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Eban, Abba, 1950-1951.

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WESTERN UNION

1220

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LC = Deferred Cable

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JOSEPH L. EGAN
PRESIDENT

WASH/NGTON DC 28 315P

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TS-CL A296 LONG PD=CT DUPLICATE OF TELEPHONED TELEGRAM=CT

DR ABBA HILLEL SILVER=

19810 SHAKER BLVD THE TEMPLE CLEVE=

PRIME MINISTER BENGURION CABLES MR FROM JERUSALEN THIS MORNING AUTHORISING ME TO EXTEND TO YOU HIS CORDIAL PERSONAL INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN FORTHCOMING CONSULTATIONS IN JERUSALEM BETWEEN THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT AND LEADING AMERICAN JEWRY ON THE ECONOMICS PROBLEMS AND TASKS OF OUR STATE STOP THE MAIN PARTY OF AMERICAN GUESTS WILL LEAVE NEWYORK BY AIR FRANCE THIS THURSDAY NIGHT AUGUST 31 STOP FOREIGN MINISTER SHARETT ADDS HIS PERSONAL HOPE YOU MAY FIND IT POSSIBLE PARTICIPATE THESE CONSULTATIONS STOP PLEASE REPLY EMBASSY ISRAEL DC OR HOTEL SHOREHAM REGARDS=

ABBA EBAN AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL

CLASS OF SERVICE

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WESTERN UNION

1201

SYMBOLS

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W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

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TS-CL241 PD=CT WASHINGTON DC 28 315P=

DR ABBA HILLEL SILVER=

THE TEMPLE TS=

ALLOW ME TO ADD MY OWN PERSONAL HOPE THAT YOU MAY BE ABLE TO
RESPOND TO PRIME MINISTERS INVITATION AND ADD THE BENEFIT
OF YOUR UNIQUE AUTHORITY AND EXPERIENCE TO NEW STRUGGLE OF
ISRAEL FOR ITS VERY SECURITY STOP VERY CORDIAL GREETINGS

EBAN=(

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

PR/0/80e-3

PERSONAL

January 8, 1951

Dear Dr. Silver:

You may remember that during my recent visit to Cleveland we discussed certain objects which the Government of Israel should seek in this city with a view to the alleviation of some of its gravest problems. Subsequently Mr. Keren spoke to you on the same subject in more detail.


The time is now ripe for vigorous and constructive action. I write to you on behalf of the State of Israel to request your support in many aspects of our task in which you can render unique assistance.

I hope you will understand my inability to write more specifically at this stage, and should only like to enquire how we can take the matter further. If you are able to be in Washington shortly I should like to discuss the problem more fully; otherwise I should be glad to send an emissary to Cleveland to acquaint you with the primary steps taken so far. I have in mind either a member of the Embassy Staff or one of our mutual friends.

May I hope to hear from you soon ? I shall be in Washington for the remainder of this week.

With best wishes,

Yours very sincerely


for. Abba Eban.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
19810 Shaker Blvd.
Cleveland, Ohio.

ae:lt

January 10, 1951

Ambassador Abba Eban
Embassy of Israel
Washington, D.C.

My dear Ambassador:

Upon my return from Winnipeg I found your letter of January 8th.

I shall be very happy to help you in every way I can. If the matter is urgent, I could come down to Washington immediately. If not, then I am scheduled to be in Washington for the 50th anniversary celebration of the Jewish National Fund on January 21st and I plan to remain there about two or three days. This would give me an opportunity, if you plan to be in Washington that week, to discuss the matter with you fully and then to make whatever contacts need to be made while I am there.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

AHS:er

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

PR/O/80-4e

January 15, 1951

Dear Dr. Silver:

Many thanks for your letter of January 10th.
I look forward to seeing you on Sunday in Washington,
and hope to confer with you then and on the following
day.

On Saturday evening I am receiving the leading
Delegates of the JNF Conference at a reception in
honor of Dr. Granott at our home. I need hardly say
that my wife and I would be very honored if you could
join us.

The enclosed paper may be of interest to you.
As you know, Israel took a leading part in persuading
the United Nations to make this final peace effort
before taking a more drastic course.

Yours very sincerely

Abba Eban

Abba Eban.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
East 105th Street at Ansel Road
Cleveland 6, Ohio.

ae:lt

UNITED NATIONS
Department of Public Information
Press and Publications Bureau
Lake Success, New York

Press Release PM/2139
5 January 1951

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ABBA EBAN (ISRAEL)

My delegation has studied the Report of the Cease-Fire Group in a spirit of grave concern for the prospects of world peace.

Affirming its anxious desire to "put an end to the fighting in Korea" and "to prevent the conflict in Korea from spreading to other areas," the General Assembly on 14 December 1950 requested three of its most distinguished and experienced delegates to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea could be arranged. The sincere and assiduous efforts of this Group have been repulsed. Hostilities in Korea continue on a mounting scale. A hideous toll of suffering and anguish is exacted day by day from the tormented people of Korea as the tide of war sweeps fiercely over their lives and homes. The search for a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues to be attained by negotiation and discussion is set aside in favour of the arbitrary pursuit of military advantage. These are the mournful consequences arising from the refusal of the Central People's Government of China to cooperate so far with our Cease-Fire Group in the quest of a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea. Had the Cease-Fire Resolution been accepted, what a vastly different scene would now confront us! Men, women and children in Korea, soldiers of the United Nations and of China now falling in a sickening torrent of bloodshed would be alive. The Korean peninsula would perhaps still be in a condition of tension, but its people would at least be enjoying the blessed relief of comparative peace. Peace-loving people in every land would be living in renewed hope. The authority of the U.N. would stand high in the world. The very issues which are cited by the Central People's Republic as an obstacle to its acceptance of a cease-fire would in fact have been much nearer to solution. For there can be no doubt that constructive U.N. action on the question of Chinese representation and on the question of Formosa would have been accelerated and not delayed, encouraged and not obstructed by Chinese support of the cease-fire effort. I submit that it is quite beyond human resource to prove that a cease-fire would have had - or would now have - any result except the saving of lives; the relief of Korean suffering; the enlargement of the prospect of world peace; and progress towards a settlement of the issues outstanding between the U.N. and the Central People's Republic of China.

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The refusal of the Central People's Republic of China to take this step for the reasons adduced in its communication, has caused special disappointment to those delegations and governments which, like my own, have consistently adopted an attitude of good will and of substantive support towards the basic international aspirations of the new regime in China. In his address to this Committee on December 13, the Foreign Minister of Israel expressed our regret that the Indian initiative on the question of Chinese representation had not been approved by the General Assembly as early as September 19. We also regretted that there had not been more success in adapting U.N. military action against aggression in Korea to the paramount objective of avoiding any widening of the conflict, or any risk of involvement of Chinese interests. Yet, even at that stage we felt convinced that no miscalculations or misfortunes had occurred which could not be repaired in the tranquility and calm of a cease-fire. In that spirit the Israel delegation voted in favour of the Resolution, duly and legally adopted, under which the cease-fire effort was undertaken.

At the same time we frankly expressed our own judgment that a cease-fire appeal would be based on stronger grounds of principle and would be more effective if it were linked with a careful formulation of all U.N. objectives in Korea and related matters. It was for that reason that my delegation would have preferred a more complete and unified expression of U.N. aims than was contained in the two separate resolutions submitted by our Asian colleagues. Since the principles which the Israel delegation outlined have evoked definite signs of interest and sympathy in many delegations, I venture to clarify them once again, leaving the Committee to indicate by discussion, whether it believes them to have validity in the conditions which now prevail.

It is the view of my delegation that a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and of all issues affecting peace in the Far East might appropriately be sought in the following stages:

- a) an immediate cease-fire,
- b) an affirmation by all Governments concerned that they accept the United Nations objective in Korea, namely the establishment of a unified and independent Korean State by free nation-wide elections supervised by the United Nations,
- c) the participation of representatives of States bordering on Korea in the work of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea which shall henceforth be charged with the supervision of the elections,

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- d) an agreement for the progressive withdrawal of all non-Korean forces from Korea within a defined period, in conditions which would ^{usually} ~~generally~~ leave the Korean people free to determine their own future,
- e) the initiation of projects for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Korea under United Nations auspices,
- f) a guarantee by the United Nations to which the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would be invited to subscribe that the independence and integrity of the reconstituted State of Korea shall be respected by all States,
- g) a declaration that upon acceptance by all parties concerned of the above recommendations (a-f) and upon agreement on their implementation, consideration should be given as a matter of urgency to all questions affecting the relations of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China with the United Nations.

The General Assembly could then call upon all Governments to cooperate with the United Nations for the achievement of these objectives and emphasize the responsibility for the peace of the world resting on those Governments withholding such cooperation.

The main outline of this plan was described by Mr. Sharett in his address to the Committee on December 13. In a communication which my delegation made to members of the Cease-Fire Group and some other delegations during this past week end we indicated how these stages might be expressed in resolution form, if it were the intention of the Committee to accept the principles of this approach.

The Committee will note that the Israel approach differs from that previously suggested by the Asian delegations in two important respects.

First: we have emphasised a definite chronological sequence for the various steps which we suggest.

Second: we believe that these successive stages - cease-fire, agreement on a plan for the unification, the independence and rehabilitation of Korea, and for the progressive withdrawal of forces, and a discussion of Chinese claims, rights and interests should all be advocated in a single resolution to form a picture of a single comprehensive U.N. policy to be implemented in stages. I wish to comment on these features a little more in detail.

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5 January 1951

I believe that the sequence of stages is dictated by strong motives of principle and logic. It is obvious that an unconditional cease-fire, which in our view would be permanent and not a mere suspension of hostilities, is an indispensable prelude to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question as a whole. In its communication to the President of the General Assembly, the Central People's Government of China suggests that the sponsors of the Asian resolution "must give up the idea of cease-fire first and negotiate afterwards." But if we gave up this idea we should find ourselves in the astounding position of suggesting that negotiations and hostilities should continue at the same time. "It is better to fight and negotiate than to stop fighting and negotiate." That may sound fantastic but it is the only meaning which the words I have quoted from ^{the} Peking communication can possibly bear. I am certain that no government, on reflection, would have any difficulty in giving up that thesis; for peace-loving peoples everywhere do regard a cease-fire as the first and absolutely indispensable condition of any successful attempt to reach a solution. It will be recalled that the cease-fire resolution was adopted by the great majority of our membership. The remaining minority, and indeed, the Central People's Republic of China itself, had supported a Soviet draft resolution drafted on 2 October 1950 which also clearly laid down a cease-fire as the first step to be followed by a political settlement. All members are committed to the self-evident political and moral proposition that the termination of hostilities is prior and indispensable to everything else. Moreover, there are no States, including the Central People's Republic of China, which have not committed themselves to certain principles regarding the future of Korea: unification and independence with the help of United Nations agencies; rehabilitation; and the determination of their own future by the Korean people themselves - these objectives have repeatedly been proclaimed by the United Nations. They even figure in the otherwise not very promising communications from Peking. My delegation is not so innocent as to be aware that different intentions may lie behind identical statements of principle. Nevertheless the degree of unanimity on how the future of Korea should be arranged is something worthy of attention, and we regretted that the Asian resolution did not express, confirm and consolidate this wide area of theoretical agreement.

The question of the withdrawal of forces should not cause insuperable

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difficulty if there is genuine good will on all sides. The United Nations and especially those members whose gallant troops have borne the main brunt of this struggle have no desire whatever to remain in Korea a single hour beyond the strict call of international duty. On the other hand the United Nations can only decide to withdraw its forces when the effect of such withdrawal would be to enable the Korean people, free of foreign domination - and this includes Chinese domination - to arrange their own future. The termination of United Nations military responsibilities in Korea is inseparably linked with the retirement of Chinese forces and the existence of guarantees that the Korean people would really be left alone and in peace. It is for that reason that we have suggested progressive and simultaneous withdrawal of troops to take place after two previous stages - the cease-fire and agreement on the unification and independence of Korea. Only agreement on those two previous stages, together with Chinese withdrawal, would enable the United Nations to consider that its responsibilities had been discharged.

There is no doubt at all that agreement on a cease-fire, the unification and independence of Korea and the progressive withdrawal of forces would create a favorable atmosphere for a discussion of the matters which cause deep concern to the Central People's Republic of China. There is no appeasement in the suggestion that the General Assembly should in that event urgently discuss the claims of China with regard to United Nations membership and the status of Formosa. The desire of the Central People's Republic to have these matters settled in this forum is in itself entirely legitimate. The General Assembly, as a matter of basic principle, is not only entitled but actually obliged to discuss and decide important international disputes brought before it. It is only the existence of armed hostilities which justifies, and indeed compels, the deferment of such discussion pending the urgent and inescapable need to restore peace. Thus if the previous stages to which I have referred, and especially the cease-fire were agreed, a discussion of the Chinese items would follow without delay.

Thus the sequence of these stages rests upon practical logic. But there is also an important principle involved. By clearly defining those separate stages we seek to avoid a position in which they can be bargained with and made conditional upon each other in a false sequence. Each and every one of these four objectives in its proper order is justified in itself, and is in strict conformity with the provisions of the Charter and of previous United

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Nations resolutions. The Charter supports the idea of a cease-fire. The declared policy of the General Assembly in successive resolutions, upholds the concept of a unified and independent Korea to be established with United Nations assistance. The resolve to withdraw United Nations troops from Korea in conditions which would leave that country genuinely free to secure its unity and independence, is clearly stated in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 12 October. The duty of examining the question of Chinese representation and other matters affecting China in its relations with the United Nations is implicit in the very purpose and function of the United Nations itself. Thus the policy which I am endeavoring to outline is completely consistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with principles to which the General Assembly has already given its support. There is here no sacrifice of Charter principle for expediency provided the sequence is observed.

I have said that my delegation would have wished to see the call for a cease-fire related to the other main objectives of the United Nations in Korea and the Far East. Experience has proved that this consideration was well founded, because the cease-fire resolution and the negotiation resolution presented by the Asian group were separate, and especially since the former was voted upon while action upon the latter was deferred, there was a risk that some parties should deduce that there was no assurance that a cease-fire would be followed by a constructive discussion of the problems which contribute to unrest within the area. The Cease-Fire Group attempted to remove any such misapprehension in the ~~first~~^{second} message which it sent to Peking on 19 December. It is, however, not clear whether that second message was considered in time to have any effect on the reaction to the first. Moreover, despite the efforts of the Cease-Fire Group to link the two questions of cease-fire and negotiation in that order, the fact remained that the General Assembly itself had separated these two items and had not embodied them together in a single resolution. This fact is the subject of criticism in the final paragraphs of the Peking reply.

My conclusion is that the two Asian drafts, one of which has been voted upon, do not clearly express what is, I believe, our general opinion that if a cease-fire can be obtained, then the Korean question and related questions would form the subjects of international discussion, with the participation of the Central People's Republic of China.

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Mr. Chairman, I am fully aware that the mind of this Committee is agitated by one fundamental question: Have we exhausted all possible efforts to achieve a peaceful solution of this question in conformity with the principles of the Charter, and in cooperation with all the parties directly involved? Or is it still reasonable and legitimate for a final effort to be made? I do not find it difficult to understand the viewpoint of those who, in the light of the Peking reply and the continuation of hostilities by Chinese forces, are sceptical of the utility of any further attempt to complete the action already taken by the Cease-Fire Group. If my delegation nevertheless ventures to submit that there is still one more effort to be made before the Committee should begin to think in more drastic terms, it is because we have two considerations in mind: First, the cause of international peace which is here at stake is so supreme and paramount in its dimensions; success is so precious; the price of failure would be so exorbitant, that this above all is a cause in which perseverance should be taken to the most extreme lengths even a little beyond the limits of sanguine expectations. My second consideration is this: the starting point in the thinking of my delegation is that expressed in the communique issued jointly by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to the effect that "every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the United Nations in Korea by peaceful means, and to find a solution of the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent united Korea." I note the words "every effort." It is true that the General Assembly has already made efforts to achieve this goal, but has it yet made every possible effort? It seems to my delegation that the defects to which I have referred in the Asian resolution - the defect of separation between the two concepts of cease-fire and negotiation in ~~xxxx~~ due sequence - and the defect of vagueness in the second draft resolution, should be corrected before this Committee could consider that it had clarified the position and intentions of the United Nations beyond any ambiguity. I therefore leave it to the Committee, and in particular, to the Cease-Fire Group to consider whether we should not complete our record of peace-making effort by stating the policy of the UN in accordance with certain principles, such as those which I have outlined and which other delegations may care to formulate. The UN requires the cessation of hostilities in Korea; the UN desires to assist the establishment of a unified and independent Korea and to contribute to its rehabilitation. The

(MORE)

U.N. wishes to hasten the day when the Korean people, with no other forces on their soil, will be left free to determine their own future, and to organise their own security. The U.N. stands ready, once the Central People's Republic of China has ceased its military intervention, to examine with that Government all the questions affecting its international status and its claims and apprehensions in the Far East. If all this were clearly and coherently stated by the General Assembly in one single act, we should have formulated a policy the rejection of which would be so clearly incompatible with any sincere peaceful intentions that the great majority of nations would clearly feel that every effort had been made for a peaceful settlement and responsibility for failure would be unmistakably clear. In that regrettable event I have no doubt that the majority of Member States will see their duty and perform it collectively to the limits of their capacity.

In offering this contribution to the common stock of our deliberations, Israel is guided by nothing but an ardent desire to see the world pulled back from the gulf of widening catastrophe on the brink of which it is now dangerously poised. We have no direct interest in any part of the area concerned. We have not taken a narrow or grudging attitude towards new forces and movements which have arisen in China; we believe that the hazards are so enormous that all efforts reconcilable with Charter principles should be unstintingly devoted towards a quest for a peaceful settlement. These, and these alone, are the considerations which prompt us to voice the urgent hope that the peace-making efforts of the U.N. will elicit a far more worthy and constructive response than is to be found in the disappointing communication from Peking. I hope that members of the Committee of the Cease-Fire Group will give earnest consideration to the principles which I have outlined.

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January 17, 1951

Dr. and Mrs. Abba Hillel Silver regret that they will not be able to attend the reception of Ambassador of Israel and Mrs. Eban on Saturday, January 20, 1951, in honor of Mr. Abraham Granot, because they will not arrive in Washington until Sunday afternoon, January 21, 1951.



In honor of Dr. Abraham Granot, Chairman, Board of Directors
Jewish National Fund

WRHS AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES
The Ambassador of Israel and Mrs. Eban
request the pleasure of the company of
Dr. and Mrs. Abba Hillel Silver

at a reception

on Saturday, January 20, 1951

from 5:30 to 7:00 o'clock

R.s.v.p.
2210 Massachusetts Avenue

at 1673 Myrtle Street, N.W.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

EC/5/30-9

January 30, 1951

Dear Dr. Silver:

As you may have guessed, I have been spending some time at Lake Success recently, and this is my first opportunity to write.

I was greatly heartened to hear of the outcome of your visit here last week. I am convinced that this has taken us a very long stride forwards, and I ask you to accept this expression of warmest appreciation.

I look forward to seeing you on my visit to Cleveland on February 6th, and very much hope for your support in the campaign for Israel securities.

With best personal regards,

Yours sincerely

Abba Eban
Abba Eban.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
East 105th at Ansel Rd.
Cleveland, Ohio.

ae:lt

February 5, 1951

Ambassador Abba Eban
Embassy of Israel
Washington, D. C.

My dear Ambassador:

I wish to thank you for your kind letter of January 30th. I trust that progress will be made in the direction of the Congressional resolution now that Senator Taft has consented to be a sponsor. Senator George would be an excellent co-sponsor for the measure.

I regret that I shall not be able to attend your meeting on February 6th. I accepted some time ago the invitation from Western Reserve University to attend its 125th anniversary banquet on that evening. I do hope that I shall be able to see you while you are in town.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

AHS:er

COPY

AUGUST 29, 1951

AMBASSADOR ABBA EBAN
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

GREATLY APPRECIATE INVITATION OF PRIME MINISTER BEN GURION RECEIVED YESTERDAY TO PARTICIPATE FORTHCOMING CONSULTATIONS IN JERUSALEM BETWEEN ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND LEADERS AMERICAN JEWRY ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND TASKS OF ISRAEL. I RECOGNIZE THE CRITICAL SITUATION. I AM EAGER TO BE OF SERVICE AND WISH IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO ATTEND. UNFORTUNATELY HAVING JUST RETURN FROM A LONG ABSENCE I AM SO HEAVILY INVOLVED IN VARIOUS DUTIES AND COMMITMENTS THAT IT IS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE LAST MINUTE ARRANGEMENTS ENABLING ME TO LEAVE IN TIME FOR THE CONFERENCE WHICH IS ONLY A FEW DAYS OFF. SHOULD THE PRIME MINISTER WISH TO SEE ME AT A LATER DATE I SHALL BE VERY HAPPY TO COME AND CONFER. IN THE MEANTIME PLEASE CONVEY MY GREETINGS AND RESPECTS TO HIM AND TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHARETT AND EXPRESS TO THEM MY DEEP REGRET AT BEING UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN NEXT SUNDAY'S CONSULTATIONS.

WARMEST REGARDS.

ABBA HILLEL SILVER