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American Zionist Emergency Council, Weizmann, Chaim,
1944-1945.

C
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P
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77, Great Russell Street
W.C.1

28th September, 1944

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Ansel Road and E. 105th,
Cleveland, Ohio

My dear Dr. Silver:

.....Officially, there is no change in the situation. We hear, of course, many rumours - some favourable, but most unfavourable. But there is nothing that can be called definite, nothing indicating action or decision.

For instance, we heard - I emphasise that all this is rumour and nothing more - that a project for partition had been worked out, which some people considered to be rather on the "generous" side; I gather it was something like the Peel project, plus the Negev, plus Akaba. Our opponents in the Middle East and in Palestine itself thought this much too much, and argued that such a project, if implemented, would produce turmoil throughout the Middle East. So everybody has been trying to whittle it down. We hear all sorts of suggestions. One which seems to enjoy powerful support amounts to something like the Woodhead "C" proposal - a strip of territory on the coast from north of Gaza to Zichron: without, therefore, the Emek, without Galilee, without Haifa, and so on. Of course it is not for a moment to be contemplated.

I repeat that nothing is certain; nothing is decided. But I do feel that our friends' hands have to be very much strengthened, so as to enable them to overcome the opposition. And that can be done only by your chiefs taking a definite and firm stand on the matter. I think the President and our Prime Minister can carry it through together, and as long as things remain on their level it will be all right. The danger begins when they descend to the level of those - in the Middle East and in Palestine itself - who want to destroy the Jewish National Home. I have repeatedly warned Smuts, and also Winant, about it. But you must now, at this critical moment, see that our friends are well informed, and that the President has this matter before him. We are preparing a memorandum on the subject, which deals with the question of why partition is not desirable, but of course I do not know whether we shall prevail. But if the partition is such as to produce a Jewish State which is not, and cannot be, "viable", that would be a first-class disaster which must at all costs be avoided. You and Wise and all our friends must therefore be constantly on the watch to see that it does not happen. I have no wish to be an alarmist; I repeat that nothing

is decided; but I certainly fear that our enemies are trying their utmost to bring about a decision utterly unacceptable to us.

Now that the Prime Minister has returned I shall attempt to see him before leaving for Palestine. I am not at all sure that I shall succeed, but it is my duty to try. I am seeing other members of the Government, too, but whether they will tell me anything I naturally do not know. If I do hear, then you will know at once.....

Both Mrs. Weizmann and myself expect to leave for Palestine at the end of October, and before we go, I am naturally anxious to know what we have to hope - or fear. I think it is essential that you should make contact with Mr. Morgenthau, and perhaps show him some extracts from this letter. I am trying to write to him myself. It was most unfortunate that I was laid up and could not see him while he was here. I am looking forward to the arrival of Hamilton Fish Armstrong, who is to join Winant here as second-in-command. He is, as you know, an old friend.....

As ever,

Yours,
(Signed) Chaim Weizmann



MEMORANDUM ON PALESTINE POLICY
submitted by the
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE
to
HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT



77, Great Russell Street,
London, W.C.1
16.10.44

The war is approaching its end, and the Jewish problem in its post-war setting calls for immediate consideration. Of the six million European Jews outside the USSR and the British Isles, probably not more than one-and-a-half million are alive to-day, and not all yet safe. The Jews in Soviet territory under German occupation have probably lost another million. Even in this war, no other people in proportion to their numbers have suffered such losses, accompanied by such horrors.

2. Allied victories are bringing immediate security to the survivors. But the root of the tragedy is the inherent weakness of the position of the Jews as a homeless people. As long as that endures, Hitler's solution of the Jewish problem by extermination will continue to haunt mankind, as a nightmare to some, as a temptation to others. To offer to the surviving European Jews, deported and broken, a return to the "status quo ante", propped up by philanthropic palliatives and paper guarantees, is morally unthinkable. For the large mass, true rehabilitation can only be achieved by a fresh start in new surroundings...Moreover, the problem is not merely one of finding homes for refugees; it is one of finding a country for a people. The solution must be constructive and permanent. It involves not only the fate of the remnants of European Jewry; the curse of homelessness must be lifted from the entire race.

3. "Some place must be found." Tropical or sub-arctic regions, such as Guiana, Madagascar, or Alaska -- to mention some recent suggestions -- can hardly be seriously considered. The colonisation attempt made in San Domingo has proved a fiasco. Even under the more favourable climatic and economic conditions of Argentina, Southern Russia, and Biro-Bidjan, experience has shown that where the national idea and tradition are inoperative, Jewish settlement cannot develop on a large scale for lack of driving power. An inspiration of high intensity is needed to transform a people of town-dwellers into agriculturists, middle-men into manual workers.

4. The renaissance of the Jewish nation is bound up with Palestine. The choice made by destiny cannot be undone. Palestine is the Jewish people's birthplace, and it gave birth to no other. It owes its place in history to the Jews,

and to no other people. The Jews as a people, and Palestine as a country, ceased to be truly creative when the bond between them was severed. But the hope of renewing that bond has kept the Jewish people alive, and meantime, Palestine remained desolate. The Jews have never ceased to pray for their return to Palestine. The urge to go back has been continuous, and in every generation practical efforts were made to return. Zionism is a final and determined bid for achievement.

3. The British people have always been conscious of the unique connection of the Jews with Palestine. From that consciousness the Balfour Declaration was born. But vision and statesmanship have not been translated into administrative practice. Jewish endeavour has received scant encouragement. Official policy has been far more alive to the difficulties of implementing the Mandate than to its creative aim. Step by step the original conception has been whittled down until a complete negation of the primary purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate was reached in the White Paper of 1939. ~~N~~ But Jewish work has attained a stage of development which precludes Palestine from becoming an Arab country.

6. If the war had found two million Jews in Palestine instead of half-a-million, the task of the Allies in the Middle East would have been greatly eased, and the position of the Jewish people would have been totally different. But even the half-million proved their value, both to their people and to the Allies. Palestine has received tens of thousands of Jewish refugees, and were it not for the paralysing effect of the White Paper policy, the dimensions of rescue would have been far greater. All resources of Palestinian Jewry, ~~in~~ in man-power, productive capacity, and scientific knowledge, were harnessed to the war effort. Palestinian Jewish units served with the British Forces in Palestine, France, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, Greece, Crete, Syria, Libya, and Italy. Civilian volunteers risked and laid down their lives in hazardous para-military operations under British command. Palestine provided a source of information, unique in the Middle East, on the industrial, technical and scientific

position in enemy countries. Jewish technicians and artisans were mobilised to perform urgent war tasks in all the neighboring countries. This war effort would have been far more fruitful had it not been cramped and thwarted by the present negative policy.

7. The Jewish Agency appeals to H.M. Government to inaugurate a new era for Palestine and the Jewish people by drawing the logical conclusion from the Balfour Declaration as originally conceived. At this juncture they regard as imperative a decision designating Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth -- a country where the Jewish people shall be free to work out its salvation by large-scale settlement and by the achievement of full nationhood.

8. The Jewish Agency is fully aware of the difficulty with which this policy is fraught on account of Arab opposition. But if Arab consent is to be a pre-condition of any political settlement, hope must be given up of justice to the Jewish people. The Arabs demand that the Jews should be made a permanent minority in an Arab Palestinian State, which should become one in a cluster of Arab States. The Jews ask that a Jewish State be established with Palestine West of the Jordan for its territory, and hope that this State, while maintaining friendly relations with all its neighbours, may be organically connected with the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Arab programme would deny to the Jews a place among the nations, which they can only obtain through Palestine. The Jewish programme would have no such effect on the Arabs, who are already possessed of many States with enormous undeveloped would be like the Czechs in Greater Germany; but an Arab minority in a Jewish Pales. potentialities. A Jewish minority in an Arab Palestine will not merely have every / tine every guarantee of equality of rights, religious freedom, autonomy in cultural and municipal affairs, and a full share in the benefits of development; the fact that Palestine is surrounded by Arab countries will add to their security. In view of what Great Britain and her Allies have done, outside Palestine, since 1914, to promote

and protect Arab nationhood and independence, Arab objections to the Jews being given full national status in their ancient homeland lack moral validity. The movement towards Arab unity is an additional reason why Jewish effort in Palestine should once and for all be established on a firm territorial and political basis.

9. Some who have come to recognise that the Jews ought to have their State, think that this could best be achieved by partitioning Palestine between Jews and Arabs. The Jewish Agency would view with deep apprehension an attempt to revive the partition idea. In 1937, a major consideration was the impending war. Now the most must be made of the potentialities of Palestine for immediate large-scale immigration. Palestine is already a twice-partitioned country, as compared with what it was at the time of the Balfour Declaration. Its further dismemberment is liable to be fatal to the viability of the Jewish State. A proper land basis is vital to Jewish development. This entails the promotion of intensive farming throughout Palestine, and access for Jews to undeveloped areas scattered all over the country. With the sea in the West, the Jordan and the Power and Potash concessions in the East, the chief water-resources in the North, and the main land-reserve in the South, any partition scheme seems bound to disrupt the country's economic frame, and wreck the chances of large-scale development.

10. In facing Arab opposition, the decisive element is time. Once Palestine has become a Jewish State, its existence would be accepted as an accomplished fact, just as the present Jewish population is accepted, though in the past there was strong opposition, accompanied by violence, to the increase of Jews even up to the present number. The prospect for the future is by no means one of perpetual strife and unsettled conditions, but of an ultimate equilibrium and collaboration. It is both the desire and the interest of the Jews to live in peace with their neighbours, and develop close intercourse with them. Even now, Palestine can render important services, industrial and scientific, to the neighbouring countries, which are taking a keen interest in these results of Jewish work.

11. The political programme here set forth required, first and foremost, the quickest possible increase of the Jewish population. Two things are urgent: to create a Jewish majority in Palestine in order to ensure the effective functioning of the Jewish State, and to rehabilitate the survivors of the European tragedy. Most, if not all, of these people, certainly the children among them, would anyhow be a charge on public funds for a considerable time after the cessation of hostilities. Such funds would be much more profitably spent on their settlement in Palestine. Apart from the survivors in Europe, the main groups of would-be immigrants are (i) refugees scattered throughout the world who have not been absorbed; (ii) Jews in those oriental countries where their safety and well-being are in permanent jeopardy; and (iii) Jews in English-speaking countries, among whom a movement to settle in Palestine is spreading.

12. For the proper organisation of this immigration, its control should be entrusted to the Jewish Agency. Large funds will be required, and an international loan may be necessary. Detailed plans of absorption are being prepared by the Jewish Agency, comprising reclamation works, irrigation schemes, and projects of intensive agricultural and industrial development. The return of the Jews to Palestine has ~~xxx~~ revolutionised their social structure and the country's economics. Sixty years of trial and error, experiment and achievement, is a firm basis on which to build the edifice of the future. With modern technique and adequate powers, what has been achieved so far can be turned into a lever for further and greater progress.

13. The present is a unique opportunity for righting a historic wrong, and solving a burning international problem. Millions of Jews throughout the world are now pinning their age-long hope on Allied victory. Its fulfilment will bring salvation to the Jewish people, and everlasting credit to Great Britain and her Allies.

הסוכנות היהודית לארץ ישראל

THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE.

TELEPHONE: MUSEUM 3815 (6 LINES).

TELEGRAMS: "ZIONIBURO, LONDON."

CODES: BENTLEY'S AND MOSSE'S.

77. GREAT RUSSELL STREET.

LONDON. W.C.1

In reply please address the Secretary:

and quote the following Reference No.:

18th October, 1944.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
c/o Jewish Agency Office,
1720 Sixteenth Street NW,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

My dear Dr. Silver,

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a memorandum on policy which we submitted to the Government here on October 16th. I should be grateful if this could be transmitted to the Secretary of State - or to the President if you and our friends think preferable - with a suitable covering note.

With many thanks in advance, and kind personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

Ch. Weizman

Enclosure.

COPY

77 Great Russell Street
W.C.1

18th October, 1944

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
c/o 1720 Sixteenth Street N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Dr. Silver,

I was extremely glad to hear that you have all come to a satisfactory arrangement which will leave you able to continue your important work without let or hindrance. It has, of course, been very difficult for me to try and do anything at all from this distance towards smoothing your path -- the reverse is so apt to happen such things, which is why I have abstained from anything approaching drastic action. Nevertheless, I am sure you realise that we were and are all most anxious that you should remain at your post during these very difficult times. It is a great relief that you are doing so, and I hope that all will continue to go well.

There is not much news here - except unconfirmed rumours about partition. I am, however, satisfied that there is as yet no definite decision, and it is therefore with great joy that I read yesterday's statement by the President, which is really the first explicit commitment on the part of a leading statesman during the war. I daresay some people here will not like it very much, but I am certain that it will strengthen the Prime Minister's hands. It is essential, however, that great vigilance should be exercised, so that we may not be confronted at the last moment with some offer or decision which it is quite impossible for us to consider.

Yesterday I transmitted officially to H.M. Government a statement on the policy which we would like to see implemented after this war: I send you a copy herewith. I am sending you another copy officially, through the Embassy, with a request that you should hand it over to the Secretary of State, or if you think preferable, to the President himself, with whatever covering note you may all think suitable.

I intend going to Palestine at the end of this month or in the first week of November, and hope before I leave to see the Prime Minister. Of course the terrorist acts in Palestine are the most terrible calamity that could befall us; they are already doing us incalculable harm, and will do worse if they continue. I have been trying my level best, directly and indirectly, to impress upon the Yishuv that they have to do everything in their power to stop it. Shertok and Golomb have just left here, and should by now be back in Palestine; they are thoroughly acquainted with the situation here and realise the inevitable consequences should the terrorists' activities continue. Whether they will succeed in checking them I do not know; but at any rate we have to enlist the whole nation in the attempt.

I don't know whether you are keeping in touch with Mr. Morgenthau, to whom I am also sending a copy of the enclosed document. As you know, he is very helpful indeed, and I feel it should be made clear to him that the President and the Prime Minister can implement the statement, but that it will require an effort, and may

Dr. Silver

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October 18, 1944

lead to some initial trouble. But then that is almost inevitable, whatever course is taken.

Please convey my warm greetings to Wise, Lipsky and the others.

I remain, as ever
Affectionately yours,

(Signed) Ch. Weizmann

P.S. I should be so grateful if you would have the enclosed letters sent on to the addressees. Very many thanks.

Enclosure.



77, GREAT RUSSELL STREET.
W.C.1.

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c/o 1720 Sixteenth Street NW,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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PERSONAL

WRHS
Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
~~c/o Jewish Agency Office,~~
~~1720 Sixteenth Street, NW,~~
~~WASHINGTON, D.C.~~

U.S.A.



Please Forward:

The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

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Affectionately yours.

A. Weizmann

P.S. I should be so grateful if you would have the enclosed letters sent on to the addressees. Very many thanks..

Enclosure.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL77, GREAT RUSSELL STREET.
W.C.1.

7th November, 1944.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
Jewish Agency for Palestine (Washington Office),
1720 Sixteenth Street NW,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

My dear Friend,

As you may know, I shall be leaving in a very few days for Palestine. Before leaving, I have been trying my best to ascertain something of our position. This had become all the more necessary as all sorts of rumours are circulating, particularly from NZO quarters, which seem to have all the inside knowledge. I therefore asked the secretariat at 10 Downing Street whether there was any possibility of my seeing the Prime Minister before I left. To my great satisfaction I received, already from Moscow, an intimation that the Prime Minister would be happy to see me on his return to London. The interview took place yesterday at Chequers.

I had almost two hours' conversation with the Prime Minister, and I should perhaps add that this time it was really more of a conversation - with both of us taking part. You will probably get a minute in due course, but here I would like to give you an idea of the salient points:

- 1) There is no definite decision as yet, and nothing will be decided until the war with Germany is over. So that all the rumours you hear about it are without the slightest foundation. I believe we still have about six months in front of us.
- 2) The Prime Minister emphasised very strongly that America ought to take a hand in the solution of the problem: it would make everything much easier. He repeatedly said that here we have a great many opponents to our policy, particularly among the Tories and the military people, so that he had sometimes to fight a lone battle. But he added that such opposition usually only hardened his heart. I pointed out to him that those who oppose us are the same elements who have always opposed him - and he fully agreed. He also added that we had many good friends in the Labour and Liberal camps - but apparently for him their weight does not compensate for the Tory opposition. So, as he put it, "If Roosevelt and I come together

ther to the Conference Table, we can carry through all we want."

- 3) There is some talk going on about partition, but no territorial project has yet been formulated, and the Prime Minister fully realises that it will be essential for the Jews to bring at least one-and-a-half million people into Palestine in something like ten years.

- 4) He also mentioned that he had been very much struck by the uncompromising opposition to Zionism which he had found among some American Jews. He mentioned only Baruch in this connection, however. But he came back to it several times. Of course I told him that the opposition is limited to a very small group of very rich people, who play no real part in our affairs. But apparently Baruch has made a deep impression on him. As you know, he is an old friend of Churchill's.

I gave the Prime Minister our reasons against partition, and he has read our official memorandum (of which you have a copy).

Briefly, that is what happened. And I think it points to certain action on our part:

(a) It is most essential that men like Baruch and one or two others should make it known that they are as anxious as we are for the gates of Palestine to be opened for a large Jewish immigration, even if they do not share our political views about a Jewish State, etc. I believe that men like Mr. Morgenthau, Eugene Meyer, Felix, B.V. Cohen, should now really take some trouble to make their views perfectly clear to the President. We shall try and do the same with our friends here. I think it is a terrible thing that an old man like Baruch, rich and sheltered, should try and make it more difficult for us to establish a sanctuary in Palestine for Jews who sorely need it.

/(b)

77, GREAT RUSSELL STREET,
W.C.1.

Page Two.

7.11.44.

(b) I believe that you ought to set up a powerful Committee to promote - if possible with Government help - Lowdermilk's plan, or something very like it. If this plan is sponsored by the President, it might easily become an important instrument which would help us to avoid partition, because it is so obvious that both Jews and Arabs would benefit by it, and that it would serve as a model for the development of the whole of the Middle East, and thus establish our claim to consideration even in the eyes of those who are at present opposed to us.

It may be that on my return from Palestine I should come over and see you all, but of course that must be left for the future to decide, and for you to think over in the meantime. I am also toying with the idea of going to see Smuts, if I can possibly manage it, and if my health permits.

But I am most anxious that some practical sign should be given by the U.S. Government that they are willing to take a hand in the actual shaping of Palestine's future: otherwise American support is merely platonic, and the British have some excuse for saying that the Americans are ready enough to criticise, but do not want to help.

I was so much impressed by what I heard yesterday that I am anxious to put to you with all the strength at my command my conviction that this is the only line leading to success, namely:

- (a) To secure the active participation of America, and
- (b) To work out a great practical project on Lowdermilk's lines, with the assistance and participation of Lowdermilk himself, and of other great American authorities in this field. If such a project were to be presented under Presidential auspices, it would give us an unanswerable case.

Well, I have indicated a line of action. We on our side shall do all we can here and in Palestine, and I am confident that in the next six months we can so prepare the ground as to ensure success.

The new High Commissioner, Lord Gort, went out a few days
/ago

ago, and, as the Prime Minister mentioned, he is fully informed of the stand which the P.M. himself is taking in these matters. I believe Lord Gort to be benevolently disposed, courageous, honourable, and without prejudices: I believe we shall be able to work with him. The Prime Minister urged me most strongly to keep in close touch with Lord Gort while I am in Palestine. The P.M. is naturally much worried by the terrorist outbreaks. I did my best to explain, but as you will understand, it was none too easy.

Do please remember about Baruch, and the others of his category. I am sure Mr. Morgenthau could help a great deal.

Wishing you all every good luck in your work, and with kind regards to all friends, I remain

Affectionately yours,



Ch Weizmann

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WRHS



Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
c/o Jewish Agency for Palestine (Washington
/Office)

1720, Sixteenth Street NW.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

U.S.A.

B. SAFE HAND

C
O
P
Y

Copy File

77, Great Russell Street,
W.C.1

8th November, 1944

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
c/o Jewish Agency for Palestine (Washington Office),
1720 Sixteenth Street NW,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

My dear Silver,

I sent you a letter yesterday through the Embassy, with an account of my interview with the Prime Minister. You will no doubt receive it in due course - but I am enclosing a copy herewith which may possibly reach you sooner.

Since dictating that letter, we have received the terrible news of the assassination of Lord Moyne. There is very little doubt in my mind at present that this foul murder was committed by the same gang responsible for the outbreaks of terrorist acts in the last year or so. I need scarcely tell you what a most dreadful blow it is. It is just catastrophic. I can only hope that the efforts which the Yishuv is making to stamp out this gang will prove successful, though I know all the difficulties and dangers which they themselves are facing - and am glad that I shall very soon be sharing them. I hope you will do all you can to lend your moral support, and that of the American Jewish Community, in this struggle against our internal enemies.

There is little to add to what I said in my earlier letter, except to emphasise once again that unless we do our utmost to put an end to this criminal gangsterism (I know that success may not always depend entirely on us), I see very little hope of achieving any positive results from our negotiations.

I leave for Palestine together with Mrs. W. this time with a very heavy heart, but I am sure that your prayers will follow us.

With kindest regards, I am
As ever,
Yours,

(Signed) Ch. Weizmann

EXAMINED BY

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EXAMINED BY

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL



Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
Jewish Agency for Palestine (Washington Office),
1720 Sixteenth Street NW,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

U.S.A.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 16, 1944

In reply refer to
FC 012.1/11-1644

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
Jewish Agency for Palestine,
1720 Sixteenth Street, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

The material enclosed herewith addressed to you
was recently received in the Department of State from
London, England.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Jack D. Neal
Jack D. Neal

Assistant Chief, Division of
Foreign Activity Correlation

Enclosure:
Letter from
Dr. Chaim Weizmann.





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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
Jewish Agency for Palestine,
1720 Sixteenth Street, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

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RECEIVED TODAY FOLLOWING CABLE QUOTE CONFIDENTIAL DIFFERENCES IN
EMERGENCY COMMITTEE CAUSED ME MUCH DISTRESS STOP IN SPITE GREAT
STRAIN WHICH VISIT HERE PUTS ON ME I PLAN COME STATES APRIL AFTER
FEW WEEKS VISIT LONDON STOP AM ANXIOUS DEVOTE ALL MY TIME ENERGY IN
AMERICA TO FURTHER OUR MAJOR PURPOSE STOP WE NEED AT THIS FINAL STAGE
UNITED ZIONIST FRONT AND FROM JERUSALEM I SEND YOU URGENT MESSAGE TO DO
EVERYTHING HUMANLY POSSIBLE RESOLVE DIFFERENCES AND REMOVE DIFFICULTIES
THUS ENABLING ALL ZIONISTS COMBINE FOR URGENT TASK WHICH LIES BEFORE
US TOP WARMEST GREETINGS CHAIM WEIZMANN UNQUOTE STOP MAILING CABLE
TODAY

ARTHUR LOURIE



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February 23, 1945

NEW YORK, N.Y.

DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER
THE TEMPLE

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

7th November, 1944.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
Jewish Agency for Palestine (Washington Office),
1720 Sixteen Street NW
WASHINGTON, D.C.

My dear Friend:

As you may know, I shall be leaving in a very few days for Palestine. Before leaving, I have been trying my best to ascertain something of our position. This had become all the more necessary as all sorts of rumours are circulating, particularly from NZO quarters, which seem to have all the inside knowledge. I therefore asked the secretariat at 10 Downing Street whether there was any possibility of my seeing the Prime Minister before I left. To my great satisfaction I received, already from Moscow, an intimation that the Prime Minister would be happy to see me on his return to London. The interview took place yesterday at Chequers.

I had almost two hours' conversation with the Prime Minister, and I should perhaps add that this time it was really more of a conversation - with both of us taking part. You will probably get a minute in due course, but here I would like to give you an idea of the salient points:

1) There is no definite decision as yet, and nothing will be decided until the war with Germany is over. So that all the rumours you hear about it are without the slightest foundation. I believe we still have about six months in front of us.

2) The Prime Minister emphasised very strongly that America ought to take a hand in the solution of the problem: it would make everything much easier. He repeatedly said that here we have a great many opponents to our policy, particularly among the Tories and the military people, so that he had sometimes to fight a lone battle. But he added that such opposition usually only hardened his heart. I pointed out to him that those who oppose us are the same elements who have always opposed him - and he fully agreed. He also added that we had many good friends in the Labour and Liberal camps - but apparently for him their ^{weight} does not compensate for the Tory opposition. So, as he put it, "If Roosevelt and I come together to the Conference Table, we can carry through all we want."

3) There is some talk going on about partition, but no territorial project has yet been formulated, and the Prime Minister fully realises that it will be essential for the Jews to bring at least one-and-a-half million people into Palestine in something like ten years.

4) He also mentioned that he had been very much struck by the uncompromising opposition to Zionism which he had found among some American Jews. He mentioned only Baruch in this connection, however. But he came back to it several times. Of course I told him that the opposition is limited to a very small group of very rich people, who play no real part in our affairs. But apparently Baruch has made a deep impression on him. As you know, he is an old friend of Churchill's.

I gave the Prime Minister our reasons against partition, and he has read our official memorandum (of which you have a copy).

7.11.44.

Briefly, that is what happened. And I think it points to certain action on our part:

(a) It is most essential that men like Baruch and one or two others should make it known that they are as anxious as we are for the gates of Palestine to be opened for a large Jewish immigration, even if they do not share our political views about a Jewish State, etc. I believe that men like Mr. Morgenthau, Eugene Meyer, Felix, B.V. Cohen, should now really take some trouble to make their views perfectly clear to the President. We shall try and do the same with our friends here. I think it is a terrible thing that an old man like Baruch, rich and sheltered, should try and make it more difficult for us to establish a sanctuary in Palestine for Jews who sorely need it.

(b) I believe that you ought to set up a powerful Committee to promote - if possible with Government help - Lowdermilk's plan, or something very like it. If this plan is sponsored by the President, it might easily become an important instrument which would help us to avoid partition, because it is so obvious that both Jews and Arabs would benefit by it, and that it would serve as a model for the development of the whole of the Middle East, and thus establish our claim to consideration even in the eyes of those who are at present opposed to us.

It may be that on my return from Palestine I should come over and see you all, but of course that must be left for the future to decide, and for you to think over in the meantime. I am also toying with the idea of going to see Smuts, if I can possibly manage it, and if my health permits.

But I am most anxious that some practical sign should be given us by the U.S. Government that they are willing to take a hand in the actual shaping of Palestine's future: otherwise American support is merely platonic, and the British have some excuse for saying that the Americans are ready enough to criticise, but do not want to help.

I was so much impressed by what I heard yesterday that I am anxious to put to you with all the strength at my command my conviction that this is the ~~the~~ only line leading to success, namely:

(a) To secure the active participation of America, and

(b) To work out a great practical project on Lowdermilk's lines, with the assistance and participation of Lowdermilk himself, and of other great American authorities in this field. If such a project were to be presented under Presidential auspices, it would give us an unanswerable case.

Well, I have indicated a line of action. We on our side shall do all we can here and in Palestine, and I am confident that in the next six months we can so prepare the ground as to ensure success.

The new High Commissioner, Lord Gort, went out a few days ago, and, as the Prime Minister mentioned, he is fully informed of the stand which the P.M. himself is taking in these matters. I believe Lord Gort to be benevolently disposed, courageous, honourable, and without prejudices: I believe we shall be able to work with him. The Prime Minister urged me most strongly to keep in close touch with Lord Gort while I am in Palestine. The P.M. is naturally much worried by the terrorist outbreaks. I did my best to explain, but as you will understand, it was none too easy.

Page Three

7.11.44.

Do please remember about Baruch, and the others of his category. I am sure Mr. Morgenthau could help a great deal.

Wishing you all every good luck in your work, and with kind regards to all friends, I remain

Affectionately yours,

(Signed) Ch.W.



MEMORANDUM ON PALESTINE POLICY
submitted by the
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE
to
HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT



77, Great Russell Street,
London, W.C.1
16.10.44

The war is approaching its end, and the Jewish problem in its post-war setting calls for immediate consideration. Of the six million European Jews outside the USSR and the British Isles, probably not more than one-and-a half million are alive to-day, and not all yet safe. The Jews in Soviet territory under German occupation have probably lost another million. Even in this war, no other people in proportion to their numbers have suffered such losses, accompanied by such horrors.

2. Allied victories are bringing immediate security to the survivors. But the root of the tragedy is the inherent weakness of the position of the Jews as a homeless people. As long as that endures, Hitler's solution of the Jewish problem by extermination will continue to haunt mankind, as a nightmare to some, as a temptation to others. To offer to the surviving European Jews, deported and broken, a return to the "status quo ante", propped up by philanthropic palliatives and paper guarantees, is morally unthinkable. For the large mass, true rehabilitation can only be achieved by a fresh start in new surroundings...Moreover, the problem is not merely one of finding homes for refugees; it is one of finding a country for a people. The solution must be constructive and permanent. It involves not only the fate of the remnants of European Jewry; the curse of homelessness must be lifted from the entire race.

3. "Some place must be found." Tropical or sub-arctic regions, such as Guiana, Madagascar, or Alaska -- to mention some recent suggestions -- can hardly be seriously considered. The colonisation attempt made in San Domingo has proved a fiasco. Even under the more favourable climatic and economic conditions of Argentina, Southern Russia, and Biro-Bidjan, experience has shown that where the national idea and tradition are inoperative, Jewish settlement cannot develop on a large scale for lack of driving power. An inspiration of high intensity is needed to transform a people of town-dwellers into agriculturists, middle-men into manual workers.

4. The renaissance of the Jewish nation is bound up with Palestine. The choice made by destiny cannot be undone. Palestine is the Jewish people's birthplace, and it gave birth to no other. It owes its place in history to the Jews,

and to no other people. The Jews as a people, and Palestine as a country, ceased to be truly creative when the bond between them was severed. But the hope of renewing that bond has kept the Jewish people alive, and meantime, Palestine remained desolate. The Jews have never ceased to pray for their return to Palestine. The urge to go back has been continuous, and in every generation practical efforts were made to return. Zionism is a final and determined bid for achievement.

3. The British people have always been conscious of the unique connection of the Jews with Palestine. From that consciousness the Balfour Declaration was born. But vision and statesmanship have not been translated into administrative practice. Jewish endeavour has received scant encouragement. Official policy has been far more alive to the difficulties of implementing the Mandate than to its creative aim. Step by step the original conception has been whittled down until a complete negation of the primary purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate was reached in the White Paper of 1939. But Jewish work has attained a stage of development which precludes Palestine from becoming an Arab country.

6. If the war had found two million Jews in Palestine instead of half-a-million, the task of the Allies in the Middle East would have been greatly eased, and the position of the Jewish people would have been totally different. But even the half-million proved their value, both to their people and to the Allies. Palestine has received tens of thousands of Jewish refugees, and were it not for the paralysing effect of the White Paper policy, the dimensions of rescue would have been far greater. All resources of Palestinian Jewry, ~~in~~ in man-power, productive capacity, and scientific knowledge, were harnessed to the war effort. Palestinian Jewish units served with the British Forces in Palestine, France, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, Greece, Crete, Syria, Libya, and Italy. Civilian volunteers risked and laid down their lives in hazardous para-military operations under British command. Palestine provided a source of information, unique in the Middle East, on the industrial, technical and scientific

position in enemy countries. Jewish technicians and artisans were mobilised to perform urgent war tasks in all the neighboring countries. This war effort would have been far more fruitful had it not been cramped and thwarted by the present negative policy.

7. The Jewish Agency appeals to H.M. Government to inaugurate a new era for Palestine and the Jewish people by drawing the logical conclusion from the Balfour Declaration as originally conceived. At this juncture they regard as imperative a decision designating Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth -- a country where the Jewish people shall be free to work out its salvation by large-scale settlement and by the achievement of full nationhood.

8. The Jewish Agency is fully aware of the difficulty with which this policy is fraught on account of Arab opposition. But if Arab consent is to be a pre-condition of any political settlement, hope must be given up of justice to the Jewish people. The Arabs demand that the Jews should be made a permanent minority in an Arab Palestinian State, which should become one in a cluster of Arab States. The Jews ask that a Jewish State be established with Palestine West of the Jordan for its territory, and hope that this State, while maintaining friendly relations with all its neighbours, may be organically connected with the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Arab programme would deny to the Jews a place among the nations, which they can only obtain through Palestine. The Jewish programme would have no such effect on the Arabs, who are already possessed of many States with enormous undeveloped would be like the Czechs in Greater Germany; but an Arab minority in a Jewish Palestine potentialities. A Jewish minority in an Arab Palestine will not merely have every / time every guarantee of equality of rights, religious freedom, autonomy in cultural and municipal affairs, and a full share in the benefits of development; the fact that Palestine is surrounded by Arab countries will add to their security. In view of what Great Britain and her Allies have done, outside Palestine, since 1914, to promote

and protect Arab nationhood and independence, Arab objections to the Jews being given full national status in their ancient homeland lack moral validity. The movement towards Arab unity is an additional reason why Jewish effort in Palestine should once and for all be established on a firm territorial and political basis.

9. Some who have come to recognise that the Jews ought to have their State, think that this could best be achieved by partitioning Palestine between Jews and Arabs. The Jewish Agency would view with deep apprehension an attempt to revive the partition idea. In 1937, a major consideration was the impending war. Now the most must be made of the potentialities of Palestine for immediate large-scale immigration. Palestine is already a twice-partitioned country, as compared with what it was at the time of the Balfour Declaration. Its further dismemberment is liable to be fatal to the viability of the Jewish State. A proper land basis is vital to Jewish development. This entails the promotion of intensive farming throughout Palestine, and access for Jews to undeveloped areas scattered all over the country. With the sea in the West, the Jordan and the Power and Potash concessions in the East, the chief water-resources in the North, and the main land-reserve in the South, any partition scheme seems bound to disrupt the country's economic frame, and wreck the chances of large-scale development.

10. In facing Arab opposition, the decisive element is time. Once Palestine has become a Jewish State, its existence would be accepted as an accomplished fact, just as the present Jewish population is accepted, though in the past there was strong opposition, accompanied by violence, to the increase of Jews even up to the present number. The prospect for the future is by no means one of perpetual strife and unsettled conditions, but of an ultimate equilibrium and collaboration. It is both the desire and the interest of the Jews to live in peace with their neighbours, and develop close intercourse with them. Even now, Palestine can render important services, industrial and scientific, to the neighbouring countries, which are taking a keen interest in these results of Jewish work.

11. The political programme here set forth required, first and foremost, the quickest possible increase of the Jewish population. Two things are urgent: to create a Jewish majority in Palestine in order to ensure the effective functioning of the Jewish State, and to rehabilitate the survivors of the European tragedy. Most, if not all, of these people, certainly the children among them, would anyhow be a charge on public funds for a considerable time after the cessation of hostilities. Such funds would be much more profitably spent on their settlement in Palestine. Apart from the survivors in Europe, the main groups of would-be immigrants are (i) refugees scattered throughout the world who have not been absorbed; (ii) Jews in those oriental countries where their safety and well-being are in permanent jeopardy; and (iii) Jews in English-speaking countries, among whom a movement to settle in Palestine is spreading.

12. For the proper organisation of this immigration, its control should be entrusted to the Jewish Agency. Large funds will be required, and an international loan may be necessary. Detailed plans of absorption are being prepared by the Jewish Agency, comprising reclamation works, irrigation schemes, and projects of intensive agricultural and industrial development. The return of the Jews to Palestine has ~~xxx~~ revolutionised their social structure and the country's economics. Sixty years of trial and error, experiment and achievement, is a firm basis on which to build the edifice of the future. With modern technique and adequate powers, what has been achieved so far can be turned into a lever for further and greater progress.

13. The present is a unique opportunity for righting a historic wrong, and solving a burning international problem. Millions of Jews throughout the world are now pinning their age-long hope on Allied victory. Its fulfilment will bring salvation to the Jewish people, and everlasting credit to Great Britain and her Allies.

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77, Great Russell Street
W.C.1

28th September, 1944

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Ansel Road and E. 105th,
Cleveland, Ohio

My dear Dr. Silver:

.....Officially, there is no change in the situation. We hear, of course, many rumours - some favourable, but most unfavourable. But there is nothing that can be called definite, nothing indicating action or decision.

For instance, we heard - I emphasise that all this is rumour and nothing more - that a project for partition had been worked out, which some people considered to be rather on the "generous" side; I gather it was something like the Peel project, plus the Negev, plus Akaba. Our opponents in the Middle East and in Palestine itself thought this much too much, and argued that such a project, if implemented, would produce turmoil throughout the Middle East. So everybody has been trying to whittle it down. We hear all sorts of suggestions. One which seems to enjoy powerful support amounts to something like the Woodhead "C" proposal - a strip of territory on the coast from north of Gaza to Zichron: without, therefore, the Emek, without Galilee, without Haifa, and so on. Of course it is not for a moment to be contemplated.

I repeat that nothing is certain; nothing is decided. But I do feel that our friends' hands have to be very much strengthened, so as to enable them to overcome the opposition. And that can be done only by your chiefs taking a definite and firm stand on the matter. I think the President and our Prime Minister can carry it through together, and as long as things remain on their level it will be all right. The danger begins when they descend to the level of those - in the Middle East and in Palestine itself - who want to destroy the Jewish National Home. I have repeatedly warned Smuts, and also Winant, about it. But you must now, at this critical moment, see that our friends are well informed, and that the President has this matter before him. We are preparing a memorandum on the subject, which deals with the question of why partition is not desirable, but of course I do not know whether we shall prevail. But if the partition is such as to produce a Jewish State which is not, and cannot be, "viable", that would be a first-class disaster which must at all costs be avoided. You and Wise and all our friends must therefore be constantly on the watch to see that it does not happen. I have no wish to be an alarmist; I repeat that nothing

is decided; but I certainly fear that our enemies are trying their utmost to bring about a decision utterly unacceptable to us.

Now that the Prime Minister has returned I shall attempt to see him before leaving for Palestine. I am not at all sure that I shall succeed, but it is my duty to try. I am seeing other members of the Government, too, but whether they will tell me anything I naturally do not know. If I do hear, then you will know at once.....

Both Mrs. Weizmann and myself expect to leave for Palestine at the end of October, and before we go, I am naturally anxious to know what we have to hope - or fear. I think it is essential that you should make contact with Mr. Morgenthau, and perhaps show him some extracts from this letter. I am trying to write to him myself. It was most unfortunate that I was laid up and could not see him while he was here. I am looking forward to the arrival of Hamilton Fish Armstrong, who is to join Winant here as second-in-command. He is, as you know, an old friend.....

As ever,

Yours,
(Signed) Chaim Weizmann

WRHS

