



## Abba Hillel Silver Collection Digitization Project

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### **MS-4787: Abba Hillel Silver Papers, 1902-1989.**

Series I: General Correspondence, 1914-1969, undated.

Sub-series A: Alphabetical, 1914-1965, undated.

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American Zionist Emergency Council, Silver, A. H. statements,  
1946.



October 7, 1946

1. The President's statement came as a result of political action and pressure which was inaugurated here a few weeks ago by the American Zionist Emergency Council in anticipation of the elections in November -- newspaper advertisements, democratic political leaders were contacted, etc. The elections this year are close and very critical and the Jewish voters hold key positions in many states. ~~They have organized politically to use the ballot to make the Administration carry out the pro-Palestine position taken by the Congress and by the people.~~

We were not looking for a public statement by the President. We were asking for action and results. It would have been better if the President and the State Department had carried on intensive diplomatic pressure on London and wait for definite results before making a public statement. There is definitely the danger that the statement was made for election advantages and that the Administration may now let the thing ride as it has right along. There is no indication that the State Department is pressing for action. *Byrnes did not approve*

It would not be wise to applaud unreservedly the statement of the President. While welcoming it, we must clearly point out that it is only an expression and a request, and that the acid test of American diplomatic effectiveness and sincerity will be results -- whether the Jews begin moving into Palestine. The Administration must be made to feel that the anxiety of the Jews of America is as yet far from being allayed, and that the President's declaration has not met the situation. There is the danger that the Administration's forces will now make capital of the President's good-will gesture and that will be the end of that. If nothing is done before November 5 by our Government, nothing certainly will be done after November 5.

? 2. Through Senator Taft, Senator Vandenberg has been contacted by Cable in Paris and I have urged him to talk to Byrnes and Bevin backing up the immediate immigration and the Agency proposal.

3. There has been some talk in the press here about a "truce" which is being arranged between the Government of Great Britain and the Agency. What is this truce?

4. We are not being kept informed of the day by day negotiations which are going on in London. There has been complaint about it at the meetings of the Council. Please send us information either by cable or by air-mail, preferably by air-mail so that we know the background of what is going on. To save time, please address these letters and cables to me here in Cleveland.

✓ 5/ What latest devel. in London?

✓ 6/ Weiz. cable to  
Wiles

*Handwritten:*  
Rosenfeld 08/10/46  
Depel 10/90

*Handwritten:*  
Shapiro - Cox, - Chel  
Reston



1. Signed statement be. of all the.

2. Are discussing my preliminary - release,  
end of raids etc.: so called "True" - cooperation  
will know tomorrow answer of Wt. Office

3. Asked him abt Ch. Weg. abt to Wiles papers,  
will cable the contents.

4. They will keep me regularly in touch with as.

5. Told him, Senators abt to Vandenberg -





10-8-46

*H.H. Silver*  
*read at meeting*  
*Exec. Council*

I am sorry that I cannot attend today's meeting. In its deliberations the Committee ~~should~~ <sup>might</sup> bear in mind the following facts:

1) We did not request the President to issue his statement. Our political action was directed towards bringing pressure upon the President and the Administration to bring the authority and prestige of our Government through diplomatic channels to bear upon London and to achieve concrete results, especially with regard to the moving of the refugees into Palestine. It was our hope that a public statement would be made by the President after he would have succeeded in getting results, not before, ~~for~~ <sup>it</sup> is clear that we have had such statements, and better ones before, issued both by Truman and Roosevelt which were never aggressively followed up by ~~the State Department~~ <sup>the President and</sup> and never yielded any results. I refer particularly to the statement issued by the President <sup>3 months ago</sup> ~~on July 2 of this year~~ to the American members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency who called upon him. He stated at that time that it was his determination that there shall be no delay in pushing forward with the policy of transferring 100,000 Jewish immigrants to Palestine with all dispatch, ~~in accordance with the statement which he made upon receipt of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.~~

2) It is not clear what Attlee's reply to the President <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~. There ~~were~~ <sup>are</sup> conflicting reports. But the press already carried the information that the President has no intention of ~~entering into~~ <sup>continuing</sup> a controversy with Mr. Attlee over <sup>the Palestine</sup> ~~this~~ issue. This might imply that having made his public utterance to satisfy the political demands of the Democratic Party in this election period, the President is again prepared to let the matter drop. The Party will <sup>be able to</sup> use this good will gesture of the President between now and election for its own purposes, and there the matter will rest.

3) The attitude of the State Department towards the President's statement is again left ~~beclouded~~ <sup>in doubt</sup>. Judging by various reports which have appeared in the <sup>press</sup> ~~paper~~, the Secretary of State <sup>Byrnes</sup> was opposed to the President's statement. If that is <sup>insurance</sup> ~~the~~



true, then it is not likely that the State Department will be more energetic in the carrying out ~~of~~ the President's purposes <sup>this time</sup> ~~than it has been~~ <sup>was</sup> in the past.

3) On the question of backing the Agency proposal on ~~partition~~ <sup>FP</sup>, the President's statement is quite clear. The American Government is not prepared to push the proposal as its own even though the American people <sup>etc</sup> ~~would~~ approve of it. <sup>He</sup> ~~It~~ hopes that some compromise may be worked out not as between the Biltmore program and ~~Partition~~, but as between ~~Partition~~ and the Morrison-Grady ~~proposal~~ <sup>so-called</sup> provincial autonomy proposal, and if such a compromise can be worked out between all the interested parties, the American Government stands <sup>ready</sup> ~~prepared~~ to back it up. This is a far cry from championing a Jewish state in Palestine. <sup>Far less than the Democratic platform called for, or Pres. Roosevelt at least put</sup> Taking these facts into consideration, it is clear (1) that we ought not to go over-board in hailing this latest declaration of the President as a great victory or a significant achievement. Nothing has as yet been achieved. The most that can be said of it is that the President has re-opened the issue of the admission of Jewish refugees to Palestine, which issue he <sup>seemed to have</sup> ~~lost~~ sight of completely when he made his ~~last public statement but one~~ <sup>in August</sup> on Palestine prior to his departure for his summer vacation. It is also to be noted that the President in his statement last Friday no longer speaks of the hundred thousand immigrants, but <sup>only</sup> of "substantial immigration." (2) While welcoming President Truman's continued interest in the problem, we should point out in the statement which the Emergency Council may issue, that the acid test of the diplomatic effectiveness and sincerity of the Administration is action, in terms of Jews actually moving into Palestine; that it is unthinkable that results cannot be achieved if an earnest, persistent and whole-hearted effort is made by our Government; that our Government has taken far more dramatic and effective action when its heart was really set on a matter and on issues on which the American people and the Congress of the United States have not expressed themselves as clearly as they have on Palestine.

4) Nothing in the statement should be so couched as to give the impression



that the Administration has now done all that can be expected of it, that the Jews of America are satisfied, and that ~~the~~ political pressure is no longer necessary. This would be disastrous for our political work in the next few weeks when our people in London will <sup>be</sup> negotiating <sup>in formally</sup> with the British Government. On the contrary, the statement should be so phrased as to suggest our increasing impatience with mere declarations and the earnest expectation that now, finally, something will be done — and that quickly.

5) I do not believe that anything <sup>shall</sup> ~~need~~ be said in our statement on partition. In an airmail letter which I received this morning from Ben Gurion ~~in Paris~~ he writes that the Executive members — Rabbi Fishman, Kaplan, Locker, Goldmann— came from London and met with him and Dr. Sneh, and that they agreed that in the <sup>talks</sup> informal ~~conversation~~ with the Government, which <sup>are</sup> ~~is~~ to take place, they should insist on the cessation of raids in Palestine, on the release of the Agency members from prison, the abrogation of the White Paper's land restrictions, and the beginning of the immigration of the hundred thousand into Palestine as a means for improving the relationship between the Government and the Jewish people. They furthermore took the position that until an agreement ~~will be~~ reached with the Jewish Agency on the ultimate arrangements for Palestine, the Government of Great Britain is duty-bound <sup>carry out the terms of the</sup> to ~~fulfill~~ <sup>in the front door</sup> the mandate which alone <sup>is</sup> ~~seems as~~ the justification for its presence in Palestine. And lastly, that the next period should be exploited to the utmost for intensified political <sup>action</sup> ~~activity~~ in the United States.

Great Britain has not accepted <sup>P</sup>partition as a basis of discussion. The U. S. Government is not prepared to push the proposals as its own. Wisdom dictates that we should not clamor for it. <sup>must continue to</sup> We insist on our legal rights under ~~the terms~~ of the mandate which is still the only "fact" and legal reality in the situation. Our claim to free immigration into Palestine, to the removal of land restrictions and <sup>the</sup> uninterrupted building of the Jewish National Home is based not upon a putative



partition proposal which may or may not ever be accepted, but on firm legal grounds defined in the mandate and on our historic connections with Palestine recognized formally by the nations of the world.

Finally, the purpose of a statement which the Emergency Council may issue is not to praise our Government, which as we all know has done next to nothing for our cause, but in dignified and respectful terms to challenge our Government, finally and ~~at~~ at long last, to act in such a manner ~~best known to it~~ <sup>as</sup> to achieve results.

