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Jewish Agency, "K", 1947-1948.

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To: Members of the Executive 2/28/1947

Re: Palestine and the United Nations

I. Procedure: a) Security Council. That the British Government may try to submit the Palestine problem to the Security Council of the UN is hardly conceivable. Indeed the only possible course for such an action would be to invoke Art. 34 and 35/1 of the Charter: "The Security Council may investigate (and any Member of the UN may bring to the attention of the Security Council) any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security". Palestine is a Mandate under British rule and Great Britain can hardly assert to have on the subject a "dispute" with another State, nor can she lodge a complaint against somebody to have created there a "situation" likely "to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security". The question "who has created this situation" would arise immediately and - as reasonably mither the Jews or Arabs of Palestine nor the Jewish Agency or any of the Arab States or the United States of America could be the objects of a British complaint - such a step would mean that Great Britain is accusing herself ... While an Arab State or even any other State Member of the UN may of course at any time submit the Palestine problem to the Security Council on the basis of Art. 34 and 35/1 of the Charter, it is extremely unlikely that Great Britain could do so at the present moment.

b) <u>General Assembly</u>: As for the General Assembly, the situation appears different but here too the procedure would not be so much easier. The normal course for Great Britain in the case of Palestine would be either a) to announce that she intends to grant Palestine the status of independence (as she has done for Transjordan) or b) to propose a new trusteeship agreement (for instance a time-limited one leading to final independence). In the latter case the procedure is provided for in Art. 77, 79, 81 (83 in case of establishment of "strategic areas") and 85 of the Charter. But according to Mr. Bevin's statement none of these two alternatives is envisaged. The British Government does not announce the granting of independence for Palestine nor do they intend at

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the present moment to submit to the United Nations any draft agreement for a trusteeship or any other proposal for a final solution of the Palestine problem. All they want is as Mr. Bevin put it - to make the United Nations "consider" and "decide" whether Palestine is to be a) a Jewish State or b) an Arab State with safeguards for the Jews or c) a Palestinian State in which the interests of both communities are as carefully balanced as possible. "We as the Mandatory Power" asserted Bevin "cannot solve that problem until the United Nations have recommended which of these three alternatives is to form the basis of the future organisation of Palestine. We as the Mandatory Power have no power to make that decision."

(It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the value of this surprising "legal" argument of Mr. Bevin nor the fact that without actually "deciding" he gave however in his vicious speech in advance the British reply to all these questions. Nor is it intended to analyse here the question - which could be ventilated usefully by our legal advisers - whether, in view i.a. of Art. 80 of the Charter, the General Assembly may be legally entitled to decide such a question without requesting, for instance, the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion (art. 96/1 of the Charter).)

What matters now is an immediate and practical question: which article of the Charter can be invoked by the British Government when approaching the United Nations on the subject of Palestine on the basis outlined by Mr. Bevin? As far as I can see it the one which certainly could apply is Art. 10 running as follows: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter and ... make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters".

c) <u>Special session of the General Assembly</u>: This question having been apparently considered it may be noted that according to Art. 20 of the Charter a special session of the General Assembly can be convoked by the Secretary-General "at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations". For reasons already mentioned it seems most unlikely that the British Government would approach the <u>Security Council</u> on the subject. The only way to have a special session of the General

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5.6.4

Assembly (for instance in May or June next) - arranged in a simplified manner with reduced delegations etc. - would therefore be to induce a majority of the States Members of the UN to make such a request to the Secretary-General. There is <u>prima facie</u> no reason to believe that if the British Government really wants to provoke such a decision they would have to face any serious difficulty.


II. The British Attitude: In comparing the stand taken by the British in 1937 and 1939 at the League of Nations with that taken now (in connection with the United Nations) it may be of interest to note certain analogies. For instance: already in 1937 the British Government (and the Royal Commission) tried to make admit the League of Nations that the Palestine Mandate is "unworkable". This thesis - the legal consequences of which would be very far-reaching - has not been admitted by the League of Nations. But in 1937 the British Government asserting that the Mandate is "unworkable" approached the League of Nations in proposing partition as a final solution. The League has indeed authorised the British Government to solve the problem finally on the basis of partition. In other words: without accepting the thesis of an objective "unworkability" of the Mandate the League however agreed that a final solution based on partition could be considered as one conform/to the spirit of the Mandate. Now this stand taken by the League of Nations was not at all what the British Government really desired (the real aim was to make admit the League first that the Mandate is "unworkable" and later on to make it admit that partition is "impracticable"). It was for that reason that in 1939 the British Government tried with the already dying League another trick: to make her admit that the Jewish National Home as provided for in the Mandate is already established and that the policy laid down in the White Paper of 1939 is therefore quite conform to the dispositions of the Mandate. But, as it is known, this trick has not succeeded either because of the remarkable resistance opposed to it by the Permanent Mandates Commission. What the British Government is trying now with the United Nations is exactly the same thing. Only the methods are different, the main difference being that they would like to get first a decision of principle and only then submit their own proposal i.e. some second or third edition of the White Paper 1939 combined with the Morrison and Bevin plans. (It is quite clear that Great Britain is prepared to use within the United Nations all her influence in support of the Arab demands as an alternative to her own

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proposals.)

<u>III____Qur_defence</u>. Under such circumstances and in view of the fact that the United Nations can and will not handle the matter from a legal point of view (based on the stipulations of the old Mandate) but from a purely political one we shall have to use tactics and to formulate our demands in a way quite different not only from what we used with the League of Nations (although the experience we won there will remain of greatest value) but also very different from all we have tried when discussing recently with the British or American Governments. To give an example: I wonder whether the negative position as expressed in the political resolutions of the last Zionist Congress against any kind of trusteeship could under present circumstances be maintained. There are many other similar questions to be considered and I shall try to revert to them in a separate paper.

Geneva, February 28th, 1947.



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APRIL 14, 1947

Via

DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA 41 EAST \$2nd St.

C O P

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MEMO from LONG ISLAND ZIONIST REGION 163-18 JAMAICA AVENUE, JAMAICA 5, N.Y. JAMAICA 6-6232

May 12, 1947

To: Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

Please find attached a copy of my letter of today to Hugo Valentin, of Uppsala, Sweden, in regard to the possibility of Swedish participation in the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Palestine. The contents of my letter are self-explanatory.

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Franz J. Katz

LONG ISLAND ZIONIST REGION ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA 163-18 Jamaica Avenue, Jamaica 5, N. Y.

May 12, 1947.

Eocent Hugo Valentin Kyrkogårdsgatan 29 Uppsala, Sweden.

Dear Docent Valentin:

Re.: Eumors on the Possibility of Swedish Participation in the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Palestine

From an usually well informed and at all times most reliable Swedish source, speculation has emanated to the effect that Sweden, if represented on the Falestine Enquiry Convision, may appoint Supreme Court Judge Buil Sandström, of Stockholm. My source added that Sandström, if chosen by Sweden, may even head the Commission, if the latter will turn out to consist of the Small Nations exclusively. With regard to both angles, my source, which wishes to remain anonymous, stressed that the points made represent pure speculation and are supenced as a logical likelihood, not based on any sort of authentic advance information.

Under the circumstances, you may deter it appropriate and feasible to take advantage of this informal suggestion and, possibly, to supply Judge Conditions with some information and literature on the subject of Falestine. The latter, I was given to understand, is not altogether alien to bis, due to his tenure of office in Cairo, with the International Court there.

I as conveying this mere runor to you on the chance that it may be a correct hint. Of course, I cannot assume any responsibility for the suggestion. Should I receive any further suggestions, hints or actual information on this point, from the above or any other competent source, I shall hasten to convey it to you. I may add that Swedish circles here indicated that the Swedish Government immediations is not particularly anxious for Swedish membership on the Falestine Commission, let alone chairmanship.

With Zion's Greetings and cordial regards to you all.

Franz J. Kata

CC: Mr. H. G. Turits, Göteborg Red. Daniel Brick, Stockholm Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver Mr. Haanuel Neumann TO: Executive of the Jewish Agency

May 26, 1947

FROM: Dr. M. Kahany

Re: Composition of the Secretariat of the Special Commission for Palestine

In my memorandum of yesterday (22 May, p.1, par.3) I named the senior members of the United Nations Secretariat who up to that day were appointed to the Secretariat of the Special Commission.

I just learned that some important last minute changes have occurred today (and others may occur still before the departure of the Special Commission). Both W. Epstein (Canada) and S. Mahmond (Egypt) members of the Middle East and African Section in the Department of Security Council Affairs are said to have been eliminated from the list of the Secretariat of the Special Commission. Instead of them Monsieur H. Vigier (France), Senior Officer of the General Political Division has been appointed to act as first assistant of the principal secretary of the Commission (Dr. A. G. Robles, Mexico). According to my information this change has been provoked by Dr. Victor Hoo who - as already noted in my memorandum of yesterday - is, as he told me, "extremely anxious to safeguard the entire impartiality of the Secretariat of the Commission". I was told that it was he who asked the Secretary-General to eliminate these two gentlemen, the one Jewish the other Arabic. The elimination of Epstein is extremely regrettable because among all the members of the Secretariat so far appointed he was the only one really familiar with the whole problem. It is significant that although his inclusion was very strongly supported by his chief, Dr. Robles and although he is a Canadian his apparently final elimination could not have been prevented.

Monsieur H. Vigier was, for fifteen years before the war, member and then assistant chief of the Political Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations. Remaining during the war in Geneva with the skeleton Secretariat of the League of Nations he acted as its deputy Secretary-General. In September last he was appointed "Senior Officer" (in fact assistant-director) of the General Political Division in the United Nations Secretariat. He is a man of high intellectual and moral standards and very independent. As the Palestine problem has been handled in the League of Nations Secretariat exclusively by the Mandates Section, Vigier has never before dealt with it. On the other side he ignored until today (Friday, May 23rd) that he would be appointed to the Secretariat of the Special Commission and he had therefore no time to prepare himself for this mission. I am in friendly personal relations with him since many years and he was an attentive reader of the French bulletin "Informations de Palestine" edited by us in Geneva. His approach to Zionist aspirations was always a friendly one but his interest for the Jewish and Palestine problems was, of course, a rather limited one. From my last conversations with him I have the impression that he is inclined to consider partition as the only practical solution. I know that he has studied quite recently -- and for the first time -- the French translation of the report of the Palestine Royal Commission 1937. (He knows English pretty well). Anyhow he is a first-class man, entirely openminded and objective, and his influence within the Commission will certainly be a very considerable one. He naturally will bear in mind also certain

particular French interests in the matter.

Astonishingly enough another former member of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, the Norwegian, P. Anker, who was from 1931 until 1946 member of the Mandates Section of the League and who in September last has been appointed assistant-director of the Trusteeship Department of the United Nations, has not been appointed to the Special Commission. This, in spite of the fact that he is the only real expert in the matter in the United Nations Secretariat. He has been appointed, it is true, as Secretary of the United Nations Commission proceeding on June 19th next to the United States -- Trusteeship territory of Samoa. In view of the change in the composition of the Staff referred to above the possibility of shifting Anker to the Special Commission for Palestine remains perhaps still open.



FROM: Dr. M. Kahany

RE: SPECIAL COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE

1. The first meeting of the Special Commission attended by only five of the eleven members already nominated (the other six being en route and represented for the time being by the permanent U.N. delegates of their countries here) has immediately revealed how difficult the task of this commission will be before they will become a really working team. Out of the twenty-two members and their alternates, there are some fifteen who never before had met. With very few exceptions (e.g. the Swedish members: Chief Justice Emil Sandstrom was during several years in Cairo a member of the Parity Tribunal for the Suez Canal, his alternate, Dr. Paul Mohn is well acquainted both. with the problem of refugees and displaced persons and with the situation in the Middle East; Karel Lisicky, the Czechoslovakian member was for several years an official in the Political Section of the League of Nations Secretariat and is well acquainted with international politics (although he had never before dealt particularly with the Palestine problem or Middle East affairs) but his alternate will be a man who sojourned in Palestine several times and is an expert in Near East affairs; Nasrollah Entezam, the Iranian, participated in the proceedings of the Special session of the Assembly and his alternate is also a kind of expert in Near East affairs; Mr.J.D.L. Hood, the Australian, Dr. Jorge Garcia Granados, the Guatemalian, Dr. Josa Brilej, the Yugoslavian and Prof. E.R. Fabregat, the Uruguayan, have all at least attended the Special Session of the Assembly in New York) the bulk of the members and their alternates have never before met each other.

2. As far as liaison "with the interested parties" is concerned it has to be noted that two British observers (Mr. Beeley and Mr. C.H. MacGillivray) and one Arab observer (Faris-el-Khoury from Syria) made their appearance at the first (very short) public meeting of the Special Commission. None of them, however, have been present at the three hours private meeting. Faris-el-Khoury asked the Secretary-General informally whether he could step into the private meeting but was informed that only the commission itself could decide whether they will admit "observers" of governments members of the U.N. As a matter of fact, the only formal request concerning a "liaison" made so far was that of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Neither the British Government nor the Arab Higher Committee nor any of the Arab States or other member states of the U.N. have presented formal requests to be admitted as "observers" or asked for the establishment of any kind of liaison between them and the Commission. In the first private meeting Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the U.N .-who is taking a very active part in the debates-pronounced himself categorically against the admission of any "observers". The delegate of Australia agreed that the Commission could not

admit "observers" to their private or secret meetings but pointed out that this rule shouldn't prevent the Commission from establishing some "appropriate liaison" with the Mandatory Power in Palestine as well as with the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee. They should be enabled, he said, to be at the disposal of the Commission which will certainly have to consult them on various points of procedure and substance. The question of how this liaison will be established has been left open for the time being. I am not going into the other details of these preliminary exchanges of views - the itinerary of the Commission and the question of investigations in Europe has not yet been touched upon in the plenary meeting - which have already been mentioned in oral reports.

All the members of the Commission received yesterday three "working 3. papers" prepared by the UN-Secretariat. These are: Volume I (82 pages) containing a list of documents available to each of the members in the special "reference library on Palestine" together with a "subject index" to these documents. (I had the opportunity to review this list and to complete it in certain respects) Volume II. (356 pages and 11 maps) contains a survey of "the principal documents of governments and recognized agencies suggesting solutions of the Palestine question and reactions thereto" (i.e. reactions of the League of Nations, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee, the Arab States. This survey is - so far as I could judge it on the basis of certain drafts I have seen (and sometimes corrected) last year and after a first glance on the whole document as standing now - a very serious, objective and complete piece of work. The eleven maps enclosed in this volume are taken from the report of the Peel Commission (two) from the report of the Woodheadpartition Commission (three) and from the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (six). Volume III. (294 pages) contains a "general background survey" giving the essential data on geography, history, population, (including immigration) languages and religion, housing, food and clothing, education, public health, labour, public opinion, political parties, government structure and administration, law and justice, land, agriculture, animal husbandry, transportation and communication, finance, foreign trade, industry, concessions and mining of Palestine.

The sources of this documentation (Vol.III) are: 1. The report of the Palestine Royal Commission. 2. The "Survey of Palestine" prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 by the Palestine Government for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. 3. "Statistical Abstracts of Palestine 1944-45" published by the Department of Statistics of the Government of Palestine and the "Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry."

I have already one copy of each of these three "working papers" - which are so far "restricted" and have been handed to me quite "confidentially" and privately - and I hope to receive one or two more copies within the next few days.

To the list of members of the UN-Secretariat who will compose the Secretariat of the Special Commission already enumerated in my two previous memos the name of Mr. Paul Cremona (Great Britain - Malta) has to be added. He is a member of the Research and Analysis section in the Trusteeship Division of the UN-Secretariat, a British subject of Malta. During the numerous conversartions I had these last days with most of the members of the Secretariat and with some of the members of the Commission I have been asked by most of them whether I am going to Palestine. I told them I am not but that other representatives of the Jewish Agency who serve as liaison will be there; but that I shall be in Geneva and shall try to do my best there. They all said - and I hope it was sincere - that they will be very pleased to see me in Geneva. I think indeed that the real work of the Commission will be done in Geneva. There are among the members of the Commission some old acquaintances of mine and I have several friends among the members of the Secretariat.



CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO # 21

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5/28,47

AHS

THE QUESTIONS AND ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE

> Observations by Jacob Robinson

1) Concerning the composition of the Special Committee and its terms of reference, the General Assembly of May 15, 1947, resolved that:

> "... 2. The Special committee shall have the widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine..." (A/P.V. 79, p.111)

While "the widest powers" were spelled out in paragraph 4 "all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine" were not itemized or clearly defined.

2) It is interesting to note that the single exception to this statement involves the issue of religious interests. Indeed, paragraph 5 of the Resolution invites the Special Committee to "give most careful consideration to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity."

Religious interests, it is true, were considered perpetual by the Mandate; yet articles 13 and 14 of the Mandate were never carried out even though, concerned as they are with "the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Falestine," they involve a far more restricted area than the term "religious interests." We should take particular cognizance therefore of the fact that paragraph 5 (referred to above) was included in the terms of reference of the Special Committee, in spite of the statements frequently reiterated at the various Assembly meetings that nothing mandatory is implied in the terms of reference. (See, for instance, Mr. Johnson's statement in A/C.1 P.V. 53, p.2).

1) "The special committee shall conduct investigations in Falestine and wherever it may deem useful, receive and examine written or oral testimony, whichever it may consider appropriate in each case, from the mandatory power, from representatives of the population of Palestine, from Governments and from such organizations and individuals as it may deem necessary..." 3) Mr. Romulo, who has been a regular attendant at all United Nations meetings since San Francisco made the following statement in the General Assembly:

"The Members of the special committee of inquiry, I take it, have an unwritten mandate, apart from the terms of reference which we may finally approve, to take due account of all the statements and declarations made here and in committee in the course of their work."

(A/P.V.78, p.106)

It is, therefore, obvious that the members of the Special Committee will be scanning the Minutes of the Assembly, First Committee, and the General Committee to ascertain a proper definition for this formula "of all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine." They will have to establish the general sentiment of the future Assembly in order to avoid unnecessary criticism for omissions or additions.

However, it is obvious that the Commission is not bound to consider every issue raised during the Special Session. Yet it will certainly be difficult for them, in view of the fact that so many members remained noncommittal, to ascertain the genuine sentiments of the Assembly. Nevertheless acquiescence in vetos may give them a clue to what the sentiment actually is more perhaps than statements made during the meetings of the Assembly. They will also be faced with the difficulty of what to do with the points stressed only by the two contending parties. Should they be ignored and, if so, to what extent?

4) It is obvious that should the Special Committee wish to produce an unassailable document, it will have to take into consideration the following factors:

a) The historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine.

- b) The Balfour Declaration.
- c) The Mandate.

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d) Restriction of Land Development,

e) The Problem of the Jewish National Home and the Jewish State,

f) The Jewish Catastrophy,

g) The Problem of Refugees, DPs, and Immigration,

h) The Feisal-Weizmann agreement,

i) Arab War Effort during the World War I.

j) Pledges to Arabs during World War I.

Out of these elements, presented in the Assembly from both viewpoints, some may be considered of minor importance, but those whose study was asked for by the two parties can hardly be ignored.

It seems that there should be no opposition on our part to a full discussion of all these complex factors in the situation.

5) In its search for a solution, the Special Committee will be unable to ignore the following additional factors:

- a) The present situation,
- b) Potentialities in Palestine,
- c) Possibilities of Arab-Jewish Cooperation,
- d) The Influence of any solution on Peace and Progress in the Near East,

e) Religious interests,

f) Interests of all Inhabitants (eliminated from the Terms of Reference),

g) Strategy and Oil.

6) In discussing the solutions it will have to decide the following questions:

a) Should there be a final settlement at this moment?

b) And if so, which one?

They will further have to bear in mind the discussion on the various solutions during the Assembly including a Jewish State in all of Palestine, an Arab State in all of Palestine, a Bi-national State, Partition, and Trusteeship.

Strangely enough, no one suggested the continuation of the Mandate. Trusteeship was suggested merely as a solution for the transition period. But above all, the problem of independence was discussed and two men, representing the extremes of modern political thought made practically the same statements in regard to independence. They are Gromyko:

> "... not one... expressed any doubt as to the final task, which is a solution allowing the creation of an independent state of Palestine." (A/C.1/P.V. 53, p.11)

and Aranha, in his concluding speech, pointed out that the idea of independence, while not mentioned in the text is the ultimate goal:

> "... we are agreed, without a dissenting voice, that the Committee shall bear in mind that independence shall be the goal of any proposed plan for the future government of Palestine. Independence is not only the very aim of the Mandate and a natural right of the Palestinian people; it is, above all, the objective of the United Nations and the best guarantee of peace and security."

(A/P.V.79, p.131).

May 29,1947.

TO: Mr. Enanuel Meumann

CC: Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

FROM: Frans J. Lats 74

RE.: Report from Hugo Valentin, President, Swedish Zionist Association, on Interview with Hon. Emil Sandström, Swedish Member, United Mations Commission of Inquiry on Palestine

ORANDUM

Today, I received another letter from Valentin. The letter is dated May 26th. Its contents throw a somewhat different and, I would say, not totally discouraging light on the attitude of Sandström.

The following excerpts (translated) are quoted from Valentin's letter and have also been communicated to Mr. Arthur Lourie of the Jewish Agency:

"Sandström received me yesterday. He was extraordinarily cordial. Our conversation lasted two hours and was most intensive, particularly on my part. I utilized the occasion to present to him copies of my most recent books, "The Destiny of the Jewish "copie," which you know, and "The Paleshine Problem" (1947) of which a Danish translation was published lately. Frior to his trip, de did not want any heavy books, such as "falestime, A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies" (Esco Foundation). However, today I shall send him some lesser writings, by Weismann, etc., for introductory purposes.

"He is not against us at all, but knows very little about the Jewish question and the Falestine issue, not more than the educated average Swede. Tog him, the primary issue is: How can one establish peace between the 'ews and the Arabs? Consequently, not: How can one help the Jewish people? However, one could hardly ask that he should view the thing through our eyes. From our angle, he represents a still unwritten page. Gonsequently, I do not share the views of Dr. Fischler that his appointment is lamentable. It would be a truism to emphasize the importance of supplying the Commission with suitable literature, such as the above-mentioned books, published by the Esco Foundation, &c."

Contact with Sendstren during his New York Stay

Under the circumstances, I deem it advisable to supply Sandström with two or three highly condensed pieces of literature, such as "Lioniam and the Arab World," "The Jewish Agency "emorandum to the Anglo-American Commission" and, if it is not too flamboyant as an introductory missile, "The Arab War "ecord."

I shall send these pieces to Sandström at his New York address, with a brief, purely personal and cordial note, making reference to Valentin and written in Swedish. A close friend of mine who is very friendly with Sandström will further advise me in the matter.

I take occasion to thank you for your cordial letter of May 27. I have been trying to phone you but, also, not very processfully!

CONFIDENTIAL

New York, 30 May 1947

To: Executive of the Jewish Agency

From: Dr. M. Kohany

Re: Special Commission for Palestine (III)

1. The "Working Papers". The three "working papers" prepared for the Special Commission by the UN-Secretariat (and briefly referred to in my previous memo of 27 May) have been distributed (on May 26th) not only to the members of the Special Commission but also to the diplomatic (or consular) representatives in New York of all the states members of the UN. The representatives of the Arab States received thus these papers officially on May 26th or 27th already. These documents are still "restricted" i.e. not released to the press or the public. I was told that representatives of the Arab office here qualified these "working papers", especially Volume II, as a biased and one-sided presentation of the Palestine problem "which could have been issued as well by the Jewish Agency for Palestine." (This assertion is of course absolutely unfounded. The objectivity of the "working papers" is on the contrary an excessive one and many quotations from official documents which are very important from our point of view are omitted therein). It may be that the Syrian representative Faris-el-Khoury who was received by Mr. Trygve Lie on Wednesday 28th May has expressed some dissatisfaction with these working papers. It seems however pretty sure that the Arabs will decide to cooperate with the Special Commission after having tried to exercise on its members and the Secretariat the heaviest possible pressure

Later in the afternnon of the same day (28 May) when Mr. Lie received Mr. Emanuel Neumann he told him that as the "working papers" have been released to the Arabs he gave instructions to remit also two sets of these documents to the Jewish Agency (we have received them already).

2. The Question of "Liaison". This matter has been discussed with Mr. Lie by Mr. Neumann. Mr. Lie explained that the decision is with the Commission and will not be taken before next week. It was however clear from what Mr. Lie told Mr. Neumann that some kind of permanent liaison with the three "interested parties" is envisaged although all of them will be excluded from participation in the (private or secret) Executive meetings of the Special Commission. As far as hearings <u>in camera</u> are concerned -- a question raised by Mr. Neumann --Mr. Lie expressed the opinion that the Commission may agree to show to the Jewish Agency the stenographic minutes of any of such hearings and give them the right to make written observations. Mr. Lie referred Mr. Neumann for further discussion of this question to Dr. Hoo and in accordance with Mr. Neumann's wish (together with Mr. Kenen) have seen Dr. Hoo the next day.

Dr. Hoo (personal representative of the Secretary General with the Special Commission) outlined as follows the "liaison" they have in mind:

a) There will be "complete equality" between the Mandatory Power, the Jews and the Arabs as far as the rights of the respective liaison officers are concerned.

b) He was not yet able to state what these rights will exactly be, but thought that they cannot include participation in executive meetings or the right to see every document (in this connection he said, for instance, the commission may receive documents from various sources confidentially; the Commission may wish to confront the information contained in these documents with the opinion of the Jewish Agency without however showing to the Jewish Agency the original document and indicating to them its authors.)

c) The liaison officer (or his alternates) should serve in the first place as the official source of any information and advice the Commission or its Secretariat may require.

I told Dr. Hoo that in asking for permanent liaison we had not in mind

to hamper the freedom of the Commission to discuss various problems in private executive meetings. We are glad to learn that there will be"complete equality" between the three "interested parties". We are particularly anxious to be helpful and are convinced that a close liaison with us can be of the greatest value to the Commission. I asked whether our liaison officers will be entitled to accompany the Commission on its trips in Palestine and elsewhere and he said that they certainly will. As to documents I proposed to make a distinction between "working papers" of the Secretariat serving as basis of discussion on fixing the procedure of the Commission during its inquiry and documents like those mentioned previously by Dr. Hoo. The former should be released to the liaison officers simultaneously with the members of the Commission while the decision concerning the communication of the latter could remain with the Commission as a whole. In this connection I mentioned to Dr. Hoo the opinion of Mr. Lie concerning hearings in camera. He promised to bear these points in mind and assured me again that there will be complete "equality" for all the three "interested parties". The Commission - which has not met since Monday, the 26th - will meet for the first time with all members present on Monday, June 2nd, and will discuss and decide on the various points of procedure as outlined by the sub-committee. I hope to have the opportunity to approach at Lake Success on Monday most of those members of the Commission who has not yet been approached by us.

3. We have also settled with Dr. Hoo and subsequently with the transportation officer the matter of <u>three seats for Jewish Agency officials</u> proceeding from here to Palestine for liaison purposes on the planes charted by the UN for transportation of the Commission, its staff and ten accredited press correspondents. These three seats have now been granted and the three gentlemen in question will have to proceed on one of the planes supposed to leave New York between June 6th and 10th.

4. <u>Composition of the Secretariat</u>. In making his apparently final decisions concerning the composition of the Secretariat of the Special Commission, Mr. Trygve Lie eventually has dropped from its list also the French H. Vigier, Senior Officer of the General Political Dept. of the Security Council Affairs (see my memo of 22 May). In taking this measure - as well as the previous elimination of W. Epstein and Mahmoud - he has again lowered the quality of the Secretariat of the Commission. M. Vigier is indeed one of the most experienced officials in the UN Secretariat and it is a great pity that he has been eliminated (after vaccination etc.) With the present composition of the Secretariat there is among the senior officials only one whose mother language is English, namely Mr. R. T. Brunche (U.S.A), director of the . Trusteeship Dept. and formerly official of the State Department. Among the Assistant Secretaries there is Mr. P. Cremona(a British subject of Malta who during the last war was employed by the European service of the BBC in London as supervisor of its emmissions in Italian). Mr. Alexander attached recently to the Social Dent of the UN Secretariat and appointed to the Special Commission as "administrative officer" (allegedly to deal only with questions of accommodations. salaries and financial arrangements), Mrs. M. Krakie (who together with W. Epstein has prepared the documentation and part of the "working papers") are both British and a British educated Australian, Jan Milner.


I think therefore that these persons - especially Mr. Brunche and Mr. Cremona will be busy with the preparation of the various drafts of the Commission. Nevertheless the most important part of the Secretariat work will be done by Dr. Hoo, Dr. Robles and Mr. Stavropoulos. The que tion of language will of course play a certain role also within the Commission itself. The Australian, Canadian, Indian and also the Swedish and Dutch memberswill be more able to participate in the drafting work that the six other members whose knowledge of English is rather limited.


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5. The Presidency of the Commission. A week ago, I asked Mr. Papouck, the Permanent delegate of Czechoslovakia to support one of the South Americans as president of the Commission by recommending especially the Uruguayan member (the Peruvian Uloa will not be able to go to Palestine where he will be replaced by the Peruvian Ambassador in Rome, but he will come to Geneva) In the meantime I have heard that the Yugoslav member intends to propose the Guatemalian Granadod as president and if this would not be accepted to propose a weekly rotation for the presidency. I don't think that the proposals of the Yugoslav if really put forward will have very much chance. It seems much more probable that the majority of the Commission will favor as president the Swedish Judge Sandstrom. In such a case, the Guatemalian may be elected vice-president and perhaps the Czechoslovakian or the Dutch rapporteur. 6. <u>The "documentation" of the members of the Commission</u>. Besides the three "working papers" all the members of the Commission have received through the Secretariat: a copy of the report of the Peel Commission, a copy of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and a copy of the Jewish Agency's "Book of Documents".

It is now necessary - a task in which we are involved - to supply the Commission with a comprehensive paper about the nature of the Jewish problem in general and the problem of European Jewry and the displaced persons in particular. Volume III of the "working papers" (pp. 7-35) contains, it is true, excerpts from the reports of the Peel Commission and the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry dealing with these subjects but it seems to me that this material has to be amplified and rectified in a proper way by a special memorandum of the Jewish Agency and of course also by its oral statements in Jerusalem.

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MEMORAFDUM

61 East 95th Street New York 28, W.Y. June 1, 1947.

TO: Mr. Emenual Foumann; CC:/Dr. Abba Hillel Silver (c/o Mr. Harry Shapire)

FROM: Frans J. Kats 21

RE/:

Zionist Background Material Presented to Justice Emil Sandström, Swedish Member, United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Palestine

Tonight, shortly after ten o'clock, I learned of Justice Sandströn's whereabonts in New York.

As indicated in my letter of May 29, I proceeded to provide Sandström with some beokground material. I sent him one copy of the Jewish Agency's "Zionism and the Arab World," and a copy of the Jewish Agency's Memorandum to the Anglo-American Committee. However. I had grave doubts about the suitability of the Christian Palestine Committee's "Arab War Effort." I finally decided against including the latter and substituted the "Harrison Report," which covers one of the most controversial angles and treats it in a dignified manner.

My note to Sandström is exceedingly brief, somewhat impersonal and written in Swedish. A copy of the original letter is attached herewith; the translation follows:

"The undersigned has received a letter from Docent Hugo Valentin, of Uppsala. In connection with Your Honor's appointment as delegate to the 18th Commission of Inquiry on Falestine, Docent Valentin stated that you are particularly interested in the restoration of Judaeo-Arab peace.

"I therefore take the liberty of enclosing herewith three memoranda which ought to prove useful, particularly because of their condensed presentation of the background of the Palestine problem.

Most respectfully yours, &c."

Upon completion of my letter, I immediately dashed over to Sandström's hotel and, in Sandström's absence, I left the (sealed) envelope with the desk clerk.

Unless His Honor returned either deadly tired or dead-drunk, there is all reason to assume that he took a look at our material before retiring in which case we got our licks in before the otners. And, this, I am sure, is all I could do in the matter, I duly informed Mr. Arthur Lourie of the above.

Encl.

P.S. Contrary to erronecus press reports, Sandström is WOT "Chief Justice," but merely "Justice," his title being "Justitieradet." FRANZ J. KATZ

61 East 95th Street New York 28, W.Y. Res.: SA. 2 - 7841) Bff.: JA. 6 - 6232) phones June 1, 1947.

Justitierådet Buil Sandström United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Palestine Hotel Robert Fulton 228 West 71st Street New York 23, N.Y.

Undertecknad har mottagit ett brev från docent Huge Valentin. i Uppsala. Docent Valentin nämnde i samband med Justitierådets utnämning till delegat vid den 18:e Undersökningskommissionen för Palestina att Fi var särskild interesserad i återställandet av en judisk-arabisk fred.

Jag tar mig därför friheten att sända Eder två memoranda som torde vara av värde, franför allt på grund av att de ger en koncentrerad bakgrund till Palestinaproblemet.

Mad utmärkt högaktningf

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Encl.

Franz J. Kata

Franz J. Katz 61 E.95th St. New York 28, N.Y.





Dr. Abba Hillel Silver c/o Mr. Harry Shapiro American Zionist Emergency Council 342 Madison Avenue New York 17, N.Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

New York, June 4, 1947

TO: EXECUTIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY

FROM: DR. M. KAHANY

* . . .

RE: Special Committee on Palestine (1V) To the question of "Liaison Officers",

This question has been discussed first by a "working group" of the Committee composed of those members already present in New York during the previous week and then by the Committee itself in a private meeting preceding the final decision taken of June 2nd. Various opinions expressed in the working group have been presented to the full Committee in the following alternative formulations:

I. <u>Public meetings:</u> such officers may;a)attend public meetings but may not address the Committee unless so requested by the Chairman;b) may be invited to sit with the Committee and may participate in its debates when so authorised by the Chairman. In the discussions precedence shall be accorded to Members of the Committee; c) may sit with the Committee with full rights to participate in its proceedings without vote.

II. <u>Private Meetings</u>: a) no admission; b) in exceptional cases the Committee may permit the liaison officers to attend without the right to participate in the debate; c) they may be invited to attend and may participate in the debate when so authorised by the Chairman.

III. <u>Presentation of Witnesses:</u> a) the liaison officers may submit to the Committee names of witnesses whom they wish the Committee to interrogate; b) they may also submit in written form questions they desire the Committee to ask of any witness. The Committee shall decide upon their relevance and importance and itself address the question to the witness.

IV. Precedence: in both the discussions of the Committee and the interrogation of witnesses, precedence shall be accorded to members of the Committee.

After a lengthy discussion all the proposals going more into detail have been dropped and the Committee agreed upon the following vague and general rule: "The Mandatory Power, the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine may appoint liaison officers to the Committee who shall supply such information or render such assistance as the Committee may require. The liaison officers may, <u>suo motu</u>, present at the discretion of the Committee such information as they may think advisable."

It was indeed a general consensus that it is not possible to know how things will develop and that it is much better not to make any rigid rule in advance but to frame the rule in such a way that the Committee in the course of its inquiry may be free to decide the matter in accordance with the needs. It was however understood that the liaison officers shall, in principle, not attend the executive (private) meetings of the Committee, that they shall not sit with the Committee - i.e. at the table of the Committee - during public meetings and that there shall be "absolute equality" of rights for the liaison officers of all three interested parties. (I learned i.a. that the Palestine Government intended to prepare in the YMCA building in Jerusalem where the Committee will hold its sessions a room "for information and reference" with officials of the Palestine Government at the disposal of the Committee. The Committee however expressed the wish that there should be no office and no officials of the Palestine Government in the rooms reserved for their work.) For the time being the tendency of the Committee is to keep aloof and to call on the "liaison officers" every time the Committee considers it necessary. The "liaison officers" are of course entitled to present all suggestions or requests they consider necessary.

From what I heard from some of the members of the Committee (the Czechoslovakian, the Swedish and the Peruvian members) I have the feeling that the arrangement is a satisfactory one and that by handling the liaison in a tactful manner we can obtain in fact much more than what is contained in the vaguely phrased sentence.

<u>Rules of Procedure</u>: The Committee has elected - as foreseen- the Swedish member as President and the Peruvian as the Vice-President. Although the rules foresee also the election of a Rapporteur they abstained from this election. The reason is that they want to participate for the time being <u>in corpore</u> in the forming of their decisions and they want also to see who in the course of their inquiry will show the best ability for the function of a rapperteur. One of the more important rules of procedure - there are so far 31 rules and they can always be amended in the course of their inquiry by a simple majority of the members present and voting - is rule 9(and 10) saying that "meetings of the Committee and of its sub-committees shall be held in public unless the Committee (or the sub-committee) decides otherwise. This rule, I was told by the above mentioned members applies especially to the hearings of witnesses and the Committee has the intention to hear all the witnesses in public. In case of hearings <u>in camera</u> they are prepared to grant special rights - permission to be present or to see the minutes - to the liaison officers. How far the good intentions prevailing here will work actually during the inquiry is difficult to foresee.

<u>Departure</u>. Before the departure there may be still one open meeting perhaps Friday. They have no meetings Wednesday and Thursday and Friday is the deadline for the/communications from the organizations or individuals having asked to be heard. The members of the Committee will leave New York on June 11th and their plane will stop somewhere en route for one night.

They will arrive in Palestine deliberately on June 13th (June 12th being Coronation Day and they wanted to avoid participation in official receptions etc.)

It may be added that according to my Information they have receivedin addition to the former requests for hearings- only one new request from the (united?) Jewish Communist Party in Palestine which asked to be heard in Palestine.

They have also received so far about 20,000 (twenty thousand) letters from individual D.P.'s in Germany and elsewhere urging them to visit the D. P.'s camps in Europe.

General Remarks: My impression is that the Commission is on the whole a rather helpless body. I don't think that we can expect very much from them. Some members- like for instance the Indian who is a relatively dynamic fellow- seems to be entirely in the hands of the Arabs. He will be seconded to a certain degree by the Iranian. I am afraid that the Canadian is also rather pro-Arab and (pro-British) while the Australian seems to be a much better man. The Swede is open-minded but being Chairman he will be more impartial than anybody else and the Dutch will naturally follow the British line. The three South-Americans will look for guidance to the State Department. The Czechoslavakian and the Jugoshavian are not very outstanding. The former is a cautious career diplomat who prefers to be silent and discreet and I wonder whether he will be very effective. The latter is not very experienced.

They will be all under various pressures: a) British b) Arab c) USA d) USSR. As matters look now they are hardly directed towards very radical proposals of a solution. None of the four "pressures" just mentioned will be exercised in favor of partition. It is clear that the UK and the USA do not favor partition but rather some kind of time-limited trusteeship. The Arabs are for immediate independence but will oppose a limited trusteeship-less violently than an immediate partition. The attitude of the USSR is well known. In such a situation it will of course be necessary for us (if we want to avoid major disasters) to present some of the members of the Commission very concrete proposals for a final solution enabling them not only to counter-act all these dangerous pressures but to suggest to the Committee the most practical solution which may be acceptable to us. TO: Executive of the Jewish Agency FROM: Dr. M. Kahany

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

New York, 7 June 1947

RE: SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (V)

1. Procedure upon arrival in Palestine.

A few among the members of the Committee, most of the assistant secretaries, the press correspondents and the officials of the Jewish Agency (including myself on my way to Europe) will leave New York on Tuesday (10 June) morning in a plane, to London wherefrom, after a 24 hours stop, they will proceed to Palestine. Another plane taking most of the members (and alternates) of the Committee and the Senior Secretaries will leave on Wednesday (June 11) and proceed to Palestine directly. Both will arrive there on Friday, 13 June and a first (closed) Executive meeting will take place on Sunday, 15 June in Jerusalem. They have decided in principle to use the first week (15-21 June) for touring the country and for "getting some background" concerning the machinery of the administration, the distribution of the population, the reactions of the population to some of the resolutions proposed, etc. Then (about 22 June) they intend to start the hearings and continue this during say two weeks. They will then take their decision concerning the itinerary in Europe. The postponement of any decision on this point proposed by the Indian member, has been agreed upon in a "private conversation" but not discussed in any of the private meetings. They have been told apparently that the Arab states which are in favour of the cooperation could not exercise their influence in this respect of a decision to investigate the position of the Jews in Europe should be taken now.

They have however decided already to go to Geneva to draft their report there.

2. Communications received so far.

Among the communications they have so far received from various organizations and individuals there are (a) a cablegram dated 29 May 1947 from the Central Committee of Liberated Jews in the U.S.A. Zone of Germany "representing over 160,000 Jewish displaced persons, the overwhelming majority of whom hope to resettle in Palestine" inviting the Special Committee to visit the D.P.'s camps in Europe "in order to enable the D.R.'s, to present their views and aspirations directly to the Committee"; (b) 20,728 letters from inmates of Jewish D.P.'s in the U.S.A. Zone asking to facilitate their immigration into Palestine; (c) an offer of "every possible assistance" of the World's Alliance of Young Men's Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) specifying that Mr. A. L. Miller, General Secretary of the Y.M.C.A. in Jerusalem will be glad to afford them this assistance; (d) protestations from the Agudath Israel of France against the refusal of a hearing to Jacob Rosneheim, President of World Agudath Israel "which is the only organization qualified to express the wishes of traditional Juaism"; (e) a booklet of the Hashomer Hatzair exposing their progrom and urging the creation of a bi-national state in Palestine; (f) printed memoranda of the American Jewish Conference, the American Jewish Committee and of the American Council for Judaism; (e) Ziff's book "The Rape of Palestine", various pamphlets, memoranda and letters from the "Hebrew Committee for Liberation", the "American League for a Free Palestine", the "Political Actions Committee", the "Zionist District No.95" and from many other more or less crazy "organizations" or individuals (this enumeration is not exhaustive).

3. The question of "experts".

This question was evoked in the course of an exchange of views about the nature and the extent of "documentation" desired by the members of the Committee. The Swedish Chairman (who was in close touch Messrs. Beeley and MacGillivray) has herd "from them that a great lot of information" has been prepared by the Palestine authorities and will be submitted to the Special Committee on their arrival in Palestine. He mentioned in this connection a "suggestion" (without saying by whom it was made) that the special committee might secure "some independent people who have studied this matter "to furnish them with information. This "suggestion" has been very warmly supported by the Candadian member Judge Rand who thought that at least two men who are authorities on the Palestine problem, its history, the history of the country during the last thirty years could be of great assistance. The Indian delegate supported also this suggestion adding however that the two gentlemen to be chosen "from two different groups." This was also supported by the Dutch member while the Australian was much more reserved. The Canadian member said that he would be able at a later stage to propose certain names of "men who are really scholars on this question." The status of such experts was also discussed and it was more or less agreed that they can neither be "co-opted" nor attached to the Committee as "scientific members of the staff" but can be only "expert witnesses and consultants" and serve the Committee as "a kind of oral encyclopedia". It was formally agreed that a definite decision concerning the possible appointment of such experts will be taken in Jerusalem when the Committee will be "better informed" about the written documentation at their disposal. The Canadian member expressed the view that such experts may perhaps be needed more in Geneva than anywhere else. (I have not yet learned which names Judge Rand has in mind.)

During the same exchange of views the Czechoslovakian member asked for more information about the negotiations in London early this year and the last statements of Mr. Bevin in the House of Commons and in the Labor Party Conference while the Dutch member, Dr. Blom. recommended to be included in the Reference Library of the Committee the Information Paper No.20 of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, Chatham House (Mr. Beeley's work).

4. Conversation with the Dutch delegates.

Last Friday (June 6th) I had a one-hour conversation with Dr. Blom and his alternate Mr. Spitz to whom I have been introduced by Dr. Maria Wetteeven, Councellor of the Permanent Delegation of the Netherlands with the UN (an old acquaintance of mine.) Both these gentlemen are very intelligent and experienced and make a very good impression. They confessed frankly that up to the day of their nomination (some two weeks ago) their knowledge of the Palestine problem was not greater than that of an average Dutchman reading newspapers. Mr. Spitz emphasized however that both he and Dr. Blom have a lot of experience with "similar problems" which they had to face in West India. This gave me the opportunity to explain to them how different the problems in Palestine are. I spoke to them in this connection about the Land Transfer Ordinance of 1940 about the Negev (inviting them to visit our new colonies there), the Arab-Jewish relations, the necessity of creation of a Jewish State etc. They put to me a certain number of questions showing that they have already studied some of the problems. Dr. Blom wanted to know whether the Jewish residents in Palestine who are not Palestinians are also discriminated against by the Land Transfer Ordinance and whether this ordinance contains a definition of a "Jew". I spoke to him about the case of Judge Rosenblatt and explained to him by the way why a certain number of Jewish residents in Palestine have not yet applied for naturalisation (he asked me about this too). He was very interested to hear about our new colonies in the Negev while Mr. Spitz asked me "which parts of Transjordan are englobed in Zionist proposals of partition," I explained to him that the plan of partition he has in mind was put forward not by Zionists but by an American non-Jevish group (the Nation's Associates). He then asked whether it would not be possible to have a "union" between a Jewish autonomous province (he actually said "state") and an Arab State englobing Transjordan. I replied that if he really means a Jewish State such a union (or an alliance) is possible and is actually our aim. But the preliminary condition is the creation of an independent Jewish State. He asked whether it would not be sufficient to give to the Jewish province


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full autonomy as far as immigration is concerned and to have otherwise a common central government. I explained to him the impracticability of such a scheme in view of the Arab opposition to any Jewish immigration and many other obstacles. I explained to them - and Dr. Blom seemed to be impressed by the arguments put forward by me - why under the present conditions only the early establishment of a Jewish State would be able to solve both the problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine and that of Arab-Jewish cooperation.

I reminded Dr. Blom of the attitude of the former Dutch members of the Permanent Mandates Commission, Mr. Van Rees and Prof. Van Asbeck. He told me that Prof. Van Asbeck came to see him before his departure and gave him "a lot of material" drawn from the minutes of the Permanent Mandates Commission. (But Dr. Blom has of course not intimated that he will in the same spirit as have these two eminent fellow-countrymen of his...)

They asked also who will assure the liason with them on behalf of the Jewish Agency. I told them that Mr. Shertok will probably direct the work of liason with the cooperation of a certain number of alternates and experts. I named Major Eban, Horowitz for Economic questions and added that some other may be appointed too. I told him that I am going back to Geneva and expressed the hope to meet them there. They asked me also who will appear before the Commission during the hearings from our side and I replied that this will be decided by our Executive meeting in Jerusalem on June 11th. I said that they will most probably hear statements from Mr. David Ben Gurion and that Dr. Weizmann may appear before the Commission as an individual. They asked me many questions about Dr. Weizmann's health, his present activities, etc. I tood them that the Committee when touring the country shouldn't miss to pay a visit to Rehovoth and Dr. Weizmann's Institute.

5. <u>The Indian's lady-secretary</u>. Acting as private secretary to the Indian delegate, Sir Abdur Raman, is an American lady who for several years and during the last Special Session of the General Assembly was secretary to the Syrian delegation with the U.N. Attending all the private meetings of the Committee (she is going to Palestine) and being in constant touch with its members and its secretariat she is of course a first-class informant of the Arabs (who probably continue to pay her). This is of course a cynical and provocative association between the Indian member - who all the time speaks of the necessity to keep away the "parties" - and one of the "interested parties". I understand that Mr. Kenen has tried to play up this story of the secretary of the Indian in the New York press but apparently has not succeeded in it. I would therefore suggest that an appropriate note on this subject may be handed to the "Palestine Post" in Jerusalem and appear there a day or two after the arrival of the Commitee.



Jerusalem June 24, 1947

Dear Mr. Lourie:

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I am profiting by the first free moment since my arrival to send you this note. Even though you may be familiar with the story, I will refer briefly to the course of events since we left New York. Our joint journey from New York to Lydda proved very useful, I think. As you are no doubt aware the government did not pay any special attention to the delegates in London. The same may be said with regard to the United Nations Secretariat there whose lack of diligence caused the delegates a good deal of uneasiness and the Etter were obliged to seek better accommodations and more comfortable hotels for themselves than those arranged by the United Nations. This small detail caused a good deal of irritation on the part of the delegates and also the newspaper men. The latter, as well as the members of the staff, on the other hand, were given much appreciated help by our official press representative (ILK).

Our enforced stay of 12 hours in Malta resulted in unnecessary inconvenience to the delegates and the other passengers. The authorities recognized no special immunity as regards the members of the Committee whose passports, like that of the other passengers, was taken from them until the time of their departure. They were obliged to seek special tickets for food and drink and were accommodated like the others in groups of three in very uncomfortable army barracks. They were not even offered a towel for their use. All this of course was hardly calculated to produce special sympathy for their hosts.

In Jerusalem, on the contrary, all the delegates and the members of the staff as well as the newspaper men, were given excellent accommodations. I had the opportunity on several occassions to speak at length with those people with whom you know that I am acquainted. They are working very hard and are very much interested to study whatever they feel is necessary and useful. They are, moreover, maintaining continuous personal contact and discussion with their colleagues.

As you have probably seen from the newspapers, they have played a very special role in the important resolutions that have been taken so far. They have rejected categorically the idea of any military or police guardianship of their persons and have made it s principle that there shall be freedom of access to the place in which they are staying.

In the same way, they are anxious to conduct their visits as freely as possible. In connection with the governments request that the testimony of the representatives of the Administration be given in closed session, they expressed their opposition and were successful at least to the extent that so far as the Agency was concerned, that body should be consulted as to whether it preferred to be hard in public or private session. The Chairman and some other members were also interested to have the Agency session in camera.

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During the evidence of the Administration they put the witnesses a number of important questions and similarly, during the public evidence of Mr. Shertok. We believe that it was of importance and was well received that the Executive decided that the evidence of the Agency should be presented in public. As you know by now, Shertok's evidence was useful and made an excellent impression.

As regards the death sentences of the three youngsters, they have played a fundamental role pursuing the matter with energy and determination. Their impressions to date of their travels though the country are good and it is evident that the contrast for them is one between civilization and desert.

In general, most of the delegates regard the enormous display of military units in Jerusalem as unjustified. In a number of cases they have made individual trips and were frequently halted for passport inspection.

The Committee has received many letters from institutions and individuals asking to be heard. Among them the detainees in Latrun and Cyprus. In general, it can be said that several delegates have a better understanding now of the necessity for a Jewish state.

As you no doubt know, the work is being carried on here very intensively in preparation for the presentation of our case at the coming hearings. For my part, I have received good information from the Washington office as well as from the other countries with which we are in contact. I have also had the opportunity to discuss various matters with members of the Executive and submitted an oral report of the Organization Department. I have also had the opportunity of visiting different parts of the country.

The Yishuv maintains itself quietly and works extremely hard. Its feeling of self-confidence impresses every one of us and was well noted by the members of the Committee. The Yishuv's reaction to the Committee is in my opinion one of quiet expectation. On the other hand, the anti-Jewish attitude of the Arabs during the recent visits to Arab zones and establishments have left a very disagreeable feeling among some members of the Committee.

But what is really quite evident is that people would like to see clarified as soon as possible the position of the United States. In this connection some of the Delegates were badly impressed by the conversation between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Arab League which as the cables said, was very cordial and promising for the Arabs. In the opinion of some of the Delegates, the American Government should have abstained from discussing this problem which is now in the hands of the United Nations. However, it was thought proper that Dr. Silver thereafter pay the visit he did and thereby presumably had the opportunity to make clear many points of interest.

Moises Toff

MIZRACHI ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

July 8, 1947

Rabbi Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman American Section Jewish Agency for Palestine 16 E. 66th Street New York City

Dear Dr. Silver:

C O P Y

Together with all other Zionist organizations Mizrachi participated today in a meeting called by the newly formed Americans For Haganah, at which meeting a decision was reached to request every national Jewish organization to send a permanent representative to the Advisory Council of this organization.

Mizrachi is certainly interested in supporting a movement which proposes to speak vigorously for the people's Defense Army of Palestine. Before doing so, however, we should naturally like to have the assurance that this organization has the full sanction of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

At the meeting for the formation of the Advisory Council I expressed, in fact, my amazement that neither the Jewish Agency for Palestine nor any representatives of the recognized Zionist organizations are represented on the Executive Committee of Americans For Haganah. It is this strange phenomenon that urges me to request the Jewish Agency for Palestine to convey to all Zionist organizations a clear and guiding statement as to its attitude toward Americans for Haganah.

Hoping to hear from you so that our participation in the above organization may come forth without hesitation, with wholehearted support and undivided enthusiasm, I am

Sincerely yours,

Rabbi Max Kirshblum Executive Vice-President

MK:RS

Q. Kliniov-letter (guly 15, 194) see letty Brodetsky to

CONSTRUCTIVE ENTERPRISES FUND

July 17, 1947

INVESTMENTS.

Out of the total of	20	LP. 98.000/- received up to this day, we invested LP. 63.968.50	

In cash ______ LP. 34.031.50

Our investments:

1. "Conversion" activities on behalf of HAGVED HAZIONI collective settlements		
COTTOR CIAA BEEFTGEBIIER	LP.	. 27.000
2. New Kibbutsim of HAOVED HAZIONI	8	4.000
3. Housing by SHICKUN EZRACHI		13.000
4. IDUD		5.000
5. KUPOTH G'MILATH CHASSADIM (Loans free of interest)		2.000
6. Agricultural school Magdiel		5.000
7. B'HAI ZION		1.000
8. Raanana Development Co.		1.200
9. Party: General Zionists 1.500		
Haoved Hazioni 1.500		3.000
10. Moadonim (General Zionists)		1.800
11. Nov Immigrants		300
12. Administrative expenses		668.50
TOTAL	LP.	63. 968.50

The Zionist Organisation / The Jewish Agency for Palestine Geneva Office

Geneva, July 28th, 1947.

.H.Silver, D.S. Nu

OONFIDENTIAL/

From : Dr. M. Kahany

To : Mr. M. SHERTOK.

1. Arrival of the UNSCOP

The members of the UNSCOP and its senior staff arrived have over the week end and they held a first private meeting this norming in the European seat of the UN.

They started a discussion about the programs of their further work including the question of a possible visit of the D.P's camps. No decision has been taken so far on this point and this debate will be resumed on Wednesday.

I met so far several members of the UNSCOP (the Iranian Entezam, the two Guatemelians, Prof. Fabregat the Uruguayan and the two Dutch, Dr. Bloom and Dr. Spits) and may have the opportunity to see others to-morrow.

The Guatemalian and the Uruguayan are in favour of a visit of the D.P's camps and Prof. Fabragat told me that he believes that the Commission will agree to 2. The Iranian is apparently trying to direct the matter of the D.P's towards the IRO and proposed as a first step some consultation with this organisation. This suggestion will be followed up. The Dutch teld me that they don't believe that they can learn from a visit of the D.P's camps more than it is already known and that the time of the Commission is so short. I explained them that the matter is of the highest importance in view of the close connection between the Palestine problem and the position of European Jewry in general and that of the Jewish D.P's in particular. I stressed the fact that since the visits of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee the problem has changed to the worse beth as far numbers and as far as the morale of the D.P's are concerned.

To their objection that they can hardly learn something new on this matter, I replied furthermore that they certainly has not learned any new things from the representatives of the Arab States in Beyrouth in comparison with what they knew arready from their former statements in New York and still they have been very anxious to make the trip to Beyrouth. To the argument of "short time" I replied that it would be easy to arrange a collective hearing of representatives of the Jewish D.F's in once of the centers of Germany and that travelling by "plane the Commission (or part of it) can accomplish such a hearing within 2-3 days.

Finally I told them that the D.P's are in a state of despair and that a visit of the UNSCOP will give them at least the impression that the United Nations are dealing with their problem and restaure to a certain degree their hope.

The two Dutch agreed that from the "psychological point of view" there is cortainly a point in what I said. I expressed the hope that these "psychological" The Zionist Organisation / The Jewish Agency for Palestine Geneva Office

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Page 2

considerations" will guide the Commission when making their decision.

I shall try to arrange to-day a meeting between the Guatemalian (and perhaps the Uruguayan) and Messrs. Adler-Rudel, Ruffer and myself in order to emphasize to them the importance of the visit of the D.P's campp.

Measrs. Shertok, Eban and Toff are expected to arrive to-day or to-morrow. I am in constant touch with Dr. Goldmann whom I keep informed.

2. The "Exedus" and the IRCC

The International Red Gross Committee being closed down on Saturday and Sunday I succeeded to see one of its members on Monday morning. The purpose was to ask them to send a representative of the IROC to the French port where the "Exodus" passengers will arrive. I explained the matter to Mr. R. de Traz and I was assured by him that they have instructed their delegate in Marseille to be present and to send them a report. The delegate in question will be Mr. Red, a Swiss citizen.

3. I had yesterday the visit of Mr. F.T.B. Friis, from the Foreign Office in Copenhagen and engaged with him on preparatory talks concerning the General Assembly of the UN. Mr. Friis is proceeding to Austria and he will be back in Copenhagen on August 11th.

4. I have sent two communiques to the press here :

a) a note explaining the background of the "Exodus" case and b) the French translation of the letter of the Jewish Agency addressed to Mr. Trygve Lie on July 24th.

MEMORANDUM

FROM I.J. Karpman

July 30, 1947

or abba theat Silver

To: Dr. Ensnuel Noumann

Your cable to Dr. Gelâstein of July 25 regarding the allocation for smallholding farmers is important indeed. According to the accounts which arrived recently from the General Zionist Fund in Palestine,copy of which is enclosed herewith, LP. 64,000.- have already been allocated. Out of this Haoved Hazioni received LP. 32,500.-, Mifdeh Ezrachi received LP. 21.200.- for its various activities, and smaller amounts were allocated to Magdiel, General Zionist Organization and administration.

The Council of Private Jewish Agriculture has received out of this amount LF. 1,000.- only for Mfar Basi Zion. From letters arriving from the Council I have learned that they are discouraged, and they feel that they are not only discriminated by the department of Dr. Pinner, but also by our own organization.

It is imperative to convince our friends in Palestine that this policy of theirs is unjustified and will do harm to our cause. You will recall your conversations with the leaders of these smallholding farmers. They have now an organization comprising about 2000 farmers. We are not so strong as to allow our Palestinian friends to antagonize this group.

While Haoved Hazioni is receiving 50% of the funds, it is difficult to explain why the bulk of the balance is to be spent mostly on housing activities. I would suggest that the list of priorities be arranged in the following way:

- 1) Haoved Hazioni
- 2) Smallholding farmers
- 3) New immigrants and housing
- 4) Magdiel etc.

I believe that during your meetings in Zurich you will find it possible to clarify these problems and secure a proper allocation for the Council of Frivate Jevish Agriculture.

August 20, 1947

Dr. all Hel Elsen

Mr. Daniel Brisker Hechalutz Farm Wappinger Falls, N.T.

Dear Daniel:

I am enclosing herewith a check in the sum of \$250. This is a gift made by Mr. Wm. Lowenstein, c/o Monte's, 24 West 59th St., New York 19, N.Y., for the purchase of a cow for our hachshara farm in Poughkeepsie.

This generous gift was made at Dr. Abba Hillel Silver's request. Please send a letter of asknowledgement and thanks to Mr. Lovenstein, and also copies to Dr. Silver and to us.

Shalom u'vracha,

Encl. IJK/mf I.J. Karpman

August 31, 1947

S. abbe thee film

Mr. W. Lowenstein c/o Monte's 34 West 59th Street New York 19, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Lowenstein:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your check in the sum of \$250.00 for the purchase of a cow for our chalutzim farm in Poughkeepsie.

May we congratulate you on this generous gift which will be a great inspiration to our chaluts youth and also enable to increase the farming equipment for them.

We appreciate very much your effort and hope that you have a deep feeling of satisfaction in helping to prepare young American chalutzim for their new life in Eretz Israel.


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Many thanks again.

LJK/mf

Cordially yours,

I.J. Karpman



STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL,

To Messrs. M. SHERTOK and N. GOLDHANN From I Dr. M. KAHANY.

Geneva, August 26th, 1947.

In the following please find notes of an address given by the High Commissioner of Palestine to the Chairman and delegates on UNSCOP at an informal meeting at Government House on Thursday, 17th July 1947:

I. May I thank you for your courtesy in coming up here and allowing me to address you, I much appreciate it and the honour you have done me.

We have presented to the Committee as our evidence the Survey of Palestine, the Memorandum on the Administration of Palestine under the Mandate, and other documents. I would ask the Committee to believe that in the preparation of these documents we have attempted to be as objective as possible. Whether we have succeeded or not the Committee will judge but I must emphasise that this was our aim and formed the basis of the instructions given for their production.

If the Committee feel that they have not had enough evidence on the Government side I beg most earnestly that we should be so informed and I may be given the opportunity of putting officials before you in camera. We are preparing a document to refute some of the contentious material you have had in other evidence, but quite clearly cannot cover all the points brought up on which the Committee may be in doubt.

I propose to confine what I have to say to small proportions and on broad lines and to submit myself to you after to answer to the best of my ability any questions you may care to put to me.

I would not propose in this address to deal too much with past history, but rather to present a summary of the present situation. It is no part of my task to success any solution to the Committee nor could I commit HMG to a solution and I am therefore not empowered to answer questions as to the future policy of HMG. I feel however that it is incumbent upon me with such knowledge as I have gained from being on the spot to say later a few words on the various factors which affect the solution of this problem.

There is one point I would make at the outset. In the fury and fire of the Falestine controversy the central issue is often misrepresented as a struggle between a dependent people and an Imperial Administration but I have been surprised that the intensity with which the evidence you have heard takes this line. In all the many dealings I have with Arabs and Jews it is remarkable how seldom in discussion with one of them is the other community ever mentioned. Yet the core of the problem is in reality a bitter conflict between Arab and Jew. A conflict of which the basis is fear of domination of the one by

the other, a fierce contest for the control of Palestine in which the mandatory is denounced for showing partiality first by one community and then by the other. This is fully recognised and commented upon in both the report of the Anglo-American Committee and the Pael Report.

A remarkable example of this attitude of the communities has been given during the Committees stay here, which quite possibly was noticed by them. On the publication of our Memorandum on the Administration of Falestine the Hebrew Press almost unanimously stated that the memorandum is a confirmation and an endeavour to justify the White Faper policy, whereas, the Arab press almost unanimously smid the document was purely Zionist, and shows clearly how pro-Zionist is the Government's policy.

The Mandatory's declared desire for the eventual independence of Palestine,

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reiterated for twenty-five years, is either forgotten or dubbed a sham and neither side recognises how their own actions have contributed to blocking the way to that desired result. As a consequence the simplest moves of Government take on political significance and this also explains the many failures the Government has had in their endeavours to get Arabs and Jews to work together in the business of governing the country and other matters.

A further difficulty occuring in the Government of this country is the power of outside pressure, on the Arab side by the Arab States, on the Jewish side by the diaspore and particularly the American Jews. This international complexion has made infinitely harder the task of the day to day government as it has the efforts at bringing the Arabs and Jews together. Much reference has been made to the desire forg cooperation between Jews and Arabs, but it has always been on terms which not have a would accept.

I understand the Committee are being told that the Government is anti-Zionist. I can assure them that contact with the Arabs would produce the exact opposite accusation. The leaders of both communities continually attribute bias, inertia and malafides to the Administration and although the Government welcomes fair criticism, they cannot accept that either the Agency or the Arab Higher Committee are the sole judges of what best serves the country as a whole. The tendency to confuse politics with administration and to accept no decision as final unless concurred in has interfered with co-operation, hinders administration and although the administration of partiality which are quite untrue.

The evidence which you have received from the Jews has been a consistently violent attack on this Administration for hampering Jewish expansion. Yet what is the truth. The British were the planners of the National Home and the prime movers in its establishment. Between 1918 and 1939 the Jews increased from a few thousands to 600,000 and this in the face of the most intense and bitter opposition of the Arabs culminating in disturbances in which thousands of lives were lost and much damage done. Had the British cracked in the year 1940/41 when they stood alone there would not have been a single Jew left in Falestine. For this we get the accusation that we were responsible for the death of millions of Jews, few of whom could in fact have got to Falestine at that time even if entry had been open. The political situation of the moment is conveniently forgotten as are the results which would have accrued had rebellion in the Arab States been successful.

2. The following section which is in headings only is intended to give a background against which the committee can assess the effect of the impact on Palestine of any solution they might be considering and deals with the present situation regarding Arabs and Jews.

- 2 -

Present state of affeirs in Palestine.


Arabs.

The Arab Higher Committee was reconstituted under Jamal Husseini in 1946 and recognised by Government xxx as there was then no body representing the Arabs in Palestine. It was thought necessary in view of impending visit of Anglo-American Committee.

It is however a self-appointed body and is only recognized by Government in default of a better arrangement.

I am not in favour of Arab Higher Committee becoming a counterpart of Jewish Agency. Representation in Government clearly preferable.

The activities of the Mufti and his relations with the Arab Higher Committee and Palestine Arabs.



Main preoccupations at this time of Arab Higher Committee :

- (a) Propaganda and persuasion in favour of an Arab State in all Palestine.
- (b) The strengthening of the Arab boycott.
- (c) The prevention of land sales to the Jews.
- (d) The unifying of various youth movements.
- (e) An attempt to unify all Arab parties.

The present situation amongst the Palestinian Arabs and their possible future

reactions.

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(NB. It should be noted here that although a forecast of possible violence was given it was emphasized that its extent and duration were far from clear. The words "revolt" or "rebellion" were not used and "violence" should be taken to mean anything from rioting with loss of life to revolt, either local or general).

The Committee will no doubt ascertain the attitude of the Arab States which is important in this respect.

JEWS.

Make clear first of all that as only their evidence has been heard by the Committee, and as it has consistently followed the line of a violent attack on the British Administration I am forced to use strong language in certain respects.

Am anxious this should not be taken as a sign of anti-Semitism. We do our best to be impartial and in this case would much prefer to deal with a constructive future than a destructive past.

Strained relations with Agency and endless accusation of the oppression of an innocent people.

Inflammatory speeches inciting to violence of 1945/46.

Connection with Hagana of Agency and touch with dissident groups to co-ordinate acts of violence with those of Hagana.

The resulting events of 29th June and issue of White Paper evidence (Cmd. 6873). Attempts to relieve tension e.g. release of leaders.

Immigration rock on which all attempts foundered.

Points regarding immigration :

- (a) Every Jew entering this country is subject of intense political agitation by Arabs and Jews have been entering for 10 years under protection of British troops
- (b) No other country is taking in Jews.

Attempts by Government to meet humanitarian angle. Quota of 18,000 per annum intended for relatives.

Present situation.

Illegal immigration defies the laws of this country and of the countries from which

the immigrants come.

Cost of Cyprus Gamps £.3,000,000. This administration does not consider this a fair charge against the Arabs.

Security.

In past 22 years :

291 incidents resulting in 316 deaths and 960 wounded including a number of civiliana Damage 12 million pounds apart from cost of security measures.

Significant there has been no diminution since Norwegian resolution in Assembly. Present situation.

"The first and most important element in the situation is that, because of political differences with the Mandatory Administration on account of the inability of His Majesty's Government to accede to Jewish demands, the Jewish community, whose

/dissident

dissident members are responsible for these outrages, have declined and still d. to give any assistance to the police and military forces in the maintenance of law and order. These forces are thus working in and among a population of over 600,000 whose leaders have refused to call for co-operation with the police against the extremists and have thus, however much they themselves may not have wished it, in effect encouraged the terrorist groups to further lawlessness and wanton assaults by all available means upon constituted authority in almost any form. Although representatives of the community have condemned these activities, their denunciations have been directed muinly towards defence of the Yishuw against those whose acts are damaging Jewish economy or the Jewish cause, and have stopped short of recognising the responsibility which belongs to the citizens of any civilized state to assist in preventing crime and bringing offenders to justice. It is a situation in which a policeman is shot and lies wounded in the street beside a bus queue, no member of which will lift a finger to help him. The task of the security forces is made immeasurably more difficult by this attitude and by the impression which exists in the Jewish community that crime of this nature can somehow be eradicated without recourse to the police.

Those who refer to the presence in Palestine of thousands of troops and who apparenly fail to understand how in these circumstances terrorist outrages can continue should remember that the use of the military forces is in aid of a still functioning civil power, and those forces act in support of the police with the methods appropriate to that purpose. If the military forces were permitted to use the full power of their weapons against the whole Jewish community, terrorist activities would be brought to an end in a matter of hours, but such measures have never been contemplated by His Majesty's Government, nor have they ever been recommended, nor desired by the Army. Critics on the other side who have advertised what they term British atrocities need to be reminded that no toher troops in the world would have exercised such restraint and tolerance in the face of such continued provocation. Stronger military action involving guilty and innocent alike would have been at any time only too easy".

This background against which Defence Regulations became necessary. These Regulations brought in in 1937 to deal with Arab disturbances and were then welcomed by Jews.

Defence Regulations enable Civil Administration to continue only other alternative calamity of Martial Law.

Brutal and uncivilised actions of dissident groups.

Requirements of any solution.

- 4 -

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I would now turn towards the future and will if I may outline very briefly what from my experience here would seem to be the requirements of any solution. But I should repeat that it is nor part of my task to suggest any particular solution to the Committee and therefore I have kept this portion of my talk on the broadest possible lines.

I would suggest that the requirements of any solution are, firstly, peace and stability, secondly, the development of the country in the best interests of all its inhabitants, thirdly, the protection of the Holy Places, and Fourthly, the security requirements from the angle of the peace of the world. Taking peace and stability first. I would suggest to the Committee that the following are the factors involved :

(a) Immigration. I feel sure that the Committee will already have come to the

conclusion that immigration is the crux of the whole problem and if the immigration question could be settled to the satisfaction of both communities all other pieces of the puzzle would fall into place and a solution would not be difficult to find. Yet as you will see the two communities are at completely opposite poles in their present attitude. The Arabs insist on the demand that there should be none and the Jews insist on the demand that it should be unlimited. Is there then anything between these poles which will be accepted by both ; There are numbers of schemes which have been suggested, such as Dr. Magnes's scheme for parity, or that the status que might be maintained by allowing in only the difference in the rates of natural increase. You will see the attempts which have been made to ascertain the absorptive espacity, etc.etc. There are an infinite variation of these schemes, but up to the moment thre have been no signs of any agreement on this problem.

I am one of those who think that the problem cannot be solved without taking into account the Jews in Europe. I do not know exactly how many are involved, the Anglo-American Committee said that there might be as many as 500,000 Jews who wished to leave gurope. I have been told, though I cannot produce any firm evidence on the point that this number has been reduced to somewhere in the meighbourhood of 150,000. I am not in any way suggesting that all should come to Palestine for in my view Palestine cannot be the sole answer to the problem.

A satisfactory and final solution of this problem must have far reaching results on Palestine policy of the future. If we can suppose European Jewry prosperously settled in a world which is at peace, and there is reason to believe that even now in some countries such settlement is taking place, will there still be the great urge for migration to Falestine ? Admittedly the spiritual appeal will always be present, but there is now no flow from America and little from England, from which one might deduce that given settled conditions wide weenle immigration may well die down.

All these seen questions which have to be taken into account.

(b) <u>Mationalism</u>. I would suggest that the growth of nationalisme amongst Arabs and Jews is the second most important factor under the handing of peace and stability. They both want dominance and independence or in other words sovereignty and this is a fador for which some satisfaction must be found.

(c) <u>Security</u>. One cannot also ignore the fact that in this country there is a vest emount of arms. Morever with its open frontiers it is difficult if not impossible to prevent arms traffic. Furthermore I would say as a soldier that one cannot disarm by

- 5 -

force satisfactorily. Therefore I would suggest that any solution must take into account of what are now virtually private armiss in the country. Also to be considered is the future of the Jewish dissident groups, although I must admit that in my opinion that is a matter for the Jews themselves.

(d) Finally I would suggest a further factor under the heading of stability must be the question of protection of minorities, whether they be Jaws, Arabus Christians or others. Hy second main heading under the requirements of the solution is development. Regarding this I need only say that the Government here is fully in agreement with Recommandation B of the Angle-American Committee and I have no doubt that given peace and stability development will follow. There are many positive schemes in existence and I need

/only ...

only add that however the Palestine problem is solved one cannot see successful development without common availability of resources and friendly adjacent territories.

The third requirement is protection of the Hely Places. On this I would only express a personal opinion and have no authority from HHG to make any suggestion, but there is no doubt that the administration of the status quo is extremely unsatisfactory and difficult there being no tribunal before which religious disputes can be brought; you will remember that the Mandate in fact recommended an international commission to be made responsible for Hely Places in Serusalem but for various reasons which I am not in a position to go into this recommendation was never implemented. I personally feel the recommendation was sound and that some such arrangement would be beneficial for the religions of the world.

Lastly the quastion of security requirements. It is again not for me to bisto HMG's views on this and I am marchy montioning it as one of the secontial factors to be considered. I would however say that "electine by its position must be of strategic impertance when viewed from the angle of world peace.

Some considerations in relation to verious solutions

With some diffidence I would put before you the following considerations which I feel bear on the problem as to what the political solution is to be.

No solution can be found which gives absolute justice to everyone. Furthermore it is clear that no solution can be found which will be shally agreed by everyone and therefore it seems that a solution must be imposed to a greater or lesser degree.

I would suggest also that any unitary form of Government emmot be imposed by force and that therefore for this solution at least a measure of agreement would be required from both communities, and I also suggest that as both communities are in aposition to show some resistance force might have to be used against one or both.

Under this heading also I should perhaps mention the economic angle. Palestine as a whole can be taken as a viable state, but if partitioned it is I think generally accepted that a viable arab state which can stand along is not pessible without outside spattance.

Finally I would like to may a word on the question of the urgency, and for the asconsity of finality in the solution. I could not agree more than with the words of Dr. meismenn in his address to you the other day. Time has shown a constantly accelerating deterioration of conditions in this sountry. I have tried to stress the difficulty of still carrying on a Civil Administration here. The sando are running out and

. 6 -

the only answer is an early political solution. I would stress also as Dr. Seizmann did the need for whatever solution is produced to be detailed. Without wishing to eriticize I suggest that the Feel and Angle-American Reports were not sufficiently so detailed and some of the difficulties which arose in their implementation were due to this fact. I would suggest that in any solution there should be no room for political bargaining backed by force wither during any transition period there may be or in the final stages.




N114 DL PD=CHICAGO ILL 11 1256P RABBI ALLAH HILLEL SILVER= COMMDORE HOTEL=.

IN THIS GREAT HISTORICAL HOUR OF OUR PEOPLE WE REVERENTLY BOW IN PRAYER ASKING FOR BLESSINGS FOR YOUR COURAGEOUS AND HEROIC STAND AND LEADERSHIP. I AM AT YOUR COMMAND AND HAVE TODAY WIRED GENERAL MARSHALL AS FOLLOWS. QUOTE

I DESIRE TO CONGRATULATE YOU UPON :YOUR COURAGEOUS STAND IN REGARD TO PALESTINE AND WHILE THE MAJORITY REPORT FALLS CONSIDERABLY SHORT OF FULFILLING PROMISES ORIGINALLY MADE TO THE JEWISH PEOPLE NEVERTHELESS IT REPRESENTS AN EQUITABLE COMPROMISE SOLUTION. AS CHAIRMAN OF THE IMPORTANT NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE AT NEXT WEEKS CONVENTION OF THE JEWISH WAR VETERANS ORGANIZATION IN ST PAUL, I SHALL INTRODUCE THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION IN LINE WITH THE LETTER SENT YOU AUGUST EIGHT BY OUR NATIONAL COMMANDER COLONEL MILTON RICHMAN OFFERING OUR FULLEST COOPERATION AND I AM CONFIDENT OF ITS PASSAGE. QUOTE AMERICANS LARGELY OF JEWISH ANCESTRY HAVE THIS YEAR CONTRIBUTED MORE THAN \$100,000,000 TO THE RELIEF AND REHABILITATION OF THEIR FELLOWS OVERSEAS. THE JEWISH WAR VETERANS ARE PREPARED TO GUARANTEE THAT ANY AMERICAN MILITARY FORCE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT=

=END 1.



N114/2=

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MAJORITY REPORT IN THE UNITED NATIONS ON PALESTINE WILL BE READILY FILLED WITH VOLUNTEERS SO THAT NO AMERICAN WILL BE CALLED UPON TO RISK HIS LIFE IN PALESTINE IN BEHALF OF THE SETTLEMENT APPROVED BY THE UNITED NATIONS EXCEPT AS A RESULT OF HIS OWN FREE AND VOLUNTARY ACT UNQUOTE. YOU CAN REST ASSURED THAT YOU WILL HAVE OUR UNITED SUPPORT IN YOUR NOBLE UNDERTAKING. MAY I AS ONE OF YOUR OLD FRIENDS ADD MY PERSONAL FELICITATIONS. PLEASE CONVEY THIS MESSAGE TO HON. HERSCHEL JOHNSON WHO DESERVES WITH YOU THE EVERLASTING GRATITUDE OF OUR PEOPLE CORDIALLY SIGNED JULIUS KLEIN UNQUOTE.

¶ GOD BLESS YOU AND GIVE YOU STRENGTH TO CARRY ON. YOUR NAME WILL BE INSCRIBED FOREVER WITH THE IMMORTAL HERTZL AS THE FOUNDER OF THE JEWISH STATE=.

JULIUS KLEIN.

HERTZL

MACKAY RADIO

Br. Silver

NOVEMBER 25, 1947

COPY

NLT PRESS RATE

EL ESTADO JUDIO CANGALLO 2194 BUENOS AIRES (ARGENTINA) MIYAD ACHAREJ HAHAZBAA BEVAADAT UN 25 BEAD 13 NEGED 17 NIMNEU 2 NEEDRU KINES SILVER JESHIVAT HANHALAT HASOCHNUT NIVDEKU SILVER HAHAZBAOT HASIKUYIM LAROV TOVIM/NEUMANN HIGISHU DRISHA LASTATE DEPARTMENT LEHISHTAMESH BECHOL HASHPAATAM LEHASIG OD KOLOT HAMEMSHALA HAAMERICAIT OSERET AVAL DARUSH SHEJAASU YOTER ZIONEJ AMERICA MAMSHICHIM LILCHOZ BECHOL KOCHAM STOP NA LEFARSEM BECHOL HAITONUT

KARPMAN

(ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA)

CONFIDENTIAL

Dominion of New Zealand Frime Minister's Office Wellington A.H.S. N.F.

17 May 1948

Dear Miss Kirchwey,

I have your letter of 3 May dealing with the situation in Palestine, and would first wish to express my appreciation of the tribute you pay to Sir Carl Berendsen, who has so effectively and compellingly stated the position not only for New Zealand, but for other peoples in the world who understand the justice of your cause.

I cannot agree, however, with what you say regarding the British Government. I do not believe that Britdan is guilty of sabotage; I 'still think she is endeavoring to hold the balance fairly until her forces are withdrawn. Though I have differed from their policy in the past, and though I think they should have taken a more positive stand in the recent discussions on the subject, I am satisfied that they have acted from the best of motives, and on what they believe is in the interests of both Jews and Arabs. Their position has not, of course, been helped by the action of the United States Government, whose failure to take the initiative on enforcement of the November resolution has created a lot of the difficulties of the present position. Now that the President has given de facto recognition to the new State of Israel, the United States may be more definite in its support of partition and prepared to help to have it implemented.

The time will come, I hope, when the Jewish people will be able objectively to consider how much has been done for them by Britian. Her administration in Palestine over many years has brought many real advantages. But the brutal and senseless assassination and murder of British soldiers doing their duty in Palestine has done a great deal of harm and affected public opinion very detrimentally in the United Kingdom and the countries of the British Commonwealth. There is in many countries latent anti-semitism, capable of being whipped up even among people not normally given to such thoughts. Nor has the cause of the Jewish people or of peace in Palestine been served by the advertisements which appeared in certain New York journals advocating the murder of British soldiers in Palestine engaged simply in the discharge of their duty. The anger caused by the stupid and cruel killing of these boys aroused undying resentment and hatred. I know some of the Jewish leaders - Mr. Ben-Gurion and others. They have done great work and, because of their leadership, their influence and example, and what I consider to be the inherent justice of the Jewish cause, I have asked our Government in New Zealand to support the November recommendation of the Assembly for the partition of Palestine and the establishment of economic union. I hope that the newly formed Jewish state of Israel will win its way through all difficulties and be firmly and permanently established.

> With kind regards, Yours sincerely,

> > P. Fraser



Miss Freda Kirchwey, President, The Nation Associates, 20 Vesey Street, New York 7, N. Y.



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PREVAILING CONDITIONS IN SECURITY COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION REQUIRE THAT ANAMOLY OF JEWISH REPRESENTATION SHOULD BE RESOLVED WITH OUT FURTHER DELAY THIS MEANS THAT THE JEWISH REPRESENTATION SHOULD REFUSE TO SIT EXCEPT FOR PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IN VIEW OF CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT IT COULD NOT BE CHARGED THAT JEWS ARE OBSTRUCTIONISTS BUT IT WOULD HAVE DUAL EFFECT OF FORCING UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT JEWISH POSITION AND PROPER THINKING UNDER AMPLE PRECEDENT OF ISRAEL'S REPRESENTATIVE: WHEN THIS HAPPENS CADAGON AND OTHERS COULD NOT RAISE QUESTION LIKE IMMIGRATION CLEARLY WITHIN PROVINCE OF A SOVEREIGN STATE THIS VIEW SHARED BYFRIENDLY ELEGATIONS BELIEVE YOU RISK NOTHING GAIN MUCH CONTINUED SITTING AS A JEWISH AGENCY RAISES DOUBT CONCERNING PERMANENCE





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OF ISRAEL SINCE IT IS COMMONLY ASSUMED A STATE WHICH FEELS SECURE DEMANDS IT'S RIGHTS HOPE YOU WILL AGREE AND ACT IMMEDIATELY WITH USUAL VIGOR KNOW SUCH INSISTENCE WILL STRENGTHEN OUR FRIENDS IN UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION= FREDA KIRCHWEY:

T. Kollek, 14 East 60th Street, New York City, N.Y.

27th June, 1948.

Rabbi Dr. A.H. Silver, Chairman American Section, Jewish Agency for Palestine, 16 East 66th Street, New York City, N.Y.

Dear Dr. Silver,

Further to my letter of June 23rd, suggesting your short visit to Mexico. After a telephone conversation with Mr. Resnikoff I understood that you are expected to deliver your speeches in Yiddish. I am adding this information as it was not contained in my previous letter. Mr. Resnikoff will try to phone you tomorrow morning at the Agency in order to invite you personally.

Yours sincerely,

T. Koleh

Elizen Kaplan

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Financial Reguments of Jewish Restlement + Economic Development in Valestine p see folder ou)

Jewish Hogeney

Elizer Kaplan report before UN Special Committe VRHS ARE LUES UNSOR reputs

M. Y Herald Tribuce - July 14, 1948

Koestler Says Bernadotte's Plan United Irgun and Israeli Regime

Author Calls Proposal to Give Jerusalem to Arabs **Provocative and Insulting, While Immigration** Problem Would Be Clogged in U. N. Agenda

This is the third of a series of articles on the new state of Israel by Arthur Koestler, author of "Darkness at Noon," "Thieves in the Night" and other books. Another article by Mr. Koestler will appear in about two weeks.

By Arthur Koestler

TEL AVIV.

Inscrutable are the ways of providence: as Columbus setting sail for India discovered America, so the valiant Count Bernadotte set out to make peace between the Arabs and Jews but performed the unex-pected miracle of uniting the Israeli government and the "dissident" Russian buffer proved on a par

Irgun. As a direct result of Bernadotte's incredible proposal to hand Jerusalem to the Arabs and deny to the state of Israel the right of free immigration, a dangerous rift between the army and Irgun was healed over night and the whole country was united in grim determination to defend its hard-won rights to the bitter end.

From the perspective of the distant Western observer there is always a natural tendency to mete out equal blame to both quarreling opponents for turning down what appears to be a reasonable com-promise. But anybody with the faintest inkling of the Palestine problem knows that the one and only aim of the Jews' struggle for Palestine is to secure one small country into which they can freely immigrate.

deterioration The tragic of Anglo-Jewish relations began with Chamberlain's White Paper of May, 1939, which made immigra- tors. First, the Jewish improtion dependent on Arab consent. visation born out of despair-com-This "Palestine Munich" was the bined with the unexpected breakstarting point of the whole Palestine tragedy. Bernadotte's proposals now turn the wheel back their full circle to this starting point; from Israel territory. though the Swedish count was probably guided by innocence probably guided by innocence unexpected arrival of defensive without experience, the effect of his "suggestions" on the Palestine the fateful weeks prior to the Jews was that of a calculated in-sult. The bitterness and indigna-tion of the Israel man-in-thestreet are difficult to convey. These people hoped to assist in the last act of a long, bloody tragedy, only to find themselves condemned to sit through it once more from the beginning.

Jerusalem Plan Provocative

The proposal to give Jerusalem to the Arabs is equally provocative. Jerusalem has a population with a Jewish majority and is the perennial spiritual focus of Israel. The entire modern city is today in The entire modern city is today in the psychological of gratitude among taneous feeling of gratitude among haive layers Jewish hands. Hardly appreciated the politically more naive layers abroad is the fact that before the of the population. Hence the paraintervention of the Arab Legion, when Jerusalem Arabs had pan-the bulk of the Israeli working icked as the Arabs did in Jaffa and Haifa, the Jews had the en-tire city at their mercy but re-applaud in Tel Aviv cafes when tire city at their mercy but re-frained from taking the Old City because of international considerations. This, in the light of subsequent events, was probably a fatal mis-take. For the Jewish restraint and agreed internationalization of Je-leaning toward the only power rusalem was rewarded, first, by the which actively helped, whatever same holy places serving artillery base for the Arab Legion, and now by Bernadotte driving home Chamberlain's lesson that restraint is foolish and aggression pays. So much for the Israeli people's emotional reactions. Taking a detached, objective view, the practical impossibility of implementing most undisguised war on them and the proposals is equally apparent. the second looked on, the psycho-Obviously the Jews and Arabs logical pressure of circumstances could never agree on an immigration quota and would refer the problem back to the United Nations, whose agenda would thus be speech on the departure of the clogged for the next hundred last British troops from Haifa. years with a perpetuated Palestine leaving the door open to recon-problem. Equally obvious is the cilicities needed of the problem. Equally obvious is the ciliation with Britain, was re-fact that a hundred thousand markable proof that Israel's lead-Jews ruled by Abdullah would de- ers have kept a cool head despite velop a violent irredentist ten- the burning pressure. But time is dency, transforming the Holy City into a periodically erupting volcano. Bernadotte's proposals will doubtless be as dead as a score or so statesman may think that the purposes fulfill the function of a text of the proposal is unimpor-tant if only time is gained and the solution dragged out by a

Russian buffer proved on a par with their political reliability. Simultaneously Bevin's policy

has produced an effect on the Jews which Russian propaganda could never achieve: destroying their faith in Western democracies. The oscillations of American policy, culminating in the paradoxical attitude of recognizing Israel but depriving it through the arms embargo of means of defense, completed this process of disillusionment.

Collapse Was Averted

Apparently the outside world as yet insufficiently understands that the British withdrawal from Palestine was carried out in a manner deliberately preventing the setting up of any administrative succession and military defense against an officially announced invasion by neighboring states. This "Operation Deluge" would resulted in Israel's catahave strophic collapse but for two facdown in the morale of the local Arab population culminating in their wholesale panicky exodus The second decisive factor was the equally signing of the truce agreement. These consignments from the zone of Russian influence, though quan-titatively modest, alone made posle TI sible Israel's physical survival in ha a literal sense.

an Doubtless the proverbial political sophistication of Jews in gen-eral, and Jewish Social-Democrats At pla in particular, helped them realize ali that Russia's gesture was far from disinterested and was exclusively designed to serve her power-political aims. Yet such critical to floy ma had tim par ferr seizu of th fied, and them to in Russian marches are repeated ad nauseam by salon orchestras in the Viennese style. of th I repeat. this attitude is not containe nected with any political doctrine or reasoning and just reflects the the had regis Depa as an its motives, in the country's darkas Jerse est hour.

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Soviet Ground Prepared

In approximately two weeks a a reported "provisional" staff of twenty. It may be taken for granted that the activities of this staff will not be confined to social engagements with other members of the non-existent diplomátic corps in Tel Aviv. These newcomers to the Middle, East scenery will find the ground admirably prepared for them by Western diplomacy.

Since the beginnings of Zionist colonization, Jewish Palestine has been economically and politically under the almost total domination of the Social-Democratic Labor party and trade union. This dominant movement has always had a consistently "Menshevik" and hence anti-Bolshevik orientation. accentuated by thirty years of Zionist persecution in Russia. This fact has not prevented the Foreign Office Middle-East advis ers from systematically misrepresenting the Jewish Labor move-ment as a Bolshevik bunch, nor from recommending feudal Arab princes as a mainstay of democracy. The Mufti and other Arab leaders, openly siding with the Axis during the last war, did not shake this set conviction of the Foreign Office. This stubborness resulted in Britain's sacrificing the Jews without receiving compensation from the Arabs, whose military strength as a potential anti-

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Lure to "Fellow Travelers"


This writer is hardly susceptible men to totalitatarian leanings, yet had yest he suffered what the people here the] suffered in the past six months, "arn while one leading member of the Western democracies waged almen licer of th it s crai might have turned even him into Pale a fellow traveler.

crev Prime Minister Ben Gurion's pera pro pas exa Fron running short; the time for mincing words is past. Legal casuisno. By the time this article appears, fact that a war of aggression bom against a small state, founded on a United Nations resolution. is tain and being waged by Brigadier Glubb's compromise suggestions by preced- being waged by Brigadier Glubb's toda ing committees. Some Western forces, which to all intents and twee dian native army under British comby Ext mand.

The remaining Arab armies beseries of improvisations until after the United States elections or other international events. But these alone, whether and when this war hav and international events. But these alone, whether and when this war hav statesmen are gravely mistaken, is stopped. Some wars may be the Airr for time thus gained is heavily paid for by whetting the Arab ap-petites while infuriating even the most moderate Jews. Hal trou that it is entirely unnecessary and crew fortuitous. It is not caused by an spon Hera incurable antagonism between Soviet diplomatic representative Palestine Arabs and Jews, but ar- room is due to arrive in Tel Aviv with tificially initiated and artificially in fa tificially initiated and artificially in fa prolonged against both expediency engin and morality. The only winner cause of "Operation Deluge" is a totalimain tarian pretender waiting to step out it in when the floods recede.

It's a tiny country, a tiny war, but symbolic; it looks as if West-Thirt engin "When ern democracies intend to commit suicide at the very birthplace of the humanitarian tradition on which they are based.

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