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American Zionist Emergency Council, Akzin, Benjamin, 1947.


MEMORANDUM

To Mr. Harry L. Shapiro

Date July 28, 1947

From Benjamin Akzin

This is to inform you that following our telephone conversation of this morning, I telephoned Dr. Silver, who agreed that the Emergency Council will reimburse Judge Rosenblatt for the fee which he will pay his counsel in the land case (preferably the ~~firm of~~ Arnold, Fortas & Porter), provided that the amount involved will not exceed \$5,000.



AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL

Constituent Organizations

Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization of America
Mizrachi Organization of America
Poale Zion-Zeire Zion of America
Zionist Organization of America

342 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.
MURRAY HILL 2-1160

September 19, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
E. 105th St. & Ansel Rd.
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

Judge Rosenblatt telephoned me to say that he tried all day yesterday to get in touch with you, but couldn't find you.

He wanted to tell you that a friend of his, a most influential English Jew, had brought him together with Creech-Jones last year in London. This man, who is on very good personal terms with Creech-Jones, is now in New York on purely personal business.

The Judge suggests, if you like the idea, that he arrange for you to meet privately with Creech-Jones through the intermediary of that friend of his.

If you are interested, kindly let me know and I will inform Judge Rosenblatt to go ahead and make the arrangements.

Sincerely yours,

Bakzin

Benjamin Akzin ✓

BA:sr

See enclosure!

MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

Date October 8, 1947

From Benjamin Akzin

The enclosed draft is based on what I have been told of Abdullah's article, which will appear in the November issue of the AMERICAN MAGAZINE. Yours is scheduled to appear in December. It answers the main points of Abdullah, but also covers additional territory (the role of Britain, etc.).

The article is written with a view to reaching the readers of AMERICAN MAGAZINE, which, as you know, is not read by the intelligentsia, but by a rather unsophisticated group of people. It was more important, therefore, to arouse their good-will than to impress them with our smartness.

After you okay this draft, I will sit down with an editorial writer from the AMERICAN MAGAZINE with a view to making the language more popular, if necessary. I will then submit to you the final manuscript.

I promised the editors of the magazine to let them have the draft this coming Friday, if possible. I would appreciate it, therefore, if you could let me have your okay and any changes before then.

BA.

BA:sr
Enc.

Unlike many international controversies of our day, the Palestine issue is not limited to diplomatic exchanges between chancellories. Its merits are a subject of wide public debate. It is good that this should be so: governments are prone to settle their differences in the spirit of hard-boiled bargaining, with political and strategic considerations dominating their thought and equity often relegated to a place of relative unimportance. The forum of public opinion, on the other hand, shows the opposite tendency: though it pays attention to politics and strategy it stresses mainly the fundamental equities involved. That is why the world would only gain were more international controversies brought into the strong light of public discussion. And since the Palestine question, dealing as it does with the fate of a Holy Land and of a homeless people, calls for a solution on the basis of public morality, it is a particularly fitting subject for open debate. Indeed, it was public opinion, aroused by the sordid chapter of British rule in Palestine, that helped to force Britain to put the Palestine question before the United Nations, thereby opening the prospect for progress.

To a large extent, the Palestine issue is one between Jews and Arabs, and one might as well treat this question first. It is best possible to illustrate the respective moral positions of Arabs and Jews by visualizing them as two parties appearing

before a Court, one seeking to have a previous decision reversed, the other asking that it be upheld and carried out.

This analogy is the more correct as the issue had ^{already} been considered by the governments and peoples of the world at the time of the First World War, and the decision, incorporated in a series of *internationally valid* documents dating between 1917 and 1924, was in favor of the Jews.

~~A series of internationally valid documents set out the status of Palestine in accordance with this decision.~~ The principal documents in question were: the British Balfour Declaration of 1917, laying down the basic policy; the decision of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, approving this policy; the Resolution of the Conference of the Principal Allied Powers in San Remo, 1920, making Great Britain responsible for putting the Jewish National Home into effect; the Mandate for Palestine approved by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922 and detailing the conditions under which Britain was to assume the temporary administration of the country; and the U.S.-British Treaty of 1924, giving American consent to these arrangements. Arab spokesmen occasionally challenge the legality of these acts. One may just as well challenge the legality of any and all territorial decisions taken by the victors with regard to the territories of defeated enemies. The morality of the decision in the case of Palestine is, of course, *a proper subject for* ~~open to~~ discussion, and the readers can arrive at their own conclusions.

Many were the attempts made to becloud the meaning of that decision. Nevertheless, its essential character remains clear enough. While stipulating that the civil and religious rights of the "existing non-Jewish population" be safeguarded and that special

measures be taken for the protection of the Holy Places, the decision decreed that Palestine be developed as "a National Home of the Jewish people." President Woodrow Wilson, British Prime Ministers David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, the great South African statesman Field M arshal Jan Smuts and the others who participated in that decision, made statements which clearly show that the meaning of that phrase was that ~~the~~ ^{the} Jews who wished to settle in Palestine should be permitted and helped to go there, so that -- should enough Jews avail themselves of that opportunity -- they would become the majority of the population and Palestine would become a Jewish State in fact. Perhaps a few quotations will illustrate the point. Here is what President Wilson said in 1919:

"I am persuaded that the Allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own Government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth."

Mr. Lloyd George, when explaining to a British Royal Commission in 1937 the meaning of that decision, said:

"...there could be no doubt as to what the Cabinet then had in their minds. It was not their idea that a Jewish State should be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty.... On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them...and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth. The notion that Jewish immigration would have to be artificially restricted in order to ensure that the Jews should be a permanent minority never entered into the heads of anyone engaged in framing the policy. That would have been regarded as unjust and as a fraud on the people to whom we were appealing."

General Smuts, speaking on the subject in 1919, foretold an increasing stream of Jewish immigration into Palestine and

"in generations to come a great Jewish State rising there once more."

Incidentally, had there been a genuine doubt as to the meaning of the 1917-1922⁴ decision and a desire to establish it beyond cavil, the British, the Arabs, the United States or almost any other State could, at all times, have requested an authoritative ruling from the World Court at the Hague. The Palestine Mandate expressly states that "if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice...". The United States, under its 1922 treaty with Great Britain, enjoys with respect to Palestine all the rights which it would have if it belonged to the League. The Jews often suggested that the Court be asked for a ruling, but not having a State of their own, were unable to make a formal request. Those who were in a position to institute court action did not do so, and so the British were able to whittle down the meaning of Britain's obligations with impunity. Still, the clear words of the documents are there for all to see, and wouldn't be silenced.

Having lost the decision, it is only natural that Arab leaders were disappointed and have been looking for ~~any~~ ^{any possible} a chance to have the verdict reversed. At first, it is true, they were inclined to go along, ~~and~~ and

in 1919 an agreement was made between the chief Arab delegate at the Paris Peace Conference, Emir Feisal (later King of Iraq) and the leader of the World Zionist Organization, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, on the basis of the Zionist program. Arab consent was again confirmed in an exchange of correspondence, the same year, between Feisal and Mr. (now Supreme Court Justice) Felix Frankfurter.

However, soon after the original decision, the British officials to whom the carrying-out of the undertaking had been entrusted, indicated that they were quite out of sympathy with the verdict rendered, and proceeded step by step to undo it in practice. The Arabs were quick to notice this change of attitude on the part of the British, and have never ceased to ask for a revision ever since. It will not be expected of me to relate their arguments. The readers of AMERICAN MAGAZINE have had an opportunity to read the Arab case as expounded by one of the most prominent Arab leaders, King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan. As far as I am concerned, I only regret that, in their efforts to gain a revision of the verdict, Arabs have often stooped to regrettable lapses from truth; that they have hired armed bands to kill peaceful colonists, to burn houses and to uproot trees; and that a large section among them follows the leadership of some of their most backward and fanatical figures -- men who were open or disguised allies of Hitler. But one can understand the very human temptation which causes the Arabs to seek an annulment of the first decision so that they may add an eighth State to the seven they already possess.

The Jews, on the other hand, ask that the original undertaking be kept and carried out.

But public opinion is not concerned with the state of mind of the two claimants. The fact that the Arabs changed their mind and

would like to add Palestine to the large list of Arab States is not any more conclusive in the eyes of the world at large than is the fact that Jews insist on a Jewish State. What public opinion is presumably interested to know is:

- (a) Was the original decision regarding Palestine justified or not; and
- (b) Has anything occurred in the meantime which makes that decision appear less justified today and therefore calls for a reversal.

As for the first question, the statesmen of the First World War period, when reaching their decision, gave full consideration to the respective claims of both communities, Jews and Arabs, to Palestine. It will be recalled that the First World War was fought under the banner of national self-determination. Under this theory, every nationality, however small or oppressed, should have a corner of the earth where it could develop its national civilization in the atmosphere of political independence. Though it was impossible entirely to prevent the existence of minority groups, it was felt that somewhere on earth each nationality ~~should~~ should have the opportunities that go with forming the majority of the population. Several new States came into being in Europe in accordance with this principle. It was also applied to large territories, formerly ruled by the Turkish Empire, whose population was predominantly Arab. Accordingly, several Arab States were envisaged, some of which were to gain independence immediately; others -- after a period of administration by some European Power. Altogether, the Arabs were given a chance at national and political independence over a territory in

excess of one million two hundred thousand square miles.

When faced with the problem of Palestine, these statesmen had before them two conflicting claims: that of the Arabs, who wanted to establish an Arab State in Palestine as well; and that of the Jews, who were ~~in~~ a minority everywhere, and to whom Palestine represented the only country to which they could possibly lay a claim. In weighing these claims, the statesmen of the First World War also took into consideration the tragic history of Jewish homelessness, the hatred and persecutions to which the Jews were being exposed in one country after another; and the fact that many times in their history, Jews were reduced to the need of fleeing from one part of the world to another, only to see anti-Semitism rise there as well. They considered the relative injustice that would be involved in awarding Palestine either to the Arabs or to the Jews. They considered that awarding Palestine to the Jews would mean that Arabs would have ^{only} five or six national States, instead of six or seven, and that one relatively small part of the Arab-speaking community would remain a minority in a predominantly non-Arab State. They considered, on the other hand, that awarding Palestine to the Arabs would mean that the Jewish people would remain a minority everywhere ^{and} ~~and~~ they would be singled out as the one people on earth to whom national independence was denied altogether. As between the two claims, they considered that the balance of equities lay with the Jewish claim, and they took a decision accordingly.

Assuming that it was a just decision in the first place, what new circumstances have arisen since then to justify a reversal?

Have the Arabs been robbed of their promised national independence in some or all of the countries which were assigned to them at that time, so that they now claim the additional territory of Palestine as compensation for such losses?

On the contrary -- all the countries, the establishment of which was envisaged at that time as Arab countries, have been freed, in the interval, from European control and have become independent in fact.

Has some catastrophe befallen the Arab peoples, so that they now face a desperate refugee problem, and having no place to settle these refugees, they need the additional territory of Palestine?

Nothing of the kind. The Arabs do not face persecution anywhere and have no refugee problem whatsoever. Nor do the Arab countries suffer from over-population but are, on the contrary, empty and under-developed. Therefore, Arabs certainly do not need Palestine today any more than they needed it a quarter of a century ago.

Has the condition of Jews in the world become so idyllic that there is no need today for a Jewish National Homeland though such need may have existed in 1917, and has the Jewish desire for a Jewish State somewhere in this world become a mere luxury?

After the tragedy of Hitler, after the catastrophe during which six million Jews were slaughtered, and now that anti-Semitism has proven itself to be so potent and so infectious a disease, everybody knows the answer to this.

Has Jewish mass settlement in Palestine proven economically *impractical,* ~~unfeasible~~ so that the idea has to be abandoned, no matter how attractive in itself?

On the contrary. Though the Government of Palestine, instead of facilitating Jewish settlement has done everything imaginable in order to render such settlement more difficult, and though it has actually prohibited Jewish settlement in about 95 per cent of the territory of Palestine, the Jews have managed to create in the small corner of Palestine open to them, a prosperous community of 600,000 people -- the only truly modern and democratic community in the whole of the Orient.

Or has this proven possible only at the cost of depriving the Arab inhabitants of Palestine of their civil rights, of lowering their economic standards, of forcing them to leave their country, in which case humanitarian considerations might militate against further Jewish colonization in that country?

On the contrary. Arab standards in Palestine have risen higher and more rapidly than in any purely Arab country. And not only has the coming of the Jews not oppressed and pushed the Arabs out of Palestine, but it has resulted in a tremendous increase in their number and even in Arab immigration from other, purely Arab countries, into Palestine.

I think that, upon consideration, it will be found that nothing that has happened since the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate has reduced the validity of the Jewish claim or increased the validity of the Arab claim, but that, if the Jewish claim to Palestine was valid then, it is far more valid today.

But the Arab-Jewish conflict, though occupying the center of the scene, does not constitute the real crux of the Palestine problem. It is the attitude of the British Government and officials -- not of

Arab leaders -- which is at the root of most difficulties experienced in Palestine. This is not written in any inherently anti-British spirit. As a man, as an American, and as a Jew, the writer is deeply conscious of the many debts which we all owe the British people. But he is equally aware -- as a man, as an American, and as a Jew -- of the many lapses in Britain's policy which certainly do not redound to her glory. Among these lapses, the British record in Palestine is one of the most unforgivable. Let us hope that this was merely a temporary aberration, such as occur from time to time in the history of all nations, and that once it is corrected, it will be forgotten despite the many tragedies to which it gave birth. But no analysis of the present Palestine imbroglio is worth anything unless it goes into the unsavory role played by Britain in that country.

I have earlier stated my opinion that though the manner in which the Arabs are conducting their case is regrettable, and though that case is not as good as the Jewish case, the Arabs do have a case. This cannot be said of the British. Though they constantly argue that their Palestine policy has been entirely selfless and aimed merely at fulfilling their international obligations, and though they have gone through the motions of trying to bring about a reconciliation between Arab and Jew, the record shows that their entire policy in Palestine has been dictated by their conception (I am afraid a mistaken one) of British self-interest; that in pursuit of this alleged self-interest they have found it useful to foment rather than to bridge the differences between the two Semitic peoples; and that in doing so, they have honored their international obligations in the breach rather than in observance.

It appears that the British officials who were most closely connected with the shaping and carrying-out of British policy in the Near and Middle East were at all times opposed to the conception of the Jewish National Home. It was against their judgment that the British Cabinet had embarked upon that course in the first place. The officials were not inclined, however, to go along with the Balfour Declaration policy, but attempted unceasingly to bring back the Cabinet to the conception which they, the officials, thought to be in the best interest of the British Empire. This conception involved that Palestine should remain a fairly primitive non-industrialized area, the bulk of whose population should remain Arab, and which should be governed either as a British colony or as an Arab State ruled nominally by Arabs though in fact a British Protectorate.

In line with this conception, the bureaucrats succeeded in persuading the British Cabinet to narrow gradually the meaning of the Jewish National Home idea. As a first step, they prevailed upon the Cabinet to agree first to an administrative and then to a complete separation of the largest part of Palestine, where an Arab regime was set up. We refer to the area known today as Trans-Jordan; this area embraces 3/4 of the original territory of Palestine, and significantly enough includes the emptiest parts of the country and those with the least religious and historic significance.

There followed other steps, the cumulative effect of which was to whittle down the British obligations under the Mandate and to slow up the progress of Jewish settlement. The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, the body entrusted with the task

of passing upon the administration of mandated territories, has repeatedly pointed out the questionable character of the British Government's fulfilment of its obligations under the Mandate.

The climax of this process was reached by the issuance of the British White Paper of 1939 and the Land Transfer Regulations of 1940. These ^{measures} ~~measures~~, which precluded further Jewish immigration without Arab consent and prohibited the acquisition by Jews of any real property anywhere except a tiny ghetto within Palestine, could no longer be maintained as consistent with the Mandate, however narrowly that document might be interpreted. The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations promptly denounced these measures as unlawful, but the British Government disregarded this verdict and put them into effect. Since those days, Great Britain cannot be considered as governing Palestine in accordance with ~~the~~ the international Mandate, but merely as military occupant, controlling the country by brute force.

The arguments with which the anti-Zionist officials tried to justify their policy were many. Best known were the argument that Palestine was "too small" to absorb the would-be Jewish immigrants, and the argument of overwhelming Arab opposition. Interestingly enough, it was these very same officials who restricted the area and scope of Jewish settlement so as to render the settlers' economic absorption more difficult indeed; and it was the action of these officials which encouraged that very Arab opposition which they thereupon used as an argument. Other arguments were given less publicity, but were quietly spread in influential circles in various countries: conservatives were

told that Jews will spread socialist or communist propaganda, while radicals were informed that Jewish capitalists are set to exploit the poor Arabs; religious people were frightened with the prospect of a "Godless" Jewish State, while free-thinkers were presented with the bugaboo of a theocratic commonwealth.

The clearest light on this story is thrown by the ingenious argument that Britain is precluded from keeping its obligations to the Jews because of her conflicting obligations to the Arabs. Indeed, between 1915 and 1918, various promises or hints were given by British representatives to the government of the (now extinct) Arab state of Hedjaz and to other Arab leaders outside of Palestine which, as the Arabs claim, conflicted with the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and the documents based thereon. British sources take an equivocal position regarding the meaning of this set of promises and hints: at times they maintain that Palestine was not included in this set of promises; at other times they maintain that Palestine was so included and that, therefore, they cannot administer Palestine on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and the documents springing therefrom; at other times, finally, they cite the need to "reconcile" the two "conflicting" sets of promises.

If the promises to the Arabs did not include Palestine, they cannot, of course, be cited as reason for not fulfilling Britain's obligations under the Balfour Declaration, the San Remo Resolution, etc. If, on the other hand, Palestine was meant to be included in the negotiations with the Arabs, this throws a very unpleasant light on the duplicity with which the British Government knowingly and

deliberately made two conflicting promises to two parties regarding one and the same territory. One can hardly see how this could have been cited in mitigation of the British record. If anything, it could only be considered as the kind of conduct which should disqualify Great Britain from any future position of trust in respect of Palestine.

Whatever bearing the Anglo-Arab negotiations should have on our moral judgment of British politicians, it was not these negotiations that determined the international status of Palestine after World War I or the sources of British authority in that country. Britain assumed the administration of Palestine on the basis of the documents setting aside Palestine as the Jewish National Home. These provisions were made the condition and the primary purpose of Britain's administration of the country, and the British record in Palestine ought to be judged by reference to these, and not to any other undertakings.

More important than the alibis used to justify British policy in Palestine, is that policy itself. It shows Britain in the role of a guardian who despoils his ward in an effort to enrich himself. Not for nothing did Winston Churchill characterize this policy as "sordid".

All through the tragic years of the Hitler era, while millions of Jews were being gassed, did Britain, prodded by a group of unimaginative and stubborn bureaucrats, pursue this policy. She continued to enforce this policy after the war, with the help of 100,000 troops and a great deal of brutality. But this only provoked Jewish resistance, and now the British Government talks of withdrawing from Palestine altogether. Sooner or later, Britain will have to withdraw in fact as she is withdrawing from other places where her rule has encountered resistance. The Empire's servants, in their too-frantic search to advance its interests, actually did it a disservice.

In logic and in justice, the threads of the Palestine issue should have been picked up at the point where it began to be mismanaged: the entire area of Palestine should have been once more thrown open to Jewish settlement under the guidance of an appropriate international authority. In other words, the principles of the Mandate should have been maintained, and only the faithless Mandatory removed. This would not have made up for lost time, nor could it return to life those who died because they were denied admission to the Jewish National Home, but it would have given to the Jewish nation of the future the same territory which was promised in the past.

But politics respects neither logic nor justice. It seems that in order to obtain Jewish mass-settlement and statehood, we are required to pay the heavy price of territorial sacrifice; that, after reducing the size of the proposed Jewish Homeland from the original 44,000 to 10,000 square miles, it is to be further reduced from 10,000 to about 6,000 square miles, in accordance with the recommendation of a special committee of the United Nations. With a heavy heart the Jews are prepared to do even this. But as these lines are written, there is still danger that diplomatic intrigues may despoil the Jewish people of even this tiny opportunity. Here is where we hope to find mighty support in public opinion: what the world is ready to grant to Albanians and to Costa Ricans and to Luxembourghers -- a small territory in which they could live in independence as members of the family of nations -- should not be denied to the oldest ^{of} Western peoples ~~on earth~~.

Occasionally, one hears objections to the Jewish State on the ground that the Jews allegedly constitute ^{no nationality but} a mere religious group, whereas religion ought not to form the basis of modern States. It is odd that this argument comes so often from Arabs, since most Arab States are more or less theocratic in character. In any case, it is difficult to treat the objection seriously. A glance at one's Bible will serve as a reminder that neither the Jewish nation nor the Jewish State are recent inventions. That American Jews have become integrated in our country is no more argument against a Jewish State in Palestine than the integration of Swedes or Englishmen or Irishmen in America is an argument against a Sweden, an England, or an Ireland. There are, at this moment, millions of Jews in ^{the world} ~~Palestine, Europe, and the Orient~~ who consider themselves Jewish by nationality as well as by religion, who have suffered greatly because of their Jewishness, and who claim for themselves that which has been granted as a matter of course to every other nationality on earth -- independent statehood. I believe in the right of every individual to decide for himself what he is, and I don't quite see how one can deny the right of national existence to people who regard themselves as a nation and whose lack of national independence has been the source of so much tragedy.

A second objection which one encounters from time to time is far more serious, and merits very earnest attention. It deals with the fact that Palestine, besides being a country made so people could live there, is also a land holy to Christianity and Judaism and containing shrines revered by Jews, Christians and Moslems.

One is often asked why this Holy Land should be set aside as National Home for the Jews.

We believe that this point, however sincerely voiced, is not well taken. While the country is spiritually close to Christianity no less than to Judaism, Christians do not think of Palestine as the place ~~where they want to live~~ which they need in order to express their otherwise suppressed national character. If a Christian's sense of veneration of the Holy Land is not shocked by its having a predominantly Arab-Moslem population, it should not be shocked anymore were its population to become predominantly Jewish. In the days of the Founder of Christianity, Palestine was a densely cultivated country with a population about twice the present number, most of them Jews, and one does not see why it is essential for the preservation of Palestine's sacred character that it be kept a semi-desert with a Moslem majority. Special measures to protect the Holy Places have to be taken in any case, but there is no reason why a Jewish population should be any less palatable to Christianity than a Moslem one.

There is one last aspect which enters into the picture. One does not discuss it much in public, but in the calculations of governments and of political observers it plays a most important, perhaps a decisive part. This aspect is very far removed from religion. It has to do with military strategy, political advantage, and economic opportunities. The hesitations of the Great Powers

with regard to Palestine, while ostensibly caused by the search for justice, spring in reality from motives of quite a different character. In the case of Great Britain, it is the desire to keep Palestine as an economic, political, and military appendage of the British Empire; in the case of the United States -- the temptation to use Palestine as a bargaining-point to strengthen Arab friendship for America and the desire to keep Palestine within the Western orbit without assuming any onerous responsibilities; in the case of the Soviet Union -- the desire to eliminate British control and American influence over the country and, if possible, to bring it under Soviet influence.

In this tangled world of ours, these preoccupations have their legitimate place. It strikes one as odd, however, to see to what extent the Great Powers' thinking of the "Holy Land" is conditioned by military bases, oil pipelines, and trading advantages. To the unprejudiced mind, it would seem far more in keeping with the reverence universally felt or professed for the Holy Land if it were taken out by common agreement from warlike calculations and made into a center of peaceful progress.

It is toward this end that the Jewish people has been laboring and will continue to labor. If necessary, the Jews, too, can base their case on political and strategic reality. American and British experts are aware that Arab concern over Palestine is far less intense than appears on the surface; that Arab military strength is grossly overrated; ~~and~~ that practically all Arab governments are artificial structures which depend on Western support not only for their economic well-being, but for their very existence; and that therefore neither their diplomatic nor their military threats

need be taken seriously. On the other hand, the military strength of Palestine Jewry is well known, and the governments are aware that the security problem in Palestine, if desired, can be solved without recourse to foreign troops, but simply by means of a local Jewish militia and police force which, for the duration of a brief transitional period, could be placed under the supervision of neutral supervisors appointed by the United Nations.

But fundamentally the Jews do not want to treat the issue as a contest of strength. Fundamentally, Jews prefer to think of the great human aspects involved. What is most important to us is that the Jewish State which has already become a reality, and whose existence the world will soon have to acknowledge formally, will make an end to the curse of Jewish national homelessness. It will solve the tragic problem of the uprooted Jews in the countries of the Old World, and will place the Jewish people on a footing of equality with the other peoples of the world, thereby in time laying the ghost of anti-Semitism. And in Palestine, Jews will have an opportunity to build a center of modern civilization, benefiting their own kin and the entire Middle East, and taking its place among the United Nations of the world.

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL

342 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.
MURRAY Hill 2-1160

Constituent Organizations

Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization of America
Mizrachi Organization of America
Poale Zion-Zeire Zion of America
Zionist Organization of America

October 20, 1947

BY HAND

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
c/o Hotel Commodore
42nd St. & Lexington Ave.
New York, N. Y.

Dear Dr. Silver:

Mr. Long, of the "American Magazine", was here today. He said, on behalf of his editors, that your article is much more persuasive than the Arab article and they are very pleased with it.

He told me that the Abdullah article raises two questions which we left unanswered, and the editors felt that we ought to say something about them. Accordingly, he and I concocted two brief insertions which will be embodied in the article. I enclose them, in the hope that they will meet with your approval.

Mr. Long said that the editors will have to cut or condense the article. They will let me have the condensed copy so that I may submit it to you.

Sincerely yours,

Bakzin

Benjamin Akzin

BA:sr
Encs.

Insert p. 12 at end of first paragraph

~~The Jews have quite properly refused to attach any~~
Therefore, Jews
~~validity to these measures. Jews everywhere regard those Jewish~~
refugees who have gone to Palestine since 1939 without benefit of
British visas as perfectly legitimate immigrants, and give full
financial and moral support to this movement.



Insert p. 14.

It has been suggested that Palestine ought not be asked to admit Jewish immigrants without restriction while the United States, Great Britain, Canada and other countries are unwilling to do so. It would be nice, of course, to see all countries exhibit more generosity toward prospective immigrants, whether Jewish or non-Jewish. But the number of immigrants these countries are willing to admit is a matter that lies within their domestic jurisdiction, since none of them has been set aside as the Jewish National Homeland. Palestine, on the other hand, has been internationally set aside for just that purpose. To propose that Jews escaping one country where they are an unwanted minority be distributed among other countries where they may become ^{equally} ~~equally~~ unwanted minorities is as if a family in need of a house and garden of its own were advised to place each of its members as a ^{permanent} foster-child with ~~these~~ strangers.

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November 3, 1947


Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
E. 105th St. & Ansel Rd.
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

I enclose a letter from the
AMERICAN MAGAZINE received at this office,
together with a check for \$500., in payment
of your article.

The article will appear in
the December issue of the magazine.

Sincerely yours,



Benjamin Akzin

BA:sr
Encs.

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL

Constituent Organizations

Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization of America

Mizrachi Organization of America

Poale Zion-Zeire Zion of America

Zionist Organization of America

342 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

MURRAY HILL 2-1160

November 21, 1947,

Dear Dr. Silver,

It was very kind of you to send me the check for the American Magazine article, and I want to assure you of my gratitude.

Since Shulamit Schwartz reviewed and added a few paragraphs to the MS, I am turning part of the fee over to her.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Baer