSTED FOR PARENTS' DENOMINATION, TYPE OF JEWISH SCHOOLING,
EDUCATION, AND INCOME

	Attend	SynMem	Org'n	JCC	Friends	Israel
Mean	33	37	31	13	83	31
<i>Unadjusted deviations</i>						
Single man	- 07	- 18	- 13	- 06	- 12	- 20
Single woman	- 07	- 20	- 12	- 01	- 11	01
Single mother	04	03	10	26	- 06	- 18
Married, no kids	- 08	- 13	- 08	- 05	07	08
Married, kids	11	22	15	04	10	01
Mixed, no kids	- 24	- 31	- 16	- 07	- 20	- 17
Mixed, kids	- 13	- 27	- 22	- 11	- 31	- 19
<i>Adjusted deviations</i>						
Single man	- 03	- 21	- 14	- 07	- 18	- 02
Single woman	- 00	- 19	- 11	- 01	- 16	06
Single mother	07	06	10	26	- 05	- 14
Married, no kids	- 10	- 10	- 06	- 04	10	08
Married, kids	09	22	13	04	12	- 02
Mixed, no kids	- 26	- 29	- 14	- 07	- 16	- 13
Mixed, kids	- 14	- 23	- 17	- 11	- 28	- 13

Note: "Single" includes all unmarried (never married, once married now divorced, and once married now widowed). "Single man" and "Single woman" refer to those with no children at home. "Married, no kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish, with no children at home. "Married, kids" refers to married couples where both spouses are Jewish and children are present. "Mixed, no kids" refers to married couples where one spouse is Jewish and the other is not, and no children are present. "Mixed, kids" refers to the same sorts of couples where children are present.

Key to communal affiliation abbreviations: Attend = attends religious services more often than High Holidays. SynMem = synagogue member. Org'n = member of a Jewish organization other than synagogue or JCC. JCC = member of a Jewish Community Center. Friends = most closest friends are Jewish. Israel = visited Israel at least once.

Table 16


THE IMPACT OF DIVORCE ON JEWISH INVOLVEMENT:
RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES AND MEASURES OF JEWISH COMMUNAL ACTIVITY BY
WHETHER RESPONDENT WAS EVER-DIVORCED,
WITH AND WITHOUT ADJUSTING FOR PARENTS' DENOMINATION,
TYPE OF JEWISH SCHOOLING, CITY, AND TYPE OF FAMILY

		Unadjusted	Adjusted
YES	Seder	- .03	- .02
NO		.03	.01
YES	Hanukkah	- .06	- .02
NO		.09	.02
YES	YomKFast	- .10	- .04
NO		.05	.03
YES	Mezuzah	- .05	.02
NO		.09	.01
YES	Twodish	- .11	- .04
NO		.06	.02
YES	Kosher	- .12	- .06
NO		.06	.02
YES	Fricandle	- .05	.02
NO		.08	.01
YES	Sabbath	- .06	- .02
NO		.03	.01
YES	Xmastree	.07	.06
NO		.01	.06
YES	Attend	- .01	- .00
NO		.05	.03
YES	SynMem	- .00	.06
NO		.07	- .03

YES	Org'n	- 03	01
NO		06	- 00
YES	JCC	04	01
NO		01	- 00
YES	Friends	- 04	01
NO		05	- 04
YES	Israel	- 03	02
NO		02	00

Key to ritual abbreviations: Seder = attends Passover seder. Hanukkah = lights Hanukkah candles. YomKFast = fasts on Yom Kippur. Mezuzah = mezuzah is posted on front door. Twodish = has two sets of dishes for meat and dairy products. Kosher = buys meat only from a kosher butcher. Fricandle = lights Sabbath candles Friday night. Sabbath = observes the Sabbath in a highly traditional way (e.g., will not ride or will not handle money). Xmas = has a Christmas tree.

Key to communal affiliation abbreviations: Attend = attends religious services more often than High Holidays. SynMem = synagogue member. Org'n = member of a Jewish organization other than synagogue or JCC. JCC = member of a Jewish Community Center. Friends = most closest friends are Jewish. Israel = visited Israel at least once.



City University - Center for Outreach for the Intermarried
December 3, 1990
Preventing Intermarriage
Steven Bayme, Ph.D.

The organizers of this conference deserve credit for including the subject of preventing intermarriage on the agenda of a conference devoted to outreach to intermarrieds. Essentially our problem is whether we define family in terms of personal fulfillment or in terms of historical continuity. From the perspective of personal fulfillment, there appears to be very little wrong with intermarriage, nor should we have any desire to prevent it. From the perspective of historical continuity, in terms of the Jews as a community, our communal imperative is both to discourage intermarriage and to encourage Jewish in-marriage. Significantly, Napoleon recognized this as early as 1806 in requesting the Jewish leaders then to endorse intermarriage. For French Jewry, however, resistance to intermarriage became the key component of defining Jewish identity. Even those who advocated total fusion with France refused to accede to Napoleon's wishes to endorse intermarriage. In America today, however, rather than the government the realities of intermarriage on the ground compel a similar debate as to communal policy concerning intermarriage.

In this light, the conversion program outlined on this panel represents a serious effort at preventing intermarriage by encouraging conversion to Judaism before marriage. To be sure, we should advocate greater dialogue among religious leaders to secure a uniform conversion procedure - without which we have differing standards of who is a Jew. However, by suggesting that this is the only program worth noting, it effectively suggests that there is nothing concrete the Jewish community can do to prevent intermarriage as a phenomenon and to

encourage Jewish in-marriage.

I suggest that strategy is flawed on several grounds: First, if we limit our efforts to advocacy of conversion, we have to face the harsh reality that most intermarriages will never result in a conversion. Most recent statistics suggest that at best 18% or one in every six intermarriages will result in a conversion to Judaism. Many of us have been arguing for quite some time that if intermarriage becomes more legitimate within the American Jewish community, the incentive for conversion to Judaism may well decline. Moreover, the decision on the part of liberal sectors of the community to accept the patrilineal definition of who is a Jew similarly may well remove a major incentive to conversion by saying that your children will be Jewish even without the conversion of the non-Jewish spouse.

Finally, we must confront the painful issue of the depth of sincerity and commitment of conversion as a phenomenon. Without question, the Jewish community has been enriched by the entry of Jews by choice into its ranks. As my colleague, Milton Himmelfarb, frequently remarked, "Our imports are better than our exports". However, we now have to face the difficult and painful reality that many conversions may be little more than pro-forma attestations. As Jonathan Sarna remarked in a recent issue of the Journal of Reform Judaism, we are probably for the first time in history facing the phenomenon of "one-generation converts". In this regard, although we should certainly devote considerable efforts and resources to the aggressive advocacy of conversion as our primary response to the reality of intermarriage, we must do so with the sober acknowledgement, first that most intermarriages will not result in conversions, and, moreover, of those that do far from the totality of the conversions represent a significant and sincere transformation of personal identity. In short, to suggest that conversion is our only response in terms of intermarriage prevention amounts to a statement of surrender on the part of Jewish leadership that the forces for intermarriage are

so overpowering in America today that we have no capacity for resisting intermarriage currents.

To be sure, our dilemma as a community is that our capacity to resist intermarriage is limited, particularly in light of our acceptance of the universalist norms of American culture. Moreover, the reality of intermarriage itself, within our own homes, limits our capacity to be effective advocates of Jewish in-marriage. Egon Mayer has documented this in his most recent survey indicating that among Jewish leaders today only a minority would discourage intermarriage. Rachel Cowan, in the current issue of Moment Magazine, goes a step further. For her intermarriage is a reality. It will not go away, and therefore, the community must find some mechanism of blessing interfaith unions. To her credit, Cowan admits that such a stance will amount to effective condoning of intermarriage as a phenomenon. However, she concludes, the need is too great, and therefore something to this effect must be done.

In short, this brings us to a crossroads. Some, particularly enthusiastic advocates of outreach, call for a fundamental change of attitude towards intermarriage as a phenomenon which will permit us to truly welcome the intermarried. A recent column in the Boston Jewish Advocate urged "that Jews must overcome the perception that intermarriage is a threat to Judaism." I would like to challenge this perspective on several grounds:

First, the responsibility of leadership is to view issues not from the perspective of personal good, but rather from the perspective of communal interest. In this regard, our continued resistance to intermarriage must be based on the definition of the Jewish family as historical continuity rather than only personal fulfillment. What may be good for individual Jews and their families may not be in

the best interest of the Jewish community.

Secondly, the historical responsibility of leadership has always been to set norms and standards - to shape the climate of opinion. To suggest, as some do, that the realities on the ground make resistance to intermarriage antiquated, is to abandon leadership responsibility for the shaping and molding of public norms and opinion.

Thirdly, in addition to shaping norms and setting standards, our responsibility is to develop pragmatic initiatives that will not only aim at outreach to those who are already intermarried but also aim at intermarriage prevention.

In this regard, it is useful to observe trends among Jewish leaders today. A recent AJC survey of Jewish leaders in six diverse communities revealed that 94% are married to born Jews, 3% to Jews by choice, and 3% to Gentile spouses. However, 26% of these individuals have children who are married to non-Jewish spouses. Conversely, 22% have sent or are currently sending their children to Jewish day schools.

In other words, the trends among Jewish leaders, as in the Jewish community as a whole, are running in two diverse directions. There is, without question, increased concern over intermarriage. Steps are also being taken for the enhancement and renewal of Jewish life, e.g., the sending of children to day schools. Similarly, Jewish leaders report a fundamental change in perception of what are the most critical issues on the Jewish communal agenda. Only three items were listed as most important by a majority of Jewish leaders - safeguarding Israel, addressing the weakness of current Jewish identity, and enhancing Jewish education. Significantly, only 44% of Jewish leaders reported that defense against

anti-Semitism was worthy of inclusion among the top 3 agenda items.

This, to me, indicates that Jewish leadership is poised to take major efforts to enrich the quality of Jewish life. Should these efforts be accompanied by a collapse of resistance to intermarriage? Or, rather, is our challenge to conduct outreach programs to intermarrieds without undermining the serious efforts at Jewish renewal that are currently taking place.

What then can the Jewish community do? First, we must realize our limitations. Communal policy will at best operate only on the margin. Most people will or will not intermarry irrespective of what the Jewish community does or says. Policy is significant, however, as a statement of communal norms and values.

In this light, it appears that the only valid opposition to intermarriage is that based upon religious imperative. We must recognize that arguments against intermarriage that are rooted in non-religious considerations are unlikely to succeed in contemporary America. However, that should not limit our capacity to state forthrightly on certain issues we are prepared to part company with the American values of universalism. Ideological opposition to intermarriage can only be rooted in the firm conviction that in certain areas of contemporary Jewish life Jews must, and indeed ought to assert Jewish values in pronounced contradistinction from universalist American norms. Only by so doing will we create a Jewish community attractive enough that people will wish to join it. True prevention of intermarriage is best achieved by strengthening Jewish communal life so that those who might otherwise consider marrying out will desire, of their own accord, to remain an integral part of the Jewish community.

Secondly, we need much more in the way of Jewish singles programs that will

increase Jewish socialization experiences among unmarried adults. We cannot and should not place our emphasis upon those who have already married out at the expense of those for whom in-marriage remains a viable option. Strengthening their ties to the Jewish community, enabling them to meet other Jews, and enriching their Jewish social experiences will all hold out the promise of their building a Jewish home within the context of a Jewish marriage.

Thirdly, we need to encourage a language of endogamy within the Jewish community. It is very difficult for parents today to argue against intermarriage. We have not provided the appropriate curriculum materials, the appropriate ideology of in-marriage which can communicate to young people in an effective form what are all the reasons why the Jewish community opposes intermarriage. Such a curriculum will, undoubtedly, offend those who have already intermarried. But that is precisely our dilemma of reaching out to intermarrieds even as we reject intermarriage. Serious outreach will necessitate that we discourage future intermarriage to bring the intermarrieds to the point where they reject intermarriage.

Finally, we will have to confront very difficult policy choices of priority claims within the Jewish community. Should we invest more in outreach programming, which at best enables us to cope with the harsh reality of intermarriage? Or, should we be affording Jewish experiences for teenagers and other young adults for whom marriage remains a future decision? It is not sufficient to say you must do both at a time of limited resources. It will not do to simply approach the Jewish community with a laundry list of demands. What is necessary is careful thought as to where we will achieve the most - in programs that reach out to intermarrieds or in programs that aim to prevent intermarriage.

What it all amounts to is maintaining a climate that will be less hospitable to intermarriage - a climate in which Jewish marital norms can be sustained. That will require a great deal of courage. It flies in the face of an American culture in which the Jew has finally become a desirable in-law. Yet if we are faithful to Jewish marital norms and if we truly believe that the Jewish family is an historical community rather than simply personal self-fulfillment, it is there that our moral imperative lies.

I think several conclusions flow from this analysis. First, if we truly adopt a positive attitude towards intermarriage that will clearly breed a climate that itself is more conducive to intermarriage. In other words, if the Jewish community abandons its resistance to intermarriage, it will only succeed in sending a message that intermarriage is ok and that it is not a problem.

In that sense, I do feel that conferences of this sort are extremely important in providing the intellectual context for outreach to intermarried couples. Those efforts should be encouraged. However, they should be informed by a realistic attitude towards what outreach is and what we are addressing - namely, a serious effort to cope with a problem in Jewish communal life rather than perceive intermarriage as the great challenge and opportunity of the Jewish future.

A visiting Israeli journalist of secularist ideology commented to me recently while visiting America that the most the Jewish community can do with respect to intermarriage is stem losses and try to hold on. His perspective is perhaps unduly negative. Without question, new pockets of energy do exist within intermarried homes. However, his message remains poignant. Let us avoid the temptation to transform a communal problem into a blessing for the Jewish future. Our attitudes toward outreach must be realistic attitudes that intermarriage remains a communal

problem and that outreach represents our best accommodation towards a difficult reality.

In this sense, the important thing for Jewish leadership is to advocate outreach coupled with strong statements of ideal family norms and models. Toleration of intermarriage ought not be confused with its endorsement. Recognizing the realities of what exists is not the same as stating what should be.

sbspeech



Intermarriage rate spirals, conversions plummet

By STEWART AIN

A staggering 49 percent of Jews who married since 1985 wed persons who were "not born or raised a Jew," and only 6 percent of the non-Jewish spouses converted to Judaism, according to a newly completed national Jewish survey.

The figures, disclosed at a three-day conference this week on Jewish marriage, conversion and outreach at Hunter College in Manhattan, drew gasps when they were announced to the 130 attendees.

Egon Mayer, executive director of the Jewish Outreach Institute, which co-sponsored the conference with the Center for Jewish Studies of the CUNY Graduate School, said he too was shocked to learn the current magnitude of the intermarriage rate. The figures, gleaned from a national population study commissioned by the Council of Jewish Federations, showed also that 21 percent of the Jews in America today have at one time married someone who was not born or raised Jewish.

Mayer said the changes in the last 25 years are truly startling. He noted that only 6 percent of all Jews who married before 1965 wed someone who was not born or raised Jewish. That figure rose to 23 percent between 1965 and 1974, and to 43 percent for marriages that occurred between 1975 and 1984.

The conversion rate of the non-Jewish spouse to Judaism was 23 percent before 1965, 28 percent between 1965 and 1974 and 14 percent from 1975 to 1984.

Several conference attendees — who were from Jewish community centers, family-service agencies and

synagogues — told Mayer that despite their "shock" at these latest figures, they should have expected it because of what they are seeing in their dealings with couples from across the country.

"That is why the issue of what can be done about this phenomenon is becoming critical," said Mayer. "The [Jewish] movements haven't come to terms with the magnitude of this problem and are often caught in debates that are made obsolete by the rapidity of change."

"If you're still debating whether to accept as members of your synagogue those who have intermarried,

Jewish movements haven't come to terms with the magnitude of this problem.

and more than half of the children of your members have intermarried, what you are really debating is whether we [as a Jewish community] should be half as large as we are in the next generation."

Another recently completed study by the American Jewish Committee found that although 94 percent of 800 Jewish leaders above the age of 50 are married to Jews, 26 percent of them have children who married gentiles. The study found also that 22 percent of the leaders sent their children to Jewish day schools and that there was "very little overlap" between those who attended day schools and those who intermarried, accord-

ing to Steven Bayme, director of the AJCommittee's Jewish communal affairs department.

Bayme said other national studies have shown that Jews who were graduated from a Jewish day school have an intermarriage rate of 7 percent. Those who had attended afternoon Hebrew school or Sunday school classes intermarried at a rate of 21 percent. Those who had no Jewish education at all intermarried at a rate of 42 percent.

Susan Weidman Schneider, the author of the book, "Intermarriage: The Challenge of Living With Differences Between Christians and Jews," said she is convinced that so few non-Jewish spouses are converting to Judaism because since 1985 the Reform movement has considered as Jewish any child whose father or mother is Jewish (patrilineal descent) and who is raised a Jew. Prior to that, the Reform movement was united with the Conservative and Orthodox movements in considering as Jewish only children born of a Jewish mother.

Schneider said this change by the Reform movement has paved the way for gentile spouses to remain non-Jewish and still join and take an active role in their synagogue, enroll their children in Hebrew school and have them considered Jews.

"There is no longer a need for them to convert to Judaism," she said.

In addition, she said the women's movement has made men "reluctant to require their non-Jewish spouse to convert, and Jewish men are also less likely to assume that she will convert for him. As a result, the onus is on the Jewish man to say to his non-Jewish spouse that

(Continued on Page 40)

Intermarriage

(Continued from Page 4)

Judaism is attractive, come and join us."

Mayer said a recent survey he conducted found that Conservative Jewish laity said they would consider their grandchildren Jewish even if the child was the product of an interfaith marriage in which the mother wasn't Jewish. When that same question was posed to Conservative rabbis, 64 percent said they too would consider their grandchild Jewish even if the child's mother was not — despite the fact that the Conservative movement is officially opposed to patrilineal descent.

"There is a debate going on in the Conservative movement about who to admit as members," said Mayer. "They are facing the same intermarriage rate they had thought only others faced. And the frustration some Conservative synagogues face is whether to continue to maintain halachic [Jewish law] standards regarding conversion."

In order for the Conservative or Orthodox movements to consider Jewish the child of a non-Jewish mother, the child must undergo a conversion. In the case of a boy, it means drawing a drop of blood from his penis. Mayer questioned whether parents of an older boy will permit that or simply opt for a Reform synagogue that will accept him as a Jew without it.

Rabbi Neal Weinberg, director of the Introduction to Judaism Program at the University of Judaism in Los Angeles, said his 18-week program is designed for both Jews and non-Jews to give them a basic foundation in the practices and history of the religion.

"I find that the gentiles inspire the Jews to learn more about their religion," he said. "It's not a conversion class. It's a learning session."


"Very few religious Christians are mating with Jews," he added. "Usually they are no longer accepting Christian beliefs. They believe in God and tradition but don't accept Jesus. I find that after they study in our program, they say they have been a Jew and never realized it before. And once we educate them, they can make the decision whether they want to be Jewish."

He said the program was established because of a recognition that intermarriage has become a way of life.

"This is the price we pay for living in a free society," he said. "We shouldn't be afraid to say the 'c' [conversion] word."

Bayme insisted that just as efforts are being made to reach out to intermarried couples, emphasis should be placed on trying to educate Jews so that they will want to continue following a Jewish way of life in their own home with a Jewish spouse.

"Toleration of intermarriage should not be confused with endorsement of it," he said.



The Wexner Heritage Foundation

551 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Huntington Center Suite 3710
41 South High Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215

212 355 6115 New York
614 464 2772 Ohio

13 April 1990


TO: Faculty for May Alumni Retreat
FROM: Rabbi Ramie Arian
Associate Director of Programs
RE: Reading Materials

.....
We are delighted that you will be joining us at our first Alumni Retreat next month in Houston. As you know, the facilitator training (required for those who will be leading workshops) will begin promptly at 2:00 pm on Thursday, May 17, 1990. The retreat will begin at 2:30 pm on Friday, May 18 and conclude with brunch about noon on Sunday, May 20.

Enclosed are a variety of reading materials to help you prepare for the retreat. The binder contains articles which are being sent to the students. They are arranged according to the session at the retreat to which the respective articles are relevant. The folder consists of additional material which we feel will help you prepare for the weekend.

Our colleague, Dr. Egon Mayer, one of our keynoters for the weekend, has asked that you assist in a research project with which he is involved. We ask that you take a few moments to complete the questionnaire which follows this letter. Use the return envelope provided to mail the completed questionnaire to Dr. Mayer. Please complete the questionnaire BEFORE you do the reading in the binder.

All of us on the staff of the Foundation look forward to seeing you in Houston in May.



The Graduate School and University Center
of the City University of New York
Center for Jewish Studies
33 West 42nd Street, New York, NY 10036

Dear Colleague:

As you may know, I have been involved in the professional study of intermarriage for nearly fifteen years. More and more, as I travel throughout the United States, people ask me how to respond to Jews who are contemplating intermarriage.

In an effort to get a broad spectrum of opinion on this subject, I am sending the hypothetical case outlined below to rabbis, Jewish professionals and lay leaders around the country. I hope to publish the results of my inquiries in a form beneficial to all who are concerned about this issue. All responses will be anonymous so please be entirely candid. Please add any other comments you may wish on a separate sheet of paper and enclose it with the questionnaire.

Thank you very much in advance for your prompt and thoughtful reply.

Sincerely

Egon Mayer, Ph.D.
Professor

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

The Case

Ruth is a 35-year-old Jewish college professor. She has never been married, though she would very much like to be. Although she works at a large state university with dozens of Jewish men, many are already married (about half to Gentile men). The others are either "too old" for her or unsuitable. The reality of her daily life is that Ruth meets many more "eligible" Gentile men than Jewish men. In fact, she has not had a date with a Jewish man in about three years.

Six months ago Ruth met Henry, a non-Jewish colleague from another department, who is 37-years-old, an agnostic of Methodist origins. The two have fallen in love, much against Ruth's early misgivings, and Henry has asked Ruth to marry him. Ruth is eager to marry and loves Henry, who is socially, intellectually, and in virtually all other ways an ideal match, except that he is not Jewish. But, she also has very strong feelings about wanting to have a "Jewish family." "I want to have Jewish children," she says.

Ruth was brought up in a rather traditional Conservative Jewish home. She went to Hebrew school three days a week until a year past her Bat Mitzvah. She attended a Jewish summer camp for several years during her early adolescence, and spent two summers in Israel, positive experiences that have remained wellsprings for her continuing Jewish self-identification.

She has asked Henry if he would ever consider converting to Judaism, but he is resistant. He says he has not given religion much thought as an adult, and has felt little need for it. On the other hand, he has a close relationship to his widowed mother who has belonged to the same church virtually all of her adult life. He is very concerned that his mother would feel crushed by his conversion.

Henry is very understanding of Ruth's feelings, precisely because of his mother's attachment to her church, and has made it clear that he will be fully supportive of raising their future children as Jews. Indeed, since the two have become serious about each other, Henry has gone with Ruth to her parents' home on many Friday evenings for Shabbat dinners as well as to several Friday-night and Shabbat-morning services at Ruth's synagogue.

Although no wedding date has been set as yet, both Ruth and Henry are eager to marry. She is hoping that given a little more time before they finalize their wedding plans Henry may yet decide to convert. Her own parents' eagerness to see Ruth married have even diminished their early admonitions against her relationship with Henry. If he agreed to convert, Ruth would be delighted. But, she is afraid that if she pushes the conversion issue too hard she will either lose him or get him to do something for which he might later resent her.

What should Ruth do? What, if anything, should the Jewish community do about Ruth and Henry's marriage plans?

PLEASE INDICATE YOUR ☐ AGREEMENT OR ☐ DISAGREEMENT WITH EACH ALTERNATIVE THAT RUTH MIGHT FOLLOW BY CHECKING THE BOX NEXT TO YOUR ANSWER..

AFTER RESPONDING TO ALL OF THE ALTERNATIVES PRESENTED BELOW, PLEASE WRITE IN YOUR OWN WORDS HOW YOU WOULD ADVISE RUTH.

1. Ruth should not marry Henry under any circumstances. 9
☐₁ Agree ☐₂ Disagree
2. Ruth should marry Henry only if he is willing to convert. 10
☐₁ Agree ☐₂ Disagree
3. Ruth should marry Henry even if he doesn't convert as long as there is agreement that the children will be raised as Jews. 11
☐₁ Agree ☐₂ Disagree
4. Ruth should marry Henry without any preconditions and work to maintain a Jewish home. 12
☐₁ Agree ☐₂ Disagree

Ruth has always assumed she would marry in a Jewish ceremony, under a "Chuppah" with all her family present, that she would raise Jewish children and maintain a liberal Jewish home. 13

Assuming that Ruth will marry Henry, how should they marry?

5. Unless Henry converts prior to the marriage, they should only marry in a civil ceremony. 14
☐₁ Agree ☐₂ Disagree
6. Ruth should find a rabbi who will perform an appropriate Jewish marriage ceremony even if Henry doesn't convert, provided that they have agreed to raise their children as Jews. 15
☐₁ Agree ☐₂ Disagree
7. Ruth should find a rabbi who will perform an appropriate Jewish marriage ceremony even if Henry doesn't convert, even if they have not agreed to raise their children as Jews. 16
☐₁ Agree ☐₂ Disagree
8. If Ruth finds a rabbi who refuses to officiate,
(A) She should look for another rabbi who will. 17
☐₁ Agree ☐₂ Disagree
(B) She should find a rabbi to help her design a civil ceremony that has some Jewish content. 18
☐₁ Agree ☐₂ Disagree
(C) She should find a Jewish judge or justice of the peace who would marry them in a civil ceremony that has some Jewish ceremonial content. 19
☐₁ Agree ☐₂ Disagree

(NOTE: If you are not a rabbi, indicate how you would want your rabbi to answer the following.)

9. If Ruth were a member of your congregation: 20
(A) Would you be willing to officiate at the marriage even if Henry did not convert but you were assured the children would be raised Jewish? 21
☐₁ Yes ☐₂ No
(B) Would you be willing to officiate at the marriage if Henry did not convert and no conditions were set about how the children would be raised? 22
☐₁ Yes ☐₂ No

(C) Would you be willing to officiate at the marriage if Henry promised to consider conversion sometime after the marriage?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

(D) If you could not officiate, would you be willing to help Ruth find another rabbi?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

(E) If you could not officiate, would you be willing to help Ruth develop Jewish content for a civil ceremony?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

(F) Would you be willing to attend the couples' wedding?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

(G) If you couldn't help Ruth in any way, who do you think could or should?

Please expand on this on a separate sheet. Thank you.

10. If Henry were your son-in-law, would you want him to become Jewish?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

11. Would you make any effort to help Henry decide to become Jewish?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

12. If Henry were your son-in-law and he did not convert to Judaism but he and your daughter were raising their children as Jews:

(A) Would you consider your grandchildren Jewish?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

(B) Would you want your grandchildren to be regarded as Jews in the eyes of the organized Jewish community?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

13. If Henry were your son-in-law and did not convert to Judaism:

(A) Would you welcome him to participate in Jewish holiday celebrations in your home?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

(B) Would you want him to be welcome to membership in your synagogue?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

(C) Would you want him to be welcome to membership in Jewish organizations that you support?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

(D) Would you want him to be welcome on any board committees in your synagogue?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

(E) Would you want him to be welcome to serve on any board committees in Jewish organizations you support?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

(F) Would you want to see any special programs in which people like Henry might become better acquainted with and attracted to Judaism?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

If Yes, who do you think should run such programs? *Please explain on a separate sheet.*

(G) Do you want to see more money spent by the organized Jewish community on programs designed to help intermarried families be a part of the community?

☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

14. Which of the following best describes your role in the Jewish community? (Check all that apply.) 43
- ☐ ₁ Rabbi ☐ ₂ Professional in Jewish communal service ☐ ₃ Member of the board of a synagogue
- ☐ ₄ Member of the board of a Jewish communal service agency
- ☐ ₅ Other (please explain) _____

15. Do you hold a position in a pulpit? 44
- ☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

16. Do you personally consider your Jewish identification 45
- ☐ ₁ Reform ☐ ₂ Conservative ☐ ₃ Orthodox ☐ ₄ Reconstructionist ☐ ₅ Just Jewish (no other labels)
- ☐ ₆ Other (please explain) _____

17. Is your congregation considered 46
- ☐ ₁ Reform ☐ ₂ Conservative ☐ ₃ Orthodox ☐ ₄ Reconstructionist
- ☐ ₅ Other _____ ☐ ₆ Not Applicable

18. Are you a member of any of the major rabbinic organizations? 47
- ☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No
- If Yes, which? 48
- ☐ ₁ Reform ☐ ₂ Conservative ☐ ₃ Orthodox ☐ ₄ Reconstructionist
- ☐ ₅ Other _____

19. What is your marital status? 49
- ☐ ₁ Never Married ☐ ₂ Widowed ☐ ₃ Divorced / Separated ☐ ₄ Remarried ☐ ₅ Married for first time

20. If ever married, is/was your current/latest spouse 50
- ☐ ₁ Jewish by birth ☐ ₂ Jewish by conversion ☐ ₃ Not Jewish

21. Do you have children? 51
- ☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

22. If Yes, are any of your children married? 52
- ☐ ₁ Yes ☐ ₂ No

23. If any of your children are/have been married, are/were any married to a spouse who is (check all that apply) 53
- ☐ ₁ Jewish by birth 54
- ☐ ₂ Jewish by conversion 55
- ☐ ₃ Not Jewish 56

24. How old were you on your last birthday? _____ 57 58

25. Are you ☐ ₁ Male ☐ ₂ Female 59

26. What is the city and state in which you now live? _____ 60 61 62 63

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL REPLIES.
PLEASE RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE PROMPTLY.

The Myth of the Shiksa¹

EDWIN H. FRIEDMAN

Here is part of a letter that a Jewish mother sent to her son after learning that he really intended to marry the non-Jewish woman he had been dating:

Dear Herbie,

Well, if you want to commit suicide, I guess there is nothing I can do. But I can't tell you how much this *shiksa* business is hurting your father and me. I don't know if you realize that this will hurt us financially. We will probably have to leave town and I will certainly have to give up my job teaching Hebrew. . . .

Your father is sick over this—you know he hasn't been well. All I can say is that if he dies, I will hold you responsible.

Mary may say that she loves you, but have you told her that we Jews think of Jesus as an illegitimate son?

Love,
 Mother

For 1000 years, Eastern European Jews and their descendants have used the term *shiksa* to refer to a non-Jewish woman who lures Jewish men away from religion and family. This attractive will-o'-the-wisp, as folk imagination would have it, is seductive, immoral, ignorant, and insensitive to Jewish values. It is not just that she is unsuitable to the warmth of traditional Jewish family life—she will destroy it!

There can be no question that within the Jewish ethnic community intermarriage has long been perceived as a major threat to the survival of the Jewish people and their way of life. Experience with more than 2000 Jewish-Gentile marriages and the reactions of their families has taught me, however, that when it comes to the individual Jewish family, this idea of the *shiksa* is myth. More important, the false assumptions that support it are hardly confined to Jewish families alone. Such false assumptions are just as

1. Several parts of this chapter have appeared elsewhere. The first presentation was at the Georgetown Family Therapy Symposium in 1968 and was entitled: "Ethnic Identity as Extended Family in Jewish-Gentile Marriage." It was later published in *Systems Therapy*, J. Bradt and C. Moynihan (Eds.). The title "Myth of the Shiksa" was first used for a presentation of the culture-family process hypothesis at the Third Annual Family Therapy Conference in Tel Aviv, 1979. An edited version of that paper appeared in *The Family* in October 1980, published jointly by the Georgetown Family Center and the Center for Family Life, New Rochelle, N.Y.

prevalent in cross-cultural marriages of any combination, and they even appear in the families of culturally compatible unions.

Precisely, therefore, because the myth of the shiksa and its constituent myths are so bound up with one another, revealing the falsehood in the particular automatically leads to revealing the truth in the universal. It is the purpose of this chapter to expose the myth of the shiksa in its specific form—the way it surfaces in Jewish families—and, as a by-product, to extract some new ideas about the general relationship of family and culture. Regarding the particular, I will show how matters such as which Jews are most likely to be “seduced,” which families and which members of those families are most likely to be reactive, and what strategies maximize keeping those families together all can be understood as matters of family process rather than culture. Then, broadening the perspective, I will show, first, how family process universally wraps itself in the garb of “cultural camouflage” and, second, how focus on background factors by families of any culture, as well as their therapists, supports an unwitting conspiracy of denial.

Clinical Experience

The ideas and examples to be presented here are based on 22 years of continuous experience in the cosmopolitan and international setting of Washington, D.C. During these decades, this area became a “mecca” for people from all over our planet and thus a fertile seeding ground for the cross-pollination of love.

Throughout this period as both a rabbi with a specific responsibility within the Jewish ethnic community and a family therapist with a broadly ecumenical practice, I found myself with an unusual opportunity to view cross-cultural marriage and family reactions within both particular and universal settings. As this situation developed, my position became one of reciprocal feedback. On the one hand, my growing awareness of the universality of family process that had been tutored by my experience with non-Jewish families helped me get past the cultural myths within Jewish families. Then, as I began to understand the emotional processes behind the cultural myth I was observing in Jewish families, I was able to carry that understanding back to all families as universal principles. Eventually I came to see the myth of the shiksa as a prototype, but for two decades it was my laboratory.

I first began to think about the relationship between culture and family process when I tried to understand a paradox about Jewish-Gentile marriage. In my premarital counseling, first, I found that Jews who married non-Jews were not at all uninterested in the survival of their ethnic community, which was contrary to what the community assumed. Second, I noticed that many of the relatives who phrased their opposition to such a marriage in terms of concern for Jewish survival had not themselves led lives evidencing such

concern and had become defenders of the faith overnight. Third, and most surprising to me, was the fact that over and over I found the grandparents, though usually more traditional than the parents, generally, were more accepting.

Next I began to see that there were significant correlations between the ideological positions individuals took on such marriages and their positions in their family. This seemed to be true both about which child "married out" and which family member reacted most strongly. Back in the late 1960s, I began to report these findings at symposia of family therapists. Almost unanimously their response confirmed my perceptions. More than that, many began to refer to me mixed couples where neither partner was Jewish, for example, Protestant-Catholic, Black-White, Greek Orthodox-Russian Orthodox, European-Asian, Japanese-Chinese. In all, the number of different combinations probably reached 50.

These referrals gave me the opportunity to realize that certain family emotional phenomena that I had found to be true about Jewish-Gentile mixed marriages—for example, which child in the family tended to intermarry and who threatened to have a heart attack at the wedding—was just as true regarding mixed marriages where neither partner was Jewish.

I then began to see mixed couples in the same counseling groups. Here I found that Blacks and Whites, Turks and Greeks, Russians and Japanese, Puerto Ricans and WASPs, and Germans and Jews could gain as much insight into their own families from observing the emotional processes of these "other" families as from observing families of a similar cultural milieu, sometimes more. At the beginning of these sessions I was so caught up myself in the general mythology surrounding culture and family process that I was astounded by the similarity in the emotional processes between non-Jewish and Jewish family life.

Eventually, the uniqueness of my position in the Jewish and non-Jewish worlds began to pay off. I was able to develop a new hypothesis about the relationship between culture and family process that helped explain and integrate everything I was observing.

My hypothesis, which is the basic premise of this chapter, is as follows: Rather than supplying the determinants of family dynamics, *culture and environment supply the medium through which family process works its art*. Culture and environment may contribute to the morphology of a family's symptomatology, but they do not determine which families or which individuals from which families in a given culture are to become symptomatic. Rather than determining family dynamics, culture and environment *stain* them; that is, they make them visible. It is not that sociologists and anthropologists are wrong in their descriptions of various kinds of family life. What is wrong is to assume that any family, at any given time, is beleaguered by relational conflicts *because* of its culture or environmental setting, even when the family issues are directly related to these factors. In certain situations

culture and environment can tip the balance, of course, but, generally, their effect on a given family's emotional processes is not so much to shape them as to supply the fabric for their design.

A simple test of the relative significance of culture and process in understanding the emotional functioning of any family is as follows. Cultural and environmental factors can no more be the sufficient or the necessary conditions for the creation of pathology in a society than paint and canvas can produce artistic accomplishment. Thus even if we could know all the cultural and environmental factors in a given family's background, we could still not posit the future of that family's health. On the other hand, if we could know all the dynamics of that family's emotional heritage and not know anything about their cultural and environmental background, we could posit the future of that family with a high degree of accuracy.²

Elsewhere I have shown that it is possible to isolate the family emotional process as an independent force from cultural background by describing 10 rules of family process regarding distance, chronic conditions, symptom formation, cutoffs, secrets, pain thresholds, sibling position, homeostasis, and diagnosis, which have the same validity for all families irrespective of cultural background.³

It is the failure to appreciate how emotional processes are camouflaged rather than determined by culture that enables family members to blame the background of others as the source of their discontent and their inability to change. Cultural camouflage encourages family members everywhere to avoid taking personal responsibility for their own points of view. It may be worse. The constant focus on and interminable discussion of background factors either among family members or with family members and their counselors allow important emotional forces to operate in their pernicious way, undetected.

It is only when we can see culture as a stain rather than a cause of family relational problems that we can devise appropriate strategies for affecting the underlying emotional processes that, rather than the cultural factors or

2. "Culture and Family Process," delivered originally at the Georgetown Medical School Symposium on Family Psychotherapy, 1971, later published in *Collection of Selected Symposium Papers*, Volume III, R.R. Sager (Ed.), Family Center, Georgetown Medical School, Washington, D.C.

3. This hypothesis should not be seen in any way as an effort to minimize or refute the general importance of ethnic and cultural values and customs in the enriching, developing, and stabilizing of family life everywhere. The emphasis here, rather, is that those same very important factors that ordinarily contribute mightily to the creation of a family, under certain conditions, are used to disguise what is destroying the same family. Ironically, as a rabbi committed to the survival of my people I came to find that I could often further positive feelings about being Jewish through approaches aimed primarily at waning the intensity of a family relationship system, even when, paradoxically, those very approaches seemed to be almost on the opposite side of reinforcing cultural commitment.

differences themselves, have the real power to destroy that family or keep it together.

This chapter is organized into three sections that follow the course of my experience. The first section will describe how ethnic cultural mythology operates in Jewish family life. The second section will show how Jewish families were helped to deal with potentially family-splitting crises when the underlying emotional "demons" in these families lost their cultural masks. The third section will develop the ideas of the first two sections into universal principles about the relationship of culture and family process in all families and then show how those principles feed back to even deeper understanding of the myth of the shiksa in Jewish families.

Ethnic Mythology and Jewish Family Life

The most blatant aspect of the myth of the shiksa today is that she will, or even wants to, attract a Jewish man away from his origins, no less destroy his family. In my experience that is the last thing she wants, generally being attracted herself to that very rootedness that she often lacks. Indeed, if there does exist a "shiksa" today, she is to be found, of all places, among Jewish women. For, in my experience, it is far more likely that when Jews and non-Jews marry it will generally be the non-Jewish partner who is influenced away from his or her origins. When the focus is confined to those marriages in which the Jewish partner is female, then I have to add that I have almost never seen such a union where the non-Jewish male will be the less adaptive partner in family matters.

The myth of the shiksa within the Jewish community today is thus doubly misleading. Not only are the designs of the non-Jewish woman who marries a Jewish man generally toward the preservation of his background rather than its destruction, but that same preservation instinct in Jewish women who marry non-Jewish men generally puts them in the very position that the term shiksa was originally intended to describe, that is, a woman who will seduce her man away from his background.

How then shall we account for the extremely negative reactions, some of them almost psychotic, that can occur in Jewish families when they guess who's coming to brunch?⁴

It is possible to answer this question with some conventional sociological theory. Times have changed; there is a lag in the perception; or any minority

4. Throughout this chapter I discuss Jewish-Gentile marriage as though the Jewish partner is always male. This, of course, is not true. The choice was stylistic as well as an effort to catch the traditional flavor of the myth. Previous to the last six or seven years, my own experience showed the Jewish partner to be male most of the time. Since the women's movement began to gather full steam, the curve has flattened out or even begun to bend the other way. I have found little difference, however, in the way family process operates around the issues of mixed marriage when the Jewish partner is female.

group is concerned about its preservation. Given the recent Nazi experience, the threats to Israel, and the long history of deep concern for survival, the Jewish people are naturally going to be even more xenophobic.

In my experience, the problem with such thinking is that I have never been able to find any necessary correlation between the degree of sociological or psychological sophistication in a Jewish family and how they respond to a mixed marriage. Nor have I found that a correlation necessarily exists between past exposure to threats to the Jewish people and how they respond to a mixed marriage. If a family that survived the Holocaust gets upset it is natural to say, "We can understand, given their past." If a deeply assimilated family from an old established, Southern Jewish community is accepting, we may be prone to explain, "What do you expect, given the diluting of Jewish identity in their background?" The problem with these background explanations is that I have often seen survivors from the Holocaust not react negatively, saying, "We have had enough turmoil in our lives," and, on the other hand, I have often seen so-called assimilated fathers take to bed for weeks.

Nor, as my experience increased, did it become possible to predict how any parents might react based on information such as the size of their town; their section of the United States; their degree of Jewish education or synagogue attendance; the amounts they gave to the United Jewish Appeal; or their trips to Israel per year.

Clearly, something deeper than cultural background or lag supported the myth of the shiksa, something else had to be present to modulate the ethnic material. A history of cultural commitment simply was not sufficient to create the reaction, and in some cases it did not even seem necessary.

My first clue to the missing variable came from observing the other side of the issue, namely, who in which Jewish family was most likely to marry an outsider. Here also, I found that the common-sense wisdom did not offer adequate explanation. While broad statistical studies might show inverse proportion between mixed marriage and cultural background factors such as keeping kosher, synagogue attendance, and number of Jewish books in the house, there were too many exceptions when it came down to the specific Jewish families in which mixed marriages were occurring. If deep commitment for Jewish values and customs prevented or inhibited mixed marriage in many situations, why did it not have the same prophylactic effect in many other families? None of the usual assumptions about degree of Jewish education and the inculcation of values necessarily held up. In fact, the correlations linking Jewish values and mixed marriages were skewed further. For it often seemed that the cultural background factors had worked and not worked at the same time. Over and over, I found that the Jewish partners who came from a family with a strong cultural tie felt intensely Jewish despite their decision to marry a non-Jew. *In their own minds one seemed to have nothing to do with the other.*

Finally a factor did begin to show up, a variable that seemed to be more determinative than cultural influence. It did not explain in every single case which Jewish individuals became candidates for cross-cultural marriage, but it seemed particularly important because it also helped to explain why the intensity of family reactions was not necessarily proportional to the degree of cultural commitment. It put both sides of the issue together in a new way, and as things turned out, it eventually led to effective strategies for family harmony.

I began to realize that Jews who married non-Jews overwhelmingly occupied the sibling position of oldest, or only, with only child defined as an actual single child or any child where there was a gap of five or more years between siblings. Such a correlation, I knew, could have meant that they simply exhibited the pioneering or leadership attribute frequently found in individuals from that sibling position. I soon learned, however, that this unusual correspondence between sibling position and the "insider" who married an "outsider" was a hint of something far more significant, something that could be true even when the insider did not occupy that particular sibling position.

As a family therapist who had taken thousands of multigenerational family histories, I knew that the child occupying the sibling position of oldest or only tended to be the focused or triangled child.

As is well known, a major and convenient way that some marital partners reduce the stress and intensity of their own relationship is by tuning down the overall emotional potential in their marriage by siphoning off the excess emotion onto the child. Such a child naturally becomes more important to the balance of the parents' relationship than his or her siblings, and where the resulting balance of the marriage is a calm and seemingly perfect fit, the importance of the child to its balance may not even be realized.

The child most likely to be emotionally triangled in this way does not always occupy the sibling position of oldest or only, of course. The child tends to be either an only, by the nature of things, or a first born simply because he or she was the only one around when the parents' marriage was in its early stages of formation as the parents disengaged from their parents. Any child can occupy this position if the timing is right, for example, when the parents' marriage needs rebalancing such as after a previously triangled child leaves (or dies) or the child is born close in time to the death of a grandparent who has been particularly important to one of the parents. Such a child, regardless of sibling position, might replace that grandparent in a similar emotional triangle that had helped balance the parents' marriage from the beginning.

In any event, if the child occupying such a position in the family does something that is perceived by the parents to be taking him or her out of that set of emotional interdependencies, the parents' anxiety will immediately

increase. And it goes without saying that the triangled child will always have more difficulty leaving home!

I began to apply this hypothesis of the *triangled child* to Jewish families involved in mixed marriage, and many things came together. Not only did it help explain the inconsistencies between the degree of exposure to cultural influence and which family member married out or reacted most intensely, but it also helped explain who married further out, that is, interracially as well as interreligiously. For if parents generally have difficulty separating from the emotionally triangled child, the more intense the emotional circuits of that triangle, the more difficulty the child has separating from the parents. More powerful circuits need more powerful circuit breakers.

I thus formed the following hypothesis: In any Jewish (or ethnic) family the child most likely to marry out is the child most important to the balance of the parents' marriage either right then or while growing up. Further, that the parent (or other relative) most likely to react negatively occupied a similar position in his or her own family of origin, either during childhood or right then.

It was, I decided, anxiety over the loss of a previously balanced togetherness that could suddenly turn the genes of cultural commitment on, as in the case of many reacting parents, or slowly off, as in the case of many offspring.

But still a piece was missing. For even if my hypothesis about family position rather than degree of cultural commitment was correct, why this kind of marriage in that kind of family? What was the connection between family process and cultural symptoms?

What I eventually came to learn was that in any family, but particularly in easily identifiable, ethnic families, to the extent the emotional system is intense, members confuse feelings about their ethnicity with feelings about their family. The resulting inability to distinguish one from the other eventually leads to a situation in which reactions in the family relationship system are discussed with the vocabulary of the family's cultural milieu. I soon came to realize that focus on cultural background was a major way members of many Jewish families avoided focusing on their emotional processes.

The inadvertent yet all-encompassing nature of this phenomenon is illustrated by the following list of comments made by Jewish partners in my office. All were spoken in passing as someone was talking about family life back home or expectations about the future.

- I came from a typical Old World Jewish family in which father was the boss.
- I came from a typical Old World Jewish family in which mother was the boss.
- Jews don't talk about death.
- Boating is a Gentile sport.

- Jews don't live near forests.
- I thought Jewish weddings were buffet.
- Jews don't talk about sex.
- I thought Jewish weddings don't have placecards.
- You never can get Jews to be serious when they are eating.
- I thought Jewish weddings were always on Saturday night.
- Jewish families don't joke at dinner.
- I thought Jewish weddings always began when the minute hand was moving up the clock.
- Jewish girls always stay with their mothers.
- Jews aren't interested in watching sports on TV.
- Jewish boys can't get away from their mothers.
- In the Jewish religion we don't tell our ages.
- Why do I worry about him? I'm Jewish.
- My daughter reminds me of a shiksa—she's so cold and distant.
- Jewish women wear knit suits.
- My father was a typical Jewish father; you know, quiet, passive, let mom do all the work in raising us.
- Jewish mothers are dirty fighters.
- I have a typical Jewish girl's build, small on top and big on the bottom.
- Jewish parents don't let their kids sit in the living room.
- Jewish parents don't take vacations without their kids.
- Jewish wives know how to train their husbands.
- Jews like contemporary homes.
- Jewish parents don't charge their daughters rent if they come home again.
- Jewish families don't make big deals over birthdays.
- Jews always buy discount.
- Distance is fundamentally a non-Jewish concept.

As I will show in the third section this phenomenon is hardly confined to Jewish families or even to other ethnic families. The less intense the family, the less likely this is to happen. But a general principle does emerge, namely, that members of families regardless of cultural background, are more likely to fuse cultural values and family processes when an important emotional issue has been touched or when the general level of family anxiety has increased.

In any event, once I began to defocus culture in my work with mixed couples and to pay less attention to the ethnic words, customs, and rubrics usually used by Jewish families to explain intermarriage and personal reactions, a harvest of insights accrued, both about the myth of the shiksa specifically and about the relationship of family and culture generally.

There is one more emotional aspect of ethnicity that needs to be

mentioned before showing the therapeutic efficacy of bypassing cultural content.

An ethnic system operates like an extended family composed of nuclear subgroupings. Anxiety in either the nuclear or extended system can escalate anxiety in the other. While this is true for any ethnic group, it has been particularly true about individual Jewish families in relation to what I would call the greater Jewish family (the worldwide Jewish community). Since the Nazi Holocaust and amidst the constant threat to Israel, sporadic anti-Semitic incidents in various countries, the falling Jewish birth rate, and the generally lessened interest in synagogue membership, the greater Jewish family is in a state of chronic anxiety about its survival.

The reciprocal elevation of anxiety between individual nuclear Jewish families and the extended system of the Jewish community works as follows: Members of an individual Jewish family concerned about the survival and togetherness of their own small group become more anxious about their personal family when they read or hear talk from community leaders about the survival and togetherness of the greater Jewish family. Similarly, when the leaders of individual Jewish families anxiously go to the community leaders for help over an issue such as mixed marriage (which in the minds of those family members has to do primarily with worries over their personal families, not worries about the community) the community leaders hear these reports as more proof that their family (the Jewish community) is in danger, and their overall anxiety increases.

This comparison of an ethnic community to an extended family is not inconsistent with the thesis that it is family process that counts, not culture. I am talking about the emotional processes in an ethnic community, not its cultural content. Of all the social groupings that act like a family, none is more like a family than an ethnic group, combining as it does all the same factors that make a family behave with the emotional intensity of a biological organism: genetic pool, long-term association, similar physiognomy, generations of emotional dependency, and so on.

The etymological history of the word *shiksa* itself is instructive of this relationship between a culture and its constituent families. The Hebrew verb *shakaytz* means to abominate, to utterly detest. In the Bible there are constant admonitions not to eat or take the *shikutz* (masculine noun form), literally, *abominated thing*, into one's house. But why was it necessary to have laws designed to keep people away from that which is abominable? We find no laws today against taking garbage into the house. Obviously whatever the *shikutzim* (plural) were, they were not by nature abominable but were probably attractive and were given this term of opprobrium to dilute people's desire.

There is, by the way, no feminine form of the root *shakaytz* anywhere in the Hebrew Bible; that grammatical construction does not exist. Only in the Middle Ages, in Europe, does the term *shiktsa* (feminine form) begin to

surface among the Yiddish-speaking Jews of the ghetto who, obviously hemmed in by their physical and other walls, found the apparent freedom of the non-Jew attractive. The psychology was the same, but the focus had switched from foreign holy objects to foreign (strange?) women.⁵

Family Process and Cultural Costume

In this section I will show how it is possible to understand four basic aspects of the myth of the shiksa in terms of family process rather than culture and how such understanding can help Jewish families thrown into crisis over an impending mixed marriage. They are (1) which family member is most likely to be reactive, (2) what therapeutic strategies are most likely to reduce negative reactions and gain acceptance, (3) which families are most likely to be unaccepting, and (4) what variables have an influence on which given Jewish family is likely to have one of its members marry out.

The Reactive Relative

When some Jewish parents realize that they might have a non-Jewish in-law the reaction can be severe. I have seen Jewish mothers threaten suicide and Jewish fathers go into severe states of depression. I have heard of threats to cut children off emotionally and financially and to get the child kicked out of medical school! I have witnessed harassment in the form of daily letters or phone calls. I have seen parents resort to arguing the Jewish partner out of the potential marriage, and I have seen the effort made with the non-Jewish partner. Whatever form the reaction takes, however, the rationale is usually phrased in terms of, or accompanied by comments on, the survival of the Jewish people. "How can you do this to us?" is usually mixed with "Remember the Holocaust?" The personal qualities of the non-Jew will be attacked along with comments on the superiority of Jewish family life. The impression

5. This theme has been developed further in "The Relationship between Culture and Family Process in the Development of Jewish Identity" delivered at a conference on the psychodynamics of Jewish identity sponsored in March 1981 by the American Jewish Committee and the Central Conference of American Rabbis, the proceedings of which were published in 1982. This paper discusses how it is possible for anxiety in the greater Jewish family (or any ethnic community) to have more of an effect on the identity of its members than the quantity or quality of cultural inputs: libraries, sermons, courses, retreats, celebrations, and so on. It shows how an entire ethnic community can be viewed as one biological organism. Applying some new medical findings on the autoimmune response, trauma, and overcrowding to the "family's" response to the Holocaust it compares that event and its consequences to the kind of debilitating shock wave that can continue down through the generations in any family after a terribly shocking and uprooting event (rape, multiple death, accident, etc.). Here the suggestion is made that if the "family leaders" could shift the concern from how many died to who survived and how, the effect on the emotional processes of the entire ethnic community would then permit the cultural inputs to be far more effective.

that results is that the reacting relative is, if somewhat belatedly, terribly concerned about the survival of Judaism, or at least Jewish family life.

There are reasons for doubting this impression. First, I have only seen failure in efforts to change such reactive family members when the issues were discussed in philosophical or sociological terms of ethnic survival. Over and over, I have seen the Jewish partner go home for a weekend, explain his or her position logically and eloquently, return feeling much better about things, and then receive a letter showing that the parents are back at ground zero. The second problem with automatically assuming that cultural survival or purity is the real issue when it is invoked at such intense moments of family anxiety is the usual response of the grandparents. As I have mentioned, I have almost never seen the grandparents (who are usually more traditional) react more negatively than their less traditional children, the parents. This finding has been so universal that whenever a bride or groom reports that a grandparent is upset, I always ask, "Did you get that directly or hear it from your grandparents' son or daughter?" (i.e., mom or dad). Invariably it was heard from the bride's or groom's parent. Time and time again I have found that the grandparent is more accepting. But how could a leap-a-generation camaraderie overcome so basic an anxiety as in-group survival?

The degree of commitment to Jewish survival is almost irrelevant to the degree of reaction when a family member marries a non-Jew. What is relevant are the following three emotional coordinates of the reacting family member. In other words, irrespective of the language used to phrase the reaction and irrespective of the degree of cultural commitment the reacting relative has shown in the past, the following three emotional factors are always present:

1. There is little distinction of self between the reacting relative and the person getting married. This is so much the case that the reacting relative almost experiences the upcoming marriage as his or her own.
2. There are important issues that have not been worked out in the reacting relative's own marriage. In fact it may be generally true that individuals who are satisfied in their own marriages rarely react intensely to another's.
3. The reacting relative is always caught in some important emotionally responsible position in his or her own family of origin.⁶

The third is really the most important, as I will show shortly, for devising therapeutic strategies, and in some ways it makes the first two redundant. For the former usually follow from the latter.

6. Portions of the following section describing the emotional coordinates of family reactions to a marriage also appear in my chapter "Systems and Ceremonies: A Family View of Rites of Passage" in *The Family Life Cycle*, E. Carter and M. McGoldrick (Eds.), New York: Gardner Press, 1980.

An objection at this point may be, "Surely this would not be true regarding Orthodox Jews." First, that has not always been my experience. Beyond that, however, what is important for understanding and changing the emotional processes in a family is not the cultural position individuals take at such times but *how they function with that position*. Even if it were true that an Orthodox Jew is more likely to object to a mixed marriage (or for that matter an observant Catholic to marriage to a divorcee), the intensity with which that relative reacts is another matter, and that can tell much about the person's family and his or her position in it.

For example, an objection simply stated as such or even a refusal to go to an event because it is against one's principles can be understood as a definition of position. On the other hand, cutting off, disinheriting, constant harassment, saying "This will put a knife in my heart," heavy interference at such moments has little to do with cultural values and traditions, even though the family members who are acting that way may claim their faith supports their behavior and even though at other, less emotional, times the same expressed concern for survival, purity, and so on, reflects positive commitment to and deep involvement in the tradition. The roots of such fanaticism will be found in those family members' unworked out relationships with their own family of origin.

For example, *shiva*, which means *seven*, is the Jewish mourning period for a first-degree relative during which traditional Jews stay at home for a week. Some Jews have "sat *shiva*" for a child who has married out, literally, cutting him or her off from the family. While this would appear to be Jewish because the process is wrapped in a fundamental Jewish custom, nothing could be more misleading. Nowhere has the mainstream of Jewish tradition suggested that this be done, and it is done today (ritually or symbolically) by Jews who are ordinarily so nontraditional that they probably would not go through the ritual of sitting *shiva* when a relative really dies. We have here a good example of the universal emotional phenomenon I shall describe in the next section as the "neurotic usefulness of religious tradition." Family cutoffs are emotional, not cultural, phenomena and always require the consent of the one cutoff. Where that individual will not consent, working on the emotional processes in the cutting-off parent can eventually reconnect the two family members.

Therapeutic Strategies

What has substantiated in my own mind the accuracy of the previously motivated matrix of three emotional factors has been the high degree of success I have had in devising therapeutic strategies for change based on their coordinates. Not only have I found that by ignoring the cultural content of the reacting family member and focusing instead on the family coordinates it is possible to affect the intensity of the reaction, but I have also found

family process also can affect the rigidity of the ideological positions! It never works the other way.

Time and again I have seen a family member's most rigid, culturally based positions change when the emotional processes of that family change. But I have never seen the emotional tone, quality, or attitudes of family members change through a direct confrontation on ideological or cultural issues. On the contrary, the latter approach intensified the deeper emotional issues.

The approach I have taken with clients is, first, to help them defocus the cultural issue and, second, to address aggressively the emotional processes that are producing the extreme reaction. Usually it is the bride or groom who is the client. Where that is the case I have through a combination of family history taking and straight teaching about family process first tried to depersonalize the problem. By that I mean I have tried to cut down the bride's or groom's reactivity to parents' emotionality by showing that he or she is the focus of a process that usually goes beyond even the parents.

I try to show how efforts to bring parents around, especially by discussing the content of the charges, only keeps the focus (displacement) on the person. To the extent the bride or groom can understand this I then make direct suggestions for interfering with the multigenerational transmission process that is funneling its way down.

Where the parents are the clients and they have come in to stop the child from "destroying" herself or himself, the goals are the same though the techniques may differ, and the therapy has to be more subtle. I try to switch their goal from stopping the marriage or breaking up the relationship to getting better definition of self between them and their child or showing how when other parents have succeeded in accomplishing this, their children usually respond by drawing closer and either breaking up the relationship themselves (sometimes even after marriage) or forcing the partner to grow. In the process, if the parents' focus can be switched to their marriage, or their own families of origin, the cultural issues tend to disappear. In short, procedures that can refocus the parents on their own marriage or involve parents more in their own extended systems have been successful in eliminating the cultural issues. And this has been true no matter how traditional the parents or the phrasing of their position.

I will give one example with respect to each of the emotional coordinates mentioned in "The Reactive Relative" section.

1. *Lack of differentiation between reacting relative and person getting married.* The general thrust here is to stay out of the "content" of the charges or the pathos of the martyrdom. Paradoxical and playful techniques have proven remarkably effective. For example, "How can you do this to us, after all we have done for you?" can be met with "Mother, why do I have so much power to hurt you?" "Doesn't Jewish survival mean anything to you?" can be met with "The problem is, father, that you didn't keep kosher."

"Where did I fail?" is responded to with "If you had sent me to Hebrew school more often this wouldn't have happened." "We tried, but you wouldn't go," is answered with "But you were the parent, you should have forced me." And it never hurts the process for the child to add, "If your mother were only here now." Such comments, however, only bring breathing space; they do not result in lasting change, though they do reduce the intensity and the reactivity.

But emotional coordinate (1) is always a symptom of (2) and (3). It, therefore, follows that no matter what the focused issue between parent and child and whether or not it is cultural, dealing with coordinate (1) alone never brings lasting change. A fundamental shift only occurs by dealing with those coordinates which underpin it.

2. Importance of the child to the balance of the reacting relative's marriage. Parents who are satisfied in their own marriage do not react with prolonged negative intensity to the marriage of one of their children. It follows that one of the most surefire ways of shifting the displacement from the child is to refocus the parent on his or her own marriage. Using as one example, mother-daughter focus, here is content for a speech or letter that I have taught to brides as a way of accomplishing this shift:

Mother, I know you are opposed to John, and you have a right to your position, but you are still my mother and I believe you owe me one more thing before John and I marry. We have never had a frank talk about sex. What has been the secret to your marital success? How many times a week would you say a man likes it? And when you don't want it, how do you keep a man away?

It is really remarkable how that paragraph will get mothers to cease their efforts to force-feed Jewish history.

Of course, not every daughter can do that little speech. So maybe the success I have seen with this one is that by selection, those daughters who can write it or say it are so well on their own way to disengagement that their own nonreactivity keeps them out of an escalating position, and without feedback to support it, the parents' reactivity wanes.

Whatever the reason, the basic point still holds: Cultural positions are susceptible to change by dealing with the underlying emotional processes.

3. Extended family of reacting relatives. If emotional coordinate (1) is symptomatic of processes enumerated in (2) and (3), (2) is also symptomatic of (3). Thus, dealing with (2) effectively will bring more breathing space than dealing with (1) alone, but neither effort will bring the kind of fundamental shift that occurs when dealing with the emotional processes enumerated in (3).

First the extended family of a reacting relative often has not even been told. "This would kill my father." I once saw a situation where a mother, ordinarily obsessed with prestige, censored from a newspaper announcement of her daughter's engagement the fact that her future son-in-law's family

went back to the Virginia House of Burgesses, the well-known first legislative body in the United States. For such information would clearly have identified her daughter's future husband as non-Jewish.

I have found that if the bride or groom can outflank the reacting relative in his or her own family of origin, causing members of that family to interact with the parents, then even the most extreme reactions usually go quietly away. One way I have coached the bride or groom to catalyze this process is with a letter such as the one that follows, written preferably to the grandparent but sometimes to another family leader such as an uncle or aunt. That is, it must go to a parent or a peer of the parent.

Dear Grand . . . , or Aunt, or Uncle,

As you may have heard [they probably haven't] I am going to marry a non-Jew [a Catholic, a Black, a Martian]. I would like to invite you to the wedding even though I know this probably goes so much against your principles that you may feel you can't attend. However, I did want you to know. Also, I wondered if you could give me some advice. Your daughter [or kid sister; not, my mother] is absolutely off the wall about this. She keeps telling me this will be the end of our relationship, calls me every night, says if you found out you would drop dead, etc. I wonder if you could give me any information that would explain why she is behaving this way or any advice on how to deal with her. . . .

Generally the letter writer does not even receive an answer, but the next time the bride or groom has spoken to his or her own parent, there is often a marked change. This approach has worked as well for non-Jewish as for Jewish families. It will work as well in the future when the first Alfa-Centurians arrive and earthling children are warned not to intermarry with creatures who grew up in a different solar system. For it will be the same kind of families that will react and the same kind of families that will produce intergalactic unions.⁷

The universal success of this approach supports, I believe, the basic premise that when it comes to intense moments in a Jewish emotional system, cultural issues are often red herrings, displacement issues, which disintegrate when the emotional processes that spawn them are nullified.

7. When this chapter was delivered in Tel Aviv, I suggested that in Israel, where there was not a plentiful supply of shikshas, the children of Jewish families who, had they lived in the United States, would have intermarried with non-Jews, would intermarry with Jews of extremely different backgrounds, for example, German-Yemenite or Russian-Iraqi. I was drawing on my experience that 20 years ago in the United States a high degree of emotional reactivity could get started even in an all-Jewish marriage from different backgrounds, for example, Russian-German. In fact, there was a time when in some cities, Baltimore, for example, Jews of different backgrounds exclusively joined different country clubs. B'nai B'rith, created by German Jews, originally would not allow the admission of Eastern European Jews. In all events, the audience of Israeli therapists immediately informed me that since 1967, when Israel captured the West Bank, the plentiful supply of non-Jews had arrived and that an increasing problem there was Jewish women and Arab men. Their experience with these situations fit with my hypotheses.

Unaccepting Families

A third aspect of the myth of the shiksa that can be explained in terms of emotional process rather than culture is which Jewish families make acceptance of an outsider contingent on conversion. While it is not always true, most reactive family members will accept an "outsider" if he or she converts. In fact, in some families, the immediate focus is conversion, with all efforts going in that direction rather than the direction of preventing the marriage from taking place, though there are situations where a Jewish family or family member will not accept a non-Jew even after properly constituted conversion. Scrupulosity in any tradition is an emotional matter, not a culturally determined phenomenon, usually relating back to one's position in the family or origin, but it is usually so disguised in cultural costume that it is often difficult to discern it from commitment.

In all events, if the myth of the shiksa and its cultural camouflage succeed in their deception, it becomes natural to assume that the families that would be most insistent on conversion would be those families that are most motivated by long-cherished traditional values. In some cases this is true and in some it is not. A more consistent characterization of those families who make conversion into the dominant issue can be found in the following matrix, again phrased in terms of emotional process. The following seven characteristics of the way a family conceives of togetherness, and not any combination of cultural positions, are what I have found to be most true about those Jewish families that focus on conversion as a basis for acceptance.

1. The family is perceived to have a superself to which the self of each individual member is to be adapted emotionally.

2. Undifferentiated closeness is considered an automatic good, and acts of self that convey emotional autonomy are perceived to be "selfish."

3. The whole relationship system is conducive to panic because the circuit-breaker effect of self is missing. In fact, there is so much feedback in the anxiety circuits of such a family that it is almost impossible within such a relationship system to be objective about what is happening.

4. "Members of the tribe" who behave in ways that would take them out of the overall network of emotional interdependencies are perceived to be threatening. For where the whole family system is seen to be so dependent on each member, members of the family will feel they have to change also.

5. The greater family of the Jewish people is perceived in a similar, undifferentiated manner. Such a family tends, therefore, to overemphasize togetherness values in Judaism and to use the customs and traditions spawned by such values to keep its own personal family stuck together. The family members assume it is their Jewishness that is giving their family its kind of togetherness rather than the family that is putting Jewishness to its own neurotic service.

6. Any outsider to such a family is considered automatically threatening since that person has not been programmed to feel as the insiders. Their very inclusion will change the system. The outsider does not have to be a non-Jew, but a non-Jew, because of the melding of feelings about family togetherness, is just that much more threatening.

7. Thinking in such families tends to go to extremes because of the totalistic quality of the emotional climate. A live-and-let-live approach is inconceivable. Solutions tend to be conceived in terms of pressuring the person not to change or to change back, nullifying the effects of the change by changing the outside agent of change (convert the non-Jew), cutting off the family member so the change will not change anyone else (sit *shiva*).

To a large extent, non-Jews change in order to solve the Jewish partner's problems with his or her family.

There is a curious phenomenon about this stuck-togetherness thinking that actually can be used to the advantage of the bride and groom in stripping away the cultural camouflage. The rigidity of position of individuals who think about togetherness in an undifferentiated way makes it appear that they have great conviction about their beliefs. It is, however, not really their values or philosophical position that is paramount but rather their desire for emotional oneness. Thus, often when such relatives realize that there is no hope of swaying the child, it is they who convert, that is, become more accepting, in order to keep the family together, that is, "one."

Family Position and Marital Choice

The fourth aspect of the myth of the shiksa that has more to do with family process than cultural background is the essential question of who is most likely to intermarry. Most explanations have tended to go to one of two extremes: Jews who marry non-Jews are uncommitted, or, when they come from families that are strongly identified in their ethnicity, must be rebelling. Both of these explanations fail to grasp the relationship between family and culture being developed here, especially the role the emotional climate of a family plays in the original inculcation of values. Growing children are affected by their family's background, but I have found that the influence is not direct. The emotional climate of a family acts as a modulating force, screening, filtering, and coloring the background values and customs. Thus, the way any child in any family perceives and is influenced by the culture depends not on his or her position in the culture but on the position within the family.

I knew one mixed couple where the children were raised according to the culture of the same-sex parent. The Jewish father's son was sent to Hebrew school and the Gentile mother's daughter was sent to Sunday

school of her own religious background. Loving his mother, the boy grew up and married a Gentile woman. Loving her mother, the girl identified with her, and eventually married a Jewish man.


This emotional screening process exists in any family. It has more effect in strongly ethnic families. And it is especially present when the emotional system of the family, ethnic or not, is intense. It is, however, most influential for the focused child in an intense, ethnic family.

To clarify this relationship between ethnic identity and the family's own emotional climate, Figures 24.1 and 24.2 show two different examples, involving two hypothetical Jewish families, the Cohens and the Levys. They are designed to illustrate how a family's cultural climate and the climate produced by that family's own emotional history shape the type of family position that tends to lead to mixed marriages.

The family history of the Cohens and Levys is identical; the degree of ethnic identification is not. In each family, the son was born within a year after the death of his paternal grandfather, replacing him in the feelings of father (B). In each situation the original marriage was balanced by the mother's intense relationship with her own mother (D-E). Now let us posit that in each family when the maternal grandmother (E) dies, the wife (D), Mrs. Cohen or Mrs. Levy, puts the newly available emotional energy that had been going into her mother (E) into her son (A) when she finds that her husband (B) was not receptive to it. In each family, then, the son would have become extremely important to each parent individually, as well as to the emotional balance of their marriage.

But let us say that one difference between the Cohens and Levys was that the Cohens were very Jewish whether in a religious, ethnic, historical, or

FIG. 24.1.






FIG. 24.2.

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

political way, but the Levys were not. The Levys were Jewish and in no way denied it, but Judaism or Jewishness did not seem to occupy a very significant part of their thoughts or their activities. Then the odds favor the Cohens' son and not the Levys' son contracting a mixed marriage, even though the Cohens are actually "more Jewish."

In Figure 24.2, the variables are reversed. This time let us posit that the Cohens and Levys had identical Jewish histories of deep cultural identification but that the family emotional histories were different.

As the genograms show, this time the Levys have the same family emotional history as in Figure 24.1, with the son consequently triangled deeply into the emotional system of his parents. This is not so with the Cohens, however. For, unlike Mr. Levy, Mr. Cohen was not particularly significant to his own family; his nephew (G), not his son (A), was the grandchild who was born close in time to the death of his father. And as for Mrs. Cohen, it is her sister (H) rather than she (D) who got stuck with the emotional responsibility for their mother. In this situation it would be the Levys with the triangled and emotionally important son and not the Cohens who would be more likely to have their son marry a Gentile, despite the fact that the family Jewish experience in each case was identical and positive.

This coincidence of family and ethnic background does not always create mixed marriage. Nor will it always be found in the background of every mixed marriage. It has shown up, however, more frequently than any set of sociological or cultural attributes and, as already mentioned, has created a theoretical framework for highly successful therapeutic intervention.

In a sense this fourth finding should have come first. It is, after all, more logical to begin with the family factors that influence who contracts mixed marriages and then go on to the emotional matrix that describes reacting relatives. I have purposely gone against that order because it is often only when we understand the reactions that we can understand their causes. So often they are part and parcel of the same process. In many situations the consequences are built in, so to speak. Certainly that is the way my own understanding of the entire phenomenon of Jewish-Gentile marriage unfolded. Only as I began to understand the depth of a parent's reaction to a son's marriage to a shiksa in terms of family history and family process did I then come to understand the depth and lure of her attraction.

The Universality of Cultural Camouflage

But the myth of the shiksa is not just a Jewish myth. First of all, families from almost any culture can be found that perceive outsiders as threats. All the same phenomena of hysteria, depression, and rejection can be found in other cross-cultural situations also. In fact the most severe reaction I ever encountered in a parent was from a Greek Orthodox priest who threatened self-immolation if his daughter married out. And, if we carry things to their logical extreme, it should be pointed out that for a Mormon family in the holy citadel of Salt Lake City, the Jew is the Gentile.

Actually the most famous shiksa in the 20th century did not marry a Jew. She married the King of England. As the Queen Mother told her eldest son bent on that intermarriage, what he was doing was "destructive to his people, shameful to his family, a betrayal of his own upbringing," and, in addition, a relationship that would be "morally destructive to him." All this regal "Mrs. Portnoy" was missing was the culturally appropriate phrase. The true basis for the universality of the myth of the shiksa lies in the universality of the more general erroneous assumptions about family life that support and that really give this Jewish myth in its particular form so much power. Demythologizing the particular leads to exposure of the universals.

Curiously, it is possible to use the in-group concept of the shiksa in reverse. Once it is recognized that the emotional phenomena described in the previous section are not particularly Jewish, then the constituent myths also lose their cover and the oft-hidden universal truths about family emotional process that those supporting myths mask also stand stripped of their disguise.

This section will be divided into two parts. First, I will show the universality of cultural camouflage as an emotional phenomenon. Second, I will show how this hypothesis leads to the unveiling of other displacement myths that feedback and support the myth of the shiksa.

Cultural Camouflage, A Universal Phenomenon

In the first section, "Ethnic Mythology and Jewish Family Life," I presented a list of statements made inadvertently in my office that showed a tendency of Jewish people to color the emotional processes of their family life Jewish. Here is a similar list of statements that I have collected in my office, this time made by individuals of various other cultural backgrounds.

- My husband has a typical Syrian temper.
- That's a typical Prussian way of distancing.
- In Japanese families the mother makes the wedding.
- If you're Catholic, you carry your cross till you die.
- German men are pushy.
- It's my English reserve—one doesn't wear dirty linen in public.
- My parents were Free Methodists—they never bought things on credit.
- The Irish don't bring up divorce at a wake.
- Europeans take things more seriously.
- In Southern families the women are treated like slaves.
- It's my Anglo-Saxon background—peace at any price.
- Korean mothers don't teach their daughters about the kitchen.
- My father was a devout Baptist; that's why we never learned about sex.
- In Indian families bad things come in threes.
- I grew up with the inhibitions of the '50s.
- It was a garden-variety close Huguenot family.
- Pakistani women have no sense of romance.
- I married an Italian; that should tell you something.
- Black women don't hate their mothers.
- In small Pennsylvania towns, you weren't allowed to talk back to your parents.
- I came from a typical European family where father was the boss.
- In those days people didn't get divorced. [Australian]
- In those days people didn't get divorced. [Chinese]
- I grew up in a WASP family; you know—no affection.
- That's his Swiss mentality.
- Once you're baptized, your parents have got you.
- Episcopalians never tell secrets.
- Swedish families can't keep secrets.
- We always tried to date Jewish girls back at school, because everyone knows they're freer.

Clearly the emotional phenomenon by which the family process is disguised in cultural camouflage is universal. Below the surface it operates in two directions, often simultaneously. On the one hand, the family pro-

vincializes to its own cultural background something that is really basic to the human condition, to family life in general. On the other hand, the family takes something that is peculiar to its own idiosyncratic process and ascribes it more broadly to its cultural milieu. An example of both is contained in the term "Jewish mother" to describe a woman overly invested in her children or as one Puerto Rican man described his "typical" Puerto Rican mother "an energy source in search of an input." Obviously, not all Jewish mothers are "Jewish mothers," but then not all "Jewish mothers" are Jewish.

A more startling example, which also gives insight into the power of the family process, is the Unitarian woman who said she was converting to Judaism because "Unitarianism guilts." Of all the "backgrounds," we even hesitate to call it "cultural" because it is so young a tradition and so absent of specific customs, Unitarianism would seem to offer the least amount of cultural camouflage. This woman, however, was a fourth-generation Unitarian whose ancestors were among the New England founders of that church in the United States. For this woman, Unitarianism really was a family affair.

But the very first time I began to question cultural causation was after seeing a mixed couple where neither partner was Jewish. The wife had experienced three "breakdowns" during the 18 years of her marriage to an engineer from Kentucky whose mother was a Christian Scientist practitioner. She was a volatile woman from Mexico with a temperament that might be called "artistic." Her husband had married her because he did not like American women who were always "so serious, so practical, and so concerned with getting things done." She had married him because she "did not like Mexican men who showed such little respect for their wives," unlike American men who "treated them with dignity."

Eighteen years later, he had spent most of his marriage trying to figure out how he had chosen the one Mexican woman who was like all American women, and she was still trying to figure out how she had picked the one American man who was like all Mexican men.

Explaining away a family's emotional process by ascribing them to ethnic cultural causation is not the only way families avoid "owning up" to their own emotional heritage. The culture of the environment, the age, the physical conditions, even the sibling position are other popular forms of disguise. For example:

- My father is cheap because he grew up during the depression. [Despite the fact that his brother, Uncle Harry, can't hold onto a dime.]
- Aunt Rose is a prude because of the times in which she grew up. [Despite the fact that Aunt Mary, her kid sister, is a bunny.]
- I am frigid because I was raised with a very strict Catholic background. [Despite the fact that her sister keeps getting pregnant out of wedlock.]

• Why wouldn't you expect me to be adaptive in my marriage? The whole "culture" taught me to believe that women are the second sex. [Despite the fact that her sister, cousin, friend, or even her mother failed to get the message and are erroneously dominating their husbands.]

Other familiar examples are:

- I think my wife is insecure because her family moved about so much.
- I can't communicate with my son because of the generation gap.
- We should never have exposed him to all that violence on television.
- She is going through the change of life.
- Our child was okay until he started associating with the wrong friends.
- He (I, she) was a middle (oldest, youngest, only) child.

Cultural and environmental explanations for family functioning tend to deny the family's responsibility for that functioning. It is just not evident, for example, that those whose ancestors came to the United States on the *Mayflower* will necessarily be more secure in marriage than those whose folks have just gotten off the boat. Cultural and environmental causation theories almost always fail to account for the fact that there are other families from the same background, or even other individuals from the same family, who are behaving differently.

It is true that sometimes there is the chance synchronization between a given family's style and certain outstanding attributes of that family's culture, so that the family is able to put aspects of the culture to its own neurotic service. When this occurs it is even more difficult to discern cause from effect. Authoritarian fathers who happen to be Mennonite or Catholic, possessive mothers who happen to be Jewish, prudish mothers who happen to be Methodist, adaptive women who happen to be Quaker, all will hear certain aspects of their tradition louder. Actually, what seems to occur is that all families of all cultures have a tendency to select or emphasize from their culture's repertoire of customs and ceremony those modes of behavior that fit their own style. And they hear those values loudest that tend to prevent change!

For example, I was once working with a Catholic family where the wife was the twin sister of a nun. When she went back home and started talking about the importance of self in marriage, her parents, secure in a mutually adaptive relationship in which they had both sacrificed their selves for togetherness, became anxious and told her to stop seeing a "Jewish" therapist since Christians believe in self-sacrifice. Whereupon, the twin sister, whose

specialty was theology, quoted a raft of Catholic theologians who had exalted the importance of self-respect and dignity.

If, however, we assume that it is the family emotional system rather than the ethnic or environmental background that does the real "culturing," then it is possible to develop an approach to the relationship of family and culture that keeps the responsibility where it belongs.

Displacement Myths and the Process of Change

I would like to present three examples of how cultural camouflage obscures the lines of responsibility in efforts to change a family. Each involves a widespread myth about family life that is reflected in the myth of the shiksa. But each, also, precisely because it is so widely believed, enhances the displacement and denial power of that particular myth in Jewish families. The areas of concern are compatibility in marriage, focus of discontent, and reasonableness and values as agents of change.

COMPATIBILITY IN MARRIAGE

For the most part, families tend to think about marital compatibility in terms of similarity; incompatibility, in terms of difference. A great deal of emphasis in premarital counseling or matchmaking is placed on finding what individuals have in common. This is especially true when a mixed marriage is being considered, where couples are warned they already have "two strikes against them," but it tends to be true about all premarital ruminations even when the "kids" grew up on the "same side of the tracks." Similarly, when any match needs repairing, the couple will consider themselves as mismatched. That there is some difficulty with this notion is evident from the fact that when individuals with strikingly different sets of interests or backgrounds make it, the explanation usually given is "opposites attract."

The truth, of course, is that differences, whether cultural or of another kind, follow the same rules and play the same roles in all families. At times of stress, they become the focus of attention, and easily identifiable differences become the causes of the stress. But even when a difference becomes an issue, whether it is a difference in cultural background or a differing over anything else, that same difference is not necessarily "differed" over everytime it shows up. What determines whether background or other kinds of differences are repulsive or attractive are factors much more subtle than the so-called basic differences themselves. What seems to be crucial is not the ingredients of the mixture but the overall emotional crucible into which it is poured. Incompatibility in marriage has less to do with the differences themselves than with what is causing them to stand out at that time.

The fact that families tend to ascribe their problems to their differences feeds back to the myth of the shiksa in two ways. First, it increases anxiety in the family and in the couple about their chances for marital success. Second,

it does the exact opposite; it deludes the couple into thinking that the mates they have selected are far different (from their opposite-sex parent) than they really are.

A striking example of this phenomenon involved a highly educated, extremely well-traveled and cultured Protestant woman from the Midwest who was marrying a Jewish English professor from New York. Her father, a bigoted bricklayer, was furious about the marriage. During the courtship, her mother, who also opposed, developed cancer and died within a few months. Father (an extremely passive man in his marriage who let mother take all the responsibility and kept her adaptive to him with constant putdowns) then began to blame his daughter for her mother's death. As the woman changed in response to the way she handled both her mother's death and her father's reactions, the fiancé made more and more noises about how she had changed, how rigid and cold she had become, and how he could not "get through" to her anymore.

He began to complain that she did not understand his dilemma as a Jew marrying a woman whose father was anti-Semitic. Next he spoke about his fears that with this new pattern of "withdrawal" she might abandon him emotionally in their marriage. He blamed it all on the fact that she was "denying" her mother's death.

Another type of cultural "fakeout" is the situation where, after a period of extreme mutual hostility, Jewish mother and shiksa daughter-in-law gravitate toward one another, drawn by the similarity with which they generally relate, namely, laser-beam focus on another person. In this process, which I have dubbed the *crossover*, the triangle shifts, and instead of Jewish husband and non-Jewish wife being in alliance against Jewish mother, it is now Jewish husband who is the outsider, as the two women exchange recipes from their respective backgrounds. I have seen this occur with Black, Pakistani, Chinese, and Appalachian shiksas.

FOCUS OF DISCONTENT

It is not only distressful issues that family members are prone to consider cause rather than symptom; other members of the family are also often perceived to be a source of anxiety when they are really the focus of the anxiety. Husbands and wives often displace their own existential discontent on their spouse, their discontent with one another on a child, their discontent with a parent on an in-law, and so forth. And it is obviously crucial for effective therapy, as well as long-lasting change, that both the therapist and the family be able eventually to distinguish a cause of discontent from a focus of discontent.

Failure to make this discrimination preserves the focus as a displacement, for, as with the culture-family process syndrome, the content (in this case, the information presented about the focused person) is seen as causative

rather than illustrative of the reporter's anxiety, and that is exactly what the myth of the shiksa is all about. Not only is she no longer a non-Jewish woman, today she is not even a woman, that is, a person. The shiksa today is a focus, a focus of discontent, and as I have tried to show, she tends to rise with all her own mythology to the imagination of certain Jewish families not because she is non-Jewish, really, but rather because that given Jewish family at that particular moment does not wish to take responsibility for the way it is put together.

Once again, however, the more general myth not only is reflected in the myth of the shiksa, it supports it. For the widespread fashion whereby families equate the focus on their discontent with the cause of their misery makes it all the more difficult for a given focused couple to understand why they have "triggered" so much emotionality against them or why they have been so unsuccessful in their reasonable efforts to calm the family down. As can be the case with even the most experienced therapist, what the couple has unwittingly done is to accept the focus by their very efforts to change the family's views. Despite their good intentions, because those efforts were directed at the content of the issues, they became part of the family's process of denial.

Of course, the fact that with the shiksa the displaced focus is on culturally different persons adds to the identifying process and creates a doubly reinforced displacement. But all forms of denial are in secret allegiance.

REASONABLENESS AND VALUES AS AGENTS OF CHANGE

In my training and supervising of family therapists, whether they be clergy, social workers, psychologists, nurses, or psychiatrists; whether they live in the East or the West, the United States or Europe; whether they work for organizations or privately; and regardless of their social, religious, or cultural background, I have been struck by one extraordinarily similar aspect of their thinking—their reliance on reasonableness and values as instruments of change. I believe this is part and parcel of the "content thinking" that is the hallmark of cultural emphases.

The kind of experience with mixed marriage that I have been describing in which emotional process almost always overrides cultural values raises suspicions about the efficacy of such reliance on reason.

Blessed with a cortex and the power of speech, it is only logical to assume that members of a family can be changed by resorting to these inherent tools. However, my experience with trying to bring change to families reacting to a mixed marriage suggests generally that families who are in distress tend to "think with their spinal cords" rather than their cortex, and that when thought processes have that quality, expressed values are less evidence of what motivates family members than symptomatic of emotional positions they have already arrived at.

In the above-mentioned paper on the relationship between culture and family process in the formation of Jewish identity, I tried to explain the failure of the emphasis on cultural content to produce a stronger identity. I suggested that such content could be compared to the fuel needed to run a motor, but that we could not make a vehicle go forward by simply enriching the fuel if the "transmission" was in neutral, no less reverse. When the emotional system is ignored and the focus is only on cultural content, communication has the effect of typing a message on an electric typewriter when the current has been turned off. When it comes to changing families since all families are supplied by their culture with an infinite variety of rationalizations for ex post facto justifications of behavior, focus on values and ideological positions is often just another form of displacement. To offer reasonable alternatives to such positions, therefore, is once again only to conspire in the family's denial of its emotional process.

It has been my experience in working with families of all backgrounds that rather than values or reason, it is power that is the most forceful agent of change. This is not the power of conquest and domination but rather the strength to get enough distance from the anxiety malstrom whirling around us to think out our own values, whether or not they coincide with values from our own background, to define them clearly, and then to have the strength to hold that position against the efforts of others to change us back. In other words, the most powerful agent of change comes more out of a focus on our own values than on a focus that tries to define the other's values.

Regarding the myth of the shiksa and Jewish families, the widespread erroneous belief that expressed values are the cause of family members' positions and that, therefore, change in a given family member's functioning can be brought about by appealing to or changing those values, simply escalates anxiety and resistance on both sides. For it encourages a process wherein each side is perpetually trying to define, convince, change, and, therefore, *convert* the other.

Summary

In summary, I have endeavored to demythologize the myth of the shiksa in Jewish families and at the same time to show how that particular myth provides a laboratory for observing the way other widespread myths of family life prevent change in families everywhere. The broader myths all have some relationship to one generally misunderstood notion about the relationship of culture and family process. Once that relationship is understood to be almost the reverse of what is often assumed, new perceptions become available for understanding all families, as well as for creating strategies for therapeutic change.