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Eban, Abba, 1952-1953.

September 14, 1952

Honorable Abba Eban  
Ambassador of Israel  
Israel Embassy  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Ambassador:

I was in Cincinnati to attend the Board meeting of the Hebrew Union College, and Dr. Nelson Glueck informed me that he is going to Israel on October 2nd to attend a conference of the Israel Exploration Society on the Jordan Valley. This is his first visit to Israel since the establishment of the State. You know, of course, of Dr. Glueck, of his residence in Palestine as head of the Palestine Archaeological Society and of the position which he occupies as head of the oldest rabbinic seminary in the United States, as well as one of the leaders of American Reform Judaism. I am sure that the State of Israel would want to take official cognizance of his presence in the country.

There is one other matter which I wanted to bring to your attention. Last June Mr. James Michener addressed the Annual Meeting of our congregation. He had just returned from an extensive visit in the Pacific and in some of the Moslem countries. At the conclusion of his address he startled us all by delivering himself of what seemed to be a pro-Arab line; the Jews have had it all their own way in the American press - the Arab states have had a bad break - the United States is alienating the Arab world which is so important to America's future - American Jews ought now to relax on their pro-Israel propaganda while the United States is proceeding on a stronger political and economic pro-Arab line, etc., etc.

At the close of the meeting I had a long talk with him. He frankly stated that he had been indoctrinated by some the Arabs for some years now. I found him not at all ill-disposed to Israel, but very much uninformed.



I took the trouble, of course, to give him the other side of the picture and I believe that I have succeeded for the time being in keeping him from further public advocacy of his pro-Arabism. Mr. Michener, as you will know, is a very important literary figure on the American scene. I believe that he should be cultivated. He may become a helpful friend. The effort is decidedly worth-while.

With all good wishes for a very happy New Year, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:er



ABBA HILLEL SILVER





EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AE/418

September 19, 1952

Dear Dr. Silver:

First let me reciprocate your good wishes and send you my own greetings for your happiness in the New Year.

I have been in touch with Dr. Nelson Glueck with whom I have a close friendship since we met in Jerusalem ten years ago. In view of his personal eminence and his position in American Reform Judaism I have recommended to the Prime Minister that suitable steps be taken and functions arranged to signalize his presence in Israel.

Thank you very much for your information about Mr. James Michener. It would certainly be anomalous for a man with such a sensitive outlook on the problems of nationalism and liberation to lack a due sympathy with our own state and movement. You may be assured that steps will be taken to cultivate him. I think that we might invite him to visit Israel and make a special study of our problems.

Yours very sincerely,

*Abba Eban*  
Abba Eban

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver  
East 105th Street at Ansel Road  
Cleveland, Ohio.



[1952?]

*The Ambassador of Israel  
and Mrs. Eban*

*wish you*

*a Happy and Prosperous New Year*

*Washington, D. C.*

WRHS







לשכת טובה תכתבו



## THE PRAGUE TRIALS

### MEMORANDUM

By the Ambassador of Israel

Owing to the absence of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs from their posts I have not yet received the guidance which I have sought on the points at issue amongst American Jewish leaders with regard to the campaign recently conducted by Communist authorities against the repute and honor of Israel and the Jewish people. The views which I now summarise are my own; but I am perfectly confident that they represent the attitude of the Israel Government and of an overwhelming majority of our people. American Jewish organizations, of course, are free to determine their own course, but Israel's responsibility for Jewish historical development makes it imperative for its views to be known.

For brevity and convenience I formulate my views as answers to questions.

1. Should the Prague Trials be constantly kept in public view?

Yes. It is a vital concern of the Jewish people that protest should continue to be heard and that a recent tendency for interest to slacken should be resisted. The anti-Semitic tendencies now running riot in East Europe should confront as many obstacles as possible. There are few obstacles as imposing as the solemn indignation of American Jewry. I would therefore favor meetings, resolutions, letters to the Press and the encouragement of editorial opinion - all on the widest possible scale.

I am convinced that the necessity for wide public reverberation prevails against any danger that things may be said under Jewish auspices which might not be congenial to us in form or content. This danger should be limited as much as possible; but it cannot be invoked as a justification for abstaining from intensive and vociferous protest.

2. Should we condemn the Trials as Anti-Semitic?

Yes, certainly. Since the passing of Streicher and Goebbels the Jewish people has never been assailed by official organs of government in any country with a hatred and vulgarity comparable to those expressed by the Czech Government and the East German Communist Party. If we do not condemn these odious racial generalisations as anti-Semitic policies we conceal and distort the truth. Within the framework of this condemnation, there is room and need for special protest against the defamation of Zionism, the liberation movement of the Jewish people; but there should be no limitation of attack on anti-Zionist agitation in any manner which would establish distinctions between Jews and Zionists, as the Communists and Arabs endeavor to do.



3. Should we declare that this proves the Soviet Union to be an Anti-Semitic Power?

The Israel Government has preferred to relate its criticism directly to the authorities practising anti-Semitic agitation - in this case the Czech Government and the East German Communist Party. Jewish organizations which are not in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union will judge for themselves whether this inhibition applies to themselves. It is undeniable that there was no anti-Semitism in the Czech Government until that Government came under the control of the Communist system. It would be childish to assume that Moscow did not approve Prague. There have, moreover, been intermittent signs of propaganda in the Soviet Union itself which are anti-Semitic, though less blatantly crude than the language of the Prague prosecutions.

However, I repeat that the Israel Government in obedience to diplomatic usage and as a small state dependent on the observance of the international code, does not feel free openly to ascribe to one Government the overt actions of another. If I were an American Jew I personally might not feel bound so rigidly by this inhibition, but the denunciation of a Great Power on the basis of activities by its satellites is not a matter to be lightly undertaken.

4. Should the matter be raised in the United Nations?

The Delegation of Israel is resolved to carry out its Government's instruction to use the international echoes which the United Nations platform commands in order to express Israel's indignation. We shall endeavor to secure a wide response from other delegations. We should welcome consultation with Jewish organizations which have their own status in United Nations organs.

5. Should we discuss the Trials in terms of Near Eastern affairs?

I see little value at this stage in publicly discussing these trials and statements as a bid for Arab sympathy with the Communist Powers. It is better to relate them to the context of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism; to explain their utter incompatibility with ideals of freedom and peace; and to contrast Israel's free institutions with the horror and darkness of the "judicial" processes followed by Prague. Our Arab relations are sufficiently complex as they are.

January 7, 1953.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

*Confidential*

AE/741

January 13, 1953

Dear Dr. Silver:

Dr. Irving Miller informed me of your interest in the question of Jewish reactions to recent events in Prague. The leaders of many Jewish organizations sought my opinion on this matter and I expressed my views in the enclosed memorandum. I should be interested to know whether your views differ to any substantial extent from those which I have here expressed.

It becomes increasingly clear that the Communist authorities in all Soviet dominated countries are resolved to use anti-semitic agitation for their political purposes whenever convenient. This makes it all the more essential that world Jewish opinion, to which - apparently - the Soviets are not entirely insensitive, should be vigorously expressed. In view of recent events, there would be no justification even for a diplomatic inhibition against associating the Soviet Government with the crimes of the Czech Government.

Yours sincerely,

*Abba Eban*  
Abba Eban.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,  
The Temple,  
Ansel Road,  
Cleveland, Ohio.



January 27, 1953

Ambassador Abba Eban  
Embassy of Israel  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Ambassador:

Please pardon the delay in answering your kind communication of January 13th. I have been away from Cleveland to New Orleans and Washington and elsewhere, and my correspondence has lagged. The festivities here in Cleveland in connection with my completion of 35 years as Rabbi of The Temple and my 60th birthday have likewise taken me away from my desk.

I read the memorandum which you kindly sent me. I hope to have the opportunity of discussing the subject with you more fully when I see you in New York on February 5th. I am in the main in agreement with your position. I believe that the violent attacks which have been made upon the Zionist Movement and the State of Israel during the Prague trials and since, should be vigorously repudiated by the Jews throughout the world. I believe that protest meetings should be held and every other publicity vehicle should be employed to expose these outrageous fabrications.

I am not as yet sufficiently clear in my mind that what we are witnessing is an all-out anti-Semitic campaign on the part of the Kremlin. There are certainly disturbing signs that this may be the case, but this would be such a wrench with its own fundamental ideological position as well as with three decades of official opposition to anti-Semitism that it might be wise to watch the trend for a little while longer before we arouse the whole Jewish world in a universal condemnation of the Soviet Union as outright anti-Semitic and as heir of Hitler.

It may well be that for one reason or another or for a complex of reasons, the Soviet authorities have decided to exploit anti-Semitism for their purposes. That will represent a major catastrophe for the three million Jews behind the Iron Curtain.

I think that we ought to approach this subject with utmost caution. It might prove a tragic boomerang which might bring about that which we want least and fear most.

With warmest regards and all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

AHS:er



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AE/818

CONFIDENTIAL

February 16, 1953

Dear Dr. Silver:

May I recall our conversation on February 6.

The enclosed document sets out my thinking on American-Israel relations at this time. I have begun discussions on these lines with leaders of the new Administration. The reaction has been encouraging so far, but no definitive conclusions for good or ill are yet possible.



Yours very sincerely,

*Abba Eban*  
Abba Eban.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver  
The Temple,  
Ansel Road  
Cleveland, Ohio



AE/803

AMERICAN-ISRAEL RELATIONSObservations by the Ambassador of Israel

In his first conversations with the Department of State under its new leadership, the Ambassador of Israel desires to present a comprehensive review of the present position of American-Israel relations. In so doing, he will make proposals for strengthening the American-Israel relationship, and encouraging peace in the Near East.

CURRENT AM-  
ERICAN COM-  
MITMENT IN THE  
ARAB-ISRAEL  
QUESTION

1. During the past five years the United States appears to have applied certain guiding principles in its policy towards Israel and the Arab States:-

ISRAEL'S  
STATEHOOD

- (a) The United States has upheld Israel's statehood as a measure of international justice and necessity. In so doing the United States has stressed that the Arab peoples have simultaneously been assisted to realize their national freedom on a scale much vaster than that available to Israel. Thus American assistance to Israel is not a discriminatory policy, but is in the highest tradition of international equity.

SUPPORT OF  
EXISTING  
AGREEMENTS AS  
INTERPRETED  
BY SECURITY  
COUNCIL

- (b) The United States has supported the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and has held them to be sovereign contracts which only the signatory governments can change. The United States and Israel have interpreted these treaties as requiring a permanent cessation of all acts of hostility, belligerency

and blockade



and blockade. On September 1, 1951 the Security Council of the United Nations upheld this interpretation and rejected the Egyptian theory of a "state of war."

NEED FOR DIRECT  
NEGOTIATIONS FOR  
PEACE AND FINAL  
BOUNDARIES

- (c) The United States has advocated that Israel and the Arab States should now negotiate directly to develop their agreements into peace settlements, including final boundaries. On December 18, 1952, after quoting an identical principle enunciated by Mr. John Foster Dulles in the General Assembly on December 11, 1948, Ambassador Phillip C. Jessup said in the United Nations:-

"We believe that direct negotiations should be direct and unconditional and that the parties should enter into these direct negotiations uncontrolled by any prior assertion or prior condition, that it should be a free and open negotiation."

Authoritative American opinion has been unanimous on this point. Thus, on October 24, 1952, President Eisenhower said:-

"Peace in the Middle East is essential to the free world. Every encouragement should be given to facilitate direct negotiations between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors whose independence, freedom and prosperity are equally the hope and wish of the American people."

REFUGEE  
RESETTLEMENT

- (d) The United States has stressed the special importance of solving the problem of Arab refugees. While encouraging Israel to do everything possible within its own capacities and resources, to alleviate the plight of refugees, the United States has seen the main formula for an overall solution to lie in the resettlement of Arab refugees in kindred Arab countries, to whose development and prosperity they could materially contribute. In Chicago on December 4, 1952, Assistant Secretary Byroade, after expressing doubt

that the



that the majority of refugees could ever return to Israel,  
went on to say:-

"In any case it seems that the larger portion of these unfortunate families must be aided to find a livelihood in areas which can absorb them and in fact benefit from their productivity. Such a program calls for the development of new areas in which the refugees can be productive."

This policy likewise has had august and impressive support. On October 24, 1952, President Eisenhower stated:-

"In my judgement both statesmanship and humanity dictate that these unfortunate refugees should, as rapidly as possible, be assisted with adequate means honorably to reintegrate themselves in the neighboring Arab countries wherever their reabsorption in Israel is either not feasible or practical."

- (e) The United States has repeatedly advocated that universal religious interests in the Holy City and the Holy Land could be expressed by the appointment of a United Nations Representative charged with safeguarding the Holy Places. On three occasions in the past four years (1949, 1950 and 1952) the United States and Israel have voted against drastic proposals which would have overridden the rights, interests and views of Israel, Jordan and the inhabitants of Jerusalem. In December 1952 it became plain, in the test of voting, that territorial internationalization no longer commanded its original majority in the United Nations.

JERUSALEM  
HOLY PLACES  
AND RELIGIOUS  
INTERESTS

The United States



ECONOMIC AID

- (f) The United States has helped all the countries of the Near East with economic and technical assistance under the Mutual Security Act. Aid to Arab States took account of their problems in the resettlement and relief of Arab refugees, while aid to Israel recognized the special burdens borne by a new state in its early struggle as well as the unique achievement of Israel in receiving 750,000 refugee immigrants within four years.

GERMAN  
REPARATIONS

- (g) The United States has publicly held that the Federal Republic of Germany should ratify and implement its treaty with Israel for material compensation for the plunder of Jewish property by Nazi Germany.

SUPPORT  
FOR DEMOCRACY

- (h) Within the framework of its support for all Middle Eastern states, the United States has expressed its special interest in the development of stable democratic government in the area. In his statement already quoted, President Eisenhower said:-

"The State of Israel has given every indication of being a progressive democracy which is desirous of co-operating with the free world in defense of human freedoms and against totalitarian aggression. It is in the interest of the United States and of all peace loving nations that political and economic aid to establish their own security should be given to Israel and to all countries in the Middle East which are similarly intentioned."

The Government



NEED FOR  
REAFFIRMING  
AMERICAN POLICY

2. The Government of Israel assumes that the above policies were formulated by American leaders after consideration of all responsible points of view; and many of them were presented to international tribunals as articles of national policy. The present leaders of the American Government have never opposed, and have in most cases specifically endorsed, these concepts on which American-Israel relations have been regulated. The Government of Israel, for its part, does not doubt that these principles have durable validity. Nevertheless, it is respectfully submitted that there would be great value for all parties in an early statement making clear that abandonment of these premises is not contemplated. For Arab opinion is evidently reluctant to regard these as serious and continuous commitments. Notwithstanding the repeated declarations of the leaders and the Party now in power in the United States, Arab leaders and newspapers have created a tension of expectancy that the United States will somehow turn its back on its undertakings and assurances to Israel. This tension is reflected in an Arab militance towards Israel which has grown sharply in the past months. Evidence is needed that American policy will develop and progress organically from the point previously attained, and will not deviate sharply therefrom with unsettling effects on an already delicate equilibrium. Such evidence of constant purpose can only be effective if a communication is made on the authority of the new Government of the United States.

OPPORTUNITIES  
FOR A DYNAMIC  
AMERICAN POLICY

The Government of Israel does not believe, however, that the United States has no means of furthering stability in this area except by the maintenance of current attitudes and policies. There are elements in the situation which would

justify a new



justify a new and dynamic development of American policy in the interests of the Middle East and of world peace. There is also an important realm - that of defense planning - in which the Government of Israel earnestly advocates a radical change in the current tendencies of official American thought.

The Ambassador of Israel would like to consider these new elements of policy and action, going beyond the consolidation of the progress already achieved.

3. It is clear that no advance towards peace can be expected unless the Arab governments and Israel negotiate freely and unconditionally for a settlement of their differences. It is true that the United States has recently advocated this very course in the United Nations without noticeably influencing the Arab attitude. But the reiteration of this view in favor of direct negotiations, with the enormous prestige and influence in the Near East of the new President and Government of the United States, might well have a decisive effect. It is not suggested that the United States should at this stage complicate its position by becoming involved in any substantive solutions of outstanding problems which would make it virtually a party in negotiations; but merely that it should reaffirm its declared policy for free peace negotiations using the great authority ascribed to its voice by all Near Eastern governments. The provisional armistice arrangements have been in existence for longer than was originally intended and are showing increasing signs of strain. Their replacement by freely negotiated peace settlements is probably the only alternative to perpetual tension.

DIRECT  
NEGOTIATIONS

The Government



The Government of Israel fully understands that the United States desires to improve its relations with the Arab world, as indeed does Israel. However, Israel hopes that no statement of American friendship for the Arab world would be made with such form or content as could inadvertently encourage the Arab states to increase their pressure on Israel or condone their refusal to negotiate directly for a peace settlement.

IMPLICATIONS  
OF SOVIET  
ATTITUDE

4. Recent statements of Soviet policy on Israel and the Jewish people represent an important development which cannot fail to have due influence on American-Israel relations. These Soviet policies have two aspects, in each of which the Israel Government earnestly invites the reaction of the United States:

(a) The monstrous charges by Soviet and other Communist authorities against the Jewish people, in the spirit of anti-Semitic propaganda, have already evoked the condemnation of the American Government, which Israel profoundly appreciates. A mobilization of international opinion against Communist anti-Semitism might have significant and important effects in the world struggle between freedom and dictatorship. The Government of Israel intends to raise this matter in the United Nations with the utmost vigor. The Ambassador of Israel would like to consult with the Government of the United States and the United States Mission to the United Nations on American support for this initiative.

(b) But the Soviet and Communist authorities have also attacked the State of Israel on the grounds of its

links and



links and affinities with western democracies, and especially the United States. The United States has not yet reacted to these violent charges against a democratic country in friendly relations with the United States. This, of course, is not interpreted by Israel as meaning that the United States repudiates only the anti-Semitic charges of the Soviet Union, but is indifferent to the Soviet onslaught on the State of Israel, its democratic institutions and elected leaders.

The Government of Israel submits that the Soviet attacks on Israel merit and require the public reinforcement of the American-Israel friendship. It is precisely because of its support of democratic causes in the United Nations and outside it, that Israel has incurred these powerful displeasures and thus increased the danger to its own security. The leading democratic powers can hardly wish to abandon small countries when their support of the democratic cause exposes them to danger. When small countries adopt resolute democratic attitudes, they may justly expect that the dangers they thus incur will be offset as far as possible by the increased solidarity of their democratic friends with them.

Destiny appears to have placed upon the shoulders of Israel and the Jewish people an unusually heavy burden in the defense of freedom and resistance to tyranny. If Israel and the Jewish people are to fulfill their role effectively, this is the time for sustaining their spirit and morale and, at the very least, avoiding any disappointments or set-backs at the hands of their natural partners in the world struggle.

Notwithstanding



ECONOMIC  
AID

5. Notwithstanding its improving prospects of eventual viability, Israel still faces many short-term difficulties under the weight of its financial burdens. Nothing would more effectively accelerate Arab reconciliation with Israel than the certainty that the United States will persevere in assisting Israel's economic consolidation. The Arab tendency to await the aggravation of Israel's economic difficulties is undoubtedly a primary barrier to a negotiated peace. Unexpected delays in the ratification of the Israel-German agreement have dislocated Israel's foreign currency budget estimates, and critical difficulties are expected in March and April 1953. The Government of Israel will suggest methods whereby the United States might help in this situation. The Government of Israel is also in close consultation with the Export-Import Bank which has recently dispatched a mission to Israel; and it may seek the assistance of the Department of State if it submits a loan application to that body. The Government of Israel also hopes that sympathetic consideration will be granted to the Note submitted by the Ambassador of Israel on Mutual Security Assistance for the fiscal year 1953/1954.

DEFENSE  
PREPARATION

6. The Ambassador of Israel expresses his Government's earnest hope that new consideration will be given to the question of Israel's place in plans for regional defense. In his conversation with the American Ambassador in Israel on February 6, 1953, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sharett, expressed the deep concern aroused in his mind by the development of American thinking on this question, as expressed by Assistant Secretary Byroade to the Minister of the Embassy of Israel on January 27, 1953. The reasons for this concern are:

The Ambassador



ISRAEL'S  
APPLICATION FOR  
MILITARY AID

- (a) The Ambassador is today renewing Israel's application for military aid submitted over twelve months ago. The request presented on February 7, 1952 was a highly important act of Israel's foreign policy. It was not lightly taken. It marked the first, and so far the only, offer by a country of the Middle East to make common cause with the United States in the defense of the area against possible aggression. The fact that this request has evoked no response by the United States is a source of considerable pain. It is not every day that States declare their willingness, with due knowledge of all the responsibilities involved, to adhere so wholeheartedly to the Mutual Security system. In view of Israel's potential manpower and its strategically significant industrial capacity and communications, the Government of Israel cannot understand why its important voluntary act should have been treated with no sign of positive interest. With the clouds on the international horizon growing more intense, and Israel's own vulnerability becoming increasingly manifest, the Government of Israel earnestly asks that serious consideration be given to the Note submitted today.

ARMS SUPPLIES

- (b) The Government of Israel understands that the Department of State may be contemplating a supply of American arms to Egypt, notwithstanding the maintenance by Egypt of a theory of belligerency, a practice of blockade and a refusal to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel.

Since Israel



Since Israel applied for military assistance over twelve months ago, a prior grant of such assistance to Egypt would be invidious in any circumstances. Moreover, the Ambassador of Israel does not know of any other instance in which the United States has dispatched arms to a country asserting belligerency towards another country in friendly relations with the United States, and exercising a blockade in violation of the security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. The supply of arms by the United States to Egypt in these circumstances is bound to leave Cairo with the impression that the United States does not attach great significance to the question whether or not Egypt is belligerent in relation to Israel; whether or not Egypt complies with the Security provisions of the United Nations Charter; whether or not Egypt establishes peaceful relations with its nearest neighbor. Thus in addition to the physical threat arising for Israel's security, the political and psychological effects of any such action would be highly negative. The position is aggravated by the fact that it is apparently not even intended to offer balancing aid to Israel or to require Egypt to abandon its blockade at Suez. Any current disposition in Egypt for moderation towards Israel would be prejudiced if Egypt were to feel that its attitude of hostility to Israel had no effect on American willingness to provide Egypt with arms.

The Government



THE PROPOSED  
DEFENSE  
ORGANIZATION

- (c) The Government of Israel is apprehensive of the fact that it may be contemplated to establish a Middle Eastern Defense Organization to include all the Arab States, but without Israel's membership. The Ambassador of Israel finds it hard to believe that all the implications of this proposal have been carefully weighed. It would be both unjust and inexpedient to establish a Middle East Defense Organization without the only State whose resistance to totalitarian aggression can be relied upon, and with the exclusive membership of Middle Eastern States whose willingness to defend freedom is at best highly problematical. That this proposal should be discussed at the very time when it is Israel, and not any Arab State, which is the actual target of Communist threats serves to underline the profound anomaly of such thinking. Moreover, it is a fact of geography and strategy that in relation to any possible threat from the North, the halting of aggression at Israel's frontiers is a primary objective. Thus the attribution of such high and exclusive priority to Egypt as against Israel in defense planning does not seem strategically logical. Nor is it in keeping with Israel's record of democratic fidelity and Egypt's indifference to the issues of aggression and totalitarianism. The establishment of a defence organization including the Arab States - and excluding Israel at the behest of those states - would amount to explicit sanction by the United States and its allies of the Arab policy of boycott and ostracism towards Israel. It is a practice

of the United



of the United Nations to refuse to establish regional bodies for the Near East on a restricted discriminatory basis without Israel's participation.

The Government of Israel is fully aware that the over-riding interest of the United States in this matter is to secure an effective protection of the Middle East against aggression, thus contributing to the security of the entire world, including the United States. It would, however, urge that the objections here outlined be taken into account, and that defense proposals more consistent with international principles and with Israel's rights and position be elaborated. The Government of Israel will give its best thought and council to this matter which concerns it intimately and directly.

CONCLUSION

The Ambassador of Israel expresses the hope that the views outlined in these observations will be taken into account in any examination by the Government of the United States of its policies in the Middle East. The Government of Israel does not doubt that the United States will appreciate the enormous and decisive importance which the Government and people of Israel attach to their friendly relations with the American Government and people. The attitude of trust and the tradition of cooperation which have grown up between the two countries are important assets to the cause of world freedom which Israel will strive constantly and zealously to preserve.

February 11, 1953



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AE/818

CONFIDENTIAL

February 16, 1953

Dear Dr. Silver:

May I recall our conversation on February 6.

The enclosed document sets out my thinking on American-Israel relations at this time. I have begun discussions on these lines with leaders of the new Administration. The reaction has been encouraging so far, but no definitive conclusions for good or ill are yet possible.

WRHS



Yours very sincerely,

*Abba Eban*  
Abba Eban.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver  
The Temple,  
Ansel Road  
Cleveland, Ohio



February 24, 1953

Ambassador Abba Eban  
Embassy of Israel  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ambassador Eban:

Rabbi and Mrs. Silver are spending a few weeks on the Pacific coast and in Mexico City, and will not return to Cleveland until March 4th. It will accordingly be impossible for the Rabbi to meet with you on March 1st, as requested in your letter of February 19th. However, I am forwarding your kind invitation to him.

Sincerely yours,

Elisabeth Rice  
Secretary to Rabbi Silver



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AE/837

PERSONAL AND  
CONFIDENTIAL

February 19, 1953

Dear Rabbi Silver:

The hostility of the Soviet Union to the State of Israel and its savage campaign of anti-Jewish incitement must be regarded as events of historic significance to Jews everywhere. Both the Government of Israel and the Jewish Community in the United States share a common responsibility in regard to the fate of two and a half million Jews in East Europe and the protection of the Jewish interests involved. Thus they have a common interest in ensuring that the response shall serve Jewish welfare, security and dignity in the fullest possible measure.

In our several ways we shall all be affected by what we do and how we bear ourselves in this grave hour. I believe that it is in our capacity to withstand the assault.

I am, therefore, inviting the presidents of some of the leading Jewish organizations in their personal capacity and a few other distinguished friends to consult with me informally and confidentially on the international and American aspects of this situation, and especially on the means of enabling Israel to meet those serious developments. I shall appreciate it deeply if you could be in Washington for this purpose on Sunday, March 1, so that we may meet at the Embassy Residence, 1630 Juniper Street, NW, from 11.30 till the mid-afternoon and take counsel together. Please inform me accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

*Abba Eban*

Abba Eban

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver  
The Temple  
Ansell Road  
Cleveland, Ohio



# J T A DAILY NEWS BULLETIN

JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, INC. 231 West 58th Street, New York 19, N. Y.

Contents Copyright: Republication only by previous arrangement

VOL. XX No. 43. - 35th year

Wednesday, March 4, 1953

## SECRETARY DULLES TO VISIT MIDDLE EAST; EISENHOWER SEEKS ARAB TRUST

WASHINGTON, March 3. (JTA) -- Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is planning a flying visit to Premier Naguib in Egypt, and meetings elsewhere in the Middle East, in an attempt to strengthen American relations with the Arab states. The trip is expected to take place immediately after the Paris meeting of the Atlantic Pact Council in April.

The new move became known today following an expression of concern yesterday by President Eisenhower to Prince Faisal, Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister, over evidence of a "deterioration in relations between the Arab nations and the United States." Mr. Eisenhower told the Prince he was determined "to restore the spirit of confidence and trust which had previously characterized" relations with the Arabs and that he hoped Arab leaders would work toward the same end.

Sources in the State Department said the Dulles visit would be part of the new Administration's efforts to learn the problems of the Arabs and win Arab participation in the proposed Middle East defense command. The Department is gravely concerned over bringing the Arab states into an alliance against Communism without regard to the fact that the Arabs' technical state of war against Israel continues. A prime desire of the Eisenhower Administration is to alter the view held by many Arabs that America is showing favoritism toward Israel.

### Israel Invites Secretary Dulles to Visit Jewish State

It could not be learned if Mr. Dulles will visit Israel during his trip to the Middle East. However, it was learned today that Israel Ambassador Abba Eban has conveyed to Secretary Dulles an invitation to visit Israel whenever the Secretary plans a trip to that part of the world. The invitation was extended by the Ambassador on behalf of Israel Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett. Mr. Dulles was appreciative of the invitation and told the Ambassador he hoped he would have the opportunity of seeing the situation at first hand.

A high State Department official said today that neither President Eisenhower nor Secretary Dulles has any intention of "cold-shouldering Israel," although he said he could not confirm or deny press reports that a major change in American policy has occurred in the Arab-Israel area.

This official, who cannot be identified by name, said it would be a mistake to draw a conclusion that the State Department will practice favoritism. There is no reason for any Near Eastern country to feel it might be overlooked by the United States, he said, because there is a feeling of friendship for all parties. Expressions by Secretary Dulles at a recent press conference and by President Eisenhower to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister should be taken at their face value, he said.



## WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON EISENHOWER'S TALKS WITH ARAB STUDIED

WASHINGTON, March 3. (JTA) -- Diplomatic circles here today studied with great interest the text of a statement issued by the White House last night following the visit of Prince Faisal Al Saud, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, to President Eisenhower, when the President promised to improve what he regarded as the "deteriorated" relations between the United States and the Arab countries.

The statement, which is interpreted by some as an indication that the United States Government will now be leaning more toward the Arab countries than toward Israel, reads as follows:

"The President received His Royal Highness Prince Faisal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, today at the White House. During the meeting matters of mutual interest to Saudi Arabia and the United States were discussed. The President expressed his great pleasure at having the opportunity of receiving so distinguished a representative of a country with which the United States enjoys especially close relations.

"He expressed his concern over some evidence that there had lately occurred a deterioration in relations between the Arab nations and the United States. He stated that it would be his firm purpose to seek to restore the spirit of confidence and trust which had previously characterized these relations and he hoped that the Arab leaders would be inspired by the same purpose.

"The President alluded to the many strong educational and cultural ties which had developed between the Arab world and the United States over a period of many decades and stated that he was confident that this provided a foundation of good will on which to build during the coming years to mutual advantage.

"The President also emphasized his great personal interest in the welfare and progress of Saudi Arabia and the other states in the Near East. The President requested Prince Faisal to convey his cordial greetings to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud."

## SENATE GROUP ALLOCATES \$50,000 FOR STUDY OF ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM

WASHINGTON, March 3. (JTA) -- The Senate Judiciary Committee approved a resolution to initiate an investigation into the condition of the Palestine Arab refugees. Despite the fact that the problem has been thoroughly investigated by the United Nations and other bodies, the Committee allocated \$50,000 to the study.

An inquiry at the office of Sen. William Langer, chairman of the Committee, brought the information that the resolution had been drafted by Richard M. Arens, staff director of the Senate Immigration Subcommittee, who is known as the principal architect of the discriminatory features of the McCarran immigration act.

## ARAB DIPLOMAT SAYS U.S. "READY TO UNDERSTAND ARAB CASE"

LONDON, March 3. (JTA) -- The United States is "ready to understand the Arab case" now and this is a "golden opportunity" to establish the best of Arab-American relations, Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Ambassador to Washington and head of the Lebanese delegation to the United Nations, today told an official dinner for members of the diplomatic corps in Beirut, according to a report received here from the Lebanese capital.

Dr. Malik also said that Israel needs peace today, "but I do not believe that the time has yet come for a discussion of peace with Israel."



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AE/896

March 17, 1953

Dear Dr. Silver:

You will see from the enclosed item (Jerusalem Post, March 6, 1953) which also appeared in the rest of the Hebrew Press that I have tried to discourage the assumption that the new administration in Washington has decided to abandon its friendship with Israel. I agree with you that the principle אל תפתח פה לשון should apply here.

Yours ever,

*Abba Eban*

Abba Eban.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver  
The Mayflower  
Washington, D. C.





## Israel Gratified By U.S. Assurances, Eban

NEW YORK, Thursday (INA)

— "The Government of Israel has been gratified by the assurances it has received in recent weeks from leading figures in the U.S. Government that the friendship between the U.S. and Israel would be maintained and strengthened," Mr. Abba Eban, Israel Ambassador, said yesterday at a public meeting here.

Referring to press reports of increased American aid to Arab states, he said, "International friendship is not a physical material, limited in bulk. If bestowed in one place it does not mean that there is less of it to be bestowed elsewhere."

Emphasizing the necessity of peace in the Middle East before the area could organize itself for social and economic progress and mutual defence, Mr. Eban said that statesmanship should focus its entire vision on securing Israel-Arab peace.

It was learned from well-informed sources here today that there has emerged from recent talks between Administration officials and Israel Embassy members the conviction that American policy towards Israel would remain as fixed by the Republican Party Convention.

It is Mr. Dulles' view, these sources say, that there can be no Middle East defence organization without Israel's participation. Mr. Eisenhower's implied promise to give more aid to Arab states would not be carried out at the expense of Israel, it was understood.



C  
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AE/971

April 22, 1953

Dear Mr. Seltzer:

I was delighted to learn today that you and Mrs. Seltzer plan to spend a few days in Israel during May.

It is my hope that both you and Mrs. Seltzer will find your stay in my country interesting and rewarding.

We have been so indebted to those who mold American public opinion for the good will of the American people towards the people of Israel, and I believe that visits such as yours may help to strengthen the ties which bind our people.

Sincerely yours,

Abba Eban.

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer  
Cleveland Press  
Cleveland 14, Ohio



April 28, 1953

His Excellency Abba Eban  
Ambassador of Israel  
Embassy of Israel  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Ambassador Eban:

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer, Editor of the Cleveland Press and one of the key men in the Scripps Howard newspaper syndicate, will be making his first visit to Israel on May 14-18. Mr. Seltzer is a very important person in the newspaper world, and he personally as well as the Cleveland Press which he edits, have been very sympathetic to our cause right along. He has been very active in the field of community activities generally and in the National Conference of Christians and Jews which recently bestowed upon him its annual Award of Merit.

I am sure that our friends in Israel will wish to give Mr. Seltzer a very warm welcome and enable him to see all the things that he is interested in in Israel.

With warmest regards and trusting that you are well, I remain

Very cordially yours,

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

AHS:er

P.S. Mr. Seltzer's address is c/o Cleveland Press, Cleveland 14, Ohio.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AE/998

May 1, 1953

Dear Dr. Silver:

Thank you for your letter of April 28th regarding Mr. Louis B. Seltzer's forthcoming visit to Israel. As a matter of fact, I had already been informed of his intention to spend a few days in Israel and have written to Mr. Seltzer personally. (See enclosed copy.)

I have passed on this information to our authorities in Israel with a request to make his visit pleasant and informative.

Thank you very much indeed for calling this matter to my attention.

With warm personal wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Abba Hillel Silver

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver  
The Temple  
East 105th Street and Ansel Rd.  
Cleveland 6, Ohio



# MISSING PAGE (S)





Wednesday, May 13th, 1953. 17.15 hrs. at Foreign Ministry, Hakirya

Foreign Minister Mr. Sharett, Mr. Comay, Mr. Shiloah, Mr. Bendor.

Secretary of State Mr. Dulles, Mr. Stassen, Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Byroade, Mr. Russell, Mr. McDaniel, Mr. Fried.

The Foreign Minister expressed appreciation of the contacts made possible by the visit in the formative and turbulent days of the State.

The tour was evidence of the overriding interest of U.S. in the affairs of the region. He hoped the visit would contribute to the stabilisation and pacification of the area and make it more impregnable to the inroads of pernicious influences.

Peace

The cardinal aim of Israel's foreign policy was peace, the desire to put our relations with the Arab States on a basis of good-neighbourliness and friendly co-operation.

There were no intrinsic conflicts between Israel and her neighbours if Israel's right to live was granted.

The difficulties in the way of peace were psychological, therefore, time was required for the Arabs to get used to the idea that Israel existed and did not mean war but peace.

Peace meant peace with us as we were not with something imaginary - as we were in area, in population, in status.

Territory

We heard loose talk about far-reaching territorial changes to our detriment. This was an unrealistic basis for any settlement. There was no reason why the countries around Israel should claim any of her territory. They had lost none - Israel did not claim any of theirs. During the war Israel armies had overrun territories of the neighbours e.g. in the Sinai Peninsula and in Lebanon. These areas had been evacuated and Israel made no territorial claims on these countries. Jordan had benefitted from the dislocation which set in as a result of the war. Israel's frontier with Jordan was difficult and a source of jeopardy, but we were willing to accept it.

Egypt neither needed nor deserved the Gaza strip, but Israel did not raise the question of the occupation of the strip by Egypt and would not make its return a condition of a settlement.

Israel was ready to make peace - peace for 100 years as the Prime Minister had said - on the basis of the present armistice lines. Minor adjustments were, of course, possible. Once that was accepted in principle, there should be no difficulty in reaching agreement.



The Arab claim to return to the United Nations resolution of 1947 had no basis in justice or reality. They could not have it both ways. Then they had rejected that resolution, declared war upon it and Israel and they had to accept the verdict of that war.

Fear of  
aggression

They claimed to fear our possible aggression. By erecting a centre of immigration, they said, we were erecting a centre of explosiveness.

The Arabs contradicted themselves. On the one hand they said that Israel was too small to contain the Jews, on the other hand they wanted to reduce the size of Israel by, for example, taking away the Negev. We could use the Negev; if it were taken away, the area of Israel would be restricted and Israel should then, according to Arab logic become more dangerous.

Even if we were to assume Arab fears were genuine, it would betray the crudeness of Arab reasoning. They thought in terms of area of land as they had plenty of it - though much was under-developed. For them area meant strength and greatness.

Israel's relative success was due to quality rather than quantity.

Generally speaking to assume we would embark upon the adventure of invading our neighbours was an insult to the intelligence of outside observers.

There was more reason to fear that the Arab States would converge upon Israel in an attempt to crush her than to believe that Israel would fan out in offensive adventure.

Such fears of Israel's aggressive intent overlooked the delicacy of Israel's international position. Israel was more internationally minded and was dependent on support from abroad, particularly from the U.S. Israel's contacts with Jewish Communities overseas made her more sensitive to international reactions.

Israel was beset with great internal difficulties produced by the integration of the new immigrants. There was a certain measure of discontent and criticism of the Government, helped on by the abusers of democracy. Nevertheless, Israel showed a disconcerting degree of stability while around her thrones tottered and heads fell. Israel had had the same people at the helm from before the days of the creation of the State.

If there was any country where a military adventure was impractical, it was Israel, which would be flouting world opinion and taking a serious risk in engaging a foe vastly superior in numbers.



If the Arabs were really afraid, they should try to receive guarantees, for example, in the form of a peace treaty binding Israel to the status quo.

#### Population

Israel had once been prepared to share her independence with a considerable Arab minority according to the partition plan.

Fate and the Arab war of aggression had brought about an Arab Exodus from Israel, not unique in recent history, (e.g. Greece and Turkey after the 1st World War; Central Europe in 2nd World War, India and Pakistan after partition). Nowhere had there been a return to the status quo ante. In Israel the vacuum had been filled by immigrants. Repatriation of Arabs would explode the security and economy of the country from within.

Again there was contradiction in the Arab claims. They said that Israel oppressed the Arab minority in the country. At the same time they wanted to increase that minority.

The Arabs in Israel enjoyed full equality, except those who lived in border zones, where the refusal of the Arab States to make peace and delinquency in the application of the Armistice agreements made certain restrictions on movements necessary. Yet Arabs in Israel lived a better life than Arabs in the same strata of society in the Arab countries.

The admission of more Arabs would wreck internal stability and security. It was better that the refugees stayed where they were, with the possibility of re-allocation in the Arab countries.

All the Arab countries would benefit from an over-all plan for the economic integration of the refugees. All of them except Egypt suffered from under-population. Perhaps even in Egypt the desert area might be exploited.

#### Compensation

Israel's liability was to pay fair compensation - fair to those to whom it was due; fair to Israel in view of her economic position and how the land had been acquired. Israel was prepared to pay the compensation into an international fund.

#### Jerusalem

The problem of Jerusalem was a problem between one Arab State (Jordan) and Israel and the United Nations.

If there were religious interests at stake, they were world interests. There was a general spiritual attachment to Jerusalem and Israel was prepared to satisfy international interests in full compatibility with her sovereignty and territorial integrity.

U. S. and Israel had voted against a corpus separatum (in 1949) as unrealistic and as meaning the economic ruin of Jerusalem, which was dependent on the hinterland. The status of the Holy Places might appear to be a problem. Actually even in the



present situation, there was no problem for Christians who had access to the Holy Places. Only the Jews suffered from lack of access to the Wailing Wall. If, however, the international community was uneasy, Israel was prepared to agree to the international supervision of the Holy Places. The main shrines were in Arab custody in Jordan. In Israel there were only the two churches on Mt. Zion.

#### Transfer of Foreign Ministry

The transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem had nothing to do with the problem of the Holy Places. If there was no international control over the Holy Places, it was not because of the Foreign Ministry. Its transfer to Jerusalem would not impede the setting up of international control over the Holy Places, but its absence from the seat of Government might affect the sensitivity for the Holy Places.

The Foreign Ministry suffered from pernicious anemia by being separated from the body of the government. It could not play its true part in the government. We had waited a few years but the Foreign Ministry could not further put off rejoining the main part of the government. It would be disastrous for the Foreign Ministry and detrimental to foreign interests of which the Foreign Ministry was the spokesman in Israel - for the Ministry to continue to remain cut off from the rest of the government. If we had to choose between the Foreign Ministry being with the rest of the government and its being near the foreign Missions, we should choose the former. We would be accommodating as far as the foreign Missions remaining in Tel Aviv were concerned and we would provide facilities for them. There was no case in the whole world where a Foreign Ministry was in one town and the other Government offices in another.

Peace would solve all the problems, but it might be long in coming. It was impossible to force peace upon the parties though they could be prompted.

#### Discon- tinuance of hostile acts

If there was no peace - and Israel could hold out without it - the least that Israel demanded was the discontinuance of hostile acts in full accord with the Armistice agreements.

#### (a) Marauding

Of late there had been a rising curve of frontier incidents that had assumed the form of guerilla warfare. The initial link in these acts of aggression was on the other side of the border. There was large-scale marauding, theft, robber, murder, sabotage - and all in one direction. Even if in hot pursuit or by way of prevention, we broke into the adjoining territory, operational initiative was on the other side, causing us increasing loss and worry. Any help of the U.S. in influencing the Arab States to curb marauding would be welcome.

That discipline would be maintained was evidence by Syria, from whose border there was no infiltration. There was little



from Lebanon too. We were not happy about the position on the border with Egypt. There were serious complaints against Jordan. Accords had been violated and repudiated and high-level talks rejected. We would be happy if the position could be brought under control lest it degenerated.

(b) Economic  
Boycott

Marauding was not the only form of active hostility adopted by the Arabs. There was the economic boycott. They could not be forced to trade with Israel - even if the boycott was a breach of the United Nations Charter - but they terrorized third parties, as for example in the case of the recent threats of Lebanon to the K.L.M. and other civil air lines that use both Lod and Beirut. If the Arab countries wanted international aid, they could not be permitted to get away with that.

(c) Suez Canal  
blockade

The blockade of the Suez Canal and of the Gulf of Akaba continued because of the disconcerting reaction of the Powers to the blockade of the Canal. Israel could never have got away with open disobedience to a Security Council resolution, as Egypt had done in flouting the decision of the Security Council which called upon her to discontinue the blockade. We might be facing an early settlement of the problems of the Suez Canal Zone including the blockade. If a solution was not at hand, or if the settlement did not envisage the removal of the blockade, we would have to appeal for serious consideration of the position, which was causing us loss of foreign currency and which was prejudicial to our international rights.

What Egypt was doing to Israel today, she would, if not checked, do to others tomorrow and therefore the blockade of the canal was a matter of general international interest.

Overall  
defence

The Arab States were actually waging war against Israel in various ways, and our primary pre-occupation was with the danger of an Arab attack. But we never forgot the wider dangers. He personally felt that there had been no change of heart in the Soviet Union only of tactics. This caused us concern, because of our democratic way of life and our democratic institutions. There was no country from Gibraltar to Japan in North Africa and South Asia in which democracy meant so much to such a high percentage of the population, in which the democratic tradition had such deep roots.

Israel was ready, had been and would continue to be ready, to play her part. The defence of democracy and Israel were indivisible. But Israel had to be helped. We used to ask if U.S. would defend the Middle East. General Marshall had once said that he could not answer that question. To us there was no question but that a third world conflict would end in the victory of the free peoples. The question was not what the ultimate result would be but what the intervening stages would be. There was danger of the work of three generations in Israel going up in smoke.



We felt that the thinking and state of preparedness of the U.S. had advanced a great deal but there was still a marked difference between Nato and any plan for the defence of the Middle East. Nato included an undertaking by the countries to go to each other's aid. In this area practical arrangements should be made to strengthen dependable units. We could not see why the reluctance of the Arab States to come forward should stand in the way of the U.S. doing something for Israel.

Valuable time had already been lost.

Israel was prepared to accept the thesis that peace was necessary in the area, but the strengthening of Israel needn't wait for peace. If it was felt that it was impossible to grant Israel arms, then the assistance could take the form of infrastructure.

Mr. Dulles said that he appreciated the illuminating and cogent presentation of the Foreign Minister. He and his colleagues had come to learn. The U.S. had no God-given mission to settle the problems of the whole world. They had, however, certain power and influence and as they wanted to act in a responsible way, they sought information.

This part of the world had been neglected by the U.S. in the past. There were policies for Europe, the Far East and South America but none for the Middle East and South Asia.

He was interested in the Foreign Minister's remarks on Soviet policy, in which he felt that there had been no basic change. He asked if the Foreign Minister interpreted what was going on in Russia as a relaxation of internal pressure to enable the rulers to concentrate on internal pensions.

The Foreign Minister said that personally that was his opinion but he would add that the objective of Soviet policy was also to widen rifts in the democratic camp.

Mr. Dulles said that the Soviet world was held together by force and the only way it would be split would be by violent revolution within. The free world could more easily break apart. If there were any relaxation in the common effort of the free world, the differences submerged would come to the top. He wondered whether the new tactics had been agreed upon before Stalin's death or brought about by Stalin's death, which necessitated concentration on internal matters.

The Foreign Minister gave it as his personal conjecture that the present policy had been maturing in the ruling group before Stalin's death but it had been repressed. The brakes were removed by the death of Stalin.



Mr. Dulles said that there were traces of the policy in Stalin's brochure of October, 1952 which said that the imperialistic powers would bring about their own ruin.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that it is a fundamental principle of Marxist teaching to help on what is inevitable.

Mr. Dulles said that there were signs that the few kind words already spoken by the Soviet rulers had let loose differences in the free world that had been submerged. That was a dangerous trend.

As for the Suez - the present negotiations between Egypt and Britain did not relate to the Canal but to the bases in the area. They were not likely to help solve the problem of the Canal.

Mr. Byroade said that that was true of the present phase of the negotiations but the problem of the Canal might come in at a later stage.

The Foreign Minister said that Egypt if left alone with the bases would be in more undisputed control of the Canal. If the British were to leave the bases without the blockade being removed, the blockade would be aggravated and world interests would be brought into jeopardy.

As the conversations ended Mr. Dulles turned to a map on the wall and said that he wished to talk about a land passage between Egypt and Jordan as well as water in the North.

The Foreign Minister said that if Egypt were to express willingness to make peace with Israel, or to be more exact to answer the overtures made by Israel, and if a peace settlement depended on a passage between Egypt and Jordan, Israel would be prepared to seek a suitable solution while preserving her territorial integrity. He added that the question of the land passage was only a question of prestige because there had never been any traffic in that area.

Mr. Dulles said that despite his preoccupation with his negotiations with Britain, Naguib had found the opportunity to talk about Israel. He claimed that what had taken place in the area had not been the partition of Palestine but the division of the Arab world into which Israel had driven a wedge.



No. 6.

During dinner, Mr. Dulles said to Mr. Sharett that he hoped that Israel would do nothing precipitate in regard to the transfer of the Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem.

The Foreign Minister said that we were thinking of transferring some time before the Fall.

Mr. Dulles expressed the hope that the Ministry would not be transferred while he was in the area. The Arab League had already passed a resolution against his visiting Jerusalem and that was sufficient.





Wednesday, May 13th, 1953.

After dinner at Mr. Sharett's home

In Mr. Sharett's study there was a discussion on Israel's economic problems in which Mr. Eshkol, Mr. Avriel and Mr. Kollek took part for Israel and Mr. Stassen, Mr. Matteson, Mr. McDaniel and Mr. Jones for the U. S. The Main topic was Israel's foreign exchange problems.

At the same time the political discussion was continued in the lounge. Mr. Sharett had with him Mr. Rokah the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Eytan, Mr. Comay, Mr. Shiloah and Mr. Bendor. In addition to Mr. Dulles there were present Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Byroade, Lt. Col. Meade Mr. O'Connor, Mr. Hadsel, Mr. Russell and Mr. Fried.

Mr. Dulles said he would like to say something about the trend of Soviet policy. People were engrossed in their local problems and did not pay attention to the danger from Communism. Such was the case in Egypt where the officers were trying to restore integrity and honesty and regain the attributes of national sovereignty.

The great question was whether Judeo-Christian civilization was going to survive - whether the moral and spiritual values for which it stood would survive.

Soviet philosophy treated human beings like animals - paying attention to their material well-being only.

Our civilization was gravely threatened. It was important that there be people who saw the problem in its broad aspects. Israel did, because the people of Israel had a sense of history.

There was a great difference between dinner the previous night with Naguib and dinner that evening in Israel. We understood what he said.

The question was whether the values we cherished were to be submerged for 1000 years. To prevent this would require vital strength and it would not be done by people who had no real sense of mission. He believed that Israel had done great things in that respect. He did not agree with us in all respects. U. S. policy had not always been in the best interests of the total situation. It had been affected by politics.

Yet Israel's vitality and what she had created justified faith in our common sense of values. This was a symbol of what could be done.

He had always been sympathetic to giving us a chance. When in 1947 there were rumours in the U. N. corridors that hordes were sweeping down in Israel, he told Gen. Marshall that if people were prepared to die for what they believed in, they should be given a chance.



We had shown that we were prepared to die for our belief. That was a great encouragement to those who shared our common ideals.

The U. S. Government had made mistakes with regard to the situation in the Middle East. However much he might disagree with us in details, he had great admiration for what we had done - it was a creative effort of those who had faith similar to theirs.

The Foreign Minister expressed his appreciation of the remarks of Mr. Dulles. He said that Israel was antagonistic to Communism which regarded ruling as a great military operation requiring discipline and blind obedience. An enterprise like ours required a regime of free creativeness.

There was another aspect. Jews everywhere were a minority. They could only hope to conduct their own cultural life if the regime allowed groups and individuals self-expression. This was not the position behind the iron curtain where no form of self-expression was allowed.

Mr. Dulles said that the Russians believed that human troubles came from disharmony. Their solution was to eliminate differences, minorities.

The Foreign Minister added that they flattened out all human personality. That bore on us particularly for we were a delicate growth ("not so delicate!" exclaimed Mr. Dulles). Even Tsarist Russia allowed certain scope for freedom of expression so that the Zionist movement was able to develop there.

Mr. Dulles said he would like to have the Minister's interpretation of the trial of the Jewish doctors in Russia.

The Foreign Minister said that the Arab aspect of the trial was only an incidental by-product. Actually the Russians were getting ready for war. Their system was built on severe isolation. That was practicable because the ethnic groups were co-eval with the system - except for the Jews.

By being aware that they are Jews, they were part of a world fraternity outside the Soviet system. The Russian rulers were not sure where the hearts of the Jews would be and they therefore came to the conclusion that the connections of the Jews with Israel and American Jewish organizations were dangerous. The next step was to warn against such connections. The step after that was to warn of possible reprisals, and so the charge of disloyalty was brought against people accused of having such connections.

The Russians were serving notice on the Jews and on the population generally.



The reversal of the charges against the doctors was part of the retreat from war-mongering and part of the peace offensive. They had to show that there was no longer any tension.

The reversal might also have been an internal matter - the squaring of accounts between Beria and Malenkov.

Mr. Dulles said that people thought that because the U.S. Government was cutting expenditure, it meant they were basically altering their policy. That was not the case.

It was not possible to foresee with accuracy when the period of greatest danger would be. The result of forecasting was an unbalanced budget.

If a country was at war or if there was a certainty of war, it threw away all considerations of balancing the budget. But if there was no war, there had to be a balanced budget while at the same time military establishments had to be kept at the same level, and progressing.

At the last meeting of the NATO Council, it was decided to concentrate on quality and training and to pay more attention to infra structure. In that way a sustained effort could be kept up for a long period of time within economic bounds. The Western Powers did not wish to exhaust themselves. They adapted themselves to a more realistic view of the peril, which had not passed and which was not less serious. The U.S. economy could maintain a military establishment for a long time.

The Foreign Minister said that as people much interested in the survival of democracy and intent on defending ourselves, we were much heartened by what Mr. Dulles said. We were not among those who received military aid so we did not suffer from the easing off!

Mr. Dulles had mentioned the insensitivity of Egypt and the problems of the area. We had been preaching the same idea for years. Arabs were proverbial sitters on fences. They did not regard European affairs as their business. Their attitude was "a plague on both your houses".

In view of this attitude, it was important that there should be an alternative to the Suez Canal if the latter were menaced. Such an alternative was a line from Elath to the coast of Israel. Other preparations too could be made to meet any possible catastrophe. Palestine had been a workshop in the Second World War. Israel was an even better workshop.

So far, however, no preparations had been made for the future, though much could be done including setting in stocks of supplies.



The Secretary had mentioned differences between U. S. and Israel. The Foreign Minister was interested to know what they were.

Mr. Dulles said that there were no basic differences after the exposition of that afternoon by the Foreign Minister. There might be differences in tactics. The U. S. was anxious for peace substantially on the lines the Foreign Minister had discussed. Any differences they might have were not of basic principle but on questions of procedure - when was the best moment to push, who was the best person to push, the relation between Arab-Israel peace and Suez and collective security. These were matters of procedure.

Mr. Dulles said that he and his party would have to leave. He understood the Prime Minister had a summer resort where he spent the summer. He had to visit him there on the morrow!





Thursday, May 14th, 1953, 10.30 hrs. At the Prime Minister's Office,  
Jerusalem.

Mr. Ben-Gurion, Mr. Sharett, Mr. Kollek, Mr. Bendor.

Mr. Dulles, Mr. Stassen, Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Byroade,  
Mr. Russell, Mr. McDaniel, Mr. Fried.

The Prime Minister in welcoming the visitors, pointed out that that day marked the fifth anniversary of the birth of the State of Israel by their calendar. He hoped it would be a happy augury.

He wished them success in their mission including their mission to win the friendship of the Arabs. There was no inherent contradiction between the well-being of Israel and the well-being of the Arab peoples. Goodwill led in the same direction.

He would talk about two main subjects: (a) Israel's relations with the United States and the world; (b) Israel's relations in this area.

We were part of the Middle East before most of our neighbours. Geography was not the only factor. History and spiritual values meant more than geography, and the former linked us more closely to the West.

We were part of humanity and what happened in the world concerned us deeply - not only because of the Jewish diaspora but because we were brought up that way - long before the State of Israel came into existence. The Prophets of old spoke to all the people and we were brought up in the tradition of the Prophets and because of that we survived.

We were living in a new world where distance did not mean a great deal. Our machinery was brought from abroad. Our youth went abroad to study - some to the United States to learn their "know-how".

Whatever happened in any part of the world concerned us deeply.

Our main concern now was peace - and peace was of greater concern to us than to anybody else. Our main purpose was construction. Our country had been laid waste and destroyed and neglected. It required a long sustained effort and above all peace to enable us to do our work of construction.

Israel was more a part of the large world than of the Middle East. Our relations with the world were not determined by present conditions in the area. Between Israel and Jordan there were a few metres of space but a thousand years of time.



We regarded ourselves as unique for spiritual reasons. We had inherited a spiritual heritage in a Book. We had made that Book but that Book had also made us.

We had evolved certain forms of life called democracy - which placed a high value on human freedom and human dignity.

If this form of life of ours were attacked, we would fight for it. But we could not fight alone.

We were the allies of all peoples who cared for peace and human dignity and they were our allies.

The world was divided between the free and the unfree.

War was not inevitable. But if it could not be averted - and also in order to avert it - preparations had to be made - physical and moral preparations.

Israel could contribute something to spiritual preparedness because war could be prevented if all free peoples united.

The Foreign Minister and himself had been born in Russia. He himself had been in Russia 30 years before. He had made a study of Lenin's works. He did not believe there had been a change in Russian purpose, which was world domination under the dictatorship of Russia.

There had been no change of heart in Russia - perhaps a change in tactics in order to split the free world and to weaken it. The free world had therefore to be on guard even more than before.

Russia had no allies, only subordinates. It was easier to divide free allies.

For Israel war would be the greatest calamity.

Two years ago he had spoken to General Marshall about the role we had to play in peace and war.

Apart from Turkey there was no nation in this area that really cared to fight for freedom or was capable of fighting for it.

Five years ago the Arabs had marched on Israel. Israel had fought tho' she had not much of an army. But we had had faith in ourselves and we had been determined to die fighting if necessary.

Egypt had not fought in two world wars. He doubted whether there was any country in the Middle East except Israel that was ready to fight for the things that the free world held dear.



Treaties were unnecessary because of the natural links between Israel and the free world. What was necessary was a mutual arrangement, independent of what was happening in other parts of the world. History did not wait until all parts of the world were ready.

The Arabs - through no fault of their own - they were the products of their history just as we were the products of ours - were not ready or willing or capable of fighting for democracy.

Israel would fight if her independence were attacked from within or from without - and we would fight whether we would be successful or not.

In the War of Independence, logically we shouldn't have ~~survived~~ ~~vived~~, - but we did.

Things had to be done without delay. Two years had already been lost.

In this part of the world, Israel was the only country with skilled people, a fine army, fine military potential and these should be strengthened.

There was not only military potential. Israel was connected with the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. If the Suez Canal fell into the hands of the enemy, Haifa and Elath would be important not only for Israel but for the whole of the free world.

In the last world war we had supplied the allied armies on a large scale. Now we could do it on an even larger scale. We had developed military and civilian industry. It was essential in the interests of peace to strengthen Israel's industrial and military potential for the good of the free world.

In conclusion of the first part of his remarks, the Prime Minister said that our aim was peace - the preservation of peace and democracy.



Mr. Dulles said that they had come to listen and learn.

They had a tremendous admiration for the creative work done in Israel. They knew our history and had admiration for it.

The best small history ever written is Paul's epistle to the Hebrews.

The U.S. had the same type of inspiration as Israel and that created affinity between the two. It made them admire very profoundly the great acts Israel was doing. That tie was more vital than anything that could be put in a formal treaty of alliance.

The history of the world was the history of treaties forgotten. A sense of common destiny - a common faith in the destiny of man and his origin in the hands of God - is a kind of thing that makes people act together in times of common peril. That relationship existed between our two countries.

There seemed in some quarters to be a fear that unless the U.S. was constantly acting in a way that seemed to favour Israel against some of her neighbours, the U.S. did not have regard or admiration for Israel, which it did have, and that was a mistaken point of view, which some people had, particularly in the U.S.

by

He was impressed/the opening remarks of the Prime Minister, in which he expressed the hope that their mission would succeed in regaining the goodwill of the Arabs. That was extremely important.

The U.S. Government shared the view that in Russia there had only been a change in tactics. He doubted whether it could be more, because just as they (U.S.) had their faith and we (in Israel) ours, so the Russians had their faith and a member of the communist party believed it was the duty of the communists to dominate the world as much as the U.S. and Israel believe in their destiny.

The communists believed there could be no peace unless there was conformity to their idea. No Soviet leader could depart from that. It would be heresy.

The change of tactics was an inherent part of the teaching of Leninism, which was their bible.

It was a mistake to assume that because of a few fine words the whole doctrine of communism had been abandoned.

The U.S. believed in constantly testing communism to see what concessions they were prepared to make.

The U.S. would be happy to do anything it could to help ~~to~~ bring about a change of heart in Russia but the hope was vain.

No great reversals could be expected.

Stalin and Molotov had made peace with Hitler and that had not involved any change in their basic thinking.



Concessions are made by Russia to gain time and they must be on guard against traps. Such tactics were apt to divide the free world. For the free nations to argue among themselves was healthy up to a point. Disturbing things were threatening to happen in the world which suggested that they (the free world) if not careful might become the victims of communist tactics.

The firm intention of the U.S. - and President Eisenhower felt strongly about it - was to keep up their strength. They could maintain a military establishment strong enough to deter aggression.

He was very glad to have the chance to express to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister the U.S. views in this matter. He gathered that the premises on which they (U.S.) proceeded were the premises that we accepted. When President Eisenhower came into office - even before - they had started thinking about these things and they had been trying to think of a policy that would adequately match Soviet strength and do so without requiring them (U.S. to abandon the essential creeds of their society. They had been studying the situation very carefully and they thought that they could do the two things at once.

Nothing they were doing was being done because they thought seriously that the danger had diminished. What they were doing had been planned by Gen. Eisenhower and some of those who were to be the members of his cabinet who accompanied him on the way back from Korea last December before the death of Stalin and before the new so-called peace offensive. They had then agreed upon the general course which they were now trying to implement. He said that because people thought their present action was due to acceptance of the so-called peace overtures. He did not know of any peace overtures. There had been no real deeds, no real evidence yet, only a few kind words. There was no certainty - only an even chance • that there would be an armistice in Korea.

The situation in Indo-China was extremely bad. The U.S. had acted very promptly to help there. Ammunition had also been sent by air to Thailand. The danger might spread to Burma and Indonesia and if these with Thailand and China were all lost, the repercussions would be serious. There was no evidence in that part of the world of any relaxation of their (the Soviet) ambitions or of their willingness to use open violence to accomplish their ambitions. The Russian armament programme was proceeding rapidly; the disposition of their forces threatening; the build-up in East Germany was serious. It was surprising that after a few kind words the West should be dropping their defences.

President Eisenhower was continuing as if there were no so-called friendly gestures. They did not believe that there had been anything to justify a change in their attitude. At the Nato Council meeting it was decided to level off costs of operations. By change of methods and by building quality instead of quantity, they could achieve their purpose of increasing their strength without economic or ~~financial~~ financial collapse in Europe.



The Prime Minister said that he was glad to hear what Mr. Dulles had said.

Mr. Dulles had quoted St. Paul. St. Paul had also talked about faith, hope and love - saying love was the greatest of all. This was the greatest rule of Judaism, which taught in the words of the Bible "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself".

The policy of the communists was a long-range policy. They could wait if necessary. They waited for internal contradictions in each country and conflicts between what they called the capitalistic countries. They could allow themselves to adopt different tactics as warranted by the circumstances.

Turning to the Middle East, the Prime Minister said that he could not see any short-range policy for this area. Things could not be changed in a short time that it usually took ages of history to change. Even after the frequent revolutions in the countries of the Middle East, things remained as they were.

Israel had greeted Naguib and his programmed. We had thought that he realised that something was wrong inside Egypt and that everything could not be attributed to foreigners. To our disappointment, deeds did not follow words. He went in the path of his predecessors - blaming the foreigner for everything. Ignorance, disease, the misery of the people, could not be changed over-night. What was required was a sustained effort which was not as spectacular as a foreign enemy.

Iraq was naturally one of the richest countries in the world. In area she was 22 times the size of Israel. She had a population of only five million - compared with Israel's 1 3/4 million - and her people were poor.

Syria was 9 times as large as Israel but her population only twice that of Israel.

Jordan was 5 times as large as Israel but had a population less than Israel's.

Israel had received 700,000 refugees in five years and there had been a natural increase of 100,000. If necessary Israel would receive more immigrants (if, for example, the gates of Russia were opened).

The United Nations had allocated 200 million dollars for the integration of the Arab refugees in the Arab countries which were underpopulated but these had not yet absorbed them.

The Arab countries needed development - something more difficult than a change of regime.



The communists had their long-range policy. The free world had to have its long-range policy especially in the Arab Middle East.

Things would not change over-night. Change of ruler was immaterial. Jet planes were immaterial too. These would not alter the basic situation.

There was a vacuum in the Arab Middle East because the people were miserable. U.S. could fulfil a historic purpose by helping towards the improvement of the lot of the people. That would do away with the vacuum in the Middle East. Liberal people in the Arab countries should be encouraged and not only the rulers. He was sure that there were among the Arabs people of goodwill who understood the problem.

The Arabs requested arms.

Whom were the Arabs going to shoot ? The Russians ? Nobody believed that. They required guns only to fight Israel.

The Arab States needed help. We were deeply concerned that they get the right kind of help and not the wrong kind. They needed friendly advice, help and guidance and encouragement to work with patience and look ahead.

This was the only solution for the Middle East. It was difficult and required patience.

There were some Arabs who wanted to mutilate Israel. They called it peace according to the United Nations decision of November 1947. We had accepted that decision at that time. The Arabs had rejected it had fought against it. We had been in deadly danger. The flower of our youth were killed. We had spent half a billion dollars on that war but that was nothing compared to the loss of our sons and daughters.

The Arabs had fled - from Haifa, from Tiberias, from Safed, from Jaffa - with a purpose. They had thought to return shortly as conquerors.

Those towns were all settled now by Jewish immigrants.

Now the Arabs wanted to put the clock back. That meant that they wanted to destroy Israel by a new method.

We wanted peace. But if the Arabs did not want it, we could wait. We had patience.

If the Arabs attacked us, we would defend ourselves.



If it were only a local problem, we could wait until they were ready. But it was not only a local problem because trouble in one area affected all parts of the world.

When the U.S. Government said "No" in Korea, they did the wisest thing in the world.

We did not want the Middle East to be the grounds for a new world war.

Mr. Dulles said that two hours after the attack on Korea began, he had cabled Washington urging that action be taken.

The Prime Minister, reverting to the Middle East, said that the Arab States did not need territory. They had so much they could leave us with our little desert.

If the Arab States were not ready for peace, we had the right to demand the complete cessation of all hostilities - military, political, economic. This was the minimum that was essential in the interests of world peace.

The infiltration from the Arab countries into Israel was a kind of war. It was not impossible to put an end to it. Syria showed that this could be done.

The Security Council had decided that the passage through the Suez Canal should be free. It would be free, if the powers insisted that it should be.

Israel for her part was ready for cooperation with the Arab States - economic, cultural and even military.

If in their travels they found such willingness on the part of the Arabs, they would find Israel responsive.

Israel was prepared to make her contribution towards the settlement of the Arab refugees. The Arab States possessed fertile lands, water, oil and other resources. They required to show some of the determination and patience which we have shown in reconstructing our country.

To sum up: firstly, there was need for a long-range programme to raise the cultural and economic levels of the people of the Arab countries. Secondly, there had to be at least complete cessation of all kinds of hostilities against Israel in the interests of world peace.

Mr. Dulles said he understood that the Prime Minister was making a suggestion that was new to him - the extension of the scope of the armistice agreement to eliminate what he (the Prime Minister) called economic hostility.

The Prime Minister interjected that he included all kinds of hostility - psychological, economic, political.



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Mr. Dulles said that for U.S. to play a useful role, they required the goodwill of the Arabs who had to have a certain amount of confidence in them. If they thought the U.S.'s only concern was with Israel, then the U.S. had no effective part to play in ameliorating conditions between Israel and the Arab States.

The Arabs felt with some justification that the prior administration of Roosevelt and Truman had been subject to Jewish influence and ignored the point of view of the Arabs. And it was known historically that decisions in this matter were taken under direct political pressure by Jewish groups who felt they had a right to exert that pressure because they had contributed to the election of Roosevelt and Truman.

The present administration of President Eisenhower did not owe that kind of political debt. President Eisenhower had been elected by the overwhelming vote of the people of the U.S. He felt a duty to the people as a whole and not to any particular segment. The President believed that U. S. policy had to continue to be one of support for Israel as being a great creative accomplishment which evoked the sympathy of the whole of the people of the U.S. and not only the Jews.

The whole American people admired the kind of thing which we had done - a tremendous creative accomplishment. That was the kind of thing the American people liked to aspire to and wanted their government to support irrespective of religious or racial considerations. That was a very basic part of the foreign policy of President Eisenhower but it was also part of his foreign policy to make the Arabs feel that there was concern for them. They had to be helped towards economic improvement and that was the reason why Mr. Stassen was a member of the party.

One of the troubles was that there were some elements in the U. S. who felt that anything they (The U.S. Government) did at all which was sympathetic towards the Arabs, which they did to help them, was in some way against the interests of Israel. That, he was sure, was not the view the Government of Israel took, nor was it the view expressed by the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister. It was a view which was held by certain elements who, whenever the U.S. Government did anything at all which looked as though they were sympathetic to the Arab problems, thought that that meant that they were unsympathetic to the Israel problems. Actually, as he saw it, the best interests of Israel were served by a more healthy environment and by the U.S. ability to be helpful to others and to bring about the conditions Israel would like to have. That could only be done if they (the U.S. Govt) so conducted themselves in relation to the Arabs that they would look upon them as friends and not as enemies. For the U. S. to get into the role of enemy to the Arabs was not serving the best interests of Israel.



The Arab peoples felt that the change of administration in the U.S. was an opportunity for better relations. President Eisenhower had asked them to take the trip not only to visit Israel but to visit the Arab countries and to indicate that the Arabs also were important people not to be ignored. The U. S. ability to accomplish that depended to some extent on whether the Jews in the U.S. had as good an understanding of conditions as we had here. Perhaps the Prime Minister could help them (U.S) in that respect.

The day before, the Foreign Minister had outlined the kind of peace that he would seek. While there were certain details that needed to be worked out, and there might be some disagreements between us, say on the status of Jerusalem - thought even there we (Israel) had indicated a willingness to accept a measure of international control or supervision in relation to certain areas - he saw nothing basic in the Foreign Minister's presentation which would make that kind of peace something they would oppose. It was the kind of thing they would like to support. If, however, they supported only Israel, that would spoil everything. The Arabs are fanatical and unreasoning.

The U.S. was not trying to set all the wrongs in the world right. They recognised that they had influence in the world. What they did or did not do had important repercussions. They wanted to help where they could. But they did not want to butt in where they were not wanted or where they could not be helpful.

They attached great interest to peace in the world; particularly they attached importance to the conflicts between (members of) the non-communist world because those could become accentuated and develop into increasing differences that tended to expose and weaken the free world which became in greater danger from the common enemy.

Where the situation existed where there still was a technical state of war and a danger that it might become an actual war again between Israel and the Arab world, then that would bring the protagonists from the East on one side or the other and that would be a dangerous situation. They (the U.S.) would like to see that kind of thing healed up. They were going to try to conduct themselves in such a way that they could do something along that line, if that met with our approval. If all the Jews of the U. S. thought that by such a course they were being unfriendly to Jewry or Israel, they would stop. It was no use trying to be helpful where the help was not wanted or where the efforts were misunderstood.

There ought to be confidence that the U. S. under any government would be extremely friendly to Israel.

There ought to be confidence in him for his role at one time or another in the U. N.



But if anything they did in the area was to be misunderstood and to lead to internal difficulties at home that would paralyse their efforts, they would have to let things take their course.

They were fairly sympathetic to our position. They would like to see us get substantially the results that were outlined by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. But if they could not do that without getting into a terrible quarrel between Jews and Arabs over here and without a terrible quarrel at home being attacked by their own citizens of Jewish race and creed, then they could drop the whole affair.

The Prime Minister said that he agreed with what Mr. Dulles said, as far as he understood it. He did not think it was to our advantage or to anybody's advantage that the U.S. should not be friendly towards the Arabs. He wished them success from the bottom of his heart in winning the friendship of the Arabs.

The Foreign Minister said that Mr. Dulles need not entertain any fear with regard to the Jews of the U.S. on the score of U.S. friendship with the Arab countries if it was not harmful to Israel.

Mr. Dulles said that there was a very strong feeling in the U.S. that either they had to have a pro-Israel policy or a pro-Arab policy and that there wasn't any policy that combined the two. That was why feeling was so strong on that and everybody was trying to figure out what it was - was it a pro-Israel policy or a pro-Arab policy.

The Foreign Minister said that in our contacts with the leaders of American Jewish opinion, we had always urged that what the U.S. should have was a pro-peace policy, a pro-stability policy, a pro-development policy for the area.

Mr. Dulles said that was the kind of thing the U.S. administration wanted to have. But they were faced by the difficulty that there were proponents of both sides - not all on the Jewish side. There were also strong pro-Arab proponents - those who were identified with the American University of Beirut or Roberts College - who had absorbed the weaknesses and the bitterness of the Arabs. The policy which was going to promote the welfare of the area was a hard one to realize because of the attacks from both sides.

The Prime Minister concluded by saying that if they (the U.S.) overcame the difficulties in the Arab countries, he hoped the difficulties from American Jews would be overcome too.



- 4 -

Before the visitors departed, the Prime Minister presented Mr. Dulles and Mr. Stassen with the new Jerusalem edition - the first to be published in Israel - of the Hebrew Bible. The inscription in the Bible presented to Mr. Dulles read:

To Secretary of State

John Foster Dulles

a souvenir of your first visit to Israel.

Jerusalem, May 14th, 1953.

D. Ben-Gurion

The inscription in Mr. Stassen's copy read:

To an old acquaintance

Harold E. Stassen

Jerusalem, May 14th, 1953.

D. Ben-Gurion.



Thursday, May 14th, 1953. 12.00 hrs. At the Foreign Minister's Office, Jerusalem.

Mr. Sharett, Mr. Eshkol, Mr. P. Bernstein, Mr. D. Horowitz,  
Mr. E. Avriel, Mr. Kollek, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Bendor.

Mr. Dulles, Mr. Stassen, Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Matteson, Mr. Russell,  
Mr. O.T. Jones, Mr. McDaniel, Mr. Evans, Mr. Street.

After Mr. Sharett had introduced the participants

Mr. Eshkol spoke briefly about the foreign exchange debts of about \$ 100,000,000 that were due for payment in the next few months. He gave a short account of Israel's potential and the prospects for agricultural and industrial development that would save and earn foreign currency.

Mr. Bernstein pointed out that in addition to the foreign exchange debt problem, there was a problem of foreign exchange for subsistence needs. Foreign currency was required to increase production which with increased productivity would increase exports.

Mr. Horowitz said that our target was to be self-supporting in 5 - 10 years time. In the first years of our existence we had expanded rapidly. Now we were retrenching. Our development was being hampered by the foreign exchange difficulties.

Mr. Stassen after expressing his appreciation for the presentation of the position, both the night before and that morning, said that the Mutual Security programme would be co-ordinated with U.S. foreign policy.

They had a friendly interest in Israel. The suggestion of a loan to help with the debts was new to him. He would give it close study. But a loan might not be the best way - refinancing might be preferable to a loan.

They believed that if the incentive of the people was the same as the incentive of the Government, the object could be achieved. If the incentive of the people and Government of Israel was to increase exports, exports would be increased.

Israel's future depended on the stability of her currency, her economic policy and the wisdom with which she would use the German reparations.

They had great admiration for the progress made by Israel.

Their(U.S.'s) responsibilities were heavy, their own budget unbalanced. It was important for the free world that the U.S. remain economically sound.



He would discuss the ways and means of helping Israel when Congress had decided upon aid to Israel.

He asked for a memorandum containing a detailed statement of the creditors to whom Israel owed the short-term debts of 74 million dollars due shortly and the amounts due to each.

Mr. Sharett said that the question of a loan or a funding operation might be new to Mr. Stassen but actually it had been under discussion with the U.S. Government for about a year.

Mr. Dulles said that the position in Israel seemed to be similar to that in Brazil.

Mr. Stassen said that the matter of assisting Israel would be taken up with the Treasury people in the U.S. and we would be advised promptly on the results.

The situation in Brazil was not similar to that in Israel because U.S. had large imports from Brazil which could be used for the repayment of the loan given to that country.

Their impression was that if conditions of peace, at least economic peace - could be established, it would benefit Israel considerably.

Mr. Sharett said that in helping Israel, U.S. would be helping a country that was helping itself. Israel was trying to attract private capital from abroad and was also receiving assistance from Jewish Communities. At home there was austerity.

Whether we were given a loan or a grant - the money would be put to the purposes for which it was given.

The expenditure would be productive in as much as it would have as its purpose to put us on our feet economically as quickly as possible.

Elsewhere the U.S. helped nations to get back to normal. In Israel they would be helping a nation to create an economy.

Mr. Stassen said that they would advise us on what they could do and if they decided to help us they would be meticulous in the follow-through.

Mr. Eshkol said that a grant was preferable to a loan. He felt that a loan should be used for development purposes.



Thursday, May 14th, 1953. 14.30 hrs. At the President's Office, Jerusalem.

President Ben-Zvi, Mr. Sharett, Dr. Simon, Mr. Bendor, s/Aluf Carmel.  
Mr. Dulles, Mr. Stassen, Mr. Russell.

The President greeted Mr. Dulles and Mr. Stassen, expressing the pleasure of the people of Israel in welcoming them on their short visit to Israel. He recounted briefly the achievements of Israel in the few years of her existence and the problems that still lay ahead. He stressed the need for peace in the area and expressed the confidence that it could be brought about.

The President recalled the great part played by President Eisenhower in freeing Europe and saving the remnants of the concentration camps. He welcomed Mr. Dulles personally for his help to Israel in the early days of her existence and Mr. Stassen for his continuous sympathy for the Zionist movement and Israel.

The President expressed the appreciation of the people of Israel for the support, material and moral, which we had always received from the United States.

Mr. Dulles said that Mr. Stassen and himself were happy to come to Israel as the special ambassadors of President Eisenhower. He handed to the President a personal message from President Eisenhower.

He said that they had talked with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and they had gained a better appreciation of our problems. They had the opportunity to express the admiration of the people of the United States for the work accomplished in Israel. The fact that Israel was doing so much in the face of difficulties earned their admiration and appealed to the U.S. character without regard for party, race or creed. They looked forward to an ever-growing association in the future beneficial to both countries.

The President thanked Mr. Dulles for President Eisenhower's message and his own words. He said it was a privilege to feel the friendship of the great American people.

He was sure that peace could be achieved between Israel and the Arab States and he expressed the belief that the United States could use their moral influence to that end.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AE/1098

Personal

May 28, 1953

Dear Dr. Silver:

I enclose copy of the New York Times on which I have marked an extract from a speech delivered yesterday.

I suggest that it would be most advisable if you would agree for a conversation to be held with our mutual friend on this subject. When I last met him about three weeks ago together with Mr. Sharett, he seemed to have no difficulty in our position on refugee resettlement. Now, however, the idea that resettlement in Israel is at least a possible solution seems to be implied in the formulation which he uses.

In President Eisenhower's message to you last October, the emphasis is quite clearly on resettlement in Arab countries; the same is true of Assistant Secretary Byroade's remarks in Chicago recently. (I quoted this in a memorandum which I sent to you in February).

I do not believe that in the case of your friend the issue is more than one of loose formulation, but it would be advisable to explain once more the utter unfeasibility of return to Israel, and the necessity of resettlement in Arab countries. It is their responsibility both because they caused the problem and because they possess the full capacity to solve it. If Israel could find homes for 750,000 refugees, how much more easily could the vast Arab East with its huge land and water resources integrate that number in its midst?

May I know whether you consider it advisable and possible for you to help in this important matter?

With best wishes,

Yours ever,

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver  
The Temple  
Ansel Road  
Cleveland, Ohio

*Abba Hillel Silver*



## Text of Taft Statements on Foreign Policy

CINCINNATI, Ohio, May 26—The text of the address by Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, read for him at the anniversary meeting of the National Conference of Christians and Jews here tonight, follows:

I have been criticized by some because I supported the independence of Israel and have stood on their side against Egypt and Jordan, which tried to destroy them. I supported a free Israel because of my earnest belief in justice and freedom and the keeping of promises.

The Balfour declaration during the first World War, the British mandate of Palestine and our own undertakings which tied us in during the first World War and during the maintenance of the mandate, I believe clearly constituted a promise to establish a Jewish national home. A Jewish national home could only mean a state where Jews predominated and could not be ruled or persecuted by others.

I believe the state should have been established at the height of the power of the Allies during the second World War. It should have been done, I doubt if we would ever have had the Israel war, or the fleeing of the Palestinian Arabs, or the danger of conditions in that region of the world today because Israel had to take up arms to establish their own independence, the British having abandoned the mandate. I have supported the movement because it seemed to me it was the only way in which we could assure freedom for millions of Jews who lived in countries where they would always be subjected to intermittent attacks and persecution. I supported it because it undertook to relieve the world of the problem of Jewish refugees, for which the world had proposed no better solution.

### Warning on Refugees Issued

The Israel war today, however, has created a situation the seriousness of which cannot be exaggerated. Because of that war, partly through the intolerance of their own leaders, 600,000 refugees left the Jewish section of Palestine and are still housed in temporary tents and huts in Syria, in Jordan and in Egypt. The food is inadequate and conditions among the children particularly are described as dangerous to their very existence. As long as that group remains there is a constant building up of hatred against the Jews.

If this national question gets into the international field it can do nothing better than try to solve this question by resettlement, either within or without Israel. Plans have been made but little progress has been achieved. Tolerance in which you believe and I believe must extend to these Arab refugees, no matter what the cause of their distress. There seems to be no peaceful solution in the Near East until this refugee problem is settled.

I cannot tonight discuss all the other problems of foreign policy, but as I hear them discussed in the Foreign Relations Committee and at the President's legislative conference, I am impressed with the tremendous difficulty of all of them and the fact that in no case does there seem to be a satisfactory solution.

My discussion of the situation tonight is merely intended to bring to the nature of comment and information. I do not intend it as any criticism of what is being done or not done, because I think the problems are so difficult that anyone would have great difficulty in feeling confident that he is right.

During the past three years, the foreign policy of the United States, whether under Democratic or Republican charge, has been based on the general opposition to the spread of communism beyond its present limits, either as an ideology or as an advance by force. Certainly our policy has not been based on any reliance on the United Nations or on any other country.

Unfortunately, the last Administration did not go all out for this policy against communism in Asia until it was too late to make it truly effective. The failure to check communism on the mainland, the unfortunate withdrawal from Korea, has involved us in a war situation and a Communist situation in Asia for which there seems to be no satisfactory solution.

Nevertheless, the last Administration certainly believed in the general policy of opposition to communism, since they backed up Greece and Turkey in 1947, and, of course, in Asia since the Korean war.

Again I point out that this policy is not a policy of working through the United Nations, but is a policy of military alliance. It is an attempt to build up freedom throughout the world and to provide arms to the nations which are sufficiently free so we can be reasonably certain or reasonably hopeful that they will use their arms to fight the Communists if they are attacked.

The difficulty with the United Nations as a means of preventing military aggression was obvious from the beginning. I pointed out in the first speech I made in favor of ratifying the United Nations treaty that it could not possibly prevent aggression because of the veto power which could be used by any one of the five powers to veto united action against themselves and against any one of their satellites.

The United Nations was based on the theory of a five-power control of the world, and whenever one of those powers refused to go along it was hopeless to create any sanctions that would be binding on the other nations to provide troops against aggression. We made an abortive attempt to rely on the United Nations when the North Koreans attacked in 1950. It happened that the Russians were wanting the Security Council, and so we were able to persuade the others to call for troops from all members against the North Koreans.

There is some doubt whether the call was a valid call, even then, because the charter clearly requires the affirmative vote of all of the five controlling nations, and I don't think that absence provides an affirmative vote.

Nevertheless, it was treated as a proper sanction and produced a few troops, in addition to those which we had to send to Korea. But Russia returned at once to the Security Council, and when Communist China attacked, then the United Nations failed to take any action against the real aggressor, and from that time until today has refused in every way



Senator Robert A. Taft

to take action or punish the real aggressor.

There has been some attempt to substitute the General Assembly as a body which can call on nations to join in defeating an aggressor, but the General Assembly has absolutely no such power under the United Nations Charter. It is very doubtful to me whether we would be wise to try to set up and develop any such power. In an assembly where we have one vote out of seventy, it can be easily turned against us in the future.

### Would Forget U. N. in Korea

I believe we might as well forget the United Nations as far as the Korean war is concerned. I think we should do our best now to negotiate this truce, and if we fail, then let England and our other Allies know that we are withdrawing from all further peace negotiations in Korea.

Even the best truce under present conditions will be extremely unsatisfactory. It will divide Korea along an unnatural line and create an unstable condition likely to bring war again at any moment. It will release a million Chinese soldiers, who no doubt will promptly be moved down to Southern China for use against Chiang Kai-shek or against the French in Indo-China.

It seems to me that from the beginning we should have insisted on a general peace negotiation with China, including a unification of Korea under free Koreans, and a pledge against further expansion in Southeast Asia. If we once make this present truce, no matter what we put in the agreement about further negotiations for united Korea, it is no more likely to occur than a united Germany.

In any event, I think we are bound in the policy of preventing Communist aggression where it occurs and where it is within our means to stop it. I have never felt that we should send American soldiers to the continent of Asia, which, of course, includes China proper and Indo-China, simply because we are so outnumbered in fighting a land war in the United Nations. I believe about complete exhaustion even if we were able to win, I believe we might as well abandon any idea of working with the United Nations in the East and reserve to ourselves a completely free hand.

This statement is going to shock a good many people who still believe in the United Nations. I believe in the United Nations myself, but not as an effective means to prevent aggression. It does have many methods by which, through peaceful persuasion, it can deter and prevent war.

It has important agencies which are concerned with the improvement of conditions throughout the world. But as far as the prevention of aggression is concerned, it might as well be forgotten for the present. I think we should call a conference for amendment of the Charter and work out a situation in Asia for which there seems to be no satisfactory solution.

But no one should be shocked at my suggestion about the United Nations in Korea, because in Europe we have practically abandoned it entirely. When we adopted the North Atlantic Treaty, we did not ask the United Nations' leave, and we did not consult it. We claim that such an organization can be formed under the terms of Section 51 of the Charter and perhaps it can. But to my mind it is the complete antithesis of the Charter itself, and while it may not violate the Charter at all, it certainly substitutes a military alliance for the United Nations as a means of preventing Soviet aggression.

NATO, following the Greek and Turkish agreements and the contemplated arrangements with Spain, is clearly a military alliance of the old type. We promised to spring to the aid of any nation which is attacked, either by the Russians or by any other nation, including one of the NATO group. Our obligation continues for twenty years.

So today, as since 1947 in Europe and 1950 in Asia, we are really trying to arm the world against Communist Russia, or at least furnish all the assistance which can be of use to them in opposing communism.

Is this policy of uniting the free world against communism in time of peace going to be a practical long-term policy? I have always been a skeptic on the subject of the military practicability of NATO. I am no military expert, but I have never heard an argument that impressed me attempting to show that United States ground forces could effectively defend Europe.

Certainly we seem to have undertaken to defend countries like Norway and Denmark, which it would be almost impossible to defend in case of a sudden Russian attack. I have always felt that we should not attempt to fight Russia on the ground on the Continent of Europe any more than we should attempt to fight China on the Continent of Asia. I have always felt that, that defense must be undertaken by those who occupy Western Europe. After all, there are at

least 225,000,000 of them, 50 per cent more people than we have in the United States.

I have always been concerned that once our troops are in Europe, the Russians would be able to bomb all of the factories and communication lines behind them. One atomic bomb would probably destroy the French port for a year, and eight or ten bombs would cut off most means of supplying our soldiers or withdrawing them in case of retreat.

If we are worried here in this country about the dropping of Russian bombs on American cities and factories, surely it is ten times as easy for them to bomb Western Europe and its ports. Or they could leave Europe alone and devote themselves to a bombing of this country, in which case our European expenses would be of doubtful value.

### Allied Divergence Implied

But there is another difficulty about maintaining the general policy of a unified world-wide opposition to communism by all free nations: we have to have not only the written word but the real sympathetic support of our allies in that job. Recent events in France and England indicate that they are more than anxious to settle with Russia and resume as much trade as possible, which means that as long as Russia talks nicely the whole military alliance against Russia is weak, even though military preparations behind the lines continue unabated.

Secretary Dulles has tried to reassure the Iron Curtain nations that we are not going to make a deal with Russia giving the Communists a zone of influence over all the Iron Curtain countries. It seems clear that Mr. Churchill and the French administration would be willing to assign that zone of influence gladly and abandon the Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians and the Rumanians to the tender mercies of Soviet Russia in return for some cut in armaments, freer trade and promises to behave in the future.

The present Administration has the job of trying to maintain this world-wide alliance against Soviet Russia. We have spent billions for that purpose. I hope that it can be carried through, and only raise the doubt as to whether it is in fact possible over any long period of years.

### U. S. Trade Policies Doubtful

It is pretty hard for the United States to claim the right to cut off trade channels which have existed for centuries. I have no doubt about the desirability of the policy if it does not go beyond our economic strength, but I do doubt its possibility.

All that I can urge is two different kinds of tolerance to this tolerant body. The first is that we be tolerant of the situation of every country that we try to understand their problems and not force upon them a policy they do not approve, either by the pressure of grants or money or by the use of soldiers. No doubt they will be glad to get these, but they will be of little use to us unless the policy which they are supposed to enforce is the determined policy of the country concerned.

Second, I urge upon you tolerance of those nations who are trying their best to conduct our foreign affairs. I think already they know more about the realities of the situation than those who preceded them. I know that they are inspired with the best of goodwill toward all nations. They have to meet what seems to me the most difficult problems of foreign policy the United States has ever faced.

## List of Books Published Today

**DATEBOOK: A Novel of Adventure** in New Guinea, by Winifred B. Senior (Exposition, \$3).  
**DEATH MEETS 400 RABBITS**, by Aaron Marc Stein (Doubleday, \$2.50). A Crime Club detective story.  
**DEATH OF THE DARK**, by Frederick C. Davis (Doubleday, \$2.50). Crime Club detective story.  
**FRUIT OF AN IMPULSE: Forty-five Years of the Carnegie Foundation, 1905-1950**, by Howard J. Savage (Harcourt, Brace, \$5).  
**HOW COME? A Book of Riddles**, collected by Agnes Rogers, drawings by Carl Rose (Doubleday, \$1.50).  
**HOW TO BELIEVE: The Questions That Challenge Man's Faith Answered in the Light of the Apostle's Creed**, by Ralph W. Sockman, D. D. (Doubleday, \$2.50).  
**JOHN T. GUITAR**, by Roy Chanslor (Simon & Schuster, \$2.50). A Western story.  
**MR. TOMPKINS LEARNS THE FACTS OF LIFE**, by George Gurnea, illustrated by the author (Cambridge University, \$2.75). An informal treatise on biology.

**MR. UNGER LIVES**, by Robert Fontaine (McGraw-Hill, \$3.75). Further family reminiscences by the author for "The Happy Time."

**NORTH FROM MALAYA: Adventure of Five Fronts**, by William O. Douglas (Doubleday, \$3.95). Reviewed today.

**REPORT ON MAO'S CHINA**, by Frank Moraes (Macmillan, \$3.75). A personal record.

**SELECTED PAPERS OF KARL ABRAHAM**, M. D., with an introductory memoir by Ernest Jones, translated by Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey (Basic Books, \$6). Selections edited by Cecily Hastings and Donald Nicholl (Sheed & Ward, \$3). A yearbook of contemporary thought in anthropology, biblical study, psychology, philosophy, theology and biology.

**SNOWBELLER SAGA: A Chronicle of Steamboating**, by Ralph Nading Hill (Rinehart, \$5).

**TALK IT OUT WITH YOUR CHILD: Better Child Guidance Through Family Conversations**, by Mary M. Thomson, M. D., with editorial collaboration of Jean Marshall Simpson, foreword by Ralph W. Sockman, D. D. (McGraw-Hill, \$3.50).

**THE BARTOLINIANS**, by Nathaniel Noren Weinreb (Doubleday, \$3.95). A historical novel about Nebuchadnezzar's physician.

**THE COMING STORM: A Novel**, by Albert Idell (Doubleday, \$3.50). The End of the World: A Scientific Inquiry, by Kenneth Heuer, illustrations by Chesley Bone.

**THE MARQUIS DE SAUR**, A Study, by Simone de Beauvoir, with selections from his writings com-

## Books of The Times

By CHARLES POORE

WHILE others are brooding about summer reading, Associate Justice William O. Douglas is out creating it. He believes that gathering material for a book adds much to a good vacation. His holidays are spent writing rather than reading. As soon as the Supreme Court adjourns he starts getting notebook, pencil and passport together for his next Asian safari, tempering justice with authorship.

In 1951 he published "Strange Lands and Friendly People," a narrative of travel through the Middle East and India that blended trans-Atlantic civic righteousness into the spirit of the Arabian Nights. In 1952 he published "Beyond the Himalayas," which carried his readers spiritedly through Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Kingdom of Swat and up to the Tibetan border. His 1953 book, "North From Malaya," takes us rapidly to Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Burma, Formosa and Korea. What will the next book be about? Africa? South America? Or the strange enclave not even John Gunther has yet tackled, Washington, D. C.?

### Justice W. O. Douglas

The justice travels on what I can only call a jet-propelled magic carpet. He couldn't have spent more than a couple of months on his "North From Malaya" odyssey, but he covered an immense area, saw persons and personages innumerable, discussed an awesome variety of burning issues, absorbed incredible quantities of history. His book makes uncommonly stimulating reading. The Asians, toward whom he is heart-warmingly, if somewhat relentlessly, friendly, must privately regard him as the V. I. P. with zip.

### A Traveler With Curiosity

This country probably has not sent out an eminent traveler with quite so much gusto, quite so much curiosity, quite such a readiness to make far-ranging on-the-spot judgments since Theodore Roosevelt. He must wear out his hosts and give members of his entourage a permanently tired feeling. His book is certain to advance the blood pressure of readers who doubt that Asia's problems can be solved without occasional alterations in the Douglas plan. The opposition will demand the right to be heard in the presence of counsel. His views always invite discussion.

He says, for example, that "Burma tolerates the Communists because its standard of civil liberties teaches that an ideology given underground develops into a more viable form than it would if it is allowed to press for acceptance in the market place of ideas." By what happened to Czechoslovakia when the Czechs were "tolerating" the Communists? And how much of the most virulent work of the Communists and their fellow-travelers is ever done out in the open market place of ideas, anyway?

Justice Douglas warns us again, and again that the world-wide Communist cabal takes its direction from the Kremlin. "The loyalty of a Communist," he writes, "whether he be a Huk in the Philippines, or a guerrilla in Malaya, or a comrade in North Korea, is to the Russian fatherland."

**"NORTH FROM MALAYA."** By William O. Douglas. Illustrated with photographs. 320 pages. Doubleday, \$3.95.

## Books—Authors

"The Flowers of Friendship," a collection of letters written to Gertrude Stein by Ernest Hemingway, Sinclair Lewis, Bennett Cerf, Pablo Picasso, W. G. Rogers and others, will be published by Knopf on Aug. 17. The material for the book came from the Gertrude Stein collection at Yale. It has been edited by Donald S. Gallup, whose "T. S. Eliot: A Bibliography" was recently published by Harcourt, Brace, Mr. Rogers, literary critic of The Associated

Press and author of a book about Miss Stein, "When This You See, Remember Me," has written an introduction.

### Aims Akin to War Lords'

The Communist objective in Southeast Asia is clear. It is curiously similar to that of the Japanese war lords when they were advancing their "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" not so long ago. It is to get control of the tin, the rubber, the rice, the oil that once more makes those countries such rich prizes in the struggle between totalitarianism and freedom.

Justice Douglas' tentative suggestions for a settlement with Red China that might help to wean the Chinese Reds away from the Muscovite Reds are very earnest—and very well supplied with alternative consequences and fire escapes. Here is a sample: "Today Red China may be in no mood to make a political settlement with the West. Or if she is, Russia may be in no mood to let her do so. Moreover, China might set too high a price for a settlement. In my view the price would be too high if Formosa were to be surrendered to the Communists. China today is not one country. Formosa is one sovereignty and the mainland another. The integrity of Formosa should be maintained and her seat in the United Nations preserved, even if Red China were recognized."

So we go round the mulberry bush. The British have recognized Red China. Where has it got them? The work that Gen. Sir Gerald Templer is doing in Malaya under British auspices wins Justice Douglas' praise. Incidentally, he shows how effectively Sir Gerald has got Malaysians to give information about members of the Communist cabal in that country. Without these informers Malaya might not be able to remain a part of the free world and get on with civic reforms.

### French Methods Disapproved

The methods used by the French in Vietnam are disapproved of by the justice in many aspects. There is also criticism of powerful Chinese merchants in adjacent latitudes. At a private club in Ipoh he turned on Chinese gentlemen who had been urging that America should pour money into Malaya. "I said," the justice recalls, "that the Chinese should clean their own stables, that they were responsible for Malaya's condition, that if loans were to be made, they were the ones to establish an E. C. A. and help finance America."

In the Philippines, there was much that he found to praise in the reform plans of Ramon Magsaysay. Here the book runs naturally behind the news since Carlos Romulo entered the race for the Presidency.

Always questioning, everywhere he went, Justice Douglas possibly may not always have asked the questions that were to come up later on. For example, after flying around Korea with Gen. James A. Van Fleet he reported that "Korea has not suffered for lack of military equipment."

In Mandalay Justice Douglas lectured Rudyard Kipling posthumously on geography. "The only person who would go to Mandalay via Moulinet," he says, "was one who lived there." Well, maybe so. Is this any more circumspect than it would be for a man who lives in Washington, D. C., to go all the way to Asia to lecture the Government in Washington, D. C., on what it should do about Asia?

Walter Gibson, who for seven years served with the Army and Sutherland Highlanders in India, China and Malaya, has written a first-hand account of being afloat in a lifeboat for twenty-eight days. In "The Boat," he tells of the torpedoing of the Dutch ship, the Rooseboom, in 1942, and how 135 survivors crowded into a lifeboat that was launched; how it drifted 1,000 miles across the Indian Ocean, becoming wrecked on a reef off the island of Sumatra. Of the original 135 survivors, there were left only Mr. Gibson, a Chinese girl and two mad Javanese. The book will be issued in September by Houghton Mifflin.

Phyllis Bentley, author of several novels about the Yorkshire country of England, has a new one on the Macmillan list for June 30, entitled "The House of Moysa." It is a story about a family haunted by scandals and about the determination of a young girl to create order in the eccentric household, as well as to find love for herself.

## CROSSWORD PUZZLE

Edited by MARGARET FARRAR

- ACROSS**
- 1 Christmas carolers in Britain.
  - 6 Ending March girl.
  - 10 City in Turkey on the Euphrates.
  - 14 Abolish.
  - 15 Native of Helsinki.
  - 16 High time.
  - 17 Rouget de —, who wrote "The Marseillaise."
  - 20 Military vessel.
  - 20 English tri-weekly of 1709-11.
  - 22 Concentrated résumés.
  - 23 Compensate.
  - 25 Just-hatched sound.
  - 26 It has wings but can't fly.
  - 28 Bedtime desideratum.
  - 30 Late grandfather of Egypt's king.
  - 33 Name of a famous queen: Abbr.
  - 35 Title of honor in Turkey.
  - 36 Straw mattress.
  - 38 How Olympic teams are made up.
  - 41 Jungle beasts: Span.
  - 42 Measures of length: Abbr.
  - 45 Attracted.
  - 45 Part of the name of a Central American republic.
  - 47 Go: Dial.
  - 48 Arab or Berber.
  - 50 Florida bay.
  - 52 Yielded to another's opinion.
  - 56 Sang in a light, gay manner.
  - 59 Overwhelmed.
  - 61 Farm building.
  - 62 Staff officer: Abbr.
  - 63 Oh — (Oh dear me!): Fr.
  - 64 Turn up one's nose.
  - 65 Girl's name.
  - 66 Concealed difficulty.
  - 67 Past, present, or future.
- DOWN**
- 1 Whitman.
  - 2 Doubt Bible name.
  - 3 Teacher.
  - 4 Fabric named after a French town.
  - 5 Important word in "Sweet and Low."
  - 6 Small lizard.
  - 7 Money in Venice.
  - 8 Lively.
  - 9 Girl in an old song.
  - 10 Destined to be a wallflower.
  - 11 Study.
  - 12 Warning cry on the links.
  - 13 Crawlers.
  - 19 Austrian author.
  - 20 Iwig.
  - 21 Stems used for wickerwork.
  - 24 System of fixed attention.
  - 25 Contemplation, concentration.
  - 26 18th word of "Friends, Romans, countrymen . . ."
  - 27 Burrowed.
  - 29 Relation of one thing to another.
  - 31 Assertion made without proof.
  - 32 Girl's name.
  - 34 Urban dwellings.
  - 36 Two cents' worth.
  - 37 Newcastle's river.
  - 39 Phrase differently.
  - 40 This month: Abbr.
  - 45 Native of a Greek island.
  - 46 In the center.
  - 49 Certain tests.
  - 51 Where to put a bookmark.
  - 52 Part of a tachometer.
  - 53 Within: Comb. form.
  - 54 Highest mountain in Japan.
  - 55 Thomas — Warr.
  - 57 Sins.
  - 58 Unit of force.
  - 60 Norse name.

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RANDOM HOUSE, N. Y.







June 2, 1953

The Honorable Abba Eban  
Ambassador of Israel  
Embassy of Israel  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Ambassador:

Permit me to acknowledge your letter of May 28th. Of course, I shall be very pleased to speak to our friend at the earliest opportunity.

What is your reaction to the statement of Secretary Dulles which I read this morning in the New York Times? I want to study that document more fully today to discover whether there has been any departure from the position which he took when I last saw him in Washington. There is so much adulatory and conciliatory diplomatic phraseology in the document, that it is rather difficult at first glance to get the "tachlis".

With warmest regards, I remain

Most cordially yours,

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

AHS:er



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AE/1139

Personal

June 11, 1953

Dear Dr. Silver:

Thank you for your letter of June 2, in which you ask me for my reaction to Secretary Dulles' speech of the previous day.

I have studied that speech against the background of the conversations held in Israel between members of our Government and Secretary Dulles. I am enclosing for your strictly confidential information extracts from an account of those talks. You will observe the extraordinary degree of unity which they reflected in the thinking of Secretary Dulles and of our own Government during these exchanges in Jerusalem. I am not in a hurry to assume that we should regard Secretary Dulles' expression of view to us on that formal occasion as being superseded by a public speech dealing with the same issues in a much less comprehensive form, and under the tactical inhibitions of publicity.

Having said this, I should like to pass to some consideration of the Secretary's speech on June 1. Our impressions are very mixed. It seems to me that the speech falls into three categories in our point of view:

first, matters in which the Secretary and we meet on common ground,

second, matters which, pending clarification, are obscure or ambiguous and might prove to be either favorable or unfavorable; and

third, views and formulations which evoke our distinct concern and disappointment.

In the first category I would include the Secretary's evidently sincere tribute to Israel's efforts and achievements; his insistence that there should be a peace settlement and an end to economic warfare; his remark that the parties themselves must work out a settlement, which, for us, is an important safeguard against externally dictated plans; his acceptance of the fact that a full scale defense project for the Middle East must await the conclusion of peace; his admission that the majority of the Arab refugees



- 2 -

will have to be settled in Arab countries. The latter admission is of course not full enough for our liking, but it may be difficult for the United States to declare at this stage that not a single Arab refugee can return to Israel. At any rate, the Secretary's formulation here is as favorable as that of President Eisenhower in his letter to you last October.

I now come to those matters which are ambiguous. First there is the reference to Jerusalem. Here I have already elicited what I suspected when I read the text - that Secretary Dulles accepts the previous American view in favor of an international arrangement for the Holy Places and religious interests alone. He avoids the use of the term "internationalization". I have learned that not only we, but Arab and Catholic circles, have been informed that this is the correct interpretation of the Secretary's remarks. Accordingly, I do not foresee a clash with the United States Government here, although they may not easily recognise our capital until the "religious interests" have been satisfied in the above mentioned way. On the other hand, I am less optimistic than Secretary Dulles with regard to the possibility or advisability of actively seeking his proposed solution in the United Nations so long as Catholic states are unwilling to abandon the previous territorial solution in favor of a Holy Places solution such as we have always upheld in agreement with the United States.

Two other matters require clarification which I am seeking officially and formally this week: first, the reference to Israel as "territory under Israel control". We shall ask if this connotes an implication that we renounce territory, and if so, we shall express the most firm and vehement opposition in the clearest possible terms. Second, does the reference to "inter-related defense arrangements" imply some recognition of the Arab League as a focus for defense organization? The previous Administration gave us a clear assurance that the Arab League would not be recognized, partly in view of its anti-Israel character. (For their own reasons France, Britain and Turkey also seem to share our view point in this matter).

I now come to discuss those matters which evoke our definite disagreement: They belong mainly to the history, philosophy and atmosphere of this speech:

- 1) The Secretary seems to accept the view that the Arab states have a righteous cause for "resentment" against the United States by reason of Israel's existence. Here he has failed to discern the central historical process in the life of the Middle East. Eight Arab statehoods have been established with the aid of the Western Powers, all with American help and recognition, within the very decade in which Israel has achieved its independence. Four Arab States have simultaneously



- 3 -

arisen, Syria, Lebanon, Libya and Jordan, while Egypt and Jordan have extended their boundaries. Never since the days of the Caliphate have the Arab states possessed such elements of power, sovereignty and status as which the United States and its allies have now put in its hands. In these circumstances it is deplorable that Israel's independence in a little strip of desert should be regarded as a just cause for resentment by a people which have come into this huge inheritance. Both on these grounds of historic truth and of tactical procedure, I believe that the United States should not assume an air of apology to the Arab states, but should rather take an assertive position and bid the Arab countries devote their efforts to the enormous constructive opportunities which challenge their statesmanship, rather than brood over rancor on the more modest fortune which Israel has achieved in this generation. Conversely, the feeling that Mr. Dulles sympathizes with their air of grievance, will stimulate Arab governments to remain in that posture in the hope of obtaining reward. Since the United States, in the last resort, cannot give them such reward, it may only be creating expectations which cannot be fulfilled. Thus, even from the viewpoint of Arab-American relations, this course appears full of danger. The Arab resentment against Israel should be regarded as a baseless neurosis to be refuted and denied - not as a just grievance to be "allayed".

2. We are not a little affronted by his references to security. Although Arab states have once made war upon Israel and still refuse peace with her, while Israel has neither made war nor ever refused peace, Secretary Dulles gives far the greater weight to his emphasis to the Arab fear of so - called Israel expansion. It is difficult for us to conceive that Israel's valid fear of security can be equalled to Arab apprehension; and to suggest that the main point in the Middle East is to reassure Arab states against Israel expansion is surely intolerable. Here again the psychological effects on the Arab governments are likely to be adverse.



- 4 -

3. As a result of this inadequate regard for our security preoccupations, the Secretary finds it possible to conjure up the possibility of some Arab refugees returning to Israel. I must, however, apply to this matter the reservation which I have mentioned above, namely that the operative part of his reference to refugees is the expression of desire to see most of them settled in Arab countries.

You will see from the above analysis that I see the chief dangers in Mr. Dulles' description of American-Arab-Israel relations.

I cabled this analysis to our Government which accepted its main conclusions, thus moderating the vigor of its public reaction. I similarly advised our friends in New York not to see this speech as a signal for an all-out public clash. On the other hand, in all diplomatic and other contacts with the Administration I suggest that we should lay the greatest emphasis on our reservations and disappointments, and give them the just feeling that the balance has been adversely affected and should be restored in future acts and speeches.

Since you were the recipient both of Mr. Eisenhower's letter, and of assurances from Secretary Dulles in full conformity with those which he gave to me, and repeated in Israel, it would - I suggest - be both natural and useful for you to seek an opportunity of discussing this matter with the Secretary again in a completely frank and unpublicized talk.

If I were to know when you could come to Washington for this or any other purpose, I should take the liberty of advising how such a visit could be most usefully adapted to our common cause.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver  
Cleveland, Ohio

*Abba Eban*

P. S. The Administration has now

- (1) asked me to see no significance in their description of "territory presently under Israel control". I have suggested they refrain from using the phrase in that case.
- (2) Disclaimed an intention of recognising the present Arab security pact but indicated a disquieting tendency to think of giving arms to Syria(!) which has supplanted Egypt in their affections.



August 10, 1953

Mr. John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Dulles:

I wanted upon your return from Korea to reply to the message which you sent me on July 11th. I regret that telephonic communications made it difficult for us to converse and that I was not in Cleveland the day before when you called.

I am taking the liberty of enclosing herewith a copy of an editorial which appeared in the London Times on August 3rd. It more nearly represents my own views on the subject, and I am inclined to believe that that is the direction in which our own government ought to move.

I do hope that I shall have the pleasure before long of meeting with you and talking over more fully this problem as well as some others of mutual interest.

With warmest regards and hoping that you may find time this summer for a good rest from your onerous duties, I remain

Most cordially yours,

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

AHS:er  
Enc.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

AE/1209

August 12, 1953.

Personal

Dear Rabbi Silver,

I am leaving on August 22 for consultations in Israel. Prior to my departure I would like to meet again with the presidents and representatives of some of the leading Jewish organizations as well as with a few other friends for an informal and confidential discussion. Such a discussion of our mutual problems will be of great help to me in my conversations in Israel.

I shall appreciate it if you would meet with me on August 18 at 8:00 p.m. in New York City at the Hotel Commodore, Parlor A (ballroom floor). Please inform me accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

*Abba Eban*

Abba Eban

Rabbi Abba H. Silver,  
The Temple,  
East 105 St., at Ansel Road,  
Cleveland, Ohio.



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


August 25, 1953

Dear Rabbi Silver:

Your letter of August 10 with the enclosed editorial from the London Times was waiting for me when I returned from vacation. I may say that the views expressed in the editorial are not remote from my own thinking.

I hope that I shall have an opportunity of seeing you when you are next in Washington in order to discuss some of these matters in greater detail.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dulles", with a large, sweeping flourish extending from the end of the name.

John Foster Dulles

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver,  
The Temple,  
East 105th Street at Ansel Road,  
Cleveland 6, Ohio.



September 1, 1953

Ambassador Abba Eban  
Embassy of Israel  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Ambassador:

You may be interested in seeing the enclosed correspondence which, of course, is off the record.

With warmest regards and hoping that you enjoyed your visit to Israel, I remain

Most cordially yours,

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

AHS:er  
Enc. 2