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35

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Jewish Agency, "B", 1947-1948.

COPY

MARCH 31, 1947

NLT
ZIONIT
JERUSALEM

CONSIDER SPECIAL SESSION ASSEMBLY IMPENDING MAY CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE
RECONSIDERATION DECISION HOLD ACTIONSCOM MAY 12 STOP ASSEMBLY MEETING WILL
INVOLVE DEVELOPMENT HEAVY PROGRAM WORK BOTH FOR EXECUTIVE MEMBERS AND STAFF
HERE WHICH PREPARATIONS FOR AND SESSIONS ACTIONSCOM WILL SERIOUSLY INTERRUPT
STOP MOREOVER NO PARTICULAR NEED FOR ACTIONSCOM BEFORE ASSEMBLY BUT MAY
DEFINITELY BE NECESSARY IMMEDIATELY AFTER STOP ACCORDINGLY PROPOSE ONE NO
MEETING MAY TWO MEETING CALLABLE SHORT NOTICE SOON AS DEVELOPMENTS WARRANT
THREE IF MAJORITY EXECUTIVE FOR MAY MEETING VENUE MUST BE AMERICA FOUR IF
AND WHEN ACTIONSCOM MEETS AMERICA SUGGEST EXECUTIVE CONSIDER REDUCED SCALE
ACCORDING KEY STOP SILVER GOLDMANN ABSENT MEETING

BRODETSKY
GREENBERG
HALPRIN
NEUMANN
SHERTOK

FAST



DIRECT



RADIOGRAM

RCA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

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RECEIVED AT 64 BROAD STREET, NEW YORK 4. AT _____ STANDARD TIME

HXY242 JERUSALEM 53 25 1520

Via RCA

NLT DR ABBA HILLEL - SILVER JEWISH AGENCY
16 EAST 66TH STREET NEW YORK =

AMAZED LEARN INTENTIONS SEND DELEGATION WASHINGTON
INCLUDING AGUDAH AND EXCLUDING MIZRACHI STOP
IMPOSSIBLE AND UNACCEPTABLE AGUDAH PLAY ROLE AS
SOLE SPOKESMAN ORTHODOX JEWRY USA STOP BEHALF
MERKAZOLAMI MIZRACHI URGE YOU KINDLY INVITE
MIZRACHI REPRESENTATIVE PARTICIPATE DELEGATION
THANKS PLEASE CABLE =

MEYER BERLIN

Telephone: HAnover 2-1811

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F. Bernstein

C o p y

The Jewish Agency for Palestine
P.O.B.92
Jerusalem

May 16, 1947

Dr. Israel Goldstein
270 West 89 Street
New York City.

Dear Dr. Goldstein:

After taking up my job in the Executive I had practically no time to spend on the affairs of General Zionism, but lately I was prevailed upon to assume once more the direct responsibility for conducting the affairs of the party, and I am trying to find out whether it is possible to fulfill the double task without neglecting one or both.

After this introduction you will understand more easily why I think it necessary to write you a rather longish letter about a certain error or judgment, which apparently occurred to one or two of our friends when they recently visited Palestine.

Those seem to have been specially and favorably impressed by the Oved Zioni, while the situation of the non-labor wing was considered less satisfactory. And it seems to have been hinted that we ought to draw Mr. Rokach and his friends nearer to the party in order to strengthen the prestige of General Zionism in Palestine.

Now this would be a very valuable advice unless the very distressing fact that Mr. Rokach left the party when Brith reunited with Hitachduth, being strongly opposed to what he considers as leftist inclinations of the Hitachduth people (A) and more particularly to the affiliation of the united party with the Oved Zioni, this being part of the Mapai controlled Histadrut. At the time Dr. Sneh, one of the presidents of the united party becoming a member of the Oved Zioni clinched the secession of Mr. Rokach and brought about the estrangement between him and myself, because I had some part in the unification of General Zionism. Most of his nearest friends had accepted the unification and voted for it, but Mr. Rokach knew to win some of them to support, before Congress, the competing Maccabi list which failed in the elections, but nevertheless caused numerous absentions from voting in the General Zionist camp.

It cannot be denied that the reality of Palestine with its partition into the Histadrut-controlled economy, very imperialist and expansionist, and the free economy involved in an incessant defensive struggle against the encroachments of conquering Histadrut makes it rather difficult to build General Zionism as a kind of compromise between two contesting sectors, and the obvious thing to do would seem an attempt to organize the non-Histadrut Yishuv, the great majority, on party lines as a defense force of free economy and private enterprise, and this is what Mr. Rokach tried to achieve. But for a number of reasons all attempts in this direction have failed and it was one of the consequences of these failures that we decided to reunite General Zionism.

I personally regret very much that Mr. Rokach does not see his way to join the united party and persists in his opposition to it, but you should understand that he objects first and foremost to the labor wing of General Zionism, most cherished by you and your friends, Haoved Hazoni. This is the real background to what may have seemed to your friends a personal quarrel. Anyway it is an error of judgment to believe that you can at the same time strongly back up Haoved Hazoni and win Mr. Rokach for united General Zionism.

It seems to me that we are on the way of creating, despite all difficulties, a party of General Zionists which will be able to organize an important part of the people who can be considered, and largely consider themselves, as General Zionists in their approach to the questions of Zionist and Yishuvit policy. But success depends for an important part on money to be spent judiciously on constructive and organizational work alike.

This too seems to be a point not fully understood in the USA.

It is quite true that General Zionism in Palestine should be able to raise the money required for organization locally, but you should not forget that we are working amongst that part of the Yishuv which had lost all confidence in its own ability to acquire political influence and which wants to see some palpable results before spending money on the organization of General Zionism. Therefore it would be a wise policy on your part to place at our disposal in the beginning considerable amounts for organizational work, which could decrease after some time, while the amounts for constructive purpose should be gradually increased. At this present juncture we can achieve much more by appointing secretaries, creating a staff, building or acquiring club-rooms in the various places, though the constructive work must give the local branches opportunities to be permanently active and to attach the members more firmly to the party.

This is how I see things and I would like you to communicate the contents of this letter to some of the friends most interested in developments of General Zionism in Palestine.

With kindest personal regards,

Yours,

signed: F. Bernstein

FAST



DIRECT



RADIOGRAM

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RECEIVED AT 64 BROAD STREET, NEW YORK 4. AT 7:17 STANDARD TIME

HXY631 JERUSALEM 49/48 1 1730

= NLT ZIONISTS DR SILVER NEW YORK =

RCA

Handwritten signature

UNDERSTAND YOUR ORGANISATION DIFFICULTIES
PARTICIPATE VADHAPOEL THIS MONTH ASWELL AMERICAN
MIZRACHI STILL APPEAL SAVE HIGHER PLYCY ZIONISM
NOT DELAY TILL JULY STOP WITHOUT MEETING BEFORE
ARRIVAL UN COMMITTEE WE WILL FACE DANGEROUS
DEVIATIONS WITH BAD CONSEQUENCES OUTSIDE AND

— INSIDE PLEASE REPLY = MEYER BERLIN

Telephone: HAnover 2-1811

Form 112 TA 23-R

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WESTERN UNION (40)

A. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LC = Deferred Cable

NET = ~~Cable~~ Night Letter

Ship Radiogram

1947 JUN 20 PM

H311 INTL=CD PARIS VIA RCA 127 20 1

NLT RABBI SILVER=

THE TEMPLE CLEVE=

HAVE CABLED THE FOLLOWING AGENCY EXECUTIVE JERUSALEM QUOTE
CONSTRAINED URGE YOU MUST STRONGLY TO DESIST FROM FURTHER
CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST HEBREW RESISTANCE FORCES STOP YOU
ARE AGAIN PATHETIC VICTIMS BELIEVING TREACHEROUS BRITISH
PROMISES AND HAVE AGREED TO CONDEMN HEBREW DISPLACED PERSONS
TO A THIRD WINTER OF TORMENT IN GERMANY STOP YOUR
COLLABORATION WITH THE BRITISH IS REACHING A POINT OF ALL
OUT NATIONAL BETRAYAL HAVING SUCCEEDED IN FORCING THE
HAGANAH TO FIGHT THEIR FORMER COMRADES IN ARMS STOP FOR GOD
SAKE DONT RECKLESSLY FORCE UPON OUR PEOPLE THE TRAGEDY OF
BLOODY FRATRICIDE UNQUOTE KNOWING THAT YOU DISAGREE WITH
THIS POLICY IMPORE YOUR IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION STOP IF YOU
FAIL ONLY YOUR RESIGNATION AGENCY WOULD PREVENT YOUR
RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISASTROUS POLICY:

PETER BERGSON.

Brodetsky

Dr. G. H. Silver

C O P Y

JEWISH AGENCY - LONDON

15th July, 1947

Mr. I. Klinov,
Jewish Agency for Palestine,
P.O.B. 92, Jerusalem,
PALESTINE.

Dear Mr. Klinov,

I received a call today from a Mr. Grosskopf, representing an organisation known as Tours, who presented me with a brochure showing that this organisation was about to prepare a guide to hotels in Europe. At the same time ^{he} ~~he~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{backing of} the Jewish Agency. The purpose of this guide, as set out in the prospectus, was to prepare a list of hotels throughout the world which would indicate to clients in Palestine that they were establishments which did not discriminate against Jews. Mr. Grosskopf informed me that he had come to this country and had begun to approach certain organisations as well as individual hotels for advertisements. He showed me a copy of a letter from the Travel Association of Great Britain, who had expressed the view that there was no need to prepare such a list as discrimination against Jews was extremely rare in this country.

I must first of all express my surprise and my indignation that a serious step of this nature backed by the Jewish Agency was undertaken without the slightest consultation with this country. The whole question is an extremely delicate one. There may be individual cases of such discrimination but I must say as one who has travelled through this country and stayed in hundreds of hotels, that I have never come across a case of this kind. I feel that such approaches to hotels would be extremely unfortunate. You would be raising questions and putting ideas into peoples minds on a problem which, in our view, is at any rate not acute.

It is however, on a general principle that I want to speak. I do not think that it is the function of the Jewish Agency to interfere in matters which concern other countries nor indeed do I think that the whole question of promoting a guide for hotels within other countries falls within the orbit of the Jewish Agency. In any case if any such step was contemplated it was surely elementary that first of all responsible Jewish organisations in Great Britain should have been consulted. It should have been remembered for example, that I am President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and in that capacity had a right to be consulted before this man arrived in this country, and before he was given a letter of authorisation from the Jewish Agency. This man had in fact begun his approaches before contacting me. It is true that he came to see me and asked my advice, but this should have been done before he ever set out.

This is not the only case in which matters relating to other countries are undertaken without consultation, and I must say that I take the strongest exception to such procedure. I informed Mr. Grosskopf that I consider it extremely undesirable that he continue with his activity, and I must say in fairness to him that he has agreed not to proceed with his plan, but it does not alter the fact that we should have been approached for our advice before ever his visit was undertaken.

I felt I must make this position absolutely clear, and I hope that nothing of this kind will ever be undertaken again before there is prior consultation with the Jewish authorities in this country.

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I have circulated copies of this letter to members of the Executive as I feel that they should be informed of the views that I hold on this matter.

Your sincerely,

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

S. BRODETSKY.

Frank Buxton

see letter of

Bob Silverman

7/30/47

upa



S.S. Kedineh
9/7/47
Strait of Messina

Y. Ben-Aharon
Givat-Hayim
Palestine

Dear Joe,

At long last I am facing East and home. I was detained in Europe for over a month to attend the Action Committee at Zurich. Although I made good use of my time - paying flying visits to Poland, (without visa smuggled there and back by the "Boys") Bavaria and Czechoslovakia - where I gathered a good deal of heart-breaking experiences and impressions on the life and doings of our people and their organizations. It is easily summed up in one sentence: People, their organizations and leaders are slowly but surely reaching a point of rotting corruption due to life on charity and speculation - from which nothing in the world not even the impact of Palestine, will ever be strong enough to save them. I cannot help it but I came to ruthless conclusions - for which there are no fit ears in our movement. One cannot even proclaim it aloud as long as he cares for his reputation, but I want you to know that we are - all of us without exception - cowardly opportunists subjecting the remnants of our people to a regime of "joint" charity; black market and wasting the substance of our peoples money and strength on the consummation of Hitler's work. All that managed to survive physically is now being finished off morally and mentally thus depriving ourselves of the one and only revolutionary fighting element dropped into our laps by destiny. Those millions of dollars if spent on Allyn Beth, active resistance, continuation of the pressure by continuous wandering and pushing across borders and seas are making Europe hell not only for our people but for the occupation powers and their appeased enemies - we would be spared the consequences of our own humanitarian follies. There are still strong and conscious centres among the survivors who are ready to continue the "Exodus" way to the bitter end provided that a Jewish Agency Executive would not decide unilaterally (1) to order them not to resist forcefully their landing at Hamburg without at the same time ordering others to take up their struggle and turning the British home in Germany into a blazing hell for Mr. Bevin's cohorts. There is a new illusion afoot - the majority report of UNSCOP - a people feel - as they sit untroubled times in the past two years - that they may rest now - the salvation being at the door! Well this time you and your leaders have succumbed to the same illusion. The coalition is now firmly united, a common internal and foreign policy - built on the shifting sand of futile belief in a solution by the creation of a Jewish state by UNO. So in the meantime we may relax and have our heroic Exodus fighters dumped back into Germany, while more, empty and bloodless verbosity will try to cover up the capitulation - unconditional - to Bevin-Marshall. Do not faint at the coupling of those two names - because the fact that the U.S.A. tolerated and in fact abated the most barbarous action since Auschwitz - the floating cages of the three deportation ships - is a political declaration against us and for Britain! Any Jewish politician who does not understand this - has not grasped our situation - and this I am afraid is the case for all parties of the coalition. This is the sum total of Zurich. I know where that policy is going to end - in submission to a Morrison-Grady state - ghetto in Palestine!

Fortified with that victory Mapai is now going back to Palestine to crucify the two opposition parties in the Histadruth. Until the bubble of the UNSCOP State will burst - sometime at the end of this year - there is time enough to carry out new elections to the Histadruth - conference waving in front of the Yishuv their achievement of a Jewish State in the larger part of Palestine and a unanimous agreement of all coalition parties - against us. We will have a rough time to persuade the tired and disillusioned membership of the Histadruth that they are made victims of a new and cruel illusion particularly - as I have found out in Europe - since at the disposal of Mapai are fantastic funds gathered by foul methods to crush the opposition. They have done the job with you by diplomatic and demagogic manoeuvres and are going now to do it to us by means of power and money. We will of course fight back - with our bare hearts - but what of it?

We'll just have to bide our time until the realities of our political situation will stand out clearly again - the pity of the situation is however that you got engaged to your neck with the official line. I doubt it whether under the circumstances we'll be able to reckon with your assistance. I suppose you will hear a good deal of satisfactory and constructive reports about Zurich, so I wanted to add to it just a touch of an opposite view and a different appraisal of the situation. Dr. Sneh was the only one who went with us to the end.

Please keep this letter for yourself and Jaques - what I have got to say publicly - I'll do in a different and more civilised vein.

Regards from Miriam and our boy, who are at the moment enjoying the Mediterranean sun while I am at pains to mar your joy of life.

So long.

Y. Ben-Aharon

Dear Jaques,

I am afraid that this letter does not bring cheerful news. It is difficult for me to conceal my disappointment behind meaningless platitudes. I am afraid - Joe will remember my words to the same effect a few months ago - that you people have no policy to boast of and in a pure match of manoeuvring - Mapai proved itself superior. But there is still more to come and we'll see how you'll orientate yourself. Your chief trouble lies - this is my feeling - in your unshakeable belief that Washington is with us. As long as you don't wake up to the fact that the British policy against us is unthinkable without Washington's tacit or explicit agreement - you'll be unable to form an independent political line of thought and action. I may be wrong of course - then nothing would give me more pleasure than to be proved wrong by the development of our case at UNO.

Sincerely and regards.

Y. Ben-Aharon

November 6, 1947

Mr. Edward L. Bernays
26 E. 64th St.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Bernays:

I hope you will pardon the long delay in contacting you. I have been so terribly involved in the work of the United Nations. I requested Mr. Shapiro to get in touch with you soon after I received your outline. By the time your outline had reached me, the situation had developed to a point where a large-scale campaign to organize public opinion in order to induce our Government to come out for the majority report on Palestine was no longer necessary. If things move along satisfactorily, we will not need any such campaign. Should there be any upset in our calculations, and should no action be taken, we may have to resort to such an activity later on.

I am aware that I have put you and your organization to considerable trouble and expense in making your preliminary study and I would appreciate very much receiving from you a statement for services rendered.

I am hoping that I shall have the pleasure in the very near of sitting down with you again and of talking over with you some of the problems which face us in our future work. I found our last meeting very helpful indeed.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK

COPY

Dr. Silver. 7/2

WESTERN UNION CABLEGRAM

AHS

JERUSALEM, NOV. 9, 1947

HLT

KARPMAN SILVER GENERAL ZIONISTS
41 EAST 42 ST NYK

COMMITTEE THREE APPEARED TO BE COMMITTEE SIX THREE MEMBERS
APPOINTED BY VAAS LEUMI BEING ADDED ALLEGEDLY ACCORDING
RESOLUTION ZURICH STOP USE IN SERIOUS DECISION OF PARTY
MAJORITY SO CREATED PROMPTED MY RESIGNATION FROM COMMITTEE
STOP MEANWHILE OBNOXIOUS DECISION CANCELLED STOP
NEGOTIATIONS MY RETURN TO COMMITTEE CONTINUING STOP
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT UNDERLYING STOP POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
UNDERLYING CAUSES OF CLASHES URGENTLY REQUIRED STOP FULL
INFORMATION MAILED

BERNSTEIN

17th of course money
in US - have not dream
to want dollar shorts

wealthy enough on

86. bank deficits

Y L. stocks bonds &
insurance

Books on ships -

= The Books we love -

Of making money
books there is a
book

Red to Jew. Book
worth

הסתדרות הציונים הכלליים בארץ ישראל
הועד הפועל

Please Return
to Dr. A. H. Silver

Has this been sent to
Dr. Silver? Did he
send it back. v.

בחושה נא להוכיח

477/47

תל-אביב, יום 10.11.1947

רחוב מונטיפיורי 27
תל-אביב 2953

F. BERNSTEIN.

My dear Dr. Silver,

I waited a few days to reply to your cable of October 31st, in order to be able to give you a clearer picture of developments.

The facts, in short, are as follows.

Rather a long time after our return from Switzerland the Chairman of the Executive assembled the committee of three, but it had become a committee of six, three members appointed by the Vaad Leumi having been added, one Mapai, one Ahduth Haavoda, one Hashomer Hatzair. When the committee was called upon to decide whether a certain action against the dissidents (which had been initiated without the committee having been consulted) should go on and in what manner, the representatives of Mizrachi and G.Z. voted against, the four leftists for. I wrote the Chairman of the Executive that I had feared this kind of majorisation and that I resigned from the committee, when the majorisation had become a fact on the first occasion. Then I was told, that the Zurich resolution included three members of the Vaad Leumi without any stipulation as regards party affiliations of the members to be appointed. If I had known at Zurich that it had been decided this way, I never would have consented to sit on that committee, since I have had ample experience in those tactics of securing left majorities either by transferring matters from the Jewish Agency Executive to the Vaad Leumi Executive or by forming joint committees of J.A. and V.L. Executives.

The decision I thought harmful was afterwards cancelled, I suppose as a consequence of my resignation. The J.A. Executive (which seemed suddenly empowered to decide) also stopped another kind of action which had upset the Jishuv very much. So the civil war has been considerably restricted, but tension nevertheless continues. There are now talks going on to have the V.L. part of the committee composed of three members, each of one of the coalition parties, and if I think the persons to be appointed acceptable I may withdraw my resignation from the committee. But all this will not solve the real problem. The danger of civil war amongst the Jews remains grave as long as the underlying causes of the tension are not removed.

I believe I have tried to explain those causes in Zurich. The question of terror and resistance has obscured the issue. Those who demanded most urgently action against the dissidents, were less opposed to terror than to the attractive power of organisations not submitting to Haganah discipline. On the other hand those who opposed action against the dissidents, were opposed to terror, at least a very

הסתדרות הציונים הכלליים בארץ ישראל הועד הפועל

בחושה וא להוכיר

רחוב סומיפירי 27
מלפון 2953

תל-אביב, יום 10.11.1947

- 2 -

considerable part of them. But the Haganah being Histadruth-controlled, and very strongly so (despite a representation of "Ezrachim" in the governing bodies) great parts of the non-Histadruth Jishuv do not want to see a force destroyed which could prevent Histadruth rule to be established in a Jewish state by force of arms. Probably for the same reason wants the Left the dissident organisations to be liquidated at all cost.

It is true that the dissidents are not "rightist" at all and their opposition to the left is directed against what used to be termed as weak Zionist policy. But as far as I know the dissidents have resigned themselves to partition (if a Jewish state will emerge indeed) so that their struggle is about to become senseless. However in situations of this kind the initial ideological background becomes obscured and there remains only the rivalry of separate, and as such antagonistic organisations. This cannot be overcome by demanding from the dissidents, as B.G. did, unconditional surrender. And I believe that every influence should be used, also by you and our other friends in America, to bring about a truce between the opposite forces and a cooperation, for the time being in separate entities.

I would like to add a few remarks about the more or less identical problem on the political level.

Since the establishment of a Jewish state in the near future became, during the last few weeks, a realistic possibility, the fear of Mapai-Histadruth domination has become rather strong in the non Histadruth part of the Jishuv. This fear has enabled the long dormant Ihud Ezrachi (the group Rokach Ariav Sapir) to stage a come-back and to proceed to what seems to be an attempt to create some new organisation, not a party exactly, but some kind of "roof" organisation of rightists blocks in municipalities and of economic organisations. It is not the first attempt of that kind and once more many participants are General Zionists. Sapir has proposed cooperation to G.Z. (I am not sure if he has, in this respect, Rokach behind him) so that the party should have decisive influence in the new structure. I myself am very sceptical about the thing, on the ground of former experience. But anyway large circles of the party are opposed to any such venture, and it could not be put through without splitting up the party. Now I am advised that the Industrialists (Shenkar) have refused to participate in the Rokach scheme and we think it necessary to mobilise all forces in the party in order to make it the focal point of a great effort of concentration. This may mean, in the beginning, opposition to the Rokach group who personally wants a party of his own. But I see no other way. And I believe a strong attitude on our part will greatly strengthen the party and attract a lot of people who remained outside until now.

הסתדרות הציונים הכלליים בארץ-ישראל
הועד הפועל

בחושה נא להזכיר


רחוב סונמיפיורי 27
מלפון 2953

חל-אביב, יום 10. 11. 1947

- 3 -

I am overcrowded with work and can give only part of my time to partywork. But I shall try to keep you informed about developments.

Cordially Yours,



70 PINE STREET
NEW YORK

November 21, 1947.

Dr. Abba H. Silver,
Ansel Road Temple,
Cleveland, Ohio.

Dear Dr. Silver:

You are quoted, on bad authority (The Daily Worker), with having made an address on November 17 attacking the aims of the Marshall Plan.

If you happen to have a release of that address, I should be much obliged if you would send it to me. You are not normally known as a propagandist of the Russian party line, and I rather imagine what you actually said is very different in outlook from the reports here.

With personal regards, I am,

Very truly yours,

Abba H. Silver

December 9, 1947

Mr. Adolph A. Berle, Jr.
70 Pine Street
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Berle:

You will pardon, I am sure, the long delay in replying to your letter. As you probably know, I have been extremely busy in connection with the work at the United Nations on the Palestine issue, and I have been away from my desk most of the time.

I have not seen the report which appeared in "The Daily Worker." My address delivered at The Temple on November 17 on the Marshall Plan was an exploration rather than an attack. I suggested that considerable more information should be vouchsafed to the American people before they are asked to give full endorsement to the project. I am enclosing herewith the report of the address which appeared in the Cleveland "Plain Dealer" the next morning. It is a fairly accurate account though by no means comprehensive.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK
Enc.

REMARKS BY DR. F. BROMBERGER

[1947?] *Stuebely Conf*

(1) I regret the necessity of dissenting from the report represented by my colleagues. This action is necessary because, in my opinion, the majority report fails to show both the full dangers inherent in the "Economic Union" proposed by UNSCOP Report and the necessary implication and results of the criticism voiced by my colleagues.

(2) A fair interpretation of the UNSCOP proposals indicates that all foreign trade matters generally (e.g. fixation of custom tariffs, trade agreements, import and export licensing etc.) will be decided by the Joint Economic Board. Moreover there will be one customs department for both countries directed and controlled by the Joint Economic Board.

(3) In my view the required surrender of economic and financial independence and sovereignty will severely limit the economic advance of the Jewish State and endanger its independence. Thus, under the proposed scheme the Jewish State would have to obtain permission from the Joint Economic Board for the purchase of arms from abroad, so long as import licensing is maintained. In the economic field, the Jewish State would not be free to develop and protect those branches and products it wants, but would have to accept the majority decision of the Joint Economic Board.

(4) It should be clear that the needs of the Arab State are two-fold namely enough financial support in order to balance its budget and the free sale in the Jewish State of such agricultural and other products which the Arab State would have in excess. Both these requirements could, if necessary, be met by the Jewish State by the following system. The net income from customs and other joint services is pooled and distributed as proposed by the UNSCOP Report though the financial obligations placed thereby on the Jewish State are onerous and are not limited in amount but will rise in proportion to the development of the Jewish State.

Arab produce should be admitted into the Jewish State without hindrance as well as products of the Jewish State into the Arab State. In short I suggest an economic union as now exists between Palestine and Transjordan.

(5) The implication of such a system, also suggested by my colleagues, should however, be clearly stated. They require a separate customs administration for each state with the free city of Jerusalem joining, for customs purposes one of the two States. Thus, the conclusion of trade agreements, the licensing of imports, etc. as well as internal duties on goods (such as purchase tax, excise duties, etc.) would remainⁱⁿ/the hands of each State.

(6) My colleagues have suggested to leave the fixation of customs duties under the control of the Joint Economic Board. With this recommendation I disagree, as the Jewish State would find it impossible to conclude foreign trade agreements unless it were able to make tariff concessions. Foreign trade agreements deal with tariffs and to separate both will mean in practice to take away from the Jewish State the possibility of concluding trade agreements. The experience with Article 18 of the Mandate based on a similar limitation of tariff concessions should not be so quickly forgotten.

(7) It may be argued that the establishment of two customs departments would require the control of the frontier between the Jewish and Arab States. And one might argue that such an internal frontier control would be far too expensive. One economist who, as it seems, supports the plan of Economic Union as proposed by the UNSCOP Report, has jokingly remarked that in case of an internal frontier half of the population of the Jewish State would be smugglers and the other half policemen trying to prevent such smuggling.

Now, this argument of the expensive internal customs frontier is baseless if it is used against the proposal for a separate Jewish customs department and this for the following reasons: Even if we assume to have only a symbolic customs frontier, a separate customs department would allow the Jewish State to import whatever it wants and requires without the necessity of obtaining the permission of the Joint Economic Board - and this alone is of considerable economic importance. Furthermore, the Jewish State would be able to conclude foreign trade agreements and to secure foreign markets for our exportable goods - functions which under the UNSCOP Report would be the prerogative of the Joint Economic Board.

The import of raw materials, machinery and most foodstuffs into the Jewish State would anyhow remain free of customs duties, so that for the bulk of our imports there will be no economic basis for smuggling. The Jewish State will, however, place customs duties on luxury goods and food which compete with locally produced articles. At the worst, therefore, smuggling would interfere with the protection of local industry and agriculture to be brought about by customs tariffs. But what is the alternative for a Jewish Customs Department? A Joint Economic Board which might refuse to enact protective duties or if it did enact them it would scarcely be in a position to use its Arab personnel (and half of its staff would presumably be Arabs) to protect Jewish industry. In short it is doubtful whether the Joint Economic Board would be able to prevent smuggling.

But I argue that even if the Joint Economic Board should protect Jewish industry and agriculture by enacting a suitable customs tariff and even if the machinery of the Joint Economic Board should work so perfectly as to be able to prevent all smuggling and assuming further that the Jewish State would be powerless to prevent large-scale smuggling from the Arab State - even then, I argue, the advantages of economic independence outweigh so heavily the disadvantages of smuggling that the difficulties of preventing smuggling cannot be used as a reason for the surrender of the economic sovereignty of the Jewish State.

Moreover, the technical question of the control of the internal frontier is by no means as difficult as it might appear on the first view. A police control of the frontier will in any case be necessary in order to prevent the entry of illegal immigrants and the smuggle of arms by Arabs. Furthermore, smuggling which cannot use roads, makes smuggling more expensive and consequently restricts the volume of smuggling. Finally, 80% of the population of the Jewish State will be concentrated in the area Haifa-Jerusalem, a comparatively compact area with land frontier not longer than 250 km. Taking four customs guards per kilometre (in Palestine today we have less than one per kilometre), 1000 guards would be required. Assuming the average salary of a customs guard at L.P. 500 per annum (a high salary), the annual cost of such a very close frontier control would be

LP. 500,000 - a not unduly high amount. In practice such a close watch of the frontiers might not be required for customs purposes and internal control such as market control would be helpful for many articles.

(8) Thus we have seen that there are no valid economic reasons against the establishment of a separate Jewish Customs Department, but there are many and weighty reasons against the surrender of the economic independence of the Jewish State. I suggest to instruct our delegation at Lake Success to insist on the economic independence of the Jewish State unless such insistence would endanger the establishment of a Jewish State.

(9) It would furthermore be useful to insert a clause whereby any economic and financial obligations accepted by the Jewish State would be terminable by the Jewish State after, say five or ten years, without the consent of the Arab State or UNO.



COLLEGE COLLEGE

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FRANCES P. BOLTON
22D DISTRICT OHIO

COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 21, 1948

Mr. Albert Pazmany
3827 Merrymound Road
South Euclid 21, Ohio


My dear Mr. Pazmany:

I have your recent letter relative to Palestine, at the moment a United Nations problem.

The U.N. Assembly agreed to the partition on the basis that it was workable and that no force would be required. Now it is in the Security Council and I would think it would have to be considered somewhat on the basis of workability there also. Our duly appointed representatives are having part in these considerations and are reporting to the President. Meanwhile, we must await their decisions.

Thanking you for writing,

Sincerely yours,


Frances P. Bolton, M.C.

WC

STATEMENT OF SIR CARL BERENDSEN, DELEGATE OF NEW ZEALAND,
BEFORE THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, APRIL 20, 1948

It is a sombre, indeed a tragic, occasion which has led to this meeting, and it is a heavy responsibility that falls upon each and every delegate in this Chamber. The occasion calls for the most complete integrity of thought and action, and it is clearly the duty, as well as the right, of every Government represented here to express its thoughts on the incredible and shocking situation that has developed. It is a time for plain speaking, and I am sure that none of my colleagues will take offence if I do, in fact speak plainly.

The problem with which the Assembly was called upon to deal last November was admitted by all to be most difficult and intractable. The situation as it presented itself then was the cumulative result of a long series of events stemming perhaps from the dim ages of the past, but for most practical purposes originating in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. That document like -- most regrettably like -- the vast majority of international documents, is not notable for clarity or definition. All, I think, agree that it is open to more than one construction, and the exact intent of its meaning has been a matter of repeated and lengthy debate and discussion in the ensuing years. Nor indeed have those portions of its intent, which are common ground to all, been free from dissent from its very inception. I have no intention of entering into any analysis of what the Balfour Declaration did mean or what was the ethical basis even for that portion of its intent upon which all agree, as a minimum, it must mean. Even that aspect is perhaps beside the point. The Mandate over Palestine was entrusted to the United Kingdom -- with the definite approval of many of those nations represented here -- and for a very lengthy period the British have been administering that territory with what any impartial observer must agree has been a commendable degree of material success, and certainly at all times with the highest motives and intentions. But it may well have been that throughout the whole of that period they have been attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable, that the conflicting rights and interests in that Holy but unhappy land -- of the Arabs on the one side and the Jews on the other -- were not at any time capable of acceptable compromise. From time to time blood has been shed in the course of this long and acrimonious dispute, and I would remind my colleagues of what I fear many of them are too often inclined to forget, that on very many occasions the blood that has been spilt has been the blood, not of the two principal contestants in this unhappy quarrel, but British blood, the blood of those who were, as trustees for humanity, endeavouring to carry out a thankless and perhaps impossible task. Finally, the British decided that they could no longer bear this burden, that the problem had become, if it had not always been, an international problem, that not only was it unfair that the burden and the odium of this task should fall upon the British alone while others at all times have felt free to offer advice and criticism from the sidelines without, of course, shouldering any portion of the responsibility for themselves, but also because of this factor, that the UK, having devoted its all to the prosecution of that great war for liberty, justice, peace and order which has just concluded, had found itself as the result, as the direct result, of its efforts during that conflict in a position of great difficulty. I think no one will disagree that Britain's temporary weakness -- because, believe me, it is temporary only -- and the sacrifices in blood, in treasure and in repute that she has been called upon to make in this thankless and perhaps impossible

task, proved to be too much and the United Kingdom, as you know, last year announced its intention of relinquishing the mandate and laying the whole matter before the United Nations where, as a world problem, it unquestionably belongs.

I am not one of those who believe that the UK has deserved the criticism it has received for its administration of the Mandate. I am not about to suggest that every step that the British have taken on the matter in Palestine has been wise or well-considered. But I do assert that what they have done from the inception of the Mandate until they were forced to the conclusion that the problem was beyond them, and laid the question before the United Nations, they have done with the highest motives, and that no other state represented here, even had it been willing (which it was not) to accept these obligations, would, or indeed could, have done any better in the circumstances as they existed.

But last year Britain agreed that Britain had failed, and the United Nations, in Special Assembly, undertook the responsibility of finding a solution. You all know what happened. After very lengthy debate a Special Committee of the Assembly was sent to Palestine. It conducted exhaustive enquiries and on its return produced a report to the Assembly which I have no hesitation in characterising as a model of moderate and constructive thought.

The views of this Special Committee -- and other views -- were considered at very great length at the General Assembly meeting in September, and after most careful consideration, and after hearing the representatives of both parties principally concerned in this tragic conflict of rights, the Assembly decided, by the requisite majority of two-thirds, that the course which appeared to offer the best chance of success in the circumstances was that of partition with economic union. Let me repeat that this was decided after the most lengthy and anxious consideration, and let me repeat that it was agreed to, that it was supported, by the requisite majority of the members of this body. Allow me to read the list of those delegations who placed themselves affirmatively on record as supporting the proposal for partition with economic union. They were as follows:

Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussia, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Sweden, the Ukraine, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

That, then, was the considered decision in November last, the considered decision of the Town Meeting of the World, the expression of the conscience of this forum of the nations of the world, in a most earnest effort to solve this tragic problem.

Now I do not think that any delegation which voted in favor of this decision felt that partition was a perfect solution. I think most people were of the opinion that the problem was susceptible of no perfect solution, that any decision at all must inevitably be the cause of injustice and hardship to very many thousands of worthy people, and that the best that could be done, and the least that should be done, was to decide upon that solution which offered the least injustice, the least departure from principle and the least practical difficulties in the circumstances as they had arisen during the course of the past thirty years.

The New Zealand Government believed then that partition was the best solution, and it believes the same thing today. It is our view that the Assembly decided to do the right thing in the wrong way, and I am not expressing that view only now, with the all the advantages of hind sight. On behalf of my delegation and

my Government, I expressed the same view when the matter was being considered last November, and if my colleagues will do me the honor of recollecting or reading what I said then, they will find that throughout the whole course of the discussion the New Zealand delegation took the view that while partition with economic union was the best course to adopt, nevertheless if the Assembly assumed the right -- as we believed it should -- to divide that country into a Jewish state and an Arab state, the Assembly must at the same time assume the duty of ensuring an orderly and peaceful implementation of that decision. And up to the very last moment I expressed New Zealand's grave and anxious apprehensions as to the efficacy of partition without enforcement and called -- unhappily without avail -- on the members of the United Nations and particularly the Great Powers, to face this question of enforcement. Up to the very last moment. I asked whether the Assembly was prepared to gamble with the lives of innocent people in Palestine. The appeal fell on deaf ears. You were prepared so to gamble; we did gamble and we lost. But we do not pay. You know today who is paying. The gambler's loss is being paid by the people of Palestine; it is being paid in part by British boys dying at their post of duty, but for a much greater part it is being paid, and will continue to be paid, by the people of Palestine, be they innocent or guilty, be they Arab or Jew. And the situation that has arisen today, incredible and disgraceful to us as it is, was, to any one who faced the facts and who was not deaf and blind, as clear and as obvious and as inevitable as night following day. They were many in November who professed to believe -- they will allow me to doubt whether they did believe -- that enforcement would not be necessary. That is an order of simplicity which is quite beyond my comprehension, and if there were such as did in fact believe this to be a possibility then they must certainly have paid no heed to the protests and warnings of our Arab colleagues. Nobody who heard these debates as I have heard them could fail to be impressed with the warmth and the emotion and the conviction with which the representatives of the Arab states expounded their cause and warned the Assembly of the consequences. Nobody could have failed to realize the justice of much of what the Arabs represented to us. Nobody doubted that whatever decision was arrived at in connection with the Palestinian problem it would inevitably bring some degree of hardship, some degree of injustice to a substantial number of people. The problem, I repeat, was susceptible of no perfect solution. But if there were in this room any who believed that the partition of Palestine could be accomplished peacefully and with good will on all sides and without enforcement, then I must say that that is a degree of naivete which did them little credit. But of course, in human affairs, there is always an inclination to hope, which in turn leads to a belief, that all will be well. Quite often it is well, but it is seldom well unless somebody is working hard and with careful forethought to ensure that it is so. And the Assembly's solution could have been effective had we taken the necessary steps to ensure that it was.

There were others last November who, apprehensive, and justly apprehensive, that this great, and it was hoped, final attempt, to solve the Palestinian problem could not be carried out without force, were nevertheless content to believe that that force had in fact been provided. Those who answered New Zealand's repeated appeals for means of implementation told us of two sources of enforcement power which, by implication, they suggested were adequate. We were told in the first place that there was to be an Arab militia and a Jewish militia and that these two militias would be able to keep order. Well, that again shows an order of simplicity which is quite beyond my comprehension, and I pass that over for what it is worth. And finally, we were told that there was always the Security Council which would see to enforcement. Well, all that one needs to say in this connection is to ask delegates to regard the situation as it exists today and the steps that the Security Council has found itself able to take.

I repeat that the Assembly in its November decision did the right thing, but by reason of its failure to provide for implementation, it did the right thing in the wrong way, and because of our error then, as the result of our error then, we have the situation today. The result of our error is death, bloodshed, murder, outrage and agony in Palestine. The result of our error then is a grave risk that the Assembly of the United Nations, is in serious and humiliating danger of losing the public confidence upon which its authority in the last resort depends. We have today, therefore, an additional problem, not only how to do justice to both Jew and Arab, but how to avoid wrecking the authority and the influence of the Assembly. I say to you that neither this organization nor indeed any of its members can hope to give to the world the lead of which the world is so sorely in need, unless that lead is steady and consistent, unless the course that is set yesterday is the course that is followed steadily today and tomorrow. The alternative is inevitable confusion and dismay.

I am far from suggesting that where circumstances have altered policies must remain immutable, but the submission of the New Zealand delegation is this, that if partition with economic union was right in November, it is right today, and indeed, I have heard no logical suggestion to the contrary. The circumstances have not changed in the slightest. The only new factor that has arisen in respect of Palestine since the matter was so carefully considered and decided in November is a detestable series of murders and outrages in Palestine. And by both sides, for there is no one who can defend or explain or excuse the violence for which it seems clear certain sections of the Jewish community have been responsible, any more than it is possible to defend or explain or excuse the violence for which certain sections of the Arab community have been responsible. Both call for the strongest censure, the utmost detestation; both call for repression by lawful force. And if an attempt is made, as in logic no doubt it can be made to draw a distinction between Jewish activities as intended on the whole to support the decision of the United Nations in favor of partition, while the activities on the side of the Arabs are intended to destroy that decision, I say that an outrage is an outrage, and a murder is a murder, and it is our plain and obvious duty to see to it that outrages and murders are stopped.

And we are, I submit, clearly bound to ask ourselves, what, if anything we have done to further the objectives which we laid down last November, and to counter the opposition which we all knew would, and which in fact did, arise. I fear the answer is nothing. It is certainly very little, despite the earnest efforts of the Commission, and much quite obviously has been done with the contrary object.

It is now suggested, as I understand it, though the proposal is far from clear in some of its implications, and the various statements that have been made do not always appear to me to have been consistent, that because of this series of murders and outrages partition at this state has become impossible. I say to you not only that these abominable incidents should have been foreseen and prevented, but that to put them forward as a reason for abandoning the decision arrived at after most careful and anxious consideration only a few months ago seems to the New Zealand delegation to be a most fantastic distortion of logical thought. If, indeed, the considered decision of the General Assembly is to be stultified, to be defeated by the application of illegal and reprehensible violence, if the Assembly allows its decision to be abandoned because it is challenged and opposed by force, then the Assembly will be taking upon itself a responsibility which will bear tragic fruit for many generations to come.

But one is entitled to ask how is the Assembly to go about it to provide

force if force is necessary, as of course it is. I will not content myself by saying, as I am fully entitled to say, that force should have been provided last November, but I would venture very gravely to doubt whether the force that would be required to implement trusteeship would be any less than the force that would be required to implement partition. And if the members of the United Nations should be willing each to take its proportionate part in enforcing a decision of the United Nations in respect of a trusteeship for Palestine, those members should, on any logical basis, equally be willing to provide their proportionate share of a United Nations force to implement the decision to which it pledged itself last November.

That is the policy which the New Zealand Government has instructed me to support at this meeting. We still believe that, with all its defects, however imperfect we may all agree that solution is, the decision of last November is nevertheless the best solution that the situation offers. We believe that, having made the decision in November we should, undeterred by lawless violence, proceed to enforce that decision by the united action of the members of the United Nations.

And I call upon my colleagues to take thought, to take serious thought, before they abandon their decision of principle as the direct result of outrages and murders which might well have been foreseen and indeed, I believe, were foreseen before that decision was made. I call upon my colleagues in this Assembly to take thought, careful thought, before they strike that tragic, perhaps irreparable blow to the United Nations that would be involved in capitulation by the world to threats and violence. It is the old, old problem which the League of Nations was not prepared to face, and which the United Nations has not yet shown itself ready to face, whether we can hope to preserve peace and order in the world by words alone. We cannot, and anybody who contends to the contrary is not facing the facts. There is no place now for wishful thinking. While the New Zealand delegation will continue to support the enforcement of partition through the joint action of all members of the United Nations, we shall nevertheless join in the consideration of any proposal which offers prospects of ending the strife in Palestine and achieving a just settlement between the Jews and the Arabs within a reasonable period. And if it is found possible to achieve a truce between the contending parties on just and reasonable terms, I need not add how warmly such a development would be welcomed by the New Zealand Government.

But here is a test case, and believe me, the future of this organization and the future of the world may indeed depend upon the way in which it is decided. What the world needs today is not resolutions, it is resolution. And it is the most earnest hope of the New Zealand Government that the Assembly will adhere to the principles it accepted last November, and show that resolution which the situation demands. We must not, we dare not, add to the irresponsibility of our November decision for partition without enforcement, the further and final irresponsibility of a surrender to illegal force.

Will you allow me to conclude by commending to your attention one of the rules laid down by a very great American for the conduct of his life, a rule which is as true for this organization as it is true for any nation or any individual. Benjamin Franklin said "Resolve to perform what you ought; perform without fail what you resolve."

C O P Y
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OUR TWO CABLES ADDRESSED DIRECTOR BERNSTEIN PALOFFICE UNREPLIED
STOP SHOCKED AT YOUR AGREEMENT WITH AGUDATH JISRAEL CONCERNING
ENTRY ON GROUND YOUR CERTIFICATE GUARANTEE STOP AGREEMENT
FARREACHINGLY DAMAGES INTERESTS OF ZIONORG AND ZIONISTS STOP
CLAIMING PARTICIPATION AND SHARE OUR CANDIDATES

ZIONORG CZECHOSLOVAKIA

VIA AIR MAIL

COPY

April 20, 1948

Palestinsky Urad
Kezia Ul. 18/1
Bratislava, Czechoslovakia

Dear Friends:

With regard to your cable enquiry of April 9th, in connection with the U.S. temporary entry permits for the Agudas Isroel, I wish to inform you that already in December 1947 the Agudah has applied to the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. to grant U.S. temporary visas to 300 families, comprising about 1500 souls. The majority of these prospective visitors consisted of rabbis and of a considerable number of Yeshivah bachurim, who had been previously accepted as students at the Yeshivah and other schools of higher talmudical learning in the United States.

A complete list of these persons has been submitted to the State Department by the Agudah, after the same lists have previously been submitted by them to the local U.S. consulates in various East European countries.

The Department of State, in March 1948, informed the Agudah that they are prepared to authorize the consulates to issue the visas to the persons listed, provided proper assurances will be submitted to them that after the termination of their stay in the United States those persons will be able to leave this country and proceed abroad. The State Department agreed that a statement to that effect by our Palestine Bureau will be considered by them as satisfactory assurance, and accordingly we wrote a letter to the Department of State in Washington, D.C.

The Agudah informed me the other day that the authorization by the U.S. Government to the consulates has already been despatched.

I understand that a similar action is now under way by the Mizrahi Organization of America, and I have assured them that I shall be very happy to write a similar letter to the Department of State, if on the basis of our letter the temporary visas will be granted to the rabbis and the Yeshivah students in whose behalf they apply.

Permit me also to draw your attention to the fact that, in the interests of the prospective visitors now in various European countries, it would be very undesirable if this matter be aired out in the press, and I am confident that you share my view in this respect.

With Zion's Greetings,

Sincerely yours,

Dr. S. Bernstein
Director, Palestine Bureau

SB:ub

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REPRISALS AND PRESENT UNITED FRONT STOP FAILURE
TO DO SO WILL MEAN ULTIMATE DEFEIT BECAUSE
D TOUR ENEMIES ARE UNITED STOP HOPE YOU CAN USE
YOUR GREAT INFLUENCE TO PREVENT ANY TRAGEDY
HAPPENING TO PERGSON WITH INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES
OF CONTINUED FACTIONALISM =

JAMES E MURRAY U S S *



[August 19, 1948?] 5/

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AMERICAN FRIENDS TERRIBLY DISTURBED NEWS PETER
BERGSON AND COMRADES UNDERTAKING HUNGERSTRIKE
BECAUSE DENIAL OF JUSTICE STOP THIS INTERNAL
QUARREL WILL GRAVELY WEAKEN AMERICAN SENTIMENT
FOR ISRAELI CAUSE STOP PERSONALLY URGE YOU
APPLY REAL STATESMANSHIP TO END THIS BITTER

Enquiry respecting this telegram should be accompanied by

FEUD AND POLITICAL *

2
Pending a solution of that problem
I don't feel I can recommend
the release of people who when freed
are likely greatly to aggravate
the present most unsatisfactory
situation.

The group includes one or two
leading commanders of Etzel and
a few of its most active supporters.
We are not ~~then~~ out of the wood yet
with Etzel — they still continue as a
separate military organisation in Jerusalem
in defiance of state authority. Greenbaum
is in touch with them on this and the
matter is due to be settled one way or
the other within the very next few days.

Nothing that I don't feel I can
reassure myself

Y. T. Bernstein

report before
UN Special Comm.
in Pal.

see folder
UN SCOT

