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Jewish Agency, "M", 1941-1948.

MEMORANDUM

April 16, 1941

King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia formerly depended largely on the revenue from the pilgrimage and customs duties to finance his government. Due to the war, this revenue has been reduced to a negligible amount.

The only economic resources of any substantial value of Saudi Arabia are its oil resources, the development of which has been seriously interfered with on account of the war.

The King has privately expressed himself, and we believe sincerely, as strongly pro-Ally. No other man in the Arab countries, nor among Moslems the world over, commands prestige equal to his. In order to feed and maintain control of his people, which is essential to maintain his prestige in the Arab world elsewhere and to prepare, even in a moderate way, for equipping his own soldiers for service, he estimates that he will require \$10,000,000 per annum until the emergency has passed and he recently demanded that the California Arabian Standard Oil Company supply him with \$6,000,000 during the year 1941. In addition to this, the British have promised him 400,000 pounds sterling during 1941, which he hopes to increase to 900,000 pounds.

Based on the best information which we have been able to obtain, it is our opinion that the King's estimate of \$10,000,000 for this year is moderate and close to a minimum figure for essential expenditures.

4/16/41

The California Arabian Standard Oil Company owns an oil concession in Arabia consisting of approximately 162, 000,000 acres and embracing all the probable oil territory of the country. This area is approximately equal in size to the states of California and Oregon. The original concession was acquired in 1933 and runs to 1993; the remaining area was acquired in 1939 and runs until 1999. The company is of American nationality and 50% is owned by the Standard Oil Company of California and 50% by The Texas Corporation. These two companies between them have approximately 160,000 American stockholders.

The development work commenced in 1933 and to date the company has discovered on three structures an estimated 750,000,000 barrels of crude oil reserves and there are many other structures of considerable promise on this concession. The Calarabian Standard Oil Company has so far spent approximately \$27,500,000 on this development. In addition, the company has advanced to the King against future royalties \$6,800,000. It has now come to a point where it is impossible for the company to continue the growing burden and responsibility of financing an independent country, particularly under present abnormal conditions. However, the King is desperate. He has told us that unless necessary financial assistance is immediately forthcoming, he has grave fears for the stability of his country.

4-16-41

PROPOSAL

1. We propose that the United States Government purchase from the Saudi Arabia Government finished petroleum products to the value of six million dollars annually for a period of five years.
2. The Company will contract with the King to produce, manufacture and load such products for his account at a Persian Gulf port.
3. The King will waive royalty on an amount of crude oil corresponding at current royalty rate to \$6,000,000.
4. The products taken under this arrangement, except that taken for use by the U. S. Navy or other U. S. Government purposes within the area, would have to be moved outside an area approximately defined as follows: Egypt, the east coast of Africa, South Africa, Australasia, India, the Straits Settlements, China, Japan and possibly the Phillippines.
5. We suggest that for the purpose of determining the quantity of products due under this arrangement an agreement be reached as to the prices of certain products to be supplied over an agreed period.
6. We suggest that our State Department approach the British not only to increase the amount of money which the British have been advancing to the King, amounting to 400,000 pounds sterling per year, but also to request the British to continue to make such advances in sufficient amount, which, added to those made by the United States Government, plus any other revenue received by the King, will total approximately \$10,000,000 per year.

Any British advances should be on a political and military basis and should not involve their getting any oil from this concession, the British at the present time being well supplied from Iran, Iraq, and Bahrein, etc.

NOTE ON MEETING WITH MESSRS. MERRIAM AND WILKINS, STATE DEPARTMENT
MARCH 27, 1947

I called on Mr. Merriam and Mr. Wilkins with reference to the reports that a special Assembly might be called to consider the Palestine question. Mr. Merriam said that informal conversations had been taking place with the British on this subject.

Mr. Merriam indicated that the committee which Mr. Lie had proposed would, if it made recommendations, be a very important committee and that, under those circumstances, they did not want to be faced afterwards with the suggestion that this committee was without legal authority. If the matter had to come to the United Nations then it was desirable that it should be dealt with without delay. It was for that reason that it was now proposed to call a special meeting of the Assembly which would itself appoint a committee. Mr. Merriam said, further, that he did not think that there would be great difficulty in arranging for such a special session for which, as he understood it, approval of a majority of two-thirds of the members was required. He did not think that the financial obstacle originally cited by Mr. Lie was insuperable, though the question of cost was bound up also with the length of time the special session would take. One of the matters to which the government was giving consideration was how to limit the session to the one issue of Palestine. They would not wish to have other issues raised at the meeting.

In answer to my question as to whether the United States Government had decided that the Assembly was a more appropriate forum than the Security Council, Mr. Merriam said there were a number of objections to the Security Council; thus, they felt there were issues involved here which were outside the scope of matters which should properly be considered by the Security Council. Reference to that body would, in all probability, in any case result in the matter being remitted finally either to the Assembly or to some other organ of the United Nations. The British, too, had objections to the matter coming before the Security Council.

Mr. Merriam replied in the negative to my question as to whether the American Government had developed a plan of its own for submission to the U.N. when the matter came up before that body.

I mentioned that when Mr. Shertok had seen the Secretary of State, the latter had indicated that there was some possibility of his discussing Palestine with Mr. Bevin in Moscow. Mr. Merriam said, with some emphasis, that no such talks had in fact taken place.

Before leaving, I mentioned that my attention had been drawn that morning to the draft rules of procedure for the Trusteeship Council and that under Article 42 there might be a repetition of the kind of situation where Iraq and Mexico had been elected to the Trusteeship Council as a result of a behind-the-scenes arrangement between representatives of the Arab League and of the South American states. I gathered from Mr. Wilkins that those concerned with these matters in the Department were aware of the implications of Article 42 as it stood. (Subsequent investigation suggests that my point was not well taken. It is the rules of the Assembly regarding election to the Trusteeship Council and not of the Council itself which are at fault.)

The talk lasted twenty-five minutes.

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
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New York, April 20, 1947
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14 East 60th Street
New York City, N. Y.

חלואיב



Dear Rabbi Silver,

I have the pleasure of informing you that I arrived in New York a short time ago from Palestine for the purpose of studying some economic matters of interest to our activities in Palestine. This trip will be probably extended over the next two or three months and I would greatly appreciate your giving me the opportunity of calling upon you beginning next month as I am just about to leave for Washington where I will stay until the end of this month.

Upon my return from Washington I will contact your office in order to make an appointment with you. In the meantime, I remain with best regards and Shalom,

Very sincerely yours,

Heinrich Margulies

April 25, 1947

Mr. Heinrich Margulies
Hotel Fourteen
14th East 60th Street
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Margulies:

Thank you for your kind letter. I shall be pleased to see you. Please telephone me the early part of next month at the office of the Jewish Agency, 16 E. 66th Street and we shall try to set a time when we can meet.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,


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Jewish Agency for Palestine
16 E. 63th Street
New York City, N. Y.

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May 5, 1947

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman
American Section of Jewish Agency
16 East 66th Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Dr. Silver:

At the Annual Convention of the Rabbinical Council
of America held at Detroit, Michigan, last week the
enclosed resolution was unanimously adopted.

I respectfully submit same to you, and trust that
you will give it your immediate and serious consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Enc.

RABBI MORRIS MAX
Executive Vice-President

The Rabbinical Council of America deplures the fact that the Jewish Agency has not seen fit to include the religious representative of the Yishuv in its official delegation to the United Nations Assembly. At a time when the purely secular nationalistic approach in Zionism has not made the desired impact upon the Christian World, it is imperative that the religious factor be injected. We feel that a strong emphasis of the religious historic rights of our people would carry greater weight than the mere humanitarian or even nationalistic approach.

We therefore call upon the Jewish Agency in Palestine and upon the American Division of the Jewish Agency in New York to co-opt the services of the Chief Rabbi of Eretz Israel, Rabbi Isaac Halevi Herzog, into the official Agency delegation, designated to represent World Jewry at the United Nations Assembly. His saintly appearance, as well as his scholarship and statesmanship, representing the religious aspirations of a historic people to their historic land, where the spiritual as well as physical rehabilitation of our people can take place, will make a profound impression upon the Assembly.

May 12, 1947

Rabbi Morris Max
Executive Vice-President
Rabbinical Council of America
331 Madison Avenue
New York 17, N.Y.

My dear Rabbi Max:

Permit me to thank you for your kind communication of May 5 and for the Resolution of the Rabbinical Council of America which was adopted at its annual convention which you transmitted to me. I shall bring it to the attention of the Jewish Agency. Speaking for myself, I am sure that there will be an opportunity during the hearings before the Inquiry Committee which the UN is to appoint, and which will in all probability also visit Palestine, for the Chief Rabbi of Palestine to be heard. I should feel that it would be tremendously helpful, and perhaps also later on, before the Assembly of the UN when it meets in the Fall.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK

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WITH JEWAGENCY APPEARANCE BEFORE FACTFINDING COMMISSION THE
MERKAR OLAMI GENERAL ZIONISTS PALESTINE HAOWED HACIONI AND
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
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TO: DR. SILVER, DR. NEUMANN, MRS. HALPRIN

IN VIEW COMPLICATIONS LIKELY ARISE IN CONNECTION ACTIONS COMMITTEE SESSION
JUNE AND OTHER DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OUR CASE IN CONNECTION WITH JEWISH
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FULL-RATE MESSAGE UNLESS MARKED OTHERWISE

Sender's Name and Address

(Not to be transmitted)

J.E. Marshall

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

COPY

June 4, 1947

My dear Senator Murray:

The receipt is acknowledged, by reference from the White House, of the telegram dated May 2, 1947 sent to the President by you and Senator Wagner. In this telegram you urged that the United States Representative to the United Nations General Assembly give full support to the program for Palestine which the United States Congress has repeatedly affirmed. You further urged that pending a final settlement of the Palestine question the weight of the United States Government be brought to bear in favor of an interim policy permitting large-scale immigration into Palestine, and that the Jewish Agency be accorded full representation in the United Nations deliberations on Palestine.

With regard to the first point raised it may be stated that the Department of State believes that, as the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations was called at the request of the Government of the United Kingdom for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare the Palestine question for consideration at the September 1947 session of the General Assembly, it would be premature for this Government to develop its policy with regard to the substance of this question in such a way as to limit the full utilization of that Committee's recommendations and its report.

In so far as immigration into Palestine is concerned you are no doubt aware that this Government has made repeated efforts during the past two years with a view to bringing about the entry of substantial numbers of Jewish displaced persons into Palestine. We are also exerting our best efforts in all other ways that are open to us to alleviate the situation of the displaced persons in Europe, regardless of race or creed, and we shall continue those efforts. As regards Palestine, however,

the

The Honorable
James E. Murray,
United States Senate.

the British Government, which has the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in that country, has felt unable to liberalize its immigration policy in the absence of a general political settlement. The British Government is thoroughly aware of our attitude in this matter, and there is no reason to believe that further representations at this time would produce results.

As regards this Government's position in the special session of the General Assembly, the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine is a matter of substance which the special session was not called to consider. It will undoubtedly be considered by the committee which has been constituted by virtue of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the special session just concluded. This committee will consider questions of substance and report regarding them to the General Assembly at its next regular meeting.

It is our sincere hope that the United Nations will handle the problem of Palestine as expeditiously as the circumstances permit, and that its conclusions with regard to all aspects of the problem, including immigration, will be such as to command the approval of world opinion.

The question of representation of the Jewish Agency has already been dealt with by the General Assembly and, as you are doubtless aware, the General Assembly at its meeting on May 5 adopted the following resolution:

"The General Assembly resolves:

"1. That the first committee grant a hearing to the Jewish Agency for Palestine on the question before the committee;

"2. To send to that same committee for its decision those other communications of a similar character from the Palestinian population which have been received by this special session of the General Assembly or may later on be submitted to it."

This resolution was supported by the delegate of the United States.

Following the passage of the resolution by the General Assembly, Rabbi Silver on May 8 presented the viewpoint of the Jewish Agency for Palestine before Committee I, which in this session had the same membership as the General Assembly.

Sincerely yours,
For the Secretary of State:

(Signed) CARL MARCY

Carl Marcy
Acting Legislative Counsel

6-4-47

James E. Murray

see

Geo. C.

Marshall



Dept State

6-4-47

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A. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

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APPOINTED EBAN LIASON. AMERICAN SECTION HAS MADE NO APPOINTMENTS NOR HAS

IT BEEN CONSULTED BY JERUSALEM ABOUT APPOINTMENT. REGARDS

SILVER

Sender's name and address
(For reference only)

Sender's telephone
number

June 20, 1947

The Honorable George C. Marshall
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Marshall:

I wish to thank you for the courtesy of receiving me yesterday and for the opportunity which you afforded me to present some of our views on the subject of the United Nations' Committee of Inquiry on Palestine and on the need for our Government to assist the committee in formulating its recommendations by expressing its views as to what it regards as a just solution, and the extent of our readiness to implement such a solution.

I was very pleased to learn from you that before a position is finally taken and announced by our Government, we will be invited to discuss the matter with you.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK

TRANSLATION FROM HEBREW

Dr. A. MIBASHAN
Delegate of the Jewish Agency
for Palestine and of the
Keren Hayesod for
South America

Cangallo 2194
Buenos Aires

July 22, 1947.

Dr. Emanuel Neumann
New York.

Dear Friend:

I refer to you a matter about which I am not sure myself whether it is within the limit of your competence.

I presume that it should be handled by Mr. Moshe Shertok. In view of his absence, I send the letter to you. Simultaneously, I am writing to Dr. Goldman in Paris. However, I know that also he is not in charge of these questions. The matter is as follows:

- (a) On August 15th a very important Conference of the Foreign Ministers of all American countries will convene in Rio de Janeiro. I have received a circular from the Latin American Department of the Agency in which I am being asked to take care of the matter and to influence the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina to put on the Agenda of the said Conference the Palestine question in order to try to achieve a resolution favourable for us in view of the approaching Session of the United Nations General Assembly. My opinion is that such a step only is not sufficient and it would be desirable that somebody of influence should be present in Rio de Janeiro during the Foreign Ministers' Conference in order to be able to influence the session accordingly.

I suggest Dr. Leonardo Firsi, representative of the Argentine Committee on Palestine, who has been of considerable assistance to us when the Government of Argentina issued her instructions to its representative to the United Nations Session in May in New York. Dr. Firsi has good connections with Aranha, former Foreign Minister of Brazil, who will play an important part in the forthcoming Foreign Ministers' Conference in Rio.

Dr. Firsi agreed to go to Rio to try his best for our cause. The trip might cost us \$400-500. The question is now, who is going to decide it and who will cover the expenses.

- (b) At the same time I received a mimeographed circular from the Latin American Department of the Agency in New York informing that the World Committee on Palestine proposes to convene

a Conference of representatives of the Committees on Palestine of the American continent to Bogota or to Mexico, prior to the United Nations Session in September.

The idea of such a Conference is a very important one but I doubt it very much whether it will be possible to arrange a Conference like this only on the basis of circular letter invitations; secondly, the question of expenses remains to be solved. I think that the Agency should decide quickly what to do in this respect. My suggestion is that such a Conference take place in Buenos Aires for many reasons and particularly because of the importance of Argentina among the Republics of Latin America. All the said above requires a clear and fast decision on your part. I ask you therefore to give me the necessary instructions for the realization of the above plan.

I hope that you will give the matters due consideration and I am awaiting your reply or the reply of the person or institution which is supposed to handle it.

I thank you in anticipation and remain,

Respectfully yours,

Dr. A. Mibashan.



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PRESIDENT

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DR ABBA HILLEL SILVER=

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FOLLOWING TO YOU FROM GOLDA MEYERSON: QUOTE WARMEST
GREETINGS TO YOU AND FRIENDS FOR THE NEW YEAR WHICH I PRAY
MAY SEE THE REALIZATION ALL OUR HOPES UNQUOTE STOP
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WRHS



Dr. Silver

C
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JAMES G. McDONALD
22 E. 38th St.
New York 16, N.Y.

Murray Hill 5-5740
Caledonia 5-3700 (Ext.1442)

September 16, 1947.

Mr. Arthur Lourie,
Jewish Agency for Palestine,
16 East 66th Street,
New York, N.Y.

Dear Arthur:

Enclosed for your personal information and that of your colleagues is a copy of a letter from Judge Hutcheson to me which sets forth very clearly his present thinking.

Though he doesn't say so categorically, I get the impression that he would not be willing to take a lead in the affirmative action suggested by our friend Buxton.

Perhaps you will give me a ring tomorrow, Wednesday, after you have read the Judge's communication.

Cordially yours,

(signed) James G. McDonald

C
O
P
Y

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Fifth Judicial Circuit

Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr.
U.S. Circuit Judge,
Houston, Texas.

September 11, 1947

Dear McDonald;

Thank you for sending me the clipping from the Times. It certainly is carefully phrased and moderate in tone and temper.

For myself, I still prefer the Palestinian State of our report. The argument that there must be a Jewish State somewhere has never appealed to me, and I believe that the interests of Jews generally and of the world at large will be better served by setting up in Palestine neither a Jewish nor an Arab but a Palestinian state.

Nothing in the Mandate either proposes or suggests partition and to bring it about by creating a Jewish state and forcing large masses of the Arab population to submit to Jewish dominance is, in my opinion, no less unjust and unwarranted under the Mandate than would be the forcing the large masses of the Jewish population to submit to Arab dominance in an Arab state.

It may be that the intransigence of both Jews and Arabs in standing to their extreme demands is such, and so great, that the matter can never be justly settled under the present Mandate. It may be that considerations of practical expedience require a new declaration by the United Nations: that it is impossible to carry out in the whole of Palestine Article 6 of the Mandate, that "The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions **."; that the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, secured by public law, can only be accomplished by partition; and that a partition of the kind proposed by the U.N. Committee comes as near as may be to the carrying out of the Mandate.

If that conclusion is reached and that declaration made by U.N. with substantial unanimity, I certainly will not oppose it merely because it does not do exact justice, for I know that in international relations many solutions must be accepted which fall short of doing justice. At present, however, I am no more convinced than I was when we had our hearings and discussed and framed our report that the Mandate cannot be carried out, as it was intended to be, in a unitary Palestine. I was sure then, I am sure now, that it can be if a firm decision is made to carry it out and this decision is firmly supported.

I am, therefore, still strongly in favor of the conclusion of our report for a unitary Palestinian solution, and not in favor of the one the U.N. Committee proposes.

On the other hand, I realize that what is most urgently needed, is some acceptable solution. I am not, therefore, so wedded to the proposals of the Anglo-American Committee that I would oppose the compromise offered by the U.N. Committee if (1) it should be found to be generally acceptable and workable and (2) if it is to be entered upon and carried out with firmness and vigor.

Sincerely yours, J.C. Hutcheson, Jr.

FRITZ MOSES
ALFRED HAAS

MAX WOLOFSKY

WASHINGTON ASSOCIATE
H. MAX AMMERMAN

MOSES & HAAS

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

50 BROAD STREET

NEW YORK 4, N. Y.

HANOVER 2-5842

WASHINGTON, D. C. OFFICE
INVESTMENT BUILDING
TELEPHONE DISTRICT 6688

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FOREIGNLAW, NEW YORK

October 9, 1947

Rabbi Abba H. Silver
Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Rabbi Silver:

Perhaps there is some value in comments on your speech before the Committee on Palestine from an old Zionist, an interested by-stander, far removed from the daily grind of the political work and from party and personal maneuvering, the concomitants of every political movement.

In my considered opinion your speech will rank with the very best of Nordau's, and that, to my mind, means with the very best speeches of modern Jewish statesmen. It will go down in modern Jewish history perhaps as the most important political utterance because of the crucial moment at which it was made and the chain of events which it will soon set in motion. These events, I am rather confident, will lead to a short-term improvement of the Jewish situation. Whether they will lead to or delay the long-term solution of the Jewish problem which is the goal of the Zionist movement as affirmed by you in your comments on the 12th recommendation in Chapter V of the Report - that, in my opinion, will depend on the type of Jewish state the Jews will be able to establish; and that again will depend to a great extent on the action which will now be taken by the Jewish

leaders. In that action will lie the supreme test of Jewish statesmanship.

Now to the special parts of your speech:

After your praise of the Assembly for appointing the UNSCOP and of the UNSCOP for its labors, you were confronted with the difficult task to convince the Committee of the falsity of the Arab statement of facts concerning the history of Palestine, the effect of Jewish immigration on the economic conditions of Palestine Arabs and the manner of Jewish resistance, as compared to that of the Arab. I think you made the most out of British statements on that subject, particularly the excellent Peel Report, excellent except for its recommendations. Prejudiced as I am, though probably less prejudiced than a Jew in the midst of the fight, I nevertheless feel justified in thinking that your statements will have convinced most of the Committee members and the public who can still be convinced at all. I was particularly struck by your sentence: "The very identity of Palestine as a unit of human society is an achievement of Jewish history." That thought - I believe - is the key to the defense against the rather strong Arab case on historical grounds. But the Jewish case is strongest on grounds other than historical. If the Jews had stressed those grounds more during the last decade, we might not have been maneuvered into the endless arguments on historical grounds, on which our position is weak.

I now come to your attack on Creech-Jones' statement.

Frankly, I had interpreted that statement as a relatively clear-cut answer, belatedly given, that the United Kingdom would abide by the Assembly's decisions, except that she reserved her decision on her active cooperation in their implementation, and, in case of non-cooperation, would "plan for an early withdrawal of British forces and of the British administration from Palestine." As the Jews are far better organized than the Arabs to take over the functions of a sovereign state, and for other reasons, I thought it advantageous to have the British withdraw "early", particularly considering that the Jewish people of Palestine can - to use your words - "provide without delay the necessary effectives to maintain public security." The more I was impressed by your attack on the British statement. For, justified or not, your attack, coupled with your subsequent denunciation of British policy in disavowing the recommendations of its own investigatory bodies, creates an atmosphere in which it will be much more difficult for the British to put a monkey-wrench into the implementation of the Assembly's decisions.

I am now coming to the main part of your speech, your analysis of the partition proposal.

I know you have vigorously fought those Jewish leaders who, though quite ready to criticize others for breach of discipline, advocated partition, contrary to the instructions of their highest authority, the Congress. You based your criticism of these leaders on tactical grounds - rightly. Whether and, if so, to what extent you were opposed to partition on its

merits, I do not know. That part of your speech which is directed against the injustice of partition is, indeed, very strong. But, of course, the sting is taken out of this attack on the report by your subsequent acquiescence to partition in principle. I do not say this in criticism of your speech and of the position of the Jewish Agency. After Nachum Goldman's express advocacy of partition in behalf of the Agency and Ben Gurion's subsequent approval - though with an interesting modification as to the temporary administration of the non-Jewish territory, the official statements of the Agency before the UNSCOP, demanding a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine, could be considered by the Committee only as a recommendation purely for consumption by the Jewish people, but not as a proposal for serious consideration by the Committee. This impression was strengthened by two incidents: First, Weizman advocated before the Committee partition; and, though he spoke in no official capacity, his position due to his merits for and his devotion to the Jewish people, is such that, whenever he speaks, he must be considered as speaking for the Jewish people in the sense that anybody can speak for a people. Secondly, Ben Gurion was asked by the Committee in Jerusalem for details as to the manner in which the Jewish state could be organized in the whole of Palestine as proposed by the Agency; and the New York Times of July 8 reports as to the answer as follows:

"The Agency's chairman conceded that he and his colleagues had not yet worked out the scheme in detail. Some delegates persisted in seeking further explanations, although with little success."

Under the circumstances, I cannot see how any member of the

UNSCOP could possibly have voted for a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine. The Agency's statement that they had not worked out "the scheme in detail", was paramount to a confession that they did not know how to implement their proposal. No responsible statesman would seriously advocate policies without knowing that they can be implemented. It follows that the Committee must have believed that the Agency had made its proposal purely for tactical or Jewish domestic purposes, but actually was in favor of partition, as advocated by members of the Agency prior to the hearings and, before the Committee itself, by Weizman. Thus, it seems to me that the Committee's advocacy of partition represents a complete approval of the real Jewish demands, as understood by the Committee. If the Agency had made a proposal for a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine with details for its implementation and thus impressed the Committee that, despite statements to the contrary, it was sincere in making the proposal, the UNSCOP might have accepted also this plan. At least it would not have brushed the plan aside summarily as it did (#3, Chapter V). Thus, even if rejected, the official Agency plan could still have been made a sound basis for argument before the U.N. But it is idle to speculate. The plan was not seriously proposed. And, thus, in my opinion, all you could do was, what you did, to accept the recommendation of partition in principle and to discuss the merits of its terms.

In my opinion, you have stated forcefully and clearly the main principle on which partition can, if at all, be executed:

"The Jewish state must have in its own hands those instruments of financing and economic control that are necessary to carry out large-scale Jewish immigration and the related economic development."

Which of the present terms of the majority report must be changed to apply the principle stated by you? What chance of acceptance by the U.N. is there? And, what should be done, if the present terms of the Report or even worse terms are accepted?

You have referred to the main terms which require change. I fully agree. I also believe that the tentative, conciliatory form in which you couched these requests was appropriate at this time and under the present circumstances. But I do believe that a concerted effort must be made to discuss widely the application of the principle of partition, as stated by you, in concrete terms to create a favorable world opinion for our position. We have the facilities, but they remain almost unused.

To my mind, it is rather amazing that even within the Jewish organizations reports about the Report are such as to give the impression that the majority proposal contemplates two separate full-fledged states. Actually, under that plan, neither of the so-called states will be sovereign as to some of the most important functions of a state, nor will the whole be sovereign.

You approve of an economic union as proposed by the Report. I suppose you could take no other position. But we are not concerned with the general principles of economic union - a conception which as theory has general appeal - but with the concrete plan of the Report concerning economic union - a plan under which customs, currency and communications, including transportation, will be joint and regulated in practice by outsiders, representatives of the United Nations; a plan under which the great irrigation and other economic schemes, necessary to prepare the country for the new immigration, will require the consent of the Arab and in some

cases other adjoining states; a plan under which, as you put it, "a large subsidy" will have to be paid by the Jewish to the Arab State.

All this and other detrimental features of the partition plan have been soft-pedalled in its discussion in the New Palestine and other Jewish publications known to me. Unfortunately, when the partition issue was first raised by the Jewish leaders, nobody went to the trouble of stating whether they would be willing to have the little finger cut off or whether they would concede to have the head severed. And, certainly, nobody came forth with concrete proposals for the political structure of the Jewish State, its constitution, its judicial system; its social and cultural functions; its financial system; its treatment of the Arab population, etc.; nobody came forth with concrete proposals for the economic development of the country in general and in particular with respect to the new immigration, the great irrigation, forestation, and general soil conservation plans, land reform, the budgetary problems and the financing of these schemes with special consideration of Jewish reparation claims, etc. If somebody evolved those plans, he kept them secret from the general public; he did not dare to have them tested in the market place. What wonder, if the statesmen of the world and the public are not ready to accept our general proposals and our concrete proposals whenever they will be worked out? What wonder too that the centrifugal forces are now breaking up and will increasingly break up the astounding unity that had been achieved; that Jewish groups, consisting of highly valuable elements, separate from the main body; and that the inner-Jewish

history of the Second Destruction of the Temple repeats itself?

It is time that these problems be brought into the open. It is time that the diplomatic attack be taken over by the Jews and positive plans be submitted. It is time to show - in defense - that under the plan of the Report a customs system would be perpetuated which is or has been highly detrimental to the development of the Jewish, not the Arab economy; that the customs are almost exclusively paid by the Jews; that therefore the Jews, who own only about 5-10% of the land in both states, will - according to the figures in the report - pay about 77% of the entire budget of the Arab state in addition to their own; and that, despite all this - the Committee is only worried about the "viability" of the Arab but not of the Jewish state.

I do not propose to discuss here these and other points. I only wish to point out:

1. If the terms of the Report on partition are accepted by the Jews and implemented, as proposed, we are selling our birth-right for a mess of pottage. Under those conditions, though we may bring into Palestine a few hundred thousand Jews, their stay may become only temporary and the Jewish state that will be created, will be a caricature of the state, as conceived by Herzl, Achad Ha-Am and those who are not just "humanitarian Zionists" - unless the Jews renege on the treaty and create a "fait accompli." That, however, means bloodshed, civil and other wars.

2. We still have a chance to accomplish the dream of millions of Jews, but only if we give up the policy of letting the Gentiles make proposals and then criticising them. We must make the detailed plans and show their workability.

For the importance of such preparation of the Jewish Case I would refer you to #4 of Chapter V of the Report:

"The committee devoted its attention to the bi-national state and cantonal proposals. It considered both, but the members who may have been prepared to consider these proposals in principle were not impressed by the workability of either. It was apparent that the bi-national solution, though attractive in some of its aspects, would have little meaning unless provision were made for numerical or political parity between the two population groups, as provided for in the proposal of Dr. Magnes. This, however, would require the inauguration of complicated mechanical devices which are patently artificial and of dubious practicality." (underlining my own)

Of course, I have never been able to find a proposal for a bi-national state which would explain the "mechanical devices" it would require; and I too have been opposed to a bi-national state, aside from other reasons, on the ground that it would not work.

Perhaps this reaction of the Committee to a proposal which was "attractive" in principle may be convincing that more is demanded from Jewish leadership than the advocacy of certain principles. We have come to the state where "brass-tack" is required. On the one hand, the best principles will not be acceptable without a concrete, step-by-step plan; on the other hand, almost any principle will be acceptable, if accompanied by a plan which the Assembly believes will "work".

I believe that the official Agency proposal, as made - sincerely or not, is workable. But the burden of proof is on us; it cannot be sustained, if "the scheme has not been worked

out in detail", as admitted by Ben-Gurion. As no scheme appears to have been worked out as yet, how do you want the Committee on Palestine and the Assembly to proceed? Whatever your procedural plans are, without a detailed, practical plan for the Jewish State, valuable, perhaps vital time will be lost, because new committees will be formed, experts appointed, hearings held, etc. before any action will be taken.

And time is against us.

Sincerely yours,

Pinchus Moses

FM: HF



Marshall Plan.

see telegram
?

Henry Stimson

WRHS



Nov. 4, 1947

RCA RADIOGRAM

HAIFA

NOVEMBER 10, 1947

NLT RABBI SILVER ZIONISTS NEW YORK

ZIONEH HAIFA SHEHITASFU LERAGLEI CHAGIGOT CHANUCAT HAMOADON

HUZIONI BESHENI BENOVEMBER 1947 SHOLICHIM DISREI BERAHA VEHAARAZA

LERASHEI HAHISTADRUTH HAZIONITH HECLALIT BEAMERICA DOCTOR

SILVER VEDEOTOR NEUMAN HAMMTZAIM BETOCH HAMAAVOK HAMEDINI

LEHAKAMAT HAMEDINI HAYEHEDITH VEMAVTICHIM

LACHEM AT EZRATAM HANEAMANA BEMILCHAMA ZU

MARGOLIN



H. MARGULIES

Assistant General Manager
The Anglo-Palestine Bank Ltd., Tel-Aviv

Tel-Aviv, November, 1947.

Mr. A.H. Silver,
Jewish Agency for Palestine,
16 East 66th Street,
NEW YORK.


Dear Dr. Silver,

I was unfortunate in not having had an opportunity of talking to you at length while I was in the States.

Since my return I have become very much absorbed by current events.

/ I am enclosing a political note of mine which I trust you may find interesting.

Yours truly,



H. Margulies

America in the Near East.

(Excerpt from an analysis of America's place in the
post-war world)

In the foregoing I have attempted to show how it came about that the United States had an active foreign policy forced upon them, for reasons inherent entirely in the economic conditions and in home politics, and independent of constellations of power abroad; how it happened that the United States today must keep running a production machine which cannot be sufficiently employed unless two outlets are found for its goods which in the past were almost unknown there: war economy and exports. Both are fields whose occupation meant building up political fronts abroad instead of concentrating all activities upon internal American affairs, a feature which had marked United States history throughout, even after the first World War. I have endeavoured to explain why the policy called the Truman-Marshall Plan exactly answers the internal needs of the United States; that a programme of this kind would have had to be invented even if, accidentally and coincidentally, developments in other parts of the globe had not supplied imperative, or at least plausible, reasons for drawing up this Plan. Without further enquiry into the whys and wherefores we may accept, for the purposes of the following analysis, the fact that the United States are today pursuing an active foreign policy on a world-wide scale and, as an integral part, a Near East policy.

I may save myself a description of the manner in which the United States has been tackling the problems of world policy while still new at the game. Without previous experience the United States were abruptly placed in the position of helmsman of human destiny, with Russia for an only partner. Hence, terrible, potentially fatal, errors of judgment could not be avoided. We cannot make out yet whether the Greek venture was more than falling into trap engineered by the British, who wanted to manoeuvre America into the line of the Russian fire so as to disengage themselves.

But rather than with the whole of Near Eastern politics these notes shall be concerned with a more limited section of it, namely Arabian politics.

It so happened that the substance of American policy in Arabia is much more clearly defined: for, in Arabia, this policy remains largely unaffected by present conditions at home which are driving the United States into foreign activities as earlier outlined; and it is, to a degree, free from the anti-Russian complex which is answerable for so great a part of American politics elsewhere in the Near East. Anti-Russian tendencies do of course cast their shadow in Arabia as well, but essentially American policy there spells OIL, with Russia only as an accompanying factor.

It is self-evident that oil policy, too, is working in opposition to Russia. But what is less recognizable is that at the same time oil policy is directed against Britain. While in Greece America's replacing Britain might still appear as a step to strengthen an exhausted partner without any wish to oust him or succeed to his inheritance, in Arabia no one is led to think of American and British interests as parallel.

The clash is so strong that it will eventually drown out all other sounds. Even today, over Palestine, a joint front against Britain is being shown by America and Russia. I shall try to demonstrate that it is not Zionism which is shifting the scene so strangely but merely the anti-British orientation common to both the great powers. True that we are still far from returning to the position in Roosevelt's day, when the United States firmly believed in their rôle as architect of the post-war world together with Russia, by way of mediating in the conflicts between the latter and Britain. The United States have been manoeuvred out of the position of arbiter chiefly by Bevin, and it will take very long to restore them to this place. But in Arabia, for one, the first step has been taken - unexpectedly, it is true, and prompted by common negation rather than by joint aims; and, indeed, to the surprise of the parties themselves.

* * *

America is no newcomer to the Near East. When the German and Turkish estate after the first World War was divided up, the United States received a part in Mosul. Since then, America has had a share in all oil interests in Iraq and Iran: these interests were apportioned to the United States, France and Britain, but Britain took the lead. She had been late in recognizing the importance of oil. As ^a producer of coal in abundance she had balked at carrying out the necessary adaptation and, as a matter of fact, had entered the first World War with a navy still largely run on coal. During the very war, conversion to oil had to be effected, and at its close Britain found herself the owner of rich coal resources

which had lost much of their former value, but without any oil reserves of her own. The first decade of peace saw Britain feverishly seeking oil concessions, but by then the world had already been carved up. Mosul, which by a wrong British estimate had been conceded to France as late as 1916, under the Sykes-Picot treaty, became the most coveted prize. A great deal of manoeuvring and the use of questionable means were called for in order to secure France's waiver of the Mosul title; later, Clémenceau and Pichou were to maintain that Britain had misguided them. Even so, the renunciation of Mosul did not mean that France had given up her share in the Mosul oil, and Britain therefore kept on a struggle to increase her own proportion in these resources, at the expense of a weakened France, but a strong America. This oil war was conducted underground and in disguise, but it was bitter none the less. In the 'twenties it was to outward appearances terminated by an oil peace in which Britain obtained the desired preponderance in Mosul, at the cost of South American rights whose loss invested Mosul with even more central importance for Britain.

Since then, peace has apparently prevailed in the Iraq-Iran region circumscribed by the so-called Red Line. It is nearly the only oil reserve on which Britain may rely. Saudi Arabia does not fall within this zone and neither Britain nor France had any concessions there. When in the 'thirties the United States secured their first concessions this was a sensation for the world and a very bad knock for Britain. In Saudi Arabia America was on her own, without the fetters of mutual considerations: here was a way in which she could upset the equilibrium so laboriously won in the Red Line Area. When it further became evident that the Arabian concession covered undreamt-of quantities of oil produced at exception-

ally low cost, enabling the United States to undersell any other producer and the Iraq-Iran oil in particular, it was brought home to Britain that the results of her long up-hill fight had been vitiated, that she was headed for a débacle with unpredictable consequences for the future of the Empire.

Britain had tried hard to secure those concessions for herself and one may presume that she was fully aware of the magnitude of her danger. But British relations with Ibn Saud were not without their strains. Her Arab policy for many years had centred on Iraq, until then Arabia's major oil producer. However, Britain could effectively rule in Iraq only if in the feud between the Hussein-Feisal-Abdullah clans, the vassals enthroned by Britain herself, and Ibn Saud, she identified herself with the former and took up their part. Despite the unscrupulous cunning of the British agents who, as during the war, pitched the Husseinis against Ibn Saud and at the same time played the latter against the former; despite their continued methods of double dealing after the war, Britain could no longer conciliate Ibn Saud. While he could never in all these years attain to any military importance, Ibn Saud yet succeeded invariably in matching cleverness against cunning. He met the British agent until the granting of the concession seemed a certainty; and when in this comforting belief the agent went on leave the first newspaper he saw informed him that the concession had been given to the United States, whose political record in Arabia was clean, whose case was supremely well supported with the argument Ibn Saud has always listened to most intently; unlimited cash resources.

As soon as America had staked her claim in Saudi Arabia, her clean record in Arabian politics was bound to suffer. She had to identify herself with the specific interests of this part of Arabia, to align herself with Saudi Arabia in the inter-Arab camp and to take up Ibn Saud's quarrel which was with Abdullah, that is to say with the same Hussein-Feisal clan that formed the mainstay of Britain's own Near East policy. This group, with British consent and leadership, was striving to seize the initiative in the Arab peninsula in accordance with a plan which has since become known as the Greater Syria programme. Automatically, Ibn Saud's policy turned anti-British, without any hindrance on America's part: on the contrary, since America now had oil interests of her own to attend to in competition against Britain, she was able to make use of Saudi Arabia as a political base and of Ibn Saud as an instrument and a means of camouflage.

The second World War retarded the process of separation into hostile camps as both the United States and Britain sought to treat all Arabs uniformly in a manner likely to prevent their defection. But since the end of the recent war the splitting-up process is again under way, in part visibly and in part underground and screened from the average observer's view.

During the second World War Britain finally succeeded in completing the manoeuvre initiated during the first War: France had to withdraw from the Near East. From the day when the Sykes-Picot treaty ceded to France not only Syria, including the greater part of Palestine, but Mosul as well, until the day when under British pressure she had to relinquish the Syrian Mandate, prematurely and unconditionally, there elapsed a long period of British attempts to prevent the enforcement of the treaty. To restrain France from occupying

Syria, the British "discovered" Hussein and his sons in the Hedjas, desert Arabs remote from a Syria which after all had a measure of urban culture. Aided by the intrigues of Lawrence Britain evoked and pressed the claims of these Arabs on Syria and presented to an astonished peace conference Feisal as Pretender. At the same time she shook France's claim on Palestine by producing the Zionists. She argued Clémenceau into leaving Mosul in the manner characterized above. The system as a whole was ingenious; only in Feisal, the British had drawn a blank since he could not maintain himself in Damascus and fled, together with his aide, when the French brought in their first machine gun. By way of compensation Britain put Feisal on the throne of Iraq, against the wish of the populace; his aide, Amin Hussein, was made Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.

France continued in her occupation of a Syria reduced in size until the second World War when Britain was able to cause the evacuation of this, France's last, Arab territory. Britain expected liberated Syria to turn to her in gratitude. While she was barred from making claims of her own, Britain saw a possibility, nonetheless, of making Transjordan - where Feisal's brother Abdullah had been made King - the foundation of a Greater Syrian bloc, to include Transjordan, Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon, as well as so much of Palestine as could be taken away from the Jews. The formation of such a bloc assumed a special importance under the aspect of events in Saudi Arabia: one may assume that Britain has not yet resigned herself to inactivity vis-à-vis the menace to her oil reserves seen in that quarter.

Too much is involved for Britain to rest her hand. A strong Greater Syria led by Abdullah might one day, perhaps after the death of Ibn Saud, revive the old feud with Saudi Arabia. Its British-trained, armed and officered forces might occupy territory, including that of the oil concession.

There is hardly a doubt that America has recognized the danger of these manoeuvrings. She first attempted to lay her pipeline not through territory controlled by Britain but across the desert to Egypt. The plan was dropped but this ought not to signify a sacrifice of her threatened interests. The dollar has been waging a hidden war in recent years in the Near East: what are possible traces may be seen wherever Arab opposition arose against Britain and where troubles broke out. The success may be measured by the results: Saudi Arabia is nothing less than isolated. A bloc has been built up including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the elements allied to the Mufti of Jerusalem in general and the Palestine Husseinis in particular. This group is fighting Abdullah's Greater Syria tooth and nail. It has pushed Abdullah into the defensive, and Britain too, and is preparing for new attacks.

One of these is Ibn Saud's claim for restitution of the strip of territory which in 1924 Britain took away from him without further ado because it separates Transjordan from Iraq. Only by its seizure was Britain able to link up the two countries, at the same time pushing a bar between Saudi Arabia and the regions of the Mediterranean coast. Ibn Saud's present claim is not founded on his wish to add more square miles of waste to his own deserts but because he wants to achieve three important ends: a wedge will be driven between Iraq and Transjordan, direct contact will be obtained with

Syria - and a corridor will be provided where an American pipeline may be laid without passing through British-controlled territory. Little wonder that Ibn Saud is only now pushing his claim: in America he has found an ally even more interested than himself. In essence this may be believed a camouflaged American demand rather than one of Ibn Saud.

The second offensive is in the writer's opinion connected with the plan to partition Palestine. This plan, as distinct from all its precursors, provides for a partition whereby Arab Palestine will not be handed to Abdullah but to the Palestine Arab Higher Committee composed of Abdullah's opponents. Should partition in this form be carried through, Eastern Palestine would form the last link in the chain encircling Abdullah's Transjordan. Eastern Palestine would ally itself with Syria, Egypt and Ibn Saud against Abdullah, and all British plans would come to an end. This reason, and none other, is probably at the bottom of Britain's violent opposition against partition: among all the proposed partition schemes Britain can accept only one strengthening Abdullah instead of weakening him. Conversely, the partition would undoubtedly have met with less sympathy on America's part had it been likely to strengthen Abdullah - and what goes for America certainly goes for Russia, whose relations with Britain promise support for any policy directed against the latter. As for Abdullah, Russia regards him suspiciously because he is still committed to a policy striving at the formation of an anti-Russian bloc led by Turkey and, obviously, inspired by Britain.

How may one find one's bearings in this whirlpool of intrigue and conflicting interests? All hopes must centre on the idea that sooner or later the Near East as a whole must be made the subject of an international oil agreement. But this will take long and many possibilities and combinations will crop up until then. Of the latter, one seems the least likely at present: it is difficult to suppose that Britain may once more unite all Arabs under her leadership. What on the other hand are the chances of Arab unity under anti-British guidance? The possibility exists, although it presupposes that Abdullah will either be eliminated or that he will desert into the dollar camp. This will mean great political sacrifices for him, but for one, these may in this part of the globe be largely counterbalanced by money; and, moreover, America may conceivably entrust to an allied Abdullah a leading rôle which he cannot fill while still an instrument of Britain at a time when British policy runs counter to that of the United States. Once Abdullah joins the American side he stands a better chance of inheriting Eastern Palestine which his opponents now deny him; in such a constellation he might become the much-needed key figure for partition and conciliation between Jews and Arabs.

For the time being, Britain is seen on the retreat. It would be childish to assume that she will evacuate Arabia altogether. She keeps Transjordan as a basis. If Britain talks of chaotic evacuation she is thinking of a withdrawal coinciding with the occupation of Eastern Palestine by Abdulla's troops, at present already stationed there, before the other Arabs can move. Britain probably regrets today that she did not carry out the partition at a time when it would have been possible thereby to help Abdullah in the desired consolidation

of his position while simultaneously securing Jewish cooperation. Antisemitism makes for short-sightedness and unintelligent policy: philosemitism gave Britain the Palestine Mandate. Anti-Jewish feeling is today clouding Britain's view: she is about to lose not only the Mandate but her preponderant position in the Near East; in a region, that is, where Britain's only oil reserves are situated.



[January 1948?]

LETTERS FROM THE FRONT #2

by

Harold Manson

(The information chief of the American Zionist Emergency Council is now on leave of absence in Palestine to get the story behind the headlines. Mr. Manson's articles are distributed by the Overseas News Agency. The following excerpts from his letters to friends in the U.S. portray various aspects of life in the Yishuv not generally covered in press dispatches. They are printed here with the author's permission.)

PILGRIMAGE TO JERUSALEM

Jerusalem, January 18, 1948 ~~There is a road between Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem~~ The road between Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem is about 40 miles long. It is the main artery of transportation in Eretz Israel, connecting the country's two major centers and providing access to and from a large number of smaller communities. We travelled that road today -- and it was an unforgettable experience.

Dr. Silver, Mrs. Silver and I were scheduled to leave at 6 A.M. in the Jewish Agency's ~~special~~ armored car, but at dawn I was phoned by a Haganah officer and told that the machine is under repair and that we must wait until tomorrow, at which time we would go with B.-G. There was a brief consultation amongst the three of us, and the proposal originally put forward by Mrs. S. prevailed: Namely, we would not wait, but would go on the Egged armored bus which is convoyed back and forth daily.

Much to the astonishment of all present at the bus depot, the "Silver party" ~~was~~ was checked into the vehicle which was to be home and protector for the next five hours. We were joined by Goldie Meyerson, who seems to take this hazardous journey fairly regularly, and proceeded to make ourselves as comfortable as possible on the bucket seats. Also present were a Norwegian and a French correspondent, sensibly dressed in wartime field uniform, a few Jewish Agency ~~officials~~ officials and, achron achron chaviy, a small ~~group~~ group of young men and a girl, who were "accompanying" us. Just before we shoved off the picture was completed: three of the parents of the 35 killed at Kfar Ezion were led in and given seats in the rear of the bus. ~~XXXXXX~~ I shall never forget those three faces, especially the woman's. The grief of a nation was there, and heartbreak travelled with us to Jerusalem.

Did your morning paper mention something about a convoy to ~~Jerusalem~~ or from Tel-Aviv? Impressive word, convoy; ~~implies~~ implies armored strength and protection -- machine guns and all that. Well, let me tell you what

it's really like under the "neutral" Palestine Administration of His Majesty's Government. Leading the convoy is an open truck carrying a small number of incredibly brave lads who are prepared to risk their lives daily in order to keep the road open. Why an open truck, and why not an armored car or a tank? Well, you see, the British who are, of course, wholly altruistic in the present situation, believe that arms or armor on Jewish convoys would only serve to "provoke" Arab attacks, and they are therefore forbidden. So those boys in the first truck must expose themselves to attack from any direction, not to mention the fact that their vehicle is the one blown up if ~~there should be~~ there should be land mines on the road. But you should also know that these boys fight for the privilege of riding on the first car. God, what a people!

If your temperature's rising, control yourself for I've only begun. In order to make certain that our Arab cousins are not ~~provoked~~ "provoked" into attacking the convoy, the British try to make certain that all "provocative" material is removed. They, therefore, make it clear that no person in the bus or in the open cars protecting it is permitted to carry arms; and to drive this point home, they stop the convoy from time to time for an arms-search. While they often frisk the men, they are not permitted to search women, and that explains the presence of the girls in the open cars. (It's a little game that we play with each other.) Those kids are fantastic -- sweet little things who rate in any ~~any~~ man's army.

~~And~~ If the good people of Cleveland, Ohio could only have seen their rebitzin today! As we were nearing Latrun, one of the lads in our bus reached into the burlap sack he had brought aboard with him (the kind one associates with dead chickens) and hurriedly removed its contents -- for our little group would shortly have a "neutral" guest. Quick as a flash, our Rabbi's wife reached over for various items that had been taken out of the sack and, with beautiful nonchalance, tucked them away ~~in~~ -- ~~as did a certain member of the Jewish Agency Executive.~~ as did a certain member of the Jewish Agency Executive. I know that Dr. Silver will forgive me for saying that ~~this morning~~ at Latrun, I fell in love with his wife.

Our convoy was not molested, either at Latrun or throughout the remainder of the trip. We arrived in Jerusalem a bit weary, but much wiser as to the facts of life in Palestine today. As we got off the bus, we shook hands with the three mourners. Dr. Silver tried to say something comforting, but his voice broke.

Later we learned that the convoy immediately preceding us had been

-3-

■ attacked and badly shot up. Three were killed and eight wounded.



Overseas News Agency, Inc.

101 PARK AVENUE

NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

MURRAY HILL 3-2997

February 6, 1948

Dr. A.H. Silver
Hotel Commodore
East 42nd St.
New York City

Dear Dr. Silver:

I am enclosing copy of a letter from Mr. Mowrer, our
correspondent in Palestine. This is one of the matters
I am anxious to talk to you about.

Sincerely yours,

J. Landau
Jacob Landau

113

jc:ies:o
enc.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

EXTRACTS

Jan. 25, 1948

Dear Vic:

This is a request to be taken off the Palestine-Middle East assignment and to be transferred perhaps to Greece (where neither the New York Post nor ONA seems to have anyone, or to some other place in Europe. For more than a week I have hesitated to write this letter, but I have come to the conclusion that it must be written.

My reason for this is the arrival here of Manson in the dual capacity of accredited ONA correspondent and Publicity Director (whether past or present doesn't make much difference) of the American Zionist Emergency Council. I have met Manson, he is a nice chap, and on a personal basis I have nothing against him. But I don't think you realize, Vic, how personal courtesies of this sort to your friends have compromised the status of ONA in covering the Palestine story, past and present.

Manson's double status here definitely compromises my own position as an independent newspaper reporter. I cannot continue here as the correspondent of an agency which is increasingly regarded as a cover for Zionist organizations. Working conditions have become none too easy. My Arab connections are slim enough as it is; the Manson development snaps them altogether. Manson is intimately linked with the American Zionist group, at the same time he is an accredited ONA correspondent; automatically, in the minds of everyone I have to deal with, that classifies me, ONA correspondent, as also a Zionist. -- and I don't want that. That is why I am requesting a transfer.

Vic, I'm sorry. I regret the idea of leaving this story now -- I feel I've been going good at it. But under the circumstances I don't see what else I can do. Knowing you, I feel you will understand. Believe me, I value my association with ONA, and I hope this thing can be straightened out.

TEL. ORCHARD 4-6300

RABBI M. A. KAMIEN

BROADWAY CENTRAL HOTEL

673 BROADWAY

NEW YORK 3, N. Y.

הרב מ. א. קאמיעז

בראדוויי סענטראל האטעל

673 פראדוויי

נ"ו יארק

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והיא בארץ
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הרב מ. א. קאמיען

הס' רמח"מ נחלק נחלק
ה' רמח"מ: ה' רמח"מ

דערב מ. א. אבן

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MAR 1 1948

BROADWAY CENTRAL HOTEL

NEW YORK 3, N. Y.

בראדוויי סענטראל האטעל

673 פראָדוויי

ניו יארק

ניו יארק
אדאם אבאן ער הכיף האט אים און אים און אים
ר' אהרן האט אים און אים און אים

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קאדמו ז' רבין דעצמן יואם דעצמן כחמס "ג-ל ליל כלום"

לפני העצרת יוקם דבאר של יחידים "במחנה" הירוקים הצבאיים
דבאר של כיסאן היצירה מסיבת יחידים של המחנה יחידים של המחנה

הידיעה והפאסות ד' שנין ממשל וד' צדק ה' צדק

מחלקת המטה
המחלקה הכלכלית
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המחלקה הכלכלית

ה'תש"ח י"ח כ"ח

אשר נכתב על ידי המלך המשיח הנ"ל ביום 11/3/11 בקפולת ה'תשס"א

דער וואס האט דאס געשריבן
און דער וואס האט דאס געשריבן

היחידות דוגר קאסאלים ואלמסלום ורצולם רב בעמק יזרעאל ואלמסלום ורצולם רב בעמק יזרעאל

אחיו דני ישראלי נכח בפניו של המושל
וילב ציוריו של 1/1-1/2 המושל ה

די באשעס היינט הקדוש אהרן הכהן האבנו הקדוש באבא נאכט

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והוא שם של שלום ויש לו יצר מן הצד הטוב והוא לא צריך יסורים

ה' כ' יב' באב ה'תש"ח

שם יצחק בן אברהם
ה'תק"ל

וזהו כח וישמע דברי ייחוד ודבור

מנו עזר כח

הרב מ. א. קאמיען

Am 2. Juli 1872.

הרב מ. א. אבן

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MAR 1 1948

BROADWAY CENTRAL HOTEL

NEW YORK 3, N. Y.

פראדוויי סענטראל האָטעל

673 פראדוויי

ניו יארק

673 בראדוויי
ניו יארק
צו די חסידים אשר יצאנו מאשכנז
דער ישיבה דער חסידים דער חסידים
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RABBI SAULAN ISRAEL MNACHEM
RABBI M.A. KAMEN
BROADWAY CENTRAL HOTEL
673 BROADWAY ROOM 721
N.Y.C.

לרובתו של רבי אהרן
של אגודת ישראל
לרובתו של רבי אהרן
לרובתו של רבי אהרן
TO MR.
RABBI A. HILEL SILVER
C/O JEWISH AGENCY
16 E 66 STR.
N.Y.C.

CLASS OF SERVICE

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WESTERN UNION

1201

SYMBOLS

DL=Day Letter

NL=Night Letter

LC=Deferred Cable

NLT=Cable Night Letter

Ship Radiogram

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination.

E63CC 2A NL PD

WUX TDM LAKE SUCCESS NY FEB 5 1948

RABBI MVORCHIM BOHOL TOV, BROADWAY CENTRAL HOTEL

673 BROADWAY ROOM 701 NYK

344 SECRETARY GENERAL HAS ASKED ME TO EXPRESS HIS DEEP GRATITUDE
FOR YOUR EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT OF THE WORK OF UNITED NATIONS AS
SET FORTH IN YOUR TELEGRAM OF 16 JANUARY

ANDREW CORDIER EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

735P

RABBI ARTHUR MEYEROWITZ

BUCKINGHAM APTS.

SCARSDALE, NEW YORK

SCARSDALE 5541

April 2, 1948

Dear Friend -

I heard you on Wednesday, but I also saw
you and your boy in the
1st 5th 1st 1st 1st

Reginald shows your criticism -
that our beloved America did yesterday
is "giving to the Jews" -
that our 5th American Jews in the U. S.
is influence power "yet" let us
use it now immediately, before they
cancel or cancel our citizenship
rights with the same hypocrisy and
dirty oil & blood as they did to
our American Jews -

Remember, during the
Hitler period you criticized the
Jews of New York for tolerating the
sale of German goods -
Now is the time when the
of Walter Austin is playing the
custodianship of the Jews of Palestine
to let them know how it is

RABBI ARTHUR MEYEROWITZ
BUCKINGHAM APTS.
SCARSDALE, NEW YORK
SCARSDALE 5541

American Jews feel about the "Self
out" double cross & humiliation -
Just think what could have happened
if they did it to the G.I.s or the
Catholic Church -
Specifically I suggest
1) a joint proclamation by L.E.C.
& Bd of Rabbis to all Jews
to stop all work, close all
shops & factories, services,
taxis, trucks for 1 or 3 days
& paralyze all the Jew
life - that will get the
attention - The Sunday parade
is worthless - We are talking cowardly
2) Organize total Jewish strike
all over U.S.
3) Demand the resignation and
court martial of Mr. Maguire, who
via cable to the J. P. S. never identi-
fied himself with King. Elders keep
the spearhead of Arab intrigue with the U.S.
which was only of the factors to cause
the reversal of U.S. policy.
Orvidsky. Arthur Meyerowitz



RADIOGRAM

FA- STANDARD TIME

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ICT634 ROMA 14 3 1553

LC ZIONPAL NEWYORK

ATTENTION SILVER NEUMAN POPE ATTENTIVE SEEMING IMPRESSED
ARGUMENT INTERNATIONAL JERUSALEM

MCDONALD .

634 ZIONPAL ...

Read to Dr. Silver
4/5/48 P.K.

RADIOGRAM



Dr. Silver

CABLE FROM JAMES G. MCDONALD, CAIRO:

April 8, 1948

ATTENTION SILVER NEUMAN NECESSITY OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TO SECURE VITALLY PROMPT ACTION YOUR IMMEDIATE
PROGRAM EVEN MORE OBVIOUS HERE THAN IN ROME REGARDS



CLASS OF SERVICE

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WESTERN UNION

JOSEPH L. EGAN
PRESIDENT

4G-55

1220

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LC = Deferred Cable

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Ship Radiogram

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CCM290 NL PD=NEWYORK NY 16

APR 16 PM 11 16

DR SILVER , SULGRAVE HOTEL

NBN

60 EAST 67 ST NYK=

MIVRAK ZE HU ISHI VELO RISHMI NEKUDA ANI OMED LIFNEI
KATASTROFA IM KVODA LO YITAREV MIYARD LATET LANU HAHALVAA
KOL YOM OVER MEIVI OTI LEYIUSH STOP TNYATEINU HACHALUZITH
HAAMITIT TIZKOR LIKVODO ETH HACHESSED BEHAZILA BEREKA KASHE.
ZE LEAMEINY ULEARZEINU STOP AVAKSHO LEKABLEINI MACHAR
BAEREV O BEYOM HARISHON BABOKER SHABATH SHALOM=

BENJAMIN MINTZ.





THE NATIONAL JEWISH DAILY

183 EAST BROADWAY, NEW YORK 2
TELEPHONE ORCHARD 4-3300

June 2, 1948.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
American Section Jewish Agency
16 East 66th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

Dear Dr. Silver:

"The Jewish Day" will issue a special supplement in English on the occasion of the Annual Convention of the Zionist Organization of America to be held in Pittsburgh on July 2--5, 1948. I have been requested to help prepare the supplement.

I intend to have a number of leaders of the Zionist Organization of America express their opinions on the achievements of American Zionism in the last few years, as well as on the issues now facing the Zionist Organization of America. I cannot imagine such a symposium of authoritative Zionist opinion without your participation.


May I therefore ask you to be good enough to send me your statement on the Zionist Organization of America, its contribution to the Jewish victory as you see it, as well as the problems that lie ahead.

You can suit yourself as to the length of the statement, which, however, should not exceed 1200 words. I would also ask you to see to it that it reaches me not later than June 15th.

With many thanks and with Zionist greetings, I am

Sincerely yours,

S. Margoshes



SM:h

June 17, 1948

Dr. S. Margoshes
The Day
183 East Broadway
New York 2, New York

My dear Dr. Margoshes:

I am enclosing herewith the statement which you requested. It is fuller than I had intended to make it, but I feel that the subject is so important that a more comprehensive statement was called for.

With all good wishes, I remain

The "persona least grata",

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

AHS:er

P.S. The New Palestine has also asked for a statement. I am sure that you have no objection to my sending a copy of this for inclusion in the New Palestine.

The year since the last Zionist Convention has been one of monumental struggle and achievement. It will be numbered among the great years in Jewish history.

When we last met in July 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine had not yet presented its report and recommendations to the United Nations. Two months were to elapse before that report was made public. Two more months were to elapse before the recommendations of that report for the setting up of two independent states in Palestine within an economic union were to be accepted by the United Nations.

American Zionists were faced with the responsibility of marshalling support for that ~~solution~~ ^{settlement}, especially as far as the United States was concerned. It was realized that the position of the American government would prove decisive at the United Nations, but ever since the Special Assembly of the United Nations when the question of Palestine was referred to it by Great Britain, the United States had given no indication whatsoever as to what its position would be, what solution it favored, and what it would be prepared to do in implementing a solution. It maintained this position even after the report was made public. Until almost the very eve of November 29th, we were not entirely sure as to whether our government would vote for the partition resolution and would use its influence with other delegations to that end. American Zionists had to organize public opinion - both Jewish and non-Jewish - to activate our government towards decisive action.

This was accomplished.

But it was not long before the unreconciled opponents of a Jewish state ~~in Palestine~~ within government circles began to reassert themselves after their defeat in November. A conspiracy was ~~launched~~ ^{hatched} to scuttle the partition plan and force a new solution. This conspiracy, backed by a powerful oil lobby in Washington, by British pressure, by pro-Arab missionary groups, and spearheaded by Forrestal and Henderson, matured in March of this year and succeeded in bringing about a ~~complete~~ ^{total} reversal in the position of the American government. Our government demanded ~~a~~ ^{the} suspension of all

work by the United Nations in the implementation of partition and the convoking of ^a ~~another~~ ^{session of the} Special Assembly of the United Nations to consider a new solution, ~~an~~ international trusteeship for Palestine.

This was a stunning blow to our cause. American Zionists ^{were compelled} ~~had to~~ inaugurate a new action ^{in order} to expose and defeat this mendacious conspiracy and to fight any attempt to impose a trusteeship on Palestine which would have indefinitely postponed the establishment of the Jewish state. It called for heroic measures, for a renewed campaign of education and the organization of American public opinion.

This was accomplished.

When it became clear that the trusteeship proposal of our government would receive scant support in the United Nations, even as it failed of support in American public opinion, the United States delegation resorted to another ^{stratagem} ~~maneuver~~ to ~~force~~ ^{bring}

^{about} the postponement of the establishment of the Jewish state. This was a proposal for ^a ~~an indefinite~~ ^{period} truce during which time the Jewish people of Palestine would agree not to proceed with the establishment of their independent state. There was no commitment as to what the United States government would do upon the termination of ~~this~~ truce. It was necessary to caution the American people, as well as our own fellow-Zionists, some of whose leaders were ^{ready} ~~prepared~~ to fall into the trap, against this palpable maneuver.

This also was accomplished.

When ^{finally} ~~it~~ became clear that the truce proposal would not carry, that the trusteeship proposal was dead, and that the Jewish people of Palestine would ~~on May 15th~~, ^{on May 15} upon the termination of the British Mandate, proceed to proclaim the establishment of the Jewish state, there ^{more} ~~remained~~ ^{steps} one important ~~action~~ to be taken - to persuade the Chief Executive of the United States to recognize the Jewish state immediately upon its establishment. This would ^{move} ~~be~~ a tremendous encouragement to the new state, would enormously strengthen its position, and would encourage other countries to do likewise. ~~A new chapter would be ushered in by such a "fait accompli".~~

In the period immediately preceding May 14th, while the fruitless debates on truce and trusteeship were dragging ^{on} ~~out their futile course~~ at the Assembly of the United Nations, a tremendous activity was carried on to enlist leaders of American public opinion and friends and supporters everywhere to persuade the President of the United States of the wisdom, ~~courage~~ and statesmanship of such a step.

This, too, was accomplished.

~~And now as~~ to the future ~~many~~ difficult tasks lie ahead for American Zionists. The proclamation of the Jewish state was a signal for the Arab League to launch its attack upon Israel. The spearhead of this attack is Great Britain's stooge, Abdullah and his British-led, British-trained, British-commanded, British-financed Arab Legion. Through the Arab Legion, Great Britain has been waging war on the state of Israel. Through the Arab Legion, Great Britain bombarded and desecrated the Holy City of Jerusalem, destroyed the Jewish quarter within the old city, killed 400 ^{Jews} and wounded 2,000 more, and attempted to starve the Jewish population of the new city of Jerusalem into surrender by blocking the life-line from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem along which convoys of food must go. Great Britain, through the Arab Legion, exterminated ^{more than 100} ~~the~~ men, women, and children in Kfar Etzion. While Great Britain has proposed a truce in Palestine which is now in operation, it has not abandoned ^{its} ~~the~~ war against the state of Israel. Bevin has not relented. There should be no illusion on ^{this} ~~that~~ score. The attempt will yet be made by Great Britain to force a cantonization scheme on Palestine, or if that is not possible, to force the state of Israel to surrender the Negev and perhaps other sections of Israel. The period of the truce, which may be prolonged after the expiration of the four weeks, will be used by Great Britain to pressure for the kind of a solution which she has always wanted in Palestine - a pro-Arab ^{+ a pro-British} solution. Great Britain will make every effort in Washington to have our government ^{collaborate with it} ~~pick up its old proposals in a new package~~. They will find the same ready ears and willing hearts in the State Department

~~to collaborate with them~~ now as in the past. We shall have much to do in the future as we have had in the past to expose and oppose these new maneuvers and to defend Israel against dismemberment. We must not relax in any of our activities which have brought us ^{such} ~~these~~ substantial achievements in the past. The new state of Israel is still in danger. The United States still remains the one country which, by its authority and prestige, can protect it against the dangers which threaten it, especially against ^{the} shameful and outrageous ^{machinations} ~~maneuvers~~ of Mr. Bevin.

The uneasy truce may terminate in a renewal of hostilities. The state of Israel must be strong to defend itself. American Zionists must be prepared to give the fullest measure of support, especially economic and financial support, to enable the newborn state to carry on the costly struggle for survival. Should the hostilities be renewed, we must call upon our government to revise the embargo on the shipment of arms to the state of Israel, ~~and the~~ ^{the} citizens of the United States must be made free to send whatever aid they can to ~~this~~ ^{the} new state which has been recognized by our government and which neighboring states, in defiance of the United Nations, have conspired to destroy.

The Zionist movement will before very long reorient and reorganize itself in view of the radical new situation which has ^{transpired} ~~developed~~. The political objective, having been achieved, our movement, outside of Palestine, will take over those functions and activities, largely of an economic nature, which will be ^{required} ~~necessary~~ to provide for large-scale immigration into Israel and ^{for} the rapid industrial and agricultural development of the state in order to absorb the masses of our people who will seek ^{to go there,} ~~the haven~~ ~~of the new Jewish state~~. There will be other important activities for the reorganized Zionist movement. ^R It is clear that the Jews outside of Palestine will not wish to ^{interfere} ~~dictate~~ the character of the social, political, or economic structure of the new state which ^{is, after all,} ~~must be~~ the concern of the citizens of that state. The Zionist parties outside of Palestine will have to reconsider whether their ^{old} party lines and ideologies are any longer warranted now that the Jewish state has been established, and its citizens ^{are} ~~will~~ ~~be~~ able democratically to determine their own kind of society.

ADOLF C. ROBISON
434 FIFTY-SECOND STREET
WEST NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY

AR
all



July 28, 1948

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
Jewish Agency for Palestine
16 East 66 Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Dr. Silver:

I am enclosing a copy of telegram
sent to you today on behalf of Mr. Sonneborn and
myself which I hope will finally clarify our current
misunderstanding.

Sincerely yours,

ACR:T
Enc.

Charge to the account of

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WESTERN UNION

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A. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

July 28, 1948

WANT A REPLY?

"Answer by WESTERN UNION"
or similar phrases may be
included without charge.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
Jewish Agency for Palestine
16 East 66 Street
New York City

On behalf of Material for Palestine emphatically disavow connection with any other organization including Americans United for Israel. Material for Palestine sole organization specifically designated by the State of Israel to receive gifts from Zionist and other bodies as well as from individuals of materials for use by Z'va Haganah. This is our only sphere of activity.

Rudolf G. Sonneborn
Adolf Robison

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WESTERN UNION

JOSEPH L. EGAN
PRESIDENT

1220

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter
NL = Night Letter
LC = Deferred Cable
NLT = Cable Night Letter
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CL478 LONG PD=EB NEWYORK NY 2 635P=

DR ABBA HILLEL SILVER=

THE TEMPLE EUCLID AVE=

1948 AUG 3 PM 7 47

By the Jewish Agency

ON BEHALF OF MATERIAL FOR PALESTINE EMPHATICALLY DISAVOW
CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER ORGANIZATION INCLUDING AMERICANS
UNITED FOR ISRAEL STOP MATERIAL FOR PALESTINE IS SOLE
ORGANIZATION SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED TO COORDINATE THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF NON MILITARY MATERIALS FOR Z'VA HAGANAH
FROM ZIONIST AND OTHER BODIES AND FROM INDIVIDUALS STOP
THIS IS OUR ONLY SPHERE OF ACTIVITY STOP MATERIAL FOR
PALESTINE IS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A GROUP CONSISTING
OF MEMBERS OF PRINCIPAL ZIONIST BODIES IN THE UNITED
STATES=

RUDOLF SONNEBORN SAMUEL CHERR CHARLES GUTWIRTH
ROBERT LAGUNOFF ADOLF ROBISON=


*Copy Sent to
Sidney Marks, ZOA
8/3/48*

:Z'VA=

DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER
JEWISH AGENCY
16 EAST 66 STREET
NEW YORK CITY

ON BEHALF OF MATERIALS FOR PALESTINE EMPHATICALLY DISAVOW CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER ORGANIZATION INCLUDING AMERICANS UNITED FOR ISRAEL STOP MATERIALS FOR PALESTINE IS SOLE ORGANIZATION SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED BY JEWISH AGENCY TO COORDINATE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF NON MILITARY MATERIALS FOR Z'VA HAGANAH FROM ZIONIST AND OTHER BODIES AND FROM INDIVIDUALS STOP THIS IS OUR ONLY SPHERE OF ACTIVITY STOP MATERIALS FOR PALESTINE IS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF AN EXECUTIVE APPOINTED BY THE PRINCIPAL ZIONIST BODIES IN THE UNITED STATES

RUDOLF SONNEBORN
ADOLF ROBISON



T. K...
148.60

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
DOMESTIC	CABLE
TELEGRAM	ORDINARY
DAY LETTER	URGENT RATE
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NIGHT LETTER	NIGHT LETTER

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise the message will be transmitted as a telegram or ordinary cablegram.

WESTERN UNION

1207

A. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

\$	CHECK
S	ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
F	TIME FILED

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

To _____

Care of or Apt. No. _____

Street and No. _____

Place _____

OF MATERIALS FOR PALESTINE TO CONFER WITH YOU ON FUTURE STEPS STOP IN THE MEANTIME I
WOULD APPRECIATE IF YOU WOULD EXTEND EVERY COURTESY TO THE COMMITTEE WHICH WAS RECENTLY
APPOINTED BY THE JEWISH AGENCY TO SURVEY THE WORK OF MATERIALS FOR PALESTINE AND REPORT
BACK TO IT FOR ITS GUIDANCE STOP I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS IN YOUR IMPORTANT WORK.

ABBA HILLEL SILVER, CHAIRMAN

AMERICAN SECTION

JEWISH AGENCY

Sender's name and address
(For reference only)

Sender's telephone
number

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
DOMESTIC	CABLE
TELEGRAM	ORDINARY
DAY LETTER	URGENT RATE
SERIAL	DEFERRED
NIGHT LETTER	NIGHT LETTER

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise the message will be transmitted as a telegram or ordinary cablegram.

WESTERN UNION

A. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

\$	CHECK
	ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
	TIME FILED

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

To RUDOLF SONNEBORN, SAMUEL CHERR, CHARLES GUTWIRTH, ROBERT LAGUNOFF, ADOLF ROBISON AUGUST 3, 1948 19

Care of or Apt. No. MATERIALS FOR PALESTINE

Street and No. 250 WEST 57 STREET

Place NEW YORK, NEW YORK

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TELEGRAM OF AUGUST 2. I WAS PLEASED TO HEAR FROM YOU OFFICIALLY THAT MATERIALS FOR PALESTINE EMPHATICALLY DISAVOWS CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER ORGANIZATION INCLUDING AMERICANS UNITED FOR ISRAEL AND THAT YOUR ONLY SPHERE OF ACTIVITY IS THAT DESIGNATED BY THE JEWISH AGENCY TO COORDINATE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF NON-MILITARY MATERIALS FOR Z'VA HAGANAH FROM ZIONIST AND FROM OTHER BODIES AND FROM INDIVIDUALS STOP I SHALL BE PLEASED TO CONVEY THIS INFORMATION TO THE ZIONIST BODIES IN THE UNITED STATES ~~FROM~~ STOP UPON THE RETURN OF THE HEADS OF THE ORGANIZATIONS FROM ISRAEL I SHALL CONVOKE A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WHICH WAS ORGANIZED BY THE JEWISH AGENCY TO FIX THE POLICIES

Sender's name and address

(For reference only)

Sender's telephone
number

Marshall Plan

+

~~General Recklement~~
Plan

see report 2

Oscar Green