



## Abba Hillel Silver Collection Digitization Project

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### **MS-4787: Abba Hillel Silver Papers, 1902-1989.**

Series I: General Correspondence, 1914-1969, undated.

Sub-series A: Alphabetical, 1914-1965, undated.

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American Zionist Emergency Council, Saud, Ibn, 1944-1945.



WAR DEPARTMENT  
Washington

10 October 1944

Honorable Robert A. Taft  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator:

I refer to your letter of September 12, 1944, regarding S.R. 247, introduced by Senator Wagner and yourself on the subject of opening the doors of Palestine to the free entry of Jews into that country.

At the time your resolution was being considered by the Foreign Relations Committee the endorsement of such a proposal by the Congress had grave implications which would seriously have interfered with the progress of the war. In response to your inquiry I have reviewed the considerations which applied at that time. I find that there is still strong feeling on the part of many officers in my department that the passage of such a resolution would interfere with our military effort. However, I do feel that the military considerations which led to my previous action in opposing the passage of this resolution are not as strong a factor now as they were then.

In my judgment, political considerations now outweigh the military, and the issue should be determined upon the political rather than the military basis.

Sincerely,

(signed)

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War



COPY OF TELEGRAM TAKEN OVER TELEPHONE - 10/30/44

Addressed to:

DR. WISE AND DR. SILVER

GREATLY REGRET UNABLE TO SEE YOU TUESDAY OCTOBER 31 WOULD BE  
DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOU COME TO MY OFFICE WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER 1  
AT 10 AM BEST REGARDS

EDWARD R STETTINIUS JR  
ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

*Subsequently changed by telephone to Nov 9<sup>th</sup>*

(CK)



# CLASS OF SERVICE

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# WESTERN UNION

1201

A. N. WILLIAMS  
PRESIDENT

## SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LC = Deferred Cable

N Cable Night Letter

Ship Radiogram

(56)  
1944 OCT 30 PM 2

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NH49 27 GOVT 4 EXTRA=SD WASHINGTON DC 30 225P

STEPHEN S WISE AND ABBA H SILVER, CARE OF AMERICAN ZIONIST  
EMERGENCY COUNCIL=342 MADISON AVE NYK=

CONFIRMING TELEPHONE MESSAGE OF THIS MORNING YOUR  
APPOINTMENT IS BEING CHANGED TO THURSDAY NOVEMBER 9 AT 10  
AM IN MY OFFICE BEST REGARDS=

E R STETTINIUS JR ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

.9 10. AM.

RECEIVED	NOTED BY	DATE	ANSWERED
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		OCT 30 1944	

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AIDE-MEMOIR  
March 1, 1945

The President invited Ibn Saud to meet with him. It was then that Mr. Churchill "thought that it would be becoming as well as convenient and agreeable that we (Churchill and Eden) should also see the two leaders who had made long journeys to come to Egypt at the President's invitation and that we should pass under friendly review with them with the many matters/which we have common concern."

It was not a general conference on Middle East affairs. The Regent of Iraq and Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordania were not present. "There was no question of shaping a new policy for the Middle East, but rather to make those friendly personal contacts by which public business between various states is often helped." Churchill played up to Ibn Saud "the famous ruler of Saudi Arabia." "I expressed to him the thanks of Great Britain for his steadfast unswerving and unflinching loyalty to our country and to the common cause which never shone more brightly than in the darkest hours of the day of mortal peril."

Churchill declared that no solution was reached on the problem of the Arab world and of the Jewish people in Palestine. He declared that "he had hopes that when the war is over good arrangements can be made for securing the peace and progress of the Arab world and generally of the Middle East, and that Great Britain and visitors who will take an increasing interest in those regions will be able to play a valuable part in proving the well known maxim of the old free trader "all legitimate interests are in harmony." Churchill discussed with President Shukri of Syria the problem of Syria and Lebanon. He did his utmost "to enjoin a friendly attitude toward the French and to encourage the negotiation of a suitable settlement with the French affecting not only Syria but also Lebanon." He declared that His Majesty's Government "would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant states." He is for recognizing French privilege in those countries.

The final settlement of this problem, as well as many other matters affecting



the Middle East are to be left for a peace conference. "All these and many other matters affecting the Middle East are necessary subjects for a peace conference at which we must resolutely strive for a final settlement and a lasting peace between all states and races comprised in the Middle East and the eastern basin of the Mediterranean."

It is clear that Churchill looks upon Ibn Saud as the key man in the Arab world and in any final arrangements affecting the Middle East. So does President Roosevelt. Ibn Saud heretofore has evidenced clear hostility to Zionism. What progress was made mitigating his hostility and what quid pro quo was offered to him remains to be seen. Roosevelt undoubtedly has the key to the answer. It is significant that Churchill does not mention the fact that he discussed the Palestine issue with the President, only with Ibn Saud. Did Roosevelt make an independent approach to Ibn Saud on the subject of Palestine? Did Churchill advise Roosevelt that the preliminary approach to Ibn Saud on the subject of Palestine would be followed up by Churchill? Did Roosevelt and Churchill following their meetings with Ibn Saud then compare notes and decide that the whole question of Palestine should be postponed until after the war? Did they agree that in the meantime certain relaxation on immigration be permitted?

It is evidently not the intention of England and the United States to impose a decision on Palestine. They plan to negotiate with the Arab rulers. It should be recalled that England brought in the Arab rulers at the time of the Arab-Jewish round table which ended with a stalemate and led to the White Paper. What business has Ibn Saud with Palestine and with the Jewish National Home? Why should he be consulted while Weizmann is ignored?