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THE ARAB CASE AS PRESENTED IN THE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION
OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND ITS GENERAL COMMITTEE

by

Jacob Robinson

This is an attempt to present the Arab case on Palestine in a systematic way. It is based on the minutes of the discussions which took place on Tuesday and Wednesday, April 29th and 30th, in the General Committee (A/BUR/P.V. 28-31) and in the General Assembly on Thursday, May 1st (A/P.V. 70-71).

Altogether during these meetings the following Arab speakers took part in the discussions on the following occasions:

- 1) Mahmud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.28, p.16.
- 2) Mahmud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.28, p.21.
- 3) Mahmud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.28, pp.26-30.
- 4) Mahmud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.28, pp.36-40.
- 5) Mahmud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.28, p. 51.
- 6) Mahmud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.28, p. 51.
- 7) Mahmud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.29, p.3.
- 8) Fadhil Jamali (Iraq) A/BUR/P.V.29, pp.4-20.
- 9) El Khouri (Syria) A/BUR/P.V.29, pp.31-40.
- 10) Mahmoud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.29, pp.41-55.
- 11) Fadhil Jamali (Iraq) A/BUR/P.V.29, pp.61-62.
- 12) Maliki (Lebanon) A/BUR/P.V.29, pp.77-95.
- 13) Mahmoud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.29, pp.106-107.
- 14) El Khouri (Syria) A/BUR/P.V.31, pp.16-25.
- 15) Fadhil Jamali (Iraq) A/BUR/P.V.31, pp.26-30.
- 16) Maliki (Lebanon) A/BUR/P.V.31, pp.44-50.
- 17) Mahmoud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.31, pp.51-56

- 18) Malik (Lebanon) A/BUR/P.V.31, pp.62-63.
- 19) Mahmoud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.31, pp.66-76.
- 20) Mahmoud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.31, p.96.
- 21) Mahmoud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.31, pp.111-116.
- 22) Mahmoud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.31, p.121.
- 23) Mahmoud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/BUR/P.V.31, p.126.
- 24) El Khouri (Syria) A/P.V.70, pp.16-30.
- 25) Fadhil Jamali (Iraq) A/P.V.70, pp.30-35.
- 26) Malik (Lebanon) A/P.V.70, pp.41-45.
- 27) Antaki (Syria) A/P.V.70, pp.51-55.
- 28) Antaki (Syria) A/P.V.71, pp.16-30.
- 29) Mahmoud Hassan Pasha (Egypt) A/P.V.71, pp.41-45.
- 30) Fadhil Jamali (Iraq) A/P.V.71, pp.46-55.

It may be of interest to note that of 55,000 words spoken during these meetings, some 22,000 (40% of the total) came from the Arab representatives.

I The Palestine problem is a simple one

All arguments of the Arab case are based on the theory that the Palestine problem is a simple one. Jamali (Iraq) stated that the Palestine issue is "very simple" (A/BUR/P.V.31, p.27) in a meeting of the General Committee and reiterated it in the General Assembly (A/P.V.70, p.31). It may, however, be noted that this view is not only not shared by representatives of other countries, for example, France (A/BUR/P.V.31, p.41) or China which characterized the Palestine problem as "an extremely complicated issue" (A/BUR/P.V.31, p.4), but even one of the Arab speakers, Mr. Malik, spoke of the Palestine problem as a problem "which is sufficiently complicated" (A/BUR/P.V.31, p.44) and Mahmoud Hassan Pasha classed it as a "thorny" problem.

(A/P.V.71, pp.43-45.. See also Asaf-Ali's statement in A/BUR/P.V.32,p.36 ff.)

II The method of its solution: Application of certain general principles to the Palestine question

The basic approach of the Arab delegation to the problem of Palestine is an attempt to apply certain general principles to this particular case. In terms of formal logic, it means the application of the deductive method to the solution of this problem. The Arab speakers reiterated this conception many times. It was most emphatically stressed by Jamali in his speech in the General Committee on April 30, 1947:

(A/BUR/P.V.31, p.28):

"They should be principles which could be applicable to the Arabs as well as to the English, as well as to the Americans, and not specially principles applied to the Arabs."

A. What are the principles?

This discussion can be usefully divided into two sections, the first dealing with the repudiation by the Arab representatives of existing principles whose validity is generally assumed and second, with the establishment of such principles as should govern the solution.

1) Repudiation of existing principles

Admitting that the principles of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate are also "principles", Jamali in a speech in the General Committee evolved a theory according to which:

(A/BUR/P.V.29, p.61)

"...The whole issue of Palestine is one of conflict of principles. The principles which are involved are of two kinds: we have high universal principles, and principles derived from expediency, power politics, and local interests."

According to this speaker, the principles on which the Jewish title is based are of a lesser value in the hierarchy of principles than those on which the Arab case is based, and therefore in this conflict,

the principles on which the Arab case is based should prevail.

In the General Assembly, the same speaker went further and in a spirit of self-righteousness and moral indignation, he stated:

"I believe the world today is suffering from a lack of regard for certain fundamental principles of international relations and human life. We either lack these principles or, if we do not lack them, we disregard them, or we are inconsistent in their application. This is the essence of the trouble with the world today."

(A/P.V.70, pp.26-30)

The principles on which the Jewish claims are based are invalid. Why? Because they are in contradiction with the Charter of the United Nations, the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Mandate for Palestine. (El Khouri, in A/BUR/P.V.31, p.21, cf. also ibid 29 and p.36 A/P.V.71, p.46-50). The charter, however, consists of 111 Articles, the Covenant of the League of Nations consists of 26 Articles. Which one of these numerous Articles contains the contradictory principles referred to by the Arab delegates?

The Mandate (and the Balfour Declaration) has been singled out by the Arab orators for special attack. Jamali went further in this regard than any other speaker.

"Legally, the Mandate on Palestine violated the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant, according to which the Mandate System was devised to help develop a people towards self-government and independence and not to deprive a people of that right by introducing aliens to dominate them and check their national development."
(A/BUR/P.V. 29, page 12).

Against the argument that the Mandate was sanctioned by the League of Nations he says:

"The answer to that is that it was one of the mistakes of the League. The League must have passed it without adequate study or perhaps without anticipation of the consequences. Even if the Members who passed the terms of the Mandate did so with good intentions, experience proved that they were wrong, just as the Balfour Declaration itself was wrong." (A/BUR/P.V. 29, page 12).

In a later speech he makes the following dramatic statement:

"The League of Nations is now dead, so is the Mandate."
(Ibid. page 47).

However, the representative of Lebanon took a diametrically opposite view:

"...after all, the only valid, legal, international instrument or framework under which Palestine is at present governed and administered is definitely that of the Mandate of the League of Nations..." (A/BUR/P.V.29, page 81).

The Indian (Moslem) delegate, who also expressed his doubts about the consistency of the Mandate with the spirit and letter of Article 22 of the Covenant, came, however, to the conclusion that

"the Mandatory continued to function legitimately and validly." (A/BUR/P.V. 30, page 12).

He came to this conclusion on the basis of the following reasoning:

"...it was up to the people of Palestine to go up to the International Court of Justice, namely, The Hague, and lodge an appeal against it and get its reversal. Apparently they did not do it.

"History is not too clearly laid before us, and we do not know how they were prevented from pursuing that course. But in any case, we in international law know of a certain principle which is known as the principle of laches, or the principle of acquiescence. Inasmuch as the people of Palestine did not appeal against this mandate, which was the ultra vires of Article 22 since 1923 right down to this day, we may assume that the mandatory continued to function legitimately and validly." (Ibid. pp.11-12. Cf. also ibid 32,41 ff.)

He "stood corrected", however, by the representative of Iraq (A/BUR/P.V. 31, page 26), who made a statement that:

"...the Arabs never acquiesced under the Mandate. They did not appear before the International Court of Justice simply because they are not entitled to do so... The Arabs, from the very inception of the Mandate in 1917, protested, revolted. Bloodshed, demonstrations, of force took place, all as an expression of the fact that the Arabs never acquiesced and will never acquiesce under such a state of affairs. The date of the Balfour Declaration, 2 November, is a day of strikes and protest every year throughout the Arab world from 1917 up

until 1947. I want it to be thoroughly understood that the Mandate is illegal; the Mandate has never gained a legal foundation.... the honorable representative of the United Kingdom can provide the Assembly with a book of Arab protests and sacrifices from 1917 until now. This is quite possible, and I am sure he is generous enough to present these facts if they are required."

With regard to the Covenant of the League, the attack is concentrated on the supposed inconsistency between Art. 22, par. 4 of the Covenant and the Mandate for Palestine. To prove this, the assumption is made that the Palestine Mandate was a class A Mandate and as such granted Palestine provisional recognition.

The representative of Egypt made it clear in his speech of April 29th in the General Committee;

"Palestine has been classified as Mandate A, and as we all know, the aim and the spirit of all mandates, particularly that of Mandate A, is ultimate independence." (A/BUR/P.V. 29, pp.48-50 cf. also A/P.V. 71, p.47-51).

Incidentally, this view was indirectly supported by the representative of the United States (Ibid., page 96):

"The terms of all Class A Mandates, whether expressly included in the special treaties setting up the mandate, or by reference to the Covenant of the League of Nations, envisaged ultimate independence for all Class A Mandates. None of us are in disagreement on that point." Mahmoud Hanan Pasha did not fail to pin down the U.S. on this score. (A/P.V. 71, 43-45).

Finally, with regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Syrian representative claimed that the Mandate is to be "killed" by the adoption of the Charter.

"Article 103 of the Charter states clearly that, when there is a conflict between the obligations of any Member States under the provisions of the Charter and their obligations under any other international instrument, the provisions of the Charter shall prevail. For this reason, we hope that the matter will be studied in the General Assembly and thoroughly investigated, in order to see whether these texts of the mandate concerning the Jewish National Home in Palestine, and the way in which the Mandate has until now been exercised, will continue living, or whether they are now to be killed, since they

are contradictory to the Charter. This is a matter which should be studied very soon because of the conflicts and the disturbances going on are taking place for that reason." (A/BUR/P.V. 29, pp.36-37).

The same speaker attempted to prove that "in the second paragraph of Article 80 it is stated that the provision of this Charter should not hinder or delay the termination of the Mandates " (A/BUR/P.V. 29, page 1) 32) .

2) The major premise: The Principles to be applied.

The Arabs then explain that these principles are:

"...self-determination, the ideals of democracy, and the right to live free in their own country...."(Jamali, A/BUR/P.V. 29, page 13).

The Arabs further state that these principles are in conformity with the principles of the Charter (Antaki, A/P.V. 71, 22; see also ibid 27-30 and 51-55) whose implementation is the Arab goal (A/P.V. 71 p.46).

Somewhat earlier the same orator exclaimed:

"... should the Arabs not enjoy the Wilsonian principles of self-determination? Are they not the people of present history and culture who are entitled to achieve their freedom and unity in the modern world? Then the right to freedom and independence which should be the right of every community is theirs. That cannot be denied to the people of Palestine." (A/BUR/P.V. 29, page 4-10).

In a later speech, Jamali said:

"It seems to me, that we need reiteration of our faith in these fundamental principles. Do we recognize the principle of self-determination? Do we recognize the right of the peoples to live without fear and without aggression in their own homes? Do we believe in the democratic way of life?" (A/BUR/P.V. 29, page 61).

1)

Paragraph 2 of Article 80 reads as follows:

"Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiations and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the Trusteeship System as provided for in Article 77."

And bowing towards the American delegation, Jamali earlier had stated:

"We owe United States a good deal in learning the principles of self-determination, principles of democracy, and many other principles whose words have been so nicely coined by great United States leaders." (Ibid.)

Emir Feisal al Saud (Saudi Arabia) also bases the right of independence and freedom "for the Arab countries that were separated from the Turkish Empire" on "the famous principle of self-determination initiated by the late President Wilson". (A/BUR/P.V.29, p.91).

In the General Assembly Jamali reiterated the same ideas, using somewhat different words:

"The question of Palestine, for which a committee is being proposed, is no exception to this state of affairs. 1)

It is only a question resulting from a disregard of certain fundamental principles of human life; namely, the principle of self-determination, the principle of the right to live peacefully in one's own home, and the principle of self-government in a democratic way.

I submit that if these principles were to be recommended by the Assembly the issue would be settled. If the consideration of these principles was put forward, there would be no problem in Palestine. The problem of Palestine consists merely in a disregard of the fundamental principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, of disregarding the very principles for which the Mandate was made, it is the imposition of the will of one people over another without their consent."

(A/P.V.70, pp.30-31)

And once more:

"...it is of vital importance that the committee shall remember that nothing but the application of the principles of the United Nations Charter will settle the situation, namely, the application of the principles of self-determination, self-government and the democratic procedure."

(A/P.V.70, pp.31-32)

Characteristically enough, the right to live freely in their own country is not an unqualified right according to Jamali. This right refers only to "rightful inhabitants of Palestine." (A/BUR/P.V.29, p.16-20). They "are to be considered as humans who are entitled to enjoy human rights" and not "to live subjected to a domination by aliens imposed by force, invasion, and aggression." (A/BUR/P.V.29, pp.16-20)

1) See above, p.3.

In order to meet the argument that the welfare of the Arab people in Palestine not only did not suffer from Jewish immigration but on the contrary, gained much, the grandiose claim is presented that:

"To an Arab, material life is not the thing which makes life worth living. Freedom, independence, honor, and self-respect are the things which make Arab life meaningful."
(A/BUR/P.V.29, p.11)

In the argument of the Arabs, the so-called "humanitarian principle" and the Four Freedoms are also mentioned (Ibid., p.13) again without any elaboration.

No attempt is made to define the nature of self-determination or to indicate the legal source for this principle or its meaning.

B The minor premise -- Palestine an Arab state

Committing--apparently deliberately--the logical error commonly known as petitio principii, the Arab speakers proceed on the assumption that Palestine is an Arab country. Said Malik:

"It is a problem of an Arab State that has been deprived of its independence up to the present date..."
(A/BUR/P.V.29, p.91)

Malik is quoted by Jamali:

"...Palestine is an integral part of the Arab world. It has been so for the last 1400 years. It has always been inhabited by the Arabs. They are the owners of the house."
(A/BUR/P.V.31, p.27)

The same idea has been picked up by Asaf Ali (India), who is himself a Moslem:

"Palestine is undoubtedly an integral part of Arabia. Nobody can deny it."

C The Conclusion -- Independence

From these premises the conclusion is drawn that there is only one solution possible to the Palestine problem, namely, the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of an independent (i.e. an Arab)

State. The theory of immediate independence as the only solution, seems to be generally held in the Arab camp. El Khouri, arguing against the U.S.A. representative who had said earlier that ultimate independence would be one of the alternatives, heatedly objected:

"I do not see how another alternative could be found; how another solution for the problem could be found. The only solution and the only object should be the termination of the Mandate and the independence of Palestine.

That is what we want. We request the General Assembly to make its recommendation on that basis and on no other."

(A/BUR/P.V.31, p.21)

However, there is a certain amount of confusion among the Arabs as to whether this independence is to be immediate or ultimate.

While the representative of Iraq thought that independence was not only the only solution but that it could be immediately recommended, the Syrian delegate made the following reservation:

"Our request is that the recommendations to be made to the mandatory power should be directed towards this end--termination of the mandate and adopting the necessary measures for recognizing the independence of Palestine. This is to be done. This is simply that such recommendations will be given to the mandatory power. In fact, we did not limit the time for these recommendations and the decision for final solution of the matter. We did not fix any date in our proposal. It is for the General Assembly to choose a convenient time to find and prepare the necessary steps in order to establish such a result. They may choose to make it in this special session in the next regular session, or anytime which the Assembly would think proper. We did not dictate any measures for any methods of procedure in order to attain this aim and to reach for that end."

(A/BUR/P.V.31, pp.18-20)

However, his Egyptian colleague, speaking a day earlier, had made it clear that the independence of Palestine was not the ultimate but the main and sole objective:

"What harm would there be in stating that not only the ultimate but the main and the sole objective of the mandate is to arrive at the independence of the mandated countries? Why not put it expressly in the recommendation?"

(A/BUR/P.V.29, p.106)

But the representative of Lebanon, dissenting from his colleagues, made it clear that in his view, the immediate independence, the immediate termination of the Mandate, was not in the minds of the Arab States for:

"Several distinguished representatives, yesterday and today, made the remark that the Arab states are asking for an immediate termination of the mandate. Several of them... use the word 'immediate'. I find no such word in the actual text that was submitted by the Arab states. The text says 'the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence!..'"

(A/BUR/P.V.31, p.44)

During the night meeting, he reiterated the same view. (A/BUR/P.V.31,p.62).

This was also the gist of his speech earlier in the day, when he advanced five reasons for discussing the termination of the Mandate. (A/BUR/P.V.29, pp.79-80). He reached the ultimate in his sophistry in the following sentence of the same speech:

"Therefore, because of the urgency of the question and because we believe that the only real solution of it is the immediate granting of the independence of Palestine, we are submitting that the question should thoroughly be gone into with the ultimate end in view."

(A/BUR/P.V.29, p.82)

Incidentally, the same orator advanced a new argument in favor of independence, namely:

"...there is one point on which the two parties most directly concerned--the Arabs and the Jews--at least formally agree, that is, the independence of Palestine. Both of them want independence. Of course they may interpret independence differently, but at least there is, thank God, that minimum of agreement, namely, the formal agreement as to independence."

(A/BUR/P.V.29, p. 81)

This view was echoed by the representative of Iran:

"If we reject the item submitted by the Arab states, the Arab proposal, we might give the impression (I agree that it would be a false impression) that the General Assembly does not attach much importance to the question of independence of Palestine. This question of independence of Palestine, is, nevertheless, the ideal which we all share and which the Arab and Jewish communities share with us.

(A/P.V.71, p.1C3)

III The Historical Argument

In addition to the legal and moral grounds, historical arguments are also advanced. Jamali made this claim on historical grounds in the following words:

"The Arabs joined the Allies in World War I and King Hussein of Hedjaz and his sons led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire of which the Arabs were an integral part. This revolt had no motive but the attainment of their national freedom and independence. All the Arabs, including inhabitants of Palestine, were to enjoy their freedom and independence. The Allies, on their part, made several promises and several declarations assuring the Arabs of attaining their right to freedom and independence."

(A/BUR/P.V. 29, pp.4-10).

The representative of Saudi Arabia made the same point but in a more precise form:

"The so-called problem of Palestine is...the problem of an Arab State that has been deprived of its independence up to the present date in spite of all the promises that were made during World War I -- yes, in spite of the innumerable promises and pledges officially made by the United Kingdom and the Allies throughout the Arab world shortly after the withdrawal of the Turks, such as the King Hussein-Sir McMahon correspondence of 1915-1916, and the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918."

(A/BUR/P.V. 29, page 91).

IV Summary

Thus, the Arab case is based on the following contentions:

- 1) that the Palestine problem is a simple one;
- 2) that its solution is nothing but the application of certain general principles which are: self-determination, democratic procedures, freedom to live freely in its own country;
- 3) that these principles are on a higher level in the hierarchy of principles than those applied hitherto;
- 4) that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate are in conflict with the Covenant (Art.22, par.4), and the Charter of the United Nations (Art.80, par.2 and Art.107);

5) that provisional recognition of Palestine as an independent state was already given in the Mandate;

6) that therefore the only solution of the Palestine problem is immediate independence;

7) that this claim is strengthened by historical considerations.



May 21, 1947

THE ARAB STATES AND THE MANDATE FOR PALESTINE

Observations
by
Jacob Robinson

1) Upon numerous occasions during the First Special Session of the General Assembly, the Arab states decried the Mandate as "illegal", "immoral," and "invalid." All of them, with the exception of Lebanon, made formal statements to the effect that they never recognized the Mandate. Mr. Antaki (Syria) stated:

"...I also wish to state that the Syrian Government has never recognized the Mandate for Palestine, either in principle or in its application."
(A/C.1/P.V./47, p.98)

Mr. Jamali (Iraq), following his Syrian colleague, stated:

"I wish to subscribe to the statement made by the representative of Syria."
(Ibid.)

At the same meeting, Mr. Ada Al Fagih (Saudi Arabia) declared:

"On behalf of my delegation, I wish to associate myself with the statement made by the honourable representative of Syria."

(A/C.1/P.V.47, p.101)

2) It is important to note that in so far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, she was admitted to the community of nations only at the San Francisco Conference. She could therefore claim that she is subject only to the provisions of the Charter. (See, however, point 8). Syria, a former mandated territory, could not have been expected to have given its agreement to another mandate, and it, too, could claim that she is subject only to the provisions of the Charter. (See, however, point 8).

3) Lebanon, on the other hand, though associating herself with the general Arab sentiments in regard to the Palestine problem did not declare her non-recognition of the Palestine Mandate. Quite the contrary. The representative of Lebanon stated:

"...after all, the only valid, legal, international instrument or framework under which Palestine is at present government and administered is definitely that of the Mandate of the League of Nations..."
(A/BUR/P.V.29, p.81)

4) The statements of Iraq and Egypt with regard to the Palestine Mandate call for special consideration.

Egypt joined the League in 1937. Neither in her membership application to the League of Nations (Special Supplement of Official Journal of the League of Nations No. 166, May 2, 1937), nor in the formal maiden speech of the Egyptian delegate, on May 26, 1937, is there a mention of a reservation in regard to the Palestine Mandate. And yet, the Egyptian representative at the Special Assembly of the United Nations stated:

"When we joined the League of Nations, we joined it with the reservation that we did not recognize either the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate."
(A/C.1/P.V.46, p.51)

It might be possible that the Egyptian representative was referring to a statement that his government issued at the last session of the League of Nations Assembly on April 18, 1946. Following the resolution submitted by the Rapporteur of the First Committee, in which the Assembly took note of the expressed intentions of the mandatory powers to continue to administer their mandates in accordance with the obligations contained therein, until other arrangements were agreed upon by the United Nations (Art. 4 of the Resolution), Mr. Mahmoud Mohamed El Darwiche Bey (Egypt) made the following statement:

"The terms of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, referred to in the preamble of the resolution under consideration, provide that the system of mandates was meant for people not yet able to stand alone in the strenuous conditions of the modern world. Palestine, after the last war, was considered to be a territory coming under this provision. The opinion of my Government is that Palestine has intellectually, economically and politically reached a stage where it should no longer continue under mandate or trusteeship or whatever other arrangements may be considered. Palestine is not behind the countries, the independence of which has lately been admitted, and to which reference is made in the resolution; she is not behind Iraq,

Syria, the Lebanon or Transjordan. I therefore feel that I have to make all reservations in the Assembly, as I did in the Committee, with regard to the fourth paragraph of the resolution, whereby the Assembly 'takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them...in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective mandates...'

It is the view of my government that mandates have terminated with the dissolution of the League of Nations, and that, in so far as Palestine is concerned, there should be no question of putting that country under Trusteeship. I have not chosen the procedure of submitting a formal resolution whereby the Assembly expresses the wish that the independence of Palestine shall be declared; I chose in the Committee, and I intend here simply to abstain from voting on this resolution."

(Seventh Plenary Session of the League of Nations Assembly, Special Supplement No. 194, Geneva, 1946, pp.58-59)

5) When assessing the value of this "reservation" certain points should be borne in mind:

a) The "reservation" referred to by the Egyptian delegate, and made by him at the First Committee on April 12, 1946, was of a very general and vague nature. (Special Supplement No. 194, p.79). International law, however, does not recognize such an obscure statement as a "reservation."

"A statement from a prospective party that may be sharply critical of the character or content of the text of an instrument as interpreted by a group of States which may have already signed it does not necessarily constitute a reservation; and it is not to be so regarded unless it embodies an essentially amendatory term, and that term is proclaimed or communicated in such a way as to leave no room for doubt that it is to be deemed a condition under which the State from which it emanates accepts the arrangement."

(Hyde, International Law, Vol.II,p.1473)

b) Aside from the obscurity of the Egyptian statement, it would lack the status of a "reservation" also because of its having had been proclaimed after Egypt had joined the League.

"A 'reservation' has been defined as a 'formal declaration by which a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to a treaty specifies as a condition of its willingness to become a party to the treaty certain terms which will limit the effect of the treaty insofar as it may apply in the relations

of that State with the other State or States which may be parties to the treaty.⁴¹

(Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol.V., pp.101-102)

c) The League of Nations was a union of states with its own system of law, of which the Covenant, "the Constitution", was not the only source. All of the mandates were equally a part of this system of law. By joining this union of states, new members accepted the Law of the League of Nations. Egypt joined the League in 1937, and thereby automatically accepted its system of law, including its mandates' provisions. Egypt, therefore, was bound to respect the Mandate for Palestine as was any other former member of the League. There could not have been any legally valid reservations upon joining the League, unless these were agreed upon by the League through its member states. (Such was the case in regard to Switzerland).

6) Iraq's attitude towards the Palestine Mandate is equally untenable. In reporting the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations to the League Assembly on October 3, 1932, the Rapporteur of the Sixth Committee of the Assembly stated:

"...the Sub-Committee has noted the letter from the Prime Minister from Iraq dated July 12 in which the Iraqi Government states that it is prepared to... fulfill all the obligations which membership of the League implies." (Annex III of A.17.1932)

Needless to say, these obligations included the one upholding the
1)
respect for and validity of the Palestine Mandate.

7) Insofar as the Law of the League of Nations in regard to the Palestine Mandate is concerned, three Arab governments -- Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon -- therefore are expressly bound by it; the first two through their League membership, the last one because of her own admission. (See point 3).

1) It may be of interest to note Iraq was not represented at the last session of the League of Nations in April, 1946. This might explain the absence of the word "reservations" in the numerous statements of the Iraqi delegate to the United Nations Special Assembly in regard to Palestine. Unlike Egypt, she had never used that word in any sessions of the League of Nations in connection with the Palestine Mandate.

Art. 80 of the Charter safeguards the rights of peoples under the mandates. The only people specifically cited by name in the entire mandate's system is the Jewish people. The right of the Jewish people to have its national home in Palestine is thus expressly recognized by this article, and constitutes part of the Law of the United Nations. This law is binding upon all of the members of the United Nations, the Arab states included, whether or not they "recognize" the Mandate.

8) The Arab States were fully aware of the scope and meaning of Art. 80 of the Charter.

At San Francisco, the delegate from Egypt sought to amend the sense of this article, which provides for the continuance of "the rights whatsoever of any states or peoples or the terms of existing international instruments"... to read:

"Nothing in this chapter should be construed in and of itself to alter in any manner the rights of the people of any territory..."

(Doc. 552, 2/4/23, May 24, 1945)

This, of course, would have meant the rights of the majority of the population now in Palestine, thus excluding any further Jewish immigration into that country.

This amendment was rejected by a vote of 25 to 5.

The Syrian delegate then sought to amend the sense of the resolution to read:

"...nothing in this chapter should be construed in and of itself to alter in any manner the rights of any states or any peoples of the territory concerned..."

(Ibid.)

The implication here is similar to that of the Egyptian amendment. This amendment was voted down by a vote of 26 to 5.

At a later meeting, the delegate from Iraq sought to amend the sense of the resolution to read:

"...Nothing in this chapter should be construed in and of itself to alter in any manner the rights of any state in any territory or to diminish the rights of the people

of that territory."

(Doc.1090,2/4/43, June 19, 1945)

This amendment was also lost by a vote of 32 to 5.

From this it is quite clear that the attempt of the Arab states to annul the rights of the Jewish people to Palestine was frustrated by the overwhelming sentiment of the United Nations. It follows, then, that the sentiments expressed by the Arab states as participants in the Special Assembly of the United Nations in connection with the Palestine Mandate are of no legal validity.



MEMORANDUM
ON
ACTS OF ARAB AGGRESSION

submitted to the
UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION
by the
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

LAKE SUCCESS, NEW YORK

FEBRUARY 2, 1948

MEMORANDUM
ON
ACTS OF ARAB AGGRESSION TO ALTER BY FORCE THE
SETTLEMENT ON THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF PAL-
ESTINE APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
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SUMMARY

The Jewish Agency for Palestine submits that a situation has arisen in Palestine whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. This situation is due to an attempt by the Arab League and by the Governments represented therein in concert with the Palestine Arab Higher Committee to alter by force the settlement envisaged by the General Assembly's *Resolution on the Future Government of Palestine* (November 29, 1947, A/516)—an attempt which, according to Part A of the Resolution, should be determined “as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.”

This aggression is taking three forms:

A. *A campaign of threats, incitement and propaganda* officially sponsored by the Arab League and the Governments represented therein, which is “designed to provoke and encourage a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace and acts of aggression,” in violation of the Resolution unanimously adopted by the General Assembly with reference to *Propaganda and the Inciters of a New War* (October 28, 1947, A/428) and of *Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter*.

B. *Direct acts of aggression* recently organized and sponsored by the Governments of Syria and Lebanon against the Jewish population of Palestine in a manner inconsistent with the *Purposes and Principles of the United Nations* (as defined in *Article 1 of the Charter*) and in violation of *Article 2*.

C. Threats and preparations for aggression in Palestine now being made by all or several Governments represented in the Arab League in violation of *Article 2 of the Charter*, relating to the “threat or use of force in international relations” and in a manner inconsistent with the *Purposes and Principles of the United Nations*.

INTRODUCTION

In April 1947 the United Kingdom Government as the Mandatory Power requested the General Assembly (under Article 10 of the Charter) to make a recommendation on the future Government of Palestine. The General Assembly, accepting the view repeatedly expressed by the United Kingdom Government that the United Nations had jurisdiction to define the form of government in the territory of the Palestine Mandate, took steps to study and investigate all matters bearing upon the situation in that country. A Special Session of the

General Assembly held in April and May, 1947, appointed a Special Committee of the United Nations to investigate all aspects of the Palestine question and present a Report to the General Assembly. On September 1, 1947, after a careful investigation conducted in Palestine and Europe, the Special Committee presented its Report¹ which the General Assembly referred on September 23, 1947, to an Ad Hoc Committee. This Ad Hoc Committee appointed two sub-committees, of which one presented a Resolution for a settlement by Partition and Economic Union, and the other, composed of Arab and Moslem states, submitted a Resolution for a unitary Palestinian State. The former Resolution was adopted in the Ad Hoc Committee by 25 votes to 13. The latter was rejected by 29 votes to 12. Accordingly, on November 25, 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee presented a Resolution to the General Assembly involving a settlement of the Palestine question by Partition and Economic Union. This was adopted by the General Assembly with 33 votes in favor and 13 votes against.

2. The General Assembly appointed a 5-power Commission to implement its recommendation; allotted certain functions to the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council respectively, in carrying out parts of the plan; and requested the Security Council to take action under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter if the situation in Palestine constituted a threat to the peace. The General Assembly further requested the Security Council to determine as "a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution." The General Assembly finally appealed "to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations."

3. The Resolution adopted on November 29, 1947, was thus the result of a prolonged attempt by the United Nations to seek a solution by inquiry and negotiation. The Arab States, as well as the Arabs of Palestine, were afforded ample opportunity to submit their views and proposals to all the organs established by the United Nations to discuss the future government of Palestine. Their representatives did in fact present proposals to the Ad Hoc Committee for a constitution establishing Palestine as a unitary Arab State.² These proposals were examined, discussed and emphatically rejected.

¹ United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, Volume 1.

² Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question. Report of Sub-Committee 2. A/AC, 14/32, November 11, 1947.

4. The following pages will show that the *Arab States in concert with the Palestine Arab Higher Committee are attempting to overthrow by force the settlement which the General Assembly has approved and to impose by force the settlement which the General Assembly has rejected.*

A. PROPAGANDA AND INCITEMENT DESIGNED TO PROVOKE A BREACH OF THE PEACE.

5. In submitting that there is a purposeful attempt by Arab Governments in conjunction with the Palestine Arab Higher Committee to alter by force the settlement envisaged by the General Assembly's Resolution, the Jewish Agency is content to rest on the admissions of those Governments themselves. The Arab League never intended to accept the results of any mediation, arbitration or judicial settlement. When the Report of the United Nations Special Committee was published, the Political Committee of the Arab League meeting in Sofar, Lebanon, on September 16-19, 1947, passed resolutions which included the following threats:

"The Committee will regard the implementation of these recommendations (i.e., the UNSCOP recommendations of the majority and minority alike) as a certain danger menacing security in Palestine, and security and peace all over the Arab countries. Therefore it has determined by all practical and effective means *to resist the implementation of these recommendations.* They—the Palestine Arabs—*will launch a relentless war* to repel this attack on their country *especially so as they know that all the Arab countries will back and assist them,* supplying them with men, funds and ammunition. . . ." ¹

6. Subsequent events in Palestine, when the Arabs did indeed "launch a relentless war" and were "backed by men, funds and ammunition" from the Arab States, make it clear that the League's statement must be regarded as a plan and not as an abstract prediction. The "practical and effective means" contrived and advocated by the Arab States were never envisaged as being limited by the provisions of the Charter; indeed, the Secretary-General of the Arab League was thinking in terms which are quite remote from the lofty sentiments of San Francisco. "This war," he said, "will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongol massacres and the Crusades." ² In his further observations Azzam Pasha outlined three characteristics of the future war—the belief in glorious death as a road to Paradise, the opportunities of loot, and the Bedouin love of slaughter for its own sake.

¹ Al-Ahram, Cairo, September 21, 1947.

² Akhbar al-Yom, October 11, 1947.

7. Azzam Pasha had made his statement to an Egyptian newspaper; Jamal Husseini, for the Palestine Arab Higher Committee, deemed the United Nations a better platform for a call to arms against the Assembly's decision: "The partition line proposed," he said, "shall be nothing but a line of fire and blood."¹

8. At the Sessions of the General Assembly one Arab spokesman after another enunciated his conception of the Arab States' attitude to the settlement of an international problem by international decision. The Assembly was repeatedly told that it must either ratify all Arab demands or be met with fierce and widespread violence in the Arab world.²

9. When the General Assembly set its own impartial judgment above this menacing clamor and refused to subject the entire Jewish population of Palestine to the domination of a unitary Arab State, violent threat became the keynote of all Arab official utterances. It was not a propagandist campaign alone; the aim and effect of these declarations were to incite Palestine Arabs to active violence and the populations of the Arab States to active aggression in their support. On December 1, 1947, Azzam Pasha made a declaration in which he said:³

"By no means shall we permit the implementation of the resolution of the United Nations to partition Palestine. We shall resist and fight off this resolution with all the means at our disposal. *We have prepared an elaborate plan agreed upon by the Arab States in the meetings of the League Council.* This plan is being put into effect for the last two months. . . . The way of operation has been entrusted to a technical Committee. . . . The time is not a time for talk but for action."

It is clear that Azzam Pasha was here referring to the Arab League's decision at Sofar in September 1947 "to make Palestine a unified independent Arab State."⁴

10. The heads of Arab Governments have been as active as the Arab League spokesmen in provoking and encouraging threats to the peace in Palestine. Their utterances in this sense are quite unaffected by their vote in the General Assembly condemning warlike propaganda.

¹ Proceedings of Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, November 24, 1947.

² Speeches by Syrian Delegate, November 26, 1947, and by Iraqi delegate, November 28, 1947.

³ Al Wahda, Jaffa, December 1, 1947.

⁴ See above, Paragraph 5.

On September 22, the Iraqi Premier told the press, "I have requested you to prepare the Iraqi people, especially the youth, for the actions and sacrifices which may be necessitated by the situation. I now repeat this request."¹ On October 23, he declared that "*the Iraqi army will march and enter Palestine if the United Nations adopt partition.*"² On December 2, the Lebanese Prime Minister stated that "Lebanon had started carrying out the Arab League's decision to make Palestine a unitary Arab State." He went on to say that "the Lebanese Army will play its part when that time comes." On January 12, 1948, the Syrian Premier, Jamil Mardam Bey, declared to youths in Damascus clamoring for arms to fight the Jews that "President Shukri al-Quwatly approves of the movement of Arab youth and of their readiness for Jihad in defense of Arab Palestine."³

11. Efforts are sometimes made to portray the assistance given in Arab States to aggression in Palestine as the voluntary and spontaneous actions of excited citizens and not as formal acts of Governments. Some Arab representatives, however, are too candid for this subterfuge. Thus in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, the Prime Minister Riad al Solh said, "I am speaking under the dome of this chamber and in this official capacity proclaiming that we shall provide Palestine with all the arms, funds and men we possess."⁴ On December 7 he said, "The Lebanese Army now on the Palestine borders will play its part with other Arab armies in saving Palestine when the proper time comes."⁵

12. The above-quoted statements by Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese ministers, designed to provoke and assist aggression against the Jews of Palestine, are well matched by similar declarations on behalf of the Governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Transjordan. Indeed, all seven Arab States associated themselves through their Prime Ministers with a declaration in Cairo on December 17, 1947, in which they pledged themselves to oppose the United Nations' decision by force. An announcement to the press after their consultations said: "Partition is illegal and the Arab Governments will take decisive measures which will guarantee the defeat of partition."⁶ The same announcement contained a threat by the seven Prime Ministers to throw the full force of their armies into "the battle . . . until victory is achieved." The communique added: "It now behooves the Arabs to

¹ Al-Ahram, September 24, 1947; Beirut, September 23, 1947.

² Reuter's Baghdad, October 23, 1947.

³ Associated Press Damascus, January 12, 1948.

⁴ Al-Ahram, October 1, 1947.

⁵ Associated Press Cairo, December 7, 1947.

⁶ United Press Cairo, December 17, 1947.

prepare for the struggle.” The decisions taken at the Cairo meeting were subsequently interpreted in separate declarations by its participants wherein they reaffirmed the attitudes which they had already proclaimed. The Prime Minister of Lebanon then said that the Arab League “had definitely decided to arm Palestine Arabs, reinforce them with volunteers and collect a war fund to finance an all-out fight in Palestine.”¹ He went on to say: “We will never sleep until we save Palestine as an independent Arab unified State. We promise you we will supply Palestine . . . with weapons, equipment and men. I hope you will have confidence in the leaders of the Arab League. You shall witness soon the results of their work.” The Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Emir Faisal al-Saud, declared: “We promise you to save Palestine by our souls, money and sons. . . . I am depending on God and you to maintain Palestine as an Arab independent State.”² The Prime Minister of Syria, Jamil Mardam Bey, said that “the time for speeches is past and the stage for action is at hand. We should all be determined to liberate Palestine by our might and money.”³ On December 6, 1947, the Yemenite representative in Cairo, Sayyid Ali al Muayyed said: “The Yemenite people are all armed and all are anxious to fight for Palestine.”⁴ On the same day the Prime Minister of Transjordan, Samir al Rifai Pasha, said: “My country’s forces will be allied with the rest of the Arab world to fight for Palestine.”⁵

13. It would be manifestly absurd to contend in the face of these declarations that Arab Governments bear no responsibility for the violence and bloodshed which have been provoked in Palestine by their propaganda and intensified by the participation of their nationals. A few weeks after the Cairo meeting the Arab League evidently deemed it prudent to discard all pretense that violent action was not officially sponsored. As’ad Dagher, Press Officer of the Arab League, convened a press conference at which he disclosed that the Arab League “*had recommended that the Arab nations occupy all Palestine with their regular armies when British troops leave Palestine.*”⁶

14. The Arab leaders in Palestine who acknowledge the ex-Mufti’s leadership are themselves quite conscious that they may rely on the support of neighboring Governments in their efforts to submerge the peace of Palestine in a rising tide of bloodshed and aggression. The adoption of the General Assembly’s resolution was the signal for

¹ AP Cairo, December 15, 1947.

² AP Cairo, December 15, 1947.

³ AP Cairo, December 15, 1947.

⁴ AP Cairo, December 6, 1947.

⁵ AP Cairo, December 6, 1947.

⁶ AP Cairo, January 15, 1948.

attacks on Jewish life and property organized by the Arab Higher Committee through its local committees and groups in towns and village areas. A leading member of the Arab Higher Committee, Emil Ghoury, informed three American journalists on December 31, of the Higher Committee's resolve to organize bloodshed in Palestine under the direction of the Arab League's military committee at Damascus headed by General Taha al-Hashimi, former Iraq War Minister.¹ Mr. Ghoury continued: "Arab forces will also include volunteers from other Arab countries . . . and the war will start at the convenient opportunity."

On the basis of these and similar official declarations the Jewish Agency submits that the seven States represented in the Arab League are responsible—together with the Palestine Arab Higher Committee—for conducting propaganda which is designed to provoke and encourage a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, and acts of aggression within the terms of the General Assembly's Resolution of November 29, 1947, in violation of the Resolution unanimously adopted by the General Assembly with reference to *Propaganda and the Inciters of a New War (A/428 October 28, 1947)* and in a manner inconsistent with the *Purposes and Principles of the United Nations* as laid down in *Article 1 of the Charter*.

B. DIRECT ACTS OF AGGRESSION.

Attacks organized by Syria and Lebanon against Jewish villages in North Palestine on January 9, January 14 and January 21.

15. On the morning of Friday, January 9, 1948, Arab forces from Syria attacked two Jewish villages in northern Palestine, Kfar Szold and Dan, both located near the Syrian border some twenty-five miles north of Lake Tiberias.²

A study of Arab statements in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine during the days preceding this attempted invasion reveals the concern of Arab leaders at the scanty results of the violence which they had organized in Palestine. On December 31, Mr. Emil Ghoury of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee had informed press correspondents that "his only criticism of attacks by the Arabs was that they are not enough."³ Dr. Hussein Khalidi, General Secretary of the Committee, had stated that the world "would soon see evidence of Arab military skill." Reliable observers had noticed an increase in the number of "Palestine Liberation Committees" in Syria and Lebanon. In the Qatana camp near Damascus, allotted by the Syrian army to volunteers for aggression in

¹ New York Herald Tribune, January 15, 1948.

² New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, January 10, 1948.

³ New York Times, January 1, 1948.

Palestine, hundreds of Arabs from Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt and Palestine were receiving training for immediate operations.¹

16. The invaders on January 9 numbered about 400: they came across the frontiers in motor trucks and attacked the Jewish villages in two waves. They were equipped with modern automatic weapons and wore uniforms similar to those of the Syrian army. A battle between them and the Jewish settlers led by Haganah commanders, raged for three and a half hours before British troops supported by artillery and Royal Air Force Spitfires intervened to bring the situation under control. Three Jews were killed and eight were wounded; the Arabs left some 25 dead.

17. The objects of the attack were varied. According to reliable reports there was a desire to test the effects of this frontier violation on United Nations opinion; and it is significant that the aggression coincided with the first meeting of the United Nations Implementation Commission. Another object was to provide cover for the infiltration of Syrian volunteers into Palestine territory. According to a well authenticated report from Damascus,² "nine hundred men commanded by Akram Kaurani moved by truck through Lebanon and crossed into Palestine near Beit Jebeil. Another six hundred commanded by Abed Shisbekli entered Palestine by the bridge known as Jisr Banat Yaqub." The same source is probably correct in defining the main object of the attack as an effort to sustain Arab morale which "needed . . . some sensational victory, such as the capture of a town that would electrify the Arab world and stir the doubting into action."³

18. On January 12, the British Foreign Office announced that the British Minister in Damascus had "called for information from the Syrian Government and . . . had expressed the concern of the United Kingdom Government over the attack and asked that action be taken to prevent the situation from being aggravated."⁴

19. No secret was made of official Syrian and Lebanese complicity with these attacks. On January 10, a Palestinian Arab daily⁵ reported that the Syrian Defense Minister, Ahmed Sharabati, had arrived in Lebanon on Thursday, January 8, with a convoy of thirty lorries carrying 700 Arab recruits from Syria on their way to Merj Ayun on the Palestine-Lebanese frontier. The British station broad-

¹ New York Times, January 19, 1948.

² New York Times, January 18, 1948.

³ New York Times, January 18, 1948.

⁴ New York Times, January 13, 1948.

⁵ Al-Sha'ab, Jaffa.

casting in Arabic from Jaffa (Sharq al-Adna) stated that the Lebanese Defense Minister, Majid Bey Arslan, had similarly gone to Merj Ayun for "an important meeting of the Palestine Defense and Liberation Army."

20. Following a request from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, the Prime Minister and Defense Minister reported to the Chamber on January 14, 1948, on the progress of current aid to the Palestine Arabs. All Lebanese newspapers carried accounts of these proceedings whose highlights are the following:

The Prime Minister stated that Arab Governments are determined to fight the partition of Palestine with all their force. He emphasized that the Arab States have not recognized and will never recognize the United Nations' decision on Palestine.

The Defense Minister gave what he called "an eye-witness account" of Arab attacks on Jewish villages in Northern Palestine. "These attacks," he said, "would be strengthened and would take the shape of a real war in the near future." He added "that all activities, such as the collection of funds, registration and training of volunteers, assembling of arms, etc., are being supervised by himself and the Syrian Defense Minister in accordance with the resolutions adopted at the recent Premiers' Conference in Cairo."¹

Meanwhile in Damascus, the Syrian Defense Minister, Ahmed Sharabati, made a statement containing his impressions of the engagement at Dan and threatening "a direct frontal attack on Jewish forces in about a month."²

Attack on Dan and Lehavot

21. The attack of January 9 appears to have established a precedent for the free crossing of the Syrian-Palestine border by Arab "volunteers." On January 14, Arabs from Syria again attacked the Jewish settlement of Dan and the younger settlement of Lehavot four miles south of Dan, blowing up the community's water source and damaging its fish ponds. This attack originated at Shuta just across the Syrian border. A British official announcement said that British troops from Metullah drove the Arabs off in a battle which lasted an hour and a half. The Arabs left one dead and withdrew into Syria.³

¹ Speeches in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, January 14, 1948.

² New York Times, January 10, 1948.

³ AP, January 14, 1948.

Attack on Yehiam

22. On January 21, a force of about 400 Arabs crossed the Lebanon-Palestine border and attacked the Jewish village of Yehiam, 20 miles east of Nahariya in Western Galilee. Nine Jews, including five settlement policemen, were killed. The attack began at 7 a. m. and lasted five hours during which time Arabs cut all the bridges and culverts leading to the village. The battle raged for six hours before British troops arrived. There are 60 adult Jewish settlers at Yehiam.

23. On January 22, a smaller Arab force again crossed the frontier, renewed the attack on Yehiam and was driven off with heavy casualties. These attacks on January 21 and 22 were carried out by well-organized uniformed companies with covering support from mortars.¹

24. Men who infiltrated into Palestine under cover of these attacks have taken part in assaults on Jews in many parts of the country. Syrian and Iraqi units have been observed as snipers in Haifa, in attacks on Ramat Rahel (near Jerusalem), and Kfar Etzion (near Hebron), and elsewhere.²

Aggression by units of the Transjordan Arab Legion

25. The acts of aggression described above have involved the violation of the Palestinian frontier at the instigation and behest of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments in order to commit wanton and murderous aggression against peaceful Jewish villages and to bring about a political settlement which the General Assembly has condemned, by methods which the Charter forbids. Murderous acts against the Jewish population have also been committed by the Transjordan Arab Legion, a foreign army maintained in Palestine under British command. These acts, for which the responsibility falls on the Mandatory Government, will be described in a separate submission by the Jewish Agency.

Summary of Direct Acts of Aggression Already Committed

26. The following Chapter, dealing with preparations for future onslaughts on the Jews in violation of the Charter and in defiance of the General Assembly's decision, will make it clear that the main phase of Arab aggression is still to come. Yet it would be futile to ignore

¹ New York Times, January 22, 23, 1948.

² AP Jerusalem, January 4, 1948, reported "Syrians, Lebanese and Transjordanians have filtered into Jerusalem to swell the ranks of Sheikh Bakhri" (leader of Arab group in the Old City of Jerusalem).

the fact that aggression has already begun, and that the atmosphere of impunity in which it has been committed must serve as an encouragement to more ambitious violence in the future. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments have already assembled, organized, equipped and despatched Arab forces to commit aggressive acts against peaceful Jewish communities in territory wherein Syria and Lebanon have no right of access or jurisdiction at all. Syria is a member of the Security Council on which the Charter (Article 24) confers "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Yet it is on Syrian territory, with the active support of the Syrian Government, that forces have been and are being armed and organized for frontier violation, aggression and attempts to overthrow a decision of the General Assembly by force. The Lebanon, with other Arab States, sponsored in the General Assembly a Resolution on "Illegal Immigration" amidst many eloquent protestations on the inviolability of frontiers. Yet the Lebanese and Syrian frontiers offer free passage for unauthorized entry of men and arms into Palestine under the personal supervision of the Defense Ministers concerned with the avowed object of disturbing international peace and security. In Beirut and Damascus respectively, in close touch and collusion with the Governments concerned, the two main instigators of the present disturbance and warfare in Palestine have their abode: *Haj Amin al Husseini*, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, and *Fawzi al Kawukji*, his accomplice as leader of the Arab Rebellion in 1936. Since the Report of the British Royal Commission¹ signalled these men out for primary guilt in the organization of bloodshed a decade ago, they have managed to perfect their aggressive techniques and ideologies through long residence during the war in Nazi Germany as allies of the Hitler regime. Through them, this attack on the very soul of the Charter is connected, in an invidious but appropriate lineage, with the "scourge of War" from which the United Nations aspires to "save succeeding generations of mankind."²

27. The Jewish Agency submits that the relatively limited scope of these acts of aggression within the past two months does not absolve the United Nations from the necessity of taking steps to suppress breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. It is submitted that only firm and timely international action can avert the full unfolding of the aggressive design which is now being prepared by certain Member States of the United Nations.

¹ Royal Commission Report, Chapter IV, Paragraph 14.

² Another such link is provided by the Arab commander in Jaffa and Lydda, Sheikh Hassan Salameh, who was described by Mr. Emil Ghoury on December 31, 1947, as one of the most active men in the field (New York Times, January 4, 1948). Sheikh Salameh was dropped in Palestine by parachute as a German Major for sabotage duties in 1944.

C. PREPARATIONS FOR AGGRESSION BY ARAB STATES AGAINST JEWS OF PALESTINE AND UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES.

28. The violent propaganda organized by Arab Governments in recent weeks, the three acts of aggression committed by Syria and Lebanon, and the current infiltration of officially sponsored "volunteers" are merely the prelude for the main phase of Arab aggression which is planned to take place in the near future. The Arab League spokesman, As'ad Dagher, in his statement on January 15 indicated that the end of the British Mandate would be the signal for the occupation of the whole of Palestine by armies of the Arab States.¹ The Syrian Defense Minister, Ahmed Sharabati, however, declared on January 13, on his return from the operations based on Merj Ayun against Dan and Kfar Szold, that "a direct frontal attack against Jewish forces can be expected in about a month from the Arab People's Army. Full-scale training and arming are progressing."²

Recruiting and Training in Syria.

29. According to the Cairo paper, Al-Zaman, of December 17, the Arab League Council entrusted the Syrian Government with the task of organizing "the popular movement for the rescue of Palestine." Damascus, by all accounts, is now the center of a well-organized movement under the direction of the Syrian Ministry of National Defence, Ahmed Sharabati, for the recruiting, training and equipment of Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arabs who are to form a "people's army" for the invasion of Palestine. The Cairo newspaper, Al-Ahram, reported on December 15 that "about 700 Palestinian Arabs are already training in Qatana barracks near Damascus; their number is growing by about 100 a day." Later the recruiting movement in Damascus began to embrace Syrian nationals as well. On December 4, Aref Nakadi, Governor of Jebel Druz, announced the beginning of recruitment in his area especially for Druses "who were made for war and war was made for them."³ The military commander of Aleppo, Jamil al-Burhani, announced that recruiting in the northern provinces would begin on December 8.⁴ On December 7, the Damascus newspaper, Alif-Ba, reported that the Ministry of National Defence had announced that special recruiting offices would be opened to bedouins "who are inclined by nature to draw the sword."

¹ New York Times, January 16.

² AP Damascus, January 13.

³ Al-Jabal, Damascus, December 4.

⁴ Al-Insha, Damascus, December 7.

30. On December 27 it was reliably reported that 38 senior officers of the Syrian army had "resigned" to help train a voluntary corps. On December 19 the Syrian Defence Ministry announced its "acceptance of the resignations . . . particularly of army officers who wish to volunteer for service in Palestine to fight against partition. The number of those resigning was not immediately discussed."¹ The leader of the recruiting movement is Fawzi al-Kawukji, who informed the press on December 9 that 15,000 volunteers were due to complete training at an early date.²

Apart from Syrians, the trainees at the Qatana camp include Palestinians from Jenin, Nablus and Hebron; a group of Lebanese Moslems; a number of young Iraqis who took part in the pro-Nazi revolt under Rashid Ali and a group of young Egyptians headed by their leader, Ahmed Hussein.³

According to information at the disposal of the Jewish Agency, the number of volunteers in Syria is presently as follows:

Damascus	5,700
Aleppo	5,000
Rest of Syria.....	5,000

Of these, 950 volunteers from Damascus and 400 from Aleppo are now under training, in addition to the 420 fully-equipped Palestinian volunteers in Qatana camp.

Recruiting and Training in Lebanon

31. In Lebanon, recruiting preparations are also in full swing. On December 18, the British Near East Broadcasting Station in Jaffa reported that the first group of 500 volunteers who had enlisted for service in the defence of Palestine had been called up for training by the Beirut recruiting office. Earlier in December the Mufti of Lebanon, Muhammed Tawfiq Khalid, made a public "fatwa" (ruling) declaring a holy war in Palestine.⁴ The Egyptian newspaper, Ruz el-Yusuf, reported on December 10 that "Lebanese volunteers have held manoeuvres near Baalbek using a number of batteries which were put at their disposal by the High Command of the Lebanese Army."

Recruiting and Training in Egypt

32. On December 14 the Damascus newspaper, Al-Insha, reported: "Ahmed Hussein, leader of the Young Egypt Party, has arrived in Damascus and entered the Qatana barracks for training.

¹ AFP—Damascus, December 19.

² AP—Damascus, December 9.

³ Qabas, Damascus, December 12.

⁴ Beirut (daily newspaper), December 4.

He began negotiations with Shukri Quwatli, the Syrian President, and Fawzi al-Kawukji about forming a detachment of Young Egyptians to be named after Mustafa al-Wakil, an Egyptian who collaborated with the Nazis during the war and died in Germany. On December 16 the *Journal d'Egypte* reported that the Egyptian cabinet had authorized the establishment of recruiting offices for volunteers. On December 23 the Cairo newspaper, *Al-Ahram*, published a letter from Ahmed Hussein giving full details of the progress of his work in the Qatana barracks. The Egyptian press reflects the impatience of militant elements with what they regard as a cautious attitude of their Government in this recruiting movement. Criticism has been directed against the Government at the party meetings of Young Egypt (*Al-Ahram*, December 19), the Wafd (*Al Musawwar*, December 21) and the Liberal Party (*Al-Ahram*, December 17). It would be a fair description of the position in Egypt to say that while the recruitment of volunteers for aggression in Palestine lacks something of the governmental drive which is freely given in Syria, voluntary activity for these purposes is sponsored by the Egyptian Government and is encouraged by the militant leaders of the Arab League secretariat which has its abode in Cairo. That this movement is gathering strength is clear from the *New York Times*, which reported on January 20: "Members of the Kawukji staff said they had been negotiating with Arab groups in Egypt. They said the Nationalist party and the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt were contributing most of the men for a force that would cross the Sinai Desert to attack Jewish settlements in the south while the Kawukji force operated from the Nablus area."

Recruiting and Training in Iraq

33. Recruiting offices of the "Committee for the Rescue of Palestine" were opened in Baghdad on December 8.¹ On December 12 a number of Iraqi young men who had participated in the pro-Nazi Rashid Ali rebellion in Iraq of 1941 arrived in Damascus and put themselves at Fawzi al-Kawukji's disposal.²

On January 17, 1948, the Egyptian newspaper, *Al-Masri*, reported that Jamal Husseini had stated after visiting the Iraqi Vice-Premier that a well organized Arab Commando group was being formed in Iraq for special assignments in Palestine.

34. On December 27 Col. Taher Muhammed, a member of the "Palestine Defence Committee," stated that "two regiments of volunteers will be sent to Palestine within a week to fight for the Arabs.

¹ *Al Sa-a*, December 9.

² *Al Qabas*, Damascus, December 12.

They consist of soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers released from the Iraqi Army." The Committee further stated that 100 retired Iraqi Army Officers would proceed to Syria within a week to train Syrian officers.¹

According to reliable reports, at least 1,400 Iraqi volunteers have passed into Syria. Some of the earlier contingents, who arrived in Syria fully armed, have departed for Palestine after brief training at the Qatana barracks.

35. Recruiting in other Arab countries has not at the moment assumed large proportions, although Government statements are on record which give full authority for any such activity that might be undertaken. It is evident that the Arab population as a whole is reluctant, despite official incitement, to embark on hazardous military operations. The masses need the encouragement of military success and the certainty that there will be no strong international reaction before embarking on a general campaign. The Arab News Agency, however, reported from Mecca on December 9 that recruiting offices had only just been opened at Riyadh and other centres. The same News Agency had reported on December 21 that "hundreds of recruits are enlisting daily in Saudi Arabia." On December 8 Azzam Pasha told the press that "Ibn Saud had placed his regular troops at the League's service and had given his blessing to any desert tribe that wished to fight for Palestine."²

36. In describing these recruiting activities, the Jewish Agency has mainly relied on Arab reports. No such reliance appears to be reasonable in regard to the numbers involved. The tendency is to give exaggerated figures, but the fact remains that a widespread recruiting campaign for violence in Palestine is being encouraged and sponsored by Arab Governments. On December 18 the Ministry of the Interior in Damascus "warned correspondents against too detailed reporting on volunteer training and other military preparation in connection with Palestine."³

Arms Purchases

37. Arab Governments who possess State resources and the access to the open markets are in a good position to ensure that sufficient arms are available for creating a prolonged breach of the peace in

¹ AP, Baghdad, December 27.

² UP, Cairo, December 8.

³ UP, Damascus, December 18.

Palestine. On December 18 it was reported from Cairo that "senior military officers of four Arab states have left the country on a mission to purchase arms and ammunition as part of the Arab League plan to prevent the inception of the Jewish State in Palestine. . . . The mission officers . . . from Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon . . . plan to visit Pakistan, India, France, Switzerland, Spain and Czechoslovakia. . . . The Arab armies, it seems, have no arms surplus and such a move on the League's part is necessary to supplement the guerrilla arsenals."¹

38. The Egyptian newspaper, Al-Masri, reported on January 20 that the Mufti had asked the Egyptian Prime Minister for permission to transfer to Palestine all arms and ammunition acquired by his agents and envoys in Egypt, the Western Desert and Libya. On January 14 the same newspaper stated that all arms used by Iraqi volunteers in Palestine were modern weapons received from Britain and further that the Egyptian Government was preparing legislation which would enable Palestinian Arabs to acquire arms in Egypt and transfer them to Palestine.

39. On January 28 it was reported from Cairo: "Ahmed Hussein, leader of the Young Egyptian Party, stated that the Egyptian Government had supplied several thousand rifles to Palestine Arabs. He said that they were given to the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem."²

40. In this connection, the Jewish Agency has to draw special attention to the grave and singular feature of Arab arms purchases, which is the availability of British arms to Arab Governments and their potential use by those Governments for aggression in Palestine. This feature of the situation will be referred to in a further memorandum.

Infiltration into Palestine

41. Another stage in the assistance by Arab Governments to the projected plans of invasion and war in Palestine is the violation of frontiers between their own territories and Palestine by the infiltration of volunteers and armies. According to reliable reports and incontestable evidence, this process has been going on for several weeks. As already pointed out, attacks from Syria and Lebanon against Jewish villages in North Palestine served as cover and screen for the infiltration of hundreds of volunteers who are taking up their positions in Palestine in preparation for future aggression. On January 9, the

¹ New York Times from Cairo, December 18.

² AP, January 28.

New York Times contained the following report from the Associated Press in Baghdad:

"A convoy of Iraqi volunteers—ninety commandos and instructors released by Iraq's Army—left today en route to Palestine. The contingent, which includes officers, is supplied with light arms, including machine guns and grenades. It will instruct and train volunteers. Other such groups are expected to leave Baghdad soon."

On January 15 the Associated Press from Baghdad reported that Jamal Husseini, Vice-President of the Palestine Arab Higher Executive, had witnessed the departure of 200 trained Iraqi volunteers for Palestine. On January 25 reports were published of the arrival in Palestine of 750 armed men from Iraq via Transjordan and their concentration in Tubas in the Nablus area. According to the New York Times of January 26 Arab sources stated that these fighters "had been deployed through a wide area." The Jewish Agency is able to confirm the accuracy of the following two reports published in the New York Times of January 26. The first report from the newspaper's correspondent in Damascus reads:

"Fawzi el-Kawukji, Commander in Chief of the Arab People's Army, was reported today to be preparing to leave for Palestine. The number of his men who have crossed the Lebanese and Syrian frontiers to gather in the mountain region around Nablus in Palestine was said to exceed 3,500.

"Mr. Kawukji has organized a 'general staff,' which will enter Palestine with him to direct operations. The volunteer army is under order not to become involved in major operations but to concentrate on organization.

"Asked when he would depart, Mr. Kawukji said: 'Never mind the date, but when I go the whole world will know.' "

The second report comes from the United Press in Beirut on January 25, and reads as follows:

"One thousand well-trained Arab soldiers slipped into Palestine from Lebanon, Trans-Jordan and Syria during the past two nights, reliable sources said today. It was said to have been the third large wave of volunteers to infiltrate into Palestine since the United Nations decided to create Arab and Jewish States."

42. On January 26, the Jerusalem correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune reported the following details of the arrival in Palestine of Syrian and Iraqi volunteers:

"The 750 Syrians and Iraqis formed the largest contingents of volunteers yet to reach Palestine in preparation for the coming Arab war on partition. Unlike Abdul Kadir's men, who follow the Mufti and concern themselves with local fighting now, the foreigners arrived under the auspices of the Arab League. Reportedly, they were under instructions to confine themselves to training and familiarizing themselves with the country.

"The men traveled in column, accompanied by a mule train to ford the Jordan River and a dozen trucks with supplies. The trucks were allowed to cross the river at Jisr el-Majami, in northeastern Palestine, where *troops of Abdullah's Arab Legion guard a bridge.*

"Their equipment included radio, Bren and Sten guns, rifles and mortars. British police believed they also had light armored cars and perhaps a few field pieces. They brought their own food and for two days camped in tents pitched in the Arab-controlled valley around Tubas, a town half-way between Jerusalem and the Sea of Galilee.

"A Government spokesman said a full report had been sent to London."

Financial Assistance

43. Direct assistance given by Arab States to aggression in Palestine also takes the form of financial contributions for the recruitment and equipment of armed forces preparing for active violence in Palestine. The Minister of the Interior of Syria announced on December 20 that "the sole body authorized to collect money for Palestine would be a committee to be appointed by him."¹ The Arab League Council had recommended at Sofar "that the League States allocate immediately the requisite funds for this purpose" (i.e. of raising funds for war in Palestine).² It is reported that a subscription of over four million dollars has been made by Arab States for the purchase of arms in aid of the Palestinian campaign. On December 17 the New York Times reported from Beirut that "money for the Arab cause appears to be plentiful. The Syrian Parliament has allocated two million Syrian pounds and the Lebanese Government another million pounds. Another 1,500,000 pounds have been raised from individuals in the two countries."

44. An unsavory feature of Arab attempts to increase the revenue available for arms purchases has been a campaign of extortion from

¹ Arab News Agency, December 20.

² Al-Ahram, October 10.

helpless Jewish minorities in Arab countries. On December 10 the Jews of Egypt were "called upon" to contribute generously to the Save Palestine Fund. The call was published in the organ of the "Moslem Brethren" by the Youth Section of the Al-Azhar University.¹ In Syria (where seven synagogues were burnt in Aleppo by a rioting mob early in December) the Jewish Community Council was forced to collect funds and hand them over to the Arab Committee for the purchase of arms to kill their Jewish brethren in Palestine. The atmosphere existing in Lebanon can best be described through the following extract from a Beirut newspaper:²

"It has been reported that Jews of Saida visited this office in order to complain about the attacks to which they have been subjected (i.e. by Arabs). They have now condemned the partition of Palestine and have declared their willingness to contribute money for Palestine (i.e. for the Arabs of Palestine). We have been informed that the Committee of the Office has reassured the Lebanese Jews that despite personal acts of hostility no future malevolence is intended against them. In the opinion of the Committee, Lebanese Jews can do nothing against the security of Arab peoples. . . ."

"Donations can be sent directly to the permanent office in the city."

CONCLUSION

45. In its task of determining whether a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression exists, the Security Council may be guided by the view of the General Assembly that any or all of those three situations is created by "an attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this Resolution." The Arab Governments have jointly and severally defined their objective in almost those very words. (See Paras. 5-13 above). Indeed it is axiomatic that a violent revolt against an international judgment cannot fail to threaten international peace and security since it constitutes a defiance of the very organization to whose care the preservation of peace has been entrusted.

46. The Jews of Palestine with the full support of the Jewish Agency will do their part in resisting this aggression against their lives, their future and their internationally sanctioned rights. They regard the General Assembly's Resolution as a compromise reached

¹ Jewish Telegraphic Agency, December 11 reporting article in Al Ikhwan al Muslimun.

² Al-Ittihad al Lubnani, December 22.

by judgment between conflicting claims. This compromise makes heavy demands upon them in terms of sacrificing historic claims—and claims which had previously received international consent. The Palestine Mandate reserved an area of 45,000 square miles from the scope of Arab independence for “the primary purpose of establishing a Jewish National Home.” Transjordan was later excluded from this purpose; and now half the area of Western Palestine is allotted to the Arabs as their eighth sovereign state. Thus on seven-eighths of the area of the original Palestine Mandate two Arab States are to be established for the independence of 1,500,000 Arabs who form 80% of the Arab population in the area of the original Palestine Mandate. The “primary purpose of the Mandate” is expressed, at a time of greatest Jewish need, by the constitution of a Jewish State in one-eighth the area originally set aside for Jewish immigration and development. This restriction of Jewish claims was approved by the United Nations, in an effort to meet Arab interests and in deference to the cause of peace, after prolonged and minute investigation of the problem in the light of the Charter and with a view to seeking the maximum degree of self-determination attainable in present conditions. There is thus no justified sense of unredressed grievance to which the Arabs can have recourse. Indeed they frankly acknowledge that their aim is to deny all Jewish rights of national freedom and establish a monopoly of independence in their own behalf.

47. In their determination to resist any encroachment on the rights which the General Assembly has approved, the Jews are not fighting for themselves alone. What has been outlined in these pages is a total assault upon the principles of the Charter and the authority of the United Nations. The Arab States are taking effective collective measures for the creation of “threats to the peace,” and the encouragement of “acts of aggression” in direct violation of Article 1 of the Charter. In defiance of Article 2 they are employing “in their international relations the threat or use of force.” Regardless of Article 2 Paragraph 5 they decline to “give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter.” They turn a deaf ear to a specific appeal from the General Assembly (November 29) to abstain from “any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of its Resolution.” They flout a unanimous Resolution of the General Assembly which “condemns propaganda, in whichever country conducted . . . which is designed to provoke and encourage a threat to the peace, breach of the peace and acts of aggression.” They carry their defiance of the United Nations to the point of conspiring against the lives of representatives and officers of the

United Nations carrying out their responsibilities under the Charter. They undermine the basic purpose of the United Nations "that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest" (of the United Nations). The world is thus faced with an attempt to hold up the Charter to mockery and violation in pursuit of ambitions which have been judged and found inadmissible by the highest tribunal of international opinion. The Jewish Agency is convinced that the success of this challenge would spell the everlasting discredit of the United Nations, and is confident that the Jews in defending their own national rights are also defending the most significant and universal of human ideals.

48. The Jewish Agency therefore appeals to the Security Council through the United Nations Palestine Commission to take the action prescribed in Chapter VII of the Charter against a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace and acts of aggression provoked, committed, threatened and prepared by the Arab States, members of the Arab League, in concert with the Palestine Arab Higher Committee.





Copies of this publication have been filed with the Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., where the registration of the Jewish Agency for Palestine as an agent of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jerusalem, is available for public inspection. The fact of registration should not be considered as approval by the United States Government of the contents of this publication.

SHIPMENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO ARAB COUNTRIES
DURING FEBRUARY 1948

LIST OF U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

The original list includes shipments of food products which have been eliminated from this copy because they are of no particular interest with regard to the question of embargo.

1. SAUDIA ARABIA

Electric battery boxes	16	
Casings, truck and bus	6,184	
Casings, auto	296	
Casings and tubes	6,272	
Inner tubes, auto	4,997	
Fan belts	1,095	
Rubber and Balata belting, not elsewhere specified	6,381	
Rubber hose	15,615	lbs.
Linseed oil	7,100	gals.
Sawed Douglas fiber timber board	112,000	bd. feet
Plywood	529,816	bd. feet
Aviation oil, medium viscosity	121	barrels
" " high "	527	"
Lubricating grease	160,832	lbs.
Tin plate and Tagger's tin	47,986	lbs.
Water, oil, gas, and electric storage tanks	24	tons
Steel bars, cold finished	6,152	lbs.
Steel bars, concrete reinforcements	33	tons
Steel bars, non-alloy	23	tons
Galvanized iron sheets	1,000	lbs.
Galvanized steel sheets	1,500	lbs.
Iron and steel structural shapes, except fabricated	165	tons
Iron and steel structural shapes, fabricated	113	tons
Iron and steel plates, fabricated, punched, f.t.c.	3	tons
Iron and steel metal lathes	35	tons
Iron and steel sash and frames	16,436	lbs.
Boiler tubes, seamless	9,849	lbs.
Pipe casings and oil lines, seamless	874,930	lbs.
Pipe casings and oil lines, welded	9,011,637	lbs.
Pipe, black seamless, not elsewhere specified	12	tons
Cast iron oil pipe	24	tons
Cast iron oil pipe fittings	8½	tons
Steel welded black pipe	490,000	lbs.
Raw iron welded black pipe	115,000	lbs.
Galvanized steel welded pipe	455,000	lbs.
Raw iron welded galvanized pipe	1	ton
Iron and steel pipe, not elsewhere specified	125	tons
Iron and steel pipe fittings, not elsewhere specified	79,052	lbs.
Iron or steel wire, uncoated	9,800	lbs.
Galvanized wire	1½	tons
Woven wire fencing	68,487	lbs.

Woven wire screen cloth, insect and otherwise	9,000 lbs.
Wire, rope and cable, not insulated	12 tons
Welding rods and wire, electric	59,800 lbs.
Wire and manufacturer's necessities	11 tons
Wire nails	65,350 lbs.
Nails and staples	32,000 lbs.
Machine parts, nuts, and screws	115,000 lbs.
Grey iron castings	1 ton
Iron and steel forging, (not elsewhere specified, non-alloy)	1,400 lbs.
tin cans	1,200
Hack saw blades, hand operated	15 gross
Others	200
Mechanical hand tools	\$ 16,650.
Hardware and builders' supplies, not elsewhere specified	16,150.
Hardware, saddlery, car and marine and harness	5,000.
Chains and power transmission	1,927.
Iron and steel wood screws	200 gross
Metal containers	10,900
Iron and steel fence posts	14,112 lbs.
Others, not elsewhere specified	\$33,000.
Copper plates and sheets	1 ton
Copper wire, bare	1½ tons
Rubber covered copper wire	12 tons
Insulated copper wire	32 tons
Brass and bronze bars, rods, pipes, fittings plumbers' supplies, screws, etc.	35,000 lbs.
Direct current generators, welding sets	1
Motor generators, welding sets	6
Non-rotating type	1
Electric generator sets, Diesel engine	10
Self-conductor lighting outfits	3
Storage batteries, 6 amperes, 12 volts	530
Flashlight batteries	50,000
Batteries, dry multiple cell	610
Transformer and distributor, not over 500 K.B.A.	1
Transformer, not elsewhere specified	12
Converters, rotating, under 300 K.W.	2
Fuses, not elsewhere specified	3,300
Electric indicating instruments	10
Electric recording instruments	4
Electric testing apparatus, parts	\$2,700.
Motors, not over 1/3 h.p.	12
Motors over 1/3 h.p., under 1 h.p.	5
Motors, stationary, up to 300 h.p.	13
Electric portable tools, power driven	26
Flood lights	3
Air port search light beacons	3
X-ray apparatus	\$37,600.
Radio trans.	\$ 6,200.

Radio receiving sets	283
Receiving tubes	81
Radio receiving set capacitors	490
Radio receiving set components, not elsewhere specified	\$ 500.
Telephone equipment	\$ 1,700.
Electric conduit, iron or steel	46,000 lbs.
" " ridged metal	19 tons
" " metal, not elsewhere specified	\$ 19,000.
Steam engines, not elsewhere specified, and parts	\$ 9,000.
Engines, internal combustion, not over 200 h.p.	2
" " " over 200 h.p.	4
" " " "	\$ 60,000.
Wheels, Turbine	125.
Pneumatic tools, portable	30.
Forge sets and welding sets	\$ 20,000.
Track tractors, not over 80 h.p.	2
Motor trucks, $\frac{1}{2}$ tons	6
" " $\frac{1}{2}$ " to 1 ton	8
" " 1 ton	14
" " " to $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons	96
" " $1\frac{1}{2}$ " to $2\frac{1}{2}$ "	21
" " 5 "	2
" " over $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons to 4 tons	1
" " 4 to 5 tons	7
" " over 5 tons	29
Passenger cars and chassis	68
Auto replacement parts	\$ 270,000.
Engine replacement, foreign cars	3
Trailers	9
Air frame assembly parts	\$ 9,100.
Propeller, assembly complete	3
Miscellaneous aircraft parts	\$ 3,100.
Coal tar dyes	2,500 lbs.
Metal working compounds	30,000 lbs.
Sodium compounds	900 lbs.
Gaseous refrigerants	1,600 lbs.
Gases, liquid and solid	\$ 1,350.
Lacquers, nitrocell, pigmented	14,199 lbs.
Military and naval equipment	\$ 36,339.
Merchandise valued at less than \$50 per shipment	\$ 43,000.

2. YEMEN

Aircraft engine parts and ground handling equipment	\$3, 132.
Photograph supplies	\$3, 726.
Balloons	\$ 900.

3. EGYPT

Bunats (Buna)	90,000 lbs.
Casings, trucks and buses	100
Casings, auto	433
- Casings and tubes, except auto	227
Solid tires, truck	600
Camel back tire material	3,268
Oil, lubricating, red and pale	4,409 barrels
Oil, lubricating, insulator and transformer	3,960 "
Oil, aircraft, high viscosity	4,651 "
" " medium "	12,100 "
" lubricating, not elsewhere specified	109,068 "
Paraffin wax, unrefined and refined	41,350 lbs.
Steel bars, cold finished	75 tons
Cold bars, non-alloy	182,610 lbs.
Tin plates and Tagger's tin	543,054 lbs.
Water, oil, gas storage tanks	312,714 lbs.
Iron and steel structural shapes	74 tons
Pipe casings and oil lines, seamless	7,002,734 lbs.
Cast iron pipe fittings	2,700 lbs.
Steel welded galvanized pipe	38,000 lbs.
Iron and steel pipe, not elsewhere specified	54,000 lbs.
" " " fittings	22,401 lbs.
" " " wire, uncoated	19,752 lbs.
Welding rods and wire, except electric	2,500
Bolts, nuts, screws, etc.	8,600 lbs.
Metal containers	7,500
Copper plates and sheets	11,200
Copper wire, rubber covered	900 lbs.
Metal manufactures, not elsewhere specified	\$ 32,000.
Elec. generator sets, Diesel engines	1
Storage batteries, 6 amperes, 12 volts	275
Battery charges	4
Motors, not over 1/3 h.p.	6
Stationary motors, up to 200 h.p.	78
X-ray tubes	10
X-ray apparatus	\$ 3,100.
Radio trsns. apparatus	\$ 28,583.
Aircraft, radio trans. and receiving sets	6
Radio receiving sets, except aircraft	135
Radio receiving tubes	162
Radio receiving sets' indicators	148
Loudspeakers	280
Tractors, track inj., 35 to 50 h.p.	1
Tractors, wheel, 3 plow	5
" " 4 plow and over	10
Parts, track and wheel	\$ 26,000.
Motor trucks, 1 ton	1
" " 1 1/2 "	4

Motor trucks inj., over 5 tons	2
" " carb., over 2½ tons but not over 4	1
Passenger cars and chassis	103
Auto replacement parts	40,000
Trailers	4
Aircraft landing gears, parts, and comp.	\$ 200.
Air frame assembly parts and comp.	\$ 18,000.
Aircraft assembly parts and comp.	\$ 900.
Propeller parts	\$ 1,100.
Aircraft engines	3
Aircraft engine parts	\$ 16,371.
Aircraft panel and operating instruments	\$ 8,700.
Railway cars, freight, not over 10 tons	98
Propellers and blades	45,000 lbs.
Coal tar	13,121 lbs.
Cellulose, plastic mold compound	20,071 lbs.
Acetate sheets, etc., cellulose	2,167 lbs.
methyl ethyl butone	18,300 lbs.
Organic chemicals with coal tar	8,600 lbs.
Lacquer, nitrocell	41 lbs.
Shotguns	1

4. SYRIA

Balloons, rubber	\$ 2,229.
Casings, truck and bus	167
Casings, auto	44
Rubber hose	310 lbs.
Rubber fans and belts, auto	859
Oil, lubricating, red and pale	20 barrels
" " black	133 "
Aviation oil, high viscosity	131 "
" " medium "	1,971 "
Tin plate, waste wasters	91 tons
Steel bars, cold finished	30 tons
" " non-alloy	4 tons
Iron and steel strip short rolled, non-alloy	21,481 lbs.
Tin plate and tagger's tin	91,462 lbs.
Iron and steel structural shapes	4 tons
Copper wire, insulated	911 lbs.
Track tractors	2
Radio trans. apparatus	\$ 1,100.
Radio receiving sets	36
Tubes	331
Elec. conduit, iron or steel	71,860 lbs.
Engines, internal combustion, not over 200 h.p.	2
Air compressors, portable	4
Track tractors, inj., under 35 h.p.	1
" " " under 80 h.p.	1
Motor trucks 1½ to 2½ tons	14
Passenger cars	62
Air frame assembly	\$ 1,200.
Aircraft engine	\$ 6,184.
" " part and assembly	1
Coal tar dyes	3,750 lbs.

Goggles	\$ 386.
X Metallic cartridges	62,000
Shells	9,841
Military and naval equipment	\$ 29,806.

5. LEBANON

Rubber balloons	\$ 8,074.
Casings, truck and bus	1,696.
Casings, auto	915
Lubricating oil, red and pale	69 barrels
" " , cylinder, refined	42 "
" " , insulator or transformer	914 gals.
Light oil, lubricating, in small packages	33 "
Aircraft oil, high viscosity	673 barrels
" " medium "	1,040 "
Oil, not elsewhere specified	316 "
Grease, lubrication	96,257 lbs.
Paraffin wax, refined and unrefined	63,890 lbs.
Steel bars, non-alloy	510,000 lbs.
Steel plate, not elsewhere specified	86,000 lbs.
Steel sheets, black, non-alloy	388,869 lbs.
Tin plate and Tagger's tin	213,495 lbs.
Wood, oil, gas, storage	51,287 lbs.
Iron and steel structural shapes	36 tons
Pipe casings and oil lines, seamless	130,000 lbs.
Pipe, black, seamless	434,000 lbs.
Iron and steel pipe, not elsewhere specified	2,800 lbs.
Woven wire screen cloth, except insect	2,200 lbs.
Welding rods and wire	600 lbs.
Tacks	5,800 lbs.
Bolts, nuts, screws, etc.	18,000 lbs.
Tin cans	65
Copper wire, insulated	4,300 lbs.
Rubber covered copper wire	300 lbs.
Batteries, storage, 6 amperes, 12 volts	413
Batteries, dry multiple cells	9,060
Batteries, prime, dry, wet	50
Transformers, instruments	73
" not elsewhere specified	43
Motors, under 1 h.p.	2
" stationary, up to 200 h.p.	17
X-ray tubes	1
X-ray apparatus	\$ 4,000.
Radio transformers, apparatus and parts	\$ 1,820.
Radio receiving sets, not aircraft	853
Radio receiving tubes	4,170
Radio loud speakers	74

Engines, internal combustion, not over 200 h.p.	2
" " " over 200 h.p.	4
Tractor parts	\$ 17,000.
Motor trucks, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton	17
" " 1 ton	28
" " $1\frac{1}{2}$ "	2
Passenger cars and chassis	135
Aircraft engines, resp., used, army surplus	4
Coal tar dyes	\$ 7,000.
Cellulose mold compounds	800 lbs.
Cellulose, acetate compounds, etc.	1,210 lbs.
Nitro-acetate cellulose compounds	200 lbs.
Oxy. acids and hydrose	4,200 lbs.
Sodium compounds	73,182 lbs.
Chemical pigments, not elsewhere specified	40,000 lbs.
Motion picture film, sens., 35 millimeter pos.	2,000 ft.
" " " " 16 " neg.	8,700 ft.
" " " " 8 " "	1,200 ft.
Shotguns	4
Rifles	20
Shells	300,000
Cartridges	190,000
Cellulose manufactures, not elsewhere specified	\$ 922.

6. IRAQ

Casings, truck and bus	806
Casings, auto	751
Oil, lubricating, red and pale	12 barrels
Aviation oil, high viscosity	125 "
" " medium "	18 "
Iron and steel structural shapes	81 tons
Pipe casings and oil lines, seamless	103,800 lbs.
Pipe, black, seamless	450,660 lbs.
Iron and steel pipe fittings	3,358 lbs.
Elec. generator sets, Diesel engine	4
Storage batteries	624
Radio transformers, apparatus and parts	\$ 416.
Radio receiving sets	95
Radio receiving set inductors	20
Radio receiving set comp.	\$ 925.
Radio receiving set accessories	\$ 535.
Pipe valves, iron and steel	126
Tractors, track inj., under 35 h.p.	1
" " " 50 to 65 h.p.	1
Tractors, wheel, 4 plow and over	17
Tractor parts	\$ 11,225.

Motor trucks over $1\frac{1}{2}$ and not over $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons	5
Motor trucks carb. over $2\frac{1}{2}$ and not over 4 tons	1
Passenger cars and chassis, new	77
Passenger cars and chassis, used	1
Coal tar dyes	1,600 lbs.
Lacquer, nitrocell pigmented	274 lbs.
Thumers for nitrocell lacquer	150 lbs.

7. TRANSJORDAN

Casings, truck and bus	357
Casings, auto	50
Radio receiving sets	30
Motor trucks, 1 ton	3
Motor trucks, 2 ton	2
Passenger cars and chassis, new	35
Passenger cars and chassis, used	1



SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM ON ACTS OF ARAB AGGRESSION

Submitted to the
PALESTINE COMMISSION AND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
of the **UNITED NATIONS**
by the
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

Lake Success, New York

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On February 2, 1948, the Jewish Agency for Palestine submitted a Memorandum to the United Nations Palestine Commission on acts of aggression committed and prepared by Arab States, members of the United Nations, in an attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by the General Assembly's Resolution of November 29, 1947. Since the submission of that memorandum this campaign of aggression has gathered momentum in all its phases. Officially sponsored bellicose propaganda has been intensified; new attacks on the Jewish population of Palestine have been carried out by groups composed mainly or largely of foreign invaders; frontier violations by armed Arab bands have become bolder and more frequent; and preparations for major aggression when the Mandate ends are going forward intensively under the auspices of Arab governments and the direction of a command jointly appointed by them.

2. The information conveyed in the Jewish Agency's Memorandum of February 2 has since been confirmed in its main features by the independent appraisals of the Mandatory Power and the United Nations Palestine Commission.

Propaganda, Threats and Incitement

3. The utterances of official Arab representatives have continued to resound with the threat of violent action against the General Assembly's Resolution. The theme of these pronouncements remains unchanged. They reveal the clear intention of Arab governments to sponsor aggression against the Jews of Palestine; and the aim of this aggression is frankly stated to be the forcible imposition of the settlement which the General Assembly rejected, namely the establishment of a unified Arab State in the whole of Palestine. On February 25, 1948, after the meeting of the Arab League Council in Cairo, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Riad al Solh, published a long declaration in the Cairo newspaper Al-Ahram on the intentions of Arab governments with respect to Palestine. He said:

"The Council has taken new decisions which the Arab governments will hasten to carry out with the same devotion and wholeheartedness. All I have to say to my brethren in the Arab countries is that perseverance, without any regard to the nature of the obstacles which may confront us,

an army consisting of the great powers or the small powers, or the forces of a Jewish organisation...Our interest and our vital needs, as well as our national duty, dictate that there shall be nothing in the whole of Palestine except a unitary Arab state. There shall be nothing else but that. This is my fundamental belief, and I am confident of its realization. In that confidence I rely on a study of the various means and resources available to the Arabs, all of which they will throw into the arena however wide the battlefield, however long the struggle." (See Annex 1)

It will be observed that this declaration was issued a day after the President of the Security Council had called upon all peoples in and around Palestine to avoid any action which might render the situation in Palestine more difficult.

4. It is clear that the growing uncertainty of the implementation of the Assembly's Resolution has emboldened and hardened Arab intransigence. Thus, on March 4, members of the Arab Higher Committee, then in Cairo, were asked by Al-Ahram to state what their attitude would be if the General Assembly's Resolution were frustrated. They replied that:

"they would never agree to a bi-national unitary state and would continue to fight for their national program, namely an Arab state in all of Palestine. With regard to the status of Zionists in such a state, things would not be any different than they were for minorities in other Arab countries...These circles added that they were unprepared to enter into discussions on any other favorable solution of the Palestine problem since the struggle for Palestine had passed in their opinion from the political sphere to the practical."

5. On February 11, the Cairo newspaper Al-Masri published an interview with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hamdi al-Bajaji, and with the Vice-President of the Arab Higher Committee, Jamal Husseini. The former stated that the armed forces of the Arab States ought actively to associate themselves with the Arab volunteer contingents in the "liberation" of Palestine. He felt sure "that the British forces in Palestine would not try to oppose or fight the Arabs because Britain was a friend of the Arabs." Jamal Husseini reiterated his warning to the members of the United Nations Palestine Commission. Referring to the Lebanese proposal

at the final session of the General Assembly, hinting at the possibility of a federal state in Palestine, the Palestine Arab leader said:

"We reject such a solution and will not accept any other than the extermination of the Zionists and complete independence for the whole of Palestine."

6. The Arab military commander in Palestine, Fawzi al-Kawukji (an Iraqi who took an active part in the Arab rebellion in Palestine before the war and who during the war worked in Germany as one of Hitler's Arab lieutenants), having crossed into Palestine on March 5, 1948, expressed the mood and objectives of Arab aggression in the following terms:

"Everything is ready. The battle starts when I give the word. I have come to Palestine to stay and fight until Palestine is a free united country or until I am killed and buried here. Our strength is adequate and infinite (sic). The armies have started flowing over the borders of Palestine and they will continue." *

6a. On March 8, the Syrian Minister of Defence, Ahmed Sharabati, declared:

"We have obtained superior weapons with which to fight the Jews. As soon as the British army withdraws from Palestine the big fight will start." **

These declarations, together with those quoted in the Jewish Agency's Memorandum of February 2, prove beyond any shadow of doubt that the incitement of the Arab peoples for aggression in Palestine is carried on by the Arab governments themselves; and that these governments in fact plan major operations against the Jews of Palestine to commence immediately upon the withdrawal of the British troops.

Actual Aggression

7. Since the Jewish Agency first submitted its report on Arab aggression, further attacks have taken place by large Arab forces on Jewish villages in various parts of the country. These attacks cannot be considered as phases of a Palestinian Arab revolt supported by external Arab forces. They are in reality acts of aggression by invading forces, assisted only to an insignificant extent by local Arabs. The true nature of Arab aggression is well illustrated in the attack by Arab forces on

* Associated Press, March 8

** United Press, March 8

the village of Tirat Zvi in Beisan on February 16. This was carried out by the invading contingent which crossed the Jordan and concentrated in the Tubas Village on January 25 (see Memorandum of the Jewish Agency of February 2, 1948, para. 41). When the attack was repulsed with heavy Arab losses, Haganah forces carried out a thorough search of the bodies of Arab dead who were left on the field of battle. Full identification papers were found on 29 of them. Of the 29, fourteen were Syrians, three from Iraq, seven former members of the Transjordan Arab Legion, one a former member of the Transjordan Frontier Force, and one a soldier in the army of Saudi Arabia. Only three out of the 29 were ordinary civilian Palestinian Arabs who had volunteered for fighting.

8. All the major attacks which have so far taken place on Jewish villages, e.g., Kfar Szold, Yehiam, Tirat Zvi, Magdiel have been mainly carried out by Arab forces from abroad, the local Palestinian recruits playing only a subsidiary part. The total of the invading forces now in Palestine is estimated at 5,000 to 6,000. Of these, 3,000 had arrived by the end of January, the remainder in February. The Syrians total about 2,500, of whom 300 entered Palestine on January 9 and 10, and 700 on January 21.* Iraqi volunteers now in Palestine total about 2,500, of whom 900 arrived on January 31 and 1,200 on February 24. There are also a few hundred Lebanese and Egyptians. On or about December 28, some 600 Egyptian soldiers with their officers arrived at Damascus; some of them are reported to have since entered Palestine. On March 5, a group of 100 men from Egypt, uniformed and equipped, reached Gaza. Most of the Syrian volunteers have been identified as originating from Aleppo, Deir el-Zor, Homs and Hama. The Lebanese are all Moslems, mostly Metualis and residents of Tripoli, with a few Druses. The northern districts of Syria have evidently been the center of special recruiting efforts by the Ministry of National Defence, as can be seen from the announcements published in Annexes 2, 3 and 4. A staff officer of Fawzi al-Kawukji has made it plain that "Arabs of Palestine play only a supporting role in the plans of the Yarmuk Army" (the name given to the Arab guerrilla formations). He added: "They (the Palestine Arabs) can blow a bridge here or there, but for military operations they just get in the way."**

* The infiltration of these bands is described in the report of the Mandatory Government to the United Nations Palestine Commission as quoted in the First Special Report of the United Nations Palestine Commission to the Security Council, February 16, 1948, paras. 7 and 8.

** Associated Press, March 8

Invasion of Palestine by Arab Forces

10. In an official statement dated February 4, 1948, the Mandatory Power reported in detail on three incidents of infiltration by considerable Arab forces from Syria and Iraq via Transjordan. The Mandatory Power did not report in similar detail on measures, if any, which the Palestine Government had taken to prevent these invasions or to eject the invaders. The Jewish Agency has drawn attention to the gravity of this problem in its Memorandum to the United Nations Palestine Commission of February 21 and in an oral submission to the Security Council on February 27. On the latter occasion, the Jewish Agency representative said:

"The gravest problem of all arises in connection with the continued incursion of Arab armed forces from outside. The Government ...maintains, to all apparent appearances, an attitude of almost complete resignation and helplessness -- or indifference -- in the face of this steady piecemeal invasion of a territory which is still in its charge. According to the information of the Jewish Agency, so far seven contingents have crossed into Palestine through the northern and eastern frontiers, numbering between them some 4,000 to 4,500 men. They did not infiltrate in small groups; they came each time hundreds of men together, mostly in well organised convoys of motor-trucks. They crossed bridges and travelled along highways. With one or two exceptions their entry was entirely unhindered. Is it conceivable that no advance information could be obtained regarding the movements of these columns and no effective guard could be maintained at the main entrances or crossings? On one occasion the Jewish Agency succeeded in warning the authorities 48 hours in advance of an impending crossing. Yet nothing was done to prevent it and the contingent crossed safely and pitched its tents near a large Arab village* where it remained unmolested until the men were presumably posted to various centres. The Administration now admits that certain parts of Palestine are under the virtual control of the commanders of these foreign forces. They are increasingly active in offensive operations. How can the general public then resist the impression that preparations are openly tolerated for the proclamation of

* The village of Tubas, from where, as has since been established, the attack was launched on Tirat Zvi on February 16.

Arab rule, local or foreign, over large parts of Palestine, in complete disregard of the United Nations decision and under conditions of mortal peril to the Jewish population concerned?"

In an address to the Security Council on March 2, in which he joined issue with the spokesman of the Jewish Agency on a number of points, the United Kingdom representative made no reference at all to these incursions which undoubtedly constitute the most serious threat to peace in Palestine at the present time.

11. In the British House of Commons on February 4, Mr. Creech-Jones referred in the following terms to the invasion of Palestine by armed Arab bands:

"It will be appreciated that the security forces in Palestine have a frightfully difficult job, and it is exceedingly difficult to maintain a watch over complete frontiers."

In its report to the United Nations Palestine Commission on February 4, the Mandatory Government refers to "the difficult nature of the border country." Both these statements give an entirely wrong impression of the Mandatory's ability to prevent the sort of incursions which have taken place. There are only four bridges at which the Jordan can be crossed by large convoys with motor transport; Allenby, Dhamiya, Sheikh Hussein and Banat Yaakub. If these bridges and their immediate vicinity were properly guarded, no columns could slip into Palestine undetected. Yet the body of 700 Syrians which crossed on the night of January 20-21 came by the Sheikh Hussein bridge, which was guarded by the Arab Legion as part of the British Forces; and the Jewish Agency had given warning of this incursion 48 hours before it took place. The party of 950 men which crossed on January 29-30 came over the Jisr Dhamiya (Yabbok) Bridge, according to the Mandatory Power's own record. * On March 5, 1948, Fawzi al-Kawukji himself crossed into Palestine, by his own admission, at the Allenby Bridge. His convoy comprised scores of vehicles. It is difficult to assume that so many incursions could possibly have taken place if the Mandatory Power had been genuinely determined to prevent them.

* United Nations Palestine Commission First Special Report to the Security Council, February 16, 1948, paras. 8 and 9

12. Arab sources also express surprise at the ease with which these incursions take place. The Jerusalem correspondent of a Cairo newspaper has described the formation by foreign Arab invaders of a well-organised bridgehead and base in the Tulkarm-Nablus-Jenin triangle. He writes:

"In Northern Palestine the invaders have become stronger and exert greater influence than the British. The frontiers of Syria and Lebanon with Palestine are practically non-existent as far as the invaders are concerned. British constables and soldiers at frontier stations do not appear outside of the gates in order not to become targets of the fire of the invaders. Checking of all traffic in North Palestine and every other place where the invaders are stationed has passed into the hands of the latter. Even the British stop and let their cars be checked. The number of invaders is growing daily without hindrance. It is believed that by May 15 their numbers will reach into tens of thousands of well-armed fighters who will be able to seize control in most parts of the country in a short time. A major offensive will probably be launched as soon as the Security Council ends its deliberations." *

13. On March 3, Al-Ahram likewise published a report of a special correspondent who declared boastingly that entry from Syria and Lebanon had become very easy and that Kawukji's men were now the sole rulers in large areas of Northern Palestine.

14. The forces from the neighboring states now operating in Palestine do not, as has already been pointed out, rely on full local support. Actually the invasion from outside is proceeding in the teeth of the sullen opposition and resentment of large sections of the local Arab population. Although the outside forces have so far brought their supplies with them and are now trying to avoid the mistake committed by their predecessors in the 1936-1938 rebellion who lived on the Palestine villages, they generally proceed on arrival to lay down the law and continue to interfere with local affairs. From many villages reports come in of the growing discontent with this virtual subjection to foreign occupation. Nowhere has the clash between the ambitious plans of the invading army and the vital interests of the local population been more patently exhibited than in Jaffa. This Arab town came under the virtual control of an Iraqi

* Al Masri, March 3, 1948

commander, by the name of Adil Nijm-ed-Din, in the first week of February, 1948. At that time negotiations were in progress between the Mayor of Jaffa and the Mayor of Tel-Aviv, initiated by the former through a British intermediary, for a truce between the two cities. The Iraqi commander issued peremptory orders for the immediate cessation of these negotiations. Upon the remonstrance of the Mayor of Jaffa, Yusuf Haykal, who pleaded that this would mean the utter ruin of his town, he was reported to have replied:

"I don't mind the destruction of Jaffa if we secure the destruction of Tel-Aviv."

Official Preparations for Future Aggression

15. The Syrian Government, whose eligibility for its present membership of the Security Council is based, according to Article 23 of the Charter, "in the first instance on its contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security," continues to play the leading role in the perpetration and planning of the campaign of Arab aggression. The responsibility of that Government for frontier violations in January has been recognized by the United Kingdom Government, as can be seen from the following extract of Parliamentary Reports, dated February 4, 1948:

"Mrs. Nichol asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if any reply has been received from the Syrian Government to the protest of His Majesty's Government against the attack in the North of Palestine which took place on January 9; and what action does His Majesty's Government contemplate to prevent further violations of the frontier.

"MR. REVIN: The Syrian Government have replied verbally to the protest made by His Majesty's Minister in Damascus. They have been left in no doubt as to the serious view that would be taken by His Majesty's Government of any further violations of the Palestine frontier."

The activities of the Syrian Government on behalf of aggression in Palestine received the following personal testimony from the Egyptian Ahmed Hussein who came to Syria at the head of an Egyptian contingent. On February 6 he made the following statement in a press interview:

"I saw all the departments of the Syrian Government doing their utmost to help Palestine. Syrian army stores are emptied to provide the volunteers with all the arms and equipment they need. Dozens of Syrian army officers daily present their resignations to join the volunteers; so do a great number of representatives and high ranking government officials."*

16. In his declaration to Al-Ahram of February 25, 1948,** the Lebanese Prime Minister, Riad al Solh, reiterated the determination of his government to "nourish the battlefield of Arab holy war in Palestine with money, equipment, and men."

17. Annexes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 contain the original texts of recruiting announcements issued officially by the Syrian Ministry of Defence; a photograph showing the Syrian Prime Minister conferring with Fawzi al-Kawukji at the Qatana training camp for volunteers near Damascus; and a photograph taken on January 10 showing the Lebanese Defence Minister and the Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Army overlooking the Huleh Valley during the attack by Arab bands on Kfar Szold.

18. In recent weeks the Egyptian Government, too, has considerably increased its contribution to all phases of Arab aggression. On February 1 it was reported that "the Egyptian Government....had prepared a large area in the Almaza desert (on the outskirts of Cairo) for training Egyptian volunteers who wish to go to Palestine to assist the Arabs there."*** The leader of the Egyptian volunteers, Ahmed Hussein, published an article in Al-Ahram on February 2 (reproduced in Annex 9), in which he announced that his government had contributed one million pounds, being 46 per cent of the total sum subscribed till then by all the Arab governments for the equipment of armed forces of war in Palestine. Ahmed Hussein went on to reveal that the Egyptian Government had donated "more than its quota" of arms for distribution to Arab forces in Palestine. After the recent session of the Arab League at the end of February, a further amount of 420,000 pounds was, according to Akbar el-Yom, contributed by the Egyptian Government. On February 6, in the interview already mentioned, Ahmed Hussein described his own arrival in Syria with the "Mustafa Wakil"**** group, and his subsequent participation

* Roz-el-Yusef, February 11

** which has already been quoted

***Musamarat al-Jeib, Cairo, February 1, 1948

**** Mustafa Wakil was an Egyptian pro-Nazi collaborator who died in Germany during the war.

in attacks on Jewish settlements in North Palestine. In the same article, Ahmed Hussein declared that the object of his visit was "to stress the necessity of opening a front in southern Palestine with Egyptian forces fighting under the Egyptian flag." On February 11, it was reported that the Egyptian government had permitted 174 army officers and men to volunteer on six months leave for action in Palestine.*

19. Photographs showing the training of volunteers for Palestine in the Egyptian army barracks at Helwan will be found in Annexes 10 and 11.

Organisation, Planning and Command

20. At the Arab Prime Ministers' Conference in Cairo on December 16, the Syrian Government was entrusted with the training and overall organisation of Arab forces for aggression in Palestine. (See the Memorandum of the Jewish Agency of February 2, para.29). In accordance with this arrangement, the President of the Syrian Republic convened a conference in his official residence on February 5 at which the Iraqi generals, Ismail Safwat Pasha and Taha Pasha el-Hashimi, were appointed to their respective commands in the "Arab Liberation Army," and Fawzi al-Kawukji was entrusted with the direction of guerrilla warfare in Palestine. The following account of the meeting was published:

"The Appointment of Gen. Ismail Safwat as Commander of the Arab Liberation Armies in Palestine

"Damascus, Feb. 6 - from the Special Correspondent of Al-Masri.

"The most important Arab meeting ever held on the issue of Palestine was convened yesterday night in the Palace of the Republic. His Excellency the President of the Republic presided. The members of the Cabinet, His Eminence, the Great Mufti, some of the leading members of the Arab Higher Executive and 'fighters of the Holy War,' as well as prominent Arab military commanders attended.⁴

"All controversial issues were finally settled, according to a trustworthy source. In the first place, the decision of the Arab League was ratified to the effect that General Ismail Safwat Pasha be appointed Commander in Chief of the Arab Liberation Army. General Taha Pasha el-Hashimi was nominated Inspector of the Liberation Armies and Commander Fawzi al-Kawukji was entrusted with the command of the Al-Yarmuk formation comprising the operations of the irregular units. It was agreed at the same meeting to divide Palestine into four military areas, each of which will be under a commanding officer.

*Roz al-Yusef, February 11

responsible to the Commander in Chief.*⁾⁾ (Text is reproduced in Annex 12)

21. On January 26 the Beirut newspaper Al-Nidal reported the arrival in Lebanon of sixteen German officers who were to train Arabs in the use and manufacture of explosives. The Arab formation now at Nazareth is under the command of a German officer and a Moslem officer of Yugoslav origin, Mohammed Kamal.

22. Upon the arrival of Fawzi al-Kawukji in Palestine, his staff officer made an announcement regarding the strategy of the Arab command in Palestine. It was planned, he explained, to consolidate large Arab forces in the environs of Nazareth, Safad, Jenin and Nablus and in the hill countries southwards towards Jerusalem. "Present operations," he added, "constituted the secondary phase of the overall strategy - testing the enemy's strength." The third and final phase would be a general assault on Jewish strong points by the Arab controlled Eastern Palestine and the Mediterranean Sea.

23. In an interview given to a representative of Al-Difaa, a newspaper of Jaffa, on March 9, the Syrian Defence Minister, Ahmed Sharabati, explained that Arab fighters do not intend to attack the British since they have declared their opposition to partition and their readiness to evacuate Palestine. He stated that decisive fighting would come after May 15, but until then Arabs would attack Jews in every place evacuated by the British. By May 15, he added, the Arabs would possess all necessary equipment and supplies.

* Al-Masri, Cairo, February 7, 1948.

24. The Jewish Agency has referred elsewhere (Memorandum on British Policy in Palestine, February 21) to the control of the Old City of Jerusalem with its Holy Places by armed bands under the command of Sheikh Bakri. More recently, these bands, with the apparent acquiescence of the Mandatory Power, have consolidated their virtual control of this area, whose religious associations led to the adoption of the General Assembly's plan for a demilitarised and international Jerusalem. In Annexes 13 and 14 two photographs are reproduced: one shows Sheikh Bakri commanding Arab snipers within the walls, and the other represents him receiving a courtesy visit from the British Area Commander. Annex 15 reveals the impunity with which Arab gangs can impose control on the Old City of Jerusalem.

Effects of Arab Aggression

25. In its Report to the Security Council on February 16, 1948, the United Nations Palestine Commission states:

"Powerful Arab interests both inside and outside Palestine are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein."

It is clear from all the evidence that the "powerful Arab interests" outside Palestine are the governments of Arab States; and that it is mainly this external aggression which invests the security problem in Palestine with its present acuteness and gravity. Without the manpower, funds and equipment supplied by foreign governments, the disturbances in Palestine, where the bulk of the Arab population has shown little disposition for conflict, would have never become a major military issue. In its task of securing peaceful conditions for the implementing of the General Assembly's Resolution, the United Nations thus appears to be faced with nothing more nor less than the task of securing the observance of the Charter by member states who, in defiance of Article 2, employ "the threat and use of force in their international relations." During the discussions of the General Assembly, the representative of the United States declared that his government assumed "that there would be Charter observance." This assumption, however reasonable it might have appeared in view of the Charter's compelling hold on the loyal adherence of member states, has not materialised. Another assumption current at the time was that the Mandatory Power would, in accordance with its own declarations, "maintain law and order" in Palestine until the termination of the Mandate. The maintenance of law and order in a country cannot conceivably be so interpreted as to exclude the vigilant protection

of frontiers against foreign armies avowedly bent on aggression. It must therefore be concluded that an unexpected dereliction of duty by the Mandatory has allowed Arab aggression to reach its present degree of menace.

26. The General Assembly recommended on November 29 that "any attempt to alter by force...the settlement envisaged by this Resolution" should be determined as "a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace and an act of aggression." The United Nations Palestine Commission reported on February 16 that there does exist "an effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged" in the General Assembly's Resolution. In the Security Council on February 24, the representative of the United States declared:

"Attempts to frustrate the General Assembly's recommendation by the threat or use of force, or by incitement to force, on the part of states or people outside Palestine are contrary to the Charter."

On March 5 the representative of France said in the Security Council:

"This recommendation (of the General Assembly) exists...There can be no discussion as to its application and its binding character upon all the organs of the United Nations, including of course, the Security Council..."

"It is quite inadmissible that any state member of the United Nations, in a territory which is not its own, should by armed force oppose the efforts of the other members of the United Nations to implement a resolution of the General Assembly. Such action goes much further than mere abstention from participation in implementation, which the Charter allows. We are faced here with open revolt...which is clearly contrary to the Charter."

27. The Jewish Agency fully subscribes to these interpretations of the effects on the Charter of aggressive acts aiming at the alteration of the General Assembly's Resolution by force. To resist any such alteration is therefore not only a dictate of Jewish national survival; it is also an exigency of the Charter and an essential process in the defence of international law. The sufferings of two generations have implanted in the hearts of their survivors a lesson which the United Nations Palestine Commission has concisely expressed:

"A dangerous and tragic precedent will have been established if force, or the threat of the use of force, is to prove an effective deterrent to the will of the United Nations."

28. It is impossible, in the face of such cumulative evidence, to deny that Arab governments are planning and executing operations which create a threat to the peace in Palestine, for the purpose of imposing the settlement which the General Assembly rejected last November. It should not require a long process of determination to assess these activities in their proper terms. If there is no threat to peace here - then war is no threat to peace.



رئيس وزراء لبنان يقول :

« وطلبت الجامعة مركزها بما ادهش خصومها قبل انصارها »
 « لن نخيفنا القوة التي ستفرض التقسيم ، فقد تاهتنا لها .. »
 « فلنشئ للجامعة دستورا نبني عليه علاقاتنا بالعالم »



رياض الصلح بك

العربية ككيان عام متصل * ونحن في لبنان نشعر شمورا كاملا بخطورة هذا الامر وخطره لذلك ترى اللبنانيين جميعا في جد وسمي ، لايفترون ولا يتوانون ، ولا ييخلون ولا يقتصدون في تغذية ساحة الجهاد العربي بفلسطين بالمال والعتاد والرجال .
 لقد املت علينا مصلحتنا وحاجاتنا الحيوية كما املى علينا واجبنا القومي ان لا يكون في فلسطين كلها غير وطن عربي موحد * ولن يكون غير ذلك *
 اني مؤمن بذلك ايمانا كاملا من حيث المبدأ واني واثق كل الوثوق بتحقيقه اعتمادا الى دراسة الوسائل والامكانيات المختلفة التي بين ايدي العرب والتي سيقدفون بها جميعا الى الميدان مهما اتسع نطاقه ومهما طال امد النضال *

ANNEX 1

Interview by Riad Al Solh, Lebanese
 Prime Minister in AL AHRAM, Cairo,
 February 25, 1948. (Extracts translated in Paragraph 3 of this memorandum)

ختم مجلس جامعة الدول العربية دورته العادية السابعة منذ يومين وغادر دولة رياض الصلح بك رئيس الحكومة اللبنانية والوفد اللبناني القاهرة صباح اليوم الى لبنان . وقد تفضل دولته فأجاب على بعض مسائل طلب اليه « الاهرام » تحديث فرائها عنها تعقبا على اعمال المجلس في هذه الدورة وقد كانت برياسته

وكان اول ما رجونا اليه الخوض فيه مسألة النقد بين سوريا ولبنان * ومعلوم ان الاتفاق الذي عقده في القاهرة مع رجال الحكومة السورية يقضي بفتح مفاوضات بين البلدين من اجل الوصول الى وضع نهائي ثابت للعلاقات التي يجب ان تظل وثيقة بينهما

مسألة النقد

لا يتحدث عنها فتحدث الايام ..

اتخذنا لفلسطين كل ما يخطر ببال !
 وكان من البديهي ان يفت دولة الرئيس بنوع خاص عند قضية فلسطين وهي التي شغلت معظم اجتماعات الوفود العربية كما شغلت العرب في كل ديارهم قال دولته : يسرني ان يكون الراي العام في البلاد العربية ادرك ان ما كل ما يقرره المسؤولون من اجل انقاذ فلسطين يجوز ان يقال او يعلن . واسمح لنفسى بعد هذا ان اطمئنه ان كل ما يمكن ان يخطر للبال قد واجهناه ودرسناه وتدبرناه . لقد سبق لمجلس الجامعة ان اتخذ عددا من القرارات في دوراته السابقة ، ويسر كل واحد منا ان يعلم ان جميع تلك القرارات قد نفذتها الحكومات العربية باخلاص ودقة ، واتخذ مجلسنا قرارات جديدة نستبدر تلك الحكومات الى تنفيذها بنفس الاخلاص وبالعزيزية الصادقة . واذا كان لي ما اقوله لاخواني ابنا البلاد العربية ، فهو ان التصميم على الفوز دون الالتفات الى لون العقبات التي يمكن ان تعترضنا هو الذي يكفل لنا الفوز المطلوب . فيجب ان لا نعنى كثيرا في نوع القوات التي ستحاول فرض التقسيم ما دمنا قد صممنا على مقاومته فسواء لدينا ان تكون هذه القوة بوليسا دوليا او جيشا من الدول الكبيرة او من الدول الصغيرة او قوة منظمة يهودية يمدونها بالسلاح . ان المهم ان نعد العدة لمواجهة القوة بمثلها ، ويجب ان نضع نصب ايماننا اننا ندخل في عراك طويل شاق بميمز جدا عن ان يكون فورة من الفورات الحماسية والهبات الشعبية الوقتية ، فانما الدفاع عن عروبة فلسطين ووحدتها وسيادتها عمل قومي عام مفروض على كل عربي في اى مكان وفي اى زمان حتى الفوز وهو فوق ذلك . عمل يتعلق باستقلال كل بلد من البلدان العربية اذ ان الخطر الذي يكمن في قيام اى كيان يهودى في فلسطين انما هو خطر مباشر يهدد كل بلد بمفرده يقطع النظر عن تهديده لمجموعة البلاد

افتتاح مكاتب التطوع لرجال العشائر

تعليمات الى صلاحيات العشائر بالانضمام للتسجيل

"Al-Qabas", Damascus, 5.12.47

بلاغ - الملتقى مديرية العشائر العامة انه اثر افتتاح مكاتب التطوع الشعبية
لنصرة فلسطين العربية وما رافق ذلك من اندفاع هائل وغيرة وطنية جبارة لتلبية نداه
الواجب وصيانة عروبة هذا الجزء العزيز من الوطن العربي فقد تهاافت جموع غفيرة
من شيوخ ورؤساء وافراد العشائر السورية على اختلاف فرقها الى دوائر العشائر في
العاصمة والمحافظات طالبة بالحاح قبولها في عداد المجاهدين معاهدين الله على بذل ارواحهم
واموالهم رخيصة في هذا السبيل .

وحيث ان ضخامة عدد المتقدمين للتطوع من ابناء العشائر وتديق امور هذا
التطوع مع تطوع الحضرين من ابناء ابلاد يتطلب وضع اسس تؤون الى انسجام
خطط العمل فقد اقرت وزارة الدفاع الوطني هذا المبدأ واخذت تمد التعليمات اللازمة
لتحقيق هذه الرغبة الصادر عن مجموعة من المواطنين الذين يعملون بالفطرة لاعمال
النضال وامتداد السلاح والذين سئموا منهم قضية فلسطين فائدة جلى لما يشعلون به من
رجولة كاملة وعزم اكيد وعروبة ثابتة وسنبليح تعليمات وزارة الدفاع فوراً بقراراتها
الى مديرية العشائر العامة للباشرة بفتح مكاتب التطوع في المحافظات تحت اشراف
مديري العشائر المعاونين وضباط البادية .

وزير الدفاع الوطني

(Translation overleaf)

AL QABAS, Damascus, December 5, 1947

Opening of Recruitment Offices for Tribesmen -
Directive to the Tribes Department to Prepare for Registration

Communique - We are advised by the Directorate General for the Tribes that, following the opening of the people's recruitment offices for the aid of Arab Palestine and the simultaneous urge and overpowering patriotic zeal to respond to the voice of duty for the preservation of the Arab character of this dear portion (Palestine) of the Arab homeland, numerous groups of sheikhs, chieftains and ordinary members of the various Syrian tribes have rushed to the offices of the tribes in the capital and districts, insistently demanding to be included among the fighters of the Holy War. They have sworn oaths to Allah to sacrifice their lives and property for this cause.

Whereas the excessive number of tribal volunteers and the coordination of their enlistment with that of the settled population require that some system should be laid down to harmonize plans of action, therefore the Ministry for National Defence has approved this principle and begun to prepare the required directives for the realisation of a desire which emanates from a group of citizens who have an in-born inclination to acts of war and the bearing of arms. The cause of Palestine will greatly benefit by this group, on account of their attributes of perfect manhood, strong determination and solid Arabism. The instructions of the Defence Ministry will immediately be forwarded to the Directorate General of the Tribes to open recruitment offices in the Districts under the supervision of the Assistant Directors of Tribes and desert officers.

(signed) Minister for National Defence

(Al-Qabas, Damascus, Dec. 5, 1947)

ANNEX 3

ANNOUNCEMENT BY SYRIAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE ON RECRUITING IN ALEPPO

"Al-Insha", Damascus 6.12.47

التطوع في حلب

بإذاعة قائد الموقع في حلب البلاغ: لي
كل الشعب الحامي الكريم:

بناء من قرار وزارة الدفاع الوطني
تشكل في حلب ابتداء من تاريخ ٣ كانون
الاول ١٩٤٧ مكتبان للتطوع: الاول
اطلاب المدارس في مدرسة التجهيز الاولى
من الساعة (١٤) الى الساعة (١٦).

ثاني: لسائر الاهالي في المستشفى
المسكري بالرمضانية من الساعة (٨) الى
الساعة (١٠). وبعد الظهور من الساعة
(١٤) الى الساعة (١٦)

فعل الراغبين بالتطوع مراجعة هذين
المكاتبين كل فيما يخصه ابتداء من ١٢.١٢.٤٧

المقدم محمد جميل البرهاني

امر اللواء الثاني وقائد موقع حلب

Enlistment in Aleppo

The Area Commander in Aleppo has issued the following communique to the noble people of Aleppo: In accordance with the decision of the Ministry for National Defence there have been formed in Aleppo, with effect from December 3, 1947, two Recruitment Offices for volunteers: The first for students - in the technical school, hours 14 - 16.

The second for the rest of the population, in the military hospital in Al-Ramadaniya, hours 8 - 10 a.m., 14 - 16 p.m. Those who wish to volunteer should apply to either of the above two offices.

Signed: Major Mohammad Jamil al-Burhan^Ni,

Commander of the Second Brigade

and of the Aleppo Area

AL INSHA, Damascus 6, 1947
December

ANNEX 4

GROUPS OF ARAB WARRIORS FOR PALESTINE ASSEMBLING IN HOMS



فريق من مجاهدي السامية اثناء مرورهم في مدينة حمص ، ويرى بينهم بعض المجاهدين من حمص
الانشاء (محمّد) 28.1.48 قبل سفرهم الى ميدان التدريب (تصوير جوزيف عيسى - حمص)


Caption reads:

Group of Holy Warriors from Selmiysh passing through Homs, including fighters from Homs before their journey to the training camp.

AL INSHA, Damascus, January 28, 1948

ANNEX 5

ANNOUNCEMENT BY SYRIAN DEFENCE MINISTER ON PLACES OF TRAINING IN DAMASCUS



Training of Volunteers in Damascus

The Ministry for National Defence yesterday issued the following announcement:

The Ministry for National Defence announces:

- a) The enlistment of volunteers in the subdistricts and adjoining areas will be the responsibility of the gendarmerie stations.
- b) The training of volunteers in preparatory schools and the Syrian University will begin as from Saturday p.m., December 6, 1947.
- c) The volunteers from the Syrian University will train in the al-Hamidia Barracks. The volunteers from the preparatory schools will begin training on the municipal playgrounds.

AL INSHA, Damascus, December 6, 1947

ANNEX 6

SYRIAN PRIME MINISTER WITH FAWZI AL KAWUKJI AT QATANA CAMP NEAR DAMASCUS

مريضة الجمعة، فبادرت السلطات بإقيل لنحمر له هناك استمر
 جان من يهود
 بعد ذلك
 العسكرية
 مدة اليهود،
 العرب .
 يودية : ان
 تر يشنه

"AL-MISRI", Cairo, 10.2.48

Jamil Mardam, Syrian Premier, at the Qatana Barracks (near Damascus), where "Palestine volunteers" are undergoing training.

البريطانية
 هذه المساء
 بمصادمات
 اله
 وجاء
 اليهودية في
 قوة عربية



الموضوع مهم .. هذا الذي
 ظهر علامات الجد واضحة على
 قسما وجوه كل من فوزي
 القاوقجي بك وصالح حرب باشا
 ودولة تجميل مردم بك ... انه
 موضوع انقاذ فلسطين .. الموضوع
 الذي يشغل بال كل عربي في
 الشرق الاوسط

مريكية لتركيا

مدفعية لليونان

ليوم ان الولايات المتحدة ستسلم الى
 طارة الامريكيين سيسلمونها في ميناء
 غنة من مختلف

Caption reads:

It is an important subject which gives rise to the serious expressions on the faces of Fawzi Al Kawukji Bey, Saleh Harb Pasha, and His Excellency Jamil Mardam Bey. The subject is the rescue of Palestine - a subject which occupies the mind of every Arab in the Middle East.

AL MASRI, Cairo, February 10, 1948

ANNEX 7

LEBANESE DEFENCE MINISTER AND ARMY COMMANDER OVERLOOKING HULEH VALLEY



האמיר מגיד ארסלאן, מניסטר ההגנה הלבנוני (שמאל) והגנרל
פואד שאהאב, מפקד הצבא, משקיפים על עמק החולה
כפי שהודיע "הארץ" ביום ב' שעבר, 12.1.48, נכחו בהתקפה על כפר סולד ביום ר'
הקודם כמשקיפים מיניסטר ההגנה והמפקד הכללי של הצבא בלבנון.

Caption reads:

The Emir Majid Arslan, Lebanese Minister of Defence (left), and General Fuad Shahab, Commander of the Army, look out over the Huleh Valley...The Minister of Defence and the Army Commander of Lebanon were present as observers last Friday at the attack on Kfar Szold.

HA-ARETZ, Tel-Aviv, January 14, 1948

ANNEX 8

LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER NEAR METULLA



Caption reads:

General Fuad Shahab Pasha, Commander of the Lebanese Army, examining a map of military positions on the Palestine borders from a gun-tripod. Before him stretches Palestine territory; the place called Metulla is regarded as the first object of any attack that may take place.

Large caption reads:

METULLA, THE FIRST TARGET.

KULL-SHAI, Beirut, December 23, 1948

"Ahrām", Cairo, 2.2.48

قضية فلسطين

ومجهود مصر في سبيلها

هالتي حينما كنت في سوريا ان الراي العام السوري لا علم له بما بذلته مصر وتبذله من جهود من اجل فلسطين . والمني ان غمط مصر حقها قد تناول بعض الرجال المسئولين فلما عدت الى القاهرة دهشت كل الدهش، اذ وجدت ان المصريين انفسهم يتصورون ان بلادهم لم تفعل شيئا في سبيل فلسطين . وهنا عذرت اخوانا السوريين اذا تصوروا فينا القصور والعجز .

ليس من شك في ان مصر لم تفعل بعد كل ما ينبغي ان تفعله من اجل فلسطين . ولكن الذي لا شك فيه والذي يجب ان يعرفه كل مصري وعربي انها قد نفذت قرارات الجامعة العربية وادت نصيبها المفروض عليها كاي دولة عربية اخرى . ذلك انه اذا كانت هناك معسكرات تدريب تقام الان في سوريا، وتجهز حملات التطوعين بالسلاح وتمد بالؤونة والعتاد . فهذا كله يتم على نفقة الجامعة العربية التي تدفع مصر ٤٢ ٪ من مائيتها .

فقد وضعت تحت تصرف الجامعة العربية ما يقرب من مليون جنيه . وساهمت بقية البلاد العربية الستة بمليون جنيه آخر .

وقد فرض على الدول العربية تقديم كمية معينة من السلاح وفرض على مصر قدر يعادل هذه الكمية . ولقد ادت مصر اكثر من حصتها وسلمت السلاح الى زعماء فلسطين لتوزيعه على المناطق الخطرة في فلسطين

h23 (21)

2.2

Article by Ahmed Hussein in AL AHRAM, Cairo, February 2, 1948

(Quoted in Paragraph 18 of this memorandum)

ANNEX 10 A



Training of volunteers at the Helwan Barracks in Egypt.

AL MUSAWWAR, Cairo, January 10, 1948

AL MUSAWWAR, Cairo, January 10, 1948



تعداد المواقع بالبوصله
والخريطة قبل الهجوم

وقد خرج من هذا المعسكر
٨٠ متطوعاً يقابلون
الصهيويين الآن في فلسطين
وهم يؤلفون كتية المعفور
له المجاهد " مصطفى
الوكيل "

تعددت في مصر المعسكرات
الخاصة بتدريب المتطوعين
من الشبان واعدادهم
للاشتراك في الدفاع عن
فلسطين . وبعض هذه
المعسكرات في حلوان والبعض
الاخر في المريش . وتشرف
عليها اللجنة العليا العربية
للدفاع عن فلسطين . وقد
زار مندوب المسامرات
معسكر حلوان الخاص
بتدريب المتطوعين من شبان
مصر الفتاة وسجل بعض
نواحي النشاط فيه بالصور
المنشورة على هذه الصفحة .

من حلوان ساروا الى
الى فلسطين
١٥.٢.٤٨

افتتاح الاسلاك الشائكة
بمعدات الميدان
MUSAMARAT
AL-JEIB,
Cairo, 15.2.48
الشبان المتطوعون يتلقون
درسا نظريا في استعمال
القنبلة اليدوية

→ متطوع يمرن على اصابة
الهدف بالمسدس تحت
اشراف احد الضباط

Caption reads:

"FROM HELWAN TO PALESTINE" - Training of volunteers in Egyptian Army

Barracks.

MUSAMARAT AL JEIB, Cairo, February 15, 1948

تعيين الجنرال اسماعيل صفوت قائد الجيش العربي في فلسطين

"AL-Misr, Cairo, 7.2.48"

7.2.48. ١٣٧

لجيش التحرير العربي في فلسطين

دمشق في ٦ - لمراسل المصري الخاص - عدد بيته اسمي القصر الجمهوري اكبر اجتماع عربي عرف حتى اليوم بفسان قضيه فلسطين وقد عقد تحت رياسته واجامه رئيس الجمهوريه واعضا حكومه وسماحه المفتي الاكبر وعدد من اركان الهيئه العربيه العليا والمجاهدين وكبار القادة العسكريين من العرب ، وعلمت من مصدر ثقة ان جميع القضايا المختلف عليها قد سويت نهائيا قريبا جدا الى القاهرة ليكون على وفي مقدمتها قرار الجامعة العربية الخاص بتعيين الجنرال اسماعيل صفوت قائدا عاما لجيش التحرير العربي واستناد مهمة تفويض هذه البعثات الى الفريق طه باشا الهاشمي على ان يتولى الفساد فوزي الفاروقي قيادة كتبه الممساكات التي تضم جميع اعمال الامور المسلم بها ان سماحه المفتي وازكان الهيئه العربيه قد اقروا هذه الاجراءات ووافقوا عليها ولم يبق هناك اختلافات في وجهات النظر بفسان القيادة العليا وما يليها من واجبات ومسئوليات ، وعلمت انه اتفق في هذا الاجتماع على تقسيم فلسطين الى اربع مناطق حريه يرأس كل واحدة منها قائد عام يرتبط بالقائد الاعلى لجيش التحرير ولكن بعض اصلاحات الداخلية منحت للقيادة العربيه في منطقه بيت المقدس اما تاليف حكومه فلسطين الذي سيكون من جمله بعثت مجلس الجامعة فقد ارجى البحث فيه لان ، ويغلب على الظن ان العربيه لمرب فلسطين بفسان ستتمتع بحكومتهم ولكن بعد تصفيه لوقف مع اليهود وقد صرح سماحه المفتي بانه لا صحة لما قيل على لسانه من انه اعترف بالقيادة في دمشق بل هو مسافر

Account of appointment of Arab Commanders for

Palestine at meeting convened by Syrian President.

(Quoted in full translation in Paragraph 20 of this memorandum)

AL MASRI, Cairo, February 7, 1948

ANNEX 13

ARAB GANGS IN JERUSALEM



في منطقة القدس القديمة داخل السور الضخم ، وقف بعض رجال الحرس الوطني من
العرب المجاهدين يؤدون مهمة الرقابة والدفاع . ومن خلفهم الشيخ يسن البكري -
الزعيم الروحي للمنطقة والمعترف على الدفاع عنها بمؤونة نجدة من المجاهدين الأحرار

Sheikh Bakri commanding Arab snipers within the walls of the Old City.

AL MUSAWWAR, Cairo, February 20, 1948

ANNEX 14

ARAB GROUP IN JERUSALEM



AL-YOM, Beirut, 13.2.48
زار قائد منطقة القدس العسكري فندق « باترا » في المدينة القديمة بدعوة من
فضيلة الشيخ ياسين بكري ، ويرى هنا الى جانب فضيلة الشيخ مع بعض الضباط
بحرسهم رجال الحرس الوطني العربي المسلحون بالاسلحة الاوتوماتيكية .

Sheikh Bakri receiving courtesy visit by British Area Commander
of Jerusalem at Hotel Patra in the Old City.

AL YOM, Beirut, February 13, 1948

ANNEX 15

PROCESSION OF ARAB WARRIORS THROUGH PALESTINE



"Musawwar" Cairo, 20.2.48
فريق من المجاهدين العرب الاشواوس ، يحملون عتادهم وذخيرتهم ومؤونتهم ، ويجتازون أحد شوارع القدس
المرية ، في طريقهم إلى الموقع الذي عين لهم للصمود فيه ومنع رجال الهاجانا والجيش البريطاني من الوصول إلى
الحى اليهودى المحاصر وتموين سكانه . . وقد اشتد ساعد العرب بالقدس بعد وصول إمداد من الأساحة اليهم

Caption reads in part:

Arab warriors ... on their way to their appointed positions to prevent
Haganah and British troops from reaching the besieged Jewish quarter of
Jerusalem and feeding its inhabitants.

AL MUSAWWAR, Cairo, February 20, 1948

March 26th, 1948.

MEMORANDUM

-re-

ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES' INTERFERENCE WITH UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS BY DIRECT SUBSIDIES TO OFFICIAL DELEGATES FROM ARAB STATES.

PRELIMINARY NOTE

There is sufficient documentary proof on hand to prove conclusively that ARAMCO is paying expenses of the Saudi Arabian Delegation to the United Nations in connection with the actual performance of their duties as delegates. Heretofore, there has been some publicity in regard to payments by ARAMCO to officials of Arab states but such payments were not directly connected with the activities of such officials at the United Nations. The evidence submitted here is merely for the purpose of justifying a thoroughgoing inquiry into this subject by proving conclusively that this situation exists in a few minor instances and giving clues and leads from which much more impressive evidence can be easily obtained.

1. EXHIBIT "A" annexed hereto is a photostat of an itemized bill dated May 30th, 1947, for \$308.00, for limousine service supplied by "David Greenfield's Limousine Rentals, 2260 Morris Avenue, Bronx, 53, N.Y.", for transporting the Saudi Arabian Delegation between Lake Success and New York, on 12 days, between the period from May 16th, 1947 to May 29th, 1947. It should be noted that EXHIBIT "A" is addressed to "Mr. J. Moon, Arabian American Oil, 630 Fifth Avenue, New York City, New York." It is further known that daily dispatch tickets are kept by David Greenfield's Limousine Rentals on official United Nations dispatch tickets, which set forth the time and place of each separate trip within each day and which

is signed by a member of the Saudi Arabian Delegation who was in the automobile that day. It is suggested that these dispatch tickets be obtained to identify some of the specific persons whose expenses were thus paid.

At the bottom of EXHIBIT "A" is a notation that chauffeur Joseph Kroener also was the driver during a prior 3 week period when the General Assembly was in session. This individual could no doubt identify the occupants of the car as members of the Saudi Arabian Delegation.

2. EXHIBIT "B" annexed hereto is a photostat of the part of the check voucher retained by David Greenfield's Limousine Rentals, which was detached from the check issued by ARAMCO, in payment of EXHIBIT "A". It is believed that this check and others are drawn by ARAMCO on their account in the National City Bank, 9 West 51st Street branch, New York City.

3. EXHIBIT "C" annexed hereto is a photostat of an itemized bill, dated December 15th, 1947, in the sum of \$350.00, addressed to "Saudi Arabia Delegation to United States, Hotel Warwick, 65 West 54th Street, New York, N.Y.", covering trips to and from Lake Success, on 8 days, for the period from December 1st, 1947 to December 8th, 1947. Although addressed as above, there is noted thereon "Arabian American Oil Co., 630-5th Ave.", to whom a duplicate was apparently mailed on January 7th, 1948.

4. EXHIBIT "D" is a photostat of an invoice dated January 5th, 1948, addressed to "Mr. J. Moon, Arabian American Oil Co., 630 Fifth Avenue, New York City, N.Y.", to cover the trips set forth in EXHIBIT "C".

5. EXHIBIT "E" is a photostat of a second invoice dated February 11th, 1948, which is obviously a follow-up on EXHIBIT "D". It is merely submitted because it contains a notation "Pd 2/11/48", which

will indicate the approximate date of the issuance of the check on the account of ARAMCO at the National City Bank.

6. LEADS:

Hotel Bills - Delegates from Arab states or the Arab Higher Committee occupied the following suites during the latter part of 1947:

Hotel Warwick, New York City, Rooms 2521 and 3005.

Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York City, Suite 841.

Plaza Hotel, New York City, Suite 465.

It is suggested that the payments to these hotels, particularly where the Saudi Arabian Delegation is involved would indicate payments by ARAMCO.

The records of the Limousine service should also be checked with respect to other periods when the United Nations Assembly or Security Council was in session.

Saudi Arabia Delegation to United Nations
Hotel Harbick
65 West 54th Street
New York, N.Y.

Arabian American oil Co
630-54 line

Monday	Dec. 1, 1947	1 Limousine	From 8:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M.	\$ 20.00
Tuesday	Dec. 2, 1947	1 Limousine	From 8:00 A.M. to 1:30 A.M. (7 1/2 hours overtime)	\$ 60.00
Wednesday	Dec. 3, 1947	1 Limousine	From 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 A.M. (9 hours overtime)	\$ 56.00
Thursday	Dec. 4, 1947	1 Limousine	From 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 A.M. (8 hours overtime)	\$ 44.00
Friday	Dec. 5, 1947	1 Limousine	From 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 A.M. (9 hours overtime)	\$ 56.00
Saturday	Dec. 6, 1947	1 Limousine	From 8:00 A.M. to 1:00 A.M. (7 hours overtime)	\$ 48.00
Sunday	Dec. 7, 1947	1 Limousine	From 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 A.M. (9 hours overtime)	\$ 56.00
Monday	Dec. 8, 1947	1 Limousine	From 7:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.	\$ 20.00

Invoice of December 15, 1948 \$ 350.00



Special rate for 1 seven passenger limousine at \$ 20.00 per day for ten hours.

Each additional hour after ten hours at the rate of \$ 4.00 per hour.

February 11, 1948

Mr. J. Moon
Arabian American Oil Co.
330 Fifth Avenue
New York City, N.Y.

Invoice of December 15, 1947 \$ 350.00



Special rate for 1 seven passenger limousine at \$20.00 per day
for ten hours. Each additional hour after ten hours at the
rate of \$4.00 per hour.

Jed 2/11/48

FROM THE NEW YORK POST - March 27, 1948

OF COURSE U.S. OIL FIRMS PAY US, SAYS ARAB DELEGATE

By Mary Harrington

"Perfectly natural."

Thus Camille Chamoun, chief Lebanese delegate to the U.N. and an Arab League leader, explained away U.S. oil company payments to Saudi-Arabian diplomats here.

"The oil companies benefit from the Arab countries," Chamoun said, smiling at such "elementary explanations."

"Naturally, they want to make Arab diplomats happy here," he said. "Wouldn't you think so?"

He said delegates from many nations were favored by big business interests. He laughed about admitted payments to the Saudi-Arabian minister in Washington by the Arabian-American Oil Co.

"That is the way one treats people when one wants something," Chamoun said. "After all, if they don't want the oil, we can sell it elsewhere. We can always find someone to buy."

As for payment of Arab League hotel bills by the oil interests, charged but not proved, Chamoun said he didn't know about that. Interviewed in his luxurious Ritz-Carlton suite before his departure for London aboard the Queen Elizabeth Saturday, he grinned over that one, too.

"The oil companies owe the Arab States up to \$30,000,000 a year," he said. "They may pay some of this by ~~help~~ helping the governments care for delegates in this country. Doesn't that sound natural?"

Then he explained the importance to this country of such idyllic relations between oil companies and Arab countries.

"The Arab states stand 100 per cent with the United States in relation to our friends in the north, a stand which would not be profitable for your country in the end.

"Those good relations make it clear why warfare in Palestine and the loss of Arab friendship over partition would be a greater loss than political support here by a small minority of people."

Then Chamoun laughed, in a friendly fashion.

[April 13, 1948?]

C
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Y

After one week's visit Palestine, G. Fielding Elliot reported on 6 April to the office of the US Military Attaches, Cairo Egypt as follows:

Transjordan Defense Force strength 3000. Arab Legion (TJ) strength approx 5000 as follows

- 4 Inf Bns (Br Colonial T/O) 1032 officers and EM each;
- 1 Regt (Br Regular T/O) Horse Cav, Approx 500 officers and EM;
- 1 Armored Car Regt, Approx 500 officers and Em, 2 Btries (Br Regular T/O) FA, some tanks.

Of total 8000, 4000 in Palestine, 4000 in TJ. Elliot reports personal estimate that efficiency Arab Legion is deteriorating as British scale down number of British Officers assigned to it.

* * * * *



April 27, 1948.

Between the Arab League, Cairo and King Abdallah, and their respective representatives, renewed conferences in Aman and Cairo have taken place since the 15th of April.

This was necessary after the new military development in Palestine itself. (Mishmar-Haemek, Tiberias, Haifa). Egypt and Saudi Arabia have for a long time accused Abdallah of working together with Great Britain to achieve his greater Syrian plan (the occupation of the Arab part of Palestine). But Abdallah was able to convince them that he had no such intention, at least not at present.

As a consequence of these meetings, a final and secret meeting took place in Serka, Trans-Jordan on April 23rd. At this meeting, all representatives of the Arab League states and the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine were present, including Hadj Amin El Husseini, himself.

Before this meeting, one day, a Hashimide private meeting in Aman took place between King Abdallah and the Regent of Iraq, Prince Abdul-Illah. From this first meeting, no details are available.

At the Serka meeting, the 23rd of April, the following points were agreed upon:

1. Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Hedjaz will send part of their regular armies into Palestine. Each state will send no more than between two thousand and three thousand five hundred soldiers including their mechanized weapons. In addition, Iraq and Egypt have agreed to send also a small part of their airforce.
2. The troops which will be working under the name of The Arab League Palestine Liberation Army will be under the command of King Abdallah in a combined headquarters in which every Arab state participating in the army will send a general.
3. A representative of the Arab higher committee (Palestine Arabs) will be also a member of the headquarters, and two generals of the Palestine Volunteer Army will be incorporated in Abdallah's headquarters.
4. The cost for the war will be divided, not according to the strength of each army but according to the power of the different states. Egypt and Iraq top the list for financial contributions.
5. If the war will start and the Arab states army will come into battle, the war will be conducted in a humane way according to the rules laid down by the Geneva convention and the convention of the Hague.
6. After a successful occupation of all Palestine, or only part of Palestine, no Arab states participating in this war will have the right to remain in Palestine or part of Palestine or to annex Palestine or part of Palestine to their respective states. The Headquarters of the Arab League Palestine Liberation Army must hand over Palestine to the Arab Higher Command (Palestine Arabs).
7. Only the Arab Higher Committee will have the right to choose the Occupation Army which will remain after victory is achieved in Palestine.

8. Such an Occupation Army will have only police power under the command of the ~~Arab~~ Higher Arab Committee and will only remain temporarily in Palestine.
9. For the first state of the Arab League Palestine Liberation Army activities, Jericho will be the headquarters of the Arab League Army and Abdallah will reside there instead of in Aman. Two of Abdallah's sons will receive the rank of generals and will command units in the army.
10. The Arab League Palestine Liberation Army will not go over to the attack before the 16th of May after the British end the Palestine mandate. Also, the already-stationed in Palestine Arab Legion, will not participate officially in the already-existing conflict and will not participate in the open in war actions of the Palestine Volunteer Army.
11. As a consequence, the Arab legion will until the 15th of May only occupy such places in Palestine which are regarded today as strictly Arab territory. (The entrance of the Arab League into Jericho is only to protect the coming Arab League Palestine Liberation Army Headquarters.)
12. Regardless of these military preparations which will come into force only after the 16th of May, the Arab League under the leadership of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, is still prepared to accept an immediate trusteeship agreement for Palestine. To this effect, secret negotiations with Great Britain, the U.S.A., and in consequence, the U.N. are still going on.
13. The Arab League is eager to avoid a total war because even in victory, the political consequences would be severe. The Arab League is therefore prepared to accept the Trusteeship Cantonization Plan as laid down in the Grady-Morrison Plan, to which the Arabs gave their consent in the UNO assembly on November 27, 1947.
14. If until the 15th of May no such agreement between the UN, the Zionists and the Arab League is arrived at, the full-scale war now under preparation will start.
15. In this case, the first political move of the Arab League, even before military action starts, will be a joint declaration of the Independence of Palestine. If no agreement is reached by this time, it will coincide with the Jewish Agency's declaration of a Hebrew Republic. In this case, Palestine will have two equal governments existing at the same time, and ~~legal~~ legalizing all military action.
16. Under no circumstances shall the Arab states involved in the war against Zionism, attack their Jewish minorities in their respective states. Neither will Jewish property be confiscated.
17. The Mufti, Hadj Amin El Hussein, will vote and sit in the Arab League's Liberation Army for Palestine Headquarters.
18. In case of trusteeship agreement, the UN must recognize Hadj Amin El Hussein as the representative of the Palestine Arabs.
19. The present commanders of the Arab Volunteer Army, Sawfat Pasha and Fauzi Kawkavzi, will be incorporated as commanders in the New Arab League Palestine Liberation Army.

20. Azham Pasha, secretary general of the Arab League in Cairo will be nominated chief liaison officer between the Arab League's Army and their political office.

21. If the necessity arises, Pakistan will send a small group of military to Palestine.

22. King Abdallah ~~not~~ although participating in the Arab League Palestine Liberation Army will have no claim whatsoever on any territory in Palestine.

These points regarding the inner Arab agreement regarding Palestine were handed over to the British High Commissioner, Sir Cunningham, on April 26.

It was also agreed upon during the Arab meetings that the Mufti will enter Palestine the first days of May and will reside in the Arab League's temporary headquarters in Jericho.

COMMENTARY: Hadje Amin El Hussein's role in this political game is clear. He will be the supervisor of Abdallah sent by Egypt, Ibn Saud, and Syria. The Mufti will act as counterweight engaged by Farouk and Ibn Saud against King Abdallah.

It is learned, but not confirmed, that a top secret arrangement exists between King Abdallah and the Arab League and the British foreign or colonial office. This agreement says that Abdallah will receive, no matter how the Palestine outcome, an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea in Gaza or in the vicinity. For the safeguarding of such an outlet or port, Trans-Jordan will receive a strip of land in Palestine, including Jericho, Hebron and ~~Ber-Sheba~~ Shebaa.

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an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea in Gaza or in the vicinity.
For the safeguarding of such an outlet or port, Trans-Jordan
will receive a strip of land in Palestine, including Jericho,
Hebron and Beer-Sheva.

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April 28, 1948

To: Mr. E. Epstein
From: A. Grinblat

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The Transjordan Arab Legion

The Arab Legion is becoming more involved in the Palestine war. The Legion is not a new face in Palestine. For years this force has constituted part of the British forces and performed, under British army command, garrison, guard and security duties. Units of the Legion were stationed in various vital areas, Arab and Jewish, and on the frontiers. Its units camped in and around Haifa, guarded the Iraqi Petroleum Company pipeline from Kirkuk (Iraq) to Haifa; were stationed near Safed in Galilee; in Sarafand, greatest British military centre in Palestine; in Tel Litwinsky, near Tel-Aviv; in southern Palestine; in the Jerusalem area and elsewhere. In October 1947, there were 4000 to 5000 Legionaries in Palestine: two regiments of the mechanized brigade, two infantry regiments, and two companies of the security group. Now it is claimed that two thirds of the full strength of the Legion is in Palestine under British authority, apart from the Legionaries who invaded the country in the anti-Jewish campaign.

Attacks Jews, aids Arabs under British auspices

Even before November 29, 1947 relations between the Arab Legion and Jewish Palestine were uneasy. Individual attacks on Jews occurred. The Jews regarded the Legion as a hostile foreign force and repeatedly demanded their withdrawal from the British.

The tension between the Legion and the Jews grew gradually after November 1947. On December 7, 1947 the Transjordan Foreign Minister declared to the press in Cairo that the Legion took part in anti-Jewish operations on the Jaffa-Tel Aviv border on December 5. On Dec. 14 legionaries from the Beit Nabala camp (Lydda area) shot 14 Jews in a convoy which passed near the camp. In Haifa 10 Jews were killed since December 1 in various attacks by Legion sentries. The invading Arab Liberation Army infiltrated into Palestine partly over bridges guarded by the Arab Legion. Legionaries joined the Liberation Army with their arms. New York Times reported from Jerusalem an instance of desertion with arms as early as Dec. 13, 1947. Seven of

the Liberation Army's casualties in the abortive attack on Tira Zvi (Beisan area) on Feb. 16, 1948 were identified as legionaries. The second in command of the Legion and its Arab top-officer, Abd al-Qader Pasha al-Jundi, joined the military committee of the Arab League, planning the Palestine campaign. He met Fauzi Qauqji in Damascus on Feb. 17. On April 18 Jon Kimche reported to ONA from Tel Aviv that Legion reinforcements were promised to Qauqji in his fiasco attack on Mishmar Haemek. This was revealed from a dispatch in possession of an envoy captured by Jewish forces. The Legion was also reported to have supplied gasoline to Qauqji's forces. On April 1 Legion armored cars took part in an attack on a Jewish convoy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. On April 18 four armored cars of the Legion led an abortive attack on the Jewish settlement, Neve Yaakov, north of Jerusalem.

Units of the Legion acting in Palestine under British command are in charge of security in areas of southern and eastern Palestine; escorting and protecting communications of Arab local and foreign gangs; making surveys of Arab villages for their fortification, taking over camps and installations evacuated by the British forces. Legion officers are in contact and cooperation with the Arab invaders. Legionaries harass and attack Jewish communications and interfere with movement of Jewish forces.

Arab Legion - A British force

With a population of some 400,000 - most of them semi-nomads and nomads - and a total annual budget of less than six million dollars, Transjordan could never support an army such as the Arab Legion, entitled in Arabic "al-Jaish al-Arabi" (the Arab Army). The Legion is substantially maintained by an annual subvention from the British exchequer, amounting to \$8,000,000. Besides the Legion receives British services training, standard arms and equipment "on loan" and at very low prices. The Transjordan contribution to the defense budget in 1947-48 was estimated at not more than LP 289,852 (\$1,159,408).

Anglo-Transjordan military alliance

Paragraph two of article 3 of the new treaty, signed by Britain and Transjordan on March 15, 1948 for 20 years reads:

"In the event of an imminent menace of hostilities the High Contracting Parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defense." The same article commits - subject to certain provisions - either party to come immediately to the aid of the other, should it become engaged in war. Before hostilities break out a peaceful settlement should be attempted in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the UN. and of any other international obligations which may be applicable to the case. (Transjordan is not a member of the UN but is pledged to the Arab League pact). Under the treaty, the Arab Legion will be trained by British officers when required. Transjordan officers will be trained in British military schools. Britain is pledged to supply Transjordan with arms, ammunition, installations and aircraft.

Legion officered by Britons

Even before the new treaty the Commander in Chief of the Legion and 20% of its officers, were Britons on loan to the Transjordan Government. The first Commander in Chief of the Legion was Peake Pasha. In 1930 John Bagot Glubb, British political officer in the tribal areas of Iraq, was appointed Deputy Commander in Chief and in 1939 succeeded Peake. Glubb is a captain of reserves of the British regular forces, joined the Legion as acting Major and was promoted in 1941 to acting Brigadier. He fought in World War I and was later official of the Colonial Office in Iraq. Robin Maugham in his new book "Nomad", describes him as "middle-aged and small of stature, with thin, white-grey hair, pale blue eyes, and a bushy, iron-grey ~~xxx~~ moustache." Maugham quotes Glubb as having said: "Great Britain doesn't want to dominate the Arabs but to prevent any other power from doing so. Let's have a Middle East Monroe Doctrine". Arab sources attribute to Glubb a leading role in the developing participation of the Legion in the Palestine war. They point out his meetings with Arab leaders and follow closely his movements between the Arab East and London and in the Arab East. In the staff list of the Palestine Government Glubb was listed as Assistant Inspector General of Police, seconded to the Transjordan Government. The second British top officer of the Legion is Col. R.J.C. Broadhurst, also listed in the Staff List of the Palestine Government as Superintendent of Police. Broadhurst is also

titled military counsel to King Abdullah.

Altogether there are about forty British officers officially on loan to the Legion, all holding key commands, even when on the face of it Arabs have executive powers. Despite the fact that some of the Arab officers received short-term training in Britain the effectiveness of the Arab Legion without its British officers is questionable. King Abdullah is certainly not a military commander in any modern sense.

Arab Legion a motley mercenary army

The first nucleus of the Arab Legion was formed in 1920: 5 officers and 100 troopers. In 1925 the Legion had 42 officers and 992 non-commissioned officers and privates. In 1939 it numbered 1600. The Legion developed and grew in recent years under Glubb Pasha, who encouraged enlistment of bedouins and development of the Desert Patrol. By the end of 1947 the actual strength of the Legion did not exceed 10,000. It may now have a few more thousand new recruits. Its fighting strength is certainly not more than 10,000.

The Legion is not a national army of Transjordan. It is a professional army of mercenaries maintained mainly by Great Britain. Transjordan could not support such a force. There is no conscription in Transjordan. The Legion contains elements from all over the Middle East. Besides Transjordanians there are bedouins from various tribes, Circassians and Chechens, particularly in the King's mounted bodyguards, Palestinian Arabs, Druzes, Christian Arabs, Armenians, etc. The pay of a private soldier is \$36 per month.

The Legion most efficient Arab army

Due to its British command, training and equipment, the Legion is considered the most efficient Arab army, surpassing the Forces of Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. In quality it is superior to the numerically stronger armies of Egypt and Iraq. However, the Legion has no battle experience. In suppressing the Rashid Ali revolt in Iraq in 1941 it played a minor part. Neither did it see much action in the campaign against the Vichy forces in the Levant.

which took place in the same year. During the War it was used exclusively for security and guard duties. Never was it sent to any front or near any front as was in the case of the Jewish Brigade group and other Palestinian Jewish units and individual soldiers.

Composition of the Legion

An analysis of the Arab Legion as well as of other Arab armies is contained in a book entitled "The Contemporary Arab Armies", published in Hebrew in Tel-Aviv in December 1947. The book was published by "Maarakhot", a monthly for political, economic and military problems. "Maarakhot" is close to Haganah quarters.

According to the above book the Legion is composed of three major parts:

- a) Mechanized Brigade. Consists of three regiments, two of which were stationed mostly in Palestine and the rest in Transjordan. The strength of each regiment is estimated at 800-900 men, apart from small auxiliary units.
- b) Infantry garrison groups, about 15 companies, and two security companies.
- c) Training centre near Amman. The new recruits formed about 20 to 25 percent of the total strength of the Legion.

The Mechanized Brigade

The author of "Contemporary Arab Armies" doubts whether the Mechanized Brigade can carry out coordinated operations on a brigade scale. Each mechanized regiment consists of one staff company, one armored company and two companies of motorized infantry, carried by trucks and partly having automatic weapons (Bren guns) and about six Bren-carriers per company. The Bren carriers have armor plate of 8mm and two Bren guns. The armored companies have about six heavy armored cars each. The heavy armored cars have a frontal plate of 20-25 mm, a two-pounder piece and two Browning machine guns (.30). Some armored cars are adapted for mortar use. There is also some heavier armor

with six-pounders (²a-1/2 inches) and 75 mm guns. There was no indication that the Legion had heavy tanks.

Each mechanized regiment had an artillery unit: 3.7 inch pack Howitzers, twenty-five pounders, six pounders, PIAT anti-tank guns and 3 inch mortars.

The infantry units are armed with rifles (Lee Enfield) and sub-machine guns, the ratio being 70 to 30. There are at least two machine guns and one 2 inch mortar per infantry platoon. The total strength of the infantry companies was estimated as 3500, that is a little over an infantry brigade. The weakest link in the Legion is of course the new recruits who form a considerable part of it. The Legion is very poor in auxiliary services (medical units, engineers, etc. for which it depends on the British forces). Altogether the regular force of the Legion does not exceed 8500, apart from the bodyguard trooper company and the Desert Patrol employed in the desert and numbering less than 1000.

No aircraft. British turned over large stores.

The Arab Legion has no aircraft, but it expects to get some from the British.

Last March the British turned over to the Legion charging sets, artillery stores, anti-tank rifles and mortars from supplies in Egypt. In recent weeks the Legion received from the British sixty armored cars, 3500 high explosive mortar bombs, 4500 smoke mortar bombs, 100,000 rounds of 30-calibre ammunition and 900,000 gallons of M.T. 70 petrol. The Legion also received other supplies and took over military camps. Its stocks are believed to be considerably enlarged.


Legion versus Jewish Palestine

Supposing the British allow the Legion to attack Jewish Palestine - any such attack is impossible without British concurrence - what are the odds of the war?

So far the morale of the Legion has been good but it stood no serious tests. The Legion has undergone Arab nationalistic indoctrination, not necessarily always in a pro-Hashemite spirit. However, in an anti-Jewish

campaign such indoctrination carries weight. There is also to consider the sense of group military honor, esprit de corps of a professional army. Moreover, if the Legion is beaten King Abdullah's position will become very awkward and the whole structure of the Arab League may also be subject to a fatal repercussion. Arab governments may tumble and chaos may spread in Egypt, and Iraq.

There is no question that Jewish forces surpass the Legion in numbers, morale, standard of education, technical and scientific resources. The Jews are fighting for survival, for statehood, for the remnants of a ~~constitution~~ six-million massacre, for the rebirth of an ancient nation and for a two-thousand year old dream of a fatherland. The Jews cannot be beaten by the Legion so long as there is no foul anti-Jewish play, in the military, political or diplomatic fields. Despite all odds the Jews will put up as tough a fight as can be imagined.



RECEIVED
MAY 1941

RECEIVED
MAY 1941

RECEIVED
MAY 1941

M. Eliash
May 10, 1948

Chis guin
* H G
J R.

THE ARAB THESIS REGARDING A STATE IN THE WHOLE OF WESTERN PALESTINE

(Note on Dr. Robinson's paper of 28.4.48)

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Dr. Robinson's paper deals very adequately with the fallacies of the argument that a Unitary State in the whole of Palestine is the only legal solution under the Mandate. It fully disposes of the contention that the "Government of Palestine" envisaged in the Mandate must mean one Government, and shows with convincing conclusion that the Partition Plan is in no way contradictory to either the explicit or implicit provisions of the Mandate.

2. The paper then deals with the contention that the Arab proposed action might be defended as a solution under the Mandate, if not necessarily the only solution. Here our position is somewhat weaker, as there is nothing intrinsically fallacious in the proposition that the majority of the population of Palestine is entitled to establish a Democratic Government. In fact, it was at one time our main thesis that the Mandate envisaged a Democratic Government to be established in Palestine by the majority of the population; except that we maintained that it should have been a Jewish majority, created by intensive immigration, in which case it would have fully accorded with the main purpose of the Mandate, that of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The fact that the Mandate terminates before the creation of a Jewish majority is not, however, in itself sufficient to invalidate the proposition that the majority is entitled to establish a Democratic Government upon the termination of the Mandate. Similarly, the logic of our rule of interpretation, with reference to the expression "Government in Palestine", that words in the singular may denote a plural, does not destroy the contention that they may as well denote a singular.

3. The choice between the two solutions being in the balance, Dr. Robinson proceeds to show that the Arab solution would be contrary to the essential purposes of the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration, while the Jewish Solution

would be in accord with them. However, this distinction by itself is not a sufficient makeweight to weigh the balance in our favor. It would not preclude any state from recognizing the Arab Government, and would leave the resulting controversies to matters of opinion, based upon a discussion as to whether an autonomous Jewish Community in a Unitary Palestine does or does not fulfil the promise of a Jewish National Home.

4. The argument must, therefore, be strengthened by insistent reference to the Resolution of 29.11.47 as the source of law which makes the Arab Solution illegal. Just as the Arabs seek unremittingly to minimize the legal value of the Resolution, so must we omit no occasion to underline its binding legal effect.

5. As regards the Arabs of Palestine, they are covered only by a "call" and an "appeal" of the General Assembly, couched in the following terms:

The General Assembly.... "calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect."

The General Assembly.... "appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations".

Perhaps a disregard of a call and an appeal would not by themselves make an action illegal from the point of view of International Law. But the General Assembly also passed a "request" to the Security Council to "determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution." It further recommended to all members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation of the Plan.

It ought to be maintained with all vigor, as a proposition of law, that no Member State can with impunity disregard these provisions of the Resolution, and that although the General Assembly seems to have inferentially approved a halt on the further steps of implementation, it cannot be taken (in the absence of any other action or resolution before May 15th) as having released Member States from their duty to do nothing which would be in flagrant disregard of the Resolution.