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Jewish Agency, "L", 1947-1948.

WORLD COMMITTEE FOR PALESTINE

41 East 42nd Street • New York 17, N. Y. • MUrray Hill 2-4917

Cable Address: WORCOMPAL

OFFICERS

January 23, 1947

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Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
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Dear Dr. Silver:

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Corresponding Secretary

MRS. DOROTHY S. LOOS

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DON JOSE NUCETI SARDI

At the conference yesterday attended by Harry Shapiro, Abe Tuvim, Carl Voss and myself, I raised the question of the future of the World Committee for Palestine, and it was suggested that I write to you.

The World Committee under the devoted services of Mrs. Rachelle Yarden has attained proportions and possibilities that deserve the serious consideration and continued support of the American Section of the Jewish Agency.

In view of the fact that the direction of Jewish Agency matters has been placed in new hands, there must inevitably be a re-study of our program, budget and personnel. Since the World Committee bank account is practically exhausted with the continuance of limited activities, some sort of interim appropriation may be necessary if there is to be a delay in the authorization of a new budget. Since the departure of Mrs. Yarden, however, the work is being continued with only one person, Mrs. Dorothy S. Loos, devoting full time to the Committee.

I am referring this whole problem to you as the Chairman of the American Division of the Jewish Agency, and will await instructions from you as to immediate procedures. I assume that you will wish to name some individual in the New York office of the Jewish Agency in consultation with whom we can work out a program of activities with an accompanying budget.

I will probably spend a great deal of time away from New York during February and March, and would greatly appreciate instructions from you as soon as possible. Your deep personal interest in this world Christian program is well known and greatly appreciated.

Cordially yours,

Howard M. LeSourd

Howard M. LeSourd
Secretary-Treasurer

HML:IM

WORLD COMMITTEE FOR PALESTINE

41 East 42nd Street • New York 17, N. Y. • MUrray Hill 2-4917

Cable Address: WORCOMPAL

February 26, 1947

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REV. DR. DANIEL A. POLING
DR. CARL HERMANN VOSS
Uruguay
DR. C. SABAT ERCASTY
Venezuela
DON JOSE NUCETI SARDI

MEMORANDUM

To: The American Members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine

From: World Committee for Palestine

The World Committee for Palestine grew out of the International Christian Conference for Palestine which was held in Washington November 1-2 of 1945. Plans for the World Committee were laid in London in the summer of 1945 when Dean Howard M. Le Sourd and Dr. Carl Hermann Voss, co-directors of the American Christian Palestine Committee, were invited to attend the World Zionist Conference as Christian observers. Until November of 1946 the activities of the World Committee were under the direction of Mrs. Rachelle S. Yarden.

The World Committee has a two-fold program: (1) a long-range educational program and (2) immediate political aims. For an interim period of two and a half months the work has been continued in the direction of the original program:

- (a) the bulletin Palestina, 4000 copies of which are sent to Latin American countries, has been published (see enclosed copy)
- (b) educational materials have been distributed
- (c) moving picture films have been circulated
- (d) considerable correspondence with member committees has been carried on
- (e) a new project has been initiated to establish an International Section of the Children's Memorial Forest

Now the activities of the World Committee, however, must expand rapidly in view of the possibility that the Palestine issue may be brought before the United Nations. There are three programs of primary importance which should receive immediate considerations:

(1) Organization: We have committees in 27 countries (18 of which are in Latin America and 9 in other countries of the world). On the European continent we have committees in Portugal, Norway, and France. There is, of course, the committee in the British Isles.

It is imperative to organize committees on the European continent and in as many of the 31 member nations of the United Nations where we do not have committees as seems feasible and necessary.

(2) Conference of the Executive Council of the World Committee:

A Conference of the Executive Council (composed of the chairmen of the various Pre-Palestine committees) was planned for this past fall, but was postponed because such a conference seemed to be of more significance at a later date if the issue of Palestine were to come before the United Nations. Now that this possibility seems more likely such a Conference should be held, at the latest, in June of this year so that the members of the Executive Council can return to their respective countries in time to work with their national committees.

The Conference of the Executive Council would interpret to the participants (a) our aims and (b) discuss methods of obtaining these objectives.

As the following quotation from a letter from the Bolivian Liaison Official will indicate, some committees understand already what our aims are:

"The Chancellor of the country (who is the Honorary Chairman of our committee) has issued a statement to the Bolivian delegates to the United Nations pointing out that the support of the just Jewish aspirations to Palestine constitute an integral part of Bolivian foreign policy and is not a casual or momentary sympathy." *

(It is requested that this information be given no publicity).

We purpose to have the Pre-Palestine committees urge that their country's delegates to the United Nations receive specific instructions to work toward a Zionist solution when and if the issue comes before the General Assembly.

(3) Extension of work with already existing committees:

We have received expressions of support from the members of the committees as well as from the Liaison Officials. We know their programs for the coming year as well as their needs. We have but to begin the intensification of our work with these committees.

SUMMARY

In order to carry out this three-fold program of (1) organizing the national committees in our countries not yet reached, (2) setting up a Conference of the Executive Council, and (3) strengthening the work in the already existing committees, the World Committee requests, as soon as possible, your support, aid, and counsel in facilitating this program.

We need efficient funds: (a) a basic appropriation of \$25,000 to cover salaries, publication and distribution of the bulletin and other materials in English, Spanish and French; and postage, cable and other incidental office expenses for the next six months and (b) enough to take care of this greatly needed World Committee Conference in June.

* translation from the Spanish

May I make a special mention of an additional item which is urgent: the need for an office. At present, the World Committee is operating in the basement office of the Jewish Agency where there are three other persons at work and where interruptions constantly come from messengers, visitors to the Agency, etc. Carrying on the work under such conditions is quite a strain.

When the Committee was moved from Washington to New York, it was to be housed at the Agency as a temporary measure. Our official address is 41 East 42nd Street; it should be kept in mind that, in many ways, it would be advisable for office space to be found at that address whenever such space is available, since ostensibly the World Committee is a separate entity from the Jewish Agency and considerable confusion results from the present arrangement.

Respectfully submitted,

Dorothy S. Lees

Dorothy S. Lees, Corresponding Secretary
World Committee for Palestine

REPORT BY MR. LOCKER ON HIS VISIT TO SCANDINAVIA

Friday, May 2, 1947

In Stockholm Mr. Locker saw Foreign Minister Uden and afterwards transmitted to him a memorandum similar to the letter to Mr. Pasmussen, copy of which is attached to these minutes. Although Mr. Uden was friendly and polite he made no promises whatsoever, but asked a number of questions. Why should the Jews want or be asked to leave the countries in which they live? He could not imagine this being done to the Swedish Jews. To this Mr. Locker replied that the Foreign Minister was looking at the matter from a Swedish point of view only and explained what had happened to the Jews during the war. "Could Palestine absorb all the Jews now in the camps?" Mr. Locker explained what had been achieved up till now and mentioned the views of Lowdermilk, Hays, and other experts, and the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Mr. Locker then asked that the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly should not enter upon a debate but should merely elect a Committee of Inquiry. The Arabs should not be represented on the Committee. As to the terms of reference, it was important that this Commission should examine the matter not as a mere territorial question but on the basis of the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine, the promises which were contained in the Mandate, and the rights acquired by the Jewish people under it, as well as the position of the Displaced Persons. It was essential that the Commission should visit Palestine.

Being unaware of the latest developments in New York, Mr. Locker also asked that the Swedish representatives should agree to state the Jewish point of view to the Assembly and that they should demand for the interim period the carrying out of the Mandate. Mr. Locker pointed out that the small Nations had two ways open to them: either the traditional way of European diplomacy, based on expedience, or an objective way, based on justice, and in the long run this would raise the prestige both of the United Nations and of the small Nations. Mr. Uden did no more than promise to consult with his colleagues, and also made it clear that terrorism was doing the Jewish cause considerable harm.

In addition, Mr. Locker saw Gustav Moeller, Swedish Minister of Social Welfare, with whom he had a long talk. He frankly explained that the small nations do not believe that any position taken up by them would be of any influence on the ultimate solution of the problem. Mr. Locker said that this was a defeatist attitude and that the Palestine problem would form a test case for U.N.O. Mr. Locker said he was aware that the Labour Parties in Europe did not want to harry the Labour Government in England; but this opportunistic attitude is in the long run harmful to the real interests of the Labour movement. At the end of the conversation, Mr. Moeller promised to speak with the Foreign Minister Uden on the lines indicated by Mr. Locker.

Mr. Locker also saw Mr. Erlander, the Prime Minister, with whom he had a conversation on lines similar to that with Mr. Uden.

In Denmark Mr. Locker saw Mr. Gustav Pasmussen, a non-party career diplomat, now Foreign Secretary of Denmark. He listened attentively and appeared to be well informed. The conversation was similar to that with Mr. Uden and a copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Locker to Mr. Pasmussen is attached to these minutes. He also made no promises, except to consult with his colleagues.

In addition Mr. Locker saw Mr. Buhl (former premier) Professor Frisch and Mr. Anderson (former ministers) members of the Danish Labour Party and explained the general situation to them and answered many questions. Although they professed to have little influence on the present Government, they promised to raise the matter with the Foreign Minister.

In Norway Mr. Locker saw the Secretary of the Norwegian Labour Party, Haakon Lie, for a long conversation. He was well informed on Jewish matters, having contact with the Jewish Labour Committee in New York. He promised to advise Mr. Finn Moe, permanent representative of Norway at the United Nations to contact the Jewish representatives there. Later Mr. Locker saw the Foreign Minister, Mr. Lange who said that in general he agreed with the Jewish point of view, although he thought it was necessary that they should seek some other places of absorption outside Palestine mentioning that Norway is taking some hundreds of Jewish D.P.'s. Mr. Locker explained that while any help given to D.P.'s is welcome, no country is prepared to take great numbers, and that even if this were the case it was not fair for the other nations to pick the fittest Jews for integration into their economy and leave the sick and the old for Palestine. Mr. Lange said that this was a new aspect of the matter. He made no mention of consulting with his colleagues and said he would send a report to Mr. Finn Moe of the conversation and ask him to contact the Jewish delegation. Mr. Lange said he had recently been for a few days in Palestine after the Cairo Inter-Parliamentary Conference but he made no personal contacts but he saw Tel-Aviv, Mi Kveh Israel, Kiryat Anavim and Jerusalem and was greatly impressed.

In addition Mr. Locker saw Professor Arne Ording, one of the advisers of the Foreign Ministry.

To sum up, there were positive promises only from Norway. Sympathy was general, ignorance was rife. The Jewish problem in general was not known, the approach being philanthropic and humanitarian and somewhat assimilationist. Mr. Locker had come to the conclusion that they had to invest considerable effort in the Scandinavian countries. There was great fear of Russia, and for that reason there was attachment to England. Nevertheless there were possibilities of long-term work. It was well worth while appointing a special representative in the Scandinavian States. Mr. Locker then concluded with a description of the internal Zionist situation in various Scandinavian countries and an account of the various rivalries which exist between individuals.

JESSE Z. LURIE

1834 Broadway, New York 23, N. Y.

American Correspondent
Palestine Post, Jerusalem

June 17, 1947

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
East 105 & Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio


Dear Dr. Silver:

I thought you might like to see a copy of the scurrilous piece of literature on the Agency which is described in the current issue of Time Magazine in the article on Ben Hecht.

I know that the Agency doesn't underestimate the effectiveness and harm of the work of this group and I hope that steps are being taken to neutralize it.

With kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,


Jesse Z. Lurie

JZL:b
encl.

Latin American Dep't
Jewish Agency

see letter of

Dr. A. Mibashim 7/22/47

to

Dr. E. Neuman

WRHS



Marseille, France
July 30, 1947

MLT JEVAGENCY NEWYORK

CABLED WASHINGTON OFFICE QUOTE SHRAGAI MYSELF ARRIVED MARSEILLE TODAY
STOP FRENCH AUTHORITIES ALREADY VISITED TWO BOATS THIRD PROBABLY TOMORROW
MORNING STOP ON FIRST BOAT REFUGEES REFUSED DISSEMBARK AND WISHED PROCEED
PALESTINE STOP SO FAR ONLY ONE AGED COUPLE AND AILING WOMAN LANDED STOP
RESULTS FROM SECOND BOAT NOT YET KNOWN STOP EYEWITNESSES DESCRIBE
CONDITIONS ON BOATS AS TERRIBLY SHOCKING STOP MEN WOMEN AND CHILDREN
HUDDLED TOGETHER WITHOUT SLEEPING ACCOMODATIONS NOT EVEN MATTRESSES WITH
LITTLE SANITATION AND INADEQUATE FOOD STOP FRENCH AUTHORITIES HERE
ACTING WITH SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING STOP STILL DANGER THAT ATTEMPT
MAY BE MADE THROUGH PRESSURE TO FORCE REFUGEES LEAVE SHIPS STOP AS
RESULT EXPERIENCE FIRST BOAT UNDERSTAND BRITISH AUTHORITIES HERE ASKED
LONDON NEW INSTRUCTIONS AND DECISION LIKELY NEXT DAY THEREFORE STILL
TIME FOR PREVENTATIVE EFFORTS STOP SUGGEST THAT IN ADDITION ACTION
LOCALLY YOU ARRANGE FOR APPEALS TO APPROPRIATE PERSONS BODIES LONDON
PARIS REGARDS

LINTON

הנהלת ההסתדרות הציונית

THE EXECUTIVE OF THE ZIONIST ORGANISATION

המחלקה הארגונית
ORGANISATION DEPARTMENT

Ref. No. : מספר :

יֵרֻשָׁלַיִם
J E R U S A L E M
P. O. B. : 92 : ד. ת.
CABLE : ZIONIT, JERUSALEM : טלגרמות
CODE : BENTLEY'S SECOND : ק 1
TELEPHONE : 4671 : 11978

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August 12th, 1947

TO THE ZIONIST FEDERATIONS
AND MEMBERS OF THE ZIONIST GENERAL COUNCIL

Dear Sirs,


Re: Problems of Territorial Zionist
Organisations.

We enclose the English translation of an address by
Dr. L. Lauterbach on the

Structural Problems of the Territorial
Branches of the Zionist Organisation,

which may be of interest to you as a contribution to the
discussion of organisation problems which has been going on in
our ranks for a long time and has lost nothing of its im-
portance for our Movement in many countries.

With Zion's greetings,
Yours faithfully,


ORGANISATION DEPARTMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE

STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

OF THE TERRITORIAL BRANCHES OF THE ZIONIST ORGANISATION

Address by Dr. L. Lauterbach
in the Organisation Committee of the Zionist Executive
at its meeting on the 26th April, 1947.

(Translated from Hebrew)

A.

The organisation problem in the Zionist movement has faced us for many years. The suitable solution of this problem is, in our opinion, a pre-requisite of all our plans for educational, information and ideological activities in various countries. It is obvious that there can be no prospect for the realisation of any plan of activities unless its implementation is based on the existence of a well-established body, namely a well-organised, consolidated and efficient Zionist Organisation.

The problem has been aggravated by the crisis which threatens not only Zionism but our nation as a whole and the Zionist Organisation in its midst. For us in Palestine, living as we do in a strong Jewish community, it is difficult to imagine the way in which the masses of Jewry in the Diaspora are living. In spite of all adversities, the Yishuv in Palestine has a feeling of collective strength, whereas the Jews in the Diaspora lack this feeling. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to draw together the scattered Zionist energies of the Jewish people and through consolidation to make them into an element of strength.

In Palestine, too, there is undoubtedly room for improvement in the field of organisation and consolidation. However, while in Palestine internal competition, controversy or independent activities on the part of the various groups and interests can be tolerated without fear of danger to our national unity, since the factual, cultural and internal home rule enjoyed by the Yishuv and the essential Zionist solidarity in fundamental matters assure our unity, in the Diaspora, where the Jews have no such natural ties, nothing is more dangerous to the very existence of the Zionist movement and its power of action than dissipation of its energies, internal strife or divided loyalties.

Neither must we lose sight of the very real dangers of assimilation which threaten even the largest and strongest Jewish communities, whose non-Jewish environment tends in fact to assimilate them.

How much worse it is for the small and scattered, weak Jewish communities in Eastern countries who are living in a hostile environment with no freedom of action or thought, often threatened with persecution and an underground life; is it conceivable that we shall organise them and endow them with strength by the means we employ to arrange our matters in the Jewish, Zionist and autonomous life of Palestine?

We have to bear in mind the position of Jewry in about seventy countries in the Diaspora, from the large Jewish community in the United States to the few Jews on some island in the Atlantic Ocean. In sixty countries there exist Zionist nuclei, organised in different ways. The question is: Should we be content with the fact that the Zionists in these countries, by the acquisition of

the Shekel and the receipt of information material alone constitute the power which carries the burden of the Zionist movement, or is it necessary to unite them within an organised and well-devised framework under a system that assures their permanent co-operation and directs their Zionist life and activities? And if such a structural framework is found necessary, should there be only one in each country or more, and if more than one, what should the relationship between them be? These are the questions which require a solution.

B.

First of all, what is the present position? Does a World Zionist Organisation in fact exist? What is its structure? Are its position and structure satisfactory, or must new and improved forms of organisation be found to adapt them to the new reality?

I am not referring here to the central institutions (the Zionist Executive, the Zionist General Council or the Congress). These bodies work in a more or less satisfactory manner, although here, too, there is room for certain improvements.

Even with a normal people living its independent national life, the government and parliament themselves are not sufficient for its existence unless they are backed by a settled and well established population which does all that is required to constitute a nation. It would be a grave error if we were to limit ourselves to ensuring the effective working of the Executive and the central parliamentary institutions and not concern ourselves with the normal existence and the day-to-day work of the far-flung World Zionist Organisation with all its branches.

The position within the Zionist Organisation was well expressed by Mr. David Ben-Gurion in 1932, when he said:-

"As it stands at present, the World Zionist Organisation is only a fiction. As there are no organised and active Zionist organisations in different countries and there are no territorial branches, the World Organisation is but an empty frame.

The only institution of the Zionist Organisation really in existence is the Zionist Congress however, since there is no organisational instrument which is active and bears responsibility all the time and which carries out the intentions and resolutions of the Congress, the Congress, which assembles for a short time only every two years, has become the stage for a parliamentary play which has no creative content and no power of enforcing its decisions.

....The Congress is not backed by any organised power at its disposal. The Executive alone which is elected by Congress is not enough. The work of the Zionist movement will not be done by the Executive but by the active Zionist workers throughout the Diaspora. The creation of such a nucleus in each country is the pre-requisite for securing the efficiency and productivity of the movement."

Has the situation improved since then? Have we not neglected the vital matters of the organisation of the Zionist movement and put them aside without making an effort to deal with them earnestly and to look for ways to improve the situation?

C.

In order to perceive the nature of the problem we must first of all define the character of the Zionist Organisation and describe its present structure.

What is the Zionist Organisation? A collective entity embracing a national mass movement composed of volunteers who are organised in territorial unions, a body built on democratic foundations, with national aims of a state-like character, which imposes upon its members duties directed towards the attainment of its object.

This definition means:

(a) The Zionist Organisation is not a collection of individuals but a public body which organises its members so as to turn disconnected energies into a collective national power under well directed guidance;

(b) An international body embracing Zionist groups which are organised in territorial unions;

(c) It is built on a voluntary basis i.e. on free adherence to the Organisation and not on compulsion or automatic membership as in some Jewish communal organisations.

(d) It is a national body, comprising Zionists without distinction of ideology, which allows its members freedom of opinion, the right to organise themselves into parties, a body which conducts its business in a parliamentary manner.

(e) It is built on democratic foundations, meaning (1) equal rights for all its members without distinction of origin, sex, etc. (2) majority rule i.e. adoption by majority vote of resolutions binding the minority, (3) extension of rights to members, but also the imposition of obligations on them.

(f) An executive body with state-like duties aiming at action and not only representation, at realisation and not only propaganda, a body which demands of its members not only agreement with its decisions but also their implementation.

(g) The Zionist Organisation is, in relation to its constituent parts, a sovereign body. There is room for parties within it, but it is not a purely formal and parliamentary meeting ground for sovereign parties.

(h) It is an organic, social body which derives its strength from personal ties between its members and from social relations based on solidarity and co-operation.

If this definition is correct, then there is justification in the words of the founder of the Zionist Organisation (written in 1897 in his article on the "Protestrabbiner"):

"Zionism is not a party; you can arrive at it from any party since it upholds all the parties to be found in our national life. Zionism is the Jewish nation in the making."

D.

And now let me describe the structure of the Zionist Organisation in its chronological development. As with other organic and social groups, here, too, there were various stages and the well-known natural evolution from a (a) un-differentiated unit, through (b) differentiated disunity to (c) a differentiated unit.

1. Until about the end of the first world war, all Zionists were members of territorial organisations. In every country there existed only one organisation to which all Zionists belonged without exception. This was a structure built on horizontal or geographical lines;

2. Parties were established, first within the territorial Zionist organisations and later outside them. The parties were given equal rights with those of the territorial organisations and were accorded the status of Separate Unions (Sonderverband) subordinated to an interterritorial authority. In other words, those subscribing to one ideological line were allowed to be organised within their constitutional framework, independent of geographical limits and irrespective of other, ideologically different, Zionist groups. This was a structure, built on vertical, ideological lines. During that period, two forms were existing side by side - territorial organisations (horizontal structure) and Separate Unions (vertical structure) - with varying results. In some countries Zionists succeeded in preserving unity and according the parties a place in the common united framework. Those were, among others, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Yugoslavia, Transylvania, South Africa, whose well-ordered Zionist life served as a model for the entire movement. In other countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, the parties became completely independent and separate, without connection among themselves. Who could estimate the loss to Zionism sustained through the waste of our best forces in internal strife and through competition between the independent parties?

3. We are now in the third phase, which is expressed in endeavours to find new forms of organisation which would combine the above mentioned centrifugal and the centripetal forces.

E.

What have Zionist Congresses decided in this matter?

The 15th and 16th Congresses decided that Joint Coordination Committees be set up ("Territoriale Arbeitsgemeinschaft" or "Dachverband"). It must be stated that the experiment has not succeeded. The reasons are that not an organisation but a joint committee was established which by its nature depends in its activities on the mutual agreement of all its members. It was not a union of members but a council of executive committees, and this joint committee dealt in reality only with administrative matters.

The 19th Congress (1935) decided on the establishment of United Zionist Federations. This decision has not yet been carried out. As a matter of fact, united federations exist today largely in those countries in which they already existed before the adoption of this decision. No progress was made in the matter even at the last Congress.

As the situation stands today, we have to differentiate between four main forms of territorial Zionist organisations. We must distinguish between (I) Countries with a Zionist Federation ("Landesverband"), (II) Countries with a United Zionist Federation ("Einheitlicher Landesverband"), (III) Countries with a Joint Zionist Council ("Dachverband") and (IV) Countries where only separate Zionist parties exist. There are, of course, stages of transition between one form and another, and the terms used here must not be taken to be of a formal character.

I. Zionist (Territorial) Federation: The Zionist (territorial) Federation is based on individual membership, is directed by a leadership endowed with authority and assisted by a permanent administrative machinery. There exist at present

I/1: Federations without any party differentiation in their midst, such as in Italy, Greece, Sweden, North African countries, Finland, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and all the nuclei of local Zionist organisations which are in their first stage of development, such as India, Persia, Cuba, Peru and 12 more countries of Central and South America (30 countries in all);

I/2: Federations which constitute a united body comprising members of different party allegiance who, however, do not form separate parties (such as Holland, Switzerland, Transylvania, Aden, Tunisia, Chile).

I/3: In one country - Egypt - there exists a Federation as defined above, but there is one Zionist party (Hashomer Hatzair) which maintains its independence and remains outside the Federation.

II./1: The United Zionist Federation (as defined by the 19th Zionist Congress) is a united body which combines and embraces all Zionist parties in the country. The authority is in the hands of a central leadership which is assisted by an efficient administrative machinery. The parties constitute an integral part of the United Federation and enjoy full autonomy in party matters. There are countries in which the Federation is based on individual membership and others where it consists of autonomous parties (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Eastern France, Brazil).

II/2: United Federations as under II/1 but with one party (Mizrachi) remaining outside its framework (England).

III. Joint Zionist Council (Dachverband):

III/1: A loose combination of independent parties in the form of a joint council conducting such common activities as agreed upon by the parties (Belgium, Canada, and countries which are still in a primitive stage of Zionist development such as Austria, China).

III/2: A Joint Council whose competence is not defined and which has no administrative machinery at its disposal (France, Denmark, Argentine).

IV. Separate Parties

IV/1: Countries in which separate parties and organisations cooperate only in the field of political action, Shkel and Congress elections (U.S.A.)

IV/2: Countries where there is no regular contact between the various party groups except at the time of congress elections (Germany, Poland, Mexico, Uruguay).

F.

This was the state of affairs when the question of the structure of the Zionist organisation in different countries was placed before the 22nd Zionist Congress. After submission by the Organisation Commission of the Congress of a number of proposals regarding the implementation of plans for the establishment of United Territorial Federations, the plenary session of the Congress adopted a minority suggestion, according to which the term "United Territorial Federation" was replaced by the term "Co-ordinating confederation" ("Dachfederation") and the condition made that such bodies were only to be set up with the concurrence of the local parties. This decision stands in the way of enforcing the establishment of a United Federation in any one country.

It will be of interest to examine the reasons for objection to the setting up of United Federations as they were evident at Congress and as they still may be heard today. I see two principal reasons for this objection:

- a) fear of majority rule over the minority;
- b) reluctance of parties to renounce their independence and prestige.

There may be some justification in the first argument, but these fears, can, I believe, be allayed by a definition of the function and a division of competences as between federation and party. While we can understand the second argument from a psychological point of view, we cannot accept it for national and political reasons. An analogy with democratic states proves that in such states the parties do not encroach upon the rights of the government. Governmental tasks are reserved for the government alone. There exists a regional division of governmental duties between regional administrative bodies (towns, counties, states in a federal union), but the parties as such have no part at all in such public function. Only in countries with a totalitarian régime did the governing parties assume control of part of the functions of the government (armed forces, police etc.), and we know the results of this régime. The inclinations of the parties towards hegemony threaten to deprive the Zionist Organisation of its power and meaning. We must not delegate all authority of the Organisation to the parties and thus turn the instrument created by Herzl for the realisation of our historic aspirations - the Zionist Organisation - into a worthless tool which exists only for the purpose of shekel registration and elections.

To tell the truth, there is a conflict between two basic tendencies: (a) for predominance of the Zionist Organisation, and (b) for predominance of the parties. The latter would lead to the eventual disintegration of the World Zionist Organisation and make of it no more than a stage for parliamentary play; it would mean the legalization of permanent splits. This situation demands of us a clear and final decision between these two alternatives. In my opinion, there is only one choice - a Zionist Organisation with full competence in all matters falling within its province and comprising parties which would enjoy freedom of action in all party matters.

I believe that this is the only possible way which does not affect the interests of either of the two factors and that it is possible to build the organisation on the following basic principles:

(a) There is no inconsistency between the existence of territorial organisations based on centralisation and unity and the existence of Zionist parties with autonomy in all their legitimate activities.

(b) In accordance with this principle, a joint Zionist organisation should be set up in every country where none exists at present. It should be well-organised and efficient, and should comprise all Zionists in that country. While having full authority in Zionist matters, it should not have the right to interfere in matters of separate Zionist ideology or internal affairs of the parties.

(c) The Zionist Organisation recognizes parties with different ideologies which enjoy full freedom of activity in party matters, but have no right to interfere in matters which are under the exclusive authority of the Zionist Federation.

(d) Every party and every Zionist group has the right to set up local societies and to organise its members in them. All local societies of any one party together form the territorial party. In places where more than one local society exists, all these societies are affiliated to the local Zionist organisation. All members, organised in all local Zionist organisations, form together the Zionist Federation which conducts its matters in accordance with democratic principles by safeguarding the rights of minorities.

(e) The Zionist Federation is not competent to adopt binding resolutions in ideological and other fundamental matters reserved for the Congress, the Zionist General Council or the Executive. In all other matters its decisions are binding on its members. Members have the right to appeal to the above governing bodies against decisions of the Federation.

(f) In all matters within its purview, the Federation is the highest and only legislative and executive body, to whose authority all other Zionist institutions in that country have to submit.

(g) The Federation comprises all Zionist groupings in its country: youth organisations, women's organisations, students' organisations, Halutz movement, etc.

(h) The Federation and the parties are subject to the authority of the central institutions (Executive, General Council, Congress) which act in accordance with the constitution of the World Zionist Organisation.

This is the scheme I want to suggest for the normalization of organisation affairs in different countries. Obviously, this scheme presents difficulties and problems, but there is no easy way and no comfortable bridge between the tendency to unite and centralise our people and the reality which disperses and separates it.

G.

The question is, can this scheme be carried out immediately? Since such a proposal naturally requires discussion and clarification and the last Congress requested immediate action to improve the existing position, I suggest that, until the adoption of a basic programme, we act along the following lines:

(a) In those countries where a certain measure of unity, centralisation and organisation has already been achieved,

(category I and II), the present state of affairs should be continued and improved as far as possible.

(b) In the countries in category II and IV, the position should be examined and negotiations be conducted with all local bodies in order to arrive at a universal agreement for a maximum of unity, centralisation and organisation in the conditions prevailing there. As far as the U.S.A. and Canada are concerned, a special direct examination should be carried out and a solution found which would accord to the largest possible degree with the above principles.

It will be our joint duty to analyse the position and to know all its details; the important thing, however, is not only to know and to clarify, but also to act, influence, guide and direct. We must make all practical and serious efforts to introduce into our Organisation order in the place of disorder, cooperation in the place of competition and centralisation of forces instead of their dissipation.



CONFIDENTIAL

THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

77, Great Russell Street,

LONDON, W.C. 1

26th September, 1947.

M. Shertok, Esq.,
Jewish Agency for Palestine,
16, East 66th Street,
NEW YORK CITY, N.Y.

Dear Moshe,

I had lunch yesterday with Gutch, whom you probably know from Palestine. He is now sharing with Trafford-Smith the Palestine Department of the C.S. - Trafford-Smith is charged with all political matters, and Gutch deals with everything else.

During lunch we had a few words about the "Exodus" people. I said that there must be some evil genius who advised the Government in their handling of the "Exodus" refugees, and referred to the statement issued that morning that unless the refugees were prepared to go to France, their rations would be reduced to the German level. Gutch said he had had nothing to do with that, and had himself only seen the announcement in the paper that morning. I said it was curious that such a statement should be issued twenty-four hours before Creech-Jones' speech at the U.N. and at a time when President Truman was considering aid for Britain and Europe. What useful purpose could be served by provoking the Jews at this time - American Jews included? As regards timing, I said it was really inexplicable why these people should have been sent to Hamburg, and particularly at that time. Gutch said that the refugees knew perfectly well that they were committing an illegal act, and the Government had been compelled to take what measures they could against such acts. I replied that they could have been sent to Cyprus; why France or Germany? I said that I gave credence to the statements that these people had been intercepted outside territorial waters, which was an act of piracy, and fully shared the opinion of our Counsel, Mr. Pritt, that the Government had committed illegality after illegality in the handling of these people. I was sorry to say it, but I had expressed the view to the Executive that it would not be useful to proceed with legal action because I felt that in the present temper of the country, and because the people concerned were Jews, and the matter raised far-reaching political issues we could not expect to receive satisfaction in the Courts here. Had the matter come before the International Court at the Hague, the results might have been different.

We then drifted into talk about the UNSCOP Report, and I said that I felt sure that the British genius would again assert itself, as it had in the case of India, and that if the U.N. accepted the Majority Report, Great Britain would make the best of a bad job, and by her handling of the situation would regain the trust and friendship not only of the Jews, but eventually also of the Arabs.

Gutch said they had managed the situation in India by giving a deadline; but of course the situation in Palestine, though it was only a small country, and the population only a fraction of that of India, was much more complicated.

I said I had no idea what Mr. Creech-Jones was going to say, but if the idea was that he should make a general appeal for help, he might get a response which might surprise him and shock Mr. Marshall.

Gutch, after a pause, asked me whether I thought the Jews could take over the defence and security of Palestine. I asked if he meant immediately, and he replied in the affirmative. I said I thought they could.

He then asked whether that would be so if there was a reaction from the Arab States. I asked him whether he meant that they would take aggressive military action against us, and began to analyse what such action was likely to mean. He said that he had not been thinking of a declaration of war, but of help they might give the Palestine Arabs in the form of arms, etc. I countered by saying that if that were to happen it would have repercussions far beyond the Middle East; if America and Britain were to tolerate such a state of affairs, they would lose the right to protest against the alleged activities of Yugoslavia, Albania, etc., on the Greek frontiers. If they did not take immediate and effective steps to stop and prevent such aid, it would cost them dear in other parts of the world.

I then put the question to him as follows:

Supposing the U.N. were to accept the Majority Report of UNSCOP, and Great Britain were to declare itself willing to implement it; supposing further, that the Arabs were to prove recalcitrant, while the Jews were to accept, and were ready to place all their resources in Palestine at the disposal of the Mandatory Power for security and defence purposes in the Jewish area - in such circumstances, what forces would Britain need to maintain peace?

Gutch thought that with such conditions only small forces would be needed. He had previously told me that they were under strong pressure from the public to reduce their forces in Palestine. I said that if the

Government were in a position to make a statement in Parliament to the effect that, as a result of having agreed to implement the decision taken by the U.N., and of having the support of the Jewish population of Palestine, they had been able to reduce their forces in Palestine from, say, 100,000 to, say, one or two divisions, it would come as a great relief to the public, and would rally support to the Government.

I thought you might care to have the gist of this conversation, particularly as to the question of our ability to take over security arrangements in the Jewish area at short notice.

With kindest regards,

I am,

Yours ever,

JL



Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Inc.

106 EAST 41ST STREET

NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

MURRAY HILL 3-2641

October 15, 1947.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
105 and Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

With reference to our conversation today, and your suggestion that I send you a memo, this is the situation:

Mr. Appelman of our Agency is conducting a drive in South Africa. I was in South Africa myself in 1934 when our conflict broke out with the Zionist Executive and all over South Africa the idea was spread that JTA is a private or commercial enterprise. They do not know that in 1935 we were transformed into a communal enterprise, governed by a board of representative members of the Jewish community, that I have transferred my shares to a committee of trustees etc., etc. For this reason, Swope, as well as I, would be very grateful if you would authorize the sending over your name of the following brief wire to the President of the Zionist Organization in South Africa and to the President of the Board of Deputies.

"JTA WHOSE COMMUNAL CHARACTER AND IMPORTANCE CANNOT
BE QUESTIONED PERFORMING PARTICULARLY VALUABLE TASK
AT PRESENT JUNCTURE I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GIVING
WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION TO MR. APPELMAN"

This wire or any other text you may prefer would unquestionably facilitate matters greatly for us in South Africa.

I am cabling our London office to sound Churchill about the article we discussed.

May I remind you of the talk I had with you in Northport? I referred to two extremely important Latin American statesmen, one of whom occupies a key position. At the present time, when so many important issues with Palestine have yet to be decided, they could be exceedingly useful if prevailed upon to adopt a firm and aggressive attitude in pushing toward just and fair solutions. I have a hunch this can be done.

Sincerely yours,

Jacob Landau

Jacob Landau

JL:F

Overseas News Agency, Inc.

101 PARK AVENUE

NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

MURRAY HILL 3-2997

October 17, 1947.

Special Delivery

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
105 and Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio


Dear Dr. Silver:

We have made some inquiries about Churchill and came to the conclusion that it was too much of a political and financial risk.

We are asking Col. L.S. Amory for an article. In this connection, we will not have to make any request of you.

If we can be of service to you in any other direction, we shall be glad to be at your disposal.

Sincerely yours,


Jacob Landau

JL:F

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Street and No. 106 E. 41st St.

Place NEW YORK

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ARCHIVES

YOU MAY SEND THE TELEGRAM INDICATED IN YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 5

IN MY NAME TO SOUTH AFRICA. REGARDS

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

Sender's name and address
(For reference only)

Sender's telephone
number

NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK

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BRITISH GOVERNMENT SEEN MAJOR BARRIER
TO SUCCESS OF PALESTINE PARTITION

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(Prof. Laski is former Chairman of the Executive Committee of the British Labor Party.)

LONDON (ONA--By Wireless)--On one important theme at any rate, the United States and Russia have succeeded in agreeing at Lake Success; both are prepared to support the majority report on Palestine of the United Nations Commission. It is true that neither has agreed either upon the boundaries of the two states which the commission proposed, and it is also true that neither has spoken of the ways and means by which the report can be implemented, especially if troops and civilian administrators are needed for an interim period while the change is being effected. But it is presently highly likely that the principle of partition will be accepted by the Assembly, and that the working out of the details will be left to a special committee for this purpose. If the issues involved can be tackled successfully this will be the first serious victory for the United Nations since it was first called into being.

At the moment the major threat to success comes from the British Government. It has a bad conscience over Palestine; its broken promises and its harsh and unimaginative administration have lowered its prestige throughout the world. It has put itself in an embarrassing position not only by announcing that it will lay down the mandate, but also by explaining that it will accept no solution not acceptable to the Arabs.

As the Arabs have rejected partition and even threatened organized resistance to it, the British Government must presently either refuse to cooperate with the United Nations, if the majority report is generally accepted, or break its public pledges to the Arabs. One thing it has presently openly ceased to care seriously about is its obligation to the Jews.

That is the inevitable result of the policy Bevin has pursued. There is no one we hate so profoundly, as La Rochefoucauld said, as those whom we have seriously wronged. Bevin will never forgive the Jews his own failure in Palestine.

Anyone who considers the courses of action presently being discussed in London cannot help the conviction that their main purpose is to prevent the Russo-American acceptance in principle becoming translated into actual fact. One course under consideration is that the British Government should set an appointed day on which it will evacuate Palestine, whatever has been done meanwhile at Lake Success.

It is clear that if the British evacuation precedes the transfer of power to an effective government or governments in Palestine, the result there will be at least civil war, and perhaps more than civil war. Another course is refusal on the part of Great Britain to participate in any international arrangements while the preparations for partition are being made. That will not only throw an additional burden on other members of the United Nations, but it will, it is argued, show the good will of the British to the Arabs, while it would earn ill-will for the other nations which participated in imposing partition.

The third course is to use all its great influence at Lake Success, first to prevent agreement on the frontiers of the two Palestinian states, and then to make as difficult as possible the provision of civil and military personnel to carry out any final agreement. It is hoped that disputes over procedure may lead to the impossibility of agreement over substance.

London, moreover, has carefully noted the imprecisions of Mr. Marshall's approval of the principle of partition, and it hopes that the likeness of the attitudes of the Middle Eastern bureau of the Foreign Office and of the State Department will suffice by joint intrigue to keep the approval so imprecise that the United States in fact does nothing. London is so wedded to its belief that Mr. Truman is planning no more than an electoral game in all this, that it feels confident that clever tactics can persuade the American Government to venture no further than it has gone into these difficult waters.

(more)

It is, to say the least, extraordinary that Mr. Creech Jones, the Colonial Secretary, should be willing thus to act as the instrument of Mr. Bevin's maneuvers. Mr. Creech Jones has been for years a warm supporter of the Jewish "homeland." While in office, it is known that he has consistently thought that partition was presently the one effective solution and that he has urged it on the Cabinet from the time he first entered it. Indeed it is probable that, had Bevin not been Foreign Secretary, Mr. Creech Jones would have carried a policy of partition into effect; but Mr. Bevin has used the bitter feeling caused by the criminal folly of Jewish terrorism to protect his prestige which is so closely associated presently with satisfying the Arabs at almost any cost.

Mr. Creech Jones is in an unhappy position. Mr. Bevin has won and the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility means that Creech Jones must, whatever his own views, accept a victory which he himself regrets, or resign. Devoted to reform in the colonial empire, he has given it admirable service over many years. If he resigned, the big colonial program with which he is deeply concerned would be carried out by someone else; and it is obviously a very difficult choice that he has to make. Nor can he help remembering how much more deeply committed on Palestine are at least three of his Cabinet colleagues than himself. His resignation would look too like a forthright attack upon Mr. Bevin, with whom he has close personal, as well as the ordinary political ties, for it to seem to him the right way out. He naturally yields to the persuasions of those who urge that one should not rock the boat at a critical moment in the Labor Government's life.

Yet there is an honorable path of compromise that the British Government could tread if its chief figures were not obsessed by their eagerness to defeat the Jews. They could set a reasonable date by which their evacuation was to be completed, so chosen that it fitted the plans for partition to be presumably made by the United Nations. They could recognize that, otherwise, they create a situation in which civil war is certain, and explain that they do not want their regime to end in large-scale blood shed for which their responsibility would be heavy.

(more)

They would use their great influence -- if necessary at the Security Council -- to prevent the Arab States from making war on Jews in Palestine, and to prohibit British officers and ex-officers from joining Arab forces in the hope of becoming new types of T. E. Lawrence. They could stop the ardent search for arms among the Jews, especially in distant settlements in the Palestine desert, since they must know that this gravely jeopardizes the safety of many Jewish lives, among them many who fought strictly for the Allied cause throughout the Second World War. In view of the approval of partition expressed by America and Russia, they could use their immense influence at Lake Success to get a settlement, instead of to prevent it.

Their present position encourages Arab extremism from every angle. They have, indeed, done more to encourage it since 1946 than any other power. Just as the members of the Government urged the Jews to compromise, presently, when there is a settlement in prospect, they owe it to the United Nations as well as to the Jews, themselves to compromise in order to help in its realization. They are entirely right to say to the Arabs that their first duty is to forward a plan which the United Nations approves; to put appeasement of Arab extremism before that duty would be a moral, as well as a political crime. They have evaded the compromise proposed by the Anglo-American Commission; it would be unpardonable if they evaded also a compromise to which the United Nations lent its support. To become the virtual instrument of the Mufti's ugly plans is not a pretty role for a British Government to play, least of all a Labor Government. Yet that would be the objective outcome of a British evacuation which washed its hands of responsibility for the peaceful transfer of the present regime in Palestine to the new authority.

I should have thought that the British Government's record in Palestine was not so shining, especially since the White Paper of 1939, that it could afford one more monstrous blunder. This is a moment when it becomes a government to be magnanimous. Without that quality, presently it will injure its own moral position far more than any of its enemies can do.

Oct. 21, 1947

BULGARIAN WOMEN LEAVE KITCHENS
TO ENTER PROFESSIONAL FIELDS

BY MILKO YANEFF

(Copyright, 1947, Overseas News Agency, Inc.)

SOFIA (ONA)--Bulgarian women have emerged from the kitchen and are filling positions as judges, members of Parliament, heads of state departments, doctors, militiawomen and a host of other occupations.

Sofia, the Bulgarian capital, indicates the metamorphosis. A woman conductor punches your ticket in the tram. A militia woman directs your car as you drive through the streets. A woman receives you as you enter the foreign department of the Sofia press office, and the secretary to the director is also a woman. In Parliament, too, the voices of women are heard, and not as spectators, but as active participants in the affairs of state.

Before the war, the women of Bulgaria raised their children, cooked and were confined to general household drudgery. Mothers could vote but could not be elected to office. Women could not engage in a profession without the consent of their husbands. Women did not have the right to be guardians of their children.

Bulgarian women received their Bill of Rights on Oct. 16, 1944, when a law was passed giving them equal status. Since the passage of the law, Bulgarian women have taken full advantage of their new stature. The National Assembly today has 38 women members. Sixteen women are judges. Yambol, a town of 35,000, elected Mara Atanasova, former high school teacher, as mayor, the first woman mayor in Bulgaria. Mrs. Raina Dimitrova, a resistance fighter, is a member of the Sofia District Court. Sofia's deputy mayor is Svetla Pavlova, while Dimitrina Russenova, 32, is deputy mayor of Varna, a port with a population of 85,000.

(more)

Women have flocked to the schools and the universities, and now their number in the high schools almost equals that of the males. Men still predominate in the universities by a two-to-one proportion; the lag is attributed to the customary marriage of many girls while in the early twenties, and because fewer girls than boys go beyond the "gymnasia," a school slightly more advanced than the American high school.

Bulgarian women have launched national child-care programs. They direct 2,000 summer homes, with 44,200 children attending last year and a slightly larger number this year. Their 137 nurseries sheltered nearly 5,000 children last year, and an equal number this year.

Bulgarian girls worked side by side with the boys in national projects undertaken by the Youth Labor Brigades. Women now outnumber the men in the teaching profession. Private factories employ 19,836 women, as compared to 17,739 men.

One of the most widely known women in the country is Tzola Dragoitcheva, president of the League of Women and secretary-general of the national committee of the Fatherland Front. A leader in the resistance movement, this 48-year-old woman was sentenced to death several times and was imprisoned for eight years. Another prominent figure is Dr. Vera Zlatareva, 42, an Agrarian leader and a member of Parliament. Mrs. Tzvetana Kiranova, 45, former teacher and present member of Congress, is general secretary of the League of Women. Stela Blagoeva is deputy president of the Slav Committee.

Pride in their new stature is evident among the women. A young woman, who formerly would have invited a friend to visit her home, extended this invitation recently: "Come to see me at the Palace of Justice. I am a judge now."

* * *

Oct. 21, 1947

THIS IS BERLIN!

SUICIDE RATE RISES AS BLEAK DAYS
AND FORAGERS PRESAGE COLD WINTER

BY ERNEST LEISER

(Copyright, 1947, Overseas News Agency, Inc.)

BERLIN (ONA)--The suicide rate is rising again in Berlin, as certain a harbinger of autumn as the carpet of russet leaves on the floor of the Grunewald, the German capital's sparse Green Forest.

Daily an increasing number of Berliners take their lives, presumably preferring death to the winter ahead. The city's statisticians note matter-of-factly that the same increase was evident last fall and continued until the weather softened again in spring.

Fall, the season for suicides, is also the time of year for pilgrimages to the Grunewald and to the patches of pine woods surrounding the battered city. Under the autumn leaves the Berliners search for twigs and branches that may have been overlooked by other foragers.

There is a boom in the blackmarkets as citizens sell the remnants of their households to get money to buy bags of coal or wood.

There is little talk and less interest in the Marshall or Molotov "plans," in the dilemma of the United Nations, in the "cold war." The talk, instead, revolves about the cold winter -- whether or not the Germans in the American sector of Berlin will get 700 pounds of coal per household, as promised by Frank Howley, the American Military Government director in the city; whether there will be more "warm rooms" to which the poor can go; whether the bickering City Assembly will be able to take effective steps to minimize suffering during the next few months.

There are fewer children on the streets. For instance, Albrecht, Peter and Heinz have been coming around for daily rides in this correspondent's new American car -- the "schonste Wagen" they have ever seen. The last time they came, nine-year-old Peter was not with them. I was told solemnly, "Oh, he must stay in the house from now on. He has no shoes and it is too cold for him to go on the streets with bare feet."

He had no shoes last year, either." And then, a little enviously, "He did not have to go to school at all last winter. He is very far behind us."

As the hot, clear, rainless days which made this such a pleasant summer -- if you forgot the parched crops -- give way to cold, clear, still rainless days, the moving season begins. Families prepare to move in to one room (if they are lucky enough to have more than one) so that they will have less to heat and may share the human warmth. People move in from the country, where they have been working on their friends' or relatives' farms, carrying potatoes and canned vegetables along with them as they hitch-hike back to their homes among the ruins.

The ruins themselves take on the extra bleakness that is a foreboding of winter. During the summer, under the hot haze, their outlines seemed less harsh, more antique and even a little historic. Now, in the sharp air, they are once again cruelly contemporary.

Despite the misery they presage, the crisp winds of Fall come as a blessing to Americans in Berlin. The frost in the air means an end to the epidemic of poliomyelitis. It means an end to the anxiety of American mothers for their children.

To the Germans, Autumn comes as no blessing whatsoever. Although they, not the Americans, were the ones felled by infantile paralysis, they weigh its death toll against the lives taken by the past winter's icy attack -- and they wish it were warm again.

* * *

Adviser on Jewish Affairs
HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Commander in Chief

APO 757 c/o P.M. New York
29 October 1947

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman
American Branch of the Executive
Jewish Agency for Palestine
19810 Shaker Boulevard
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:


In my last two letters to Mr. Kenen for the Organizations, I stressed the urgency of selecting my successor as soon as possible.

As you may know, I must be back in Philadelphia prior to January 5, when I am to take the oath of office for a new judicial term of ten years. It would be most helpful if the man to succeed me were to arrive in Frankfurt early in December so that I may have an opportunity to spend a few weeks with him in the Theater.

I need hardly tell you that the Army is becoming more and more drastic in its regulations affecting the DPs, and that our people are naturally becoming more difficult to control. I am happy to be able to report that thus far I have managed to prevent any serious deterioration in the relationship between the Military Authorities and the Jewish population, but I fear that the situation may become far more critical during the winter months. It is, therefore, essential that the best available person in the country be assigned to take over this extremely important office of Adviser on Jewish Affairs to the Commanding Generals, and that he be urged to stay for as long a period as possible.

With kind personal regards, I am

Faithfully yours,



LOUIS E. LEVINTHAL

Adviser on Jewish Affairs

to the Commander in Chief, European Command

LEL:rr

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HAVE THIS DAY SENT FOLLOWING CABLE TO JEWISH STANDARD YOUR CITY "YOUR ISSUE

DECEMBER NINETEENTH CARRIES STATEMENT HEADED ADMISSION WHICH ATTRIBUTES TO ME

CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE AT THE MANHATTAN CENTER MEETING. I MADE NO SUCH STATEMENTS

AND YOUR REPORT IS A PURE FABRICATION. PLEASE MAKE CORRECTIONS.

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

March 3, 1948

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
16 East 66th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

Dear Dr. Silver:


Mr. Appelman of our office, who spent considerable time in the Philippines, saw General Carlos Romulo, Chief of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations today.

General Romulo, who just returned from the Philippines, told Mr. Appelman, in confidence, that Jorge Bocobo, ex-president of the University of the Philippines and now Chairman of the Philippine Code Commission, will probably be appointed by the Philippine Government to represent the Philippines on the Palestine Commission.

Mr. Appelman knows Jorge Bocobo intimately and says that if he is appointed he would prove sympathetic.

Regards.

Sincerely,



Jacob Landau
Managing Director

JL:LM:J

TO: Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

FROM: Mr. Jacob Landau

Mar. 23, 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

I saw Dr. Lissak this evening. I told him that HBS wanted me to tell him, that he felt that the Commission had the legal right to nominate the Jewish Government and hoped this would be accomplished immediately. The Commission decided to continue, Dr. Lissak said, and thought Palestine Jewry was wise to postpone proclamation of a state until May 16th as the government could not start functioning before May 16th. He made the point that the Commission would be the real government, the Jewish Council functioning under it.

He further stated that the Commission would have to await developments and adjust itself to same. I pressed that it would be advisable for the Commission to nominate the Jewish Government by or before April 1st. This he said was impossible as the mandatory power was opposed to such procedure. ~~He~~ I countered that it would be a standby government which, while not exercising governmental functions in Palestine, could conduct negotiations abroad, contract loans, purchase food, etc. This too, he answered, would be contrary to the wishes of the mandatory power.

I asked: "Would not the establishment of a Government create a desirable fait accompli and make it more difficult for the U.N. Assembly to undo partition?" He answered: "The U.N. was created to prevent fait accomplis and not to establish same." He referred to the meeting in Mr. Brode's house, pointing out that he had been skeptical about the attitude of the United States but HBS had been too optimistic. However, the Jewish Agency, he understood, felt confident that more than one third of the Assembly votes would be against rescinding partition. He emphasized that the Commission had quite a number of tasks to perform such as securing food for Palestine, etc. and would attempt to attend to these.

He emphasized that thus far, the Commission was confronted merely with a statement made by Austin and not with any action of the Security Council. He indicated that the Zionists had been prematurely vehement. (He talked in intimate and rather indiscreet terms on this subject.)

He said he knew that some people considered him to be a heartless person. He decried emotionalism, asserting that complicated political problems must be objectively and calmly surveyed and analyzed. I pointed out that millions of Jews in Europe had been turned into dust; that the effort in Palestine represented the great constructive effort to which millions of Jews had contributed in order to secure a decent and dignified existence for part of Jewry. If a beggar were given a million dollars and a fortnight later deprived of this fortune, he was of course more unhappy than he had been ever before. The change in United States policy was a terrific blow and it was difficult not to be emotional about it. He and his colleagues could perform a truly heroic deed of vast historic importance by going ahead boldly, nominating the government, etc. etc. He answered smilingly that he had told a newspaperman at a press conference, "We do not want to be either heroes or martyrs."

Asked whether he thought that the British would surrender the mandate on May 16th or rather join with the United States in a U.N. trusteeship, he answered: "Bevin's statement in the House of Commons proves that the British will not change their mind. The latest United States move also took the British by surprise." He admitted that the Arabs had some inkling.

I asked him whether he would not write a book. I expressed the hope that his title would be "Success" and not "Failure of a Mission." He answered that he had been thinking about writing a book. I told him our Agency would like to acquire the option for serialization in the press, that Crum's book had been a great success, that a few hundred thousand copies had been sold. I indicated that the rights for film, radio, serialization royalties of the book, etc. could perhaps total \$100,000. He criticized the Crum book indicating modestly that he could write a much better book. I told him that Schocken would be an ideal publisher, who readily would spend a fortune to make the book a great success. I gave him details

about Schocken's unusual character and scope of activities, and emphasized that Schocken's passion was to bring out high quality books, etc. I offered to bring him together with Schocken. He said he would think it over. My impression is that he is interested and wants to be coaxed.

At 8 o'clock, the man who is known for the delight he takes in being disagreeable, rose and went to dine with his co-delegate Mr. Federspil of Denmark.



APR 5 1948

Sparkill, N.Y.
April 3, 1948

Memo. on Oil, Air-Bases, and Our Zionist Strategy

To the Attention of Silver, Shapiro, and Manson:

I believe the time has come when we must revise one of the bases of our propaganda and political strategy. As a dangerous symptom of this need for a change, I may call attention to the flood of anti-Zionist articles which have recently appeared in some of our leading and most widely-read magazines: Readers Digest, Colliers, Harpers, Look, Fortune (tho' this one was "killed"), etc. As you are well aware, these articles must have been "placed" weeks and even months ago. One can be nearly certain that the editors of these national magazines were pressured by the U.S. government. One can also be nearly certain that the pressure took the form of claiming that a pro-Arab line is a necessity for American "national defense" in any ensuing war with Russia. We can be almost sure, too, that this necessity for defense did not exclusively emphasize the need for Arabian oil. I believe that the pressure took a stronger and less controversial line; that when the government talks about oil out loud, they mean something else; it whispers privately into the ears of editors and other moulders of opinion. By "oil" the government means air-bases and other strictly military needs in the Middle East.

It is, therefore, essential that bring into open discussion the real line of the State Dept. and Dept. of Defense; that we show its weakness and, by so doing, counteract the scare to which our magazines and other public figures are being subjected.

My argument is as follows:

1. Oil is not the Real Issue. For some months now American journalists (such as I.F. Stone) have been debunking the anti-Zionist oil arguments. They have re-iterated in every key the obvious facts that (a) the Arabs will sell us their oil, regardless of our Palestine policy, because they have no one else to sell it to for dollars and have no one else who can take delivery of it (b) that American security cannot depend on Arabian oil because, during a war, we could not be sure of keeping open the sea-routes to ~~the~~ the Middle East oil-fields (c) that potential sources of oil on the American continents are huge and more than ample and always accessible in war as well as in peace (d) and that the steel needed for the Trans-Arabian pipeline can better be used for national defense here in America. Etc. Etc.

These are well-known facts. So well-known that they must be known to the oil companies, the State Department, and Secretary of Defense Forrestal. It is indeed impossible to imagine that our government does not know these facts in greater ~~detail~~ and more convincing detail than our journalists.

To be sure, the journalists who have told the public as much as they know have rendered a valuable service by this exposure. ~~But now the public knows~~ It was essential as the first step towards enabling the public to understand what is afoot, to tell them what is not afoot. We are not pursuing a pro-Arab and hence anti-Zionist policy in order to secure oil we will be able to buy in any case during peace, or to protect oil supplies we will not be able to use during war.

The exposure shows that oil is not the explanation of our pro-Arab policy. It leaves stark and unanswered the question: What then is the real explanation of this pro-Arab policy?

2. Air-Bases & Military & Political Strategy

The explanation, or a major part of it, is not far or hard to seek. Our Arab policy - in its anti-Zionist and pro-Arab League aspects - is part of our preparations for an impending war with Russia. It is based not on a consideration of oil supplies, but on military and political strategy.

A few among the many items which bear out this explanation are as follows:

a. On Jan. 14, the Air Policy Commission informed the President that by Jan. 1, 1953 we must expect that Russia will be making atomic bombs on a military scale, as well as planes to launch them and to engage likewise in a bacteriological warfare; and that by that date we must be prepared to defend ourselves.

b. Shortly after the middle of January (as you know) it was reported to us that Forrestal believed it possible that Britain would not take part in a war with Russia.

c. On Feb. 24 Herbert Hoover brought this whispered suspicion of Forrestal's into the open. In a public address he said it was very possible that Great Britain and the countries of Western Europe would be unable to fight on our side, for to do so would be suicidal.

d. On Jan. 30 Forrestal was quoted (N.Y. Times) as saying - besides the customary warnings about oil - that "the vital interests of the U.S., so far as ocean communications are concerned, extended from Gibraltar to the Indian Ocean."

e. Gibraltar? On April 1, Walter Lippmann claimed that the military men in our government (meaning the Council of ~~Defense~~ Defense, presided over by Forrestal) had instigated Congress to perpetrate that political boner about giving ERP funds to Spain. If England and France and Italy cannot be counted on to fight, obviously our military and air bases must, if possible, be established in Spain. European

In relation to the Middle East, what do these, and many similar, portents add up to? They mean that, if Europe north of the Pyrenees may be unavailable, our air bases against Russia must be established in Moslem lands - "from Gibraltar to the Indian Ocean." (In China, too, but that is another story) Obviously such bases cannot be located too close to Russia., i.e. in Greece, Turkey, or Iran, where they would be too exposed to heavy Russian attack. Instead, they must be maintained in North Africa, Libya, Egypt, and Southern Arabia. To do this with the minimum of friction with the Arabs and the maximum cooperation from them (however little that maximum may prove to be), it is prudent and wise for us to do everything possible to cultivate Arab friendship or, at least, acquiescence.

Moreover, as matters stand now, England is trying to keep the goodwill of the Arabs by sacrificing the Jews - this not only on strategic but economic grounds. But England may not be our ally in the coming war. Again, despite England's sacrifice of the Jews, her friendship with the Arabs is precarious: witness her dispute with Egypt over the Sudan, the refusal of Irak to sign a military accord, etc. Meanwhile, as an exponent of partition, the U.S. was weakening if not losing Arab

friendship. And yet the U.S. - and not England - will be the country that must depend upon air and military bases in the Arab world.

If necessary, the U.S. can of course install and operate military bases despite Arab resistance, reluctance, or even open hostility. But why entail the loss of a single American life or indeed the singeing of a single American eye-brow - if this can be averted by the extermination of some several hundred thousands Jews in Palestine and the extinction of every hope of a million Jews in central and eastern Europe? To understand how easily and readily the sacrifice of the Jews can be made by the U.S. Government, it is only necessary to re-read the Morgenthau revelations in Colliers of last Nov. 1st

3. The Importance of Openly Discussing This Strategy

At first thought, one might conclude that the above analysis, to the extent it may be true, is so damaging to the Zionist cause that it should ~~be~~ not be discussed in public. This would be a grave mistake. For to the extent that our State and Defense Departments are thinking and planning along these lines, we may be certain that they are discussing it privately with the moulders of public opinion in order that the way may be opened to attack and smear the Zionist cause. If we allow this sort of discussion to remain private we have no way of confuting or refuting the position of our enemies. The moulders of public opinion will have heard only one side - ~~one~~ ^{the} opponents' side; and it makes a very plausible and convincing case for ~~the~~ ^{the} pro-Arab and anti-Jewish policy. Unless we are to be knifed in the dark we must bring a counter-attack out in the light.

4. The Nature of Our Counter-Attack

To refute the "air base and military strategy" thesis is both harder and easier than to refute the "oil" thesis. It is harder because the oil argument turned to a great degree upon physical ascertainable facts, and these palpable concrete facts do not support the government's position. But the case for "air bases etc" rests on political imponderables and on long-range strategy that depends upon uncertain future events. To refute guesses as to what other nations (England, the Arab States) will someday do is harder, but to defend them is harder too. Or, to phrase it differently, it is easier ^{for us} to meet what is after all only a argument with a contrary argument than it is to defend a fact when it is isn't a fact.

For the gov't

Our counter-argument should run along the following lines:

a. Either the Arab States can afford to choose between Russia and the U.S. or they cannot. If they cannot afford to choose - if, as can be shown, it is almost certain they must join with the side that will enable them to retain their political power and economic privileges - then the U.S. need not fear that a pro-Zionist policy will have alienated the Arabs when it come to show-down of a war with Russia. If the Arabs can afford to choose - I find this almost impossible to conceive - then they will prove to be as unreliable allies in the coming war as in the past; and especially unreliable since Russia, unlike Rommel, is already at their borders. If they can afford to choose, if they can flirt with Russia as readily as with us, then we will be compelled anyway to maintain our bases in Arab lands in the face of recurrent hostility and the danger of treachery - regardless of our policy towards the Jews.

b. It may be argued that the Arab States will try to remain neutral. If they do try, the chances of their succeeding are very slim. Quite apart from the critical need of America to secure bases, neutrality could be maintained only if Russia renounced any attempt to bomb or capture the oil fields of Iran and Arabia. But Russia has already shown that she finds it either ~~useless~~ ^{futile} of worthless to placate the Arabs ^{by backing} ~~them on~~ the Palestine question. ^{try to}

In sum, the political imponderables favor a pro-partition policy. They show that our American military strategy and needs do not depend upon the sacrifice of the Jews.

c. As for the moral imponderables, they obviously favor a pro-partition policy. The familiar themes need not be repeated here: the future of the UN, the value of justice and democracy in formulating our war aims, the need for keeping the confidence of all small nations, ~~xxx~~ the weapon we give to the communists by cultivating and allying ~~ourself with the Grand Mufti~~ ourselves with the Grand Mufti and Arab feudalism, etc.

4. What To Do.

Our counter-attack on the real arguments and position of the government - which are based on air bases and not on oil - should begin with articles written by Sumner Welles and George Fielding Eliot. Welles should be induced to speak openly on the political aspects and Eliot on the military aspects.

Naturally, our offensive is not to be confined to magazine ~~articles~~ articles. We must orient all of our propaganda in this direction. And orient our own political thinking in that direction as well.

Marvin Lowenthal

Supplementary Memo. on Political Strategy

Sparkill, April 7, 1948.

To the attention of Silver, Shapiro, and Manson:

After listening to Manson and agreeing with him that (a) we must win to our point of view persons of weight and consequence, and (b) conduct a "whispering lobby" of our own - I should like to add to my previous memo. the following observations:

1) I think that Ben Cohen could be of help in winning over persons of influence. Two such persons immediately come to mind: Baruch and Swope. Besides, of course, the right senators and congressmen.

2) "Whispering" and other quiet work are, as Manson says, an essential preliminary. But our campaign, to be of avail, cannot be limited to whispering. The reason is plain: we can never whisper into all the same ears that have already heard the whispers of the State and Defense Depts. We have, for example, no access to the ears of the top editors of the national magazines or to the real policy-makers among the directors of the broadcasting systems. First we must get our important supporters. Then we must "whisper." But finally we must come out into the open and, assured of a strong backing, seek to win over the public.

3) Manson shrewdly asked himself the question: why, if the government is thinking in terms of air-bases, did it concentrate on "oil" as the pretext for its political strategy? I believe it did so for two reasons. (a) Oil is something concrete and something about which the public, already threatened with a shortage, is concerned. (b) More important if true, the "oil" argument, weak as it proved to be, is stronger than an argument which compels us to underwrite reactionary, feudal, indeed semi-barbarous governments without getting in return anything concrete like oil, anything that can be valued in dollars.

At this point the question arose: How is it possible or convincing for us to claim that our Defense and State Depts. can be mistaken in their political strategy - and hope to get away with our claim? We must - let me emphasize - make a sharp distinction in advancing our claim. We are not in any way trying to advise the Dept. of Defense how to prepare or run its military affairs. Anything they say in this respect we accept. We agree in advance to the necessity of Middle East military bases, etc. But we are claiming that the political strategy based on these military requirements is mistaken. To meet these requirements, we maintain, it is not necessary to pursue an anti-Zionist policy; it is not only unnecessary but useless to placate the Arabs by sacrificing the Jews. And, as I shall show in items 4 and 6 of this memo., It is worse than useless: it is dangerous.

As for the mistakes, we must point out the patent fact that the Defense and State Depts., not being infallible, have already made plenty of them. The most recent example was the "boner" in demanding that Spain be included in ERP. According to Walter Lippmann (April 1st), "the action of the House of Representatives on Spain was, as Mr. Reston correctly reports, instigated by military men in ruthless disregard of the considered views of the Dept. of State.... This could not have happened if... Mr. Forrestal had had clear guidance and had then exercised the discipline which a civilian official is supposed to exercise over the military establishment." In other words, Lippmann thinks it is correct to say that the Defense Dept. pulled that political boner with regard to Spain. In the late North African campaign, it was the State Dept. which

made the boner in backing Darlan and Giraud (while De Gaulle was the hero of France), and at that time public opinion forced the State Dept. to change its mistaken strategy. Everyone can make mistakes in political strategy. It is neither criminal nor unpatriotic to argue against any political policy of the government. It is all a matter of trying to guess right; and this is our strength in the matter.

4. Why We Should Placate the Jews. I believe it will be wise in advancing our arguments, first in private and then if useful in public, to bring out the positive aspects of our policy. It is not enough to say that it is unnecessary or futile to placate the Arabs. We must demonstrate why it is both useful and almost essential to placate the Jews of Palestine.

Our line should be: (a) Palestine as a military base is more secure if the Jews are friendly; and its military value is enhanced if, on the basis of this friendship, we can avail ourselves of Jewish industry, skill, and fighting ability. (b) Unlike the Arabs, the Jews can and, if the U.S. forces them to it, will go over to the Soviets. They can and will do this for compelling reasons. On the one hand, if we deprive them of all aid and hope, they will have no other recourse - except extinction. The U.S. must be brought to realize that the Jews will not extinguish themselves in order to help the U.S. placate the Arabs. If the U.S. promises them nothing but death, obviously they will take life - no matter under what conditions - from Russia. On the other hand, if reduced to this last resort they can afford to accept Russian aid and Russian rule - as the Arabs cannot. Unlike Ibn Saud, Ben Gurion will not lose the head from his shoulders through a Russian alliance; he and all other anti-Communist Jewish leaders will merely be removed from public office. Unlike Ibn Saud, No Palestinian Jew will lose a million-dollars-a-month revenue; none has that income to lose. Among the Jews Palestinian industry and agriculture and public services are already in great part socialized; for the majority of Jews a communist dictatorship would not deeply upset the daily order of things. It would mean a change of officials at worst. But civil rights and political liberty - which would be also lost? These are precious to the Jews, as precious as to the Americans; for the Jews too are anti-communist. They would gladly fight and give their lives for any side that would promise them this liberty and these rights. But what is the U.S. now promising and offering them in its pro-Arab policy? It is promising them either the continuance of the present regime under which the Jews have no rights and no liberty, or literal massacre at the hands of the Arabs. "Give me liberty or give me death" is a watchword for which the Jews are now daily sacrificing the lives of their finest youth. But the U.S. is not offering them liberty; it is indeed only threatening them with death. Is this policy intelligent or shrewd, or anything else but folly? Does it make political sense to turn Jewish Palestine, the only democratic stronghold in the Middle East, into another Yugoslavia, into another Poland - to make Russia the gift of a new satellite? A new satellite, or a body of 700,000 communist allies in the heart of a region we claim is vital to our defense? After we have done this, how many American boys will be killed in trying to undo this blunder by force of arms? Etc.

5. Back to the matter of our State and Defense Depts. making mistakes: We must hammer home the fact that they already made a mistake in basing their pro-Arab arguments on oil. We blew the argument up in their face. As the result of our exposure of this blunder, they have been forced to fall back on their real argument - which is military bases and the political policies these bases entail. And I would not be surprised if they are handling this real argument in whispers, as though it were a deadly state-secret, because they are afraid of committing another blunder

by again coming out in the open. As a further answer to Manson's ~~everyx("Whyxix")~~ doubts about publicity, I think that the government's present "secret" tactics give them a psychological advantage - an advantage they did not possess in the "oil" argument. You saw from that Senator's letter - and Akzin can tell you from his interview with Sulzberger - how effective it is for the government to pull a long and solemn face and whisper, "If you only knew all - but we can tell you this much under the deepest cloak and pledge of secrecy..." etc. Eventually, I repeat, we must break this spell of secrecy, bring the "secret" into the open, and there destroy its force.

To pursue this theme of the government's mistake - we must point out why the State and Defense Depts. are being misled in their pro-Arab (and hence anti-Jewish) policy. After all, Marshall and Forrestal are not ninnyes. We should rehearse the familiar story in all the details we possess of how our Near East "experts" have been pro-Arab for decades, how their pro-Arab slant long preceded and has nothing to do with the post-war crisis over Russia, how it is tied fast to the prejudices imbedded in our colleges at Beirut and Cairo, how for these permanent officials - our Hendersons, Hoskinses, and Wadsworths - pro-Arabism is not a policy or even a mistake, but an habitual frame of mind. They would be pro-Arab even if the Arabs were the enemies of the U.S. just as our inveterate pro-Germans were pro-German to the very outbreak of hostilities with Germany. And it is these blinded experts upon whom Marshall and Forrestal must rely, unless the latter choose to give more time and independent thought to the matter than they have so far found fit to do. We must publically prod them into giving this time and independent thought.

6. Finally, our own lobby and propaganda should dwell on the difficulty and danger of placating the Arabs. Britain has found to her cost how difficult they are to appease. She has given them seven seats in the UN and thereby only raised the number and price of their demands. The Arab League which Britain created as a little Near East social and card-playing society whose demands - Britain calculated - might proceed so far as to include an occasional strawberry-festival - is now well on its way to create a unified political block stretching from Morocco to Pakistan. And the end is not in sight, for there is still much of Central Africa, West Africa, the Sudan, the East Indies, to go. The difficulty of appeasing the Arabs is bound to reach a point where it will constitute a danger.

Marvin Lowenthal

Marvin Lowenthal

MEMORANDUM

Wednesday, April 7, 1948

Senator Lodge's secretary telephoned me in New York stating that the Senator had seen Mr. Lovett and that he had a long talk with him and presented to him my plan. Mr. Lovett was very much interested in it. He stated that he would give very serious study to it. He furthermore stated that the State Department had not abandoned belief in their desirability of partition.

He also saw Senator Vandenberg, who is deeply interested. He said that he would give the plan the most careful consideration.



7-1-34
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

16 East 66th Street

New York, 21, NY

June 9, 1947

The Honorable
Trygve Lie
Secretary-General of the United Nations
Lake Success
New York

Dear Sir:

With reference to the note of the British Government of May 23, 1947 circulated by the Secretary-General to the member nations of the United Nations, I have the honor on behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to transmit to you the accompanying observations of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

The attention of the Secretary-General is drawn to paragraph 10 of these observations, and it is respectfully hoped that the same circulation will be given them as in the case of the original note of the British Government.

Sincerely yours,

Abba Hillel Silver
Chairman
American Section

AHS:IBG
Enc.

THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

16 East 66th Street

New York, NY

June 9, 1947

The Honorable
Justice Emil Sandstroem
Chairman, Special Committee
on Palestine
United Nations
New York

Dear Sir:

I have the honor, in behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, to submit for your information and that of the other members of the Special Committee and for such action as may be deemed advisable the enclosed Observations on the Note of the British Government, of May 23, 1947, circulated by the Secretary-General to the Member Nations of the United Nations, which has also been transmitted this morning to the Secretary-General.

Sincerely yours,

Abba Hillel Silver
Chairman
American Section

AHS:LNF
Encl.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE NOTE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, OF
MAY 23, 1947 CIRCULATED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE MEMBER NATIONS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. On April 21, 1947, one week prior to the opening of the Special Session of the General Assembly to deal with Palestine, a note was filed by the British Government with the Secretary-General of the United Nations for circulation among the member nations requesting that they do all in their power to discourage "illegal immigration" of Jews to Palestine. This note was withdrawn before any action had been taken in pursuance of it by the Secretary-General.
2. In the course of the debate which subsequently took place at the General Assembly appeals for peace for the period of the "inquiry" were made by a number of delegates both in the First Committee and in the General Assembly. A Resolution along these lines was thereafter adopted by an overwhelming majority of the Assembly with five Arab States abstaining.
3. It is submitted that this Resolution, as its wording indicates and as appears clearly from the discussion at the Special Session, was intended to refer to violence or the threat of violence in Palestine pending the report of the Special Committee. By no stretch of the imagination can it properly be interpreted as calling for cooperation by the United Nations in the campaign being waged by the British Government against the immigration of Jews into Palestine outside the quotas prescribed by the Palestine Government.
4. Indeed, at no time in the course of the discussion at the Special Session did the British Delegation ask for the inclusion in the proposed Resolution of any clause designed to prevent such "illegal immigration." Nor by a single word was it suggested that the so-called peace Resolution was directed at the continuance of such immigration, the legality of which in the face of Britain's illegal policy under the 1939 White Paper the Jewish Agency has repeatedly asserted. Had the British Government sought to do so its action would undoubtedly have been challenged on the ground that it was bringing into issue the very matter for which the Special Committee of the United Nations was being appointed.
5. The Jewish Agency now learns that on May 23, 1947, eight days after the conclusion of the Special Assembly, the British Government renewed its request to the Secretary-General to circulate to the

member nations of the United Nations its note requesting their active support in discouraging "illegal immigration"; and that on May 29 a circular note was sent out to this effect by the Secretary-General to the member nations who were also asked to inform him of any action that they may take.

6. This request of the British Government and the ensuing action of the Secretary-General would appear to be altogether out of order.
7. The British Government, if it desired action on the part of the United Nations with regard to "illegal immigration," could and should have sought such action in the course of the eighteen-day Session of the Assembly -- all the more in view of its abortive attempt prior to the Session to use the machinery of the United Nations for this purpose. The failure of the British Delegation to bring up the problem openly before the United Nations was undoubtedly, as suggested above, because the British were uncertain of the possible reaction of other Delegations. Now that those Delegations have left for their homes, however, by a forced interpretation of a Resolution directed to another end, Great Britain seeks to obtain by subterfuge what she could not achieve by open discussion. This can only be described as a devious and improper stratagem to which it is regrettable that the Secretariat has given its support.
8. But beyond that, it must be observed that the United Nations is not committed to the immigration policy of Great Britain in regard to Palestine and can, therefore, take no action on this score. As for the statement of the British representative that "illegal immigration" should be discouraged while the matter is sub judice, it must be emphasized that, by Article 80 of the Charter, Great Britain is committed to respect the right of the Jewish people under the Mandate to have its immigration to Palestine "facilitated" and not curbed. It is urged that the proper course would accordingly be for the Mandatory Government to revert to the obligations to which it is committed under the Mandate and, pending the inquiry, to abandon its illegal restrictions on Jewish immigration. The Secretary-General, by asking the member nations to inform him as to the action taken by them in pursuance of the British note has improperly identified the United Nations with the policy of Great Britain on Jewish immigration as arbitrarily determined by Great Britain alone.

9. It is clear that the Secretary-General is not bound to accept Great Britain's unilateral interpretation of the Resolution of the Assembly. Nor is there anything in the so-called peace Resolution which empowers the Secretary-General to take any action in the implementation of that Resolution or to ask an accounting from member states as to their compliance with the request of the British Government. In doing so it is submitted that he has gone outside and beyond the scope of his functions.
10. It is with deep regret that we find ourselves constrained to protest the action of the Secretary-General. The Jewish Agency for Palestine, as the body officially recognized both under the League of Nations Mandate and by the General Assembly of the United Nations as representing Jewish interests in regard to Palestine, accordingly requests the Secretary-General to circulate these observations to the member nations of the United Nations.
11. Insofar as the action of the Secretary-General introduces new and prejudicial factors into the situation at a time when the Special Committee of the United Nations has begun its inquiry, the Jewish Agency for Palestine is transmitting a copy of this note to the Chairman of the Special Committee for the information of the members of the Committee and for such action as they may deem advisable.

* * * * *

June 10, 1948

Dr. I. Lifshitz
Palestine Emergency Fund, Inc.
123 West 44th Street
New York 18, New York

My dear Dr. Lifshitz:

I believe that you will be interested in the enclosed three cables which were received in the office of the Jewish Agency. The first, dated May 30th, and the second dated June 2nd are signed by Shertok. The third, dated June 5th, is a release in Tel Aviv of a spokesman of the Provisional Government of Israel. You have probably seen the text of the release of the American Section of the Jewish Agency on this subject. An abbreviated form of the text appeared in yesterday's issue (Wednesday, June 9th) of the J.T.A. Bulletin under a misleading headline. I am enclosing copy of a letter which I sent this morning to the Editor of the Bulletin.

At a meeting of the American Zionist Emergency Council yesterday, June 9th, the question was raised whether or not the Irgun units in Jerusalem outside of the borders of Israel were being maintained by the Provisional Government or whether they still have to rely on their independent funds. It was voted to send a cable to Israel to ascertain the facts. Such a cable has been dispatched. The Emergency Council is delaying the release of the Agency's statement until this information is received.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very sincerely yours,

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

AHS:er
Enc. 4

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Alex U. Zuchman

June 14, 1948

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, The Chairman
American Section, Jewish Agency
16 East 66th Street
New York City

Dear Rabbi Silver:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 10th, and the enclosed copies of telegrams from Mr. M. Shertok of May 30th and June 2nd, Ruth Goldshmidt's cable from Tel Aviv dated June 5th and copy of your letter to the Editor, Jewish Telegraphic Agency dated June 10th. I am pleased to note that the Zionist Emergency Council is delaying release of the Agency's statement until the receipt of information concerning the maintenance of the Irgun units outside the borders of Israel.

I presume you have seen in the daily press the statement made by Menachem Begin concerning the future status of the Irgun. The report agrees substantially with reports we received direct from Irgun headquarters. Inside the territory of Israel, Irgun units have been formed into battalions which are coming under the command of the Jewish Army. Outside this territory the Irgun continues to function in accordance with the agreement ratified in April by the Actions Committee. As far as financial and material assistance is concerned, none has so far been received by the Irgun from the Jewish Government or from any of the official Zionist institutions for any purpose. In the future, Irgun battalions inside the Jewish Army will no doubt be put on the same basis as all other troops, but outside the territory of Israel the Irgun will have to continue to rely on its own resources for its maintenance and equipment.

In view of these facts, there was no justification for the spokesmen of the Jewish Government to state that the Irgun has been completely dissolved and that fund-raising for it is "fraudulent", "subversive" and a "crime against the most precious possessions of the Jewish People...."

I sincerely trust that a public statement retracting these allegations and giving the true facts will be issued at the earliest opportunity by the representative of the Jewish Government and by the Jewish Agency.

Sincerely yours,

DR. I. LIPSHITZ

Executive Director

June 14, 1948

Mr. Arthur Lourie
Jewish Agency for Palestine
16 East 66th Street
New York 21, New York

Dear Mr. Lourie:

I have received today the enclosed letter addressed to Senator Taft by Ambassador Wellington Koo. It might be well to find out, if possible, just what is meant by the "new instructions" which were sent by the Chinese Foreign Minister to the Chinese representative on the Security Council.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

AHS:er
Enc. 2

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7-1-34
16 East 66th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

July 24, 1947

The Honorable
Trygve Lie
Secretary-General of the United Nations
Lake Success
New York

Dear Sir:

I have the honor, on behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, to address you with reference to the following.

1. The 79th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on May 15, 1947 passed the following resolution:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY calls upon all Governments and peoples and particularly on the inhabitants of Palestine, to refrain, pending action by the General Assembly on the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, from the threat or use of force or any other action which might create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early settlement of the question of Palestine."

2. On June 22, 1947 the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine resolved to transmit to the British Government, through the Secretary-General, an appeal for clemency submitted to it by the relatives of three Jews in Palestine upon whom sentence of death had been passed by a British Military Court. In so doing, the Special Committee referred specifically to the resolution of the General Assembly, of May 15, 1947, the relevant paragraph of which is quoted above. The Special Committee thereby clearly indicated its opinion that the execution of the death sentences by the British Government while the Committee was conducting its investigations was likely to create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early settlement of the question of Palestine.

Despite this action, the British authorities in Palestine rejected the initiative of the United Nations Special Committee and confirmed the death sentences, thereby greatly increasing tension and violence in Palestine.

3. On July 18, 1947 a ship, the "EXODUS 1947," carrying more than 4,500 Jewish displaced persons seeking refuge in their homeland, was intercepted and forcibly seized by British warships outside territorial waters and in flagrant violation of the rules of international law governing the open seas. The EXODUS 1947 was rammed and severely damaged

The Honorable Trygve Lie

July 24, 1947

and the lives of all on board were endangered. In the course of the seizure three persons were killed and approximately one hundred were injured, many of them seriously. The EXODUS 1947 was brought to Haifa and its passengers immediately trans-shipped to other vessels for return to France.

4. The circumstances under which these events took place have come as a shock to the civilized world and have deeply agitated the Jewish community in Palestine. The forcible return of these survivors of the Nazi massacres to the refugee camps of Europe is a shameful and inhuman action calculated to destroy their morale and to produce further acts of desperation amongst their brethren in Palestine.

5. For many months past it had been the practice of the British Government to send to Cyprus refugees arriving in Palestine outside the quota, there to await their turn for admission to Palestine. This new and drastic departure in British policy, undertaken precisely at a time when the United Nations Special Committee is completing its work in Palestine and is about to proceed to Geneva for the preparation of its report, has created in Palestine an atmosphere of utmost bitterness which cannot but be prejudicial to an early settlement. The action of the British Government would appear to stand in direct contradiction with the resolution of the General Assembly.

The Jewish Agency for Palestine respectfully brings these facts to the knowledge of the Secretary-General with the request that the member states of the United Nations and also members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine be apprised of the contents of this note.

Sincerely yours,

Abba Hillel Silver
Chairman
American Section

AHS:LNF

MEMORANDUM

To Danny Silver

Date July 26, 1948

From Bookkeeping Dept.

In reply to your letter of July 16, our auditor read its contents and checked the books. He found that we had handled your account correctly. He explained your fund of \$200 as follows:

Originally, when your office opened, you were given 2 checks of \$100 each to enable you to pay expenses without reaching into your own pocket. Thereafter you submitted expense sheets for monies spent from this fund. Each of these expense sheets was paid in full, thus returning your fund to its original balance of \$200. Therefore, according to our records, until you submitted your final expense sheet, you had \$200 in the fund.

To finally close your account, when you submitted expense sheets for \$262.35, we would normally have returned this sum to you and expected in return the \$200 which we had originally advanced to you. To eliminate checks going back and forth, we sent you the excess of your \$200 fund, which amounted to \$62.35.

There is a possibility that you failed to submit an expense sheet. If this is the case, please send it to us. We are as anxious as you are to keep the records straight and to prevent our field representatives from spending their own money. Needless to say, we appreciate the fact that you donated your time and efforts to this organization.

We hope this letter has satisfactorily explained the matter.

I never submitted expense sheet for monies spent from original \$200 - Only detailed report of how ^{money} spent and request for new funds - which never came,

Louis Lipsky

re Am. Jew. Conference

see folder

American Jewish Conference

WRHS
Agency File



League Council Meeting

at Aleh

see folder

Aleh League Council Meeting



Zalman Lifshitz

see Report in folder

Partition Map of Majority Report

