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Jewish Agency, Gelber, Lionel, 1947-1948.



## The Jewish Agency for Palestine

MEMORANDUM

JANUARY 31ST, 1947.

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Members of the Executive, Jewish Agency for  
Palestine.

FROM:  
Lionel Gelber

On Wednesday afternoon, January 29th, 1947, I called on Mr. Paul Hasluck, Australian Counsellor-in-Charge, United Nations Delegation and until recently his country's most conspicuous spokesman on the Security Council. We enjoy common acquaintances in the Australian academic world and once shared the same pursuits; I have, therefore, always been able to speak frankly with him.

I told Mr. Hasluck of my personal impression that in recent matters, directly or indirectly concerning us, Australia had tended to take its lead from London -- the admission of Transjordan to the United Nations, about which I had previously visited him, and the treatment accorded the International Refugee Organization during its committee stage seemed to be straws in the wind. This, I pointed out, was all the more odd because Australia, in major issues, had been taking a more forceful line than Canada; but Canada had certainly gone its own way, looking neither to London nor Washington, over the Palestinian phase of the International Refugee Organization. Friendly rivalry between these two Commonwealth Powers has been apparent since the war in international affairs; these remarks were deliberately framed in the hope that they might be transmitted and have some effect in Canberra.

Finally, I gave Mr. Hasluck the following dispatch to read, from the New York Herald-Tribune of January 28th, 1947, which might indicate a somewhat pro-Jewish but steadily anti-Zionist attitude in the Australian capital:



## JEWES ON CYPRUS OFFERED HAVEN IN AUSTRALIA

But British Ask They Call Off Attempt To Enter Palestine

From the Herald Tribune Bureau  
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PARIS, Jan. 27.-- British officials at detention camps on Cyprus are offering interned Jewish refugees there visas and transportation to Australia and other parts of the British Empire if they will agree to call off their attempts to enter Palestine, an officer of Haganah, the illegal Palestine defense force, declared in Paris today.

The officer, who asked that his name be withheld, said he was a lieutenant assigned to assist illegal immigration from Europe to Palestine, and that he escaped from Cyprus in late December. Up to the time he escaped, he said, not a single Jew had accepted the British offer.

The twenty-five-year-old lieutenant said he was on his way to "eastern European countries" to help organize more shiploads of illicit migrants. He said he would accompany another group in an attempt to break through the British blockade.

A Palestine citizen who was trained in British military schools during the war, the lieutenant said he was traveling on a Palestinian passport with a French visa.

He said he was captured last September while conducting a party of refugees traveling on the Beracha Feld, a clandestine ship bound for Palestine with 819 immigrants aboard. He was interned at Cyprus with the rest of the ship's passengers.

The lieutenant declared that the British offer of visas and transport to the refugees was made officially by the internment camp commander, a major, to Jewish leaders in the camp. "After years in German concentration camps when their only hope for the future was in Palestine, it is no wonder that the Jews on Cyprus refused the bait", the lieutenant said.



If the facts were as reported, I wondered what advantage Australia might receive from Britain in some other transaction to induce her to make offers of this sort. Mr. Hasluck disclaimed any knowledge whatsoever of them. Internal evidence, he argued, indicated that the report was simply not true. First of all, no British military or official person would dare speak in the name of Australia in any external matter; this was a reference to Australia's known sentiment of national independence which the British would slight at their peril. Secondly, Mr. Hasluck felt that if the Australian Government wished to take additional numbers of refugees, they would do so in the normal manner from the Continent of Europe and not turn to the special group on Cyprus, to relieve the British of a particular embarrassment.

(It is conceivable that dependent areas of the British Empire were involved rather than a self-governing one of the Commonwealth, such as Australia, over which Whitehall exercises no control. The Haganah officer may be correct about the broad London attempt but in error over the exact British territories affected.)

Speaking generally, Mr. Hasluck, in answer to any inquiry of mine, said he was aware of no pressure on his Government or the External Affairs Department by Jewish or Zionist bodies. The community there was small and respected, he said, but he and colleagues were not driven to take a stand in the light of domestic politics or the wishes of any one section of the Australian populace. This, I remarked, was in contrast to Canada and somewhat to be regretted. Australia was important in the eyes of the world as never before, because of the vigor with which, ever since the San Francisco Conference, she had played her unique part. If our affairs came before the Security Council or some other United Nations organ, Mr. Hasluck himself, I pointed out, would have to come to grips with the entire question.



In such an event, Mr. Hasluck declared, he would probably be instructed, as in other major issues upon which his Government had no special view, to decide according to his own judgement and on what he himself deemed to be the merits of the case. I at once assured Mr. Hasluck that I certainly would not try to influence him unduly but that some features of our claims or activities, if unfamiliar, might puzzle him. Should he at any time seek an explanation of Zionist or Palestine developments, I was at his entire disposal. We discussed the difference in diplomacy between Washington and New York, and he confirmed my belief that reports on general questions did not emanate from his office here in the way that they would from Washington. Specific issues and a specialized functional approach were the keynote here. I nevertheless cherish the hope that some account of our conversation might go back to Canberra.

Mr. Hasluck asked me how the United Nations could be siezed of the subject. I explained the various possibilities of action by the Assembly, the Security Council or even the Trusteeship Council, which had arisen in the past or might in the future. There was talk also between us of our present demand for a Jewish State as well as of the prospects of any partitioned Arab area, and its effect on the Arab world.

Dealing with a Commonwealth personage, I repeated to Mr. Hasluck what I had again told Mr. Philip Jordan and Mr. William Edwards at the British Embassy in Washington several weeks ago. Mr. Bevin must have the courage and imagination to redeem himself through a stroke of high policy, comparable to the grant of self-government to the South African Union soon after the Boer War. Britain then was, of course, much more secure and infinitely more

liberal in her foreign policy than the Labor Government has so far permitted itself to be. No course was easy, but it was to be hoped that Mr. Bevin could rise to this great, perhaps tragic, opportunity.



As to Mr. Hasluck's own position, I have learned from a well informed source in the United Nations that this is not all that it might be. He has come to be regarded as the executant of an anti-Russian, pro-British policy, which is not altogether satisfactory to some of his colleagues. Mr. Evatt's Australia has, of course, emerged as the champion of the small against the large powers; it would not require much of a shift in emphasis under present circumstances for Mr. Hasluck's supposed attitude to arise. During the General Assembly of the United Nations, and on the Security Council, he has lately been pushed aside in favor of Mr. Norman Makin, Australia's Washington Ambassador, but this may be temporary. From what I hear, Mr. Hasluck is more likely to grasp the complexities of our problem than Mr. Makin. I should be surprised if he were not open-minded about it. He asked me to keep in touch with him.

P.S. A copy of this memorandum should perhaps be sent in confidence to the responsible head of Australian <sup>4</sup>Zionism. It is furthermore suggested to members of the Jewish Agency Executive that the relations of Australian Zionism with its own Government in the United Nations sphere, and perhaps in Commonwealth affairs as expressed at London, be looked into without delay.



## The Jewish Agency for Palestine

## MEMORANDUM

January 31st, 1946

TO: Members of the Executive, Jewish Agency for Palestine

FROM: Lionel Gelber

Luncheon on Friday with Mr. Samarendranath Sen, Permanent Liaison Officer, Indian Delegation to the United Nations, was arranged by Miss Dorothy Adelson, so that we might discuss matters of common interest. Towards the end of our general conversation, I expressed the disappointment we felt at the cable of good wishes addressed by Mr. Nehru to the Arab Office during the Palestine Round-Table Conference in London. Last summer, I told Mr. Sen, I had gone to see Mr. Kirpalani, who represented his country when the International Refugee Organization was in an early committee stage, and who had voted against us at one juncture; we had sensed throughout the International Refugee Organization proceedings, I added, that India was not inclined to side with us. We lamented this all the more since Mr. Nehru was an outstanding leader of liberal progressive forces throughout the world; while we Jews knew what to expect from a reactionary or fascist State, it was a blow to realize that we could not rely on a Government, constituted like the present Indian Administration, rejoicing in its own new freedom, and sympathizing with the aspiration to freedom of all oppressed peoples. It was this sort of thing that made us skeptical about the United Nations and rendered us apprehensive about having our problem considered by it.

Mr. Sen stated at once that this was a question of politics rather than morality between which he drew a firm distinction. Perhaps when the Hindu majority reached an agreement with the Moslem minority, they would not have to go out of their way to make gestures such as these. When I argued that the Jews could not wait, Mr. Sen replied that he meant an immediate entry by



the Moslems into the Indian Government, rather than any long-term  
o conciliation between the two Indian communities. Mr. Jinnah had  
probably been cabling words of encouragement to his co-religionists  
in London; if only to prove that the Indian Congress is not a purely  
Hindu aggregation, Mr. Nehru could not afford to be outdone by the  
Indian Moslems.

I reminded Mr. Sen that many American Jewish intellectuals had  
been in the van of American support for Indian freedom and that if  
India continued on her present diplomatic course, she might create  
for them a conflict of spiritual loyalties. We, of the Jewish Agency  
for Palestine, did not want any sentiment of opposition to  
crystallize, such as might exist between us and the members of the  
Arab League; certainly we had not drawn these unfavorable trends to  
the notice of the Jewish public. Mr. Sen took my clipping from the  
New York Times and seemed determined to report back to New Delhi what  
I had said.

On driving me back to the office, he again stressed the  
importance of my ~~seeing~~ seeing their new Ambassador, Yusuf Ali, when  
he comes here to take charge of their United Nations affairs in the  
middle of March, and he himself will speak to Mr. Ali about this. Mr.  
Ali, while a Moslem, is a Congress Moslem and Mr. Sen felt it might be  
worthwhile to reiterate to the Ambassador all that was troubling us about  
India's apparent policy.



# The Jewish Agency for Palestine

MEMORANDUM

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

To: JEWISH AGENCY EXECUTIVE

February 10, 1947

From: LIONEL GELBER

In a memorandum dated February 6th, 1947 (please see also report of conversation with Mr. Sen dated January 31st), I reported a conversation held with Dr. Lanka Sundaram of India. Dr. Sundaram returned yesterday to India, but before doing so, offered, through Miss Ruth Karpf, to be of service (a) in arranging that appropriate Jewish bodies be invited to the Asiatic Conference and (b) that the time of a traveling friend in India be spent to the best advantage. I have since ascertained from Mr. Eliahu Epstein that as the Vaad Leumi will represent the Palestine Jewish Community, nothing further need be done by Dr. Sundaram; that the most appropriate Jewish body had in fact been invited. Also, as I have now learned ~~and~~, since Mr. Epstein himself has been in touch throughout with our traveling friend, I know that before his departure, he will be briefed on the new importance for us of India's policy within the sphere of the United Nations.

These matters have arisen during the past few days because, for United Nations purposes, I wanted to see Dr. Sundaram, who is our staunch friend, before he flew home again 24 hours ago.

Meanwhile, there has been one direct outcome of my conversation on Wednesday with Dr. Sundaram. Mr. Serge Fliegers is the Diplomatic Correspondent for the Express Newspaper chain of India and has been very close here to Dr. Sundaram. The following dispatch which Mr. Fliegers sent to India on Friday, February 7th, is not as discreet as we would wish; certainly I did not expect



Dr. Sundaram's reply to one of my confidential queries to appear, as it did, in the last paragraph of Mr. Flieger's cable. But on the whole, I feel the message to the Express newspapers may serve a useful purpose if it indicates at once to Mr. Nehru and Indian opinion what the repercussions of any step they might take may be in the West:

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 7TH.

FROM SERGE FLIEGERS TO EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS LTD.

Influential Jewish circles in the United States tonight expressed incredulity and amazement over published reports that Nehru had sent a congratulatory telegram to Arab League headquarters in London on the eve of the Palestine Conference.

One prominent Jewish leader in New York, whose name cannot now be revealed, told this correspondent "we do not believe it possible that Nehru could have sent a telegram of support to the Arab League, even if only for the fact that Indians, persecuted for centuries, would never go against another community in this world which has borne the cross of persecution too".

The Jewish leaders felt that possibly, at the request of London circles, Nehru may have sent a message of good cheer to the whole conference, but held it extremely unlikely that at this crucial point in Indian politics, the Congress leaders would have backed the Arab faction in this manner.

Indian circles here feel that, if reports about this telegram are true, Jinnah's present position may become logical.

They feel, moreover, that the whole basic question of partition is much too delicate a problem today, and Nehru certainly has at present enough domestic complications to prevent him from engaging in external politics of this sort.



Jewish quarters here have debated the possibility of sending a delegation to discuss the whole problem of Palestine and world Jewry with the Indian leader, but have been advised against such action at this time.



הסוכנות היהודית לארץ ישראל  
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE  
16 EAST 66TH STREET, NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

RHINELANDER 4-4200

Cable Address JEVAGENCY

February 10, 1947.


Dear Dr. Silver:

The enclosed draft is intended roughly to indicate the kind of press statement which the Jewish Agency might issue either at once or if Arab threats become more specific. It is conceivable also that the same argument could be made public in some other manner or at your forthcoming Washington Conference on Palestine.

The draft concludes with a paragraph which it might not be politic to append, but the gist of which should, I think, be at the back of our minds and perhaps might be conveyed somehow to our friends.

If you feel that any steps along this line should be taken, I shall be very glad to hear from you.

Yours sincerely,



Lionel Gelber

LG:SA  
Encl.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,  
The Temple,  
105th St. and Ansel Road,  
Cleveland, Ohio.

Washington  
2210 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.  
Washington 8, D. C.

London  
77, Great Russell Street  
London, W.C. 1

Paris  
83, Avenue de la Grande Armée  
Paris XVI

Jerusalem  
Post Office Box 92  
Jerusalem, Palestine



February 10, 1947.

DRAFT STATEMENT ON ARAB THREATS

Threats uttered in London by Arab spokesmen at the British-Arab Round Table Conference <sup>on Palestine</sup>, should be a matter of deep and immediate concern to all peoples who put their faith in the United Nations and who hope for a new and better era in international relations. Speaking of new proposals which might permit the admission to Palestine of some Jewish Displaced Persons from Europe, an entry to which they are freely entitled anyway under the League of Nations Mandate, an Arab spokesman in London has stated that such a step "will mean war". \*

Among the strains and perplexities of world adjustment in the post-war era, this Arab threat has the unholy distinction of being the first of its kind to be uttered. Any single country or group of countries like the Arab League which indulge in violent threats such as these, are unworthy of membership in the new post-war system. It will shake the moral, as well as the political, basis of the United Nations if, during the course of any negotiations whatsoever, outworn, evil tactics of this sort are employed on one side or condoned on all sides.

Under Articles I, II and XXXIII of the Charter, Member States of the United Nations have adopted a code of international behavior with which Arab threats of force are wholly irreconcilable. The representative of Egypt has been President of the Security Council and Syria is today the Arab member of that same body -- one whose main duty and supreme task it is to maintain peace and foster tranquility between the peoples of the earth. The United Nations will speedily fall into disrepute if its own members are the first to conduct themselves in flagrant disregard of its fundamental principles.

\* The New York Herald Tribune, Monday, February 10, 1947, Page 10.



Since threats of this kind play into Mr. Bevin's hands, as proving the large obstacles put in the path of just concessions to the Jews, Britain herself is not likely to protest. For purposes of her anti-Zionist diplomacy, threats against her at this moment and from such a source, may be welcome or may even be inspired by the threatened. But everyone who seeks a better system of peace, justice, and orderly international procedure, cannot fail to reprehend this brazen defiance by Arab States of a new post-war order for the achievement of which most peoples other than the Arabs themselves made so heavy a sacrifice.

Not to be published?

L.M.G.



February 12, 1947

Mr. Lionel Gelber  
The Jewish Agency for Palestine  
16 E. 66th St.  
New York 21, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Gelber:

Thank you for your kind letter of February 10.  
I recall that not so long ago, we did issue a statement  
on the Arab threats. I am not clear at the moment whether  
that statement was issued by the Agency or by the Emergency  
Council. Please check up on it. At the next meeting of the  
Executive we will take up the matter of whether it is desirable  
to issue another statement at this time.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK



2/14/47

BRITAIN, THE JEWISH AGENCY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The announcement of Mr. Bevin's scheme for Palestine has revived debate about a reference of the Palestine problem to the United Nations. The following pages attempt to summarize the writer's impressions of what might happen, now or later, if such a reference is made. The prospects for the policy of the Jewish Agency, as well as that laid down by His Majesty's Government, are considered even if Jewish Statehood has, for the moment, been rejected by the British Cabinet.

Much depends, of course, upon the organ of the United Nations before which the question would come and under what circumstances it was brought up. The International Refugee Organization, which bore obliquely upon us, was, for the most part, the business of the Economic and Social Council, or its subordinate machinery. Direct political consideration of the entire matter could be undertaken by the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Trusteeship Council.

I. SECURITY COUNCIL OR GENERAL ASSEMBLY

How does the Security Council fit into the picture? On the whole, it has not stood in the foreground. This may alter, however, if the latest measures of repression, upon which the Palestine Administration has embarked, so increase unrest and violence, that virtual warfare results. Any State outside the Anglo-American sphere, one of the Asiatic or Slavonic grouping for example, might complain that peace was being imperilled. But action embarrassing to Britain could be stifled by her own permanent member veto in the Security Council - although, in the case of Syria and Lebanon, no such veto was applied. On the other hand, even if the enforcement of a decision were unfeasible, a reference to the Security Council could at least permit the airing of grievances. This would be



true for the Arabs as well as ourselves. Properly sponsored by a member of the Security Council, we might get our side taken up; but we would want to be very sure of our advocate ahead of time -- the Arabs having their Syrian voice and we having none -- even if we could find one.

Even if Britain refers the matter to the regular meeting of the General Assembly in the autumn, or to some earlier session, as a Trusteeship project or for general political guidance, that does not preclude a prior reference of it to the Security Council by some other Power as a threat to peace; the General Assembly may not deliberate on questions while they are before the Security Council, but the Security Council is free to consider them before and during the General Assembly.

Would an Arab State or States protest to the Security Council if Britain en fond were opposed? Before answering that query, we should have to know more than we do about the love-hate, semi-Oedipean relationship which exists between the British parent and its own Arab League progeny. If Egypt, with the blessings of the Arab League, appeals to the United Nations (Security Council or Assembly) because of the breakdown in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, we will be better able to gauge how far they might be prepared to go over the Palestinian situation. And what if Russia were to pursue the more pro-Arab line towards which she seems to be gravitating? Would not the British have to compete with her for the goodwill of their own Arab satellite bloc? With somewhat less disrelish than usual, the policies of Moscow and London may thus for once tend to converge -- and at our expense.

Although the Security Council has now had a year's continuous activity behind it, it is still impossible to estimate what it might do with a problem such as ours. The Norwegian Minister, who is in charge of



his country's United Nations Delegation, has informed the writer that most Governments in the United Nations hope the Palestine issue will not come up before them as a question still burning for settlement. They would prefer some prior agreement (presumably between the British, ourselves, or the Arabs) upon which their mere stamp of approval need be elicited.

In surveying the broad field of possibilities, let us for one moment suppose that our negotiations with Britain, instead of breaking down, had gone well or might even be resumed with what we would regard as a favorable result. Subsequently in this paper, it will be contended that the latter eventuality would be the easier way out of the present impasse for Britain herself and as a matter of her own national self-interest; it is, therefore, not a piece of remote academic speculation. Given this hypothesis, then, the British Government and the Jewish Agency, having reached a prior agreement to set up a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine, what steps can His Majesty's Government take in the United Nations sphere? At this point, the lucky precedent of Transjordan should always be kept by us to the fore. When Transjordan was established as an independent State, all that happened was that a blanket resolution, communicating in advance Britain's broad intent, was introduced and passed in the General Assembly -- with a concurrent vote of approval by the expiring last Assembly of the League of Nations. The British Government, moreover, did not wait to bring down a detailed scheme -- though this could have been done -- but followed what would again in our case be for both of us a safer and wiser course.

In this connection, pursuing the hypothesis of an agreed outcome to Anglo-Zionist negotiations, the writer wishes to reiterate views expressed on this subject in his memorandum of November 15, 1946.



Independent Jewish Statehood can come about in two forms; (a) the Jewish State may become a fully accepted member of the United Nations and (b) it might achieve independence on the Transjordan model, but thereby resign itself to being excluded from membership in the United Nations.

Inside The United Nations (A):

Let us, first of all, scan the prospects for membership by a new Jewish State within the fold of the United Nations. There is some irony in this goal for us, since we were none too pleased when Transjordan, having had sovereignty conferred on it, applied for admission to the United Nations. It was a sagacious diplomacy which precluded us from playing our hands on this topic too overtly at that time. For what we then opposed in Transjordan, we must now turn to good account and exploit to our utmost advantage. The decision on Transjordan was not legal but political -- and that is most fortunate. As a result of the steps which they took or approved over Transjordan, neither the British Government nor the General Assembly of the United Nations can now consistently interpose technical obstacles of a legal character if any similar procedure were adopted to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish State. The Mandate for Palestine being the very same instrument in each case, the Transjordan precedent is identical and precise. Sauce for the Transjordan-Arab goose is sauce for the Jewish-Palestine gander.

This point might be stressed by us at London, should talks ever be resumed, and at Washington for one very important reason. Our proposals before any United Nations body are safe so long, and only so long, as we have the backing of a Great Power. We must always regard what happened to us in the committees and sub-committees of the United Nations, while the International Refugee Organisation was being hammered out, as a minor test



case. When a stage arrived during which the support of a Great Power -- that is, of the United States -- weakened, the lesser Powers hesitated to show themselves on our side. They abstained despite previous assurances we had obtained from them -- or else they proved themselves ineffectual -- as for example, when Canada (Mr. Colwell) stood up manfully, yet futilely, on our behalf against the United States (Mrs. Roosevelt) in committee and was alone in reasserting her stand (Mr. Paul Martin) when the International Refugee Organization project came up before the United Nations General Assembly.

The point, however unpalatable, may be put in yet another manner. Short of being totally abandoned by Britain, we cannot make such progress within the sphere of the United Nations without her or without the United States as a sort of sponsor, champion, or advocate. We must not delude ourselves into the belief that if we fail with Britain, the United States, or both, there is some clear alternative provided by the United Nations itself. There is no such clear alternative, no exact dividing line between Britain or the United States and the United Nations. For us, at any rate, they merge into each other. From the very outset, when the United Nations began to be forecast prior to the San Francisco Conference, its first postulate was that it could function only under the leadership of the Great Powers. Our fate, inside or outside the United Nations, is tied to London and Washington. For better or for worse, we may still have to fall back on the English speaking Powers if any satisfactory settlement within the orbit of the United Nations itself is to be achieved.

What is the voting position within the United Nations which we should have at the back of our minds at all times? There is a difference of opinion between qualified observers as to the lasting danger of the Slav and Arab blocs joining against us; whether, amid the permutations and



combinations of diplomatic deals, they can always carry some or many Latin-American States -- against the wishes of Washington -- with them. The American official, who guided Mrs. Roosevelt when we were defeated over the Palestine phase of the International Refugee Organization, said to the writer that this danger was imminent, as he sought to justify his own retreat. But at least one acute and highly placed United Nations official has indicated to the writer occasions when the menace was averted; and he also is skeptical of the notion that the non-White, anti-Western, ex-Colonial or semi-Colonial peoples of the Orient will make common cause against us or do much to oppose us. Here again the prospects depend on the attitude of one or more Great Powers, without whose support we are lost. Perhaps the matter should be stated in a different fashion. Groupings adverse to us may crystallize or coalesce if Britain or the United States foster them or acquiesce in their existence, but will dissolve if London and Washington drive right through them.

Certainly none of the above groupings will be expected to favor any application for membership by a Jewish State into the United Nations. The Russian Government, which voted against the admission of Transjordan as a British military satellite, would ~~not~~ have to turn around and join with the Arab States to oppose the Jewish application on either the same grounds or for a quite antithetically pro-Arab reason. But unless Russia attaches paramount importance to the Palestine issue, this will be one of the occasions when some of her own associates, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland, are likely to hesitate or abstain. As for the Oriental bloc, a special effort can be made to keep in touch with officials of the two leading Powers of Asia, India and China. Certainly Mr. Nehru's cable of good wishes to the London-Arab Delegation during the Palestine Round



Table Conference shows that, by making a bid for Indian Moslem League support, even the most ostensibly high-minded of statesmen will allow his own domestic politics to weigh heavily in external affairs.

Trends such as these would be apparent in the General Assembly if any application for membership by a Jewish Palestine got beyond the Security Council stage. In fact, they would be relentlessly evident before then within the Security Council itself, which, under the Charter, must first sift and pass upon applications. And there too, we would again stumble upon the famous permanent member veto of the Russians -- even if Syria, the present Arab member of the Security Council, cannot do much to offset us.

#### Outside The United Nations (B)

Private discussions with British officials on this side of the Atlantic during the autumn and early winter months of 1946-47, revealed their own view (probably based on what was being said at Whitehall) that partition is the only remedy. If there were no immediate unconditional reference of the problem to the United Nations, it could be conceivable that the Bevin Plan is only another stage in a bargaining process from which we might yet gain our end. But it was always pointed out by these officials, during the writer's talks with them, that in the event of an Anglo-Jewish agreement over the establishment of a Jewish State, the new State will have to enter into a formal military alliance for common defense with Britain (naval bases, air facilities, military cooperation on land). As the writer often replied to them, it is hard to imagine the Jewish populace of Palestine, after all they have endured from the Palestine Administration and the British military forces, entering willingly into commitments such as they might have adopted before 1946. But it could be a strategic price -- even against Russia -- the Jews would have to pay for



political independence.

On the other hand, after the experience of the Transjordan application for membership, it is quite improbable that a Power such as Russia <sup>be</sup> and there may other Powers to object on similar grounds -- would thus agree to any stabilization of British imperial defence in the Middle East. Wooing the Arab world, Russia might oppose the establishment of a Jewish State quite apart from any link it may have with British strategic arrangements and therefore, in any case, veto in the Security Council a Jewish application for United Nations membership.

This brings us to the second range of probabilities. It would be appropriate if a Jewish State were set up and admitted to the United Nations. It is perfectly possible for a Jewish State to exist even if it fails to gain admission into the United Nations. Nor is diplomatic recognition by all other Powers a prerequisite to political independence. Non-recognition is a familiar circumstance in the history of international relations. The American doctrine of non-recognition is studied by all students of the foreign policy of the United States. It is, of course, better to be recognized by other Powers in the traditional diplomatic sense; it would be preferable for a Jewish State also to be a member of the United Nations. But a Jewish State can exist without these advantages if it must. Certainly none of the disadvantages thus incurred would be fatal to it.

It is imperative that we should be clear in our own minds about this and not allow the British to contend, in any negotiations, that prospects within the United Nations are so dubious for a Jewish State that they could become a further argument against setting one up. They themselves have not  
nor | had much success with Transjordan in this respect, or indeed with some of



their other friends who applied for entry into the United Nations. The rights and needs of the Jews are paramount. That point the British must not be permitted to obscure. Admission to the United Nations is a desirable but secondary goal.

What the Jewish Agency at this critical juncture must consider is whether or not a reference of the Palestine problem to the United Nations does not spell the indefinite postponement of our hopes for a Jewish State. We have seen how our aspirations could have been achieved if Britain had been willing to sponsor a Jewish sovereignty on the Transjordan model. In view of the conditions we confront within the United Nations, and in the light of the limitations and complexities of its own powers and procedures, there is immense difficulty in forecasting how it might provide us with an early fulfillment of our major aims.

## II. TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

If Statehood is definitely ruled out, the idea of Trusteeship recurs -- and it may be either a British one, a joint one such as an Anglo-American scheme would furnish, or a United Nations project. To all of these approaches there are common objections. First of all, the provisions of the Mandate for a Jewish National Homeland (immigration, land purchase, etc.) may not be renewed or carried forward. But secondly, the very idea of Trusteeship arises from the notion that the Powers must first take care of the indigenous inhabitants of any given non-self-governing territory. This fixed welfare view does not only derive strong backing from the peoples of the West; to the other countries of the Orient, suspicious of the Jews as a novel kind of Western semi-imperialist intruders, the so-called welfare of the present majority of the Palestine populace (their own self-determination even on a lower standard of living) may tend to come first and all Jewish interests to come second.



Thirdly, the Jewish Agency are committed either under the Biltmore program or its 1946 modification of "Peel plus Negev" to an independent sovereign Jewish State in the Jewish segment of Palestine. Such independence and any proposed Trusteeship are utterly irreconcilable. The former signifies equality as a member in its own right of the United Nations; the latter calls for subordination to one or more State members of the United Nations. What we require is independent membership by the Jewish State within the United Nations, and not under it -- or a sovereign status entirely outside its orbit. To abjure for Jewry an inferior political stature is one of Zionism's major objectives.

It is the contention of the writer that no matter what you desire in the United Nations sphere, you must, to be sure of success, have the sponsorship of a Great Power. A Trusteeship proposal by its very nature entails some kind of dependence on a superior ruler. If the Mandate is altered, it must be submitted in the first instance to the General Assembly. Here, too, the outlook is clouded. If Britain' is to remain the sole Trustee, she will have to take the initiative, under Chapter 12 of the Charter, in framing the new terms of agreement -- terms which the Bevin Plan indicates would afford fewer safeguards for Jewish rights and aspirations than the Mandate. In addition, despite the debates held during the General Assembly over Trusteeships and preliminary to the setting up of the Trusteeship Council, nobody even now knows how to interpret the celebrated phrase of Article 79 of the Charter about "the States directly concerned". And here Russia, as well as the Arab members, might insist on being heard from over Palestine, despite the fact that the entire Article, in the opinion of competent judges, has been violated already by the United Nations itself.



More significant than anything else in this connection is the plain fact that Britain may have trouble in getting through a Trusteeship agreement for Palestine. The Russians will not want to renew or confirm British ascendancy in that vital region; relatively disinterested Governments may feel, in view of the danger of conflicting pressures between the Russian and British empires in the Middle East, that they might seize the opportunity to lower those pressures by seeking to rid the area of British power altogether; other members or blocs will have their own axe to grind. And since the procedure is a complicated one, Britain may be quite incapable of achieving the necessary two-thirds vote. Here again, much will turn on whether or not the United States concurs in British proposals for a Palestine settlement, whether she will or will not crack her Latin American whip.

For these reasons, if for no other, an Anglo-Zionist agreement over partition is, from the point of view of Britain's own imperial self-interest, the best course for her. The Transjordan precedent of transforming the Mandate and conferring recognition of independence was infinitely simpler than any Trusteeship venture. Britain faces the prospect of denying Jewish Statehood and of being simultaneously unable to get a Trusteeship project adopted. When Britain approached one or other organ of the United Nations, she will have made up her mind to face the contingency of having to forsake Palestine not only politically but strategically. A Trusteeship under direct United Nations administration is feasible. It means, as Mr. Churchill has repeatedly pointed out, the end of British power in that corner of the earth.

What our diplomacy might have asserted in London is the argument to which British officialdom refused to pay heed for many years. It is



still, nevertheless, true that perhaps only on the Transjordan model for a Jewish State could a settlement be reached in which British military needs might also have been met. Under no other circumstances is Britain's military position in Palestine, within the strategic context of the Middle East, likely to be safe. Common interests, in short, not benevolence or fair-dealing, might still have preserved community of action between Britain and Zionism. Mr. Bevin could still be told through one channel or another, that he has been biting off the British nose to spite the Jewish face.

But even a favorable development in London, which would have permitted a Jewish sovereignty to emerge, might still leave us with certain interests which would come under the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Council. If, for example, the Jerusalem area were to be internationalized, it might be preferable for it to be a Trusteeship arrangement under the United Nations as a whole -- the first venture in that direction -- rather than under British suzerainty. Trieste was internationalized but not as a Trusteeship; it was put under the Security Council because strategic control has to be exercised, with the permanent member veto perhaps coming into play. There is no reason for strategic control in the small Jerusalem area itself. Because of the very character of the region and of the international trust, there is a very good case for allowing no one single Western Power to be paramount there. Assuredly, a wider approval inside or outside the United Nations for a partition scheme could be anticipated if a directly administered United Nations Trusteeship were established in the Jerusalem ~~area~~ region. What Jerusalem needs to protect it is not military clauses but that divergent religious interests should be focused and that freedom for each should be guaranteed by the United Nations.



One other area within the orbit of our Palestine discussion which might be internationalized, is the Port of Akaba. This potentially valuable outlet, yielding a freedom of access to the East which obviates in the era of atomic and air warfare the use of Suez, is one to which neither the British nor the neighboring Arab or Jewish States might be able to lay an exclusive claim. It should be noted that for Akaba, as for the Jerusalem area, the British themselves under any British Trusteeship arrangement, may be disinclined to introduce security considerations. Under the Charter (Article 83), all functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of Trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, has to be exercised by the Security Council; and that, of course, again raises all the complications of Russia and the permanent member veto which the British must seek, in the case of Palestine, to avoid. As a matter of fact, it is the Americans with their Pacific Island proposals, rather than the British, who have taken the lead in submitting a strategic area Trusteeship project. The British assume, no doubt, that for their purposes, the defensive provisions contained in Article 84 of the Charter suffice. The broad truth probably is that Britain gained her vital strategic areas long ago and retains them in her colonial empire; for her the problem does not arise, as it does in newly acquired American territories, at vital strategic points.

There remains the alternative of a British military renunciation of Palestine -- something which she might not want but which her strained resources in men, money and materials, as her current domestic crisis reveals, may impose. In such an event, the likely ~~it~~ issue will be a United Nations Trusteeship under United Nations administration. At this



prospect, from the point of view of political Zionism, we should neither throw our hats up into the air -- nor throw in the sponge. So far as the writer can gather at the present stage, the thinking among United Nations officials will then be to have Arab and Jewish zones with a maximum degree of local autonomy. The United Nations administration will supervise relations between the zones and conduct all of Palestine's external affairs, but attempt to exercise a minimum of actual day-to-day interference. To this regime a definite time limit might be attached, as when at one stage of the war a Trusteeship for Korea was discussed by the Great Powers.

What must be affirmed very strongly by the diplomatic representatives of the Jewish Agency is that Jewish political maturity is such that we desire no transition stage to independence. The problem, after all, is not one of Jews being trained for self-government, but that, being perfectly capable of self-government on the highest level, they alone are still denied in Palestine or any where in the world, the right of self-determination. In the same fashion, the United States toyed with the idea of putting Italy's North African colonies under a Trusteeship regime which would be federalized rather than unitary in character. Let us be warned of one thing. If such a United Nations direct Trusteeship permitted free Jewish immigration into Palestine, the scheme as a whole (disregarding Arab opposition) might be difficult to counter within the United Nations sphere. It is, nevertheless, hard to conceive how, in the mechanics of government, it could be worked out in practice. Such, moreover, is the disparity between Arab and Jewish interests that even a zonal arrangement under direct United Nations administration would not meet the exigencies of the Jewish plight in Europe and Palestine.



One further conclusion should be noted. On the disposal of the Pacific Islands, Britain and the United States have begun to differ; psychologically, then, we can now count on Anglo-American unity being somewhat less close over Trusteeship questions than over other crucial features of world politics. That is in our favor. But too much must not be read into this. Britain's domestic crisis is a matter of primary interest to the United States; it could alter the entire balance of world power to the detriment of the English speaking peoples and to the advantage of Russia or the Orient. The United States may be less inclined than during the past year to quarrel with Britain over Palestine at this grave hour in British fortunes. On the other hand, if more concrete assistance is needed by Britain to bolster her up economically along the lines of Canadian and American loans of 1946, Washington and Ottawa might again be able to ask a quid pro quo from London. It is an open question whether, for United Nations or other purposes, we could persuade the American and Canadian Governments to induce Whitehall to take a more generous early view of our demands. Patently this is a question we ought at once to examine.

Perhaps the writer may conclude by repeating from his memorandum on this subject of November 15, 1946, some words of his own:

Experience with other international issues before the various organs of the United Nations, provides little confidence about the manner in which its awkward machinery will function; we can only be sure of the degree to which delay, partisanship, motives external to the questions themselves and apart from their merits, dominate the scene. Between the rivalries of the Anglo-American group with the Russian bloc, the tendency



of the Asiatic Powers to combine by themselves or with some other set of members, the undue voting strength of the Arab States, doubts about the goodwill of other Powers large and small, Jewish Palestine may become a helpless pawn in a bigger game. The tendency has been to conceive of the United Nations as a nostrum which will cure all diseases of the Jewish body politic merely by invoking its magic name. There could be no greater illusion.

Lionel Gelber

February 14, 1947.



## The Jewish Agency for Palestine

### MEMORANDUM

February 19, 1947

To: Members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency

FROM: Lionel Gelber

#### BRITAIN'S PALESTINE POLICY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

So far, only newspaper accounts are available of Mr. Bevin's statement of February 18th in the House of Commons, on the submission of the Palestine problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations. But four points strike one at once. Subject to later correction and fuller knowledge, they are set down here for what they are worth:

#### I.

In the first place, it is still not absolutely certain that the case will wait over until September. As the writer indicated in his long memorandum of February 14th, ("Britain, The Jewish Agency and the United Nations") any or all the Arab States could still bring the issue before the Security Council as a threat to peace -- and whenever they please. All that Mr. Bevin has done has been to serve notice of his own autumnal intentions. That may be a fact of importance in the deliberations of the Arab League; but it is a fact of policy, not of law. The Arabs, or others of the Slav or Oriental blocs, are precluded not one whit from taking either an earlier or concurrent step within the Security Council -- and one that could enjoy, over the General Assembly in September, both priority in time and authority of treatment. Other States are not bound to accept Mr. Bevin's view that there is no jeopardy to the peace and that the Security Council is accordingly excluded.

The Jewish Agency must, therefore, be prepared for all eventualities.



The rising temper of Arab leaders, as expressed by Dr. Fahdel al Jamali of Iraq and Faris el Khouri of Syria, reveal, since the London British-Arab Round Table Conference on Palestine, the growing audacity of the Arab challenge to the fabric of the peace. For quite some time the writer has been urging press exposures by the Jewish Agency in response to such an unchallenged defiance of the peace system. These by throwing discredit on Arab policies within the sphere of the United Nations would lay the groundwork for our diplomacy later on.

## II.

Mr. Bevin should not be allowed to get away with this claim that he has no power under the Mandate of the League of Nations to award Palestine either to the Arabs or the Jews, or even partition the country between them. This is a twilight zone over which international lawyers may grope endlessly and come to no unanimous or agreed conclusion. But for practical diplomatic purposes, we must openly and insistently ask why His Majesty's Government cannot do for cis-Jordania what they have already done for Transjordan. Having once partitioned Palestine, with the consent of both the League and the United Nations, the British Government really must not throw dust in the eyes of the world about their incapacity to do it a second time. Once more the Transjordan precedent stands and should be exploited by us to the utmost. Here, as always, what counts is not legal power but willpower, policy rather than law. The policy may be adverse so far as we are concerned, but the blame should be put where it belongs.

## III.

The forthcoming submission by the United Kingdom of the Palestine problem to the United Nations General Assembly without any proposals of their own, that is without strings, unconditionally, may amount to an immense gamble by Britain ~~itself~~ herself. It could result, again as indicated in the writer's



memorandum of February 14th, in a total strategic withdrawal by Britain from the Palestine area; they themselves may offer no concrete plan for staying there; a sufficient number of other Powers might prefer not to facilitate any renewal of British military strength in that vital region. But the gamble is not only military; it is also, or even more, a diplomatic one; and its objective may be the opposite of what it seems. For renunciation could be the means, restoration the end. By ostensibly washing her hands of the problem, by throwing herself with presumed innocence on the tender mercies of the United Nations, Britain may in fact be inviting the full acceptance of her own solution along the lines made familiar by Messrs. Morrison, Grady and Bevin.

Here, as elsewhere, the key rests in the hands of the United States. Mr. Bevin and his advisers may regard themselves by their latest maneuver as having at last called the American semi-abstentionist bluff. What does a British political and strategic withdrawal from Palestine entail? Alarm in this country over Britain's current domestic crisis springs not only from sympathy or altruism, but from the firm conviction that the English-speaking peoples over against Communist or Eastern groupings must support a common world order; any weakening of the British pillar shakes the entire edifice. Similarly, Palestine, as a power vacuum, must instantaneously raise all anxieties over the search for oil, control of Suez, defence against Russia, and even the potentially combined hostility of the Powers of the Orient, large and small, to the intrusion of the imperialist West. Can the American Government afford to let the British step out of Palestine, since the United States itself is not likely to be able to replace them?

Mr. Bevin might have known that he would put the Truman Administration in this dilemma. Perhaps he expects to be asked by them to state his own terms, to tell the American Government on what conditions he would remain in Palestine.



And that, of course, would be the chance for which he is waiting, the fulfillment of his calculations.

It is just conceivable that the United States would be satisfied to protect her own vital interests in the Middle East through a United Nations directly administered Trusteeship for Palestine. American suggestions to turn the Pacific Islands into a strategic area Trusteeship would tend to show, however, that in current American official thinking, the realistic note, the global strategic preoccupation, the role and responsibility of the United States as the leading World Power, are uppermost. If that is so, the British may not be gambling blindly when, over Palestine, they force the United States into a corner, when by silent implication they yet manage to cry out that, if ever, the United States must now stand and deliver.

#### IV.

Should this be the case, the personality of Secretary of State Marshall is crucial. Mr. Marshall's thinking must, of necessity, be permeated with the military, <sup>the</sup> strategic, the power planning side of things. This does not mean that he is a militarist in the ugly sense of the word; but the defence of the United States and the world system which she upholds must, in its more concrete daily application, flash continuously through his mind. Mr. Bevin could be banking on such a set of reactions in Mr. Marshall's mentality; the diplomatic conditions envisaged by Britain in her latest step may be the conditioned reflexes of Mr. Marshall himself. And that is why the ~~stakes~~ stakes for which Mr. Bevin is playing in his public utterances may be quite the reverse of what they appear to be.



## The Jewish Agency for Palestine

### MEMORANDUM

April 4, 1947.

To: MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY

FROM: LIONEL GELBER

An hour long conversation in his New York office on April 3rd with Mr. Charles Noyes, StateDepartment Assistant to Senator Austin in the Security Council, was necessarily inconclusive. Last summer the writer had discussed with him the Trans-jordan application to membership in the United Nations. Since then, Mr. Noyes has grown visibly more cordial.

Mr. Noyes explained that questions of current policy, until they actually come to the United Nations, are bound to remain in the hands of the State Department in Washington. Later on the United States delegation to the United Nations, of which he is a member, may be briefed and even have views of their own to express, once matters are being deliberated at the Assembly. For the moment, the State Department remains the only source to be tapped and indeed the only one with which concrete issues can be effectively discussed. The New York office will be in touch with us, he assured the writer nevertheless, whenever the need arises.

Most of the conversation was of a general character on Jewish needs and aims, as well as the decisions of the Basle Congress and the recent meeting of the Executive in Jerusalem. Of special significance, however, was the reaction of Mr. Noyes to the idea of membership by an Arab State on any committee of inquiry set up by the special session of the General Assembly. He agreed at once that it would be inequitable in this case for any Arab State to appear as claimant and judge; he also concurred in the opinion that quite apart from this special Palestinian case, these circumstances would be bad in principle and set an evil precedent for all such future United Nations purposes -- something in which the United States had a long-term stake.

But in the United Nations as he knows it -- and Mr. Noyes knows it very well -- compromise is inevitable. He thinks it will be too bad but perhaps unavoidable that



an Arab State should get on the committee of inquiry. He thinks, too, that the Jews, though admittedly it is not quite just, should be content to get the fullest possible hearing short of actual membership on the committee.

The writer in reply pointed out that the main business of any inquiry committee may be done after all the evidence is in, that its business as distinguished from the business of the Security Council, may be all transacted in the main behind the scenes, and that the report the committee thus hammers out must exercise a considerable influence in shaping a final decision of the Assembly at large. Certain analogies in the history of the settlement of Anglo-American disputes, particularly that over the Alaskan boundary, were pointed out to Mr. Noyes.

The writer repeated the views of these questions conveyed by Mr. Shertok to Mr. Loy Henderson: That in certain unfavorable conditions the Agency may have to reconsider its whole position, and that the United States cannot be regarded as an interested party on the same footing as an Arab State. Mr. Noyes was surprised to hear of these views and the writer informed him that the State Department had been made aware of them. The writer added that while these appeared to be procedural questions, they would in effect set the stage for the moral authority which may or may not be attached to any United Nations findings or decisions on the entire issue.

As Mr. Noyes had voiced the desire of the United States to have a settlement attained, that side of things struck him as a serious one. He did not know whether the policy of the State Department and the White House had advanced or receded from the position indicated in October, 1946, as the whole problem was not one with which he had as yet been made familiar. The writer, nevertheless, took the opportunity to express our hopes and our fears on the subject of the current American attitude.



הסוכנות היהודית לארץ ישראל  
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE  
16 EAST 66TH STREET, NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

RHINELANDER 4-4200

Cable Address JEVAGENCY

May 19th, 1947.

Dear Dr. Silver:

Everything is so rushed at the Agency Executive meetings that it is not always possible to pass on every item of news. But the other day, just as the United Nations special session closed, Mr. Andrew Cordier, Administrative Assistant to Mr. Trygve Lie, again asked me to express to you his deep appreciation of your address. I told him I had done so when he first congratulated me on your behalf but that I would be glad to repeat his comment. His praise, like that of so many others, was unstinted.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

*Lionel Gelber*

Lionel Gelber.

LG:SA

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,  
The Temple  
105th St. & Ansel Road  
Cleveland, Ohio

Washington  
2210 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.  
Washington 8, D. C.

London  
77, Great Russell Street  
London, W.C. 1

Paris  
83, Avenue de la Grande Armée  
Paris XVI

Jerusalem  
Post Office Box 92  
Jerusalem, Palestine



TOP SECRET

June 2, 1947.

TO: Members of the American Branch,  
Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine

FROM: Lionel Gelber

CONVERSATION WITH MAJOR GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

Two and one-half hours with Major George Fielding Eliot, a distinguished American student of military and international affairs, in his office and at his home, brought out several concrete items of current information. Before the Special Assembly on Palestine, it had been intimated to the writer from quarters close to the American delegation to the United Nations, that Washington's policy would finally be decided on strategic grounds. On this aspect of affairs, the writer dwelt in Agency memoranda on his talks in October and November -- as well as in January and April -- with Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department; he had hoped in the autumn that the new positive role of the American Fleet in the Mediterranean could be turned to good account as a factor in the implementation of President Truman's October statements on Palestine. Since then, the Truman Doctrine has supervened. It was, therefore, deemed necessary to persuade the War and Navy Departments that so far from Zionism being at odds with it, this fresh departure should bolster rather than impair American defensive interest in a stronger, self-determined, Jewish Palestine.

1. Major Eliot, who is also close to Secretary of State Marshall, agreed during our talk to speak to General Eisenhower. On such questions, the Chief of Staff consults him frequently. Major Eliot may undertake to



X write a memorandum of his own. He will ask General Eisenhower in particular to put him in touch with the officer of the General Staff charged with overseeing Middle Eastern Affairs.

(Quite by accident, the writer discovered, just before his interview with Major Eliot, that an American-Jewish spokesman is to discuss these same matters with General Eisenhower. The approach to Major Eliot was mentioned at an earlier Executive meeting; parallel action with General Eisenhower may not be out of place; as the writer held at the outset, however, any steps taken may be more effective from a non-Jewish expert military source. The writer wonders, moreover, whether the Aide-Memoire prepared, he gathers, to assist General Eisenhower's visitor, should not be modified somewhat in the light of Mr. Gromyko's concluding speech at the United Nations Special Assembly.)

2. President Truman, in conversation with Major Eliot, has told him lately that there is no change in American policy towards Palestine. By this, however, Major Eliot seemed to understand the President to mean X chiefly the admission of the 100,000 Displaced Persons. Major Eliot was a trifle dubious when the writer pointed out that the October 4th statement and the Truman letter to King Ibn Saud went far to back in principle political Zionism's demand for Jewish Statehood. At his own request, the actual texts are being supplied to Major Eliot at once.

3. The foregoing is rendered all the more significant in view of the fact that Major Eliot has recently been apprised in Washington of State Department thought on the entire subject. The trend there is away X from Jewish sovereignty and towards a form of trusteeship, broader in ultimate responsibility than Britain's Palestine Mandate.



As envisaged in official Washington, such a trusteeship, either Anglo-American or United Nations, would allow for larger Jewish immigration and wider land purchase -- but to what extent is not clear. It might be for a five-year period, after which the Jews could be in a position satisfactorily to shape their own destiny in Palestine.

On the defects of such a scheme, Major Eliot concurred with the writer: (a) a fixed time limit, entailing a race towards the goal by Jews and an attempt by Arabs and others to hold them back, might protract and deepen turmoil in Palestine; (b) the fate of the entire Jewish enterprise must, under trusteeship of any description, still rest largely in the hands of outside bureaucrats.

(On this point, the writer is bound to voice the suspicion that State Department preference for trusteeship, if authentic, might date from the Soviet acknowledgement of Jewish Statehood as possibly the only practicable solution. At a moment when the elements of agreed settlement on a Great Power level are not lacking, it would be tragic if the opportunity were wasted and Palestine again became a shuttlecock in Soviet-American contention. If the United States recedes from its October policy, the Soviet Union, having once started upon a new course, may tend to occupy what until now has been the American position. Of the dangers to us of such an alternation, not only in Palestine but throughout the world, the White House should be made aware -- as well as the advantages of what, on this vexed issue, could at least be a common front.)

4. Like so many others, Major Eliot is of the opinion that the United Nations Committee of Inquiry will, for a variety of reasons, be able to do little more than list a number of known solutions -- leaving it to Governments and the General Assembly to make their choice. This,



of course, reinforces the view that the Jewish Agency, especially after the stand taken by Moscow, should not permit itself over the summer to be fobbed off by Washington with the excuse that nothing may be done between the Great Powers until the Committee's report is available. Because of his anti-American outlook on general foreign policy, Major Eliot rates Crossman low as an ally of ours. Crum he did not mention; he did say that the prejudices of State Department officials were hardly in our favor. If Major Eliot had his own way, he would, he remarked, give the Jews free scope over the entire area of Palestine and see what they could do with it.

5. Major Eliot is of the opinion that the attitude to the Palestine problem of the War and Navy Departments would be a perfectly dispassionate one. As an instrument of major policy there, they want to employ social reform throughout the Middle Eastern sphere. The notion that Zionist endeavor could be a spearhead of such an approach, was one he had never conveyed to American authorities.

In undertaking to do this, Major Eliot added, furthermore, that American policy would be based on Turkey. He wondered whether this could have any serious effect on us.

6. Further inquiry may be advisable into one suggestion of Major Eliot's. During the past year, he has had the fullest discussion about the interests of the English-speaking Powers in the Middle East with Lord (General Sir Hastings) Ismay, who was Mr. Churchill's special military assistant during the war. Major Eliot told the writer that General Eisenhower has the highest respect for General Ismay; that a further early talk between them should urgently be facilitated. The writer could not quite ascertain whether Major Eliot was hinting that the Jewish Agency



X quietly sponsor such a visit. But Major Eliot repeated several times that nothing General Ismay believes about the future of the Middle East is contrary to Zionist aspirations; on this, as presumably on other things, he shares Mr. Churchill's philosophy. Lord Ismay is in India at the moment with the Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten. It may be worthwhile to find out in London where General Ismay does stand and to promote such a pilgrimage by him to Washington in the event that it would serve a constructive purpose.

7. Major Eliot attributed the reference of the Palestine problem to the United Nations to: (a) the line taken by the Basle Congress; (b) the refusal of the Jewish Agency to enter the London Conference; (c) the gap in the London Embassy between the weak Winant and the strong Lewis Douglas; (d) the absence, during critical months, of a firm hand from the helm of the State Department.

Major Eliot had urged Byrnes to see Bevin during the autumn and he felt that he himself might have had something to do with their talks on Palestine. He promised to look closely into the career and influence exercised by the hitherto obscure Beeley.

8. One additional comment on the conversation with Major Eliot may be permitted. The writer had reported hurriedly at an Executive meeting on some features of his latest talk with Mr. William Edwards, Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington and generally in charge of the British Information Services in the United States. Mr. Edwards, who was in New York, telephoned to say he was about to make a short visit to the Foreign Office in London to survey American developments. Before leaving, he wanted to have the views of the Jewish Agency on the United Nations



Special Assembly.

On the main issue, Mr. Edwards indicated that a stumbling block in the path of a Jewish State would be the Arab military menace. What security would there be for the Jews if, as a result of British displeasure over United Nations proposals, they cleared out entirely and without waiting for suitable defensive measures to take shape? This struck the writer as a potential threat to Washington as well as the Jews; the obverse side of the medal, which Mr. Edwards and the writer had discussed, to the idea that in fact the British would hang on in Palestine whatever the United Nations said or did.

Appropriate answers, from the Jewish and international angle, were made at the time to Mr. Edwards and the matter thrashed out frankly -- though no names were mentioned -- with Major Eliot. It is imperative steadily to combat in Washington any mining and sapping from the British side of proposals otherwise favorable to Jewish Palestine. Major Eliot agreed that if the United States put her foot down, the British over this as other things, would be compelled to act cooperatively.



[1947]

הסוכנות היהודית לארץ ישראל  
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE  
16 EAST 66TH STREET, NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

RHINELANDER 4-4200

Cable Address JEVAGENCY

June 10, 1974.

My dear Dr. Silver:

Your most welcome letter of June 5th reached my desk this morning. I have noted with care the various points you raise and I shall take action after I ascertain what, if anything, is being done by Judge Rifkind.

Since Major Eliot has not been altogether clear as to our needs and policy, a preliminary process of orientation may be required before we can be absolutely confident of high-level representations outside his own specialized sphere. But I like his attitude of good-will and I shall do what I can with him.

Many thanks for your kind letter and helpful directions. Your cordial good wishes are warmly reciprocated.

Yours sincerely,

*Lionel Gelber*

Lionel Gelber,  
Political Adviser,  
Jewish Agency for Palestine.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,  
The Temple,  
105th St. and Ansel Road,  
Cleveland 6, Ohio.

LG:SA



STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

June 5, 1947.

TO: Officers of the Jewish Agency,  
Attached to the Committee of Inquiry.

FROM: Lionel Gelber

At lunch with Mr. Justice Rand and M. Leon Mayrand, the Canadian alternate delegate, several points of interest emerged.

M. Mayrand, who is an amiable French-Canadian diplomatist, has travelled in the Near East, as his wife comes from Turkey. He spoke of Syria especially. He has been reading widely on the Palestine problem and it would be astonishing if his influence were not of an intelligent, liberal character. Mr. Justice Rand was reluctant to accept this appointment; his summer holiday had already been arranged. M. Mayrand, on the other hand, is frankly thrilled at the prospect of his Palestine mission. The latter has served Canada over the past 13 years in Rio de Janeiro, London and Moscow.

Mr. Justice Rand, with whom we discussed the Harvard Law School, of which he is a graduate, mentioned Felix Frankfurter and other American lawyers whose identity with Zionism he had discovered in the Brandeis biography. Mr. Justice Rand has read the Peel Report and some of the current Zionist literature which the Canadian Delegation here has received.

A mild, cultivated gentleman, he thinks highly of the Swedish and Dutch members of the Committee. He also spoke well of his Czechoslovak colleague, though his response was not enthusiastic when the Australian was named. He feels that the Indian member, who is a competent, High-Court judge, has an open mind and that the Iranian is an interesting person.



The question of moderate Arab spokesmen was raised. Mr. Justice Rand seemed to suggest that he would like to meet some of them privately, even if their public appearance is precluded. Should there be any Arab moderates, Palestinian or non-Palestinian, who may safely be brought forward, this matter ought to be considered by those managing Jewish Agency business before the Committee of Inquiry.

Mr. Justice Rand did not himself deem it imperative to visit the DP camps first. Nobody, he said, with the slightest acquaintance with the world scene can be unaware of the connection on which we have insisted between the Palestinian and European situations. Nothing will be lost, in his view, through a later visit before the Committee of Inquiry settles down to write their report in Switzerland. M. Mayrand at this juncture pointed out how effectively Mr. Crum had dealt with all that.

The names of Jewish Agency officers and officials with whom they will be dealing on their trip to Palestine and in Geneva were mentioned to them.



MEMORANDUM

June 18, 1947.

TO: EXECUTIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY

FROM: LIONEL GELBER

The writer has had an opportunity of reading the important memorandum of June 17, 1947 (No.23) on "TRUSTEESHIP FOR PALESTINE" by Dr. Jacob Robinson. In expressing his agreement with Dr. Robinson's analysis, he wishes to remind those who peruse it of a few supplementary arguments. To that end, and with Dr. Robinson's concurrence, the writer appends certain passages from an article of his own in the "New Palestine" of April 4, 1947.

As a result of Mr. Gromyko's concluding speech at the United Nations special Assembly on Palestine, the paragraph expressing dissent from a bi-national solution is perhaps no longer academic -- and the line indicated the writer has since pursued with one of Mr. Gromyko's colleagues.

The following passages are intended to round out Dr. Robinson's cogent presentation;

..."First things come first. And these the United Nations will have to be told by spokesmen for the Jews. The merit of sovereignty is manifest. Being masters in their own household and able to run their own show, the Palestine Jews and no outside bureaucrats could decide for themselves the rate of immigration to ease the desperate plight of their displaced brethren in Europe; they might regulate their economy in the interests of their own people at home or abroad; with self-government resting in their own hands, barriers to land purchase would disappear. And the likelihood of a tranquil relationship



either with Britain, Russia, the United States or even neighboring Arab countries might be enhanced if friction over such matters were thus eliminated.

The United Nations, moreover, will have to be informed that few of these objectives could be attained in a bi-national Palestinian State. For in any such frame of governance there would have to be equality of rights between the Jewish and Arab entities -- something which must demand that the numerical disproportion of populations be frozen at its current or a fixed level. It is difficult, because of the fundamental clash in aim and purpose between the two communities, to envisage a constitutional mechanism which would work in Palestine as it does in multi-national States such as Canada or Switzerland. On the one hand, the Arab effendis would wish to maintain the status quo; on the other, the Jews, as a progressive, dynamic element, must ceaselessly endeavor to alter it. The Arabs will always struggle against Jewish immigration and free land purchase, just as it is these goals precisely for which the Jews must tirelessly labor. A bi-national State would be in a state of perpetual deadlock.

Another plan which the United Nations will have to consider is that of Trusteeship. And this, too, would be a solution which could not satisfy the Jews. A Trusteeship might be either a British one, a joint one such as an Anglo-American cooperative scheme would furnish, or a project directly administered under the United Nations. To all of these approaches, there are common objections. One of the most serious is that, in them, the provisions of the Mandate for a Jewish National Homeland may not be renewed or revalidated. Under the Charter, the ambiguous right of "states directly concerned" to



have a voice in Trusteeship settlements might give Arab countries, and any other hostile Powers, a further brake on Jewish aspirations. Some of the latter, suspicious of the Jews as a novel species of Western semi-imperialist intruders, may take a narrow, unimaginative view which stresses the "welfare" of the indigenous inhabitants of a Trust territory (even on a lower standard of living) and minimizes Jewish claims, as well as the pervasive social value of the Jewish contribution.

A Trusteeship proposal by its very nature assumes, moreover, some kind of dependence on a superior ruler or rulers. The Jewish community in Palestine enjoys a sufficient political maturity to warrant complete independence; it does not require, and perhaps could no longer tolerate, any transitional period of constitutional tutelage -- British, Anglo-American or United Nations. Much of the trouble between Britain and Palestine Jewry has indeed arisen from the fact that the British colonial bureaucracy have held sway over a group which is, to say the least, by no means culturally or technically more backward than they themselves. The problem is, after all, not one of Jews being trained for self-government but that, being perfectly capable of self-government on the highest level, they alone are still denied in Palestine the right of self-determination.

Independence might signify equality for Palestine Jewry as a full-fledged member of the United Nations; Trusteeship entails subordination to one or more State members of the United Nations. What the Jews of Palestine would like is independent membership by the Jewish State within the United Nations and not under it -- or a



sovereign status entirely outside its orbit. To abjure for Palestine Jewry an inferior political stature is one of Zionism's chief aims.

The danger of a Trusteeship is, then, that at best it might only be the Mandate reborn or writ afresh. And this would be true of any Trusteeship, whether British, Anglo-American or administered directly by the United Nations". .....





MEMORANDUM

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

JUNE 27th, 1947.

TO: Members of the American Branch,  
Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

FROM: Lionel Gelber

STATE DEPARTMENT CONVERSATION

CONSULTATIVE STATUS, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND  
SOCIAL COUNCIL.

Dr. Walter Kotschnig, who is in charge of the State Department division concerned with the affairs of the United Nations General Assembly and of the Economic and Social Council, was reported to have expressed doubts about the advisability of pressing on with the application of the Jewish Agency for Consultative Status at the forthcoming July session of the Economic and Social Council. In September, 1946, when the writer saw Dr. Kotschnig on quite another matter in the New York office of the United States Delegation to the United Nations, the latter voiced surprise at the step we had taken. He regarded us as a semi-governmental institution and deemed any such move as derogating from our real status.

When the writer called on Dr. Kotschnig at the State Department in Washington yesterday, he discovered that none of Dr. Kotschnig's qualms had abated. If we insist on pursuing the issue, the United States in all likelihood would not be disposed to vote against us. But -- and he put his opinion in collective rather than in individual terms -- they in that office prefer to have the entire application postponed.

The feeling is that at a time when the Jewish Agency has just been accorded exceptional international recognition in the proceedings of the United Nations Special Assembly on Palestine, it should not seek entry into a



class of consultants which functions on a very much lower level -- Rotarians, World League for the Blind, etc. Dr. Kotschnig, himself, admitted that he does not know how this exceptional recognition will turn out for the Jewish Agency. But there is a chance of it even developing into Statehood, or, at any rate, into some more important rank than "B Status" in the Economic and Social Council. Until that is a bit more clear, he, and those with whom he is officially in touch, would like us to hold back.

When the writer pointed out that there is no assurance of an early decision on the Palestine issue or the consequent future of the Jewish Agency, Dr. Kotschnig agreed that if there is a protracted delay we should reconsider our position. But nothing would be lost -- since we ourselves are not submitting concrete questions at the present moment to the Economic and Social Council -- by a postponement at least until the January session. Although its presumed advantages were discussed in some detail, Dr. Kotschnig is not persuaded that we will have gained a great deal even when a Consultative Status has been achieved. But if things go so badly for us on the highest plane of world politics that we are left with no other means of coming into the United Nations circle, then this nebulous method of attachment would be favored by him. While aware of trends elsewhere in the State Department on general Palestine policy, he is not so pessimistic as to assume at this stage that Consultative Status is our only hope. At any rate, until it is, he suggests that we abstain.

From conversation with him on the general issue of Palestine, the writer is not convinced that Dr. Kotschnig's line is confined to his own particular group of American experts on United Nations affairs. While it may originate with Dr. Kotschnig as the responsible official, it would appear to be shared by the State Department as a whole. One guesses that until the major policy



of the United States on Palestine re-crystallizes, (he says that it has not yet "jelled") they all do really wish this thing kept in cold-storage.

What he suggests is that we merely write to Mr. Lyman White of the United Nations to say that without prejudice to future decisions and until the larger relations of the United Nations and Jewish Palestine are more clear, we ask that consideration of our application be postponed. One incidental factor is the assurance Dr. Kotschnig gave the writer that the opinions he indicated are now held by the other representatives of the Big Five. In such Jewish Agency matters, he asserted that Britain leaves the initiative to the United States; but after a recent meeting he was able to tell the writer that the other Great Powers, too, were of the same opinion at this particular juncture. Was there a prospect, then, of the Economic and Social Council itself postponing the Jewish Agency application while the United Nations was in an early stage of its Palestine deliberations? Dr. Kotschnig replied that there was. For the sake of our own prestige, it would, he intimated, be better for the Jewish Agency itself to ask for postponement than to have the question of postponement raised by the Council.

What had happened at their last meeting in the spring of 1947, Dr. Kotschnig explained as being without great significance. The Agency application was neither accepted nor rejected because Lebanon sought to elicit more information about the objectives of the Jewish Agency -- something which, out of international courtesy, could not be refused by the Council. Otherwise, there was no opposition to our application from any quarter. But what has altered the situation since then is the seizure of the entire Palestine issue by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Until there is some clarification in this respect, we are advised by him to suspend action -- with the proviso of remaining capable of going forward or withdrawing altogether later on, as the situation warrants.



[ June 1947 ]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the American Branch,  
Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

FROM: Lionel Gelber

A FURTHER TALK WITH MAJOR GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

Since the writer's memorandum of June 2nd, 1947, on his talk with Major George Fielding Eliot, he has twice visited the Eliot home. On this last occasion, a small cocktail party, Senator and Mrs. Austin and Mr. Herschel Johnson, of the United States delegation to the United Nations, and several leading British officials on the press and information side, were present. None of the conversation was, however, political in character.

But last week, when the writer dined at the Eliot home, he did manage to get in some brief discussion about Palestine. After our first meeting, nearly four weeks ago, the Major apparently made it his business to conduct further inquiries in official Washington quarters - even though General Eisenhower was not available. But State Department counsels would seem to have prevailed. Major Eliot's sympathies with Palestine as a Jewish relief project are as pronounced as ever. The President, he reminded the writer, had told him only a month ago that American policy was still based on the admission to Palestine of the 100,000 displaced persons.

But any proposal for partition or any project looking to immediate Jewish political independence he regards now as an error. State Department opinion, he asserted more emphatically than ever, is tending very much against any such approach; the Truman statements of October, 1946, the texts of which having been submitted to him by the writer, he deems something less than a precise commitment on policy. A trusteeship - Anglo-American or United Nations - which permits sufficient immigration and better rules for land purchase would, he thinks, meet Jewish needs.



It is his contention that as the immigrant Jewish populace increases, the control of the country will more and more really be in Jewish hands. And this he would welcome. But he does not agree that the Arab birth-rate will operate against the Jews adversely or that the Jews may be hamstrung perpetually by an Arab majority. He is very certain that the entire destiny of the country would be so effectively shaped by Jewish energy and the growth of Jewish enterprise that this will outweigh an ostensible, numerical inferiority.

The writer expressed apprehension lest violence, if there is Jewish discontent in the old or in a new form, be thus directed against American trusteeship officials. For it is not desired to repeat against other countries, especially not against the U.S.A., the sad tale of embitterment which now mars the record of Britain's relations with Palestine Jewry.

What has had an effect on Major Eliot's mind is the strategic aspect of the American stake in a pro-Zionist solution. The line will therefore have to be pursued with him that this will be more secure in a strong Jewish state than under any kind of trusteeship. Major Eliot himself returned to the idea that Lord Ismay and General Eisenhower be again brought together; implying that funds would be available, the writer inquired whether Lord Ismay could not be brought to America as a private guest to some distinguished American public figure. For the moment, Lord Ismay is tied up in India and General Eisenhower is taking a new post as President of Columbia University. But General Eisenhower's influence is bound to remain great and the project may prove feasible later in some modified way.

At Princeton, over the week-end, the writer was asked by Lord Inverchapel what position Dr. Weizmann now occupied in the Agency. There was no opportunity, in the presence of others, for private conversation.



MEMORANDUM

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

July 9th, 1947.

TO: Members of the American Section,  
Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

FROM: Lionel Gelber

AN INFORMAL TALK WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS

Some weeks ago Mr. William Edwards, Counsellor of the British Embassy at Washington, telephoned the writer to suggest that we meet and talk over the United Nations Special Assembly before he left on a brief trip to report current trends on this side of the Atlantic to the Foreign Office. This was done. A fortnight ago, Mr. Francis Watson, of the New York office of the British Information Services, similarly arranged for Mr. Edwards, who is his chief, and the writer to meet again as soon as Mr. Edwards returned to America. In the meantime, a long conversation was held with another New York colleague of his, Major Ormerod, who was on the platform at the Margate Conference of the Labour Party when Mr. Bevin spoke and had himself canvassed the situation recently in London; it was Major Ormerod who arranged for Dr. Silver to see Mr. Bevin here last year. Mr. Edwards, Mr. Watson and the writer dined together the other evening and from our talk, mostly with Mr. Edwards, the following points again emerged:

1. Mr. Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, told Mr. Edwards that Britain needs an early solution. This was put down to her domestic manpower shortage affecting the world-wide distribution of occupation forces, quite apart from the problem of unrest and violence in Palestine itself.

2. In submitting the Palestine issue to the United Nations, the Imperial General Staff were overruled by the Labour Government. In



addition to any new structure of strategy resting on Africa, the Imperial General Staff still attach paramount importance to British control of the Middle East -- a control which would be lost, it was felt, if the Arabs were given cause for hostility and which, presumably, excluded any Zionist notion of a strong, allied Jewish Palestine as a more effective bastion of Western power.

3. The British contend that they would not have turned to the United Nations if they had put their own strategic interests first. But, while claiming credit for this, fault nevertheless was found with the Zionists for leaving Britain with no other choice but to refer the entire matter to the United Nations. The writer, however, reminded Mr. Edwards of what he had told him on May 20th: By going to the United Nations with the Palestine issue, the United Kingdom Government had themselves given Russia an opportunity to figure more prominently in a Palestinian settlement. Once they had decided to work primarily through the United Nations rather than directly with the Jewish Agency, they themselves were the ones who had pushed the Russian factor to the center of things.

(For what it is worth, the writer has the impression that the British really counted on a straight anti-Zionist attitude by Russia in the United Nations proceedings. Any calculation based on this would therefore have been upset by the Gromyko speech).

4. Mr. Edwards, like other British and American officials at the moment, asserted to begin with that no steps may be taken towards direct agreement between Great Powers before the Committee of Inquiry itself brings down its Report. But when pressed with the argument that nothing essentially new will be brought forth and that time would be short, there was a tendency to relent. As the Committee of Inquiry gets



under way and the nature of its thinking is revealed, it was admitted there may be steps of the kind indicated. The fact had been stressed by the writer that the Gromyko speech afforded a unique chance, which should be looked into at once, for an understanding over Palestine between the United States and Russia; and that Britain herself, if she insisted on leaving the initiative to others, should, in the sphere of Palestine at any rate, jettison the Spears-Beeley school of positive Pan-Arabism and at least interpose no obstacles.

(There is little doubt in the writer's mind that London and Washington have yet to adjust themselves to the full meaning of the Gromyko speech and that they hesitate to take advantage of it in a frank, open, early approach to Moscow, lest it redound to the benefit of Zionism).

5. Partition was the one concrete solution which was mentioned by Mr. Edwards. The Washington rumor that Anglo-American negotiations are under way for a revised Morrison-Grady plan he denied; Major George Fielding Eliot previously said to the writer that this rumor was 90% incorrect, leaving unanswered the question of what does the valid 10% consist. British reflection on the subject could, however, now try to appear less self-regarding than before or at least alter somewhat in its incidence. Thus, for example, not as the sole sponsoring Power, but merely as one of many, they themselves today -- the Hindustan-Pakistan venture making the term again respectable -- might favor partition. At any rate it was intimated that Britain would not stand in the way of a partition scheme acceptable even to the Jews -- a viable State in an adequate area -- if responsibility for it were joint and international rather than single and her own. The British might thus conserve Arab



affinities, while extricating themselves from commitments to the Jews. It was conceded that the Arabs after loud pretexts would acquiesce in an international fait accompli. It was argued, however, that they would do this only if they realized they were up against the firm, broad-based judgement of the entire United Nations rather than any special groupings of the Powers.

6. Quite apart from the problem of political responsibility, British diplomatists clarify the strategic issue of Palestine by pointing separately to its short-range and its long-range aspects. The short-range and simpler aspect is that of defending a settlement favorable to the Jews against Arab intransigence; the long-range is that of the defense of the Middle Eastern region against Russia -- one in which the problem of bases, oil, sea, land and air power is more grave.

(The writer imagines that the Imperial General Staff for its part would contend that the short-range and the long-range aspect merge into each other and are actually inseparable).

Certainly there is less and less disposition in British and American quarters to settle the Palestine issue by itself and as an isolated one. It will be decided as a regional Middle Eastern rather than as a narrow Palestinian territorial question, or not at all.

(Informed American officials emphasised this before the breakdown of the Paris Conference with Russia on the Marshall economic Plan for Europe. The widening of the rift between East and West since the United Nations Special Session on Palestine is for Zionism, as for much else besides, not a good omen).

7. Several times Mr. Edwards inquired whether a viable Jewish State necessarily precluded a viable Arab one. He seemed anxious to get clear that Zionists would favor American or other international develop-



ment schemes for the entire area. And if the Arab portion of Palestine were joined to Transjordan, would a Jewish State enter into cooperative fiscal and economic arrangements with it and with its other Arab neighbors? Since much of that part of our conversation was commonplace, the writer could not help but suspect that somehow the question was raised because something along such lines was brewing somewhere -- either in official thought or in contemplated action.





MEMORANDUM

July 11th, 1947.

TO: Members of the American Section,  
Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

FROM: Lionel Gelber

DISPLACED PERSONS AND AMERICAN ANTI-ZIONISTS

A matter of internal American-Jewish interest, which no doubt is known from other sources, came to my attention at lunch today. Jewish anti-Zionists in the United States appear to be pressing hard behind the Stratton Bill at Washington for the admission of Displaced Persons to this country on two counts. There is, first of all, the humanitarian aspect, in which a sincere interest cannot be denied them. But a special effort has been made during the past year -- the details are interesting -- in order to cut the ground under the Zionist argument that Palestine is the sole adequate refuge. By diminishing the number of DP's in Europe, they diminish the pressure on Palestine and modify the urgency of Zionist political demands at the State Department, the White House, on the Democratic and Republican Parties, and elsewhere.

Mr. Arthur Goldsmith, of the Council for American Judaism, spent an hour with Cardinal Spellman at noon today to persuade him to testify on Thursday next for the Stratton Bill; owing to a previous engagement, His Eminence will not be able to testify but is backing it otherwise wholeheartedly. In my presence, over the telephone, Mr. Herbert Bayard Swope was asked to exercise pressure on Senator Vandenburg in Washington on Monday next, and seems to be helping this endeavor along.

Mr. Goldsmith, who now accepts fully the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, is lunching next week with Major Ormerod, of the British Information Services -- which is not an



un-natural tie-up. Mr. Goldsmith said people were "shocked" when Dr. Silver failed to accept a Vice-Presidency, with other eminent Americans, of Earl Harrison's Citizens Committee for Displaced Persons. He did not know whether Dr. Silver had been invited as the Zionist head or just as a leading citizen. Tribute, however, was paid to Dr. Silver for the way he had presented his case at the United Nations Special Assembly on Palestine and the manner in which the Jewish Agency, from the general public relations point of view, had discharged its responsibilities at that time.

In working for the admission of Displaced Persons to the United States, Mr. Goldsmith's associates were dismayed over the lack of cooperation from Zionists throughout the country.

Mr. Lessing Rosenwald, who refused to contribute to the United Jewish Appeal because its constituent, the United Palestine Appeal, indulges in propaganda for a Jewish State, has, I was told, been expending a sum large even for him in attempting to bring about the entry of DP's to the United States.



*Private and confidential*

As from: The Barbizon Plaza Hotel  
101, West 58th Street, New York

THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

10, September 1946.

My dear Dr. Silver,

It was good to read your statement on your return to these shores. Welcome back! Copies of my memoranda have gone forward to you in Cleveland as usual.

I myself have long hoped that on the eve of the General Assembly you might be able to spare me an hour for a very frank talk on organizational matters of a semi-technical character. You will recall your own displeasure over certain features of our liaison work during the Special Session. My own position before and since then has not been entirely satisfactory. In 1946, when I was first appointed <sup>than</sup> Political Adviser to the Agency in the USA, I enjoyed more authority ~~that~~ I have throughout the present year and this has been bound

to affect my activities inside and outside the Agency.

If there is to be teamwork both with and under the Executive, in internal and external functions, responsibilities will have to be more clearly defined. This is all the more necessary since additional personnel may join us ~~for the~~



for the duration of the Assembly at a time when the handling of  
our contacts with government representatives and the  
Secretariat alike must be watched with vigilance lest we  
~~may~~ mar the good effect of the recent past.

You yourself, at a critical moment during the Special  
Session, assured me that my status was not as subordinate  
as, when put to the test or ~~in~~ in abnormal conduct of affairs,  
it generally seems to be.

What I should like you to do I trust - I may come and tell  
you, preferably in your hotel, once we are both back in town  
after the New Year and before the Assembly really gets under way.  
Meanwhile, please do not trouble to reply to this - or, at any  
rate, not to any address other than my New York residence as  
indicated above.

I know I can write to you in a spirit of the utmost  
confidence and that you will not mention this letter to your  
colleagues, or my own, until I have been able to speak to you.  
My warmest good wishes for the New Year to Mrs Silver and yourself  
and for the attainment of the goal to which you have set your  
hand.

Yours sincerely,

Simon Gelber

Dr. A. H. Silver,  
The Temple, Cleveland, Ohio.



The Barbizon-Plaza Hotel,  
101 West 58th Street,  
New York, New York.

Sunday, September 21, 1947.

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

LG

Dear Dr. Silver:

The circulation of memoranda permits one to express oneself on the development of our general policy. But there never seems to be a chance to voice one's views on the way we might organize ourselves on the official rather than the Executive level for the application of that policy. Decisions on general policy are taken after long thought and in common counsel. Yet, in selecting the modes and instrumentalities of their application, a reverse method appears to be the habit. This unsatisfactory state of affairs may, during the present critical General Assembly, cause us to disregard certain advice about our contact work and thereby do us harm.

Frankly, I find it hard to explain to myself, or to others, where I fit into the picture. In June, 1946, I was appointed Political Adviser to the Jewish Agency in the United States. It was specified at the time that I would be directly responsible to the American Executive, or, more particularly, to the Executive member charged with the conduct of our United Nations affairs; in the latter sphere, I was described as his assistant and in his absence so acted for him. Although the term United Nations Department is often employed, no such Department has ever actually been created. There has been no Director of a United Nations Department with authority, in his prescribed sphere, over other personnel and for carrying out routine duties. During the Basle Congress, I was left in charge of the New York Office but was not among those to whom a similar responsibility was assigned during the Zurich meeting of the Actions Committee.

Although the lines were blurred from the start, the Director of the New York Office until January, 1947, did not concern himself with diplomatic activities. But at the beginning of this year, the position was suddenly to be changed. I thereupon again requested that, before there was any precipitate reorganization, the problem of a so-called United Nations Department, my own personal relations to it and to the new Directorate of the New York Office, be clarified and defined. This request has always gone unheeded.

What I feared began, almost at once, to come to pass. Most of the activities of the American Branch that really count, other than those which go through Washington, have been diverted unduly into a single channel; the larger our work has grown, the fewer the hands into which its control has been concentrated. If the nucleus for a separate United Nations Department ever did exist, the recent tendency has been (save in minor, relatively unimportant things) for it to be by-passed. As set up, the machinery was bound to exclude me from consultation or participation even over steps in what is, ostensibly, my own sphere of the United Nations -- quite apart from other spheres in which my pre-Agency interests or connections might have been used. My professional experience, though not



gained in the service of the Agency, has been put fully at its service. Even as a lobbyist, the only role left to me, my scope has been and is being limited.

The solution, as I have been pointing out since January, is a simple one. Confusion and imbalance are derived from the fact that the American Branch of the Jewish Agency has two main Directorates functioning in what are, at bottom, three quite distinct fields of endeavour. These are: (1) an American Government sphere (Washington Office); (2) a United Nations sphere (New York Office); (3) the sphere of the American Secretariat of the Jewish Agency (New York Office). A bottleneck is created when the New York Office, unlike its Washington counterpart, undertakes a double burden; when it carries not only the heavy, wide-ranging, administrative labors of an Executive Secretariat, but also absorbs much of the United Nations diplomatic work and thereby precludes the establishment of a separate United Nations Department under its own specialist Director.

The American Executive, like every similar governing organ, needs and possesses a highly qualified chef de Cabinet with his competent Secretariat. The labors of the latter should be to communicate to others the decisions of the Executive; to do liaison work with Zionist and Jewish bodies at home and abroad; to keep in touch with our own officers and offices wherever they may be; to conduct and coordinate such financial, economic and other business as is common to all phases of our work. The American Government Department of the Agency in Washington is free from most of this internal activity and, while maintaining immediate access to and from Executive members, can devote itself primarily to its specialized function, its external diplomatic pursuits.

On the same pattern, but in its own sphere -- and one just as distinct from the Executive Secretariat -- a United Nations Department should be formed. This would be headed by its own Director, armed with the same powers in our work, the same authority over personnel, the same seniority and priority in consultation and participation as that accorded the other two Directors. The duties of the United Nations Department call for little elaboration. Its task would be to specialize in external contacts with Government representatives and United Nations officials at the seat of the United Nations. Policy questions which must arise within it, as distinct as any which arise within the Executive Secretariat or American Government Departments, must be treated accordingly.

It is contended here that the Director of the United Nations Department should enjoy the same facilities and prerogatives as other top officials. Yet, the difficulties today are mechanical rather than personal. The fault is not with individuals but with a structure of organization progressively overweighted on one side and progressively underweighted on the other. What we require are not two but three Directorates of equal rank to correspond with the diverse realities of the American Branch's triple functions -- each autonomous in its own sphere and able to sustain its own direct, constant, first-hand contact with the appropriate members of the Executive or the Executive as a whole.



Technical objections will be raised. But to house two of these three Departments under a single roof may offer less of a difficulty than to have the one swallow up the other because of the accident of propinquity. Foreign Offices and Embassies are not celebrated for their efficiency. But if we are to meet them on their own ground, we must gird ourselves in a manner at least as efficient as any they display -- we cannot, even on a smaller scale, be, assuredly, any less efficient than they are.

I do hope that these proposals will merit your early and serious consideration.

With kindest regards to Mrs. Silver and yourself for the New Year,

Yours sincerely,

*Lionel Gelber*

Lionel Gelber.

Dr. A. H. Silver,  
The Temple,  
105th St. & Ansel Road,  
Cleveland, Ohio.





October 1, 1947.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the American Section,  
Executive of the Jewish Agency.

FROM: Lionel Gelber.

THE SAAR PLEBISCITE - AN ANALOGY.

The way in which the Saar Plebiscite was conducted may, it has long been contended, furnish a precedent for the policing under international auspices of the Palestine area during a transition period or during a period of enforcement. This view is understood to have been contested privately by members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. They have argued, I understand, that only French troops occupied the disputed territory during the taking of the Plebiscite. According to them, the entire undertaking furnished, therefore, no useful international example.

My own recollection was, however, a different one when I first suggested the analogy in the spring and I offer verification below.

The relevant League of Nations documents are in the "Official Journal" of the League of Nations, Vol.15, pp.1840-42.

The most authoritative work on the entire question was published in 1940 by the Harvard University Press. It is Miss Sarah Wambaugh's volume on "The Saar Plebiscite". The following passages are quoted from Miss Wambaugh's book, pp.282-284:

".... On December 8 (1934) the Committee of Three had reported to the League Council that, in reply to its query, the German Government had acquiesced in the proposal of an international force to maintain order before, during, and after the plebiscite. Accordingly the Council on the same day had invited the governments of the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden to take part in the establishment of such a force. At the same time it had instructed the Committee to set up a sub-committee of one representative of each of the countries so invited, together with the chairman



of the Governing Commission, in order to study and propose measures necessary for the organization and functions of this international force.

The four governments having replied favorably, the Council on December 11 voted that the International Force should be placed at the disposal of the Saar Governing Commission and requested the members of the League concerned to grant every facility for the transit through their territory of the national contingents and their supplies. The costs of transport and of maintenance resulting from expatriation, in so far as they were not covered by the credits already provided in the budgets of the respective governments, together with any costs of accommodation, were to be charged to the League fund for the plebiscite. Should this fund prove insufficient, the Committee of the Council was authorized to request the French and German governments to make supplementary payments. ...."

"The composition of the force of 3,300 men was as follows:

United Kingdom.....	1,500
Italy .....	1,300
Netherlands .....	250
Sweden .....	<u>250</u>
Total .....	3,300

As the commander-in-chief was to be under the orders of the chairman of the Governing Commission, the Committee of Three asked the United Kingdom to make the appointment, and on the recommendation of the British Ministry of War the British Government appointed Major-General J. E. S. Brind.

The British force consisted of two battalions of infantry (1st Essex and 1st East Lancashire regiments) and a squadron of lancers (the 12th) with armored cars; the Italian of two battalions of infantry (one of grenadier and one of carabinieri) and one squadron of tanks; the Dutch of two companies of marines; and the Swedish of two companies of Royal Guards. There sufficient lorries to transport half of the total force in case of emergency.

The German government informed the Committee of the Council that it would give free transportation and provisioning to the frontiers of the Territory to the Dutch and Swedish contingents, and the French government did the same for the British force.

On December 20, only ten days after the written orders had been received by the Force Commander, the first companies of the International Saar Force had detrained at Saarbrücken and other stations in the Territory. On December 23 the last of the contingents were arriving. The Italian force, carefully selected from the elite



of the Italian army and dressed in new uniforms, had been reviewed by Mussolini before entraining. They were a magnificent spectacle as, bayonets fixed according to the Italian regulations, they marched down the Bahnhofstrasse of Saarbrücken. The Dutch, members of a picked corps, gave an appearance of sturdy impassivity. The Swedes were specially enlisted, and special legislation had been necessary to enable them to serve outside Sweden. The British, the only ones not especially picked and with many raw recruits among them, gave a disarming impression of informality with their bayonets carried in inconspicuous fashion and their "Baby Austins" dashing back and forth.

The task of the International Force was not intended to be that of a police force in the ordinary sense, but of an emergency reserve exercising by its mere presence a restraint on any who might be tempted to provoke disorders. ...."





Strictly Confidential

October 31, 1947.

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE JEWISH AGENCY EXECUTIVE

FROM: LIONEL GELBER

V.S. Volin

Today at Flushing I had two conversations with American diplomatic officials, to which the utmost weight must be attached. The second was more important than the first, but taken together, they indicate a settled line.

Mr. Kopper, the first of the two, told me that being also concerned with Korea, he was out there rather than at Lake Success. What worried him in the context of American-Palestine affairs, was the mystery brewing in the Black Sea. Nobody knew what Russia was up to and things were being made difficult for his Government. He obviously had in mind a new shipment of Jewish Displaced Persons. But he implied that <sup>any</sup> coming from Eastern Europe would be Communist. *I pointed out that* If so, I had had this sort of talk from the British as long ago as the summer of 1946, when the passage of immigrants from Central Europe was even being winked at by the American military authorities in the occupation zones. Nobody could blame red-blooded human beings, I retorted, if they tried, by every possible means to escape the misery and anti-semitism of Roumania. "The trouble is", said Mr. Kopper, plainly referring to us, "That some people won't cooperate". Mr. Loy Henderson, he added, had mentioned the matter to Mr. Shertok when they last spoke together. Mr. Kopper felt Europe must provide for its own Jews; Palestine could not solve the entire problem; the hand of the United States in pursuing its present policy on partition certainly would be strengthened if the Stratton Bill were passed and the United States herself shared some of the burdens over against the Arab world. The Arabs had spoken to the United States about this Black Sea business.

At the time I felt that Mr. Kopper's objection to the new immigration was ideological. I therefore contended, of course, that Socialists, coming to Palestine or resident there, were more of a Bevinite than a Stalinite persuasion.

But ideological suspicion, even if it owes something to Arab and British promptings, was not alone what inspired the Americans. This I learned when I lunched later on with Mr. Dean Rusk, who searched me out as an old Oxford contemporary of mine and who is now Chief of



the United Nations affairs of the State Department. Mr. Rusk feels that Russian pressure is forcing America and Britain into an ever closer union; this may be the key to much State Department thinking on our problem as on others. At any rate, after telling me what Mr. Herschel Johnson was going to say to the Palestine sub-committee out at Lake Success, Mr. Rusk told me that the State Department viewed with the utmost seriousness proceedings in Constanza. I asked him what he meant.

He declared that ~~the~~ two boatloads of refugees were present in the Black Sea; that they must at all costs be prevented by us from coming to Palestine while the U.N. is deliberating upon the problem. Mr. Rusk asserted that the United States needs to cooperate with the British Government, especially at this delicate stage in the Palestine issue (he was referring, I gathered, to implementation). The British, he added, had valid complaints when their hand was forced by the so-called illegal immigration -- was forced, in short, by the Jews.

In Mr. Rusk's remarks there was a clear, if moderately couched, threat. Should we be so ill-advised as to permit these new boatloads to arrive in Palestine, a new Exodus incident might occur. If that happened, the U.S.A. would speak out sharply -- and speak out against the Jewish Agency ~~if~~ for not cooperating at this stage in keeping matters quiet.

The Secretary of State had spoken to Judge Proskauer about this. The language employed, or intended, was of the severest and firmest character. Mr. Rusk envisaged all American efforts on our behalf at the U.N. being undermined or ruined by any neglect on our part of this issue. He probably meant American diplomatic facilities and American men-of-war ~~crossing~~ <sup>crossing</sup> in the Middle Eastern waters when he offered to put at our disposal every means of communication with the Black Sea ships, if we would endeavor to help them out. He apparently assumed that the Haganah in this respect and the Jewish Agency were one and the same thing. On being quieried, he mentioned the figure of from 10,000 to 15,000 souls as being concerned in this transshipment -- one that is rather high even for two of the most crowded vessels.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the <sup>vigor</sup> ~~figure~~ with which he spoke ~~of~~ <sup>up</sup> this question and the insistence with which he returned to this topic when I tried to switch the subject to other phases of our common work.



He did suggest that the matter not be discussed with the U.S. Delegation at the U.N. unless it first be cleared with him. So far as he knew it was a Washington State Department preoccupation.

My own impression is that unless tackled at once this aspect of the situation may be full of peril for us and may <sup>even</sup> be immediately more dangerous even than any potential Irgun-Haganah ~~conflict~~. There is no mistaking Mr. Rusk's gravity or authority. Successor to Mr. Ross, Chief Adviser under Senator Austin to the American Delegation at the U.N., he described himself as the opposite number of Gladwyn Jebb of the British Foreign Office (he apparently knew that I had been seeing Mr. Jebb).

Perhaps some of our Executive should act without delay on the highest level at Washington. The U.S. is clearly determined that these ships do not land and may turn against us if they do. Our collaboration in delaying their arrival would be appreciated by American officials ~~to~~ of every rank seeking to get a Palestine settlement in the U.N.

Quite gratuitously and somewhat ominously, Mr. Rusk added that we would be profoundly in error if we thought that the U.S. Government will move on this matter as if it were on the domestic political plane. It would be handled entirely as a foreign policy question pure and simple. Mr. Rusk, at parting, asked me to keep in touch with him.



November 19, 1947.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Members of the Jewish Agency Executive

FROM: Lionel Gelber

UNITED STATES POLICY - III.

On Tuesday, November 18, 1947, Mr. S. Kopper, of the United States delegation to the United Nations, approached me. Mr. Dean Rusk had telephoned from the State Department in Washington and had directed Mr. Kopper to draw my attention to the continuing flood of stories in the newspapers, more particularly Monday's dispatch in the "New York Herald-Tribune", about ships leaving Mediterranean ports for Palestine with Jewish unauthorized immigrants. I at once told Mr. Kopper that we had checked and rechecked; that every endeavor was being made to see that our assurances about the two ships at Constanza were being kept; that according to our information, though we did not exercise control, nothing would happen in the Black Sea in the near future. In this, as in other matters, British authorities may be waging a war of nerves against us. But I would again inquire and let him know.

Later in the day, after consulting Mr. Shertok and other Executive members, I was able to reiterate these assurances to Mr. Kopper. I also furnished him with a copy of an Associated Press dispatch in the "New York Post" of November 18, 1947, from Istanbul, which had just appeared and which stated:

"Two large ships were reported today to be waiting at Constanta, Roumanian Black Sea port, to embark 14,000 European Jews seeking to enter Palestine without British certification. The vessels, identified as the Panyork and the Pan-Crescent, were said to have been loaded and ready to sail last week, but a Jewish Commission ordered the passengers disembarked pending further alterations to the ships. Recent arrivals from Roumania said they believed it would probably be two weeks before the ships left Constanta."



This, I said, seemed to coincide with the assurances which we had supplied. But that did not altogether satisfy Mr. Kopper. Why, he inquired, should it have been stated in the dispatch that the passengers disembarked "pending further alterations to the ships"? I retorted that people living under terrible stress could not always be given the exact diplomatic reasons. Mr. Kopper felt, however, that the fact might be that the ships had been emptied in order that armament could be installed. Why then, I asked, had the Displaced Persons been embarked in the first place? Mr. Kopper thereupon remarked that perhaps in the meantime Jewish strategy had changed. This seemed to indicate an attitude of extraordinary suspicion.

Mr. Kopper also was discontented with the reference in the dispatch to the two week interval, which he thought much too short. I reminded him that we had given assurances about the Black Sea only for November; that we would do our utmost to let sleeping dogs lie until the United Nations adopts a scheme of settlement. But Mr. Kopper now feels that this is inadequate. He apparently intends to get into touch with me again after consulting Washington.

This approach may or may not tie in with a telephone conversation on Wednesday morning with Major George Fielding Eliot. Major Eliot's concern in the matter of the Displaced Persons was established by his powerfully sympathetic column in the "New York Post" during the Exodus incident. He therefore apparently feels himself on strong ground in demanding, in a forthcoming article, that matters be kept quiet at the ports. Major Eliot telephoned me on his own initiative. I, of course, did not tell him of the action we had been taking, so that his concern in this most recent stage may be fed with information from the State Department. Major Eliot contends that whatever happens over Palestine, there is going



to be bloodshed on quite a large scale, even though the Arab States may formally remain quiescent. He argues that more disorderly immigration, which he thinks will be stepped up as soon as plans are adopted for a Jewish State, will be a red rag to the Arabs. The Jews in Moslem countries live at this moment in absolute peril of their lives; Major Eliot predicts wholesale massacres; and he feels that too many Jews had died as it is. I pointed out that partition would in any case furnish a pretext for pan-Moslem incitement against Jews or for domestic violence within Palestine itself. He argues, however, that immigration, sanctioned by the United Nations, and conducted under some internationally approved regime, will have an effect on the Arab world less catastrophic than prolongation or extension of the present system.

Although a friend of our cause, he does not take a cheerful view of our prospects in the United Nations or for early peace in Palestine.



CONFIDENTIAL

December 12, 1947.

TO: Executive of the Jewish Agency.

FROM: Lionel Gelber.

BRITISH - UNITED NATIONS COOPERATION?  
A Conflict in Timetables.

Addressing the House of Commons during the Palestine debate on Thursday, December 11th, 1947, Mr. Arthur Creech-Jones, Colonial Secretary in the United Kingdom Government, is quoted in press reports as having declared that it would be "undesirable for the Commission to arrive in Palestine until shortly before the termination of the Mandate".... "Much preliminary work", he added, "could be done by the Commission outside Palestine". The date planned tentatively for the laying down of the Mandate, it should be recalled in this context, Mr. Creech-Jones announced as being May 15th, 1948.

There may be appeals to the United Kingdom Government to favor the earlier presence of the United Nations Commission on the spot in order to smoothe the transition from the Mandatory to the successor regimes. But the situation is a more serious one than that. If this point in Mr. Creech-Jones' stand is correctly reported, it may require either a public statement by the Jewish Agency for Palestine or direct representations at London and Lake Success.

Let us recall the actual wording of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union as submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine question and as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29th. Part I, Division A, Section 4, consists of the following two paragraphs:



"The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.

If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations."

In the light of the foregoing, unless the Committee is allowed to get down to work in the near future in Palestine itself, it is hard to see how this United Nations recommendation can be honored; how the Commission might select and establish in either State "as rapidly as possible" a Provisional Council of Government. Nor can the Commission exercise "general direction" over the activities of the Provisional Councils of Government if, for a critical period, they are to operate as Mr. Creech-Jones seems to imply, by remote control.

The clash in dates is crucial. The Assembly resolution (in the second paragraph of Section 4 as cited above), envisages that this phase of the process be under way before April 1st. Mr. Creech-Jones' desire to delay the arrival of the Committee until the eve of May 15th must preclude the fulfillment of that provision on or before the date specified in the United Nations Assembly's recommendation.

But the timetable indicated by Mr. Creech-Jones would not only interfere with the responsibilities assigned to the United Nations Committee. It might hold up the function allotted to the Security Council itself. Paragraph 2 of Section 4, as quoted above, requires that the United Nations Commission report to the Security Council by April 1st, 1948 any failure to set up one or other of the Provisional Councils of Government - and also keep the Secretary-General informed



for communication to the Members of the United Nations. There is thus a combined operation between the projected Commission and the Security Council and this British policy might impede. The United Kingdom Government could argue, of course, that the Commission does not have to be on the soil of Palestine itself in order to report back to the Security Council. But in view of Section 4 as a whole calling for consultations, the selecting and establishing of Governmental Councils and specifying the general direction of concrete activities in Palestine, it is difficult to believe that such a contention would carry weight.

We have always expected the Security Council to act in this matter, even if peace and security are not previously violated, on or after April 1st in order to fill a vacuum which must exist internationally in the partitioned Arab areas of Palestine. Mr. Creech-Jones' statement does not fit in with this expectation and may have been designed to undermine it. We shall have to make clear that the disposition of Arab territory so integrally bound up with that of the new Jewish State is a matter to us of the most profound concern. It is not to our interest that there be a breach in this phase of the United Nations programme.

The issue is one which should be further examined and upon which steps by the Jewish Agency for Palestine may have to be taken at once.



THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

PERMANENT HOME ADDRESS:

133 Lowther Avenue,  
Toronto, Canada.

NEW YORK ADDRESS:

The Barbizon-Plaza Hotel,  
101 West 58th Street,  
New York, New York.

June 9, 1948.

My dear Dr. Silver:

Until June 15th I shall remain in and around the office in order to send a parting word to various United Nations officials and Government people with whom I have been in touch in the course of our work here.

Meanwhile I want to express my deep appreciation of your own generous remarks at the meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency on Monday evening. As I said at the time, I don't deserve comment of that kind. It is, nevertheless, heartening to be told that in a small way I have been able to be of some use to those of you who have borne major responsibilities at a turning point in Jewish and world history.

Do please convey my greetings to Mrs. Silver.

With renewed thanks and every good wish,

Yours sincerely,

*Lionel Gelber*

Lionel Gelber

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,  
Chairman, American Section,  
The Jewish Agency for Palestine,  
c/o The Temple,  
105th Street and Ansel Road,  
Cleveland, Ohio.

LG:eb