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P A L E S T I N E

A REPORT

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

and to

THE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE FOR PALESTINE, INC.

Together with certain recommendations

by

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I. FOREWORD


My mission to Palestine was primarily prompted by the conviction that the present situation in the Middle-East is fraught with danger to that Anglo-American friendship and unity of action for which I have worked so long and so hard and the maintenance of which I consider of paramount importance to the peace and prosperity of the world.

It is my opinion that the challenge to the world presented by the current problems in the Middle-East can no longer be met by Great Britain alone, and that the key to the solution thereof lies nearer to Washington than to London. This point of view will be enlarged upon and I hope convincingly explained in this report.

To those who believe in "One World," as I most fervently do, the possible creation of a new state in Palestine need present no paradox. Surely the strength of the United Nations must eventually depend not just on a few great powers, but on the peace, contentment, and prosperity of all the peoples. Our own American history has successfully demonstrated that only states secure in their sovereignty, and the contentment which ensues are strong enough to federate or unite eternally.

As to the conclusions I drew from my investigation of the problem presented by Palestine and the Middle-East generally, I should like to emphasize one important point, - they are not based on hasty decisions. While my actual tour of Palestine was limited to ten days - a self-imposed limitation promoted by previous experience that too long a stay offers temptations to interested groups to take possession of one, if not actually, at least in the public mind - my conferences in Washington and London, and my study of the problems presented covered a far longer period, actually running into many years, as the record will prove.

Finally, in submitting this report, I cannot let the occasion pass without expressing my profound gratitude to those individuals and organizations, both at home and abroad, who helped to make the report possible. First amongst these I want to thank the President of the United States, the Honorable Harry S. Truman, whose request that I report my findings to him personally permitted me to travel in an official capacity, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Honorable Clement R. Attlee, who received me cordially in London. The organization which conceived and initiated my survey on the basis of wide latitude - that I be free to report my findings independent of its objectives, is the Political Action Committee for Palestine, Inc., to whom I am deeply indebted for having financed my mission. I must add that its founder, Rabbi Baruch Korff, went out of his way to encourage an impartial investigation of fact. To the Britishers, Arabs, and Jews in Palestine who, together with the United States Consul, Mr. Lowell Pinkerton and his staff, made my stay in the Holy Land both pleasant and informative, go my especial thanks, as well as to my many friends in London and Paris who similarly cooperated.


Joseph Clark Baldwin

II. PREAMBLE

Even the most casual student of current history realizes that there is a problem today in the Middle-East. To some it is a Jewish problem; to some it is an Arab problem; to some it is a British problem; to practically no one in this country except the Zionists it is in any sense an American problem.

This report is written in the conviction that the Middle-East generally, and Palestine specifically, do present a problem to the United States. In the first place, we now know - for if two World Wars in a quarter century haven't taught us, nothing ever will,--- that any trouble spot in the world cannot long be ignored with impunity. In the second place, there are natural resources in the Middle-East so vital to our own economy and to the preservation of our standard of living that we are already very deeply involved commercially. In the third place, a large section of our people are vitally interested in the problem on humanitarian grounds. And last, but by no means least, Anglo-American relations, the favorable maintenance of which is so important to the peace and prosperity of the world, are threatened by the political implications therein contained.

On the first score, surely nothing more need be said. On the second, it might be well to point out that our high American standard of living runs as surely on oil and rubber as that the Earth revolves around the sun; that the oil supply in our own country is not inexhaustible; that until some other medium is discovered and perfected, oil is essential to our economy; that except for the oil possessed by Russia either within her own boundaries or within the boundaries of neighboring states now under her sphere of influence, and except for some deposits in Central and South America, the future oil supply for the Western World will apparently come from the Middle-East. Nor can the humanitarian angle be ignored from an American interest point of view. Czechoslovakia stands today as a monument to the interest of the American people in the national aspirations of Minorities everywhere. Certainly a world presently controlled by Christian Nations must view with considerable horror and alarm the retention of hundreds of thousands of fellow human beings in the concentration camps built for them by the late enemy, where whole families of men, women and children, still live behind barbed wire in chambers 40 by 30 feet, with no privacy, little or no sanitation, and in groups of 250 to a chamber. But from the point of view of this report it is on the last score that emphasis has been placed. For without Anglo-American unity of action in the Middle-East, and everywhere else, what would be the fate of the political aspirations of any small nation, existing or proposed?

Actually, Palestine, the territory covered in this report, is about the size of the State of New York. Its present population, exclusive of aliens, consists of approximately one million Arabs and - officially - about 600,000 Jews, though it is possible that by now the Jewish population, through so-called "illegal" immigration, is close to a million.

Palestine was last independent over 2,000 years ago as a Jewish State, and, except for the spasmodic and partial rule of the Crusaders under the Baldwin dynasty, has only been independent as a Jewish State. That Arabs have lived there for 2,000 years in insignificant numbers cannot be denied. But they lived there under the yoke of the Ottoman Empire and were only freed from the Turks after the first World War, when Allied might under the late Lord Allenby - spearheaded by the Jewish Legion under the command of the late Vladimir Jabotinsky, with the aid of certain courageous Arab elements, set them free.

It was then that the first independent Arab States were set up, which today total six, exclusive of Trans-Jordan, originally part of the British Mandate over Palestine. They are currently Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt which was not under the Turkish rule, covering in area of over one million rather sparsely populated square miles, and which, together with Trans-Jordan, form the Arab League. With the exception of Syria and Lebanon, they are kingdoms, governed in somewhat dictatorial fashion, by former Emirs whose revenues are largely derived from oil concessions and pipe-line leases to Great Britain and the United States, as well as from almost total personal ownership of the nation's land.

The Arab League itself seems to be somewhat loosely united, except against any threat to Arab Supremacy in the Middle-East. On the Oriental side, its chief support apparently comes from Saudi-Arabia, and on the more modern side, from Syria and Lebanon where the graduates of the American University at Beirut are beginning to wield a very real and important influence.

That comparatively tiny Palestine, the biblical homeland of the Jews, more recently confirmed as such by international covenants and treaties, should become an issue in a Middle-East so obviously ample from a territorial point of view for all the Arabs in the area, is an astounding as well as a disturbing fact. But that it is an issue cannot be gainsaid; an issue presenting a problem and a consequent challenge to the world at large and more specifically, as has already been pointed out, to Great Britain and the United States.

The present cause of dissension in Palestine, and in the Middle-East over Palestine, dates back to 1929.

Immediately following the first world war when the Middle-East had been wrested from the Turkish Empire by the Allied Nations, it was felt that on practical and moral, as well as on historical grounds the Jews deserved a National home which should be in the Promised Land of biblical fame. By its creation, it was hoped there would be solved amongst other things many future problems which might arise as a result of oppressed Jewish Minorities in other lands.

On the basis of this guaranty of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, sponsored originally by Great Britain in the now famous Balfour Declaration (see appendix) England was given the Mandate over Palestine by the League of Nations. The Balfour Declaration was subsequently endorsed in substance by Emir Feisal Ibn Hussein, the then chief Arab leader, in the treaty of "Racial Kinship" of January 3, 1919, (see appendix) acknowledging the right of the Jews to Palestine, and was formally recognized by the United States in the Anglo-American Convention of December 3, 1924.

Slowly but surely, as a result of this British declaration and protection, a Jewish homeland was successfully developed in Palestine by Jewish pioneers who overcame almost insuperable physical obstacles in the process.

Then, at the most crucial moment in current Jewish history, when the Jews were being harried from both Western and Eastern Europe, Great Britain issued a series of "White Papers" which closed the doors of the Jewish homeland to the Jews, except for a pitiful monthly allotment, reduced successively by each "White Paper." This was explained by British and American statesmen as an attempt to keep the Arabs and their sympathizers in line for the impending world conflict. This policy, however,

barely succeeded in keeping them neutral. Occupied by the actual outbreak of war in Europe, the nations of the world ignored this indirect, though none-the-less flagrant, violation of the terms of Britain's Mandate.

The issuance and the maintenance of the most recent and drastic of White Papers (that of 1939 - see appendix) is the root cause of all the trouble in Palestine today. It is the profound desire to contribute something constructive to an Anglo-American solution of the problem thereby presented, which inspires this report.



III. REPORT:

A. London Conferences:

When the Political Action Committee for Palestine, Inc., decided to send a representative to the Middle-East to investigate the situation on the "spot", the President of the United States was consulted and the Committee's representative was asked to report directly to him. As a result, the Committee's representative traveled in an official capacity.

Reaching London in mid-November, 1946, the formal opening of Parliament caused a certain delay in the projected conferences with high British Officials; but finally, on Tuesday, November 19th, 1946, at 10:30 in the morning, he was received by and conferred with the British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, at 10 Downing Street. It was pointed out to the Prime Minister that the Palestine problem was rapidly becoming a very significant political issue in the United States, and that aside from the merits of the question, it was important to good Anglo-American relations that a solution be found as promptly as possible. The Prime Minister was both immediate and vehement in his response:

"The British Government is determined to find a satisfactory solution to this problem."

He expressed concern over the Zionists' failure to participate in the recent Anglo-Arab-Jewish conference in London, and said that he hoped that when it re-convened after the conclusion of the Zionist Congress at Basle, the Jews would consent to attend. He pointed out that the Arabs had presented their proposal, which was "not satisfactory," and added that "there is an empty niche for a Jewish proposal which must be filled before any sound discussion can take place."

The proposal of the Committee that the Jews in Palestine and the homeless Jews in Europe should be considered as an ethnopolitical entity in the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine was then presented and discussed. The Prime Minister seemed to be interested in the theory of a political majority which need not necessarily for a time be a residential majority and suggested that the proposal be presented to Mr. Bevin the British Foreign Minister should he return in time from New York.

The Prime Minister then admitted that, sooner or later and in some form or other, the Balfour Declaration would have to be fulfilled and distinctly gave the impression that it was no longer a question of whether there should or should not be a Jewish State in Palestine, but when it should be created, what form it should take, and what its boundaries should be.

Although partition was not directly mentioned in this connection, it was so evidently implied, that the Committee's representative hastened to point out the opposition of American Jews to any solution which would confine the Hebrews to a mere fragment of their promised homeland and, in effect, merely create another ghetto along Eastern European lines.

The Prime Minister was swift in his assurance that whatever was done, so far as the British Government were concerned, there would be a very real attempt to carry out the purposes of the Balfour Declaration.

He then said that the whole problem would eventually have to be brought before the United Nations, but he was loath to come before them without a definite proposal. British withdrawal from the whole picture, unless the Jews consented to cooperate in finding a solution, was obviously in his mind.

The question of American participation was then brought

up. On being assured that Washington might be persuaded to assume certain responsibilities in the Middle-East, the Prime Minister asked whether the United States would be prepared to use force if necessary.

The Committee's representative replied that American cooperation in a forceful decision might be obtained but that if it came to the actual use of arms, he was convinced the American people would never consent to a purely American Expeditionary force, but would insist on the use of the United Nations for such police functions.

Apparently, in the mind of the Prime Minister, as in that of almost every other Britisher with whom the Committee's representative conferred, the threat of an Arab uprising was paramount.

This was mentioned, and it was pointed out that such an attitude precluded any settlement except on Arab terms. This, however, the Prime Minister denied, explaining that the British Government had to be prepared for any eventuality and had a right to know on whom it could count, given certain eventualities.

It was then for the first time that the Committee's representative realized how much this British pre-occupation with Arab reaction might have to do with Zionist refusal to participate in any Arab-Jewish Conference under English auspices without certain advance guarantees, either by the British or by the United States.

The whole impression left by the Conference - an impression confirmed in subsequent conferences both in London and in Palestine - was that of a Government frankly perplexed by its conflicting obligations to the Arabs and the Jews; somewhat fearful of the consequences of any forthright decision one way or the other; and obviously tempted by the historic example of Solomon's judgment on the disputed parentage of the child.

2. The Lord President of the Council.

The next Conference was with the Right Honorable Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council. Inevitably, the so-called "Morrison Plan" for a partition of Palestine into two quasi-autonomous provinces, Hebrew and Arab, under a sort of federation on the top governmental plane, was brought up. Mr. Morrison said that when he presented the plan in Parliament he was speaking with the full authority of the Prime Minister, who was absent at the time.

The Committee's representative promptly pointed out that the suggested partition left to the Jews an area so small as to preclude the increased immigration essential to a real solution of the problem of the homeless Jews in Europe, and again stressed the view that American Jews would be strongly opposed, but added that, since by its introduction the British Government apparently recognized the necessity of creating some sort of a Jewish State in Palestine, there was an area for discussion, however insignificant that area might be.

The Lord President then asked what ideas the Committee had on the subject, and its representative then again presented the project of a Jewish Democracy embracing the biblical area of Palestine and including politically, though not necessarily residentially, the majority of the homeless Jews of Europe. Mr. Morrison seemed to feel that this idea was not so completely

at variance with his own plan as to be incompatible, and it was pointed out to him that while, in a sense, it might only be a question of degree, that degree was vitally important, for the Jewish homeland promised in the Balfour Declaration was never intended to be limited to Jews already in Palestine as would be the inevitable result under his plan, but rather to provide a home for any oppressed or homeless Jews anywhere; otherwise it would be pointless. Mr. Morrison claimed his plan did not intend to be so limited.

The Lord President, like the Prime Minister, seemed eager to find a prompt solution to the Palestine problem, but equally loath to do anything which might "Arouse" the Arabs. He seemed to feel, somewhat bitterly, perhaps, that the whole question could have been equitable and easily solved by the preceding British Government during the early stages of the war. However, he very frankly admitted that his own Government could not indefinitely continue to "ride with the hounds and run with the hare;" his own expression, it might be added.

3. The Under-Sec'y. of State for Colonies.

All colonial affairs for the British Government, including Palestine, are in charge of the Under-Sec'y. of State for Colonies, presently Mr. Arthur Creech-Jones, with whom the Committee's representative had his next conference. This was lengthy and enlightening. At one time Mr. Creech-Jones was an ardent advocate of Zionism, in Parliament. He gave the impression that he had not fundamentally changed his opinions.

Nevertheless his main concern seemed to be the possible Arab reaction to any decision and the importance of the whole Moslem World to the Empire. He pointed out that the recent war had proven to the Western World the importance of Empire security, a question which today "definitely affects the United States." He also wondered what Russia's reaction might be to British withdrawal from Palestine. His constitutional position being more administrative than policy making, this discussion was largely confined to Britain's actual handling of the present situation and the consequences which might arise therefrom; and he seemed genuinely concerned about the activities of the Jewish Underground, both as regards "illegal" immigration and "acts of violence."

"To threaten is the surest way to get the British back up," he said, and wished discussion of a solution could proceed in a calmer atmosphere. He, too, expressed the hope that the Jews would eventually participate in the Arab-Jewish Conference.

He explained at length the British Administration in Palestine, and emphasized the conviction of the Colonial office that the country could not presently absorb any large influx of Hebrew or any other kind of immigration, either economically or politically. He pointed out that the British public were slowly but surely becoming aroused over the piecemeal assassination of British soldiers innocent of anything but blind obedience to orders, and apparently felt that this could become a political obstacle to a fair and sound solution of the problem.

He seemed impressed by the Committee's proposal but, of course, was noncommittal. Other than administrative explanations, obviously of great help to the Committee's representative later on, his chief contribution to the general picture, was the flat statement that if the United States would agree to receive some of the homeless Jews now in concentration camps in Europe, it would be far easier to solve the local

problem. Pressed for an explanation, he said that the chief fear of the Arabs and in turn of the Colonial Office was that the granting of any original immigration demands would lead to further demands which could not practicably be granted.

Unquestionably, the Colonial Office feels that in due time some sort of Jewish State will be created in Palestine. But unquestionably also, this conviction is subordinated to the much wider Moslem problem facing the Empire.

On the query of how Empire security could be jeopardized by the creation of a Jewish Democracy in Palestine, Mr. Creech-Jones replied that it was more a problem of how such a Democracy could be fitted into the general picture of the Middle-East. He pointed out that if Palestine were on one side of the Suez Canal, Egypt was on the other. To which the obvious rejoinder was made: that Britain was even now terminating her occupation of Egypt.

Further discussion centered on the personalities of those presently representing the Colonial Office in Palestine.

As to Colonial Office policy there, in particular, and British Middle-East policy in general, it was only after his arrival in Palestine that the Committee's representative believed he discovered the real reasons for them, - all of which will subsequently be taken up in this report.

4. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.

At two separate luncheons, the Committee's representative discussed his mission with a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and its British Secretary. The Pigeon-holing of the Committee's report, which at least had the merit of official American participation, apparently gave them a prejudiced approach to any further discussion of the problem, and at least one of them, Mr. R. E. Manningham-Buller, saw no possible satisfactory solution. The other, Mr. H. Beeley was more hopeful, though he too felt an opportunity had been missed. Indeed Parliamentary opinion in general regretted that the report had not been followed up, irrespective of its merits, on the theory that it did, after all, represent Anglo-American opinion and could be reasonably used to obtain further American participation. Everything said, however, confirmed impressions obtained at previous conferences. If these luncheons are mentioned here at all, it is merely to emphasize the fact that all shades of British opinion were sought by the Committee's representative, and discussion of the report and its "whys" and "wherefores" was inevitably informative on a factual basis. Actually, the report itself, which was lengthy and painstakingly compiled offered no decisive or clear-cut solution.

It might be interesting to note that the luncheon with Mr. Beeley was given by Mr. Lewis Jones, member of our American Embassy Staff charged with Middle-East matters, who, throughout the London visit of the Committee's representative, was most helpful and cooperative.

5. Parliamentary Opinion

Mention has already been made of parliamentary opinion on the Jewish question and perhaps it would be well to enlarge on the subject. The Committee's representative conferred at various times during his visit approximately with fifty members of the House of Commons, representing both parties and all shades of opinion. Many of them were old friends of the Committee's representative, and some of them had been extremely helpful to

him on previous missions. While good taste precludes the mention of all of their names, given the private nature of most of the conversations, two at least must be mentioned in grateful recognition of their constructive help: Capt. L.D. Gammans and Lord Hinchinbroke, heir to the Earl of Sandwich. Each of these friends, in a sort of "amicus curiae" position, arranged for any number of meetings with his colleagues.

The attitude of Parliament seemed to be one of bewilderment, bitterness and benignity. Bewilderment because they cannot grasp the Government's program, if any; bitterness, because of the apparently unnecessary loss of both British lives and prestige; benignity, because they sincerely want to fulfill their obligations under the Balfour Declaration and are convinced that a forthright and forceful decision in this connection should and could be made with benefit to all concerned. If this sums up to criticism of the Government then it is criticism of the Government; which, incidentally is sure to grow in volume.

Not one member approached, seemed seriously concerned about an Arab uprising under the circumstances, although every such member apparently believed a Jewish State inevitable. Some of them felt Great Britain would throw the whole business into the lap of the United Nations forthwith, and be done with it!

B. Palestine

1. The British Point of View:

In Palestine itself the British point of view seems to be a mixture of legalistic determination under the White Papers and moral obligation under the Balfour Declaration; not a very consistent program. Generally speaking, local British policy is apparently based on what the Committee's representative is convinced are four fallacies. First, that if a decision in Palestine is made ostensibly in favor of the Jews, the Arabs will rise. Second, that the Jewish Underground is a minority group of violent extremists, frowned upon by the mass of the population. Third, that the country is presently incapable of absorbing any increase in population. Fourth, that Russia will surely rush in where Britain fails to tread. It will be the purpose of this report to attempt to prove each of these arguments unfounded.

In the meantime, local conditions and general prospects for a solution are in no way improved by the retention, as overall military commander, of a man, who, having got his wind up over the destruction of the King David Hotel, so far forgot his mission and the best interests of his country, as to vilify the whole Jewish population, which presumably he had been sent out to protect quite as much as the rest of the population of Palestine.

Travelling north from Jerusalem, where Supreme British Army Headquarters is located, to Haifa, militarily administered by General Gale, one is almost startled by the change in the attitude of the population and, correspondingly, of the military. At least ninety per cent of the so-called terrorist incidents occur in the Jerusalem - Tel-Aviv area. Indeed, the Committee's representative was subjected to a horrid evening of them in Jerusalem - while comparatively none occur in the area administered by General Gale. The Committee's representative conferred at length with General Gale in Haifa, and was deeply impressed with his approach to the whole problem and the evident respect in which he was held by the local population, both Jewish and Arab.

2. Colonial:

Far more significant from a political point of view is the attitude of the representatives of the Colonial Office, who,

together with the High Commissioner, represent the Crown, and are, in fact, the real Governors of Palestine. Obviously policy is being carried out under Home Government instructions. But it is very doubtful whether these instructions are always based on sound advice from the scene of action. There is an evident attempt on the part of the Civil Servants in the lower category, who are inevitably closest to the picture, to arrange the situation to fit policy, rather than to arrange policy to fit the situation. It can even be suspected that certain Arab flare-backs are prompted from without, by design, rather than from within by desire. Certainly the argument that the Arabs and the Jews cannot and will not get along together is belied by even a casual investigation of the facts.

The Palestine Police Force, for instance, which is commanded and administered by the British under an English Inspector General, W. Nicoll Grey, whose heroism, tact and ability is an inspiration to anyone coming in contact with him, has the complete confidence of the general public. Yet it is formed of a mixture of Arabs and Jews. In one station you will find an Arab sergeant commanding Jewish privates; in another a Jewish sergeant commanding Arab privates; and in still another a conglomeration of the two; all functioning happily and efficiently together. Likewise, two Citrus Growers Association consists of a Board of Directors evenly divided between Jews and Arabs, which functions effectively and amicably; and there are many more examples of the same sort. In other words, deprived (sic) of political instigation, the Arabs and the Jews do get along.

That certain of the Arab chieftains, or Effendis, are suspicious or resentful of the improved standard of living of the masses resulting from the advent of the Jews, cannot be gainsaid. But certainly the day has passed when within Palestine itself any local tribal chief or political leader can cause serious trouble, or, at least, trouble that cannot be localized and speedily and successfully controlled.

The machinations of some of the members of the Colonial Office in this connection has already been mentioned. But the justification of policy prompted by unsound advice from the scene of action cannot be entirely confined to the lower brackets. The splendid members of the Army or bodyguard of King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, Arabs every one of them, equipped, trained and armed by the British, individually and as units move freely through present day Palestinian territory, and are, in fact, occasionally used for police or military purposes there. Could one conceive of a more provocative situation? Even the British residents are embarrassed and apologize for what they claim is a mistake.

The Committee's representative conferred on all these matters with responsible local British officials, beginning with his Excellency, the British High Commissioner, Lieut. Gen. Sir Alan Cr. Cunningham, who is the direct representative of the Crown. Sir Alan is typical of the British Overseas statesman who is sincerely attempting to carry out difficult instructions with tact and ability. His breadth of vision and his desire to acquit himself well, not just with his Government, but with the people he had been sent out to govern, was deeply impressive. He, too, however, talked about the Arab problem, although in a far more rational vein than some of those who had discussed it at a distance. He felt, for instance, that if the Jews and Arabs were left to their own devices, the Jews would hold the upper hand initially, but the Arabs would eventually overwhelm them. He asked if the Committee's representative was going to see any Arab leaders, - even suggesting one - eventually conferred with, it might be added, - and hoped that their story as well as that of the Jews would be told to the American people. He was also anxious that a visit be made to various of the cooperative and collective farms run by the Jews as pioneer units, and particularly

mentioned one near the Dead Sea, as an outstanding example. Here the salt had to be drained out of the land before any crops could be grown. He pointed out that while this was too expensive a process to be generally applied, he knew of no other place where the courage, ingenuity, and infinite patience of the Jewish pioneers was better demonstrated. These facts were later confirmed by personal inspection.

Another local official conferred with at length was Sir Henry Gurney, the Secretary. Sir Henry is the direct representative of the Colonial Office in Palestine. The conference was largely a repetition of previous conversations with other officials, locally and in London, although it is clear that he has a far more realistic grasp of the situation than his superiors in London. He was helpful as to information of a fact-finding sort, but apparently had the universal Colonial Office prejudice in favor of the Arabs. In this connection, it might be well to point out a possible explanation of this widespread British attitude. It is obviously far easier and simpler to deal with local Arab Chieftains who control the local population as dictators, than to deal more clumsily with any group formed along democratic and representative lines, such as is set up by the Jews. Some, at least, of the British local officials openly feel this way.

C. Commercial:

Of course, the whole question of Statehood for the Jews, the Arabs, or a combination of the two cannot be divorced from the ability of the area independently to support its population. It is widely maintained and generally assumed that Palestine is a purely agricultural state, with consequent population limits. While this may be more or less true today, it need by no means be true in the future. Jewish pioneering in Palestine along industrial and commercial lines has been quite as impressive as along agricultural lines, although perhaps not quite as dramatic. This has been deliberate Jewish policy, for it is obvious that no large increase in Palestinian population so essential to the creation of an adequate homeland for the homeless Jews in Europe can be based on agriculture alone.

Whether the Mandatory Power, aware of the native genius of the Hebrew along commercial lines, is loath to promote a possible local competitor to Empire goods, or whether this particular endeavor on the part of the Jews in Palestine is not yet taken seriously, the fact remains that every possible hindrance is placed in the path of industrial development in Palestine. The impossibility of obtaining dollars to purchase badly needed equipment and machinery, lack of adequate transportation facilities, and exceptionally high taxes are just a few of the hindrances which might be mentioned.

There has been some talk of damming the River Jordan and the creation of an operating corporation like the Tennessee Valley Authority in America, which would provide cheap power for industrial expansion and agricultural irrigation purposes. So far, this has remained in the realm of discussion. It is said that the neighboring Arab States would refuse to cooperate and that Jew, Moslem and Christian would vigorously oppose any such "desecration" of the holy waters of the Jordan. It is the Committee's representative's firm opinion that these objections are largely legendary, and that a serious study should be made of the industrial possibilities in this regard. At a subsequent point in this report, the industrial situation in Palestine will be gone into more fully. Suffice it to say here that, despite ~~the~~ the fact that the Mandatory Power apparently confines its interest in the commercial sphere to the possibility of marketing British goods, infant industries under Jewish guidance are springing up all over Palestine.

D. Military:

For many years the presence of British Arms in Palestine was symbolic of Jewish freedom. Not even the most rabid Jewish Anglophobe can deny that British troops saved the day when, some years ago, disreputable politicians incited serious Arab riots against the Jews. Nor can he deny that English sympathy and English protection were entirely responsible for the original opening of the biblical promised land to the Jews.

If the picture has changed today, if the mass of the Jewish population in Palestine look upon the British troops there as an enemy occupying force, it is probably because the Jews, ninety-nine per cent of whom have had one or more members of their family or friends tortured or wantonly slain in Europe, consider British refusal to open the promised homeland to the homeless when they need it most, as an act openly inimical to the Jews, and because the impingement of this local and, to them, hideous, policy on the wider Empire policy of security has not been understood or possibly even properly explained.

In any event, the current military situation in Palestine is obviously an intolerable one from both the Jewish and the British point of view. The verbal attack of the British Military Commander on all Jews indiscriminately, and his promulgation of orders forbidding the troops under his command to have anything whatsoever to do with the Jewish population hastened, if it did not actually bring about, popular conviction that Great Britain was now anti-Jewish and that the Balfour Declaration had become just another one of those "scraps of paper."

On the other hand the British troops themselves, merely carrying out orders, feel themselves the innocent victims of policy and apparently view their current duties with considerable distaste except for those whom local incidents have imbued with a dangerous hatred for the Hebrews. Certainly the Army is not to blame for the situation. The danger, as always in such situations, is the possible frustration of high minds by hot heads and the high-handed action which so often ensues.

The British have to keep troops in Palestine for obvious reasons of Middle-East security. The Jews, in their current desperation, too frequently forget this extremely important fact. Should present British public pressure force their withdrawal before some satisfactory formula for substitution be found, it would probably be as sorry a day for the Jews in Palestine as for anyone else. It is unfortunate that a better public relations job on this score has not been done by the British in Palestine.

2. The Jewish Agency

a. Political

The Jewish Agency in Palestine is in a quasi-governmental position. It was set up by the British, under the Balfour Declaration, to supervise the creation of the promised Jewish homeland. It functions not only under, but to the best of its ability, with the Mandatory Power in administering the State. Its principal though limited function is as a sort of land-holding corporation administering Jewish funds for the purchase and maintenance of agricultural properties. As the only Jewish organization recognized locally by the British for handling Jewish matters, it has a great deal of influence with the Jewish population, although lately, for reasons which will become obvious, it has lost some of its local prestige.

The Committee's representative conferred at length with its acting president, (the President was attending

the Zionist Congress at Basle) and with the Agency's brilliant fiscal agent. Publicly, the Jewish Agency supports the British policy in Palestine. Privately, it admits to a state of undeclared war and does everything possible to facilitate the entry into Palestine of the homeless Jews in Europe. It maintains that under the Balfour Declaration and the implied, if not the actual terms of the Mandate, the British have no right to prevent the immigration of these people. At one point, the British summarily arrested and threw into a local concentration camp all the top-flight officials of the Agency, and some of the minor ones. While they were eventually released, the occasion marked the end of any real cooperation between the Agency and the Mandatory Power.

The Committee's representative came away with a very favorable impression of the courageous and exemplary policy of this organization. The administrators are fearful of jeopardizing what small hold for a homeland the Jews have already obtained in Palestine by any open quarrel with the British, but this has by no means dissipated their loyalties or warped their judgment, and the best that can be said for their present relations with the local government is that it consists of a sort of armed truce.

Thanks to the cooperation of the Agency, it was possible to inspect not only many of their own projects, but many others as well.

b. Agricultural

The principal projects of interest to a student of modern Palestine are agricultural, for here all the outstanding qualities of the Jew as a pioneer are in evidence. These consist largely of land units purchased by or through the Jewish National Fund and directly or indirectly administered by the Agency, as land developments for purely agricultural purposes. They are both cooperatives or "colonies", involving individual ownership which shares certain projects and equipment; collectives, which are communal but in no sense communistic, for the profit motive is enthusiastically recognized; and farms, which are comparatively large holdings operated and owned individually. Several of each kind were visited by the Committee's representative, including the "collective" near the Dead Sea, mentioned by Sir Alan Cunningham. The type of men and women engaged in these projects is of the highest, and their pioneering spirit, reminiscent of the early days of America's West, is both moving and inspiring; for these undertakings are by no means without hazard, in lonely countryside where frequently brigands and robber bands wander.

The produce from these projects is either marketed cooperatively or consumed on the premises, or both. Fruit, wheat and vegetables are grown, and generally dairy and beef herds maintained. A unique angle of farming in this connection, at least to the Committee's representative, was the existence on several of these projects of "fish farms" consisting of a series of artificial pools in which native fish were bred and kept for periodic disposal in the market as well as for home consumption. It is said that this is a very lucrative enterprise in the inland areas and is further tribute to the genius of the Jewish pioneer.

The cradle of this agricultural success in Palestine is probably the Weizmann Chemical Foundation and the adjoining Agricultural Station. They were both visited by the Committee's representative. The Foundation is constantly experimenting among many other things, of course, and contributing steadily to local fertilizer possibilities. It is largely on guard against animal and human diseases, and provides valuable and authoritative information in this regard, as a result of its experiments.

The Agricultural Station, which is beautifully equipped and capably managed along the lines of similar stations in America, studies the soil of various localities in Palestine and maintains nurseries for the study of both citrus and general agricultural produce as well as for forestation and reforestation.

Palestine is a large citrus fruit country, and the Arabs and Jews have cooperated most impressively in developing its agricultural possibilities. The Committee's representative visited several large orange and banana plantations and, on a visit to Tel-Aviv, saw hundreds of thousands of crates of oranges being loaded for shipment abroad. This business alone in Palestine runs into many millions of dollars in gross turn-over, and is capable of employing thousands of Jewish immigrants.

Another product of the country which comes under the head of both agriculture and industry is wine, in which again there is a large and lucrative financial turn-over and vast employment possibilities. The industry was originally started by Baron Edmond de Rothschild in the early part of the century. The Committee's representative visited one of the principal wineries and is able to vouch for the importance of the enterprise and the excellence of the product.

c. Industrial

At least one of the industrial developments of Palestine has prospered with government support. This is the phosphate plant on the Dead Sea, one of the largest phosphate producing units in the world. The Dead Sea of immortal biblical fame, is, it might be pointed out here, 1292 feet below sea level! In summer the atmosphere is almost intolerable. Yet here again the intrepid Jewish pioneer has established a successful project. The war, of course, made its product invaluable. Today it is principally controlled by the British Government, although the land belongs to the Jews; is only held in trust by the British; and under an outstanding agreement, based on payments made and to be made, is eventually to be returned to its Jewish owners.

Another Palestinian product geologically present is cement, a large plant for its production is near Haifa. Incidentally, close by is a prosperous farm unit, - further proof of the courage and ingenuity of the Jewish pioneer, who created out of desert soil a veritable garden of Eden. This, too, is owned by the British.

The Committee's representative visited both the phosphate and cement projects as well as the farm unit just mentioned.

Besides these two important industries, there are being developed, as has been pointed out, many other industrial projects. A morning was spent in Tel-Aviv, with the President of the Manufacturers' Association of Palestine, visiting the Industrial Exhibit there. The Exhibit tells a story of courage and of genius which is epic in itself. Light industries have been developed covering almost every line of household and small plant equipment as well as wearing apparel, including shoes and leather goods generally. A conference was also held with the officials of the General Federation of Labor and later with the labor organization of the Orthodox Jews.

Labor itself owns and operates two of the largest industrial plants in Palestine. One is a steel plant and the other is a glass works, both at Haifa. Both were inspected, and subsequently an evening was spent with the chief engineer of the steel mill in his home discussing the problems and possibilities of his project.

The housing projects of the City of Tel-Aviv and the infant but thriving shipyard there, were also visited.

It is the sincere opinion of the Committee's representative that lucrative industrial expansion employing hundreds of thousands of people would result overnight were any modicum of economic freedom given to the local industrialists.

d. Health and Sanitation

The whole question of health and sanitation in the Jewish community is well handled by the Vaad Leumi or Jewish National Council. There is one project in this connection, however, without which no report on Palestine would be complete. That is the Hadassah Hospital built and largely maintained by the Hadassah Organization of Jewish Women in America. The hospital is modern, beautiful, and complete. Its wide windows, facing on flower-massed courts, overlook the hills of biblical fame and the distant Dead Sea. Its particular significance in this report, aside from well-deserved tribute to the doctors and nurses who staff it, and the generosity of the American women who made it possible, is to point out that here again Arab and Jew live together in peace and contentment. Much of the time, there are as many Arab patients as Jewish, and always there is a large percentage of Arabs in the wards. It is significant to note in this connection that today even the local Arab Chieftains, or Effendis, send their wives, of whom they each have several, to Hadassah Hospital to have their children!

On the educational side, primary schools are maintained in every center and in most of the projects. Adjoining Hadassah Hospital on Mt. Scopus, with the same view over the "everlasting hills" and the Dead Sea, is the great Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Its library contains a priceless collection of Hebrew manuscripts and literature dating back to the dim past. Students from all over the world are enrolled, including American soldiers, under the "G. I." Bill of Rights.

3. The Arab Point of View:

a. Within Palestine

Generally speaking, the Committee's representative got the impression that the Arab problem within Palestine is physical rather than political; for it is the increased standard of living throughout Palestine resulting from Jewish initiative and enterprise which has clipped the wings of the old-fashioned Arab Chieftains, more inclined to think of their employees as serfs than as human beings, and now genuinely troubled about their own future. Nor has the more modern Arab landowner been untouched by this situation. On the one hand, Arab workers have already formed a labor organization which demands better standards; and on the other hand, the increased value of his land is a constant and too often irresistible temptation to strip himself of his very means of livelihood. As a result, the Arab apparently entertains a very real fear of being crowded out of the land by his neighbors. Indeed a paradox!

In the meantime, in an attempt to maintain some semblance of the status quo, the Government has divided the whole of Palestine into zones restricted and unrestricted for purposes of land purchase, as the case may be (see Appendix). It is the belief of the Committee's representative that this zoning tends to divide the Arabs and the Jews rather than to accomplish its protective purposes.

Several of the younger and Westernized Arabs conferred with, who had been educated either at the American University at Beirut or abroad, maintained that Palestine should be an Arab State on the theory that the land had been occupied by the Arabs for many hundreds of years. This fact is constantly being pointed out by the Arabs without mentioning the further fact that this particular Arab tenure had been under the political domination of the Turks, a yoke only removed by Allied arms in the first World War. In addition, Palestine in all its history has never been ruled by the Arabs.

A morning was also spent conferring with one of the leading Arabs of Palestine, Dr. Hkaldi, President of the superb Arab College in Jerusalem, and brother of one of the leading members of the Arab Committee in Palestine. He made a strong presentation of the Arab case, and their right to remain a political majority in the land they had occupied for so long. He seemed very much interested, however, in the Committee's proposal, particularly the theory of a non-resident political majority, confirming the impression of physical rather than political concern. He was particularly bitter over the fact that so much of the vast, and admitted, accomplishments of the Jews had been made possible by money from abroad while the Arabs had to "start from scratch." When it was pointed out to him that untold foreign funds were passing into Arab hands for oil leases, he avoided the issue by saying that this money did not come into Palestine. So completely westernized in dress and conversation, and so definitely cosmopolitan in his approach that he could easily be taken for an Englishman or an American, he nevertheless argues that in spite of the admitted improvements brought by the Jews, the Arab should be permitted to scratch dead soil should he so desire!

b. Outside Palestine:

By contrast the most vigorous exponent of modernizing the Middle-East, and consequently the Arab, came from a living symbol of the past, King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, son of the famous Emir Feisal Ibn Hussein, and one of the leaders of the revolt against the Turks who refused any sort of compromise. The Committee's representative lunched with him at his summer villa in Trans-Jordan, and was deeply impressed with the brilliance as well as the subtleties of his definitely inquiring mind. His chief concern seemed to be that whatever was decided about Palestine, the United States should recognize Trans-Jordan and his regime there. This, of course, could be an important bargaining point, should the powers recognize the separation of Trans-Jordan, which is part of Palestine under the Mandate. However, the King was by no means entirely egotistical in the interview. He dwelt at length on the possibilities in the Middle-East and the importance of modernizing it with American help and money, which he was sure would be returned many times over and prove the soundest of investments both financially and politically.

Of course the point of view of the Arab League, of which Trans-Jordan is a member, and which purports to represent the Arabs outside Palestine, is frankly political. It is the opinion of the Committee's representative that the chief support of the Arab League, other than that provided by Great Britain which created it, comes on the one hand from the students already mentioned who are keen to modernize the Middle-East, and on the other from Saudi Arabia for purely oriental purposes. It is not the intention of this report to belittle or ignore the aims and ambitions of any of the Middle-Eastern States. On the contrary, given the above stated conviction that the Middle-East can only be considered as a whole, the Committee's representative is fully persuaded that American financial and commercial participation in the development of the Middle-East is of paramount importance and shall so shortly recommend.

4. The Jewish Point of View:

a. Within Palestine

The Jewish point of view within Palestine is an absolutely forthright one. The Jews in Palestine are not only in favor of creating a Palestinian democracy with a Jewish majority, but are actively engaged in promoting it both through the Underground, of which more later, and through their agricultural, political, and industrial activities.

While the Jewish Agency itself, as has been already pointed out, is extremely reserved on this score, due to its quasi-governmental position; and while the Jewish population lives not only under the rule of the Mandatory Power, but under the extremely watchful eye of the Mandatory Power's Army; both are one hundred per cent active in promoting the Jewish State in question.

The better part of a morning was spent with the Chief Rabbi of Palestine, Rabbi Izaac Herzog, who summed this situation up as effectively and as eloquently as it probably could be put. Having spent ten years in Ireland as spiritual head of the Jews there, he speaks fluent English with such a pronounced Irish brogue that the effect, under the circumstances, is dramatic to say the least. He was one of the most sincere and inspiring men the Committee's representative met on his mission. His parting words were:

"This is our historical homeland. We are not really wanted anywhere else. At least give us a chance to fulfill our destiny here."

b. Outside Palestine:

Outside of Palestine, whether in America, England, France, or anywhere else in the Western World, the Committee's representative, who has for many years been a student of this problem, finds mixed feelings on the question of Palestine, amongst certain of the Jews. These Jews, however, who for one reason or another appear more or less opposed to the Zionist cause in Palestine, are in a minority. The records show that the mass of the Jews everywhere are ardent Zionists. Nothing could be further from the mind of the author of this report than to present any solution which would involve in any way the nationals of any country who might be incidentally of the Jewish faith but who by birth or adoption have their roots deep in the soil of lands other than Palestine. In this day and age the proposal of a theocracy anywhere would be abhorrent and, for that matter, inadmissible. Nor do the Zionists seek any such thing. Those of the Jewish faith who are in fact British, American, French or citizens of any other country need have no part in any Palestine proposal except insofar as their individual kinship, interest, or generosity prompts them to contribute thereto as Americans of Czech, Polish, or Irish extraction, for example, contributed to the re-creation of their former homelands.

The very use of the words "homeland for the Jews" bespeaks homeless Jews, and whatever is said or proposed in this report regarding Palestine is based on that premise. The writer has found many of the Jewish faith in other countries disturbed by the thought of the creation of any state which might by implication differentiate them from their fellow citizens. It would be well to point out here and now that the creation of a free State in Ireland with a Catholic majority, or in Czechoslovakia or in Poland in no way involved the nationals of other countries of Irish, Czech, or Polish origin except in so far as they, themselves, chose to be involved.

If this point is mentioned at all in this report it is because the importance of obtaining world support under the United Nations for the creation of this homeland for the Jews in Palestine involves inevitably at least the moral support of the peoples of the world, whatever their race or creed who function on such matters through the United Nations.

5. Summary

That the aim of both the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine is the creation of an independent Palestinian democracy is now a matter of public record. Of course the Arabs want such a State controlled by the Arabs, and the Jews want it controlled by the Jews. But the desire for an independent Palestine is common to both groups. More significant as a local common denominator, however, is the complete unanimity of both groups in their fear of communism and their determination to avoid more than formal relations with any state advocating such a political philosophy.

Nothing could be more alien to the Arab way of life, with its deep-rooted feudal customs and its local recognition of somewhat dictatorial chieftains than the communist system. As for the Jews in Palestine, too many of them were hounded from their original homes in Eastern Europe by powers politically communistic for them to welcome even the semblance of such a system in their new homeland.

This universal attitude in Palestine must be taken into consideration in an attempt to arrive at any solution of the Middle-East problem.

C. The Underground or Resistance Movement

1. Their relation to the public:

The so-called Underground or Resistance Movement in Palestine has been variously described as "a small band of sincere patriots," "a misguided group of die-hards," "a handful of bandits and assassins who feel that the current unrest gives them license to do anything", and "a collection of aliens who are only interested in power for themselves," to mention a few of the terms applied. None of these things are true. The Underground Movement in Palestine, in its several groupings, consists directly or indirectly of the majority of the people in Palestine; and that, perforce, includes the Arabs. It should not be inferred from this statement that all Palestinians are actually members of one or the other of these "resistance" groups, but it is a fact that the mass of the population support these Underground activities in their various categories.

2. Their Organization

a. The Haganah

Theoretically, there are three resistance or underground movements, although one is quite open in its purposes and in most of its activities and actually embraces in its membership the members of the other two. The first and parent organization, is the Haganah. It was originally founded as a sort of "Homeguard" for protection against the inevitable hazards of pioneering, such as pillage and robbery, but more recently has been active in promoting so-called "illegal" Jewish immigration. Once only has it allegedly resorted to violence, and that was in blowing up the bridge across the River Jordan as symbolic of Jewish disapproval of the Mandatory in dividing Palestine into two separate states. Practically every Jew in Palestine is a member of the Haganah, including, as has been said, those who are members of the other two groups.

b. The Irgun

The second is the Irgun Zvai Leumi, a group of patriots, which, under the leadership of David Raziel, split from the Haganah in order to take a more positive part in the creation of the Jewish homeland, and which currently destroys military installations, but avoids bloodshed, wherever possible. Its membership consists of approximately 20,000 able-bodied young Jewish men and women definitely organized along military lines.

c. The F.F.I. or "Stern" Group

The third is the F.F.I. (Fighters for Freedom of Israel), more popularly known as the "Stern" group, because of the name of its founder, Abraham Stern, who led a group of Zealots in a break from the Irgun, because the latter swore allegiance to the British during the recent war. It frankly believes in bloodshed and assassination as the only way to bring the current situation forcibly home, not only to the Mandatory Power but to the world at large. It consists of about 2000 young Jewish fanatics. Incidentally, the founder, Stern, is no longer alive. He was killed in 1941 when his home was entered by a British Captain and Lieutenant and two British soldiers, and one of the officers, firing into a closet where he was hiding, killed him.

As the author of this report has mentioned before and now repeats, it is his most earnest conviction that these three movements, separately and collectively, are widely supported by the population, both Jewish and Arab, and that they are slowly but surely forcing the British Military in Palestine out of the position of a friendly force and into the position of an enemy occupying Army; at least in the public mind. There can be no other explanation of the failure of the British to apprehend any of either the instigators or actual perpetrators of current acts of violence. Likewise, it is well known that the so-called robberies of institutions to obtain funds are collusive and only items heavily insured are taken.

3. Visit to Irgun Commander

The Committee's representative spent the better part of an afternoon with Menahem Beigen, the head of one of these organizations, the Irgun Zvai Leumi. Although he has two "stand-ins", who apparently so resemble him as to be indistinguishable one from another and either from him, subsequent events have proven beyond peradventure of a doubt that Menahem Beigen was the man interviewed. He is a saintly looking, calm, and extremely soft-spoken man with an evident distaste for bloodshed. The portrait of a zealot, there is no question that he is a sincere patriot.

The author of this report, who has expressed himself both publicly and privately as opposed to violence in the current situation in Palestine, went to this conference in some trepidation, but came out, if not in approval of the Movement, certainly impressed by the sincerity of its motives and the motives of its leader. The circumstances leading up to this interview were themselves so dramatic and significant of the present Palestinian picture as to warrant a brief review in this report.

Having personally no contact with the Underground except through the local press, this medium was successfully employed for publicizing the desire for a rendezvous. Breakfasting in his hotel room one morning, the Committee's representative was called on the telephone by a young woman:

"I will see you"

"Who is this talking?"

"You will not know."

On the realization that this might be the sought-for Underground contact, the young woman was directed to come to the room.

It was only then that the thought of possible personal violence occurred. After all, a dead congressman might be a surer way of bringing the United States into the picture than a live one of persuading them. So the door was opened cautiously and when a bunch of flowers, the traditional cover for assassination weapons appeared, the door was very nearly slammed shut. Fortunately the flowers were promptly followed by a young girl of sixteen or seventeen, literally a "bobby-soxer."

"You will see my chief?"

"Who is your Chief?"

"The head of the Irgun."

"Yes, I would like very much to see him."

"Then you will be in the lobby at 2:30

this afternoon. You will ask no questions. You will be gone six hours."

The mysterious young messenger departed.

The 2:30 P.M. rendezvous in the hotel was kept; but it must be confessed that the precautionary measure of asking the American Consul General to organize searching parties after 9:30 P.M. was taken.

A closed car with two drivers and the "bobby-soxer" as escort constituted the personnel for the initial part of the trip, which was completed after dark on foot, and after three cafe stops and three changes of cars and of escort, none of whom, except the last, apparently had any idea of whom they were escorting, and where he was going.

The actual conference was held in a bed-room with Commander Beigen ostensibly ill in bed, a ruse, it was later learned, to prevent any estimate of his height, just as the beard he wore was apparently donned to prevent any knowledge of his actual features.

During the conferences, two of the leader's lieutenants were presented. They were stalwart, clean-cut young men, with splendid bearing and very real dignity, who stood at attention and saluted smartly.

When it was pointed out to Commander Beigen that the violent tactics of his organization were jeopardizing current political negotiations, he replied that any such negotiations were obviously an indirect result of the bombing of the King David Hotel, which startled the world into a realization that something was wrong in Palestine. He added that the Jews would rather be killed in some sort of military action than to die a slow mental and physical death in concentration camps. Incidentally, he said that the author of this report and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver were the only two foreign representatives he had ever received.

Politically, the Irgun appears to subscribe to the proposals of the Committee, and pending action on the political proposals therein, they are equally convinced there need be no delay in admitting all the homeless Jews into Palestine. They sincerely believe they are following the pattern of other revolutionaries in history and are obviously fanatic in their determination to achieve a Jewish Democracy in Palestine. Every argument of the Committee's representative against the use of violence under the circumstances, irrespective of any possible

attitude of the Committee to the contrary, was met with polite but definite firmness. The Commander expressed concern that innocent British soldiers should be victims of policy but emphasized that history was replete with similar tragedy, and added, "What about the six million Jews slaughtered in Europe?"

It might be added that not only the Irgun but the other Underground Movements are constituted on quasi-military lines; are apparently armed to greater or lesser degree depending on assignment; and that their discipline seems to be perfect. This point was particularly emphasized at the conference as the result of a remark that Underground tactics too often bred either immediate fascism or subsequent disregard of all law and order, even after ostensible objectives had been achieved.

Whatever else may be said about these Underground or Resistance Movements in Palestine, no one who has visited one of their chiefs or talked with any of them, or for that matter discussed the question with any of the rank and file of the population, can deny their courage and sincerity. Opinions may vary as to whether or not they are misguided patriots, but honest opinion cannot possibly deny that they are patriots.

The author of this report has no doubt whatsoever in his mind that these Resistance Movements in Palestine will never cease in their activities until the Jewish homeland in Palestine has become, through Statehood, an actual fact. And it is more than probable that, should no satisfactory solution to this problem of Statehood be found before the Spring, the three movements will combine in lesscovert military action.

D. Immigration

1. As has been said before in this report, and as is known everywhere, the purpose of the Balfour Declaration issued in 1917 was to create a home for the Jews. This is primarily why the League of Nations granted the Mandate over Palestine to Great Britain. As events moved from bad to worse so far as the Jews in Europe were concerned, and as the various nations themselves began to worry about the problem presented by harrassed Jewish minorities, particularly in Eastern Europe where the Great Power there was quietly active in ejecting them, the word "home" in the Balfour Declaration was rapidly translated into "homeland" in the public mind. From that to "Statehood" was an inevitable third step, for in the world as we know it today, apparently no actual homeland anywhere can be created which does not possess, at least under the United Nations, some sort of national sovereignty as a guarantee.

The whole problem came to a head when the British published their first White Paper, covering the subject. This White Paper was progressively followed by others until by 1939, with the publication of the final version, Jewish immigration was limited to a pitiful handful a month. The publication and enforcement of these White Papers rapidly nullified the whole purpose and intent of the Balfour Declaration. This tragic fact is not difficult to prove, for if even temporary refugee camps, as proposed by the author of this report in the United States Congress had been provided in Palestine for the Jews fleeing Hitler's purge, we now know that hundreds of thousands of the six million exterminated might have been saved. Hundreds of them literally swam from Denmark to Sweden when that country offered them temporary refuge in the form of such camps! In the meantime, in the very homeland which they had been promised, the doors were barred by this succession of British White Papers.

2. Absorption Possibilities of Palestine

While it is the opinion of the Committee's representative that the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine

should not necessarily be predicated on the immediate acceptance as residents of the million or more homeless Jews in Europe, for it would seem reasonable to permit the proposed State to make its own decisions thereon, it is equally the opinion of the Committee's representative that at least five or six hundred thousand of them could immediately be absorbed by Palestine without any fundamental economic disruption. In an inspection of the City of Tel-Aviv, its works, its shipyard, its hotels, cafes, suburbs, adjacent small factories, housing and general construction, it was successfully demonstrated to the author of this report that there alone nearly two hundred thousand newcomers could be housed, cared for, and employed in no time at all! There is no question that if real economic freedom were granted to any proposed Jewish State in Palestine, hundreds of thousands of immigrants could be absorbed promptly.

3. So-Called "Illegal" Immigration

On the question of "illegal" immigration the general assumption on the part of the Jewish population in Palestine is that it is not illegal under the Balfour Declaration, and that Great Britain exceeded its right under the Mandate in publishing and enforcing the terms of the White Papers which limited immigration. It is becoming increasingly obvious to the world at large and for a long time must have been obvious to the Mandatory Power that the "illegal" immigration in question is not only being promoted by the Jews within and without Palestine, but by people everywhere, in France, in Germany, in America, even in England itself. Surely the numerous ships which have left Europe for Palestine laden with immigrants who are unloaded at Cyprus, cannot be purchased, leased, run or equipped, leaky and unseaworthy though most of them seem to be, without money and active cooperation from those outside of Palestine. It is fairly reliably rumored in this connection that to date the fund raised for this "illegal" immigration is approximately thirty-eight million dollars!

It is the opinion of the Committee's representative that should a census be taken today of the Jewish population in Palestine it would be found that it is no longer the six hundred thousand; presumably there but very close to a million. This, of course, could only be proven by an actual census in which the population cooperated, probably only obtainable on a promise of no reprisals and no deportation.

IV. Recommendations

A. Political

Whatever decision is taken regarding Palestine in an attempt to solve the current problem, it is bound to cause temporary trouble and it is consequently essential that it be both forthright and forceful. Even the apparent present British theory, that partition is the only way out, satisfies neither the Jews nor the Arabs, for a majority of both have come out in opposition. It would then seem healthier for the world in general, and Great Britain and the United States in particular, if, whatever the decision, it avoided unnecessary compromise, was final, and, most important of all, was made in Anglo-American agreement and cooperation. It is with these points in mind that the following political recommendations are made:

1. A Jewish State:

It is recommended that the Government of the United States invite the British Government to confer immediately in Washington on the following propositions:

- with a Jewish Majority*
- a. The joint recognition of Palestine as an independent democracy in which shall be included politically the homeless Jews in Europe, and the boundaries of which shall be the existing boundaries of Palestine, temporarily exclusive of Trans-Jordan.
 - b. The joint presentation to the United Nations of:
 - I. A request for similar recognition of such an independent democracy by, and its inclusion in, the United Nations.
 - II. A request for a United Nations Commission to arrange for, and to supervise, the calling of a Palestinian Constitutional Convention and the subsequent elections to be held thereunder, both of which shall include, as electors, the homeless Jews in Europe as Palestinian citizens.
 - III. A request that the British Mandate over Palestine be terminated on the date of assumption of power by the Palestinian Government to be elected.
 - IV. The creation of a United Nations Palestine Land Commission, which shall supervise and approve any land transfers by sale or deed as between Arab and Jewish citizens with the declared purpose of protecting the Arabs in their present land holdings in Palestine, and to insure an orderly return to the Constitutional Government of Palestine of the immense land holdings in Palestine of the Mandatory Power. Such Commission to function during the five initial years of the new State and terminate thereafter.

2. Contingent Recognition of Trans-Jordan

It is further recommended that, contingent upon the recognition by the government of Trans-Jordan and the other Arab League States of the proposed Palestinian State, the Government of the United States recognize the State of Trans-Jordan and other non-recognized members states of the Arab League, and jointly request with Great Britain their inclusion in the United Nations.

B. Financial

It is recommended that the United States Government, through its Export-Import Bank, loan to the several States of the Middle-East up to the sum of three hundred million dollars under the terms of the creation of the bank for such purposes as the bank shall approve and under certain contingent political as well as financial agreements with the States in question, having particularly in mind the use of the River Jordan for industrial power and irrigation purposes.

C. Military

That in order to protect the orderly progress of the proposed independent Palestinian State, the Governments of the United States and Great Britain jointly request the United Nations to establish an International Military Force in Palestine to relieve the present British military force there, and to

function until a local army is trained and equipped, or until the United Nations and the independent Palestinian State decide in formal agreement that such a force is no longer necessary, either for the protection of the New State or for the peace of the world generally.

V. Conclusion:

No one is infallible; and it is far from the mind of the author of this report that his recommendations are necessarily the perfect solution to the problem. But given the facts as he has found them, and given his most earnest desire to offer a solution on the terms of which not only the Zionists but the English, the Americans and the Arabs can eventually agree, he is convinced that the proposals herein presented are both equitable and practical. At least they form a basis not only for discussion but for constructive decision. The Committee's representative would not now offer them did he not believe this, and were he not profoundly convinced that they are the nearest approach to a satisfactory answer which his findings warrant, and the surest guarantee of a permanent state of amity between not only the Jews and Arabs within Palestine but among Palestine and the other States of the Middle-East.

New York, Jan. 21st, 1947 -

To,

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver

With regards from

Joseph Clark Baldwin

Appendix I.The Expenditure by Jewish Urban Consumers
on Food Produced on Jewish Farms.

Prior to the outbreak of War, Jewish urban food consumption was derived as to about 28% from food produced on Jewish farms. In 1943/44 this percentage increased to about 45%. During the last agricultural year, October 1944 - September 1945, however, this proportion did not apparently increase further, except in so far as such increase was reflected in a slightly improved diet. This calculation is based on the average quantities of the various kinds of food consumed, calculated at pre-war farm, respectively c.i.f., prices, thus excluding from the comparison changes in price level as well as the influence of food subsidies. The share of Jewish produce in total supplies is, however, lower if supplies are calculated in calories; this is mainly due to the large dependence on imported bread cereals and oil seeds. Jewish products mainly consisting of milk, and milk products, eggs, poultry, meat, vegetables, potatoes and a few kinds of fresh fruit, have not the highest calory values. These products are usually known as protective foods, and Jewish produce represented in 1938/39 one-third and in 1943/44 nearly 60% of animal protein supplies.

Naturally, assumptions as to food supplies during the post-war development period should not be based exclusively on experiences and achievements during the war; nevertheless, a post-war nutrition policy can and should make use of such war-time experience and achievements.

The following suggestion for a "National Diet", to be introduced gradually, is in the main based on detailed market research and pre-war nutritional tendencies, but the lessons taught by the war have not been neglected. In addition, the

special structure of Jewish intensive agriculture as well as the apparent tendencies in cost of production in the main farm branches have been taken into account:

Pre-War and Suggested Future National Diet
Per Capita Consumption of Jewish Urban Population

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>1937/39</u>	<u>After a ten years' period</u>
Cereals	kg.	150	140
Rice	"	9.5	10
Sugar	"	20	20
Potatoes	"	60	75
Fresh Vegetables	"	52.5	70
Legumes	"	4	4
Bananas	"	11	12
Grapes	"	16	20
Deciduous Fruit	"	25	30
Citrus	"	50	50
Vegetable Fats	"	13	11
Butter	"	5	6
Milk and milk products (in terms of milk)	litres	105*)	200*)
Eggs	No.	265	300
Meat	kg.	22	15 22**)
Poultry	"	5	5
Fish	"	12	12
<u>Per day</u>			
Carbohydrates	gr.	382	381 381**)
Fats	"	69	69 71**)
Proteins	"	80	83 86**)
(thereof animal protein)	"	(29.6)	(36.6) (39.7)
Calories		2,533	2,546 2,573**)

*) Includes skimmed milk obtained in manufacturing local butter (1937/39 about 20 litres, after a 10 years' period 40-50 litres).

**) Higher meat consumption in case of larger purchasing power.

It will be seen from this table that the changes in the suggested diet consist in the first instance in a large increase in the consumption of milk and milk products, in the main, fluid milk and cheese; and, furthermore, a small

increase in egg consumption associated with a decrease in meat consumption. A small decrease in the consumption of cereals (i.e. bread) is also assumed, the deficiency to be replaced by vegetables and potatoes. The relatively small sugar consumption is complemented by a large and, as compared with the pre-war diet, increased fruit consumption.

A detailed calculation of food consumption according to sources of food is given in the following table:

Per Capita Expenditure on Food
by Jewish Urban Population at Farm
and Wholesale Import Prices at the End of the
Development Period

	Jewish Produce		Arab Produce		Foreign Produce		Total	
	kg.	mils	kg.	mils	kg.	mils	kg.	mils
Cereals	35	315	-	-	105	945	140	1,260
Rice	-	-	-	-	10	125	10	0,125
Sugar	-	-	-	-	20	340	20	0,340
Potatoes	60	450	-	-	15	105	75	0,555
Fresh Vegetables	45	338	10	60	15	112	70	0,510
Legumes	1	15	-	-	3	45	4	0,060
Bananas	9	108	3	33	-	-	12	0,141
Grapes	10	100	8	56	2	18	20	0,174
Deciduous fruit	15	225	-	-	15	285	30	0,510
Citrus	40	120	10	30	-	-	50	0,150
Vegetable fats	4	120	-	-	5	150	9	0,270
Olive oil	1 *)	45	1	45	-	-	2*	0,090
Butter	(2.5)	-	-	-	3.5	430	(6)	0,430
Milk and milk products (in terms of full milk) litres	180	1,800	-	-	20	200	200	2,000
Eggs (units)	165	545	30	66	105	231	300	0,842
Meat	6	300	2	100	7	350	15	0,750
Poultry	4	280	1	65	-	-	5	0,345
Fish	4	280	2	110	6	230	12	0,620
Total: £P.	5.041		0.565		3.566		9.172	**))
%	55.0		6.2		38.8		100	

*) Local butter included in Milk and milk products".

**) Minor foodstuffs, not specified in the table and on the whole not produced on Jewish farms, account for a further 10%, thus bringing up the total figure to £P.10.

It will be seen from the table that almost exactly £P.5.- at farm prices will be spent annually per capita on food produced on Jewish farms, and the proportion of Jewish farm produce in the total food budget may be put at 55%.

It may be useful to compare briefly the cost to the consumer of the new diet and that of the diet prevailing during 1937/39. The new diet costs (at pre-war prices) 5% more than that of the last pre-war years, but those years were years of economic depression. Taking the average expenditure on food during the last pre-war decade, the new diet will, at the most, require the same expenditure and probably a slightly lower one. The new diet results moreover in somewhat reduced margins between producer and consumer prices, in itself an achievement favouring both producers and consumers.



Appendix II.

The Marketable Production of a Jewish Farm Unit providing livelihood for four persons

1. The figures used in the present calculation are based on actual figures of income and expenditure in the years 1935-1940, as appearing from an examination of the accounts of approximately 1250 units. Using actual figures of revenue from each branch of production the gross income figures in the present calculation have been adapted to a production plan which would be in accordance with the consumption assumed in the main text. All figures are, of course, pre-war figures.

2. Annual Maintenance Cost, per Head	£P.27.5
Unit of four persons:	£P.110
Cash expenses for general administration per annum and per unit	£P. 5
Cost of borrowed capital invested	£P. 22
	£P.137
Cost of production (not including farmer's own labour but including maintenance and repairs)	£P. 145
	£P.282

3. This amount is covered by the farmer's income from various sources as follows:

a.	Farm Produce for human consumption on the farm	£P.27
b.	Sales of commodities marketed, not included in the definition of Mixed Farm Products supplied to the general public as used in the main text, such as citrus produced in mixed farms, feeding stuffs for animals, seeds, flowers, eggs for breeding purposes, etc.	28
c.	Income from work outside the farm	17
		<u>£P.72</u>
4.	Expenditure	£P.262
	Income from sources specified above	<u>72</u>
	Income derived from sales of food for direct human consumption on urban markets	<u>£P.210</u>

5. The figure of £P.210 is not to be taken as an amount to be aimed at, but as an average revenue actually earned in the past with a production plan as assumed.

6. It will be seen that if the farmer's net income from which he defrays the maintenance of himself and his family amounts to £P.110 and if his income from work outside the farm amounts to £P.17, his net farm income amounts to £P.93.

7. It is also obvious that to the extent that the item of £P.22 is not required for interest and repayment of invested capital borrowed from outside, the money will be available for consumption or saving and the latter can, of course, be used for additional investment in the farm.

8. The total value of output (excluding fodder grown on the farm for own livestock and manure used on the farm) comes to £P.265 as follows:-

(a)	£P.210	sales of food
(b)	£P. 28	" " various commodities, not included in (a)
(c)	£P. 27	farm produce for human consumption on the farm
Total	<u>£P.265</u>	



Appendix III.

Agricultural Production for Export.

1) Exports of Vegetables, Fruit (Citrus excluded) Seeds and Flowers.

Palastine's climate permits of exports of the above mentioned commodities at seasons when prices in Europe are comparatively high because of short supplies. One may mention as an example tomatoes during the winter season. Europe gets supplies from the Canary Islands only at prices three to four and even five times as high as during the summer and the early autumn. There is room for large additional supplies, but if these were forthcoming there would be a more than corresponding decrease in prices. Nevertheless, export might pay. A definite opinion on price formation and its relation to supplies would, however, require detailed research.

The same would hold true for other vegetables, for early potatoes, early grapes, subtropical fruit, strawberries, flowers and seeds. Even if it is assumed that exports would not be handicapped by trade barriers and would be furthered by cheap transport facilities - in some cases air transport - there exists no reliable knowledge of post-war European markets nor any sufficient experience in such exports, apart from small consignments of bananas and cauliflower several years ago, and some trial shipments of other fruit.

Under these circumstances it is a risky thing to make predictions about the number of farm units which could subsist on these exports. It may be considered as a reasonable goal for the development of exports of this kind which could hardly lead to disappointment as far as market

conditions can be judged on a rough survey without scientific analysis that they should amount to some 5% of the output for the inland market, and it would be highly satisfactory if they should ever equal 10% of that output. The former ratio would allow for the establishment of 1,900 new full farm units, the latter for 3,800. They would respectively provide the means of existence for 7600 or 15,200 farmers and their dependents.

2) Exports of Citrus.

Compared with the pre-war citrus area of about 300,000 dunam there are now only between 240,000 and 250,000 dunam under citrus. However, groves in full bearing cover about the same area as before the war. During the war the grapefruit area was reduced by one half, i.e. from 38,000 dunam to 19,000 through conversion (by way of regrafting) into "Valencia" orange plantations. 200,000 dunam remained planted with "Shamuti". In addition, there are 10,000 dunam planted with lemons, and a few thousand dunam with other citrus fruit. The change in the proportion of the different kinds of citrus fruit is bound to facilitate marketing.

Any prediction about the future development of the citrus market is admittedly likely to be influenced to some extent by the research worker's personal attitude to the problem even if he studies conscientiously the available data on pre-war consumption per capita, consumption trends, and the like. Every estimate, even if based on wide experience and on all the material available at present, may, therefore, prove erroneous after the ten years' planning period will have elapsed, and it may well be attacked by other experts with, perhaps, equally strong arguments. The opinions expressed

below cannot, therefore, be considered as a definitive forecast, but they do represent a goal which can be pursued with a very reasonable expectation of success.

It is suggested that the expansion of the total citrus area by 150,000 dunam may be considered as presenting a reasonable aim, so that ten years hence Palestine's citrus area would amount to about 400,000 dunam. In 1955/56 the exportable surplus would be in the neighbourhood of 19 million boxes of 33-34 kg. each, or 636,000 tons, as compared with 512,000 tons in 1938/39, i.e. an increase of 124,000 tons or 3.7 million boxes. At full bearing stage the exportable fruit would, however, amount to not less than 26 million boxes or about 870,000 tons, i.e. an increase of 358,000 tons over 1938/39.

There is little reason to doubt that such a volume of export would at such time be marketable, if the assumption can be made that a reasonably free flow of trade will prevail.

The following two tables have been drawn up in order to substantiate this expectation. The first table gives a picture of the aggregate consumption of oranges in the year 1937 in the main European countries which import citrus fruit. Consumption per head is calculated on the basis of population figures. The resultant figure, however, is a matter of general information only and it is not one on which any conclusions ought to be based. (Although this is too often done!) The rural population, practically everywhere in Europe, is not a consumer of importance. It finds sufficient fruit in its own immediate surroundings and distribution of the highly perishable orange in rural districts is much more difficult. A calculation of the consumption per head should, therefore, be based on the population figures of urban and urbanised

industrial districts. To this end the population of towns with 100,000 and more inhabitants has been taken, and in the more advanced countries a liberal but varying percentage has been added for districts sufficiently urbanised to be orange consuming, in addition to towns of over 100,000 inhabitants. By this method per capita figures may be obtained for the main orange-consuming sections of the population which are both more correct and more conservative in character.

In the next table it is assumed that consumption per head will, after a decade of rehabilitation, be raised in the more advanced countries to the pre-war level of countries like Holland and Switzerland, i.e. 24 kg., and in the more backward countries to the pre-war level of a country like Hungary, i.e. 12 kg. In countries which before the war had already reached this level it is assumed that there will be no increase. It is furthermore assumed that Russia will become a consumer again on the lowest basis (of 12 kg.) and for a fourth or fifth part of her population only. As this table shows, an increase in consumption of 1,073,000 tons would follow. Let it now be assumed that in the case of Germany the calculation was over-optimistic and that this country must be relegated to the rank of the backward countries with a consumption of only 12 kg. per head.¹⁾ An easy calculation will show that the aggregate increase figure should in that case be reduced by 231,000 (one half of 648,000 = 324,000 minus 1937 consumption of 93,000 = 231,000). Let it be furthermore assumed that in the case

1) That the 1937 figure was a very low one proves nothing; it was part of the "guns before butter" policy; the pre-Hitler figures were much higher.

of Russia, too, the table was too optimistic and let the figure of 300,000 be reduced by one half to 150,000. The aggregate figure would then become 1,073,000 minus 231,000 minus 150,000 = 692,000 or a round 700,000. This compares with a 1937 figure of 1,053,000 tons and the question arises if an increase of 70% must be considered as unreasonable. It is contended that this is not so. The world is becoming more and more "fresh fruit minded". The consumption of oranges has, wherever it was not reduced (as in Germany and Russia) in accordance with a set policy, practically everywhere made steady progress. The Hot Springs conference of 1943 declared itself in agreement with the "nutritional recommendations" of the National Research Council of the United States of America of the previous year to the effect that consumption of vitamin -C- rich fruits, such as citrus fruits or tomatoes, was required in quantities of 36 to 43 kilograms per person and per year. In the present calculation a maximum of 24 kilograms is being assumed.

The next point which arises is whether out of this ~~increased~~ ^{total} consumption of about 1,800,000 tons Palestine would arrive at providing something like 50%. There is no reason to be sceptical about this as it would merely mean maintaining that proportion of the markets concerned which Palestine already enjoyed in the last pre-war years. There are some reasons to believe indeed that Palestine can improve its relative position, the most important of these being that Spain, the main competitor (in Western Europe only!), shows no tendency towards any important extension of its orange plantations and it is not even sure that there is room for such an extension.

Table I.

Orange Consumption 1937 *)

	Total 1937 1,000 ton	Total Population 1,000	Per capita kg	Population in towns of 100,000 and more	Increase for other urban centres+) %	Consum- ing Public 1,000	Per ca- pita con- sumption of special consumer circle Kg.
United Kingdom	625	46,075	13.6	20,833	60	33,300	19.0
Belgium	69	8,092	8.5	1,825	70	3,100	22.3
Holland	78	7,938	9.8	2,162	50	3,200	24.4
Denmark	9	3,551	2.5	771	50	1,200	7.5
Norway	20	2,814	7.1	253	50	400	50.0
Sweden	38	6,142	6.2	874	50	1,300	29.2
Switzerland	26	4,066	6.4	633	30	1,000	26.0
Germany	93	66,029	1.4	19,973	35	27,000	3.4
Czecho- slovakia	24	14,730	1.6	1,478	25	1,800	13.3
	<u>982</u>						
Austria	20	6,760	3.0	2,136)		2,100	9.3
Poland	27	31,928	0.8	3,351)		3,400	8.0
Rumania	9	18,025	0.5	1,063)	±0 ++)	1,100	8.5
Hungary	<u>15</u>	8,688	1.7	1,258)		1,300	11.5
	<u>71</u>						
Grand Total	<u>1053</u>						

+) As also other districts with urban standards and habits of nutrition.

++) No increase assumed for more backward countries, so that a reserve remains.

*) France, one of the large consumers, second only to Great Britain, has been excluded from the list, as it may be assumed that such increase as can yet be attained there will be supplied by North Africa. That the producing countries Spain and Italy are excluded stands to reason.

Table II

Calculation of potential increase of consumption

		Consuming circle 1,000	Total Consumption tons	Increase tons	Remarks
United Kingdom)	33,000	792,000	167,000	Market reserve of 10-20% might be safely assumed
Belgium)	3,100	76,400	7,400	
Holland)	3,200	78,000		
Denmark)	1,200	28,800	19,800	
Norway)	400	20,000	± 0	
Sweden)	1,300	38,000	± 0	
Switzerland)	1,000	26,000	± 0	
Germany)	27,000	648,000*)	555,000	restorat- ion of 1930 purchasing power as- sumed in 1954
Czechoslovakia)	1,800	24,000	± 0	
Total			<u>1,731,200</u>	<u>749,200</u>	
Austria)	2,100	25,200	5,200	market reserve at least as high i.e. 24,000 tons
Poland)	3,400	40,800	13,800	
Rumania)	1,100	13,200	4,200	
Hungary)	1,300	15,600	600	
Total			<u>94,800</u>	<u>23,800</u>	
Russia	12 kg. per capita			<u>300,000</u>	
Grand Total			<u>1,826,000</u>	<u>1,073,000</u>	

*) 275,000 tons had already been attained in 1931.

The division of the additional 150,000 dunam citrus plantations among Jewish and Arab growers is a matter of conjecture.

During a period of normal profitability of citriculture from 1930-1935 the Arab share in the whole citrus area amounted on the average to 40%. Only when, from 1936 onwards, expansion of citrus plantations slowed down in the Jewish sector owing to sharply decreasing prices, did the Arabs continue to expand their citrus areas and their share, therefore, increased to 48% of the total in 1939.

It seems reasonable, therefore, to estimate the share of Arab plantations for the next decade at 40% of the additional area, i.e. in a proportion corresponding to normal conditions.

One thus arrives at an expansion of 60,000 dunam for the Arabs, leaving 90,000 dunam for Jews.

Apart from the above argument there is a second factor which will probably induce some of the more progressive Arab farmers not to increase the area of their plantations. These farmers will in future have an additional outlet for their initiative in connection with large scale irrigation schemes and the promotion of the intensification of their mixed farms.

Number of Workers and Dependents in Jewish Citrus Groves.

<u>In 1955/56</u>	<u>Million Working Days</u>
Cultivation of 210,000 dunam: 16 working days per dunam	3.36
Picking and Packing of 10.5 million exported boxes at 360 working days per 1000 boxes	3.78
Handling of unexportable fruit 70,000 ton: 5 working days per ton	<u>0.35</u>
Total	<u>7.49</u>
At 300 days per full worker	25,000 working years
thereof: in mixed farming 10%: 2,500	
Arab workers 20%: <u>5,000</u>	<u>7,500</u> " "
	Remain 17,500 working years

This number represents, taking into account 2 dependents (in view of the particular structure of orange grove and packing labour) a population subsisting on this industry of 52,500 persons. It will not be overlooked that the number of working years does not correspond with the number of individuals seasonally engaged.

<u>At full bearing stage:</u>	<u>Million Working Days.</u>
Cultivation of 210,000 dunam: 16 working days per dunam	3.36
Picking and Packing of 15.75 million exported boxes at 360 working days per 1000 boxes	5.67
Handling of unexportable fruit 105,000 ton: 5 working days per ton	<u>0.53</u>
Total	<u>9.56</u>
At 300 days per full worker:	32,000 working years
Thereof: in mixed farming 10% 3,200	
Arab workers 20% <u>6,400</u>	<u>9,600</u> " "
	Remain 22,400 working years.

On the same lines as calculated above this figure stands for a population of 67,200 persons. In the main text this latter figure has been approximated at 70,000.



Appendix IV.

Calculation of the number of Jewish Mixed Farm Units existing at present.

The figure of 8,500 Units referred to in the main text is an adjusted one. It refers to farm units comparable in every respect in their structure and outfit with the units on which the calculation of extension is based. This figure has been arrived at as follows:

2. The actual value of the output for human consumption in Jewish mixed farms in 1944/45 (1st October - 30th September) amounted, expressed in pre-war prices, to £P.1,970,000.
3. This figure does not, however, include the value of farm sales of some commodities, such as citrus in mixed farming, feeding stuffs for animals not kept on the farm, seeds, flowers, eggs for breeding, cattle for raising, a small amount of fish caught mainly by agriculturists apart from pond breeding, and some further minor products, which form altogether about 14% of the output value mentioned above and were in 1944/45 to be valued at about £P.290,000 (at pre-war prices). Thus the total value of output (excluding fodder grown on the farm for own livestock and manure used on the farm) comes to £P.2,260,000.
4. In Appendix II it has been shown that the total value of the output of a farm unit as envisaged in the development scheme, amounts to £P.265 (leaving aside any income from work outside the farm) so that the Jewish farms existing in 1944/45 represented $2,260,000 : 265 = 8,500$ full farm units, although their actual number is 12,000 according to the most recent statistical publications. The difference is explained by the fact that numerous farms are still in a state of development

and have not yet reached the full capacity required for the maintenance of 4 persons per farm unit as assumed in the main text.



Appendix V.

Water Requirements for irrigation purposes in Jewish and Arab Agriculture (including Citriculture) at present and at the end of a decade.

1. The irrigated area devoted to Jewish Mixed Farms at present may be put at 110,000 dunams. There are large differences in the water duty per dunam between the various farms and quite often even between different parts of the same farm according to crop rotation, nature of plantation, texture of the soil, climatic conditions, etc., but it may be assumed for present purposes that on the average the annual water duty is around 700 c.m. per dunam. The total annual requirement is, therefore, 77 million c.m.
2. The irrigated area in Jewish Citriculture may be put at 120,000 dunams. The average annual water duty is 700 c.m. The total annual requirement is, therefore, 84 million c.m.
3. The irrigated area in Arab Mixed Farming is not easy to estimate. No statistics have ever been published and it is to be doubted whether they have ever been made. However, rough surveys are available and they lead to an estimate of around 100,000 dunams which is probably as reliable as such a survey can be. It may be doubted, in any case, whether the margin of error is in excess of 10%. However, cultivation and irrigation are incomparably less intensive than Jewish cultivation and irrigation and it would almost certainly be an exaggeration to put the average annual water duty at any higher figure than 250 c.m. On the other hand, the position is far from static. The Arab peasant is by no means so slow in learning the lessons and appreciating the blessings of intensive cultivation as is sometimes assumed. What is required is that

these things be brought home to him, not through exhortation, or theoretical or even practical teaching, but through the living example of others who are actually engaged in and thrive by these things. There are countless cases in the neighbourhood of Jewish settlements which prove this to be the fact. Example is, of course, not enough ^{by} of itself. The efficient use of water calls for a land settlement different from that at present prevailing and for a spirit of cooperation which, while certainly not entirely lacking, nevertheless requires very much to be fostered. It would be unduly optimistic to believe that the standard of intensification and the concomitant water duty can in the course of a decade be brought up to the Jewish level, but there is no reason to assume that it could not be brought up to a level calling for an annual water duty of 400 c.m. As the present calculation is being made in order to ascertain not present but future requirements, this figure will, therefore, be used and it follows that the total annual requirement has to be put at 40 million c.m.

4. The irrigated area in Arab citriculture may be put at 120,000 dunams. The average water duty is lower than in the Jewish sector owing to the smaller average plantation density and it will hardly be as high as 600 c.m. Modern planting will on the whole probably be more on Jewish lines but this can hardly affect the existing groves. The total annual requirement would, therefore, be 72, million c.m.

5. The irrigated area required by additional Jewish Mixed Farming has been put (in the main text) at 553,125 dunams. There is no sufficient reason to assume for the time being any other annual water duty than the present one of 700 c.m. and the total requirement is, therefore, 387 million c.m.

6. The area of additional Jewish Citriculture has been put (in the main text) at 90,000 dunams. In this case, too, there is no reason to assume for the time being any other annual water duty than the present one of 700 c.m. and the total requirement is, therefore, 63 million c.m.

7. The irrigated area required by intensified and additional Arab Mixed Farming has been put (in Appendix VI) at a figure in the order of magnitude of 200,000 dunams. As explained in para. 3 an average annual water duty of 400 c.m. must be assumed and the total requirement is, therefore, in the order of magnitude of 80 million c.m.

8. The irrigated area required by additional Arab Citriculture has been put (in Appendix III,2) at a figure of 60,000 dunams and it will be assumed that the annual water duty will not be 600 c.m. as in present Arab citriculture but 700 c.m. as in Jewish citriculture. The total requirement is, therefore, 42 million c.m.

9. The eight requirement figures thus obtained may be recapitulated as follows:

<u>Total water requirement for irrigation purposes at the end of a decade in millions of cubic metres per annum.</u>					
	<u>At present</u>		<u>Additional</u>		<u>Total</u>
Mixed Farming					
Jewish	77		387		464
Arab	<u>40</u>	117	<u>80</u>	467	<u>120</u> 584
Citriculture					
Jewish	84		63		147
Arab	<u>72</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>114</u> <u>261</u>
Total		273		572	845

Or in different order:

	<u>Jewish Sector</u>	<u>Arab Sector</u>	<u>Total</u>
At present			
Mixed Farming	77	40	117
Citriculture	<u>84</u> 161	<u>72</u> 112	<u>156</u> 273
Additional			
Mixed Farming	387	80	467
Citriculture	<u>63</u> <u>450</u>	<u>42</u> <u>122</u>	<u>105</u> <u>572</u>
Total	611	234	845

10. It is learned from these tables that the total water requirement of Palestine for irrigation purposes after a decade will be a figure in the order of magnitude of 850 million cubic metres; that the Jewish sector, mainly based on intensive cultivation, will require around 610 million c.m.; the Arab sector, still principally based on extensive cultivation, around 230 million c.m.; that Mixed Farming will require over 580 c.m.; and Citriculture over 260 c.m.; and finally that present needs are over 270 c.m. and future needs some 570 c.m.

11. Where hundreds of millions of cubic metres are under discussion and where the figure aimed at relates to a future of ten years from now, it is obvious that pedantic accuracy can neither be claimed nor expected. But it is contended that the present estimate is as honest and reliable as it can be with the data available; and this appendix should not be concluded without pointing out that, whereas it arrives at an estimated total annual requirement of far less than 1,000 million c.m., there does not seem to exist an authority, Jewish, British or American, which puts the available supply at less than double this figure.

APPENDIX VI.

Jewish Intensive and Arab Extensive Mixed Farming. An Outline of Mutual Relations.

1. Total Production on Jewish and Arab Farms.

In the following table both pre-war data and data on recent production are given. Data on Arab production are given for a period of several years: only the inclusion of average data for the main crops, and not of figures for a single year can give a picture which is as correct as possible under the prevailing circumstances. For intensive Jewish agriculture, data must be given for a single year, because of the continuous expansion through additional settlement and through enlargement of existing settlements. Moreover, most branches of intensive farming are only to a modest degree dependent on natural conditions (mainly rainfall) so that crop failures occur mainly in cereal farming and unirrigated fruit plantation, which in Jewish agriculture play a subordinate part only.

Comparative Table of Jewish and Arab Agricultural Production.

Commodity	Unit	Pre-War		Jewish Production 1.10.44 - 30.9.45	Average Arab Production 1942/44
		Jewish Production 1.10.38 - 30.9.39	Average Arab Production 1935/39		

Production for Human Consumption					
Cow's Milk	Thousand Litres	35,000	36,000	70,000	45,000
Sheep's & Goats Milk	" "	280	24,000	2,200	24,000
Meat	Tons	1,030	9,000	2,000	10,500
Eggs	Thousand	60,000	50,000	80,000	72,000
Poultry Meat	Tons	1,400	2,500	1,925	3,500
Fish a)	"	60	-	1,050	-
Fresh Vegetables b)	"	15,000	75,000	14,000	85,000
Potatoes	"	3,000	6,800	16,000	10,000
Fruit (Citrus and Wine grapes excluded)	Tons	5,700	65,000	11,450	65,000
Wheat	"	10,000	73,000	12,000 c)	83,000
Barley and Durra	"	-	27,000	-	30,000
Olives	"	-	40,000	-	50,000

Value at Pre-War Prices

Total	LP.	1,040,000	3,620,000	1,850,000	4,210,000
Other Commodities	LP.	60,000	540,000	120,000	630,000
Grand Total	LP	1,100,000	4,160,000	1,970,000	4,840,000

Fodder Production

Barley, Durra, Maize	Tons	12,000	91,000	23,000	102,000
Green Fodder	"	100,000	200,000
Hay	"	12,500	18,000
Karsennah	"	6,600	7,700
Chickpeas	"	1,300	1,500

Value at Pre-War Prices

(Natural Pasture excluded)	LP.	200,000	550,000	360,000	620,000
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- a) The reference is only to pond fish breeding which is an integral part of Jewish agriculture and finds no place at all in Arab farm economy.
- b) Melons, Watermelons, onions and garlick excluded which are included in "other Commodities".
- c) Partly crop failure; normal crop would have amounted to 16,000 tons at least.

2. Main Differences between Jewish and Arab Agricultural Production Plans.

The following table will be found instructive:

PERCENTAGE SHARE OF THE VARIOUS FARM BRANCHES IN TOTAL PRODUCTION PROCEEDS.

Farm Branch	PRE-WAR		Jewish Production 1944/45 %	Arab Production 1942/44 %
	Jewish Production 1938/39 %	Arab Production 1935/39 %		
Dairy Farming	38.2	23.4	42.2	23.0
Poultry Farming	27.5	5.8	20.2	7.1
Fish	-	-	3.7	-
Vegetables and Potatoes	13.4	11.6	12.7	11.4
Fruit (Citrus and Wine Grapes excluded)	7.0	12.3	8.1	10.4
Cereals (Fodder excluded)	8.2	19.7	7.1	19.3
Olives	-	14.2	-	15.0
Other Commodities	5.7	13.0	6.0	13.8
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

It will be seen that in Jewish agriculture "secondary" production, i.e. dairy, poultry farming and fishery, provides for some two thirds of the total value of production. In Arab farming cereal growing forms the backbone of the production plan, followed by olives; dairy farming makes a fair contribution to the total income, but resting as it does on natural pasture, it can under present conditions hardly be extended; poultry raising is in a similar position.

This difference in farm structure explains to a large extent the wide divergence between increase in production during the war in intensive and extensive agriculture respectively. Intensive agriculture, based to a large degree on purchased feeding stuffs and dependent on irrigation and fertilizers, lent itself far more easily to expansion, than indigenous farming, which is greatly dependent on climatic factors and on the natural fertility of the soil. But the mental attitude of the farmers was also a decisive influence: whereas Jewish farmers did their utmost to respond to the call to increase their food production, most of the Fellaheen were either not in a position to do so, for lack of means, of schooling, or of capacity to adapt themselves quickly to new circumstances - or were too indolent or indifferent to make a real effort. In so far as some increase in production has taken place, it was achieved by the as yet very small progressive element among the Arab farmers.

The Fellaah's farm is first of all directed towards self-supply; only minor surpluses are sold - on the average at most one-third of the total production, certainly less than that on most small farms, though more, of course, on progressive and larger farms.

The intensive farm on the other hand produces mainly for the market. According to statistics over an extended period, about 75% of the total production is disposed of in the market. This average of 75% does not even fully represent the extent of dependency on the market, as sales within the rural settlements are certainly under-estimated. It is true that in farms not yet fully equipped this percentage of surpluses has still to be reached, but the tendency in fully established diversified farms is certainly to get a surplus for the market not of 75% but of as much as 85% of the total production.

3. Relations between Jewish and Arab Agriculture.

One may distinguish broadly between three different groups of relations.

- a) Indigenous farming supplies intensive farming with certain means of production;
 - b) Arab produce competes to some extent with Jewish produce in the Jewish market;
 - c) Arab produce complements supplies from Jewish farms.
- a) Jewish intensive farming is a large customer for feeding stuffs, manure and livestock from Arab farms in Palestine and neighbouring countries. This relationship is a factor of some importance in the general economy throughout the Arab Middle East.
- b) Competition has existed in the past in the markets for eggs, vegetables and some varieties of fruit. This competition has, however, gradually led to a division of markets, according to seasons and to kinds of vegetables and of fruit,

and also to a territorial division of markets: Jerusalem has so far remained a market largely supplied with typical Arab products, whereas the Jewish population of Haifa has received almost entirely Jewish products; at Tel-Aviv the share of Jewish produce also exceeds by far and in a growing measure that of Arab food,

c) Arab produce complements supplies from Jewish farms. Here one might mention cereals, meat, fish, certain vegetables and fruit, and also eggs; and one may include supplies from surrounding Arab countries. It is true that for instance with regard to eggs, Syrian eggs in some months of the year compete with eggs from Jewish farms, and it is also true that in certain other instances it is not quite possible to differentiate between competitive and complementary supplies, but one may safely say that on the whole complementary supplies have a strong tendency to replace competitive supplies.

It follows that there is every reason to assert that the common interests of both sections of Palestinian agriculture will far outweigh their conflicting interests.

4. Intensification of Arab Farms and Allocation of Irrigated Land.

It has been estimated that to the existing 110,000 dunams of irrigated land now under cultivation in Jewish Mixed Farms (citrus excluded) a further 550,000 dunams should be added.

It has also been estimated that there may possibly be something like 100,000 dunams of irrigated land in the Arab Mixed Farming sector. It is, however, certain that

a large part of this irrigation cannot in any way be called full irrigation and there is vast room yet for intensification of Arab irrigated cultivation. Furthermore it will take a long time until the fragmentation of Arab agricultural property, which obviously stands in the way of any rational irrigation, will have been reduced to a more practicable system. It will also take a long time until the spirit both of cooperation and of enterprise which is required in order to put irrigation to full use will have been fostered among the Arab cultivators in a degree comparable with the existing spirit among Jewish cultivators. All this being the case, nothing like an extension on the scale mentioned in the first paragraph, even if ardently desired by the guiding authorities and by the Jewish elements as well (in their own interest, if for no other reason) can be expected in the course of the next decade. It will be very optimistic to assume an extension on a scale about half as comprehensive as the Jewish extension (which pre-supposes a very large additional settlement). To treble the present (insufficiently exploited) area is an ambitious aim. It seems, therefore, impossible to put the area which the Arab agricultural population can bring under irrigation during the next decade additional to the present area, at more than 200,000 dunams and the estimate may in the end well be found to have been over-optimistic.

It follows that the availability or otherwise of water will in no way be the limiting factor. That point is reverted to in Appendix VIII.

Appendix VII.

A calculation to show that the area required per head of the population subsisting on agriculture (including citriculture) at the end of the development period is not essentially different from the area on which such a person actually subsists at present.

The present Appendix, to which no explicit reference is made in the text, has been added in order to make it clear by comparing fundamental figures that the agricultural settlement plans and prospects on which the reasoning of this chapter is based are firmly based on experience. The area per head of the population which is expected to find its subsistence in agriculture (including citriculture) in the future is not essentially different from the area which is required at present, viz. around ten or eleven dunams. Jewish Agriculture in Palestine has by now a history of some 65 years. If the whole pre-first-War period of about 40 years, when development was on a comparatively small scale, be disregarded, and only the last quarter of a century is considered, it must be admitted that even this latter period was still one of considerable trial and error (as is to be expected in all progressive agriculture), but it did result in a measure of achievement on which plans may be based. Such criticism as may be levelled at the present state of Jewish agriculture must of necessity be, broadly, to the effect that the experience gathered until now has not yet been sufficient to render methods optimally efficient, i.e. that the maximum production per head, per dunam and per cubic metre of water has not yet been attained. To the extent to which such criticism may be justified - and there is every reason to assume that to some extent that will be the case - the area required per head of the agricultural population will be smaller than that assumed

in the prognosis on which the present chapter is based. The natural conclusion would, therefore, be that either less land will be required or more persons can be settled or both. These things, it is submitted, may be safely left to future development.

Comparison of Acreage per head
in Jewish Agriculture at present and according
to the Development Scheme.

1. Jewish Mixed Farming at present:

Area: Irrigated land	<u>dunams</u> 122,000	(including 12,000 dunams citrus groves)
Unirrigated land	490,000	
Settlement area ^{*)} about	<u>75,000</u>	
Total	<u>687,000</u>	

Population: 12,000 farm-units with 42,500 persons (on the average 3.5 persons per farm-unit).

Acreage per head of population: 16,2 dunams

(" " farm-unit: 57 ")

2. Jewish Citriculture at present:

Area: Irrigated land	<u>dunams</u> 108,000	(Citrus in Mixed Farms excluded)
Settlement area about	<u>10,000</u>	
Total	<u>118,000</u>	

Population: 11,200 Jewish workers (Arabs and Jewish workers in Mixed Farms excluded) $\times 2,5 = 28,000$ persons, on the assumption of normal conditions in citrus export.

Acreage per head of population: 4,2 dunams

*) Assuming that the total settlement area is about 85,000 dunams, whereof the share of Mixed Farming amounts to 88% = 75,000 dunams and that of citriculture to 12% = 10,000 dunams.

3. Total of Jewish agriculture at present:

Area: Irrigated land	230,000 dunams
Unirrigated land	490,000 "
Settlement area	<u>85,000</u> "
Total	<u>805,000</u> dunams

Population: 70,500 persons

Acreage per head of population: 11,4 dunams

4. Jewish Mixed Farming at the end of the Development Scheme.

Area: Irrigated land	684,125 dunams	(including 21,000 dunams citrus groves)
Unirrigated land	1,227,500 "	
Settlement area	<u>163,500</u> "	
Total	<u>2,075,125</u> dunams	

Population: 29,500 additional Mixed farm units with 118,000 persons (on the average 4 persons per unit), and 42,500 persons on existing mixed farms, together 160,500 persons.

Acreage: per head of population: 12,9 dunams

(" " farm unit: 52 ")

5. Jewish Citriculture at full bearing stage.

Area: Irrigated land	189,000 dunams
Settlement area	<u>17,000</u> "
Total	<u>206,000</u> dunams

Population: 22,400 workers (Arabs and Jewish workers in citriculture in Mixed Farming excluded) x 3 = 67,200 persons.

Acreage per head of population: 3,1 dunams

6. Total of Jewish agriculture in the future:

Area: Irrigated land	873,125 dunams
Unirrigated land	1,227,500 "
Settlement area	<u>180,500</u> "
Total	<u><u>2,281,125</u></u> dunams

Population: 227,700 persons

Acreage per head of population: 10 dunams



APPENDIX VIII

Structural differences between Arab and Jewish Mixed Farming.

This Appendix, like the previous one, has not been explicitly referred to in the main text. It has been added in order to throw some light on a subject which is bound continuously to crop up whenever the future of agriculture in Palestine is discussed.

The differences between Arab and Jewish mixed farming methods are immediately apparent.

The Arab farmer will find no difficulty in selling poultry, milk and eggs (and to some modest extent vegetables) cheaper than the Jewish farmer.

The fact has led superficial students, particularly during the war, when intensive mixed farming had to be carried on under abnormal conditions, to contend that Jewish intensive mixed farming was altogether an uneconomical proposition. Any other proof for so sweeping an allegation than that the products of a primitive farm economy generally prove to be cheaper than those of intensively cultivated farms, was seldom adduced; and the fact that those products were neither better nor more abundant was overlooked. This easy and tempting but entirely fallacious view unfortunately has some adherents in positions of influence and it may be useful briefly to examine it.

2. The typical Fellah farm economy is a cereal growing and pastoral one; its production is directed principally towards self-supply, and more than half the value of the total production is accounted for by direct products of the soil. As a rule only about a third of the production reaches

the market and of this something like three-quarters consists of direct products of the soil (mainly cereals). The pastoral part of the economy is characterized by the keeping of primitive breeds of cattle and sheep adapted to conditions under which they have to subsist on poor grazing with very little supplementary fodder and with a correspondingly low yield. The number of chickens is small, they find their own food on the farm and receive very little supplementary chicken food. Cultivation is generally carried on on unirrigated land and crops vary widely with the volume and distribution of rainfall.

3. In Jewish Mixed Farming only 30% of the value of production is accounted for by direct products of the soil and 70% by indirect and processed products, i.e. milk and dairy produce generally, eggs, poultry, fish (pond-bred), honey etc. More than three-quarters of the total production reach the market and about two-thirds of the sales in the market are accounted for by indirect and processed products. Concentrated fodder in quantity is added to farm grown green fodder and roughage, as high yields are looked for, and these can be obtained only through a generous measure of supplementary fodder.

Wherever irrigation is feasible irrigated cultivation is preferred to dry farming. This results in a reduced dependence on the hazards of the weather and the yield per unit of area is greatly increased, be it through better paying cultures (like bananas and alfalfa) or through the possibility of using the same area for an increased number of short period crops in the same year.

4. It is obvious that methods so radically different result in considerable differences in the volume and value of the yield per unit of area and in the man-hours spent on production per unit of area. With production methods, and, therefore, the various factors contributing to the formation of cost figures, so radically different, the cost per unit of commodity produced will nearly certainly be different in the two farm systems; and it may well be that in many cases the cost price of the product of intensive farming will be the higher of the two. But this ~~bold~~ comparison is meaningless from the point of view of a country's general economy, unless the other main results are considered, viz.: volume of production per unit of area, number of persons finding employment and sustenance on such unit and thirdly the level of such sustenance, i.e. the standard of living. If then it is found that intensive farming enables a much larger number of people to lead a much better life while producing a much larger volume of food all on the same area than primitive extensive farming, the basis for a comparison between the relative justification of the two systems will have been laid. To judge them by market prices per kilogram, as has too often been done, is not permissible.

5. One other misconception has to be warned against. It is the idea that intensive and extensive cultivation are absolute conceptions, clearly defined or at least definable. Nothing of the sort is the case. The two adjectives do not in any way stand for absolute values; they are relative and comparative. A farming system can be called intensive or extensive only as compared with

another, just as any point can be called an Eastern one as compared with one to the West of it, and a Western one as compared with one to the East of it. It is only the student who has one particular type of agriculture in his mind (probably that of his own home), as a normal standard, who can conceive of other types as absolutely intensive or extensive. Jewish agriculture in Palestine, speaking generally, must be called intensive as compared with Arab agriculture in Palestine in a general way. But as compared with the methods of the Beduin of the Negev those of the Fellah of the Nablus district are fairly intensive, and as compared with the methods of the Chinese of the Yang-tze valley those of the Jewish farmer of the Jordan valley must still be called extensive.

There is no good sense in stamping one method as in itself better than the other. Everything depends on circumstances and aims. "Wide open spaces" and sparse populations are, of course, an encouragement to extensive methods. The larger the population becomes which aims at living on the same area the more intensive naturally agricultural methods have to become. One combination of climate, water and soil will allow of more intensification than another. Assuming one particular way of cultivating and irrigating the land as the only or the best possible, it will, in conjunction with the factors just mentioned, set a limit to the degree of intensification attainable. But another way of cultivating may well be found yet which will allow of a higher degree of intensification. Intensification itself is not an aim worth pursuing for its own sake. It is desirable only to the extent to which it results in a well-balanced combination of increased production, increased population

on the soil and an increased standard of living. To increase intensification until the standard of living of the Chinese peasant is reached is in no way more recommendable than to reduce it until the standard of living of the Sinai Beduin results. It is the balance that counts and it is by its overall results that it is judged.

It is not contended that Jewish agricultural methods in Palestine are ideal; but a short tour through the country and a glance at agricultural statistics will show that on the whole they cannot be anything else than sound and a considerable improvement on Arab methods. Firstly: many more Jewish peasants can live on a given area than Arab (with their present methods). Secondly: they produce much more per unit of area in volume and value. Thirdly: they make (under normal conditions) a better living out of it. True, they have to work harder, but even so they have saved a reasonable leisure yet, becoming to intelligent citizens, and they are far from being slaves of the soil like Chinese coolies.

It is by results like these that the relative values of agricultural methods have to be measured, not by the price of an egg in war time as has been done.

6. Few words need be lost on the difference in density of population per unit of area as between intensively cultivated Jewish and extensively cultivated Arab agricultural zones. Expressed in numbers of dunams required for the sustenance of one person with present methods the rough average figures are 7 to 8 dunams in the Jewish sector and some 20 to 25 dunams in the Arab sector.

7. A general picture of production results in the Arab and Jewish farm economies respectively may be gathered from the following figures:

<u>Production</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Arab Farm Economy</u>	<u>Jewish Farm Economy</u>
Milk per cow per year	Litre	600-800	3800-4200
Milk per sheep per year	"	40	80-120
Eggs per chicken per year	Number	60	140-170
Wheat Crop (per dunam) *)	kg.	70-80	120-160
Barley crop (per dunam)*)	kg.	75-90	140-180
Wine Grapes per dunam	kg.	300-400	900-1200
Vegetables per dunam of physical area	kg.	800-900	2000-2500

Since the quality of Jewish products is at least equal and generally superior to that of the Arab production no proof is required to show that the value of Jewish production per unit of area stands to that of Arab production at least in the same proportion as its volume.

8. If the respective standards of living of Jewish and Arab peasants resulting from their methods of cultivation are to be compared, a short tour through Jewish and Arab villages will leave a much more vivid picture than any figures could paint.

The following figures may be found sufficiently illustrative: Under pre-war conditions and at pre-war prices the total annual income of the Fellah, calculated

*)

Crop yields vary, of course, widely in various districts and various years. Averages over fairly long periods in the best districts have been calculated for the present purpose.

per family of 5 to 6 persons and including farm produce consumed on the farm was estimated at £P.35 to 40, i.e. £P.7 to 8 per head.

The corresponding average total annual income of the Jewish farmer was £P.100-120 for a family of 3 to 4 persons or some £P.30 per head.

It ought to be added, though, that from the point of view of consumption of foodstuffs the difference in standard of living is not so vast as might be deduced from these figures. The Fellah covers about two-thirds of his needs by own production, and the value of this produce is contained in the calculation of his annual income at much lower prices than corresponding Jewish produce. On the other hand the value of Jewish produce consumed on the farm accounts for only a quarter of the farmer's income (or rather less than that if outside work is taken into account, as explained elsewhere). Still, on balance the Fellah's standard of living is, as far as food is concerned, nearer to that of the Jews than one might deduce from the figures. It is in respect of all or most amenities of life that he lags so emphatically behind.

9. The three advantages of intensivation: increased population, increased production and higher standard of living are clear enough. These blessings do not fall from heaven; a price must be paid for them. It consists mainly in a larger number of working hours per annum and in a higher cost of production per unit.

As to the working hours the price is not excessive. It is true that the Arab agricultural methods give the Fellah long spells of leisure which easily counterbalance

his intensive efforts during some other short seasons, but it has not been found that this leisure profits him more than the more modest regular daily leisure which intensive methods leave to the Jewish peasant.

The question of the cost of production is more difficult. The first thing that has to be said is that the subject may not in fairness be considered on the basis of abnormal war conditions, as has too often been done in the recent past. When poultry raising forms a branch of the farm economy, when an annual average of 140 to 170 eggs per chicken is attained, when a large proportion of the chicken food consists of grains in various forms and when these grains must be procured at prices three or four times in excess of the normal price, then, of course, the minutely calculated cost price of an egg will compare unfavourably with the "cost price" of an egg produced by a few stray chickens whose methods of feeding depend on their own enterprise. On the other hand, the intensive farm unit produces a hundred big eggs a day against half a dozen small ones on the extensive unit.

It is not under abnormal price conditions that the two systems must be compared. Under normal conditions Jewish agriculture has shown that, in competition with Arab methods and with imports of fresh farm produce from neighbouring countries and of farm produce in various preserved forms from overseas and without any high protective customs duties it has not only held its own, but has continuously and rapidly extended without imposing on the Jewish consumers any exaggerated burden. Those who tend to draw comparisons favourable for the more primitive Arab methods would do well

to remember that after thorough study of Arab agricultural conditions the Government has found it necessary to introduce protective duties on wheat in order to maintain under a gliding scale a selling price of £P.9 per ton of wheat which was deemed necessary in order to safeguard for the Fellah at least that modest standard of living which he enjoyed.

It can in no way be made plausible that the quite modest difference in the average cost of the overall production of the intensive farm unit as compared with the extensive unit, bears even the remotest relation to the enormous and demonstrable advantages of higher density of agricultural population, increased production and improved standard of living.



APPENDIXPALESTINE-IRAQ TRADE

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports from Iraq into Palestine LP.</u>	<u>Exports from Palestine into Iraq LP.</u>	<u>Palestine's Adverse Balance LP.</u>
1933	81,592	5,393	76,199
1934	180,542	6,169	174,373
1935	219,776	7,070	212,706
1936	156,172	5,895	150,277
1937	361,161	12,047	349,114
Average of 5 years	199,849	7,315	192,534

	<u>1933</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>
<u>Imports from Iraq (LP.)</u>					
Class I (Food, drink & tobacco)	63,280	136,087	182,977	141,843	
Class II (articles mainly un- manufactured)	7,216	9,747	7,467	331	
Class III (articles wholly or mainly manu- factured)	3,393	985	18,770	2,077	
Class IV (unclassi- fied)	<u>7,703</u> 81,592	<u>33,633</u> 180,542	<u>27,455</u> 219,776	<u>11,921</u> 156,172	<u>361,161</u>

<u>Exports to Iraq (LP.)</u>					
Class I (Food, drink & tobacco)	1,726	2,841	3,996	3,946	
Class II (articles mainly unmanu- factured)	-	-	8	42	
Class III (articles wholly or mainly manu- factured)	3,667	3,326	3,066	1,907	
Class IV (unclassi- fied)	<u>-</u> 5,393	<u>-</u> 6,169	<u>-</u> 7,070	<u>-</u> 5,895	<u>12,047</u>

APPENDIX I.Treaty of Lausanne.Article 21.

Turkish Nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, will acquire British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in the local law, and will thereupon lose their Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months after having so opted.

Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming into force of the present Treaty who, at that date, have acquired or are in process of acquiring British nationality, in consequence of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also thereupon lose their Turkish nationality.

It is understood that the Government of Cyprus will be entitled to refuse British nationality to inhabitants of the island who, being Turkish nationals, had formerly acquired another nationality without the consent of the Turkish Government.

Article 30.

Turkish subjects habitually resident in territory which in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty is detached from Turkey will become ipso facto, in the conditions laid down by the local law, nationals of the State to which such territory is transferred.

Article 31.

Persons over eighteen years of age, habitually resident in territory detached from Turkey in accordance with the present Treaty, and differing in race from the majority of the population of such territory shall, within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, be entitled to opt for the nationality of one of the States in which the majority of the population is of the same race as the present exercising the right to opt, subject to the consent of the State.

Article 33.

Persons who have exercised the right to opt in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 and 32 must, within the succeeding twelve months, transfer their place of residence to the State for which they have opted.

They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in the territory of the other State where they had their place of residence before exercising their right to opt.

They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export or import duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.



[undated]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

TO THE

PALESTINE PARTITION COMMISSION

SUBMITTED BY

M. USSISHKIN



MEMORANDUM
TO THE
PALESTINE PARTITION COMMISSION

The Zionist Congress, held at Zuerich in August 1937, considered the proposal of the British Government to partition Palestine into three parts, namely, one in which a Jewish State would be established; one for the creation of an Arab State; and one which would be under a permanent Mandate of the British Government and to which the Balfour Declaration would no longer apply. The Congress adopted the following three decisions: -

(1) To urge that the British Mandate, as ratified by the League of Nations, including the obligation to facilitate the rebuilding of the National Home by the Jewish people, be maintained over the whole of Palestine. This was carried unanimously.

(2) To reject the proposal to establish a Jewish State in a part of Palestine as defined by the Peel Commission. This was carried unanimously.

(3) The Zionist Executive submitted a proposal to negotiate with the British Government concerning the establishment of a Jewish State in a part of the country on lines other than those proposed by the Peel Commission. Following a debate which lasted several days, this proposal was carried by a majority, a considerable minority opposing. As the principal speaker on behalf of this minority, I consider it incumbent upon me to bring to your notice the grounds of our opposition to such negotiations and to the establishment in any form whatsoever of a Jewish State confined only to a part of the country. These grounds are both ideological and practical.

I. Ideological grounds

The Zionist movement, of which the Zionist Organisation is the representative, aspires to achieve, within the historic borders of Palestine, the concentration of a large section of the scattered Jewish people, with a view to the establishment of a free, autonomous national life, such as is lived by other peoples in their respective countries. Zionism, which was created on the very day that the ancient Jewish State was destroyed in Palestine, aspires to the following ends: -

(1) The return to the homeland, the land of our fathers, where the Jewish people dwelt as a free nation for 1,400 years, and created a culture, civilisation and spiritual assets, which later became the heritage of the entire enlightened world. Throughout the 1,900 years during which it has been cut off from Palestine, the Jewish people has never for a moment forgotten its homeland, but has ever hoped, prayed and longed to return to it. Wherever sections of our people have been scattered, at all times and in all generations, in conditions satisfactory and stable, or difficult and uncertain, they never forgot the homeland, the land of our fathers. The phrase "Next year in Jerusalem", was the most sacred declaration uttered down the generations in all the lands of our dispersion. Hence, the various proposals made from time to time to give the Jewish people an autonomous political basis in a country other than Palestine have proved abortive, and have left no mark in the history of the Jews. It is a desertion of this eternal ideal of the people to return to its historic land, to propose to divide historic Palestine and substitute for it but a portion, whichever it may be, of the land. Not only those who voted against the proposal of the Executive at the last Congress consider that it is impossible to contemplate the partition of our land, but also those who supported it,

undoubtedly believe that their explicit endorsement applies only to a first step in the occupation of the whole country.

I desire especially to stress that the partition scheme of the British Government, drawn up by the Peel Commission, excludes precisely the historic and sacred places most precious to the Jewish people, from the projected area of the Jewish State. The holy city of Jerusalem, symbol of the entire country, which embodies all our hopes and is bound up with all the religious, national and cultural associations of our people, has been excluded and transferred to the area of the permanent British Mandate. I am referring not merely to the new town, but to the entire city and, in particular, to ancient Jerusalem. But for the historic, eternal city, no importance would attach to the modern quarters. Hebron, where the tombs of the patriarchs are located, and where the basis of the kingdom of the House of David was laid, has been withdrawn from the Jewish area. Beer-sheba, where our early forefathers dwelt, has similarly been excluded. The historic places on the hills of Samaria, which was the capital of the kingdom of Israel, have also been excluded. Mount Gerizim, the Mount of the Blessing of the people according to the Bible, has also been withdrawn. Transjordan, which was conquered in the days of Moses and was the first possession of the people, has not been included in the borders of the Jewish State. The birthplace of Elijah the Prophet and the hero Simeon son of Giora, have also been excluded. The town of Tiberias, where Rabbi Yehuda the Prince, lived and composed the Mishna, has been transferred to the administration of the British Mandate for a limited period. Mount Carmel, scene of the historic appearance of Elijah the Prophet, has also been temporarily assigned to the British Mandate. Safed, where the Kabbala

was created in the Middle Ages, will also be under temporary British Mandate. Jaffa, the first port of Bible times, bound up with the name of the Prophet Jonah, has been entirely withdrawn from the Jewish State.

In short, not one of the historic towns of our great past has been included in the borders of the proposed Jewish State. The only town within that area is Tel Aviv, an infant 25 years old, which important though it is to-day, has no historic significance. Thus the proposal of the Peel Commission eliminates the principal aspiration of Zionism - the return to the land of our fathers. For all those places which are endeared to the Jewish people owing to the part they have played in our brilliant past, are to remain in the hands of the Arabs or the British Government. This is sufficient reason why every Jewish opponent of partition, thinking and feeling, must refuse under any circumstances to accept partition: he must remain unreconciled to it, even if it be imposed upon him. He will continue to pray "May Thou return to Jerusalem Thy city in mercy", and continue to educate his children to aspire to the return and restoration of the whole country.

I had the great honour, together with Dr. Weizmann and the late Dr. Sokolow, to represent the Zionist Organisation at the Peace Conference in Paris of 1919. In my address to the statesmen assembled there to redivide the world, I remarked - "You, the rulers of Europe and America, are, both politically and culturally, the true heirs of ancient Rome. Nineteen hundred years ago Rome took Palestine from us and drove us thence. You who are the successors of Rome, who declared war against tyranny and for the sake of justice, and who have declared that every nation is entitled to live its own life in its own country, are in duty bound to restore to the Jewish

people that which the ancient Romans took from it."

I consider that any curtailment of our rights to our historic country is tantamount to a new despoliation of the Jewish people. To this day we are not reconciled, nor can we ever be, to the closing of Transjordan, which constitutes more than half of historic Palestine, to Jewish settlement. How much less can we accept the whittling down of Western Palestine to one-fifth, so that the proposed Jewish State would occupy but one-tenth of our whole historic country?

This ground, based on ideological and historic factors, sufficiently explains our rejection, at the Congress, now and in the future, of the proposed dismemberment.

(2) Zionism incorporates not only the return to Palestine, but also the return to the soil. In historic times the Jewish people was chiefly a nation of cultivators in Palestine. Its vitality was drawn from the soil, not merely in the material but also in the spiritual sense. Our great men came for the most part from the village and the field. Our first forefathers were shepherds. Even our great leader, who created the nation and enacted its law, our Teacher Moses, is described by the Bible as a shepherd. Of King David it is said: "I took thee from the sheepcote, from following the sheep, to be ruler over my people, over Israel" (II Samuel, 7: 8). He established the dynasty of the House of David with which the hopes of the people are bound up, for the Messiah too will be a son of that House.

All our great prophets came from the village and the field. Our people's constant spiritual ideals were integrally bound up with the soil. Jewish poetry, the beauty and sentiment of our literature, also had their

foundation in the autonomous life of the Jews on the soil. All the hopes and visions of the Jewish people were woven round its restoration to Palestine and primarily to the soil of Palestine. Our settlement work began not by building towns but by redeeming the soil and settling upon the land.

The return to the soil has become the second objective of Zionism, immediately following in importance that of Palestine. But land only has the significance of its area. Not only is quality decisive, however important, but quantity, i.e. area, with its wide prospects of development. It is not the large industrial town, densely populated, which will achieve a Jewish renaissance. That will arise on Jewish soil in the Jewish village. Large areas of land with a close population of cultivators of the soil constitute the fundamental and primary ideal of the national revival of people and country. To take from us 90% of the historic area of Palestine (including Transjordan), is tantamount to choking our aspirations for the soil and rendering futile all our hopes. Such a curtailment of the country, which even within its historic borders is a sufficiently small country, cannot be accepted by us or the Jews of the world under any circumstances.

These are both ideological and practical grounds, ideological because of the spiritual bond between the Zionist movement and the hunger for the soil, and practical, because without a wide agricultural basis a healthy settlement of importance will not prove feasible.

(3) In addition to the aspiration to return to the homeland and to the soil, Zionism strives to concentrate in the land of our fathers the maximum possible number of our scattered and dispersed people from all parts of the world. This object, known in literature as "Kibutz Goluyoth" (In-gathering of the Exiles) receives a decisive blow by the curtailment of the

Jewish State. One of the objections of the opponents of Zionism in its early days was based on the smallness of Palestine. Zionist leaders replied that, though small, we should convert it into a large country by intensive labour. Now it is proposed to subtract nine-tenths of this small country, and leave us the petty remaining portion in which to concentrate the Jewish masses. With the maximum intensive effort possible, the concentration of an important section of our people in such area cannot be contemplated.

It is said that by intensive methods it will be possible, within the area proposed by the Peel Commission, to accommodate up to one and a half million Jews. I do not know how far this estimate is correct. I have no faith in Jewish or other experts. An expert can only gauge the present situation, and not foresee the future, particularly in such matters as settlement and the development of a country, which are dependent upon various factors of which we are to-day ignorant, such as water, which some experts think can be discovered in large quantities, while others are sceptical; technical progress of cultivation methods; the ability and devotion of the labourer and settler, political conditions, economic relations with neighbouring countries and marketing conditions in various countries, etc., etc. I cannot therefore attach decisive importance to the estimate of one or another expert. The facts which emerge subsequently are either much better or much worse than the experts expect, but do not correspond exactly to their assumptions. This is especially so when the expert's opinion is not entirely objective but largely influenced by political considerations, as in the case of statistics, which are interpreted to suit the individual's particular conclusions.

However, if in this small area it is possible by intensive cultivation and other factors to create a dense settlement of one and a half million people, then it is obvious that in the entire country it will be possible to gather a very much greater number, twice and three times as large. It is unjust

therefore to destroy the profound hope of the Jewish people to concentrate large masses in its homeland, by awarding the larger part to Arabs, and placing another part under a permanent British Mandate from which the Balfour Declaration will be eliminated.

It should be borne in mind that these grounds would still be potent even were the Jews at peace in the various countries of their domicile, and their demand for room for the Jewish people in Palestine not a sheer vital necessity but rather a spiritual and national need. The proceedings of the Evian Conference have revealed to intelligent observers the terrible tragedy of millions of Jews who stand at the crossroads, faced either by extinction or the necessity of leaving the country of their domicile and settling elsewhere. In the face of that tragedy the nations of the world sat in conference, and in spite of the goodwill of President Roosevelt, the initiator of the Conference, the countries represented have remained closed and barred to the Jews, whose only certain, real hope, a hope based upon full historic rights, is in Palestine. If this solitary hope is undermined, the Jewish people will be placed in a situation comparable to that of Samson, who clutched the pillars of the Philistine temple and cried "Let me die with the Philistines" (Judges, 16:30). Should all hope be taken from the Jews, should no other way face them but death, they will not perish alone.

(4) The crown of Zionism is the Kingdom of Israel, the Jewish State. That is the peak of Zionist aspiration. It must be preceded by the return to Palestine, the acquisition of land, concentration of Jewish masses; then the Jewish State will automatically arise within the historic borders of Palestine. But pending the completion of this process, in accordance with the decision of the fifty-two member-nations of the League of Nations, the British Government has been charged with a Mandate to retain in its hands the administration of the

whole country and to facilitate the rebuilding of the National Home by the Jewish people. It is not possible to establish a State without land and population. That was feasible in the days when warfare and arms alone dominated, and even then conquest was protracted over many years. But in our days, the principal basis for the establishment of a State is the existence of people and of land.

It must be explicitly emphasised that those who voted at the Zionist Congress against negotiations with the British Government on the basis of the partition of the country, do not oppose a Jewish State in principle. It would be absurd to make that assumption. The best among our people have from the first days of Zionism dreamed of a Jewish State. We, who oppose the establishment of a Jewish State in a portion of the country, say: (a) there should be a Jewish State in the whole country, and (b) the Mandate should be continued until conditions are firmly created for the establishment of the State. Otherwise it would lack a positive basis, and hence a future.

Two questions therefore arise:

- (a) Does the British Government desire to carry out the Mandate? and
- (b) Is it feasible to carry out the Mandate?

I cannot answer the first question. I do not know whether the British Government desires to proceed with the Mandate. But there cannot be the slightest doubt that it is its duty to do so until the Jewish State is established because it was on the basis of that obligation that it received the Mandate from the League of Nations. We have always considered the British Government a Power which does not regard signed contracts as mere scraps of paper, like the ruler of Germany, for which attitude he duly suffered.

Can the Mandate be carried out? I, as well as those who agreed to negotiate with the British Government, assert that it certainly can. There is no doubt that it has become increasingly difficult from year to year. But you

will pardon my frankness if I point out that the responsibility for that lies with the persons and administration in whose hands the task of executing the Mandate was placed. Much could be written of the interpretation which the Palestine Administration always endeavoured to place on the obligation to facilitate the rebuilding of the National Home. Throughout the past 20 years, year by year, and day by day, the Administration attempted to empty the Balfour Declaration of its content and to reduce it to a barren framework. The evidence heard by the Royal Commission adequately demonstrated this and, as you have this Report before you, there is no need for me to add to it.

I would like, however, to dwell on a few points. It passes comprehension that in a country under the flag of the British Empire, which rules over so large a part of the world, there have occurred on four occasions within 20 years, serious attacks upon the Jews comparable to those in Tzarist Russia. The British Government, which has known how to enforce respect, with the aid of 100,000 soldiers, from the three hundred million inhabitants of India, has not been able in this small country to prevail over a small group of Arab law-breakers. That has remained an unintelligible riddle to the present day. The events of the past two years were summarised by one of the Zionist leaders at the Congress as the declaration of war by Qaqun and Jenin against England, which to this day has not been able to restore the peace. This alone is sufficient to evoke among a large number of the Arab inhabitants the feeling that the Administration is unconcerned and unwilling to carry out its obligations under the Mandate. It is symptomatic that all the riots have broken out under the slogan, among others, - "The Government is on our side!"

One can cite the names of responsible officials in the Administration, absolutely hostile to Jews, who were unofficial advisers of the entire Arab movement. It is not without cause that the Arab movement is referred to in Palestine as a "Government House product." I do not altogether agree with this,

for I have no proofs to that effect, but the prevalence of the opinion indicates the atmosphere in the country, and the attitude of the Administration, and is sufficient indication that all has not been well with it.

Many other examples may be mentioned which, while not of primary importance in themselves, illustrate the attitude of the Administration towards the building of the National Home. Let us take the case of Jerusalem. Its Jewish inhabitants number 60%, and perhaps more, of the population. The greatest part of the Municipal revenue comes from Jews. Yet to this day, in spite of many endeavours, the Government has not found it necessary to appoint a Jewish Mayor in the town. This can be due only to a political and not a practical reason, for at present the Deputy Mayor, who is a Jew, carries out all the functions of this important office, proving that the talents of the Jews in Municipal Administration are not inferior to those of other elements. Hence the conclusion is drawn that the Jews in Palestine are considered second-rate citizens.

Another typical example: the sacredness and historic importance of Palestine is due to the Jews among whom Christianity arose. But for the Jews, through whom this small country became the Holy Land, it would attract no interest. And yet, to this day, the country is called not Eretz Israel (Land of Israel), but Palestine. Every effort to have it called, at least in Hebrew, by its Hebrew name, has so far failed. More humiliating is the fact that it is described by initials as "E.I.", while the official use of the full phrase "Eretz Israel" is prohibited. What is the reason for this humiliation of the national pride of the Jews? What would be the result of an enquiry among civilised peoples as to their knowledge of the names and activities which the Jews have stamped on their ancient land, compared with those of the Philistines? Apparently the sole name which has remained

from the epoch of the Philistines is that of Delila, because of her connection with Samson. Even the Arabs who insist upon their rights to the country have no Arab name for Palestine. They use that of the Philistines; some have tried to call it Southern Syria, but they have no separate Arab term, yet we must suffer from contempt for the Hebrew name of the country - Eretz Israel. It will easily be understood that this has influenced the Arabs by indicating that Jews may easily be deprived of their rights.

Another illustration may be taken from the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, the bulk of the revenue of which is derived from Jewish business. In spite of endeavours made here, in London and in Geneva, to secure the use of Hebrew orthography in telegrams, except in the case of two or three places, this has not been granted. The excuse for such action is always: lack of funds. When a small amount is needed to satisfy the national pride of the Jews money is not available. Jewish pride is not a matter of concern to the Treasury.

A further illustration is the Western or Wailing Wall, the place most sacred in Palestine to the entire Jewish people. I do not refer to the Moslem attacks against Jewish rights at the Wall - that is a chapter in itself - but the attitude of the Administration to this Holy Place. Acts of desecration have often occurred at the Wall. It has been besmirched by dung and filth. But not once have the police apprehended those responsible, nor have they maintained a complete, continuous watch over it. Consider, for a moment, if such acts were committed at the Holy Sepulchre or the Mosque of Omar! The whole world would be aroused and the police would search every nook and cranny until the guilty party were discovered, while there would be a strong guard to prevent the repetition

of such offences in the future.

We have other complaints to make, but the above illustrations will suffice to show how by its attitude the Government encouraged among the Arabs, or rather among their leaders, the conviction that it is possible to behave thus towards the Jews. The Government in this way created itself that monster from which it has not been able to emancipate itself these two and a half years. I have no doubt that if the Government were categorically to declare but once that it is determined to carry out the Mandate completely in spirit and letter, and permit the Jewish people to rebuild their National Home, and further proved its declaration by deeds, then it would certainly be feasible to implement the Mandate and bring it to its ultimate successful culmination.

It should be remembered that during the first post-War years the attitude of the Arabs and their leaders to Zionist aspirations was in every sense a favourable one. In 1919 I was present at a function attended by the late King Feisal, King of Iraq, Dr. Ch. Weizmann, the late Dr. N. Sokolow, and others. The speeches which were then exchanged expressed complete harmony between the aspirations of the Arab people to build up its numerous lands and the aspirations of the Jewish people to build up its single country. The relations between the two peoples began to deteriorate only later, following the attitude of the British Administration.

Finally, I desire to revert to a matter of principle. What action should be taken regarding the Arabs now living in Palestine? Have we, that is to say the Jewish people, the moral right to acquire the land when another people lives here, and have we the practical ability to do this? I say categorically that our conscience is absolutely clear.

Moral conceptions evolve from generation to generation and do not remain static. There was a time when the private ownership of the individual was considered the most sacred moral right. But time passed and as we progressed, man came to understand that it was not so very moral that one should be the owner of much and the other of nothing. There began that social reform movement which gradually prevailed over the whole civilised world, which demands a revision of such conception, namely, that the Government must intervene and create such social conditions as to preclude one having much and the other nothing at all. That is to-day the loftiest moral striving, and it applies not only to individuals, but also to peoples. It is not right that one people should have all, and another be destitute. It is not just that one should have unlimited land and many countries, even unsettled, while another people be deprived even of its small country, and remain landless. The Arab people, by which I mean the large numbers who live in the Arab countries as one national group, as insisted upon by the Arabs, are rich in countries - Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudia, Yemen, Egypt, Algiers, Tripoli and Morocco. In them are many millions of hectares of land entirely uncultivated, or cultivated in a primitive fashion, and there is room there for the settlement of tens of millions. The Jewish people of 17 - 18 millions, scattered and dispersed throughout the world, has not a foot of ground under its feet, and suffers in most lands of the Diaspora, - is there a greater moral wrong than the refusal to restore to this people that one small country, almost half-desert, in which the Jews were the first to create any civilisation? Among great moral ideals, surely the greatest would require the rectification of this wrong.

The famous English poet, Lord Byron, in one of his wonderful Bible poems, "Songs of Zion", refers thus to the Jewish people:-

The wild dove has its nest
The fox its cave;
Mankind their country -
Israel but the grave.

But the Jewish people does not desire the grave. It is alive and desires to continue to live. It has no other place to live in as a people, except its own land, to which it has so many claims. Since the day when we were expelled from Palestine no other people has created eternal values here. The country has served as a corridor for various nations - Greeks and Romans, Byzantines, Persians, Mamelukes, Crusaders and Mongols, Arabs and Turks have passed through it. One has succeeded the other, but the culture created in Palestine is bound up with the Jewish people. The Arabs created great cultural values, but only in Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo and Spain. They have no important creation in Palestine. They have but one important holy place, namely, the Dome of the Rock. But its importance is second in range, after Mecca and Medina, and its holiness is due to the fact that it stands upon the site of the Temple of King Solomon. The cultural, historic and moral rights of the Jewish people cannot be compared with those of the Arabs.

This is not to say that the million Arabs now in the country must leave it. No Jew and no Zionist thinks of that. I am referring to political rights. The Arabs who have lived in the country for generations are fully entitled to remain on their land, to live there as loyal citizens

in the State to be created, with full political, economic, and cultural rights. Nor need there be any doubt whatsoever that their position will be much better than that of their fellow-Arabs in other countries, for two reasons:-

(a) The economic and cultural development of Palestine will be much more rapid than in Arab countries. One can learn much in this respect from the manner in which our work has developed during the past 20 years and its influence on the Arabs of Palestine. There is an immigration of Arabs from neighbouring countries, for the most part of an illegal character, which is not the case in other Arab countries. Emigration of Arabs from Palestine, which was of large proportions before the War, has entirely ceased. Their cultural conditions have much improved, thanks to expenditure by a Treasury which thrives particularly on the large receipts deriving from Jewish immigration. It is useful to compare the position of the Arab villages near Jewish centres with those at a distance. The economic difference is enormous. As far as the political situation is concerned there is no standard by which to compare the condition of the Arabs under the Turkish administration with that under British rule. During the past 20 years the Arabs have gained tremendously. Their standard of living has risen to a large degree, while the number of Arab officials of various categories participating in the Government has increased immeasurably compared with Turkish times, when most officials were Turks.

(b) The second ground for the condition of the Arabs in the Jewish State being much better than in the Arab countries, is that the Jews very well appreciate the position of a minority. Our law states

"Thou shalt not oppress a stranger; for ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt "(Exodus, 23:9) and we add to-day " Ye know the heart of a minority, for ye were a minority in all countries of the world." Moreover our opponents throughout the world will scrupulously watch our every act here, and even more so will our fellow-Jews, observing how the Jewish government acts towards the Arab minority. Yet the Arab leaders desire the administration of this country to be in their own hands - not only that of Syria, Iraq and Egypt, but also of Palestine, because to-day they are a majority in the country, and desire to remain so always. Is there any nation in the world with 100% of its members concentrated in one national State? Many millions of Germans, French, Italians, and also British, are scattered over many countries, and why should a small portion, some 10 - 15% of the Arabs, not be able to remain a minority in a neighbouring country? There is no answer but the vicious theory that one people may have everything and another nothing.

I therefore consider that from a moral and from a practical point of view it is certainly feasible, with goodwill on the part of the British Government and its administrators, to implement the Mandate in its entirety, in the spirit and the letter. Had the attitude of the Administration towards Jewish settlement during the past 20 years been favourable, we would to-day have constituted here not 450,000 but a million or more Jews, and the problem would now have been solved. But there is no point in decrying the past. We must look towards the future. We cannot agree to any curtailment of our rights to this country, and we cannot agree to accept only a portion of it and to forego the largest area of our historic land, even if thereby we receive political freedom.

II Practical Reasons

It may be said that the above submissions are justified from an ideological and historic standpoint, but that it is not possible, or desirable, to satisfy these claims, and that therefore it is proposed to give us not all that we demand, but a part, namely a Jewish State in a portion of Palestine, in which there will be free, tranquil and secure conditions, and with which we should therefore be content. To this I would reply: Were the proposal well founded, that is, if such a small corner were an integral, sound and secure unit, even then, we should not agree to accept it by paying the price of giving up the greater part of Palestine. But in fact even this small concession which is proposed has no real basis, either politically or economically.

The Government desires to tranquillise the country, and hence divides it between the two protagonists believing that thereby it will bring about permanent peace. It is a tragic mistake to imagine that the partition of the country will bring about peace. On the contrary, the relations between the two peoples will become even worse. It is not as though they have themselves approached each other with this proposal to make peace on the basis of the partition of the country. The Arabs unanimously assert, not only verbally, but also by the terror, which is growing, that their attitude to partition is entirely negative. Perhaps certain leaders of the Arabs think otherwise, but they are so weak and ineffectual, that they have not the courage to express their opinion. The Arabs in the neighbouring countries either do not intervene at all in Palestine affairs, or, if they do, also oppose partition.

In regard to the Jews, a large section of world Jewry and of the community in Palestine, drawn from all elements and trends, Zionists, non-Zionists, and anti-Zionists, Orthodox and Socialists, middle-class and labourers, in Europe and in America (having reasons which vary and possibly contradict one another), oppose partition which cannot be reconciled with the condition of the Jewish people. An important section will be unreconciled to the scheme even if Government should decide to carry it out. But a large majority of those who agree in principle to partition regard it only as a provisional arrangement, an opportunity to concentrate forces in the curtailed Jewish State, with a view subsequently, under other conditions, of spreading to all parts of that country from which we are now to be cut off.

In such circumstances can we seriously contemplate peace between the two people's? In the truncated Jewish State we shall continue to sing our national anthem, Hatikva,

"Our hope then is not lost, to return to the City where
David camped, to return to the Land of our Fathers."

In our schools we shall educate our children on the basis of the Bible and Jewish lore, saturated with longings, for the whole land and impregnated with faith in the Divine promise that the whole country will belong to the Jewish people, which is destined to be restored to it. Our youth will continue to study Zionist literature and inevitably will develop the normal longings of a people from whom the largest part of its country has been taken, though promised to it by the British Government and the League of Nations. The same development will arise among the Arabs. In their schools, the teachers will not cease to explain that

the part of the country occupied by the Jewish State was taken from the large Arab State, and that the Arab people must be ready for the great moment when it can restore what has been taken from it on the other side of the border. Is it conceivable that under such conditions true peace will prevail between the two peoples?

Conflicts and disputes will certainly grow, and become even sharper since the scene of the quarrel will be smaller after the partition of the country. The Mandatory Government, if it really desires to maintain these two States, will be faced with the task of protecting them with its own forces. Yet the British Government desires to emancipate itself from that task. Otherwise, why should it found a small State, when it could with its own forces maintain peace in the whole country and carry out the Mandate completely? If that is not its policy for the whole country, why should it apply it to a dismembered State?

Nor must it be forgotten that in the small truncated State, 40-50% of the population will be Arabs, who will under no circumstances be reconciled to the creation of a Jewish State. The acuteness of the national minority problem may be gauged from the events now taking place in Czechoslovakia. Germans in that country do not constitute 40-50% but 25% of the population. Economically and culturally they enjoy all rights to no less extent than the Czechs themselves. Their political situation and individual freedom is on a plane much higher than that of their fellow-Germans in Germany itself. Nevertheless they do not wish to accept the Czechoslovakian State, the position of which has been shaken notwithstanding that it has so many friends and sympathisers among the greatest nations of the world. As for us, Jews, we should have to

establish our State in an atmosphere of absolute hate on the part of the minority, which would compose almost half of the inhabitants, whereas the sympathy of the nations for the Jewish State is far from comparable with their friendship for Czechoslovakia.

Let us consider the example of other countries. Poland contends with many difficulties owing to its minorities, and primarily owing to the Ukrainian minority, which is not so large. It is not for me to indicate who is at fault, Poles or Ukrainians. But the fact is that in Poland this problem gives rise to considerable and acrimonious conflict. In Belgium, one of the most cultured and modern countries, the relations between the two peoples, the Walloons and the Flemish, are far from normal. As for us, without any political experience, surrounded by enemies and hostile forces, persecuted in all parts of the world, we should have to begin our political life burdened with a minority of nearly 50% opposed to us. In spite of these conditions it is sought to assure us that we shall live in peace and tranquillity.

I shall no doubt be asked what would be the situation if a Jewish State were established in the whole country? But it must be obvious there would be a tremendous difference in that case. In the dismembered State we should begin our political life as a group of 300,000 Jews, since according to the scheme of the Peel Commission, Jerusalem is excluded from the proposed Jewish area. Even if a portion of Jerusalem were added, as far as strategy and unity are concerned, it would be exceedingly weak because cut off from the body of the State by the corridor allotted to the British Mandate. As for the Jews of Haifa, what their situation would be is very obscure, and it cannot be certain whether they will have any

connection with the Jewish State. It follows, therefore, that the small number of 300,000 people will have to shoulder the burden of commitments to the Arabs both in and outside the country. But within the whole of Palestine we aspire, and hope, to gather a great force of millions of Jews, and pending their concentration, we desire the administration not to be in the hands of the Jewish people, but of the Mandatory Government. In the course of time, pending the growth of the country and the Jewish element, we hope gradually to come to an understanding and agreement with the million Arabs living here, as they become convinced that there is no other solution but the creation of a Jewish State in the whole of the country. No doubt this will require considerable time and effort, but it is feasible.

But in the curtailed Jewish State we begin in reverse circumstances: Can there be a State whose inhabitants possess no more than 20% of its land? Of the area of five million dunams which is embraced by the borders of the proposed Jewish State according to the Peel Commission, 75%-80% belong not to Jews but to Arabs. If there is no land basis there can be no real existence for the State.

Such a State will be exceedingly weak from a strategic standpoint. A small country, long and narrow, containing corridors or enclaves, for Jerusalem, Nazareth, Acre, and the Arab State. Considerable police and military forces would have to be concentrated within these borders. The State would be entirely in the plain, while its neighbouring people on all sides, except for the west, occupied the hills. It is not necessary to be a strategist or military expert, to appreciate that with modern military technique, the entire Jewish State could be destroyed in 24 hours if a strong Arab State were really founded at the side of a small

Jewish State. Not only in time of war, but also in peace time an Arab terrorist living in Tulkarm or other nearby village could easily continue his destructive work - at all events, it would be much easier for him than now. To-day, he and his victim are in one State, but after dividing the country into two States, he would easily escape into his own country.

The onerous burden of the protection of the Jewish State by means of police, military, intelligence and other forces, apart from requiring enormous financial resources, which the small State would be unable to provide, would also raise the question of the participation of the Arabs in these State forces. The result would be an abnormal situation since we should either have to oppose their participation and place the maintenance of security only in the hands of Jews, or, if we accepted the Arabs, which would mean introducing the "Trojan horse" within the State, we should have ceaseless complications. The Palestine Administration is now apparently gradually appreciating how abnormal is the attempt to establish tranquillity in Palestine with a police force, most of which is composed of Arabs, who must suppress Arab attackers. It is not feasible. Thus the principal purpose of the British Government in partitioning the country - to establish peace and tranquillity - would not be attained.

I foresee several years of disturbances in the dismembered Jewish State, and the British Government will be faced with new difficulties, so that it may well be that eventually another Commission will be sent from London to investigate the situation and find a new solution. The history of the past 20 years has revealed sufficiently clearly the result of such Commissions. It is always to conciliate the attacking

Arabs at the expense of the Jews murdered by Arab terrorists. No doubt, the future Commission will follow the same path, and propose that, as it is impossible to establish peace between the Arabs and Jews living in the truncated Jewish State, it must be divided further into two parts: one for each people! That is the logical sequel of the development hitherto of affairs under the Palestine Administration - to liquidate the pledges of London and Geneva and put an end to the hopes of the Jewish people.

We cannot proceed along that path. We desire to occupy the whole country within its historic borders by way of creative labour, with the assistance of the British Government executing the Mandate in its true spirit. Then we should reach a period when most of the land would be in the hands of Jewish workers, and the Jewish settlements in the whole country would be sufficiently large and strong; then and only then, could the State in the whole country be established.

What would be the economic position of the proposed curtailed State? I do not know how many agricultural units could be established within its borders. No doubt you have Memoranda from various experts on this subject. I have referred to my attitude towards experts. But one thing is definite, and one need not be an expert to appreciate it: economics are based upon land, and not upon sky-scrapers which may be built in Tel Aviv. How will this land be obtained since four million dunams belong to non-Jews? The Peel Commission made a sound political proposal:- to expropriate the land and to transfer the Arabs to Transjordan and to other Arab States. From a moral standpoint that perhaps would be difficult, and as a Jew I fully realise the gravity of such a step. But from a practical standpoint the proposal is sound and proper. But it has been abandoned, according to Mr. Ormsby-Gore at Geneva, and the White

Paper which he published half a year ago. There remains therefore but one possibility - to purchase the land from the Arabs, and it may be asked whether they will desire to sell. I foresee that they will not for two reasons: (1) Their economic position, as I have intimated above, will be very much better than that of their fellow-Arabs in the Arab countries, and (2) their patriotism and fear of the terrorists will not permit them to sell the land, for they will hope that some day the Jewish State will be destroyed and annexed to the Arab State over the border. If a few are found to agree to sell, they will demand such prices as will make it quite uneconomic to purchase the land and build upon it agricultural settlements which will not be able to defray the excessive expenditure involved. The reason for the rise of land prices is simple - the demand will be very great and the offers small and limited. Following the closing of Transjordan to Jewish settlement, land prices in Western Palestine rose to an enormous degree, and with the further curtailment of the area of Western Palestine they are bound to rise still higher. There is no remedy against that. Without land there can be no basis for the existence of the Jewish State, and the land which will be available for purchase will be very restricted.

I know that there are even among Jews those who think differently. They believe that the Arabs will sell their land gladly and at convenient prices. But if, following partition, my forecast should prove correct, what will then be the attitude of the British Government? A State cannot be maintained without land, and there is no assurance that the

land will be in our hands. The British Government cannot give that assurance and without the possibility of buying land it is obvious that we should be helpless. A plan by which the Government would permit us over a number of years to acquire the land and subsequently establish our State is comprehensible. But otherwise the creation of a Jewish State has no reality, but is something in the air, toying dangerously with the hopes of a poor and oppressed people.

The second economic basis of every State is industry. I am not referring here to industry which provides the internal needs of a State: such a State would not absorb hundreds of thousands of workers. I refer to industry for foreign markets. Which markets can be considered? Primarily, those of the neighbouring States, which are Arab countries. But if there prevails a condition of constant warfare, those markets would be closed against us. Much has been said about altering Paragraph 18 of the Mandate, and it is thought that thereby changes could be introduced which would quickly improve the position in regard to export and import trade in favour of Palestine. I know that on formal grounds the Mandatory Government has done nothing to change this clause; even following the proposal of the Peel Commission a year ago, no steps have been taken in this direction. What guarantee have we that the Government of the Jewish State will be able to effect the requisite changes easily? Much time will undoubtedly pass before negotiations with other countries are carried out in regard to the conditions under which they would agree to an alteration of present conditions. And pending the conclusion -

on what basis would a large immigration be organised in the Jewish State, if it has neither land nor the possibility of developing industry? Nor must we overlook the burden of the huge expenditure which the Treasury of the Jewish State will carry for its maintenance, particularly in the early years of its existence. The Government Administration will certainly be of a higher standard than that of the junior officials in the Palestine Administration to-day. The Government of the Jewish State will have to raise the standard of life of the Arab officials and to pay the Arab policeman more than he receives from the present Government. The Arab schools - 40%-50% of the educational institutions in the State - which now have a shorter school day than the Jews, would have to be brought into line with the level of Jewish development, which would again call for large funds from the Treasury. We should have to maintain military forces on a scale out of proportion to the size of the State, particularly in the first years, for reasons I have indicated. All the funds required to defray expenses would have to be drawn from taxation and contributions from Jews abroad. Immigration in the first years would be very limited, because we should be short of land and because we should not have developed industry. Until these two questions are solved many years must pass. How so small a State would be able to sustain this heavy burden and remain stable is beyond my comprehension.

In addition we have to reckon with the abnormal and complicated character of the truncated State, due to its various and strange corridors which would undoubtedly be the cause of constant clashes. It is well-known

that the corridor between Germany and Poland is one of the causes of ceaseless dispute between these two great Powers. In the Jewish State there will be a British corridor between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv dividing the State into two parts, the southern portion, a paralysed limb. Jaffa and Tel Aviv would be separated, each into a different State. Such arrangements are so abnormal and artificial that without constant and excessive supervision on a large scale the Jewish Government would not be stable. Such conditions will increase dissatisfaction with the British Government which will also have a heavy burden. It will be much easier for the British Government to continue with the Mandate and to incorporate in the military and police forces, large numbers of Jews who can be relied upon in an emergency. That would be a much cheaper and simpler scheme, from a strategic point of view, to preserve order and tranquillity throughout the country than to endeavour to solve the disputes which will follow partition.

It has been suggested that Jerusalem could be divided. That would mean that there would be a further enclave and corridor, with separate sections. The result would be an even greater confusion in the Municipal affairs of the city which will prejudice the general life of the inhabitants. Those who propose such a division cite examples from other lands. But there is no parallel. Elsewhere vast cities of millions of inhabitants like Shanghai in China, or small places where there is complete harmony between the inhabitants have been divided. But such partition is not

feasible in the city of Jerusalem. It is a small town in which there are numerous and varied sects within each of the Jewish, Christian and Moslem populations which are hostile to one another.

Moreover, there is also the psychological but important point that in the past, Palestine, and in particular Jerusalem, though enduring various epochs and rules, have remained single units historically, ethnographically and economically. It is now proposed under the rule of a British Government, the mightiest and most civilised Power in the world, to make a division, or more correctly several divisions, in the country and also in its capital. That is most inappropriate from an historical point of view and unworthy of the British nation. There are things too sacred to be hacked with the scalpel of the surgeon.

What power would the Jewish State possess? A shadow and not real power. I know that your Commission is very concerned about the situation of the Arabs in the Jewish State, whether it be a dismembered State or a State eventually embracing the whole of the country. I have been most concerned not as to the position of the Arabs, but that of the Jews. There is no cause for anxiety in regard to the Arabs. When Sir Herbert Samuel became the first High Commissioner of Palestine it is said that he received a message of congratulation from one of the greatest Zionists, the well-known writer and psychologist, Max Nordau. The message was a prayer that he would act towards the Jews in Palestine with the same degree of justice and righteousness as towards the Arabs. I would

send a message to the head of the Jewish Government in the Jewish State praying that it would treat the Jewish subjects of the country with the same justice and righteousness as the Arabs. For, as for the Jews, their position in the abnormal conditions which would prevail in the Jewish State would be very uncertain.

I have said that the Jewish State will only have the shadow of power. Power will, in fact, remain in the hands of the British Government, for without constant assistance from the British Government the State will have no basis and no existence. What honour will there be in bearing a name which has no content? The Jewish people in the course of its terrible experiences for many generations may be compared to Shakespeare's King Lear, whose two daughters - the Christian and the Moslem religions - have deprived it of its kingdom. That is tragic but impressive. But the establishment of a Jewish State only in name, and without content, will make the Jewish people comparable to Don Quixote who believed that he was a great and strong knight, and in fact had no power. That will be not tragic, but ridiculous. That is beneath the dignity of the Jewish people. Under the rule of the British there are scores of hundreds of rulers in name alone: Kings, Rajahs, Emirs, Sultans, etc. They are in fact but figure-heads, carrying out the task imposed upon them by the superior British Administration. It would be idle to add to them another figure-head representing the Jewish people.

The Jews require:

- (a). An ingathering of our exiles within the whole of the country;
- (b). Large areas of land;
- (c). Upbuilding and creation;
- (d). Then the ultimate glory of the Jewish State, real in form and content, will eventually arise.

I know that the final arbiter in regard to the future of Palestine will be only the British Government, acting with the approval of British public opinion. I know that in arriving at that solution the interests in the first place of the British Empire will be decisive. It is not for me to indicate what is preferable for the British people, for it knows best what lies before it. But I may be permitted to say that there can be no doubt that the interests of the British people in Palestine should be based upon the sympathy of the local inhabitants for such interests. I believe that the only element in the country on which the British people can rely always is the Jewish element. The Jewish people for generations has been intimately associated with the British world, for many reasons such as that equality of rights was first given to Jews in England; that famous men of Jewish stock have headed the British Government while still remaining true to their people; that the tradition of the British, and their education is based on the Bible and respect for its sacredness. For all these reasons there are spiritual links between the Jews and the British people, and, therefore, after the War we asked that the Mandate

should be given to the British. In the future, throughout our generations, the Jewish people will appreciate that, situated in an Arab sea, it must always be bound in every respect to the one great and strong Power assisting it to revive. That Power can only be the British. In what form these links are to be fashioned, whether by way of a treaty of alliance or in the form of a Dominion, is for the future to indicate. It is at all events clear that the interests of the British and Jewish people are common, which cannot be said of any other element in Palestine. If Britain considers the matter in a far-sighted manner, and not from the point of view of the present day, I believe that it will arrive at the same conclusion.

There is another factor which a cultured people like the British should consider. There are things which add lustre to a nation - creative achievement, not merely of a material kind, but of a high spiritual order. The creation of a State in historic Palestine for the Jews, facilitating the return of the Jewish people to its country in order to fulfil the vision of the prophets is a task of such spiritual significance that Great Britain deserves that it be inscribed to its credit in the history of mankind.

Permit me to conclude by recalling a personal incident. When I and my colleagues, Dr. Weizmann and the late Dr. Sokolow, appeared before the Peace Conference in Paris, Dr. Weizmann addressed the gathering in English, Dr. Sokolow in French, and I in Hebrew. When we concluded

and withdrew from the hall, the late Lord Balfour approached us, and shaking hands, said:- when you spoke about universal idealism and the return of your sons to their borders, the Peace Conference reached its loftiest moment. Then turning to me he added:- it was glorious and wonderful to hear the offspring of the prophets speaking in the language of the prophets. Such incidents are not forgotten in the life of an individual: how much less so in the life of a nation. If the British people, its Government and its representatives in Palestine, after genuinely facilitating in the course of years the implementing of the Mandate should bring about the creation of the Jewish State, they will win for it in addition to its present merits, a cultural treasure of the loftiest kind. The British people will have become the medium of the fulfilment of the Divine Promise to the Prophets. Perhaps in the materialistic and utilitarian world of to-day not everyone will appreciate such a privilege. But the world depends not only on a material basis, but on those eternal imponderabilia which alone can create and influence the universe.

MENAHEN USSISHKIN

Jerusalem, July 22, 1938

SECRET

AGRICULTURAL POSSIBILITIES IN SYRIA

- I. Area and Population.
- II. Climate.
- III. Water Resources.
- IV. Methods of Agriculture.
- V. Cultivable Area.
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- VII. Possibilities of Large Scale Settlement.
- VIII. The Region of el-Jezireh.
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I. Area and Population.

1. The total area of Syria, excluding the Lebanese Republic, amounts to 193,144,000 dunams. ("Statistiques Relatives a la Superficie des Etats de Syrie et du Liban" published by the "Regie des Travaux du Cadastre et d'Amelioration Fonciere des Etats de Syrie et du Liban".) The population of Syria (including nomads) amounts to some two and a quarter millions ("Economic Organization of Syria," edited by S.B.Himadeh, Associate Professor of Applied Economics at the American University of Beirut, p.7).

2. The density of population per sq.km. is indicated by the following table:

	<u>Area in Km²</u>	<u>Popula- tion</u>	<u>Density of Inhabitants</u>
Sanjak of Damascus	8,544	470,606	55.08*
" " Aleppo	19,288	656,516	34.04
" " Homs	9,165	149,798	16.34
" " Hama	5,573	113,831	20.42
" " Heuran	4,342	90,166	20.77
" " Lattakia	6,300	322,000	51.
" " Jebel Druze	6,800	65,365	9.6
Total:	97,492**	2,077,813	21.31
Sanjek of Alexandretta	4,805	197,548	41.12

*The density of inhabitants in the Region of Damascus (excluding the population of the city of Damascus) is 39.9 per sq.km of the cultivable area of that region.

**This figure excludes the desert region comprising 90,847 km².

II. Climate.

3. "In spite of the fact that Syria is a rather small country, its physical geography naturally brings about great variations in the climatic conditions in different parts of the country. Thus the coastal plains, stretching from the Palestinian frontier at Ras al-Naqurah to the Turkish frontier north of Alexandrette, are subject to the influence of the sea breeze and, in general, have the Mediterranean climate. The temperature varies with the seasons. During the winter months (December-March) the average minimum temperature is about 10 degrees centigrade, while during the summer (July-September) the average minimum is 21 degrees. The average maximum also varies being about 16.6 degrees in winter and 32 degrees in summer... The mountainous regions have in general a colder climate and a heavier rainfall. The temperature during the summer is cooler than in the plains which makes these regions particularly suitable for development as summer resort centers. The winters, however, are cold and rainy, especially on the western slopes. Some of the higher mountains are snow-capped during a large part of the year... The interior plains in Syria represent a third climatic region. In this area lie the fertile plains of al-Biqa, Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Antioch, as well as the oasis of Damascus and the plains of the Hauran. This region is characterised by cold, severe winters and exceptionally hot summers. The dryness of the air, however, makes the heat more tolerable than in the more temperate, but damper, coastal plains. The variation between the maximum and minimum daily temperatures is greater in this region than in the others, especially during the summers. During 1928, the average minimum temperature for June, July, August and September were respectively 12.87, 17.2, 16.5 and 13.3 degrees centigrade, while the average maximum temperatures for the same months were 30.65, 32.9, 32.9 and 30.4 degrees. Although in general the annual rainfall is not heavy it varies in the different

plains, being about ten inches around Damascus, heavier in Hauran and the plains of Homs, and heavier still in the plains of al-Biqa and of Ba'albak. The northern plains around Aleppo also have a heavier rainfall than the region near Damascus. The eastern parts of these northern plains border on the Syrian desert and have a much lower rainfall, averaging not more than two inches a year. In all this region, as well as elsewhere in Syria, the lack of rainfall during the summer months makes irrigation essential to cultivation... All this diversity of climate in Syria, however, is an advantage, because it makes possible the cultivation of crops requiring different climatic conditions". ("Economic Organization of Syria", pp.30-31).

III. Water Resources.

4. "The hydraulic resources of the country are quite abundant, except in the eastern plateau region... The Euphrates River, whose waters irrigate at present only a few hundred hectares of land, has an additional irrigation capacity of about 170,000 (1,700,000 dunams)". (Ibid, p.101). "Many other small rivers and streams are found in Syria especially in the coastal zone and mountainous regions. In general, good use is made of the available waters of these small rivers and streams for irrigation purposes. However, much better and more profitable use could be made of most of them if dams were built enabling winter waters to be stored for summer irrigation... The available water supply of Syria, if properly harnessed and utilised, is capable of irrigating more than 600,000 hectares (6,000,000 dunams)... Elaborate irrigation systems existed in Syria in ages past. Remnants of these systems still indicate the important role irrigation played when Syria was at the peak of its agricultural development... Efficient modern irrigation systems are rare in the country at present... The value of extensive irrigation works to the

country cannot be over-emphasised... An extensive system would enable the country to practically quadruple the present irrigated areas" (Ibid, pp. 102 & 103).

5. In a recent economic survey of Syria the following estimate of irrigation possibilities is given: "The potential water power resources of Syria and Lebanon have been estimated by some at about 500,000 H.P. A more conservative estimate sets the potential capacity at about 190,000 H.P. Only 27,420 H.P. of these are developed at present. The possibilities of further development will depend upon the growth of industry and population... The hydraulic resources of Syria and Lebanon are very important both for irrigation and for water power. For the former purpose great possibilities remain untapped in the Euphrates and Khabur valleys, the latter being an important tributary of the Euphrates in the north-eastern part of Syria. The Euphrates traverses Syrian territory for 680 kms. before flowing into Iraq. At present only a small part of the land around these two rivers is being irrigated. The irrigated area could be increased tremendously in the future as more people settle in this region which is destined to become one of the great agricultural regions of Syria. The Orontes river which flows through the plains of Homs, Hama and Antioch also presents important possibilities of irrigation". (K.A. Zilkha, "Economic Survey of Syria and Lebanon", 1937, p.7).

IV. Methods of Agriculture.

6. "The present methods of cultivation in Syria are primitive and inefficient. Ploughing consists of scratching the surface of the soil to a depth of three or four inches with a simple wooden plough with a wood or iron share attached, guided by hand and drawn by animals, usually oxen. Since the weight of the plough is not sufficient to drive into the soil, the land must be gone over more than once to

loosen the soil to the depth of a few inches... Grain is still cut with a primitive form of hand sickle, which is both slow and tiring to use. On steep, rocky hills a knife is used for harvesting in place of a sickle... Modern agricultural machinery was first introduced into Syria before the War by the German Railway Company at a time when the country was not ready for such development... The failure of this attempt to introduce machinery showed that the real need of the country was for simple, light agricultural machinery which did not require much capital investment or technical knowledge". (Ibid, p.90). "The Syrian peasant is more like a miner than a farmer. He exploits the soil without restoring the fertility. Generally speaking only fruit orchards and vegetables are fertilised. Land cultivated with cereals is not manured except by the negligible amount left by animals in the fields after ploughing and harvesting". (Ibid, p.92). "Agricultural experimentation is rare in Syria, except for that undertaken by the Government for the purpose of introducing a proper kind of tobacco and cotton seed. The introduction of new varieties of plants and grains has been largely accidental and rarely on an experimental basis". (Ibid, p.93).

V. Cultivable area.

7. The total cultivable land in Syria was estimated in "La Syrie et le Liban" (1919-27) to amount to about 40,000,000 dunams.* A more recent and probably more accurate estimate fixed the cultivable area of Syria, exclusive^{of} the Lebanon, at 55,536,000 dunams, of which 3,936,000 dunams are situated in Lattakia, 1,600,000 in the Jebel Druze and 50,000,000 in the remainder of the country. ("Statistiques Relatives a la Superficie des Etats de Syrie et du Liban", p.1). In 1928 the cultivated area amounted to 16,000,000 dunams. The annual average area of land cultivated during the years 1928 to 1933 inclusive was approximately 11,000,000 dunams. ("Economic Organization

*"La Syrie et le Liban sous l'Occupation et le Mandat Francais, 1919-27, p.237.

of Syria", p.74). The following comments from recent publications may here be quoted: "The riches of Syria and the Lebanon are confined to the soil and its cultivation whether it be agriculture in Syria or aboriculture in the Lebanon, together with flock raising in the wider desert areas must ever provide the principal source of wealth of the country. Of the 150,000 square kilometres which is the extent of these territories only a little over 13,000 square kilometres are cultivated. This could be increased four-fold, and in undertaking irrigation and land reclamation schemes the authorities are endeavouring to exploit the only natural resources of the country". ("Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Syria and the Lebanon" by G.T. Havard, C.M.G., His Majesty's Consul-General, Beirut, June 1936, p.2). "The most important natural resource of Syria and Lebanon, is their fertile land. In the interior of Syria (i.e. excluding the autonomous regions) it is estimated that 36,260 sq.kms. are cultivable. The total cultivable area of Syria and Lebanon will probably amount to 50,000 sq.kms. Of this total, only 13,300 sq.kms. were cultivated in 1935. In general, the average area annually brought under cultivation since the War, has been less than one-fourth of the cultivable area". ("Economic Survey of Syria and Lebanon", 1937, p.6).

8. Four reasons are given for the failure to make any use of half of the cultivable area of the country. (a) Syria contains vast stretches of swampy land. (b) The existing irrigation facilities are inadequate. In 1929, for example, only one-quarter of the 6,400,000 dunams of irrigable land was being irrigated. There has been little increase in this area since then. (c) The prevailing agricultural methods are primitive in nature. (d) Beduin raids in certain districts hamper agricultural development. ("Economic Organization of Syria", pp.73 et seq).

9. With regard to these four difficulties the following observations may be made. The proper drainage of swampy land could make large areas of good cultivable land available for use and would, at the same time, improve the health of the country. The water resources of the country are so great that with comparatively little expenditure the irrigated area could be trebled or quadrupled. Many improvements in agricultural methods could be introduced with little cost. The Beduin raids are becoming less frequent and will, no doubt, decrease as the country becomes more populated and as governmental control extends into outlying districts.

VI. Present State of Agriculture.

10. Syria is mainly an agricultural country, some 60% of its population being directly engaged in agriculture. Three-quarters of the country's exports are agricultural products and even its industry consists primarily in the transformation of its agricultural products into manufactured goods such as soap, leather, alcohol, preserved fruits, etc.

11. At present the principal agricultural products are cereals, such as wheat, barley, oats, maize, sesame and sorghum (Indian millet). It is estimated that of the cultivable land, 30,000,000 dunams could be profitably used for growing cereals. With the present methods of cultivation, the potential yield of this area would be 2,000,000 tons. This quantity would be greatly increased if improved methods of cultivation were introduced. ("Economic Organization of Syria", p.76).

12. The principal industrial raw materials grown are cotton, silk and tobacco. During the Middle Ages, Syria was the principal centre of the world's cotton cultivation. There is also a considerable production of hemp and castor oil plants.

13. The country is, moreover, eminently suited for fruit cultivation, the principal varieties grown being olives, grapes, citrus,

apricots, figs and melons. Almonds and pistachio also are grown in considerable quantities. There is further a large production of vegetable and leguminous plants, the most important being potatoes, onions, beans, chick peas, lentils and vetch.

VII. Possibilities of Large Scale Settlement.

14. It is clear from a comparison of the foregoing figures as to the cultivable area of land and the area actually cultivated that there is room for considerable agricultural development. This would be the case if all the cultivable land had actually been put to use, because of the primitive methods of agriculture and incomplete use of the water resources. The introduction of improved methods of farming and capital with which to drain swamps and make full use of the abundant water supply for irrigation purposes would make possible a much more intensive exploitation of the soil and thus place could be made for more agricultural settlers. This is all the more the case as fully half of the cultivable land is not put to any use whatever but lies waste for want of farmers to work it.

15. The Government of Syria has in fact made a start with the task of improving irrigation facilities. His Majesty's Consul General in Beirut reports as follows: "The raising of the barrage on the lake of Homs is being actively pushed forward and when it is finished in 1937 it will provide irrigation for some 14,000 hectares on the north side of the lake. Two other important irrigation schemes are being begun this year; that of the Chab in the plain of the Orontes river near Hama, where it is proposed to settle some 20,000 Assyrian immigrants from Iraq under the auspices of the League of Nations, and the reclaiming of the extensive Amouk marshes in the neighbourhood of Antioch". ("Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Syria and the Lebanon", June 1936, p.2).

16. The adequacy of the Labour supply in relation to the needs of Syrian agriculture has been much discussed by those interested in the agricultural development of the country, but no thorough study

of the question has yet been made. The prevalent opinion is that Syria is agriculturally underpopulated. It is submitted that such is, indeed, the position, particularly when viewed in the light of future possibilities. This view is also upheld in the above mentioned "Economic Survey of Syria"; "The mere enumeration of these and minor obstacles in the way of agriculture in Syria and Lebanon suggest the great possibilities which a reasoned agricultural policy of reform and encouragement could realize. The least that can be said is that Syria and Lebanon could be made to support, with a higher standard of living, much more than their present population, were their agricultural resources to be efficiently exploited". (Ibid, p.9).

17. In considering the possibilities of agricultural settlement the question of State domain is of special importance. The following is a list of some of the property belonging to the State, comprising the former private property of Sultan Abdul Hamid and lands that had been under control of the Ottoman State Treasury:

<u>1. State domain situated in the District of Aleppo:</u>		
In the vicinity of El Iss and El Hass	2,620,000	dunams
In the vicinity of Abu Kalkal and Mombidje	2,480,000	"
<u>2. State domain situated in the northern part of the District of Selimie:</u>		
Domain of El Hamra	890,000	"
<u>3. State domain situated in the District of Homs:</u>		
In the Eastern part of the District of Homs (including the Amuk swamps)	5,510,000	"
In the South-Eastern part of the District of Homs, in the sub-district of Kusseir (8 villages)	89,200	"
<u>4. State domain of Palmyra (recently surveyed)</u>	<u>920,000</u>	<u>"</u>
TOTAL:	12,509,200	dunams

It is estimated that of the land to the west of the desert 27% to 28% is State Domain.

VIII. The Region of al-Jezireh

18. Particular reference must be made to the colonisation possibilities in the section of Syria known as al-Jezireh. Al-Jezireh is

situated in the north-eastern extremity of the country between the frontiers of Turkey in the north and those of Iraq in the south-east. Its territory extends along the Tigris, Euphrates and Khabur Rivers. It comprises the two administrative districts of Syria known as al-Jezireh and Euphrates.

19. It is in the main a hilly region extending southwards from the slopes of the Taurus Mountains and gradually changing into rolling plains. Its soil, which is largely of basalt formation and belongs to the type of heavy black soil, is excellent.

20. Al-Jezireh covers an area of some 37,480,000 dunams. It is estimated that of this total, 12,600,000 are cultivable, which is more than the cultivable area of Western Palestine. In fact, however, only 4,600,000 dunams are cultivated, the remaining 8,000,000 dunams of cultivable land lying idle. Al-Jezireh has ample rainfall and abounds in rivers and streams.

21. The length of that part of the Euphrates which runs through it is stated by the French Institute for the Investigation of Water resources in Syria to be 680 kilometres. The minimum flow of the Euphrates during the summer season, when its waters are required for irrigation purposes, amounts to as much as 300 cubic metres per second.* According to an arrangement made between the Governments of Iraq and Syria, half of the flow of the river is at the disposal of Syria and the other half of Iraq. The Euphrates has a large number of tributaries which in turn are fed by a number of smaller rivulets. The principal of these tributaries are the Khabur, the Jaghjagh, Al Balikh, Jirjib, Kabir, Zergane, Samuna, El Abbas, Kharamuk and Ein Issa Rivers. The waters of the Euphrates are rich in alluvial soil which is deposited along the banks of the river over a width of some three kilometres when the river overflows its banks. The soil deposited over this area is exceedingly fertile, somewhat like the land along the banks of the Nile.

* E.Archard "L'irrigation", l'Asie Francaise, May 1924, p.205.

22. The Khabur, which is one of the principal water sources of al-Jezireh, is 260 kilometres in length. The triangle formed by Ras-el-Ain, Hassetché and Kamishli and situated in the north-western part of al-Jezireh is one of the largest areas in Syria enjoying natural irrigation. This entire area is intersected by numerous rivers and streams and contains many springs. It is, to a large extent, covered with a rich natural vegetation in which wild boar and other animals abound. This region is most suited for large-scale colonisation and is estimated to contain some 600,000 dunams of cultivable land of which only a part is actually cultivated.

23. The Al Balikh River, which runs through the western part of al-Jezireh, extends over a length of about 100 kilometres within the boundaries of Syria. It has its source near Ein Arus where the waters of hundreds of streams meet. This area is consequently most fertile and at present furnishes throughout the year a rich pasture for the herds of the Beduin tribes.

24. The Tigris forms part of the eastern border of al-Jezireh for a distance of some forty kilometres. The Tigris is in this area at its fullest and could be effectively utilised for irrigation purposes. The whole region along the Tigris is rich in natural vegetation.

25. The climate of al-Jezireh is influenced by its proximity to the Taurus Mountains, to numerous streams and to the desert in the east. In general the climate of al Jezireh may be said to be more equable than that of the surrounding country. In the summer the heat is dry. The winter is severe only in the northern part when the winds blow from the hills of Kurdistan.

26. The fertility of al-Jezireh must be measured not only by the good quality of its soil but by the abundance of its water, which at present is far from being effectively exploited. "At present the area along the Euphrates which is in fact cultivated by irrigation is infinitesimal compared with the area which is fit to be irrigated.

Only some hundreds of hectares are in fact irrigated and that for the most part in the vicinity of towns situated along the river." ("Economic Organization of Syria", p.33). This is, no doubt, due to the fact that it is difficult to irrigate the soil by natural means because the land along the banks of the Euphrates is higher than the river and there is little drop in the course of the river.

27. On the eastern bank of the Khabur River large settlements of Assyrians have been established. They irrigate their lands along the bank by the primitive method of a revolving wheel to which buckets are affixed, the wheel being turned around by the force of the water flowing down the river. Some of the land further away from the bank is irrigated by means of motors. The lands along the western bank of this river, which could be colonised in the same manner, lie practically uncultivated. For example, at Tel Rumman, some 4,000 dunams of land are cultivated by means of eighteen such revolving wheels. Tens of thousands of dunams to the west of this village could be cultivated if water were pumped from the river and used to irrigate the soil.

28. The principal crops of al-Jezireh are wheat, barley, maize, tobacco and sesame. Experiments have also been made recently in growing rice and cotton. Sheep, goats, camels and pigs are raised in large numbers.

29. Cereals are grown principally in the south-western part of al-Jezireh in the region of the Khabur River, of the Al Balikh River along the Turkish frontier, in the region of Tel Abyad and in the region of Jerablus in the Euphrates Valley. Rice is cultivated in the swamps south of Kamishli and south-east of Ras-el-Ain. In the vicinity of Deir-ez-Zor cotton is grown.

30. The land of ^{al-}Jezireh belongs in large part to beduin sheikhs and to town dwelling effendis who after the Great War acquired vast tracts of land. Some of these own many villages, For example, one

landlord owns 15 villages in the vicinity of Ein Dubar, another 12 villages near Kamishli and Derbissiye and a third 8 villages in the neighbourhood of Derouna.

31. In 1934 the estimated population of al-Jezireh was 209,531, of whom 144,645 resided in the District of Euphrates (33,800 in the town of Dair-ez-Zor) and 64,886 in the District of al-Jezireh proper. Thus the density of population was 5.6 persons per sq.km., or 16.6 persons per sq.km. of cultivable land.

32. The settled population of al-Jezireh, including the agricultural population, consists for the most part of Kurds and Christians. Their mother tongue is partly Kurdish. The number of Christians in al-Jezireh is about 75,000. There is a deep-seated enmity between the Kurds and their Arab neighbours. The Kurds look with disfavour on the Central Government established by the Syrian Arabs at Damascus and have consistently resisted its attempts to interfere in their local affairs. They are also dissatisfied with the Damascus Government for having neglected the economic development of the country and having failed to provide means for improved irrigation.

33. Although al-Jezireh is one of the most fertile parts of Syria and eminently suited for colonisation by new settlers, the present Administration of Syria can hardly be expected to find the financial means to promote agricultural development and to exploit this vast area. It is an open secret, moreover, that Syrian patriots are most concerned over the danger of the population of al-Jezireh, under political influences, seceding from the Syrian State. As stated, the principal element which is recalcitrant is the Kurdish population. It is, therefore, very much in the interest of the Syrian State that this area should be populated by Moslem Arabs who may be expected to counteract this separatist tendency.

Factors in Palestine
Situation

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Strategic Factors in
Palestine Situation

