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Jewish Agency, Shertok, Moshe, 1947-1948.

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From: Isadore Hamlin, Press Officer
Washington Office, Jewish Agency for Palestine
2210 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington 8, D.C.

#15

WASHINGTON, D.C.
FEBRUARY 26, 1947

Statement of Mr. Moshe Shertok, Chief of the Political
Department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, at
Press Conference - February 26, 1947

1. The announcement of the British Government's intention to bring the Palestine problem before the U.N. marked a new turning point in the tortuous road along which the problem has been dragged for so long. The British Government can hardly relish the prospect of having to throw the problem in its present unsolved state into the international arena. In his statement yesterday, Mr. Bevin indicated his preference for a solution which would obviate that necessity. What we may therefore be facing is not a decision to refer the matter to the U.N. but merely a move intended to bring about an otherwise unattainable compromise which would render such reference unnecessary.
2. It should therefore be emphasized that the Jewish Agency has no quarrel with the underlying principle of the new departure and is quite prepared to face up to it. The principle is that Britain is in control of Palestine by virtue of an international trust and is accountable for its policy to international authority. If the matter is re-

ferred to the U.N., the Jewish Agency will do everything in its power to uphold and defend the internationally recognized rights of the Jewish people and its present-day interests in Palestine before the new political tribunal of the world.

3. The Mandate recognizes the right of the Jewish people to reconstitute its national home in Palestine. Such reconstitution, if it be true to its historic context, must signify the re-establishment of the Jewish State. This is the logical conclusion of the free and unfettered development of the Jewish National Home. This is the only form in which the primary purpose of the Mandate can be fulfilled today in conformity with the needs of the Jewish people, its present position in Palestine and the new political set-up of the Middle East, characterized by the emergence of six Arab countries as sovereign states. It is not the perpetuation of the Mandate that we are now primarily seeking but the achievement of independence; not a new tutelage under the U.N. but a place for the Jewish people in their councils.

4. Time is of the essence. Reference to the U.N. will take months. An ultimate decision and its implementation may take years. Meanwhile the position in Palestine and among the Jewish survivors in Europe is untenable and calls for an immediate remedy. A quarter of a million Jewish Displaced Persons in Europe are on the brink of despair. The question of interim policy, pending the submission of the major problem to the U.N., is of crucial urgency.

5. The strain in Palestine, both for the population and the Government is unbearable. The roots of the evil are the arbitrary throttling

of immigration and the maintenance of a racial, anti-Jewish land regime. Both provisions are in violation of the Mandate. To both the uncompromising opposition of the Jews is pledged. Terrorism is a hideous outgrowth of the present pernicious policy. The only way out of the present impasse is by attacking the evil at its roots.

6. The immediate raising of the immigration quota so as to bring in, as quickly as possible, the first 100,000 from Europe, was urged in yesterday's debate in the British House of Commons by supporters of the Government and the opposition alike. That measure, and the abrogation of the racial land law, would be no more than an act of restitution on the part of the Mandatory Government. They owe it to themselves. They owe it to the U.N. They cannot in one and the same breath flout international authority by violating the Mandate and swear allegiance to it by submitting to the judgment of the U.N. He who seeks equity must come with clean hands. If Britain desires to lay its trust before the high international body, it must restore it intact, unsullied and undistorted by all the violations contained in the White Paper of 1939 and enforced today.
7. There is little hope that those of the British Cabinet who are in effective control of Palestine policy will easily be persuaded to effect these changes. Playing for time has been their guiding principle, pursued with inexhaustible ingenuity, at the expense of the peace of Palestine and the rescue of our European remnants. They have probably thought, and may be still thinking, that they would exhaust the patience of our DP's and make them turn their backs on Palestine, that they would *TIME*

the Jews of Palestine and make them put up with the White Paper regime, that they would break the spirit of the Zionist movement and make its leaders accept any solution dictated to them. All these calculations have miscarried, but the attitude remains unchanged. It is characterized by a stubborn refusal to face realities. Only yesterday we were told by Mr. Bevin that there was no place for us, the Jews, in the United Nations because we are merely a "religion." The Jews have never empowered Mr. Bevin to decide on their behalf what they are. So long as he is unwilling to recognize that the Jews as a collective unit are a people, entitled to a position of equality among the nations of the world, so long as he fails to grasp that what we are engaged in in Palestine is nation-building, it is idle for him to tackle the problem rooted in these basic facts. It is not surprising that, thinking as he does and advised as he is, he cannot solve the problem. What is odd is that he should blame his failure on others.

8. Mr. Bevin argued yesterday that the White Paper of 1939 was in the nature of a binding agreement concluded between the British Government and the Arab States. But the Arab States have no locus standi in relation to Palestine. They were brought into the picture by the British Government itself. According to Mr. Bevin, the assumption in 1939 was that the National Home had already been established and the pledge of the Balfour Declaration fulfilled. This was not the view taken in 1939 by Mr. Bevin's Party, which fought the White Paper policy tooth and nail. Moreover, it was not for the British Government to judge its own case. The issue had to be decided by the League of Nations, and the competent organ of the League, the Mandates Commission, did decide at the time.

that the White Paper was a violation of Mandate.

9. Mr. Bevin asserted that if the Jews would give up their claim to Statehood, the Arabs might agree that 100,000 more Jews should be admitted, provided that thereafter it would be up to the majority of the population to decide whether immigration should continue, which means in effect that thereafter all Jewish immigration would stop. Alleged potential readiness of the Arabs to accept another 100,000 Jews is quite a revelation. Why has Mr. Bevin so far stubbornly refused to grant any increase whatsoever of the current monthly quota? Was it not because he was under a pledge to the Arabs in that regard? But irrespective of whether the Arabs might or might not agree, the Jews will never accept the position that their return to Palestine should be subject to Arab consent. Nor will they ever be ready to barter national freedom against human lives. It seems that Mr. Bevin does not even realize the insulting character of the offer. Did the British people stop to think for one moment of such a barter when they stood the Blitz and faced alone the danger of Nazi invasion?

10. The fundamental issues of the Jewish rights and status in Palestine, and of international responsibility for the solution of the twin problems of Palestine and the Jewish people, have now been raised afresh. Today more than at any time in the past, the attitude of the United States Government is of far-reaching importance. As a major victor in the First World War this country shares responsibility for the fate of Palestine. The Mandate was entrusted to Great Britain with its concurrence. Today, it is second to none in the councils

of the United Nations. Its traditional policy of sympathy to the Jewish National Home was reinforced by recent official pronouncements urging the immediate admission to Palestine of 100,000 European Jews and favoring the establishment of the Jewish State. The eyes of Jews throughout the world are turned to the United States. Palestine and the Jewish problem is a world responsibility and only a great and progressive world power can show the way.

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Copies of this Bulletin have been filed with the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., where the registration of the Jewish Agency for Palestine as an agent of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jerusalem, is available for public inspection. The fact of registration should not be considered as approval by the United States Government of the contents of this Bulletin.

הסוכנות היהודית לארץ ישראל

The Jewish Agency for Palestine

MEMORANDUM

April 18, 1947


TO: The Members of the American Section of the Executive

FROM: Moshe Shertok

I am enclosing herewith copy of Report on the Inter-Asian Conference (in draft form), submitted by Y. Shimon, Bombay, April 6, 1947.

MS:MF
Encl.

WRHS



REPORT ON THE INTER-ASIAN CONFERENCE

(D R A F T)

1. ON THE CONFERENCE GENERALLY.

(a) There can be no doubt that the prime significance of this Conference resides in the mere fact of Representatives of all the Asiatic peoples having met even without considering the contents of their deliberations and resolutions. The only countries and peoples not represented at this Conference were:- All the Arab States, except Egypt and one observer of the Arab League; Japan; Siberia; Turkey was represented by an observer only.

The fact of all these peoples meeting has some political significance in itself, and this political significance was strongly and frequently stressed in the various speeches delivered. Apart from this, the opportunity for contacts, off-the-record talks and exchanges of explanations was widely exploited and many prove of additional political significance.

(b) The actual deliberations and Sessions of the Conference were, in my opinion, not so important as the opening and closing speeches would have liked to infer. As far as I can judge, the only real work was done by the Round Table Group for Economic and Social Affairs, the other Groups/confined their deliberations to very general and non-committal talks. having

(c) In fact, the Conference was kept going in peace and harmony only by the constant effort on the part of all sides concerned to avoid any controversial or problematic issues. And as these controversial and problematic issues are, actually, the most important ones, and those which really affect the political and social conditions of the various peoples concerned, the outcome has been that most of the real problems have either not been touched upon at all, or were touched upon lightly and casually only to be immediately hushed up. The question of the Chinese immigrant population in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia, the problem of their economic domination in these countries and the resultant hatred against them, the clashes, and even pogroms which occur from time to time; the problem of Indian immigrant population in Burma and Ceylon, of their economic domination and the resulting antagonism between them and the nationalist movements in the countries concerned; the antagonism between the revolutionary Government of Viet Nam and the independent Hinterland States of Cambodia, Laos and Cochin China - which are considered by the Viet Nam as "French Puppet Governments" and by themselves as independent states threatened by Viet Nam imperialism; the problem of the possibilities and scope of support to be given by independent Asiatic States i.e. China and India, to peoples still struggling for their independence such as Viet Nam and Indonesia; Burmese fear of Indian and Chinese imperialism; all these problems were glossed over or immediately hushed up. This was the price requisite on bringing so many peoples together and maintaining harmony; but it, of course, lessened the real value of the Conference and lent to a good many of the beautiful speeches delivered an unreal and phraseological note.

(d) The same tendency toward caution led the Leaders of the Conference assiduously to avoid making any commitments. There was no question, of course, of any resolutions passed by the Conference committing the Governments concerned, as most of the Delegates present were unofficial ones. Even so, the Leaders of the Conference very strongly opposed every proposal to pass resolutions and make recommendations, however broadly worded. The same caution led to serious discussions on the question of whether a permanent body should be set up as a result of the Conference. This discussion was held in the Steering Committee only and was not brought to the plenum. I am told that the Chinese representatives and part of the Indian delegation opposed the setting up of a permanent body out of fear of commitments. Other delegations of the smaller peoples and states expressed, casually, some fear that such a permanent body would be dominated by Indians and Chinese.

The permanent body which was finally set up as a compromise, is very innocuous; it is to deal only with research work and the fostering of relations, and to avoid any political issue.

(e) The Plenary Sessions of the Conference which heard reports by the various Round Table Groups into which the Conference was split up suffered, in my opinion, from a serious constitutional handicap; it was not made clear whether they were to consider and to pass on the reports of the Round Table Groups only (which would imply that they had no right to add to these reports or to change their wording, since the reports were simply an account of the actual discussions which took place in the Round Table Groups) or whether they enjoyed the right to make their own remarks or change the reports. This question remained unclarified throughout the Conference, a fact which lent a certain unreality and vagueness to the Plenary Sessions.

(f) It should be understood that the Conference as a whole was unquestionably dominated by the Indian delegation. This Indian predominance resulted from three factors:- First, the Indian delegation was the strongest numerically, as it numbered more than fifty, as compared with fifteen to twenty for a big delegation from another country and one to five for a smaller delegation. Secondly, whereas the other delegations were composed mostly of men of secondary importance, the Indian delegation included men like Pundit Mahru, Mrs. Vijayalaxmi Pundit, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu and other powerful and high-ranking personalities; thirdly, apart from the official delegates from India, a host of dozens of Indian politicians and other personalities swarmed around the Conference incessantly. The technical staff, the Secretariat, etc, were all completely Indian. It should be understood that Indian domination means Congress domination, as the Muslim League boycotted the Conference and other non-Congress bodies but lightly were represented.

(g) It has already been mentioned that a permanent body, called the "Inter-Asian Relations Organisation," was set up with an aim to do research work and to foster relations. This Organisation is to consist of national units, one for each country (I shall deal later with the question of how this decision affects our affairs). The next Conference is to be held in 1949 in China. The Organisation has set up a provisional council, with one to four representatives from each country. Professor Bergmann has been appointed a Member of this Council.

2. THE JEWISH DELEGATION AND JEWISH AFFAIRS AT THE CONFERENCE.

(a) The above impression of the value of the Conference as a whole applies even more closely to our role at the Conference: the most important and positive gain to be assessed is, in my opinion, the mere fact of our participation. This participation, in itself, has established Jewish Palestine as part of the Asiatic Continent and as a member of the family of the nations of Asia. The fact that the Arabs of Palestine were not represented at all, created some difficult situations for us: in spite of our constant efforts to call ourselves "Jewish Palestine Delegation" and to maintain that we represented only the Jewish part of Palestine, we were considered, sometimes consciously and sometimes implicitly, as a delegation from the whole of Palestine. In my opinion, this slight falsification of the real position on the part of the members of the Conference has a certain negative aspect, but it may have some positive results as well. There can be no doubt that the fact that the Arabs of Palestine were not represented was a grave mistake on their part and a great disadvantage to the Arab cause, especially as other Arab countries were not efficiently or adequately represented.

(b) Apart from the political significance of our participation in the Con-

ference, the most important asset of this participation is, to my mind, the numerous contacts which we were able to make with various personalities from different countries. It is impossible, of course, to give an account of all the persons we met and all the conversations we had. It may, however, be pointed out that generally, we met with a great deal of complete ignorance of our affairs on the one hand, and with a fair amount of readiness to hear and to try and understand, on the other hand. During many of our conversations we met with outspoken sympathy for our case. It need not be pointed out, however, that this sympathy may be considered, in most cases, a matter of politeness and diplomatic manners and that, even in cases where it was sincere and real, not only did it not commit, in a political sense, the Governments of the countries concerned, but even the personalities expressing these opinions were not bound by them.

Apart from the constant unofficial contact with dozens of diverse personalities, we were officially present at a number of receptions given by various bodies. Such receptions were given by the President of the Indian National Congress, Mr. Acharya Kripalani, the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, the Vice President of the Indian Interim Government Pandit Nehru, the permanent Ceylonese Trade Delegation in India, the Friends of the Soviet Union (in honour of the Soviet representative Delegates as well as other Delegates) the Muslim Jamiat-Ulamaldin (in honour of the Muslim Delegation as well as other Delegations), the Chinese Embassy, the Indian Literates, Intellectuals and Writers Association, the Indian Press Association, the Indian Archaeological Association and others.

A number of small receptions were given especially for us. An after-dinner party in Bombay by Mr. and Mrs. F. W. Pollack (for the four Delegates who arrived early). At this party we met some Indian intellectuals, writers, etc., some of whom were guests at the Conference. A lunch party was arranged in New Delhi by Mr. and Mrs. B. Shiva Rao (Mrs. Shiva Rao is a Viennese Jewess and he a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian and other progressive papers in India and an influential member of the Congress). At this lunch we met a small number of select Indian personalities, amongst whom should be mentioned Lady Rama Rao, one of the outstanding leaders of the Women's movements in India, her daughter, Sante Rama Rao, who is a young writer educated in America and the author of the well known book "Home to India" published by Collance, Mr. Shiva Rao's brother, who is Constitutional Adviser to the Indian Constituent Assembly, and others.

A cocktail party was given by Mr. and Mrs. Nehru. Mr. Nehru is a distant relative of Pandit Nehru and, if I am not mistaken, he is an official in the Ministry of Finance. Mrs. Nehru is a Hungarian Jewess. At this party we met again, Lady Rama Rao and her daughter, Mr. and Mrs. Shiva Rao, Mr. Tyabjee, who is a retired Judge of the High Court, New Delhi, Dr. and Mrs. Sen and their daughter (Mrs. Hannah Sen who is half Jewish and the principal of a girls' college in New Delhi. Her daughter, being quarter Jewish, has developed Jewish consciousness and is keen on coming to Palestine for her education). Among all the other contacts we were able to make, special mention should be made of a number of Indian and other Economists who were especially attracted to us and deeply interested in the economic aspect of our work in Palestine. These Economists have, generally, a better knowledge of our affairs than other persons. Most of them have read Dr. Bonne', Infield's and others' books.

Special mention must be made of our contact with Pandit Nehru and with Mr. Gandhi. The first "incident" between Professor Bergmann and Nehru will be dealt with later. Two days after this incident we were invited to dinner with Pandit Nehru. At this dinner party we met only his sister, Mrs. Vijaylaxmi Pandit, who is the leader of the Indian Delegation to the UN, and his daughter Mrs. Gandhi. The fact that no other guests were invited has been commented on by some of us negatively; apparently, Pandit Nehru did not wish to publicize this dinner. I noticed, also, that at the dinner parties that he gave for other Delegations

photographs were taken, whereas this was foregone at our party. It should be mentioned here that most of us had the feeling during the entire Conference that Pandit Nehru was not very keen on greeting us or meeting us in the Hall or Lounge, the Dining Room, or wherever he saw us in public. (Some in our Delegation do not share this feeling and ascribe it to our being too sensitive.) A more detailed account of this dinner party with Nehru seems necessary. Before dinner the conversation turned, after a few generalities (during which Nehru told us that he has read many books on Zionism and that in the past he used to receive regularly THE JEWISH FRONTIER), to the Afghan Jewish refugees in India. It must be fairly said that Pandit Nehru tried hard to avoid discussing this matter but he was eventually obliged to listen to us. He referred us then to the Minister of Interior, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and, as you know, the matter has been settled for six months in their favour. I have no doubt that this was done through the personal intervention of Nehru and that it would not have happened were it not for the fact that the Jewish Delegation was present and that he did not want to disappoint us. After dinner we sat down on the verandah and talked politics for an hour and a half with him. He commenced by asking "What will happen in Palestine?" It seems to me that what we said is not of much interest. (We tried hard to say the right thing. We afterwards had quite a lively discussion about the party among ourselves and some of us were very disappointed with the part others had played.) Nehru listened carefully and in his questions and discussions revealed, in my opinion, a great deal of true understanding of the question and a deep knowledge. Sometimes he displayed quite a sympathetic attitude towards the Jewish problem, but it fell short of the political consequence of such a sympathetic attitude as regards the Palestine question. I do not think we succeeded in convincing him. He seems to form his opinions not so much on the merit of our case but rather on political constellations. He surprised us by interrupting the discussion of the merits of our case with the brutal question, "What is the force behind you, the force you can rely on?" Subsequent to this discussion some of us felt that we should write him a letter formulating our demands/outlining our case. Such a letter was finally dispatched to him as a private letter under the signature of David Hacohen. We received no reply to this letter and when Pandit Nehru was asked, in the course of some casual conversation in the Hall, if he had received it, he answered, "Yes, I read it" and did not express any opinion or make any further comment on it and, as the Delegate who put him the question said afterwards, his face became expressionless.

Our conversation with Mr. Gandhi lasted only some ten minutes. After David Hacohen had appealed to him to raise his voice in favour of our persecuted people, etc., he asked about "this terrible terrorism in Palestine" and requested to be "counted out of the picture." He hinted that if somebody would insist that he, Gandhi, should say something about the Palestine question, his words would necessarily be directed mainly against terrorism and therefore it would be better, for our sake, to leave him out of the picture. He asked about the means and ways we propose to fight terrorism and when he was told that we are sure that terrorism would subside by itself if only the immigration restrictions were lifted or some friendly gesture made by Government, he compared this answer to the dealings between the British Government and Hitler, when everyone said if only my demands are fulfilled, everything will be alright.

(c) I come now to the official procedure of the Conference and the part we played in it. First, it should be mentioned that Pandit Nehru, in his opening speech, greeted one by one every Delegation from every country but omitted our Delegation. We were of the opinion that this omission was a deliberate one. Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, in her opening speech, also omitted any reference to our Delegation, but she at least added to her special greetings to some other Delegations the words, "and all other Delegations" which Nehru did not. Dr. Olswanger approached Mrs. Naidu and told her that we had been

hurt by this omission. She emphatically denied that the omission was deliberate and promised to make amends at the second opening Session, before the speech of Professor Bergmann. Unfortunately, she fell ill during the second opening Session and had to leave it so that the regrettable matter rests as it was.

Secondly, the "incident" which took place on the second public opening Session of the Conference. Professor Bergmann had delivered his speech of greetings which had been carefully worked upon by us so as to avoid any political or controversial issue. Nevertheless, the Arab Delegation thought that they should protest against what they deemed some political allusions made in this speech. The observer of the Arab League who was not present at the first opening Session and was now given the opportunity to make his speech of welcome, referred to the fact that Palestine was not represented at this Conference and that foreign immigration was forced on the country "at the point of the British bayonet." He, however, made no special reference to Professor Bergmann's speech. After his speech, Miss Karina Said, who had spoken the day before, delivering a message from the Egyptian woman leader, Huda Shaarawi, was now permitted to make a special interpolation in which she protested against Professor Bergmann's speech and made violent attacks on our movement. When Professor Bergmann asked the Chairman, Pandit Nehru, to be permitted to answer, he was refused this permission after an interchange of some two or three minutes. It should be mentioned here that at the time of Professor Bergmann's speech Nehru had not been present so that he had no knowledge as to whether or not Professor Bergmann's speech had contained any controversial issue. When Professor Bergmann was thus refused the right to speak, he left his place on the dais and walked down the high hall, followed by all of us. During this incident some members of the Indian Delegation who sat immediately behind us, cried out constantly "let him speak" and when we walked out some prominent Indians--including Mrs. Vijayalaxmi Pundit, Miss Maidu (Mrs. Maidu's daughter), Pundit Kunzru, Bhatnagar and others--ran after us and tried to persuade us to come back. They expressed loudly and openly their opinion that we had been wronged and requested us to do them the favour of returning because by our walking out the whole Conference would be upset. Eventually, Professor Bergmann was persuaded to go back and he ascended the dais amid a storm of applause and under a second burst of applause approached the observer of the Arab League and shook hands with him.

The same evening dozens of Delegates and others approached us either in the Hall and Dining Room or in our rooms to express their regret and to ask for forgiveness. Amongst these people should be mentioned Mrs. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, one of the closest collaborators of Gandhi. The same evening we had a meeting of our Delegation to decide what should be done. Some held that we should send an official letter of protest, that we should release a statement to the press, etc.; others objected to this and maintained that we should await further developments. Those advocating letters and a statement were divided on the question whether such a statement should contain a formal protest, mentioning that Bergmann's speech had included no political controversial issue and that therefore the protests against it were unjustified, or if the statement should comprise an answer to the accusations made on our movement by the Arab Delegates. The view that we should do nothing for the time being prevailed.

In my opinion, the results of this incident, regrettable as it was in itself, have proved, after all, positive. First, the incident aroused a special interest in our affairs, putting us in the limelight and gaining us publicity that we would never have attained otherwise. Secondly, everybody endeavored to be even more polite and sympathetic, at least formally, and not to hurt our feelings any more. Thirdly, the discussion on the incident and the expression of regret, etc., brought us and especially Professor Bergmann into contact with more people, who made many visits in connection with the incident.

Fourthly, it is quite possible that even the invitation to dinner with Nehru was an outcome of this incident. The fact that David Maccohen was afterwards elected Chairman of one of the sub-groups of the Economic Round Table Group may be ascribed to this also. There was even a proposal that Professor Bergmann should be elected Chairman of the Steering Committee (this proposal was dropped as it aroused Arab opposition).

(d) In the formal sessions of the Conference and its groups, our Delegation was most active in the Economic Group. In this group an account of our cooperative systems and our modern methods of agriculture aroused much interest. As mentioned, D. Maccohen acted as Chairman of one of the sub-committees. Dr. Bonne gave a lecture on more general economic problems and B. Ilan gave an account on our Settlements, etc. In the group for cultural problems, several of our Delegates spoke, but as far as I know, the deliberations of this group were not important at all. In the group for women's movements, Dr. Brachyahu spoke. In the group for racial and immigration questions, Y. Shimoni made an explanatory statement: when it was decided by this group that every country should have the right to decide the amount of alien immigrants it would be ready to accept and that no discrimination between nations and races should be made in the admission of alien immigration, he pointed out and asked it to be put in the Protocol that according to International Law and to the consensus of opinion of all the Nations represented in the League of Nations and to Jewish opinion, Jewish immigration to Palestine is not to be considered as alien immigration. He said that he knew that this was a controversial point to which our Arab friends were probably opposed, but he said the fact of this Jewish attitude and of this international law should be laid down in the Protocol. The statement was accepted without comment. It was not included in the report of this group to the Plenary Session and we thought it wise not to press for it as this would have given rise, without doubt, to an unpleasant discussion in the Plenum.

In the Plenary Sessions the Jewish Delegation took almost no part. Dr. Olswanger spoke twice; once advocating Esperanto and once on the question of women's rights. He did not mention Palestine or the Jews. Y. Shimoni spoke in the discussion on National Movements for Liberation. He expressed his regret that the official report of the group meetings on this question, as well as the plenary discussions, had been centered only on the political aspect of National Movements, whereas, in fact, a National Movement has many other aspects, such as cultural, social and constructive. He gave the example of our National Movement in Palestine as being centered first of all around constructive work, etc. His speech was welcomed by the audience.

(e) It should be pointed out that concerning memoranda, printed material, participation in exhibitions, etc., our position was extremely difficult as a consequence of the utterly bad organisation and inadequate preparations made in Palestine. The paintings for the Art Exhibition never arrived. The books for the Book Exhibition arrived too late and were of no use because no Book Exhibition had been arranged. The memoranda, of which many copies had been printed in Palestine, arrived too late and as a result of this were distributed by the Secretariat of the Conference during the last two days only and as the activity of the Delegation slackened in the last days, I am not sure that many of them received the memoranda at all. The memoranda of which sufficient copies had not been printed in Palestine, arrived too late to be printed at the Secretariat, so that but one copy of each was handed out.

(f) A delicate question arose out of the final decision that the Asiatic Relations Organisation should consist of national units, one unit for each country. When this resolution was adopted, we discussed in a meeting of our

Delegation what should be done: should we request that an exception be made for the Palestine question and that in Palestine two units be allowed? Should we tell the Council of this new Organisation that we would try to bring the Arabs of Palestine into our unit but that we are almost sure that we shall not succeed? Should we point out that we represent the Jews of Palestine only? We decided that Professor Bergmann, as our representative in the Council of the new Organisation, should point out that we represent the Jews of Palestine only and that the unit to be set up by us after our return home should be a Jewish Palestinian unit only; that we were prepared to try to bring the Arabs of Palestine in, but that we would prefer that the Arabs be invited to set up a unit of their own and that afterwards the Council should try to bring the two existing units under one common roof. The Council, however, under the Chairmanship of Pandit Nehru, did not enter into a discussion on this question as it wanted to avoid this controversial and difficult issue. It seems to me, therefore, that we are not obliged to approach the Arabs of Palestine in order to bring them in the Palestinian unit of this Council if our leaders should not deem it advisable, and that for the time being we are recognised as the unit of the new Organisation. I have no doubt, however, that in future some difficult problems will arise out of this abnormal situation and that it would be wise to take the necessary decision right now. It should be pointed out that the Arabs are represented in the new Council by one representative only, e.g., the observer of the Arab League.

(g) This last point is connected with the psychological difficulty of our position in the Conference and in the new Council: all the Delegations and Representatives of the Nations were of the unanimous opinion that in every country a homogeneous unity should be created out of the existing groups, minorities, and religions. We pointed out in various private conversations that this could not apply to Palestine as in this country two different nations are living, neither of which would be prepared to assimilate or to amalgamate itself with the other. In the official deliberations of the Conference, however, we saw no chance to stress this point. It would have given rise to a very controversial and difficult discussion and as all the discussions were centered around the problems of South East Asia only, we felt justified in avoiding this controversy. The point arose, however, in the final decision and I have no doubt that it will come up in future.

BOMBAY.
6th April, 1947

(Y. SHIMONI)

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April 24, 1947

Mr. Gholam Abbas Aram
First Secretary, Iranian Embassy
3005 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Aram:-

In continuation of our conversation of yesterday I beg to formulate in writing the request which I put forward to you orally.

The Special Session of the Assembly of the United Nations has been convened to consider a problem which has a direct bearing on the future of the Jewish people. Fifty-five nations will meet to consider and express their views upon that problem, yet the representatives of the people most vitally concerned have not been invited to attend. The interests of the Palestine Arabs will be defended by the Arab States. The Jewish people, however, will have no spokesman unless the present anomalous position is remedied. We have, therefore, approached the Secretary General of the United Nations with the request that the representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which is the official representative Jewish body recognized in the Palestine Mandate, should be permitted to attend the Session and take part in the discussions. Not being a State, we naturally do not claim a vote, but it appears to us to be a matter of common fairness that at least our voice should be heard. We appeal to the Iranian Government to support us in this plea and instruct its delegates to vote in its favor at the Steering Committee and at the Plenary Session of the Assembly.

With many thanks for the readiness you kindly expressed to transmit this request immediately by telegram to your Government, I beg to remain,

Respectfully yours,

MS:RM

Moshe Shertok

lm/4/26/47

C
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April 24, 1947

The Honorable
Dean Acheson
Acting Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Acheson:-

In connection with the interview which you so kindly granted me yesterday, I feel I must reiterate our appeal to the United States Government for support of our plea that the Jewish Agency be admitted to the forthcoming Special Session of the Assembly of the United Nations and be allowed, subject to the President's rulings, to take part in the discussion.

The representatives of fifty-five nations will meet to consider a problem which has a direct and most vital bearing on the future of the Jewish people. It appears to us indefensible that the representatives of that people alone should be debarred from attending the meeting. Not speaking for an established State, they naturally cannot claim a vote, but elementary fairness and equity demands that they should at least be given a voice.

It should be recalled that had the original proposal as to the method of appointing the United Nations Committee on Palestine been adopted, the present contingency would not have arisen. We do not in the least dispute the validity of the reasons which prompted the United States Government to oppose that procedure of direct appointment and to favor instead the convocation of a Special Session. The fact is, however, that the adoption of the latter expedient has now opened the way for an attack being launched in open Assembly against Jewish rights and interests in Palestine and that, as things stand, in the absence of a reply from the Jewish side, these rights and interests will remain undefended.

Under these circumstances we feel morally entitled to appeal to the United States Government for assistance, and we hope that on further consideration it may be found possible to instruct the United States Delegation to support our plea in the Steering Committee and in the Plenary Session of the Assembly.

With renewed appreciation for the time and attention you accorded me yesterday, I beg to remain,

Respectfully yours,

MS:RM

Moshe Shertok

lm/4/26/47

CABLE ADDRESS
JEWAGENCY

המוכנות היהודית לארץ ישראל

The Jewish Agency for Palestine

2210 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.
ADAMS 5411

May 29, 1947.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
19810 Shaker Boulevard
Shaker Heights, Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:-


The enclosed telegram from Mr. Ben-Gurion addressed to yourself was received in the Washington office on May 28th. It arrived by special code and its decoding was finished only this morning. As you will observe, some words are corrupt and the office is trying to elucidate them from Jerusalem. If you want your reply to be sent by code, please telephone it to the Washington office or to Mr. Lourie.

I am seeing Mr. Sack this afternoon in connection with the action proposed by Mr. Welles.

The talk with Dean Acheson was, as usual, inconclusive. The operative sentence on his part was: "all I can do is share with you my puzzlement". His mood was generally valedictory.

I asked to see Secretary Marshall next week and there is some prospect of this being arranged. I am definitely seeing Mr. Lovett one day next week.

Yours sincerely,



M. Shertok

MS/RM

June 5, 1947

Mr. Moshe Shertok
Jewish Agency for Palestine
2210 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington 8, D.C.


My dear Mr. Shertok:

I am enclosing herewith a letter which I received from a leading Zionist in Los Angeles, and the newspaper account of Professor Leon Roth's observations on Palestine. I think something should be done about it and I would suggest that you take this matter up when you get to Jerusalem. I am quite sure that the Hebrew press would be interested in the comments of Professor Roth.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK
Enc.





TIME TO MAKE A FUSS OVER DAD

JUNE 15TH

WESTERN UNION

JOSEPH L. EGAN
PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter
NL = Night Letter
LC = Deferred Cable
NLT = Cable Night Letter
Ship Radiogram

(24)

WM39

W. CT55 PD=CT WASHINGTON DC 6 1159A

1947 JUN 6 PM 1 28

DR ABBA HILLEL SILVER= *east 105th + Arsel*

19810 SHAKER BLVD SHAKERHEIGHTS CLEVE=

ON SECOND THOUGHTS IT MIGHT NOT BE DESIRABLE APPOINT LIAISON
ON LEVEL OF EXECUTIVE MEMBER STOP WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
SCOPE ALLOWED BY COMMITTEE WHICH IN LIGHT HOOS LETTER JUST
READ TO ME BY ARTHUR ON TELEPHONE SEEMS VERY RESTRICTED
ALSO ON LEVEL AT WHICH ADMINISTRATION AND POSSIBLE RAB

COMMITTEE WILL APPOINT THEIR LIAISONS STOP BELIEVE SHALL
SEE WHOLE PICTURE MORE CLEARLY IN JERUSALEM STOP KINDEST
REGARDS=

MOSHE SHERTOK.



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HOOS.

*To Drafts
To mail
jc 13ar*

RCA
EXY263 JERUSALEM 69 19 2040 CODE
LOURIE JEVAGENCY NEWYORK

JUNE 19. 1947

55/65 FOLLOWING FOR MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE ONLY STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
STOP FOLLOWING MOTION VOTED UPON FIRST WE CLAIM SPECIAL PROVISIONAL
INTERNATIONAL REGIME 5 YEARS ENSURE IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENT LARGE
SCALE SETTLEMENT SNEH BERNSTEIN FOR 8 AGAINST SHERTOK ABSTAINED, SECOND
WE CLAIM JEWISH STATE IN ADEQUATE PART PALESTINE GOLDMANN GRUENBAUM KAPLAN
FOR 6 AGAINST, THIRD WE EXPRESS READINESS AS BEFORE CONSIDER PROPOSAL
JEWISH STATE PART PALESTINE GOLDMANN GRUENBAUM KAPLAN LOCKER MEYERSON
SHERTOK FOR 5 AGAINST. TO BE CONTINUED

WRHS



Shertok

RCA
YK361
XHX289 JERUSALEM 80 20 1050 VIARCA
LOURIE JEVAGENCY NEW YORK

JUNE 20, 1947

56/76 FOURTH WE DECLARE JEWISH PEOPLE ENTITLED TO CLAIM
ALL PALESTINE AS JEWISH STATE GRUENBAUM GOLDMANN LOCKER SHERTOK
KAPLAN FOR FIFTH WE CLAIM ALL PALESTINE AS JEWISH STATE DOBKIN MEYERSON
BERNSTEIN GOLDMANN RABBI FISHMAN SHRAGAI FOR. THIS IS TO BE ADOPTED SNEH
ABSTAINED SIXTH OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN CONVERSATION MEMBER(S) COMMITTEE
AND GOVERNMENTS MAY ATTEMPT ELICIT PROPOSAL VIABLE STATE SIZE ADEQUATE
AREA 7 FOR 5 AGAINST. SEVENTH NO REPRESENTATIVE(S) EXECUTIVE OF
JEWISH AGENCY ENTITLED (TO) SOLICIT OPPOSITION ANY GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL
JEWISH STATE ADEQUATE AREA 10 FOR NONE AGAINST. TO BE CONTINUED



RCA
YK 389
HXY316 JERUSALEM 80 20 1555 VDE
LOURIE JEWAGENCY NEWYORK

JUNE 20, 1947

57/76 EIGHTH WE OPPOSE CONTINUATION BRITISH MANDATE ALL
FOR.NINTH WE CLAIM TRUSTEESHIP INCORPORATING RIGHTS UNDER
MANDATE NONE FOR BERNSTEIN KAPLAN SHERTOK ABSTAINED REST
AGAINST.TENTH WEIZMANN MAY APPEAR AS PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL SIX FOR
SHRAGAI AGAINST REST ABSTAINED.STOP OPENING MEETING(6) BENGURION
STATED PENDING CLARIFICATION INTERNAL ISSUES COALITION AT THE
MEETING OF ACTIONS COMMITTEE,HE WILL NOT BE PARTICIPATING IN
VOTING OF EXECUTIVE OF JEWISH AGENCY THEREFORE DO NOT INCLUDE
HIM BUT EXPRESSED SUPPORT THIRD

WRHS

SHERTOK
(SHERTOK SIGNATURE)



JERUSALEM
JULY 17, 1947

EPSTEIN
JEVAGENCY
WASHINGTON

INTENSIVE PRIVATE CONTACT LAST FEW DAYS IMPROVED GENERAL
IMPRESSION US TO STATE THINGS STOP MAJORITY SEEMS DEFINITELY
MOVING ALONG LINE PARTITION AND STATE BUT QUESTIONS TERRITORY
AND INSISTS ^{once OF} ^{ON} SOME COMBINED STATE WITH FEDERALISM ARE SNAG
STOP OUR LINE IS OPPOSED FEDERAL STATE FAVOR CONFEDERATION
STATES STOP INFORM NEWYORK

SHERTOK

M. Shertok = memo
received from

Kahany

7/28/47

see
WRHS



C
O
P
Y

THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

77, Great Russell Street,

LONDON, W.C.1

September 17th, 1947

Mr. Moshe Shertok
c/o Jewish Agency for Palestine
16 East 66th Street,
NEW YORK 21, N.Y.

Dear Moshe,

Berl spoke yesterday to Chaim Greenberg, and told him about his talk with Laski, but I thought that you might care to have a somewhat fuller report.

Berl had some correspondence with Laski, and saw him yesterday. Laski told him that the International Sub-Committee of the Labour Party Executive, of which Laski is the Chairman, met yesterday and discussed the Unscop Report. Only two members of the Committee were absent, and the Committee decided unanimously to ask the Government to accept the majority report, and to try and establish the Jewish State, if possible, within one year, otherwise within two years. During the interim period, Jews should be given every opportunity to make the necessary military preparations so that they could take over the defence of the country when the Jewish State is established, and Britain leaves the country. The Committee expressed the hope that the Jewish State would be prepared to enter into treaty relations with Great Britain, which would give Britain a base in the Jewish State. Four members of the Cabinet were present at the meeting. We know of two names, Mr. Shinwell and Mr. Bevan, and we presume that the other two were Mr. Greenwood and Dr. Dalton. The Committee decided not to wait for confirmation of the Resolutions by the full Executive of the Labour Party, which is meeting on Wednesday of next week, but transmitted the Resolution immediately to the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries. Laski stated that he had spoken to a number of Cabinet Ministers, and his estimate is that at least 13 Ministers out of 19 are in favour of the majority report. Mr. Bevan will lead the action in favour of the Resolution in the Cabinet. The Committee expressed doubts about the inclusion of Jaffa in the Jewish State, and Berl told Laski that we would be prepared to consider an exchange of Jaffa for Western Galilee.

I believe that you already know that Berl saw last week Mr. Shinwell and Mr. Greenwood, and that they had both expressed themselves


2.

optimistically that there would be a majority in the Cabinet for the majority report.

With best wishes for the New Year and kindest regards.

Yours ever,

IVOR



The Jewish Agency for Palestine

MEMORANDUM

To: Members of the American Section of the Executive September 23, 1947.

FROM: Moshe Shertok

I must put on record the expression of my deep regret that at last night's meeting with the organizations (World Jewish Congress, American Jewish Conference, American Jewish Committee and Agudath Israel) I was the only member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency present. I understand that Dr. Silver could not be in New York yesterday but I can find no excuse for the absence from the meeting of all the other five members of the Executive, all of whom, as far as I am aware, were in town. It must have looked extremely odd to the organizations invited by us to attend that while each of them was represented by two or three persons, there was only one member to represent the Jewish Agency for Palestine and that one happened to be the least American of the whole group. The experience through which I went last night is not of a kind that invites repetition.



MS/bfa

October 10, 1947

Mr. Moshe Shertok
Berkshire Hotel
21 E. 52nd St.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Shertok:

You have read the letter sent to me by Mr. Dubin from Miami, Florida with reference to the airplanes. He phoned me again last evening from Miami. Have you discussed the matter with our friends? Mr. Dubin is prepared to come to New York for a conference.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK



A. H. Silver

The addition of France and Brazil to the Committee on the majority report will mean a strong pro-Arab trend in the committee and a whittling down of the area of the Jewish state. Such a whittling down will not insure the 2/3 vote because the opposition to the majority report on the part of some states and the hesitancy on the part of others were not based on the ^{area}~~size~~ of the Jewish ~~state~~^{area}. I do not believe that we will win over a single state by reducing the Jewish area. The 14 states who will oppose the majority report will do so because they are opposed to partition and favor a unitary state. Those who will abstain from voting will do so for many reasons none of which will have to do with the size of the Jewish state. It is therefore most desirable that the sub-committee bring a report in as favorable to us as possible. ^P There is also the danger that France and Brazil may bring in a minority report which will throw the matter into Chaos. Mr. Evatt should therefore be advised not to change the composition of the committee. ^P Nor is it desirable to have so-called neutrals placed on the Arab Committee. It will be very bad for us if these neutrals come to work out a plan along the Arab lines.

TO

Historic - Secret

Telephoned
10-24-47

I am considerably disturbed by the situation which is developing. The U. S. delegation, under pressure from certain people in the State Department, is pressing for a radical revision of the areas of the Jewish state proposed in the UNSCOP Report. It is the only delegation that is doing it. The excuse given is that the United States wants to insure getting a 2/3 vote on the proposal. Actually, the areas of the two states have not at all figured in the debate at the United Nations. It was generally assumed that the UNSCOP Committee brought in a fair scheme of partition, and while certain minor rectifications on the basis of a quid pro quo could be arranged for, no one expected the United States delegation to come forward with a ~~radical~~ *revolutionary* proposal to equalize the territories of the two states, a principle which was rejected by the UNSCOP Report, since it was clearly understood that the Jewish state was to be allowed ~~sufficient~~ *some additional* territory to take care of refugees and the large influx of immigrants, and also since it was recognized that one Arab state had already been carved out of Palestine; namely, Trans-Jordan.

If the U. S. delegation, under pressure from the State Department, will insist upon its ~~revisions~~ ^{radical} revisions, it ~~will~~ ^{may} make it impossible for the Jewish Agency to accept the proposal of partition, and the whole scheme might collapse. The Administration which has received great praise for having given America's endorsement to the project would then be saddled with the blame for bringing about its collapse.

I believe that this is a serious enough matter, and urgent, since decisions must be made in the next few days, to bring to the attention of the President.

(Telephoned to Senator McGrath - 11-7-47)

12:30 K. U.
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Gen Harding ~~sent~~
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overruled

COPY

CODE

NOVEMBER 11, 1947

**SHERTOK
JEVAGENCY
NEWYORK**

**EXECUTIVE OF JEWISH AGENCY DECIDED LODGE COMPLAINT BEFORE HONORARY
COURT...CONGRESS AGAINST RESPONSIBLE EDITORS HABOKER FOR PUBLISHING
SECOND NOVEMBER LEADERS AND AGAINST ZIVAV FOR PUBLISHING ARTICLE SIGNED
BY HIM CAUSING GREAT HARM TO ZIONIST INTERESTS STOP ALSO AGAINST
EDITORS HABOKER AND HAMASHKIF FOR PUBLISHING ARTICLES DEFENDING TERROR
ACTS IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI CONTRARY TO DECISION ACTIONS COMMITTEE STOP
PLEASE APPROACH FELIX ROSENBLUTH HE SHOULD SUGGEST TO US ACCORDING TO
SUB-PARAGRAPH FOUR OF PARAGRAPH 79 TO SUSPEND THEIR RIGHTS DASH
OR PARTLY DASH UNTIL COURT ANNOUNCES DECISION**



EXECUTIVE OF JEWISH AGENCY

December 15, 1947

Mr. M. Shertok
The Jewish Agency for Palestine
16 E. 66th St.
New York 21, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Shertok:

I am enclosing this letter which I received from Mr. Ormerod of the British Information Service. A few weeks ago he telephoned me about this same matter. I would suggest that you call in the two brothers Carlin and size them up. Ormerod has been quite decent right along. Please let me know what action you take.

Mr. Marve Dubin phoned me this morning. He is in Cleveland. He would like to know what disposition was made of the matter. They are anxious to plan their activities.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very sincerely yours,

AHS:BK
Enc.

הסוכנות היהודית לארץ ישראל
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE
16 EAST 66TH STREET, NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

RHINELANDER 4-4200

Cable Address JEVAGENCY
me

December 24, 1947.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

I am sorry I missed you when you came to the office yesterday but. I had an extremely hectic day and kept rushing in and out.

I understand that you were surprised to hear that I was going to Palestine this week. I thought I had mentioned my trip as a possibility at one of our last meetings. The point is that nothing much will be happening either at Lake Success or in Washington till after the New Year. On the other hand in the second week of January things will probably start moving. There will probably be a meeting of the Security Council at which our question may come up; and at long last the Commission will assemble and begin to work. The British, as we now hear, prefer all their negotiations with the Commission to take place at Lake Success. For this purpose officials are coming over from both London and Jerusalem to assist Cadogan who will formally be the chief negotiator. In short, things will be "humming" at Lake Success all through January and probably well into February.

I feel a vital need for the renewal of a direct contact with Palestine in preparation for this coming round of our struggle. It is, first of all, a matter of getting the physical feel of things on the spot - to know exactly what our defense position is and how the Yishuv is taking its present ordeal. It is, secondly, the need of consulting colleagues in Jerusalem before we face the Commission on all the crucial issues involved in the transfer of authority and in our preparations therefor. After all, whatever strength I possess here on the outside front stems chiefly from my factual knowledge and direct contact with the scene of action, but I have now been away from Palestine for five months and find myself sorely in need of a refresher course.

I also hear that you thought that since I am going to Palestine there was really no cause for the postponement of the Executive and A.C. sessions. This would have been so if the sessions had been scheduled for the end of December and not for the middle of January.

Washington
2210 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington 8, D. C.

London
77, Great Russell Street
London, W.C. 1

Paris
83, Avenue de la Grande Armée
Paris XVI

Jerusalem
Post Office Box 92
Jerusalem, Palestine

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

-2-

December 24, 1947.

As I foresee it, by the middle of January we shall be most actively engaged at Lake Success and in the circumstances our attendance in Jerusalem would have been physically impossible. I hear that the Executive in Jerusalem has decided on February 8th as the date for the opening of the A.C. meeting. For myself, I welcome another week's grace and as far as you are concerned I don't think it makes any difference, since this time, you are going for a longish stay. It may well be that I will be tied up here even in February. In that case I shall be unable to attend the meetings in Jerusalem and since most, if not all, the other colleagues will be present, I do not think this will be a malheur. I am booked to fly on Friday via Geneva and will reach Lydda on Monday evening. As at present advised I intend to be back by the 7th of January. I am sorry to have to miss your dinner on the 29th, but I have sent a message to Emanuel who, I understand, will be chairman.

I take this opportunity of wishing you and Mrs. Silver a pleasant voyage to Palestine and I look forward to meeting you there, whether in February or later.

Yours sincerely,

M. Shertok

Moshe Shertok

MS/bfa

airmail
special delivery

COPY

16 East 66th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

February 9, 1948.

Hon. Trygve Lie
Cranston Towers
123 Greenway North
Forest Hills, Long Island
New York

Dear Mr. Lie:

In compliance with your kind request I beg to set forth for your consideration the following brief program of urgent action:

- 1) Immediate departure for Palestine of an advance party of officials of the Palestine Commission.
- 2) Definite notice to the British Government of date (in second half of March), of departure of Commission to Palestine making it clear that refusal to provide facilities will be tantamount to obstruction from which the British undertook to refrain.
- 3) Immediate entry into negotiations with the Jewish Agency with a view to earliest possible appointment of a Provisional Council of Government for the Jewish State.
- 4) Immediate steps for the appointment of a Governor of the City of Jerusalem and the formation of an international police force for it.
- 5) Immediate strong protest by Security Council to Arab States, with warning that if aggression does not cease stern punitive measures will follow.
- 6) Your interviews with President Truman and Secretary Marshall, primarily on the question of international force, indicating that the whole machinery of United Nations may collapse if Palestine decision is not implemented.

Please accept our deep appreciation of your magnificent stand and personal confidence.

Faithfully yours,

Moshe Shertok

UNITED NATIONS
LAKE SUCCESS, NEW YORK

11 February 1948

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Shertok,

In response to your letter of 9 February 1948, setting forth a "brief program of urgent action" on the Palestine question, I may give you the following information:

1. An advance party of the Secretariat attached to the Palestine Commission will depart for Palestine within a few days.

2. The Palestine Commission has notified the Mandatory Power of its dissatisfaction with the position thus far taken by the Mandatory Power on the matter of the time of the Commission's arrival in Palestine. Negotiations on this question between the Commission and the Mandatory Power are continuing.

3. I am informed that the Commission intends to consult with the representative of the Jewish Agency on the matter of the steps looking toward the selection and establishment of the Provisional Council of Government for the proposed Jewish State.

4. The Trusteeship Council will re-convene in its Second Session on 18 February. The approval of the statute for the City of Jerusalem and the appointment of a Governor for the City are on the agenda of the Council for this meeting.

5. The Palestine Commission expects to submit to the Security Council within a few days a special report on the security problem in connection with the resolution of the General Assembly, at which time the Security Council will undoubtedly explore all aspects of the security situation and various courses of action.

6. I personally intend to undertake consultations with responsible representatives whenever the opportunity affords and there is prospect of effectively serving the cause of the United Nations.

Sincerely yours,

Trygve Lie
Secretary-General

Mr. Moshe Shertok
Member of the Executive
Jewish Agency for Palestine
16 East 66th Street
New York 21, N. Y.

STATEMENT OF MOSHE SHERTOK, HEAD OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, JEWISH AGENCY
FOR PALESTINE, BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

FEBRUARY 27, 1948

Mr. President and Members of the Security Council:

Jews throughout the world, and particularly the Jews of Palestine in their grave ordeal, have for many weeks past eagerly awaited the opportunity of bringing their case regarding the present position in Palestine to the direct attention of this high international body. The Jewish Agency is therefore deeply grateful to the Security Council for the privilege accorded it of being seated at this table and enabled to express its views on the subject now under discussion.

It is nearly three months since the momentous resolution on Palestine was adopted by the General Assembly. The resolution did not accept the full Jewish claim. Far from it. The Jews had asserted their internationally recognized right to immigration and settlement in all parts of Palestine west of the Jordan, so that upon the formation of a Jewish majority the whole of that territory might become a Jewish State. The Arabs had asked for the complete stoppage of Jewish immigration and the immediate proclamation of Palestine as an independent Arab State. The Assembly adopted a compromise solution. It did so after exhaustive deliberation which absorbed two of its sessions and the work of a special eleven-power committee - altogether a process of eight months' continuous discussion.

The compromise, as is well known, was to set up two independent States in Palestine - one Jewish, one Arab; to place Jerusalem under international rule; and to maintain the over-all unity of Palestine by linking together the three units in an Economic Union.

This solution, Mr. President, entailed most far-reaching sacrifices for the Jews. Twenty-five years ago, the closing of Transjordan to Jewish settlement had reduced the area of the Jewish National Home to about one quarter of its original size. The Jews were now expected to part with nearly one-half of the remainder. Moreover, Transjordan having in the meantime become an Arab Kingdom, Jewish consent was now sought for the establishment of a second independent Arab State in the country which the Jewish people had for thousands of years regarded as its national patrimony and historic heritage. The separation of Jerusalem from the Jewish State was a particularly painful wrench.

Yet the Jewish Agency, with the support of the overwhelming majority of Palestinian Jews, decided, however, reluctantly, to accept the compromise. It bowed to the imposed verdict of the international tribunal. It was able to do so because, though only in one-eighth of the area promised in the Balfour Declaration, the new solution satisfied the Jewish claim to statehood and a place in the family of nations; also because even that limited area contained possibilities of development which opened the way for large-scale settlement; and because, though sovereignty was to be curtailed by the Economic Union, the freedom of the Jewish State to admit as many Jewish immigrants as it found necessary and possible remained unimpaired. It was the combination of these three elements - statehood, the given area and freedom of immigration - that constituted the irreducible minimum which the Jews accepted; but beyond which they would not go.

What has happened in the course of the three months and what is happening today is a determined attempt, in open defiance of international authority, to deny to the Jews even that minimum and to reduce them to a state of political subjection, if not actually to confront them with the menace of physical annihilation. The Arab governments, members of the United Nations, are endeavouring to defeat the Assembly's resolution by force of arms. The Mandatory Power is

thwarting the United Nations plan by a policy of non-cooperation and is openly tolerating the active obstruction of its implementation.

Mr. President, the Security Council is faced with an open attempt to alter by force the settlement decreed by the Assembly, which the Assembly requested the Council to determine "as a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace and an act of aggression." The attempt is directly sponsored by the governments of Arab States, members of the United Nations. This assertion hardly stands in need of evidential proof or investigation. It rests on the free admission of the parties concerned. Nor is any research or intelligence work necessary to bring that admission to light. It is shouted from every public platform in the various Arab capitals and blared through all the trumpets of their official propaganda machine. The endeavour of the Arab governments is not limited to the defeat of the United Nations plan; they aim at imposing their own solution, the one which the Assembly has rejected; and they are trying to achieve both ends - the negative and the affirmative - by methods of aggression and violence which are the very negation of the letter and the spirit of the Charter.

The threats of force to resist the Partition Plan, which were voiced by practically every Arab delegate to the Assembly, are still vivid in memory. The governments concerned are now making every effort to live up to the words of their spokesmen. Even before the session of the Assembly in September, 1947, soon after the recommendations of UNSCOP were published, the six Arab governments, members of the United Nations, met in Sofar, Lebanon, and adopted a resolution expressing their determination "to resist the implementation of these recommendations" and undertaking to assist the Arabs of Palestine in "a relentless war" against them, "supplying them with men, funds and ammunition."

Soon after the Assembly's session, the Prime Ministers of the Arab States held a consultation in Cairo, as a result of which an official announcement was published on December 17, 1947, which declared that "the Arab governments will take decisive measures which will guarantee the defeat of partition" and threatened that they would throw the full force of their armies into the battle until victory is achieved. On the same occasion the Lebanese Prime Minister issued a statement in which he said: "We will never sleep until we save Palestine as an independent Arab unitary state...we will supply Palestine... with weapons, equipment and men." The Syrian Prime Minister likewise stated: "The time for speeches is past and the stage of action is at hand; we should all be determined to liberate Palestine by our might and money." On January 15, 1948, the Press Offices of the Arab League - a League comprising seven Arab governments of which six are members of the United Nations - disclosed that the League "had recommended that the Arab nations occupy all Palestine with their regular armies when British troops leave Palestine."

The stage of action had, indeed, arrived. Time will not permit a full enumeration of all the activities which received publicity. Members of the Security Council might refer to the Jewish Agency's Memorandum on Arab Aggression, of which they will receive copies. Here only some of the most salient facts will be mentioned. The Arab governments have jointly proceeded to the formation of what is called an Arab Army of liberation. They have appointed its high command. In most Arab countries recruiting offices for volunteers have been opened with official sanction of the governments. In Syria recruitment and training are under the direct charge of the Ministry of Defence, which issues official notices to regulate it. The Ministry has announced, *inter alia*, its acceptance of the resignation of army officers volunteering for service in Palestine to fight against partition. Similar "resignations" are reported from Egypt and Iraq where the officers were placed in charge of training volunteers. When the first incursion of an armed force from Syria via Lebanon into Palestine occurred on January 9, the press reported that the Ministers of Defence of both countries personally led the convoy, and that the Syrian Defence Minister's car headed the column, the car flying the Syrian flag. Subsequently, on January 14, the Lebanese Defence Minister gave to the Chamber of Deputies in Beirut an eye witness account of the attack which the force had made on Jewish villages, and in which, incidentally, Mr. President, it suffered a crushing defeat. He added that "all activities, such as the collection of funds, registration and training of volunteers, assembly of arms, etc., are being supervised by himself and the Syrian Defence Minister in accordance with the resolutions of the Prime Ministers' Conference in Cairo."

Since that date several such columns have crossed the frontiers into Palestine as reported by the Mandatory Power to the Commission, all provided with motor transport and all properly equipped and provisioned. The invaders from outside form the backbone of the forces now attacking the Jews in Palestine, attacks in which Palestine Arabs play only a secondary part. All these activities are conducted in conjunction with the Palestine Arab Higher Committee of which the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem is still the president. It is noteworthy that prominent in the high command and among the district commanders are men who, like the Mufti, spent the war years in Germany helping Hitler. The backbone of the Iraqi contingents are those who fought under Rashid Ali in the pro-Nazi rebellion of 1941. When the leader of an Egyptian contingent arrived in Damascus, he proposed that the contingent be named after a notorious Egyptian Nazi who had died in Germany.

The distinguished delegate of Egypt must be complimented on the extreme moderation and restraint of his expressions when he attempts to describe these aggressive acts, to which his government is a party, as being merely a matter of "non-compliance" with a recommendation of the Assembly. Open and active defiance are the words indicated. Moderation is, indeed, a relative notion. To the Egyptian delegate, the Arab solution for the Palestine problem, which expects the Jews of Palestine to put up with the fate of a crystallised or dwindling minority and console themselves with a paper guarantee of religious toleration, is the very acme of moderation. Such imperviousness to arguments from the other side and refusal to understand the essence of the national movement of another people make the continuation of political discussion futile. It is high time for the representatives of the Arab governments to realise that the Jewish people in Palestine will never submit to the status of a minority on sufferance which is the lot of the oriental Jewish communities; that the urge for independence will never be eradicated from Jewish hearts; that the very logic by which one Arab country after another in the Middle East has achieved its national sovereignty makes the Jewish claim to statehood in Palestine indisputable and its realisation irresistible; that as long as Arab states continue to resist by force the attainment of the Jewish national goal there can be no peace or stability in the Middle East; and that the long-term interests of all concerned can only be served by mutual adjustment based on equality of status rather than by attempts at suppression and obliteration.

The Jews repudiate, Mr. President, as fantastic and grotesque, the allegation which the Syrian delegate saw fit to repeat here that for the Jews, Palestine is a mere springboard for imperialistic expansion into the whole area of the Middle East. The assertion is fantastic under any circumstances, for it is the very essence of Zionism to concentrate on Palestine and not to create a new dispersal. The assertion is grotesque at a time when all the countries around Palestine are poised to swoop down on it to crush the budding Jewish State out of existence.

It may be idle to try to refute many other outworn shibboleths in the Syrian delegate's speech, for this has been done many a time, apparently to no avail. Only one charge cannot be ignored, for it carries in it poisonous seed which may strike fruitful ground in the Middle East and bear pernicious fruit. It is that the creation of the Jewish State would place Christian and Moslem holy places under Jewish domination, with results too horrible to contemplate. The Syrian delegate's speech was undoubtedly animated by the highest ideals of inter-religious peace. The speech will probably be widely read in the Arab countries but there will be no footnote to inform the uninitiated that Jerusalem and Bethlehem are in the international zone, that Hebron (incidentally holy primarily to the Jews!) and Nazareth are in the Arab State, and that throughout the area of the Jewish State there is hardly a single Moslem or Christian Shrine, in the true sense of the term. As to ordinary churches and mosques, the delegate of Syria gave the impression that there were many cases of their desecration by Jews. Actually not a single such case is on record anywhere in the world. This is to compare with the riots in Aleppo in December, 1947, when all the twelve Jewish synagogues of the city were sacked and burned practically to the ground, invaluable ancient scrolls being consumed in the fire, or with the riots in Cairo in November, 1946, where synagogues and churches alike were the target of mob violence. While the Syrian delegate was making his speech, the newspapers of the day carried a picture

showing Arab riflemen at the Wailing Wall, the greatest sanctuary of the Jewish people, to which the access of Jewish worshippers is now barred. Such incidents serve as a measure of degeneration of the proverbial Arab chivalry. Other manifestations of it are, on one plane, the forcible extortion of contributions from the Jews of Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq in support of the anti-partition campaign, i.e., of the killing of their kith and kin in Palestine and of the liquidation of the national hope of their people which they so fervently share; and, on another plane, the horrible mutilation of the bodies of Jewish fallen in Palestine and the parading through Arab towns of the cut-off heads of Jewish victims stuck on spikes.

The Arab spokesmen have invested much effort in the contention that the Resolution of the Assembly is a mere recommendation. I hope, Mr. President, that though not privileged to represent a member state I may be permitted to make a few comments on this aspect of the problem which specifically concerns the United Kingdom. When the United Kingdom proposed and other powers agreed that the problem of Palestine should be referred to the Assembly, they were fully aware of the powers of this body. They were also fully aware of the fact that Palestine had for 25 years been an international trust. In the face of the announced decision of the Mandatory Power to terminate the Mandate, the General Assembly was fully aware of its responsibilities in regard to this trust and of its power to fill the vacuum created by the liquidation of the Mandatory regime. One government goes, another government -- the United Nations Commission as agent of the General Assembly -- replaces it.

This recommendation of the General Assembly, which was addressed in the first place to the Mandatory Power, was accepted by the Mandatory Power as a decision of that body. I underline the word decision. Speaking in the House of Commons on December 11, 1947, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Creech-Jones, said:

"The decision of the Assembly is regarded by H. M. Government as the decision of a court of international opinion. This is not a grudging acceptance...we wish our authority transferred to our successors in an orderly manner. We can only express our hope...that the greatest respect will be shown this decision of the international authority."

On December 12, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bevin, declared:

"I am not going and H. M. Government are not going to oppose the United Nations decision....There is the United Nations decision....If my colleagues or I can render any assistancewe shall do it."

It may be recalled that when the British Government first referred the question of Palestine to the United Nations, it made no stipulation as to whether and under what terms it would comply with the recommendation. It seemed reasonable to assume, at the time, that whatever the verdict, the United Kingdom would accept it and, as a loyal member of the United Nations, cooperate in its execution. Later, when conditions were put forward, every effort was made by those responsible for the drafting of the Plan in the session of the Assembly to meet them. Yet the attitude of the British Government has developed and hardened into one of non-cooperation bordering on obstruction.

The British Government declared that it would take no part in the implementation of the Plan. Actually, the Plan was not based on its enforcement by the Mandatory Power. On the other hand, it insisted that, as long as the Mandate lasts, it can suffer no rival authority in Palestine but must alone be responsible for the maintenance of law and order. It has not discharged that responsibility.

One can understand the quandary in which the United Kingdom Government found itself placed as a result of its own attitude. The Arab attack was not directed purely and simply against Jewish lives and Jewish property. Its main

target was the policy of the United Nations. To defend Jews against Arab attack meant by implication to defend the policy of the United Nations against those trying to subvert it. From this implication the mandatory administration found itself inhibited. It therefore could not fully maintain law and order. To say the least, its will was paralysed, its springs of action were braked. At the very inception of the trouble, a senior government official informed the Jewish Agency that police escort could not be provided for inter-urban transport since "this might be interpreted as British implementation of partition."

In trying to escape the dilemma, the Administration evolved a theory of its own neutrality in a conflict between the Jews and the Arabs, and in justification of the theory it proceeded to conjure up a spurious equality of guilt as between the attackers and the attacked - between those upholding and those defying the authority of the United Nations. "The Jewish story that the Arabs are the attackers and the Jews the attacked is not tenable," said Sir Alexander Cadogan in his statement to the Commission. "Elements on each side," he went on, "are engaged in attacking or in making reprisals undistinguishable from attacks." But this artificial equality, in the further endeavour of rationalising British behaviour, becomes again an inequality, this time somewhat in favour of the Arab and to the discredit of the Jew. For, so runs the official British account, "the Arabs are determined to show that they will not submit to the United Nations Plan of Partition; while the Jews are trying to consolidate the advantages gained at the General Assembly."

The fallacy of this analysis was, Mr. President, we believe, fully exposed in the Jewish Agency's "Memorandum on the Policy of the Mandatory Power in Palestine Since the Adoption of the General Assembly's Resolution, with Particular Reference to Security," submitted to the U. N. Palestine Commission on February 21, 1948, copies of which were sent to members of the Security Council. It was the Arabs who launched the attack. The Jews acted in self-defence. They expected a strong reaction from the Government, in accordance with its undertaking. This was not forthcoming. On the contrary, Jewish self-defence activities were hampered and disrupted. Searches of arms among the Jews, arrests of Jewish defenders almost under the fire of Arab attack, prohibition of the use by Jews of more effective defence equipment were the order of the day. It was only then that isolated acts of indiscriminate bloodshed on the part of dissident Jewish groups occurred. Although even these came by way of reaction to Arab violence, they were unreservedly condemned by the organised community, but were seized upon by the authorities in justification of their neutrality. On the other hand, the organised Jewish defence organisation, the Haganah, found itself constrained by official inaction or by lack of official action to assume the counter-offensive by trying to attack and eliminate enemy strongholds. Its counter-attacks have been limited in number and aimed at selected targets. No action of the Haganah was ever motivated by the desire "to consolidate the advantages gained" from the Partition Plan, though if there were such action, its purpose would have been to uphold the United Nations decision and not to resist it. The only act which could by a long stretch of interpretation come under that definition was the refusal of the Jews to follow official advice to evacuate certain parts of Palestine - but this was no consolidation, it was mere maintenance of previously acquired positions, which the Government wanted them to surrender. Throughout, the Jewish plan of campaign was one of defence, that of the Arabs one of aggression. It was only complete political disorientation that could so distort the picture in the eyes of the Mandatory Government.

Were the facts to conform with Sir Alexander Cadogan's theory there would have had to be cases of large crowds of armed Jews converging from all sides to wipe out an isolated Arab village, or crossing into Syria, there to disrupt traffic or attack peaceful settlements. Then, and then only, would the acts on both sides indeed become "indistinguishable."

There are questions arising from certain aspects of the Mandatory's policy and practice to which it is indeed difficult to find an answer. Why are arms distributed to units of the Arab municipal police and withheld from the Jewish? Is it not clear that those arms will be used against the Jews and the United Nations Plan? Why are units of the Arab Legion so stubbornly maintained in or near Jewish areas after their murderous attacks on Jewish traffic and passers-by? Must the Jews be continually subjected to this extreme provocation? Why does the British Government

continue to supply arms to the Arab States? Representatives of the British Government have denied that these arms are being used for fighting in Palestine. How can they be sure? And even if this were true, is it not clear that the supply of arms to Arab States at this juncture releases other arms for Palestine? And I should like to add: Why is it that the domination of the entire area of the Old City of Jerusalem by Arab bands is tolerated?

The gravest problem of all arises in connection with the continued incursion of Arab armed forces from outside. The Government which has shown such a remarkable excess of zeal, vigilance, and efficiency in tracking down and intercepting sea transports of Jewish refugees from Europe, maintains, to all appearances, an attitude of almost complete resignation and helplessness -- or indifference -- in the face of this steady piecemeal invasion of a territory which is still in its charge. According to the information of the Jewish Agency, so far seven contingents have crossed into Palestine through the northern and eastern frontiers, numbering between them some 4000 to 4500 men. They did not infiltrate in small groups; they came each time hundreds of men together, mostly in well organized convoys of motor-trucks. They crossed bridges and travelled along highways. With one or two exceptions their entry was entirely unhindered. Is it conceivable that no advance information could be obtained regarding the movements of these columns and no effective guard could be maintained at the main entrances or crossings? On one occasion the Jewish Agency succeeded in warning the authorities 48 hours in advance of an impending crossing. Yet nothing was done to prevent it and the contingent crossed safely and pitched its tents near a large Arab village where it remained unmolested until the men were presumably posted to various centres. The Administration now admits that certain parts of Palestine are under the virtual control of the commanders of these foreign forces. They are increasingly active in offensive operations. How can the general public then resist the impression that preparations are openly tolerated for the proclamation of Arab rule, local or foreign, over large parts of Palestine, in complete disregard of the United Nations decision and under conditions of mortal peril to the Jewish population concerned?

The situation, Mr. President, is further aggravated by a process of rapid disintegration of authority which is destructive of discipline. Latent hatreds are given free rein. There have been clear cases of individual Jews being shot in cold blood by British troops and police, and worse excesses are believed to be possible. The very fact that such is the state of feeling creates an untenable situation and contributes an additional reason why the British Mandate must be terminated as soon as possible and should certainly not be prolonged beyond the fixed date of May 15.

Despite all the bitter disappointments born of the White Paper of 1939, the Jews had hoped that the winding-up of the British Mandate would produce a détente in their relations with the Mandatory and make possible a friendly separation. These hopes have been tragically falsified by experience. As long as the Mandatory Government inexorably pursues its present political course, even the slightest revival of mutual confidence seems unthinkable. On the crucial issue of immigration, policy has remained unchanged, and even a clear recommendation of the Assembly for the freeing of a port to allow a substantial immigration has proved of no avail. Only 750 permits per month are available for immigration from Europe, the balance of the quota being devoted to the evacuation of Cyprus. In these circumstances, is it surprising that groups of survivors of the European massacres continue to cross the Mediterranean on their own? What is surprising is that the arrival of these transports, all intercepted, should be set by the honourable spokesman of the United Kingdom as a disturbing factor in the security situation, equal in its damaging effect to that of the incursion of armed Arab forces across the land frontiers -- and this at a time when all recent refugee transports let themselves be diverted or transhipped to Cyprus without the slightest disturbance or the least resistance.

The Mandatory Government has also so far opposed steps being taken in preparation of the Jewish State militia. The British Secretary of State for the Colonies in his statement to the Security Council said that his Government could not agree "to the formation of a militia under the control of the Provisional Government of the future Jewish State." But nothing of the sort was requested

at this stage by the Jewish Agency. The proposal which we put forward to the U. N. Commission on Palestine and which we understand was transmitted to the Mandatory Government was not for the immediate establishment of a militia to operate independently of British control during the period of the Mandate. It was something quite different, namely that preparations should start now for the setting up of the militia after the termination of the Mandate. We suggested that permission should be given for the proper training of a nucleus of the militia, which would take no part in day to day defence duties, and that facilities should be given for the acquisition and storing of the necessary equipment. It is these requests that, according to our information, have been refused by representatives of the Mandatory Government.

This question of the militia and of the forces required for the implementation of the Plan in general calls for a clear definition of the Jewish Agency's attitude. We have throughout maintained first, that the Jews of Palestine are ready to shoulder far-reaching responsibilities in their defence and in the defence of their territory under the Plan; second, that in view of the fact that the United Nations authority may be threatened by aggression from outside, an international force is vitally necessary. This attitude remains unchanged. Our experience as a result of the operation of the Haganah in the last three months has been definitely encouraging. We have held our ground throughout. Every single attack has been beaten off. We have been assisted by British forces only on special occasions, more often than not after the battle had already been decided in our favour by our own action. In general, we have been hampered and impeded in our defence activities by the limitations imposed by the Government. Granted adequate equipment and full freedom of action, we feel hopeful of being able to build up an effective defence force for the Jewish State. To achieve that we require assistance -- certainly in arms, possibly in funds during the initial period, but not in men.

On the other hand, there is the problem of the enforcement of the Charter and of the prevention of aggression which is essentially a United Nations responsibility. We have never set the formation of an international force as an indispensable condition for the implementation of the Plan. In view of the fact of outside aggression, an international force is clearly indicated. Yet if the international force is not established, we shall still be ready to discharge our responsibility but in that eventuality our need for assistance will be correspondingly greater.

Whatever happens, and even if the worst comes to the worst, the Jews of Palestine will fight for the defence of their lives and their political rights. Their spirit and their capacity have been revealed in the last three months.

Time is of the most vital essence. Since we must be ready to assume responsibility upon the termination of the Mandate, naturally under the direction of the United Nations Commission, our preparations must begin at once. We have asked the Commission for the immediate provision of supplementary arms for our present needs. But apart from the forces engaged at present in day to day defence, additional contingents of our people must be organised and commence their training, and arms must be provided for setting up the militia. This would call for the revision of indiscriminate embargoes and for the initiation of an arms policy which would be in harmony with the United Nations Plan, namely, the supply of arms to those who are ready to assume defence responsibilities in the implementation of the Plan and the denial of arms to those engaged in resisting it. We very respectfully suggest, Mr. President, that the Security Council might consider issuing a call to all member States to adopt such a policy in regard to the sale or supply of arms to Palestine and the neighboring countries, including all countries of the Arab League.

The United Nations Commission, which has been at work since January 9, has already made progress with many aspects of the program of implementation. We are gratified to note their decision, communicated to the Security Council, to proceed with their work, in which the Jewish Agency will be happy to continue its fullest cooperation. One of the most important and urgent tasks of the Commission is the formation of a Provisional Council of Government, in regard to which negotiations are in progress.

The possibility that on April 1 the Security Council may have to consider what steps should be taken in regard to the Arab State area if no Provisional Council has been formed there was anticipated in the Resolution and is no reason why a Provisional Council for the Jewish State should not be established in time.

These are, Mr. President, our observations on the subject of implementation. The distinguished delegate of the United States has introduced a resolution proposing that the Council "accept, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, the requests addressed by the General Assembly to it in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of the General Assembly Resolution"; and that it establish a committee comprising the five permanent members of the Council whose functions will be, inter alia, "to consider whether the situation with respect to Palestine constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and to report its conclusions as a matter of urgency to the Council." The Jewish Agency submits, Mr. President, that both steps are patently urgent.

The Delegate of the United States also proposed that the same Committee should "consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine concerning the implementation of the General Assembly recommendation." In the passage of his address which bears on this particular proposal he explained that the purpose of the Security Council in undertaking this consultation should be to "make every effort to get an agreement on the basis of the General Assembly recommendation for the underlying political difficulty."

The purpose of the consultation, we must confess, is not clear and the proposal leaves us greatly bewildered. We fear that it may lead to new delays and complications which may jeopardize the implementation of the whole plan and further exacerbate the situation in Palestine. In the past, innumerable attempts were made by the Jewish Agency and some also by the Mandatory Government -- each side, naturally acting according to its own lights -- to explore the possibility of an agreed settlement of the Palestine problem. All these efforts remained fruitless. It was as a result and at the end of this long, laborious and futile quest for an agreed solution that the question was eventually brought before the United Nations for final adjudication and the partition compromise was adopted by the Assembly as a way out of the difficulty. In recommending to the British Parliament the submission of the question to the United Nations, representatives of the British Government themselves expressed their conviction, based on long experience, that a solution acceptable to both parties was outside the realm of practical politics.

Thus, Mr. Bevin, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, declared in the House of Commons on February 18, 1947, that there was no prospect of reaching any settlement in Palestine "which would be even broadly acceptable to the two communities in Palestine." This view was also expressed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Creech-Jones in the House of Commons on August 12, 1947, and Sir Alexander Cadogan in the General Assembly on November 26, 1947.

A similar view was very cogently expressed - with remarkable cogency - by the delegate of the United States at the last session of the Assembly, and I would beg leave to quote the relevant passage. Speaking at one of the concluding meetings of the Assembly on November 26, Ambassador Johnson said: "Much has been said during the course of these debates on the desirability and necessity of presenting to the General Assembly a plan which would command the agreement of both the principal protagonists in this situation. I think there is no delegation here which does not know that no plan has ever been presented, either to this Assembly or to the Mandatory Government during its long years of tenure, or in any other place, which would meet with the acceptance of both the Arabs and the Jews. No such plan has ever been presented, and I do not believe that any such plan will ever be presented. If we are to effect through the United Nations a solution of this problem, it cannot be done without the use of the knife. Neither the Jews nor the Arabs will ever be completely satisfied with anything we do, and it is just as well to bear that in mind."

It is doubtful whether a change of even one word in this memorable statement is warranted today. Be that as it may, the Jewish Agency feels bound at this stage of the proceedings to make its attitude clear beyond any possible doubt. The Partition Plan adopted by the Assembly is, to us, the last and final compromise and the irreducible minimum of acceptability. No reduction of Jewish rights under the Assembly's Plan, either in territory or in sovereignty, can be accepted by the Jewish people.

Mr. President, the United Nations through its various organs has worked hard in grappling with the Palestine problem. The Resolution of the Assembly represents the collective wisdom of the international community on this burning issue. Ours is a historic problem and its constructive solution will be a distinct contribution to the success and vitality of the new great international organisation. We appeal to the Security Council and to all its members to take such action as falls within their province to translate the Assembly's plan into a reality.



ANS

March 1, 1948

The most difficult session of the Arab League, which ended three days ago, faced numerous external and internal problems caused by present circumstances - problems which are beyond its power and competence to solve. These are:

Acute differences and cleavages of opinion such as principles in monetary matters between Syria and Lebanon;

Failure of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty and the revolt of the Iraqi people against their veteran leaders (e.g. Qasabeh Jabr and Huri Said) and their ousting from power;

Tension in North Africa and the firm resolve of France and Spain to suppress any attempt at revolution or revolt there;

The referendum in Libya and differences between Britain and America on the one hand and Russia on the other over that country's political future;

The Yemenite revolution and the murder of Imam Yahya and his four sons;

The Anglo-Transjordanian talks and their postponement until after the Security Council's Palestine discussion;

The Anglo-Egyptian conflict and Egypt's refusal to resume negotiations until after all British forces are withdrawn from the Nile Valley;

Numerous and strong reports about an impending new world war and the pressure being brought to bear by British and American statesmen to get Arab countries to align with the West early.

To all these is added the Jewish-Arab armed conflict in Palestine and the Arab world's undertaking to oppose the partition plan by force.

All reliable reports received so far show that resolutions on all matters adopted at the League session are unclear and uncommitting except for the Palestine question where the League found the best means for exercising internal and external pressure, for safeguarding Arab solidarity and for securing the Arab League's continued existence.

This attitude was adopted by the League after frequent and protracted telephone consultations with Arab representatives in the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, and consultations with some of the Chiefs of Staff of the Arab States.

Arab UN representatives advised their governments to remain neutral in quarrels between the West and the East, to find out about vindications and possible rewards from each of them, and to wait and see how matters develop.

Concerning the quarrels in Libya and particularly North Africa, Arab governments were advised to confine themselves for the time being to declarations, protests and threats, but to avoid, as far as possible, fomenting armed revolt.

In the matter of a collective treaty or series of individual treaties with Britain on a joint staff or joint defence for the Arab East - this should be postponed until the international situation is cleared up and until the Security Council defines its final attitude on the Palestine problem, the Arab governments were advised.

Chiefs of Staff of the Arab States reviewed their countries' military position and made it clear that Arab countries cannot - financially, economically and militarily - get entangled in another armed resistance in addition to that in Palestine.

Invasion preparations during the last three months and the resultant difficulties have shown that the Arab world is not prepared for a regular and lengthy war - neither from the standpoint of manpower nor equipment nor psychologically. In addition, their internal situation is complicated to the extent of excluding the use of Arab regular forces in the Palestine conflict in the next few months.

Thus, for example, armed revolt in Yemen compels Saudi Arabia to mobilize all her forces to secure the continued existence of her present regime and to guarding her frontiers. In Iraq, fermentation is not yet over despite the deposition of Salah Jabr with his friends, the dissolution of Parliament, and the new government's undertaking to indict the signatories of the Portsmouth agreement for trial. Progressive quarters continue to gain ground and urge fundamental reorganization and general revision of government machinery and the political course.

Arab Chiefs of Staff also quoted other examples about the precariousness of the internal situation in Arab countries - Egypt, Syria and Lebanon - and repeatedly urged that Arab forces should not be burdened with new commitments which are beyond their resources.

In accordance with testimonies and statements of Arab representatives in international institutions and of Arab Chiefs of Staff, the Arab League session was compelled to consider the situation realistically and to refrain from adopting extremist resolutions on any problems, including that of Palestine. It postponed practically all decisions for its next session ~~next~~ which will assemble in the second fortnight of March, hoping that by then some matters would be cleared up.

But simultaneously it probably decided to wage a war of nerves in the West to demonstrate that the Arab States are determined to reconsider their economic links with any country that would support the partition plan and to resist by force any international armed intervention in Palestine affairs.

This is one reason for all the extremist statements by Azzam Pasha and others, the effort to get all volunteer forces in Palestine on time, and the attempts to launch extensive and strong attacks on Palestine Jews here and there in Palestine. This is also the reason for the circulation of false and imaginary reports on Arab victories in Palestine. But together with the war of nerves, the League session decided to admit that it is being helped by Arab friends in Western countries, to wage a new political battle for the postponement of the partition plan in one form or another, and to secure continued preservation of Palestine's status quo. If successful, these maneuvers would disentangle the Arab world from heavy commitments which it undertook towards the Arab peoples and towards the world at large - commitments which are beyond its resources and which it would not be able to discharge for objective reasons under the strained international circumstances.

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As known, the Arab League ~~meeting~~ at its last session decided to appropriate a second million pounds ~~fund~~ to purchase arms and equipment for Arab fighters in Palestine. Akhbar al Yum reports that Egypt immediately paid its part, the new appropriation amounting to 420,000 pounds.

According to Falastin (March 2) the new Hindustani Minister in Egypt visited Premier Nokrashi and informed him officially that his country is willing to supply the Arab League with arms and equipment for the fighting in Palestine. Falastin also reports that the League appropriated 300,000 pounds to purchase arms and cars of ~~various~~ various types from Hindustan and Pakistan.

An Arab source in Damascus reports that ~~some~~ 20 trucks, loaded with light and heavy weapons, arrived in Syria a few days ago and was sent directly to the fighters. ~~consisting~~ This consignment, ~~consisting~~ of British and American arms, came from Iran.

Lebanese Premier Riad Hasulkh declared that the situation of the Arabs ~~at~~ with regard to arms and equipment at the beginning of the present disturbances was similar to that of the British after Dunkirk, whereas now they have a big advantage ~~as~~ over the Jews.

In an interview with a Lebanese journalist, Abdal Kader Hussein, commander of the Arab bands in/Jerusalem area, inadvertently stated that the Arabs have succeeded in securing some artillery, guns and airplanes. He declared that ~~that~~ in the present struggle the Arabs are determined to get rid of the Jews once and for all, "deny them a ~~a~~ state, immigration, development, freedom and any form of independence in Palestine."

It should be pointed out that foreigners of neighboring countries directing hostilities in Palestine enjoy full freedom of movement in Palestine and the Arab States. For instance, Ahmad Hussein, head of the "Young Egypt" fascist party, visited southern Palestine during the last few days and delivered inciting orations at the mosques in Ghaza, Khan Ysunie and Leersheba. He entered and left Palestine in a private

car without any hindrance at the frontiers. ~~He~~ Some weeks ago, he visited northern Palestine and witnessed the Arab attack against Yeshiam.

Similarly, Arab gang commanders--Abdal Kader Hussein and Hassan Salameh, whose entry into Palestine was prohibited under order of arrest--move undisturbed in Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt in cars and airplanes. They also publish, in Palestine papers, instructions, orders and communiques to ~~the~~ the Arab public and fighters without interference of censorship. ~~Similarly~~ In addition, the heads of the Transjordanian Arab Legion have begun to appear openly at public functions in Palestine. The commander of the Arab Legion unit stationed at Wadi Sarar gave a ~~a~~ luncheon for ^{the} Arab mayors of Jaffa, Ghaza, Mejdal Faluga and Hebron and about 200 Mukhdars. Arab Legion officers have delivered headed anti-Jewish speeches declaring that their valiant troops are already engaged in saving Palestine from the Jews.

Arab morale is now high. The Arabs feel that ~~until the British evacuate, they~~ must be adequately equipped and prepared for war.



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March 17, 1948

CABLE TO SHERTOX FROM SASSON

An extraordinary, urgent meeting to discuss the Palestine problem and take the Big Four urgent decisions in the light of consultations is being held tonight in Beirut by the Political Committee of the Arab League.

Azzam Pasha, secretary of the League who had been at Jeddah en route to Yemen as head of the All-Arab delegation, returned to take part in the meeting at the request of the Egyptian Premier. It was rumored that he was about to fly to the United States to join in the effort of the Syrian, Lebanese, and Egyptian UN representatives against partition to defeat partition and substitute another solution of the Palestine question.

The Beirut meeting is taking place as a result of ^{a demand from} the Arab Higher Executive UN representatives and under pressure of American and British representatives in the Middle East. The Syrian government received a series of cables from Faris el Khouri ^{who} reported that the United States has retreated from its ^{an} sympathetic attitude towards partition and that the Big Powers ^{are} were seeking a new solution which would bring peace to Palestine and the entire Middle East and which would be favorable both to the Jews and the Arabs.

Damille Chamoun cabled the Lebanese government that there were good prospects for scrapping partition and ^{for} the acceptance of his plan for a unitary state which he outlined in the General Assembly on November 29.

Mahmud Fawzi informed the Egyptian government that international circumstances and the present atmosphere in the United States created in the Security Council a favorable approach to Arab demands. He said it is ~~imperative~~ imperative to exploit this opportunity as speedily as possible.

The cables from all three stressed the need to compel the Arab Higher Executive to depart from its determined negative attitude and to participate in the deliberations of the Security Council and the informal talks going on ^{between} among Arab UN representatives.

and the Big Powers to find a new solution other than partition. American representatives in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt in the course of the last week have frequently visited the respective Premiers informally to discuss the prospects of American support for other solutions and to demand that the Arab League make a protest against the negative stand of the Arab Higher Executive and decide to send a delegation to the U.S. to discuss new solutions. All this pressure has apparently borne fruit and brought about tonight's urgent meeting of the Political Committee.

writes

However Al-Ahram (March 15) reports that according to reliable reports from New York it seems that serious differences on the Palestine question exist among the Big Four and that it is necessary to refer the matter to UN for reconsideration.

The paper says that America is ready to support a ^{united} federated state solution with Jerusalem under international control. America is also ready to mediate between the Jews and the Arabs and to support any other solution acceptable to them, according to the report. Al-Ahram's Beirut correspondent reveals that the purpose of today's meeting of the Political Committee is to discuss and propose a new Arab scheme for the solution of the Palestine problem. Political circles in Lebanon believe the new scheme will be based on two previous Arab plans: the one submitted by the Arabs at the London conference last year and Chamoun's plan of November. Al-Ahram concludes that the British have informed the Arab States that they would support all international institutions in their new scheme. Outside observers believe that the Mufti, who is participating in the Political Committee's meeting, will determinedly oppose any solution other than an Arab State in all of Palestine. In fact, he has already declared that the Palestine Arabs would reject any solution of a federative or binational state and refuse to recognize any rights for the Jews other than those of minorities in other countries.

Hostilities in Palestine are expected to continue until the Arabs achieve the

realization of all their demands of their national program. But for several objective and subjective, internal and external reasons, the Arab States are interested in concluding the warfare in Palestine the earlier and the better and before serious battles develop and it is not impossible that they will overcome the Mufti's strong opposition and show elasticity and readiness to assist the Americans in to restore peace and order in Palestine and to find new solutions. They are aware of the attitude and the view of Russia and will refrain from any negative stand or stiff, extreme decision which would make the American situation difficult and strengthen Russia's position. It seems that the Arab States are ready to give the "liberation army" instructions to cease hostilities if they are given the least assurance that the Palestine question will be referred back to UN for reconsideration. It is also probable that they would agree to the prolongation of the mandatory regime and an increase in the monthly immigration quota if only they may thus save their prestige by the abolition of partition.

[April 19, 1948]

אחוד דתי בלתי-מפלגתי בארץ-ישראל
NEUTRAL RELIGIOUS UNION
OF ERETZ ISRAEL

CENTRE IN TEL-AVIV
2, LEVONTIN ST., P.O.B. 1339
TELEPHONES: 3620, 2458

Our ref.
Your ref.

המרכז בתל-אביב
רחוב ליבונטין 2, ת.ד. 1339
טלפונים: 2458, 3620

C O P Y

Rabbi Silver - Moshe Shertok

United Nations LAKE SUCCESS

Our Group Represented By Five Members In Assefath Menivcharim
And One In Vaad Leumi Has Been Ignored In Composition Of
Provisional Council Please Rectify By Adding One Of Our Members
Stop Same Cable Was Sent To Jewish Agency And Vaad Leumi Please
Confirm

Independent Orthodox Party

Executives Schocher Kirsch Cohen

P.O.B. 1339

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יום ו' ניסן תש"ח

לכבוד
מר דוד בן גוריון
יו"ר הנהלת הסוכנות, היהודית
כ א ו .

א.נ.

הנדון:- השתתפות האיחוד הדתי הבלתי-מפלגתי במועצת הממשלה הזמנית של המדינה היהודית.

הועד הפועל הציוני החליט על הרכבת הממשלה הזמנית בת 27 חברים ולתמוך בה חרב לא קבלנו אפילו הזמנה לשייבה שדנה בשאלה הזאת. ברצוננו להטעים שאיחודנו מיוצג על ידי 3 צירים באספת הנבחרים ועוד 2 צירים מחתאחדות הסוחרים - בס"ח 5 צירים; וכן יש לנו נציגות בועד הלאומי. והייתכן שציבור לא יובא כלל בחשבון לגבי הרכבת הממשלה הזמנית בה בשעה שרוצים לייצג בממשלה הזאת את כל חוגי הציבור ואפילו את החוגים הבלתי-רצויים כמו הקומוניסטים, וכן, אלה שלא השתתפו עד עכשין בכנסת-ישראל. ואחריו אנו חמיר השתייכנו לכנסת ישראל ובשעה שנבקשו לתת את אה ייפוי-כוחנו לסוכנות ולועד הלאומי לשם הרכבת הממשלה, לא היססנו אף רגע כי לא רצינו לעכב את הקמה הממשלה בהתאם להבטחה שקיבלנו מאת יו"ר הועד הלאומי מר רמז, שעניין השתתפותנו בממשלה יסודר אחרי כן.

בשים לב להנ"ל, אנו מוחים נמרצות על שלא הזמנו אפילו להביע את דעתנו בעניין הרכבת הממשלה, וכן דורשים אנו בכל חוקף את נציגנו למועצת הממשלה הזמנית.

אנו בטוחים שלא תרצו בראשית צעדיכם לקמה חלק ניכר של הציבור, הנאמן לכנסת-ישראל, וחמיוצג במוסדותיה העליונים - אספת הנבחרים והועד הלאומי - וסמלנו את דרישתנו הצודקת.

אנו מחכים לחשובה מהירה.

בכבוד רב

אחד דתי בלתי מפלגתי

י"ח ניסן תש"ח
1/11

העתקים: למר דוד רמז
לחרב הראשי חרצוג שליט"א
לחרב פילבר
למ. שרתוק
לאגודת הרבנים באמריקה

אחדות דתית בלתי-מפלגתית בארץ-ישראל

NEUTRAL RELIGIOUS UNION OF ERETZ ISRAEL

Att 5

1/10/48

UN N P 1/1

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טלפונים: 2458, 3620

יום י' ניסן תש"ח (19.4.48)

לכבוד

מר משה שרתוק

ראש המחלקה הדמינית של הסוכנות היהודית לא"י
ליי-סאקס - ניו-יורק.

א.נ.

הנדון: - השתתפות האיחוד הדתי הבלתי-מפלגתי במועצת הממשלה הזמנית.

אנו מאשרים את מברקו למי החעתק הר"פ, וכן מצרפים אנו העתק ממכתבו מיום ו'דנא למר דוד בן גוריון, הדן בקיפוח שנעשה לנו על ידי זה שלט צורף נציג ה"איחוד" למועצת הממשלה הזמנית, למרות כל החסברים והמחאות שלנו - ולא עוד אלא שלא מצאו אפילו לנחון לחזמין אותנו לכינוס הועד הפועל הציוני בכדי לאפשר לנו להרצות את חביעותינו בפני הועד הפועל הציוני.

כב' יודע כמה חשוב האיחוד והליכוד ביישוב הן כלפי פנים והן כלפי חוץ, ואנו בטוחים שכב' יביע את דעתו בפני הסוכנות בירושלים שהמעוות שנעשה לנו מעון תיקון מיד.

אנו שאנו המעט בעמים מרגישים יפה את העוול שנעשה לנו ע"י עמים אחרים רבים וחזקים ממנו; ומן הראוי שלמחות נדע להימנע מעוול וקיפוח כזה החוכנו אנו ונדע להכיר ולהוקיר כל מפלגה גדולה או קטנה, אם היא רק עומדת על בסיס יהודי כללי.

נכיר חודה לכב' אם יואיל להעביר את חלונתנו להמרכז ויבקש לתקן את המעוות לטובת העם והארץ כולה.

אנו מבקשים לאשר לנו את קבלת המכתב ומודים למפרע.

בכבוד רב

2 הצרפים

The Jewish Agency for Palestine

MEMORANDUM

April 14, 1948

To: Mr. Shertok

FROM: Dr. Carlos Grünberg

SUBJECT: Summary of an interview I had with Prof. Enrique Rodríguez Fabregat on April 12, 1948.

The change in the United States attitude cannot be attributed to any one cause, nor to all of them together: oil, bases, appeasement. It can only be explained as the result of a strategic Anglo-American military agreement precipitated by the proximity or the possibility of a war with Russia which implies coldly sacrificing the Jewish people and their State.

All sorts of speeches can be given in the Assembly. One can point out that the U. N. is yielding to threats and to force; that the U. N. is losing all its prestige; that the United States is motivated by interests, not by justice and that on the contrary she tends to deprive the Jewish people of the justice recently granted to them and to convert it into the most wicked injustice; that the partition plan is, both legally and morally, definitive and irrevocable; etc. The U. S. will not even condescend to answer these points; as a good powerful State it will limit itself to procuring votes, not to giving reasons.

The fact that the United States trusteeship plan is not yet ready or published could still mean that it cannot yet count on the necessary votes. But it will be able to count on them later. Or perhaps the dangerous federation plan, which Arce and others prefer and which still has a fascinating power, will count on them.

In theory, the Jews have the relatively easy task of getting one third of the votes in order to assure the survival of the partition plan. But, assuming that there will be no abstentions, a third will mean 20 votes and they cannot hope to get them.

If it is proved in the Assembly that there are votes to assure the triumph of the new plan (trusteeship, federation), some delegates will have no other recourse but to use delaying tactics, such as maintaining that if the partition plan required a special commission and long study and discussion, a new plan will require at least as much.

The Jews ought to understand that any new victorious plan means that sooner or later the Yishuv will be completely liquidated. They also ought to understand that accepting a truce, i.e., the first part of the U. S. plan, means accepting the rest of the plan. Some delegates, friends of ours, are afraid that the Jews will not understand this and they anxiously hope that they will. The Jews, therefore, have no other solution but this one: to maintain the legality, bindingness and irrevocability of the partition plan, without yielding one inch in that respect, since to do otherwise will be to implicitly admit its total revocability, and to reject every truce and fight with their arms, being convinced that not to fight is to die and that, on the other hand, not all those who fight die. Any other attitude will be suicidal.

STATEMENT OF MOSEH SHEERTOK,
HEAD OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY
BEFORE COMMITTEE I OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
April 27, 1948

The present session was convened for the purpose of giving further consideration to the question of the future government of Palestine. This euphemistic phrase "further consideration" clearly portended a revision of the solution previously adopted. Though it was not sought formally to abrogate the Assembly's Resolution of November 29, 1947, the proposed trusteeship arrangement was tantamount to its complete reversal. The Resolution had stemmed from the recognition of two basic facts: first, that Palestine is ripe for independence; second, that within it exist two nations. Accordingly the Assembly decreed the creation in Palestine of two independent States linked in an Economic Union. Trusteeship does violence to both these basic realities. Palestine is forced back into subjection, to outside tutelage and the duality of its population is ignored.

From the standpoint of the Jews the proposal is totally unreal. For not only are the Jews expected to forego the independence and statehood accorded them by the Resolution. They are invited to accept a status which is no status at all; whatever the constitutional formulae, without any of the shields forged for the Jews by the Mandate, the Arab majority is bound to assert itself at their expense. None of the fundamental provisions of that document, which were designed to promote and safeguard the development of the Jewish National Home, is reproduced in the United States draft trusteeship agreement. The recognition, with all its corollaries, of the connection of the Jewish people throughout the world with Palestine is swept away.

Above all, the right of Jews, as Jews, to immigrate and settle in Palestine is no longer to be valid. The wording of the United States proposal on immigration alone would be enough to condemn the entire project in the eyes of the Jewish people. Presumably in an attempt to overcome these insuperable obstacles to Jewish acceptance of trusteeship, the honorable representative of the United States has painted a glowing picture of an era of economic prosperity and progress to be ushered in for Palestine by that regime- big irrigation works, attraction of capital, agricultural and industrial development, and what not. May I recall that Ambassador Austin has visited my country. He has had the opportunity of ascertaining at first hand that the progress of Palestine in our time has been primarily due to continued large scale Jewish immigration and to constructive Jewish initiative and capital investment which drew its strength and inspiration from but one source, the hope of rebuilding a free Jewish commonwealth. To deny to the Jewish people the fulfillment of that hope is to destroy their initiative and arrest the progress of Palestine. Trusteeship and economic progress in the context of Palestine are a contradiction in terms. A tree bears no fruit after its roots have been severed.

The Resolution of the Assembly, by establishing a Jewish State, albeit in a part of Palestine, provided for the fulfillment of the fundamental concept of the Palestine Mandate: it sought to realize in 1947, against the background of existing circumstances, what was originally conceived in 1917. It was true to the creative trend of modern Jewish history which has its roots in Jewish national independence in the ancient past and in age-long Jewish martyrdom. The United States trusteeship proposal disregards the past, flies in the face of present day realities and darkly beclouds the future.

The Jews of Palestine and the Zionist movement have rejected the trusteeship idea. The Executive of the Jewish Agency and Jewish National Council in Palestine have declared their uncompromising opposition to any proposal which would prevent or delay the establishment of the Jewish State. In fact, it may be asked whether an attempt to revise or to set aside the Assembly's Resolution is not at variance with international law. Much has been said by opponents of the Resolution of its allegedly non-binding character in view of the fact that technically it is no more than a "recommendation." It is of course a truism that resolutions of the Assembly in matters which concern the national sovereignty of the members of the United Nations are mere recommendations which with all their moral and political weight have no binding character. But the Resolution on Palestine is different in essence. The problem here is not one of a conflict between two sovereign states in regard to which the Assembly can do no more than "recommend" a settlement. At stake in the case of Palestine is the future of a territory which is subject to an international trust, and which therefore constitutes a direct responsibility of the United Nations. It is not within the jurisdiction of any member of the United Nations, but solely within that of the United Nations as a whole to determine the future of that territory, and that decision has a binding force. Moreover, we believe it to

be arguable that the decision of November 29, 1947 cannot legitimately be revoked or altered. That decision conferred statehood upon the Jews of Palestine as it did upon the bulk of the Palestine Arabs. Each group acquired rights under the Resolution which it cannot now be forced to renounce. It is significant that the Resolution throughout refers to the two states in terms which imply that they already exist. Now to go back on the Resolution and to re-impose on Palestine some form of international tutelage is to legislate out of existence an established fact.

But whatever the legal aspect of the situation, there can be no doubt as to its political realities. During the eight months, April to November, when the Palestine problem formed the subject of continuous and active examination by the General Assembly and its organs, the political status of Palestine was in suspense; but this has by no means been the fact since the end of November. The passage of the Resolution has released a process of change which has grown apace from week to week, and even from day to day, with the progressive liquidation of the Mandatory regime. While the present special Assembly deliberates, the position of Palestine does not remain static. Systematically or otherwise, the plan of Partition is being implemented. It is not merely a question of setting up a central authority to administer the area of the Jewish State upon the termination of the Mandate on May 15. Such authority is already in operation, filling the vacuum, territorial and functional, which is produced by the shrinking of the Mandatory Administration. The Jews, in building up their government, are not merely striving to uphold and exercise their rights under the Resolution: their present course of action is imperatively dictated by the necessities of civilized life, and of life itself.

It is no longer a question of whether and when and with whose help will the militia of the Jewish State be set up. The Jewish militia is already in existence and in action, fighting its battles day in and day out. To impose a trusteeship is no longer a matter of substituting one resolution for another. It will have to contend with the compelling forces which produced partition and which have in turn been vastly accelerated by the acceptance of partition by the Assembly.

That the process of the establishment of the Jewish State had been made unnecessarily and tragically difficult needs no elaboration. When distinguished delegates speak of peaceful implementation as of a hope unfulfilled, they seem to forget that the Assembly's Resolution was adopted in the teeth of persistent threats to defy it by force, that the question of an international force to give effect to the Resolution had been discussed at considerable length on various occasions, and that no such force was provided, not because it was unnecessary, but because it was found impracticable. During the last regular session of the Assembly, the Jewish Agency had pointed out that if trouble in Palestine were localized, the Jews would be able to cope with it alone, but if the country were invaded by forces from the neighboring states, an international force would be called for, primarily because such an invasion would be an open revolt against the authority of the United Nations which it would be the duty of the United Nations to put down. We refer to the deterrent effect which the mere existence of an international force would exercise because there is no contradiction between peaceful implementation and availability of force. On the contrary, it is an axiom of international politics that readiness to use force is an indispensable condition of the maintenance of peace. At the same time the Jewish Agency declared that should formation of an international force prove, for any reason, impracticable, the Jews would be ready under any contingency, to carry the burden of defending themselves and their State alone, but in that event they would require and deserve assistance in arms.

Our fear that armed forces from neighboring countries might invade Palestine has materialized. The invasion is officially and publicly organized and financed by the governments of the Arab States, members of the Arab League and of the United Nations, in deliberate obstruction of the Assembly's plan. Documents which we have submitted to the Security Council contain conclusive evidence of our contention. The incursions of military formations from the neighboring countries into Palestine have proceeded in broad daylight under the very eyes of British military and civil authorities. The British navy has continued to blockade Palestine's seaboard against the arrival of visaless Jewish immigrants, but the land frontiers, north, east and south, were left open to the aggressor. Inside Palestine the British forces proved either unable or unwilling to put down Arab violence and to

protect Jewish settlements from attack. Sometimes they were of help; more often they turned against Jewish defenders; in most cases they stayed aloof. The United Kingdom Government continued to supply arms to Arab States under the existing treaties in disregard of the active part played by these governments in the invasion of Palestine. On the other hand, no armed assistance was provided to the Jews and they were left to fend for themselves. The appeals of the Jewish Agency for the relaxation of the United States embargo in favor of those defending themselves and the Assembly's Resolution were fruitless. So was our appeal to the Security Council for an international arms policy in defense of an international decision. The Security Council even found itself unable to declare the invasion of Palestine a threat to the peace within the terms of the Charter and of the Resolution on Palestine.

Encouraged by the Council's inaction and by the absence of any military assistance to the Jews by the United Nations, the Arab Governments and the Palestine Arab Higher Committee intensified their campaign of violence. The blustering commanders of the so-called Arab Liberation Army promised their followers the loot of Tel Aviv, the razing of all Jewish settlements to the ground and the hurling into the sea of the Jews who survived. Jewish Jerusalem found itself besieged. The Old City within the walls, with all its shrines, was allowed by the Administration to fall into the hands of fanatical Arab guerrillas. Its small Jewish community owed its survival only to the gallantry of its own defenders. The 100,000 Jews of Jerusalem were cut off from food and other supplies, and their communications with the outside world were disrupted by Arab bands operating outside the city. Jerusalem was shelled for the first time in its history.

In all these circumstances, the entire Jewish people of Palestine rallied to the supreme task of self-defense- defense of its life and property, of its rights and future. The defense organization of the Jewish community, the Haganah, came out into the open. It enrolled new members, improved its organization, increased its equipment as best it could. It had to be on the alert night and day in more than 300 Jewish villages and towns, never knowing where and when the enemy would choose to muster an overwhelming superiority of forces for a decisive blow. As a result, large proportions of manpower and equipment were immobilized in purely static defense. Inevitably the Haganah was compelled to assume the counter-offensive to tie up the enemy's resources, to forestall attacks and to strike at menacing concentrations of foreign troops. Above all, there was the imperative need to relieve isolated Jewish settlements and to save Jerusalem. To this day, every Arab attack against Jewish settlements has been repelled and not a single Jewish village or defense post has been evacuated anywhere in the country. As time went on, the Haganah in successful counter-thrusts scattered the attacking forces and drove the enemy back to its bases. It occupied Arab strongholds, including villages and hilltops, commanding the main road to Jerusalem, which was thus reopened to food convoys. This daring enterprise was undertaken by the Haganah after every hope had to be given up of inducing the British authorities to protect the access to Jerusalem, and as the only means of saving the Jews of Jerusalem from starvation. But the position inside Jerusalem remained critical. The most revolting chapter of the present Palestinian situation is the fate of the great Hadassah hospital on Mount Scopus, adjoining the Hebrew University. The Arab command had converted an Arab quarter lying athwart the route from the hospital to the city into an armed stronghold from which all Jewish convoys, whether medical or otherwise, were attacked. On April 13th, after an assurance of safe conduct by the British authorities, a convoy carrying medical and university staff was blown up by land mines and attacked with machine-gun fire: 74 Jews, mostly doctors, nurses, university professors and students, were butchered, some of them burned to death. Though the massacre went on for hours, a British army unit stationed nearby took no action, while a Jewish defense unit was held up on the way to the scene. After the disaster, the hospital found itself completely cut off. British military authorities proceeded to negotiate- yes, to negotiate- with the bands entrenched in the Arab quarter to let food and hospital equipment through. The Arabs refused, insisting on the total evacuation of the hospital, and the British took no action. Again the Haganah had no choice but to act on its own, and on Saturday night, April 24th, after a fierce battle, the Arab bands were ejected and the Haganah forces occupied the Sheikh Jarrah Quarter. Promptly, British troops intervened and proceeded to shell the Haganah posts. The present situation in that quarter is obscure and the fate of the hospital hangs in the balance.

When British troops evacuated Haifa, the Haganah forces moved in to prevent the main part of the city, placed by the Resolution in the Jewish State, from falling into the hands of foreign Arab bands which had already infiltrated into it and attacked the Jews. By and large, we have broken the first wave of Arab aggression. It depends largely on international reaction whether the second wave will begin.

When I hear Arab spokesmen bemoaning the fate of Palestinian Arabs as innocent victims of wanton and brutal attacks allegedly perpetrated by the Jews, I am reminded of the old Arab proverb: "Darabani wa-baka, sabaqani wa-shtaka," which means, "He beat me and wept, ran ahead of me and complained." The Arabs are suffering from the boomerang effects of their own mischief, and their distress is self-inflicted. Were it not for the onslaught against the Jews initiated by the Arab Higher Committee and magnified to its present proportions by the Arab States, Palestine would today have been a peaceful country. Plagued by defeat, Arab representatives have sought refuge in wildly exaggerated allegations against the Jews. Typical was the report of the Syrian delegate about the events in Haifa. According to the formal statement presented to the Security Council by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the engagement in Haifa was started by the Arabs who attacked Jews for several days before the Jews took the action which brought the town under their control. The number of Arabs killed in the operation, according to official British sources, was about 100, and there was nothing to justify the term of massacre. I would add that a high ranking British officer in Haifa, in describing the events to a well-known foreign press representative, commended the smoothness with which the Haganah carried through the operation and the high regard its fighters had shown for human life.

The Arab spokesmen before this Committee have also distorted the facts about Arab civilian evacuation. It is by no means the policy of the Jews to drive Palestinian Arabs out of their towns and villages. On the contrary it is both our desire and our interest to show that Arabs can be perfectly secure within the Jewish State. Even before the Haifa engagement there had been a large-scale Arab exodus from Haifa, running into tens of thousands. The reason was that these people had no heart for the fighting and did not want to be involved in trouble. The subsequent mass evacuation was dictated by Arab commanders in a military demonstration - with one eye on the Arab world and the other on this Assembly. In Tiberias there had been a truce between local Jews and local Arabs which lasted several weeks. It was broken by armed men who came in from outside and when the Jews counter-attacked, again it was the Arab command which called upon the people to leave.

In Jaffa, which is outside the Jewish State, truce negotiations initiated by the local Arabs were in progress two months ago when the town came under the command of an Iraqi officer who promptly ordered their discontinuance. When warned by the Arab mayor, he replied: "I don't mind the destruction of Jaffa if we secure the destruction of Tel Aviv." Arab attacks from Jaffa against Tel Aviv were resumed, as were the Jewish counter-attacks, and here too Arabs proceeded to flee.

We have made it clear in the Security Council that we would most sincerely welcome a truce provided it was not a mere sham, to be used as a mask for the preparation of further and more violent aggression. The conditions for a real truce must include an effective prevention of further armed incursions from outside and the removal of foreign bands already in Palestine. Nor must our rights under the Resolution be prejudiced. But even before the truce resolution was adopted by the Security Council, we offered to cease fire as soon as the other side did. Yet Arab attacks have not stopped, and judging by what we hear of conferences and preparations in the neighboring Arab capitals, we must be ready for graver ordeals. Arab heads of governments and military chiefs are assessing the results of the first wave of invasion which was a fiasco, and are preparing for a new phase of their military adventure. Forces composed of guerrilla volunteers with a mere sprinkling of regular officers having failed, they are now considering the dispatch of regular armies across the frontiers. For a long time past, there has been a plan for the invasion of Palestine by the armies of Saudi Arabia and Egypt from the south, Iraq and Transjordan from the east, and Syria and Lebanon from the north, possibly with a view to eventual partition of the territorial spoils between Palestine's neighbors. Iraq is now in the throes of an acute

economic and financial crisis and is reported to be urgently appealing for outside help, yet notwithstanding internal difficulties, she is reported to be ready to dispatch for direct and overt intervention in Palestine.

But the spearhead of this new campaign of aggression is to be, according to reports, the Arab Legion, the army of Transjordan. Units of this Legion have for a long time past been stationed in Palestine as part of the British garrison. Their presence has been a constant menace. Of late they have taken an increasing part in Arab aggression in Palestine. The other day we were assured by the representative of the United Kingdom in the Security Council that the Legion would be removed from Palestine before May 15th. Yet only yesterday we read that the main airport of Palestine at Lydda which belongs to the Jewish State was, upon the withdrawal of British personnel, occupied by the Arab Legion. So were the British barracks in Jerusalem. At the same time the King of Transjordan is reported to have stated officially that his troops would soon march into Palestine, bent on conquest. He is now being credited with the intention of himself marching into Jerusalem, at the head of a composite column of troops of the Arab League, to be crowned as King of Palestine.

It is obvious that the Legion can move into Palestine, whether before or after the 15th of May, with the same ease and facility with which the invading Arab forces have hitherto moved in. The Transjordan Government jointly with the Government of the United Kingdom would then be responsible for a most critical situation. Though the Transjordan Government is seeking admission to the United Nations, it apparently feels free to violate the Charter with impunity. Certainly the United Nations is not powerless to halt this flagrant move to open warfare. The responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom is equally unmistakable. The Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty which has just been renewed provides for full military alliance between the two countries and the establishment of a Joint Defense Board. Under the treaty, the Government of Transjordan receives an annual subsidy of \$8, 000,000 from the United Kingdom for the maintenance of the Legion. The commander and other senior officers of the Legion are appointed by the British Government, and the Government of Transjordan may not undertake offensive operations outside its own territory without consulting its ally. We understand that British evacuation plans include the supply of all operating requirements for the next eight months. If Transjordan brings war to Palestine, the British Government will be responsible, and if the whole issue is not placed on the agenda of this Committee and of the Security Council, then it cannot be said that the United Nations is dealing with the realities of the Palestine crisis.

I ought to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that while we believe that this threatened invasion of Palestine by the regular armies of the Arab States around us calls for very firm action by the United Nations, we ourselves are making every possible preparation to meet the next phase of the onslaught with our own forces. We certainly do not regard the Arab Legion as invincible and we are prepared to join issue with it. Our strength may be limited but there is nothing that a people conscious of its past and cherishing its future will not do in defense of its life and liberty, if forced to. We know we shall be helped by Jews throughout the world, wherever they may be. We are as appreciative as any other people of the boon of peace. But like any other freedom-loving nation, we do not set peace above everything else in life. Peace is a means to higher ends, not an end in itself. Moreover, the terms of the Arab Higher Committee or the Arab League, would place us on the precipice of national as well as of physical extinction. That would certainly not mean peace.

This debate is already twelve months old, yet it keeps reverting to the roots of the problem and to its most fundamental aspects. Notably, the distinguished delegate of the Lebanon has made a renewed intellectual effort to probe the problem to its very foundations. I appreciate the honesty of his purpose, but I deplore the mental or psychological obstacle which he has not managed to overcome. That obstacle is the refusal, conscious or otherwise, to concede to the Jews what is regarded as the natural and elemental birthright of any other people under the sun, namely, its right to a country which it can call its own, its right to a complete mastery over the conditions of its life, its right to accommodate within that country as many of its sons and daughters as it can, its right to a seat in the family of nations and its right to make its own distinctive contribution in all fields of endeavor to the common stock of mankind. The delegate of the Lebanon is prepared to concede us many things: full civil and political rights, complete freedom of

religious worship, full opportunity to develop our Hebrew language and culture, and so on. He denies us only one thing: equality - not individual equality, which he grants - but collective equality - equality of status for the Jewish people with all other nations. So long as you do not realize that the Jewish people as a people is homeless and that homes for individuals, happy and prosperous as they may be - if they are - are no substitute for a home for the people, you do not begin to touch the core of the Jewish problem and it is idle for you to attempt a solution.

Dr. Malik seems to forget - or maybe he does not - that all the blessings he would bestow on us in the Palestinian state of his conception are fully enjoyed today by Jews as individuals in every democratic and progressive country. Nevertheless, the yearning for Zion persists, for here the soul of the people seeks its redemption, and only here can the body of the people as a national entity achieve its renaissance. Dr. Malik assures us that in the Palestine State, in which the Jews would give up their claim to a separate collective identity, they would be able to hold the highest offices, including appearance as delegates of that State to the United Nations. Does he really imagine that such a prospect is so startlingly novel in Jewish history? There was a time when the Foreign Minister of the Second German Reich was a Jew and he appeared in that capacity in the highest international councils. It is not so long ago that the Prime Minister of France was a Jew who, by virtue of his position in French life, may at any time be called to fill that office again. In modern times, there have always been Jews in the governments of Great Britain. In the United States, Jews have held and are holding state positions of the highest dignity. All these honors and distinctions, of which those directly concerned and other Jews were rightly proud, did not advance the Jewish people one step towards the solution of its problem as a people. Only a territory of its own, in whose history the people has deep roots and over whose future it has the unchallenged mastery - in brief, statehood in its own country - can solve the problem.

This is the historical aspect. But what of the practical problem as it affects today the 700,000 Jews of Palestine and those hundreds of thousands who are determined to settle there? Dr. Malik appealed to us, Palestine Jews, to seek integration into our Arab environment and abandon all claims to "separate existence". If by "integration" he means that we should seek to get closer to our environment, that we should study its language and its ways of thought, that we should forge links with our neighbors near and far, then he is right and this is exactly what we are trying to do. But if by "integration" he means that we should strive to dissolve in our environment, then he asks for the impossible, and what is more, he commits an injustice for he seeks to do to us what he does not want done to himself. His own country, the Lebanon is far less sharply differentiated from the rest of the Levant than we in Palestine are from our Arab neighbors, yet the Lebanese people rightly regard an independent political status as an essential condition of their harmonious integration into the Arab world as a whole.

For us no question of integration into the Arab world exists, for we are not nor do we wish to be Arabs. It is the essence of our return to Palestine that there, and there alone, we can live as Jews and nothing else. We do not cut ourselves off from the world around us; on the contrary, we are anxious to be connected and associated with it as closely as we can; but we do not give up our corporate identity; rather are we anxious to develop it to the highest level attainable, as our neighbors do, as do all nations. We believe that the very process by which each of the countries around us has attained its separate independence and sovereignty makes our claim to statehood unanswerable. We also know that we are already a nation and that the process of our complete emancipation as a sovereign state in the part of Palestine assigned to us will prove irresistible.

We do not base our claim on any cultural or economic superiority. But it is indeed singular that a man of Dr. Malik's intellectual stature should be prompting us to conform to the patterns of life which characterize the countries of the Arab East - some of which are centuries behind us in education, social structure and economic development - and yet should deny us equality of status, even with the most primitive of them. It is equally singular, if not absurdly incongruous, for the United States to endorse the claim of these relatively primitive societies to sovereignty and membership in the United Nations and yet advocate further tutelage for both peoples of Palestine.

In all his admonitions to us, Dr. Malik appears to assume that the Jews by a mere act of will can surrender their independent existence and renounce immemorial aspirations to the reconstitution of their State. He reveals how profoundly even most cultivated Arab minds persist in misunderstanding or underestimating the historic motives and all the strains and stresses of Jewish life. The idea that a people should rest content with a disembodied culture and give up its claim to free political institutions would sound too ridiculous to merit any serious thought if applied to any other nation. The United Nations itself is conclusive proof that the independent sovereign state is the only normal unit of national activity - the only recognizable constituent part of the international world.

That the attainment of statehood by the Palestine Jews would have been infinitely easier if it did not involve the inclusion in the Jewish State of 350,000 Arabs living today within its area, is axiomatic. But the retention in the Jewish State of this Arab minority is by no means such an enormity in ethics and in practical politics as some of the more violent critics of the plan of partition would represent it to be. As has been pointed out time out of number, justice and practicability are relative concepts in the highly complex and most closely integrated international scene of today. The question is, in which case would injustice and practical difficulty be greater: if less than one-third of the Palestine Arabs were left in the Jewish State while remaining surrounded by masses of their kith and kin in the neighboring countries, all of which, including the newly to be formed Palestine Arab State, would enjoy full sovereignty and independence, or if twice that number of Jews were left as a permanent and completely isolated minority in an Arab State with the Jewish people as a whole deprived of statehood forever?

It would appear that the coupling of an economic union with partition should have been regarded as a further safeguard for the Arab minority, added to its ethnic unity with the wider Arab perimeter, its geographic contiguity with independent Arab states and the self-interest of the Jewish State to mete out to it the fairest treatment possible. Yet the Lebanese delegate repeats the theses of the distinguished representative of Pakistan that there is something absurd or anomalous about the idea of economic unity combined with political separation. In reality, this is one of the most advanced conceptions which modern political thought has produced. It would be worthwhile in this connection to recall the following extract from the speech of the representative of the Netherlands at the General Assembly on November 26, 1947:

"We are convinced that the establishment of a unitary state would not be the appropriate solution for the United Nations to preach now. Historically speaking it is a fact that nearly always in all parts of the world where there was to be found a historically formed difference between peoples whom destiny brought together, no solution in the direction of a unitary state has proved to be workable. After the Napoleonic Wars, Belgium and the Netherlands were brought together in one unitary state. Although our two peoples had very close ties, relations and interests..this unitary state ended rapidly and unsuccessfully. The differences between Arabs and Jews now are much greater..than those between Belgium and the Netherlands in 1830. Now, together with Luxembourg, those countries are reunited, not politically but economically, and now what counts is not our political separation but our union for economic purposes...History has taught our three countries this valuable lesson of independence combined with unity for certain important but limited purposes. We try to apply this lesson earnestly because we believe strongly that this is the best way to freedom, prosperity and the safeguarding of minorities. We believe this not only because it is our own way, but because it is also a very human and intrinsically democratic way."

Failing to learn this lesson, Dr. Malik denies both principles - separate political independence and economic unity. He calls upon the Jews to commit political suicide and then proceeds to brandish over their heads the threat of economic boycott. It was astounding to hear the President of the Social and Economic Council uphold as a "sovereign right" this expedient of economic warfare which every provision of the Charter enjoining economic cooperation, and full collaboration between nations generally, implicitly condemns.

To divert in this context to the trusteeship idea, it is no paradox to say that the plan of partition with economic union leads through separation to the eventual

highest degree of attainable unity, whereas trusteeship, by the imposition of artificial unity, is bound to widen the gulf between the two peoples and is liable to make it eventually unbridgeable. For under trusteeship as under the Mandate, the two parties will seek their self-expression by a continuous pressure and counter-pressure on the third party, that is the trustee, and will thereby pull apart and sharpen their differences; whereas under partition they will face each other as equal partners, bear the full brunt of direct responsibility and be driven by the impact of their own interests to accept their mutuality and come to terms, both within the economic union and beyond it.

Incidentally, the representative of the Arab Higher Committee again tried to assail the plan of partition on legal grounds by invoking the arbitrary theory that the termination of the Mandate can only result in the conversion of the mandated territory into a unitary state. Not only is there no vestige of evidence in support of this theory in the Mandate itself, but the actual course of events which has so far attended the liquidation of mandates has produced two major precedents in support of partition. France was granted one mandate by the League of Nations for the Levant territory, yet that territory comprises two states, Syria and Lebanon. The Palestine Mandate itself is another case in point. There was one mandate for Palestine and Transjordan, yet its oneness did not prevent the first partition of Palestine, the setting up of Transjordan as a separate Arab Kingdom, nor has any Arab national institution ever voiced a protest against this procedure.

The delegate of the Lebanon concluded by inviting the Jews to face an either/or. But the alternative which he commends- that of collective renunciation by the Jews of the very essence of their ideal- is a purely imaginary one. The sooner Dr. Malik and his friends give up this peice of wishful thinking and accept the reality of Jewish nationhood, the better for all concerned. It is thus the Arabs who are faced with an either/or, and in their case the positive alternative is fully practicable and entails, comparatively speaking, a very small sacrifice for which a peaceful and more prosperous future will be an ample compensation. Either they will pursue a sterile campaign which will absorb all their best energies to no constructive purpose or conclusive result, with the vain object of crushing the Jewish nation- that stiff-necked people- out of existence; or they will acknowledge the Jewish right to Statehood, based on history and on the facts of today, and will then accept the Jewish Palestine as an equal partner in the great enterprise of regenerating the Middle East. The choice is between perpetual, aimless discord and immediate, fruitful peace.

Above all, let it not be forgotten that history has seen few more impressive proofs of mass determination than that provided by the transports of Jewish refugees which, despite all hardships and hazards, continue to cross the sea on the way to Palestine. Will the Arab navies stop them?

Mr. Chairman, we shall never cease to offer peace to our neighbors and to pledge our cooperation and association with them, provided our elementary claim to equality of status is accepted and our need for growth and development within a reasonable part of Palestine- the part assigned to us by the Assembly's Resolution- is satisfied. We shall accept nothing else than a State. We shall accept nothing less than that area. But as a State within that area, we shall solemnly undertake to respect its boundaries, scrupulously to observe the obligation of full equality of civil, religious and political rights to all our co-citizens, and effectively to cooperate with the neighboring states within such organized framework as may be found acceptable for the common benefit of all. An alliance based on mutual non-aggression and on joint economic and development activities would find in us a most willing partner. But the starting point must be equality of status. Our claim for statehood is inherent in our elementary human dignity. Our striving for it draws its strength from the eternal bond between us and our country and from the centuries of exile and persecution. Our urge to attain it now is the direct result of the impact of world events upon the position of the Jewish people in Palestine and in other parts of the world. For all those who have eyes to see, the Jewish State already exists. Jewish control of the Jewish State area is a growing reality. Arab rule over the Jewish area is a flight of fancy. The full-fledged development and international recognition of the Jewish State cannot be long delayed. All the energies of the Jewish people are mobilized to bring about that consummation.

C O P Y

AHS

THE NATION ASSOCIATES
20 Vesey Street
New York 7, N. Y.

May 4, 1948

Mr. Moshe Shertok
Jewish Agency for Palestine
16 East 66 Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Shertok:

I am sending you, for your confidential information, copy
of a letter which I have just received from Sumner Welles.

I call your attention in particular to the paragraph
before the last.

Cordially yours,

(signed) Freda Kirchwey

C O P Y

May 1, 1948

My dear Miss Kirchwey:

Thank you for your letter of April 30 and for your kindness in sending me a copy of "The British Record on Partition." I am glad that you have published this report and that it has been widely distributed. The British record in Palestine should be better known in the United States. It represents British policy at its most short-sighted and at its least intelligent.

You ask me "is there not something" that I can do about it.

I certainly wish there was something more effective that I could do than that which I have so far been able to accomplish. I have been spending every moment of the last five weeks completing a book on Palestine that Houghton Mifflin will bring out on June 7. I hope that this book may be helpful. One of the things that has most appalled me in the last few months is the extraordinary ignorance of even the more intelligent sector of American public opinion of the modern history of Palestine and of the fundamental issues that are involved. If by good chance I can do something in the way of clarification, the book may serve a useful purpose.

Confidentially, I am beginning to feel that a by no means inconsiderable factor in the sorry history of United States policy on Palestine has been the quiet but effective intervention of a number of our fellow-citizens of the Jewish faith who are exceedingly influential in their own communities and who have urged at the White House the adoption of this trusteeship plan. I am not referring to those who have openly opposed the partition plan.

With my kind personal regards, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

(sgd) Sumner Welles

MAY 20, 1948

TELETYPE FROM WASHINGTON:

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM TELAVIV:

*EPSTEIN JEWAGENCY WASHINGTON DC

MR99 FOLLOWING TELEGRAM JUST SENT 'I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAVING TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF ITS RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO SEEK THE APPROVAL OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, WHICH I CONFIDENTLY HOPE WILL BE FORTHCOMING WITHOUT DELAY, FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LEGATION OF ISRAEL IN WASHINGTON AND TO APPOINT MR. ELIAHU EPSTEIN, FORMER REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, AS THE MINISTER OF ISRAEL IN WASHINGTON PARAGRAPH I TRUST THAT THE LEGATION WILL BE ACCORDED ALL PROPER FACILITIES AND THAT THE CORDIAL PERSONAL RELATION EXISTING BETWEEN MR. EPSTEIN AND OFFICIALS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL CONTINUE IN THE NEW AUSPICIOUS PHASE OF HIS DUTIES PARAGRAPH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HOPES THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MAY SOON SEE ITS WAY TO ESTABLISHING A LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND TO SENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ITS REPRESENTATIVE TO TEL AVIV WITH THE STATUS OF A MINISTER PARAGRAPH I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF REITERATING THE DEEP APPRECIATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE PROMPT RECOGNITION GRANTED TO IT BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AS THE DE FACTO AUTHORITY IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL AS WELL AS OF EXPRESSING MY OWN GRATITUDE TO YOU MR. EPSTEIN IN THE PAST'. YOU ARE HEREBY APPOINTED MINISTER OF ISRAEL IN WASHINGTON. HAPPY INFORM YOU OF THIS AND SEND YOU MY HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS. THIS CABLE BEING DICTATED IN AIRSHUTTLE WITH EGYPTIAN PLANES FLYING OVERHEAD AND MACHINE GUNS RATTLING CHAZAK VERMATZ

MOSHE SHARTOK UNQUOTE

COPY

MAY 26, 1948
TELAVIV

EBAN JEVAGENCY NEWYORK

MH177 FURTHER MY 176 FELT ESSENTIAL IMMEDIATE COUNTERSTROKE TO ANGLOARAB
PLOT MOREOVER HAD PROVIDE CONTINGENCY ARABS ACHIEVING DECISION IN
JERUSALEM DURING DELAY WHEREUPON OUR ACCEPTANCE CEASEFIRE AFTER DELAY
WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT SUBMISSION ARAB CONQUEST JERUSALEM STOP AS IN THAT
EVENTUALITY WE SHOULD NOT BEEN ABLE ACCEPT CEASEFIRE WITH HONOUR BUT
SHOULD HAVE HAD TO FIGHT ON FELT VITAL PREPARE GROUND FOR IT WITH FULLEST
POSSIBLE PRIOR JUSTIFICATION

SHERTOK



C O P Y

Personal and Confidential

May 27, 1948

Mr. Loy W. Henderson
Department of State
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Henderson:-

After returning to my office it occurred to me that you might wish to have a brief record of certain of the considerations that I presented to you in connection with the matter of the exchange of Ministers or Representatives.

First: In accordance with our original conversation on this matter I naturally advised my Government regarding the views which you informally indicated to me. Indeed, the message to Secretary Marshall from Mr. Shertok was prompted by the receipt of those advices. Insofar as my Government understands the United States is prepared to go forward with an exchange of Ministers. Our conversations today would unquestionably be regarded as a reversal of United States policy.

Second: I am genuinely concerned regarding Arab reaction to any announcement that the United States is unwilling to go forward with an exchange of Ministers. This would almost certainly be viewed by the Arab countries as a modification in the United States position and might well lead to increased resistance to any overtures by the Security Council or others.

Third: There is a strong possibility that the proposed action by the United States, if announced at this time, would be interpreted by the American public and by world opinion as a reversal in the attitude of the United States toward Israel. This concerns me deeply since the de facto recognition already accorded has been widely interpreted as resolving doubts regarding the American position.

Fourth: The U.S.S.R. and other countries have already advised the Government of Israel that they are going forward with an exchange of Ministers. Quite frankly, any announcement now that the United States is unwilling to move ahead will seem to be retrogression, and I strongly fear may undo the good accomplished by the fact that the United States was first among the countries of the world to recognize the new State. Full diplomatic relationships will thus first be begun with countries other than the United States.

I fully recognize and appreciate the fact that the exchange of Special Representatives would in practical consequence be much the same as the exchange of diplomatic representatives. Nevertheless, it is unfortunately true that the symbol is extremely important, and the denial of larger and customary rights will almost surely be regarded as in the nature of a rebuff and a modification of American policy. The danger of such an interpretation would seem to be aggravated by reason of the statement in the letter which I have before me refusing to go forward because of "the situation in Palestine" rather than because of the provisional nature of the Government.

The foregoing views are naturally both personal and preliminary and are here recorded for your convenience as considerations which should perhaps be taken into account.

With my personal regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,

Eliahu Epstein

EE/RM



E O P Y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
NE

May 27, 1948

Dear Mr. Epstein:-

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a telegram dated May 19, 1948, addressed to the Secretary of State, from Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary in the Provisional Government of the state of Israel, with regard to the exchange of Missions and Representatives.

It would be appreciated if you would inform Mr. Shertok that the United States will be prepared to exchange Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary with Israel when the situation in Palestine is such as to cause the Government of the United States to decide that it would be appropriate for it to accord de jure recognition to the Provisional Government of Israel.

In the meantime, the Government of the United States would welcome the establishment in this country of a Mission from Israel headed by Mr. Epstein as Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel and is prepared, if agreeable to the Provisional Government, to establish in Israel a Mission headed by a Special Representative of the Government of the United States.

Mr. Eliahu Epstein
2200 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C.



Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A LOVETT

C O P Y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1948

In reply refer to
NE

Dear Mr. Epstein:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a telegram dated May 19, 1948, addressed to the Secretary of State, from Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary in the Provisional Government of the State of Israel, with regard to the exchange of Missions and Representatives.

It will be appreciated if you will inform Mr. Shertok that the United States Government is giving careful consideration to the exchange of legations and envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary between the United States and Israel and will communicate later with the Provisional Government of Israel on this subject.

In the meantime, the Government of the United States would welcome the establishment in this country of a Mission from Israel headed by Mr. Epstein as Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel and is prepared, if agreeable to the Provisional Government, to establish in Israel a Mission headed by a Special Representative of the Government of the United States.

WRHS
Sincerely yours,



Robert A. Lovett
Acting Secretary

Mr. Eliahu Epstein
2210 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, DC

Back
Fidelity Union Bank
MADE IN U.S.A.

SHERTOK

IN CODE

MAY 29, 1948

FOLLOWING EXPLANATORY MESSAGE PROMISED MY 48 ONE COLON ON MAY TWENTYSEVEN HENDERSON
HANDED ME A LETTER IDENTICAL WITH ONE TRANSMITTED TO YOU IN MESSAGE 48 AS TO THE
FIRST AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS BUT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING SECOND PARAGRAPH QUOTE
IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF YOU WOULD INFORM MR SHERTOK THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL
BE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE ENVOYS EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY WITH
ISRAEL WHEN THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE IS SUCH AS TO CAUSE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES TO DECIDE THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR IT TO ACCORD DE JURE
RECOGNITION TO THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL UNQUOTE TWO COLON HENDERSON
EXPLAINED THAT THOUGH HE HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED A PROMPT EXCHANGE OF MINISTERS
THE DEPARTMENTS LAWYERS HAD RULED THAT SUCH AN EXCHANGE WAS IMPOSSIBLE SINCE
IT WOULD CONSTITUTE FULL DE JURE RECOGNITION THREE COLON HENDERSON SAID DE FACTO
RECOGNITION DID NOT INVOLVE ACCEPTANCE ANY PARTICULAR FRONTIERS STOP HE INDICATED
QUITE CASUALLY AND INCIDENTALLY THAT HE WOULD BE PERSONALLY INTERESTED IN
KNOWING WHETHER WE WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE SOME FRONTIER ADJUSTMENTS IN ORDER
TO ACCELERATE DE JURE RECOGNITION STOP EYE REMINDED HIM OF MARSHALLS STATEMENT
TO PRESS DAY EARLIER AFFIRMING THAT DE FACTO RECOGNITION DID INVOLVE ACCEPTANCE
ISRAELS FRONTIERS STOP AS TO MY REMARK THAT NOVEMBER TWENTYNINE SETTLED THE
FRONTIER QUESTION HENDERSON REPLIED THAT AMERICAN RECOGNITION WAS NOT BASED ON
NOVEMBER TWENTYNINE BUT RATHER ON A DE FACTO SITUATION PALESTINE AND THE
DESIRE TO AVOID A VACUUM STOP MOREOVER HENDERSON ADDED THAT WITH NO MORE ECONOMIC
UNION IN VIEW QUOTE SOME CHANGES AND ADJUSTMENTS UNQUOTE IN NOVEMBER TWENTYNINE
FRONTIERS COULD HELP VIABILITY ISRAEL STOP WHEN REQUESTED TO INDICATE PARTICULAR
PROPOSALS HENDERSON HASTILY DROPPED WHOLE MATTER AND DENIED HAVING HEARD BRITISH
VIEWS OR PRESSURE ON MATTER STOP FOUR COLON THEREUPON TOLD HENDERSON THAT WHILE
EYE WOULD TRANSMIT TO MY GOVERNMENT THE LETTER AND INFORM CONCERNING HIS EXPLANATIONS
COMMA I FELT REQUIRED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS STOP FIRST
OBSERVATION COLON I NATURALLY ADVISED MY GOVERNMENT OF HIS FORMER VIEWS REGARDING
EXCHANGE OF MINISTERS AND SHERTOK MESSAGE TO MARSHALL WAS BASED ON THIS ADVICE
SEMICOLON CONSEQUENTLY MY GOVERNMENT WILL SEE THIS LETTER AS A CHANGE OF

POLICY AND WILL BE CORRESPONDINGLY DISTURBED STOP SECOND OBSERVATION COLON EXPRESSED CONCERN REACTIONS WORLD OPINION COMMA AMERICAN PUBLIC COMMA AND ARAB COUNTRIES OVER APPARENT NEW SHIFT AMERICAN POLICY STOP THIRD OBSERVATION COLON POINTED OUT UNDESIRABILITY OF UNITED STATES LOSING POSITION DERIVING FROM PRIOR RECOGNITION BY ALLOWING MOSCOW OTHERS TAKE PRECEDENCE IN ACCORDING FULL DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE STOP FINAL OBSERVATION COLON STRESSED GRAVE IMPLICATIONS DENIAL FULL DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE BECAUSE OF PRESUMED QUOTE SITUATION IN PALESTINE UNQUOTE STOP FIVE COLON HENDERSON DISTURBED BY THESE OBSERVATIONS SUGGESTED I SEE LOVETT AND MEANWHILE WITHHOLD TRANSMISSION LETTER MY GOVERNMENT STOP I AGREED AND MEANWHILE SENT HENDERSON IMMEDIATELY LETTER EMBODYING MY OBSERVATIONS STOP SIX COLON SAW LOVETT IN COMPANY WITH HENDERSON MAY TWENTYNINE STOP REPEATED MY OBSERVATIONS SYSTEMATICALLY AND ADDED THAT OUR LAWYERS ADVISED THAT AMERICAN PRACTICE DOES NOT EXCLUDE EXCHANGE OF MINISTERS UNDER DE FACTO RECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT AND CONSEQUENTLY ADHERENCE POSITION MAY TWENTYSEVEN LETTER WOULD BE VERY UNFORTUNATE STOP LOVETT DID NOT CHALLENGE MY REFERENCE TO DE FACTO GOVERNMENT AS DISTINGUISHED FROM STATE AND ADMITTED THAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DE FACTO AND DE JURE RECOGNITION IS VERY THIN STOP SEVEN COLON LOVETT NEVERTHELESS EMPHASIZED TWO REASONS WHY AMERICA UNDESIROUS IMMEDIATE DE JURE RECOGNITION COLON FIRST REASON ISRAEL MIGHT EXPAND FRONTIERS TO AMMAN SEMICOLON SECOND REASON COMMUNISTS MIGHT CONCEIVABLY ACQUIRE DOMINANT INFLUENCE IN OUR GOVERNMENT STOP HE SUGGESTED AVOIDING PRESSURE WHICH WOULD EMBARRASS GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT STOP EIGHT COLON LOVETT STRESSED THAT MISSION WOULD HAVE ALL RIGHTS OF LEGATION EXCEPT THAT ONLY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD HAVE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY STOP OTHERWISE MAY OPEN AND CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL AGENCIES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT COMMA MAY OPEN CONSULATES COMMA ISSUE VISAS COMMA USE SECRET CODES COMMA HAVE DIPLOMATIC COURIERS COMMA ETC STOP NINE COLON WHILE ATTEMPTING TO SECURE MY ACCEPTANCE MAY TWENTYSEVEN LETTER AS SATISFACTORY LOVETT ADMITTED BEING IMPRESSED MY OBSERVATIONS AND WAS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED TO EXTRICATE HENDERSON STOP HE THEREFORE TOWARDS THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION SUDDENLY PRODUCED

THE NEW LETTER CABLED YOU IN MY 48 AND SAID HE WOULD SIGN IT IF ACCEPTABLE
STOP I TOLD HIM THAT THOUGH I SAW THE IMPROVEMENT I COULD ONLY REFER THE MATTER
TO MY GOVERNMENT FOR INSTRUCTIONS STOP I EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE NEW LETTER
DID NOT IN ANY WAY SOLVE THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM BUT ONLY DELAYED THE MATTER STOP
LOVETT CONCURRED IN THIS VIEW STOP TEN COLON VIEW URGENT NEEDS PRACTICAL WORK
WHICH HINDERED BY LACK ANY STATUS I ADVISE ACCEPTANCE MISSION BUT MESSAGE
ACCEPTING MISSION SHOULD INDICATE WE REGARD MISSION ONLY AS MOMENTARY STAGE ON
PATH EXCHANGE FULL MINISTERIAL REPRESENTATIVES AND URGE SPEEDY SOLUTION MATTER STOP

EPSTEIN



C O P Y

TEL AVIV

MAY 30 1948

LOURIE JEVAGENCY NEWYORK

MH 244 FOR EBAN EPSTEIN EXECUTIVE FOR INFORMATION LECHI FORMALLY
DISSOLVED SIXHUNDRED ALREADY ABSORBED IN ARMY ISRAEL STOP ABSORPTION
REMAINDER MATTER FEW DAYS STOP DISSOLUTION AND GRADUAL ABSORPTION
ETZEL BEGINNING TODAY STOP AFTER PROMULGATION ISRAEL DEFENCE ARMY
ORDINANCE PKUDAT TZVA HAHAGANA LEYISRAEL DISSIDENT MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
ARE ILLEGAL

SHERTOK



C O P Y

TELAVIV

JUNE 2 1948

TOFF JEWAGENCY NEWYORK

ME 258 VIEW DISSOLUTION ETZEL AND IMPENDING COMPLETE INCORPORATION IN
ARMY ALL SEPARATE DRIVES AND ALLOCATIONS MUST BE DISCONTINUED IMMEDIATELY
STOP WHOEVER SUPPORTS ETZEL FINANCIALLY WILL HENCEFORTH BE ASSISTING IN
VIOLATION LAWS ISRAEL UNDER WHICH EXISTENCE DISSIDENT MILITARY
ORGANIZATIONS IS ILLEGAL

SHERTOK



TELAVIV JUNE 5 1948

PRESS NEWPAL NEWYORK

FOR PUBLICATION AND ATTENTION LOURIE TOFF

51700 FROM RUTH GOLDSCHMIDT TELAVIV STOP IN CONNECTION WITH REPORTS FROM ABROAD CONCERNING FINANCIAL DRIVES UNDERTAKEN BY VARIOUS GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS ON BEHALF OF OR FOR THE SUPPORT OF DISSIDENT MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN PALESTINE A SPOKESMAN OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: UNDER A DEFENCE ARMY OF ISRAEL ORDINANCE PROMULGATED MAY 26 1948 THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OR FORMATION OF SEPARATE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DEFENCE ARMY HAS BEEN DECLARED ILLEGAL STOP TWO DISSIDENT MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS WHICH EXISTED IN THE YISHUV OUTSIDE THE RANKS OF HAGANAH, IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI AND LOCHAMEI HERUTH YISRAEL, HAD PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED THEIR READINESS TO DISSOLVE AND JOIN THE RANKS OF THE NATIONAL ARMY ONCE THE JEWISH STATE WAS ~~BE~~ ESTABLISHED STOP AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THE DEFENCE ARMY ORDINANCE THE SECOND OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED ORGANIZATIONS DULY CARRIED THROUGH ITS OWN DISSOLUTION AND ITS MEMBERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ABSORBED BY THE ARMY STOP IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI LIKEWISE INFORMED THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ITS DECISION TO HONOUR ITS UNDERTAKING, DISSOLVE OF ITS OWN FREE WILL AND INSTRUCT ALL ITS MEMBERS TO ENLIST IN THE DEFENCE ARMY OF ISRAEL UNDER CURRENT REGULATIONS STOP EXISTENCE OF THE IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI AS A SEPARATE MILITARY ORGANIZATION HAS THEREBY BEEN TERMINATED AND THE ABSORPTION OF ITS MEMBERS IN THE DEFENCE ARMY OF ISRAEL IS IN PROGRESS STOP BOTH GROUPS HAVE DELIVERED THEIR ARMS TO THE APPROPRIATE ORGANS OF THE DEFENCE ARMY STOP ALL PARTS OF THE DEFENCE ARMY ARE FINANCED WITH CENTRAL FUNDS AND NO QUESTION CAN ARISE OF ANY SECTION OR GROUP OF THE ARMY CLAIMING SEPARATE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR ITS MAINTENANCE OR OPERATIONAL EXPENSES STOP UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THOSE PURPORTING TO COLLECT MONEY FOR THE NEEDS OF THE IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI OR THE LOCHAMEI HERUTH YISRAEL AS FIGHTING ORGANIZATIONS ARE GUILTY OF COMMON FRAUD STOP MOREOVER WHOEVER SUPPORTS OR ~~THEY~~ TRIES TO ENLIST SUPPORT FOR DISSIDENT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IS IN EFFECT ASSISTING IN VIOLATING THE LAWS OF ISRAEL AND IN UNDERMINING ITS VERY FOUNDATIONS STOP THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUESTS THAT ALL ITS WELLWISHERS WILL SET THEIR FACES AGAINST SUCH FRAUDULENT AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND CONDEMN THEM AS A CRIME AGAINST THE MOST PRECIOUS POSSESSION OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE -- THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND ITS DEFENCE ARMY END COMMUNIQUE

TO: Mr. M. SHERTOK

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Dr. M. KAHANY

Copies to: Dr. Goldmann & London Office
New York Office
M. Fischer, Paris
E. Epstein, Washington

Geneva, June 10, 1948

Re: Conversation with Minister A. Zehnder, Chief of the Foreign Affairs Division,
Federal Political Department, Berne.

Minister A. Zehnder - who is the Swiss permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs - received me very cordially a day before yesterday. We had a long and very frank conversation. Minister Zehnder is the brain and the actual chief of the Swiss Political Department. His opinions and advices have often more weight than those of the Foreign Minister himself (Federal Councillor Max Petitpierre). I was therefore very agreeably surprised to find him extremely well informed about the situation in the Middle East, the conflicting interests of the great powers, the weakness and the bluff of the Arab League, etc. He said for instance - after having listened very attentively to my introductory remarks - that he had told the Swiss Federal Council (i.e. the Swiss Government composed of nine "Federal Councillors", one of whom is by yearly rotation "President of the Confederation") already some six months ago that if the Arabs will start a fight against the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly of the U.N. of November 29th, 1947, the result of it will be that the Jewish State will emerge much quicker as an entirely independent entity and that the process of its consolidation and its military strength will be accelerated by the desperate need to face and to resist the Arab aggression. "Well", he said, "I am very happy that I was right in my appreciation of the situation which, at that time, had somewhat astonished most of the members of my Government. "Now", he said, "we all know that the Jewish State is a reality and we have not the slightest doubt that you have already won the battle, both diplomatically and militarily." He told me also that according to the reports he has from the Swiss diplomatic representatives in the Middle East, the so-called unity of the Arab countries is far from being real and he let me understand that he has a poor opinion of the solidity of the Arab League and that he is far from over-estimating the importance of the various Arab States.

We then came to the question of recognition of Israel by Switzerland and he explained the peculiar position of his country - known to me from my experience of 22 years life in this country - as a perpetual and obstinate "neutral" one. He reminded me that Switzerland traditionally is the slowest country to recognise both the apparition of new States and the disappearance of old ones (the Baltic States, for instance, have not been recognised by Switzerland during many years after the end of World War I and, on the other hand, they continued to recognise them during the last war, long time after their complete incorporation into the Soviet Union; India has been recognised by Switzerland only some two months ago, while Pakistan is still not recognised by them, etc. etc.). Smiling however, he added very significantly: you have been told - this was clearly an allusion to the conversation a few days ago between Dr. M. Petitpierre and Dr. M. Goldmann - that recognition is for us mainly a juridical question and that we do recognise only when there is not the slightest doubt any more from the legal point of view. But "entre nous" I can tell you that recognition is not so much a legal than a political question, a question of political opportunity. When one believes that it is politically opportune to accelerate the recognition, then the legal advisers are very quick in finding the necessary solid ground for it... I can assure you that in the case of Israel we will find immediately the necessary legal basis when the moment will come for us. We

clearly could do nothing as long as military operations have gone on. But once the truce is established, we may already be in a little different position. We certainly will not wait to be the last one to recognise you.

I replied that we have shown ourselves a deep understanding for Switzerland's particular position: indeed it was for this reason that our Foreign Minister had so far not addressed to the Swiss Government - as he has done to the Governments of almost all states of the world - any formal request for recognition.

I had the honor to have been asked by our Foreign Minister to initiate quite informal talks with the Swiss Federal Government on this subject and to hear first what their opinion is. We would not like at all to embarrass a friend with whom we have quite better means of discussion than official notes ... (Min. Zehnder reaffirmed me - what we already heard from Dr. Petitpierre - that they had been delighted by our acting this way). I told him quite frankly that purely politically speaking, there are other countries the recognition by which is at this stage much more urgent for us than that of Switzerland. But the recognition by Switzerland, I said, has for us the greatest possible value from a moral and sentimental point of view: for the Israelis, for the Zionists and indeed for all Jews over the world Switzerland was not just casually the homeland of the "Basler Programm" and the hospitable master of so many historical Zionist World Congresses. We met here so frequently because we admire the true democratic spirit of this unique country and we enjoyed the sincere and spontaneous sympathy which the Swiss people has always shown for our national aspirations. We always found in Switzerland - more than in any other country in the world - that atmosphere of sympathy without which Zionism could not prosper. Many of the leaders of our movement - I mentioned of course in the first place Dr. Weismann - have lived, studied and taught in Switzerland. Many of our young people in Israel are dreaming of similar opportunities in the future. Switzerland, I told him, had a great moral capital in the hearts of the Jews of Israel and of the world and it is why they would attach a special importance to a quick recognition by Switzerland of the young State of Israel.

As a foreigner, I said, I am not well placed to give advices on what would be best from the point of view of Swiss national interests. But if permitted to do so I would say that it would well be in the interest of Switzerland not to delay too long time this friendly gesture. If accomplished early by Switzerland it will be very highly appreciated by Israel and by the Jews all over the world and the benefit of it for Switzerland in the future will be quite obvious. I should therefore appreciate it very much to hear from him (Min. Zehnder) as soon as possible whether our formal request for recognition is welcomed and we shall submit it then immediately.

Min. Zehnder replied that he agreed entirely with what I said and expressed again his and his Government's gratitude for the way in which we have chosen to act. He disclosed that a week ago he has sent instructions to the Swiss diplomatic representatives in France, in the Benelux and in the Scandinavian countries enjoining them to keep him informed about the real intentions of the governments of these countries concerning the recognition of Israel and let him know it early enough - i.e., before they will proceed - whether these countries are in principle ready to act favourably. "As soon as I shall hear from them", he said, "I shall let you know it and we will then ask you for kind immediate submission of the request of the Government of Israel". He added that "matters will be much easier" after the conclusion of the truce agreement.

My personal impression is that as soon as the recognition by France will be forthcoming, the favourable moment for Switzerland will appear.

Passing to a final point, I submitted to Min. Zehnder the suggestion cabled to me by you concerning the establishment of the Swiss Consulate in Tel-Aviv (after its closure in Jerusalem). He reacted first with some hesitance, pointing out that without previous recognition this may be a difficult proposition. The decision to close down the Swiss Consulate in Jerusalem, he said, was taken by the Federal Council (Government) in a previous meeting which he (Min. Zehnder) was prevented to attend. They received indeed a cable from the Consul in Jerusalem (Monsieur de Claparede) saying that his activities in this city are now without object, that life there is dangerous, that out of the some 300 members of the Swiss colony in Palestine, 40 have left the country while the remaining 260 are "Zionists" who have joined Israel's army and will therefore become Israelis and that there are therefore, so to say, no Swiss citizens to protect there. M. de Claparede asked furthermore to be allowed (in view of his health condition) to come to Switzerland for a two months leave. Min. Zehnder concluded however that he personally was not very happy with the decision taken by the Federal Council and would he have been present at the meeting he would have advised the Government to delay this decision.

I then tried to convince Minister Zehnder by various arguments that a transfer of the Swiss Consulate (at least partial) from Jerusalem to Tel-Aviv would be of considerable mutual interest. I told him that our offer has been presented in a friendly spirit and that we don't consider the formal recognition of Israel by Switzerland a necessary pre-requisite to the establishment of the Swiss Consulate in Tel-Aviv. Learning that the Swiss Consulate is in a difficult position in Jerusalem and is closing down for this reason, we are offering them our hospitality in Tel-Aviv in order to give them proper opportunities to work with us in matters of common and practical interest. We do of course expect that the Consul or his substitute, when assigned to go to Tel Aviv, will be instructed to deal there with the Government of Israel as if normal relations would have already been established between the two countries. But we shall not press the Swiss Government to proceed now with formal recognition because the Swiss Consulate (or part of it) in Jerusalem should be transferred from Jerusalem to Tel-Aviv.

Min. Zehnder asked me then how M. de Claparede and his people could proceed from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv and I expressed the opinion that M. de Claparede could certainly proceed to Haifa (with all his personnel and luggage) - he certainly would be able to get the necessary "laissez-passer" from the Arab and Jewish military authorities with the help of Mr. Ascarate - and that from Haifa he could then direct his substitute, etc., to Tel-Aviv in case he himself should decide to go home for a leave. Also some other gentleman could be designated by the Government to replace M. de Claparede in Tel-Aviv.

Min. Zehnder was personally very much in favour of my proposal and assured me that the Swiss Consul in Tel Aviv - if sent there - will deal with the Government of Israel on a basis of all due respect to them. He told me that he will convey our invitation to the Federal Council in its meeting on Friday (i.e. tomorrow) and will inform me immediately after the meeting of the result. (I have informed you about this matter briefly in my cable no. 14 of June 8th).

I have seen in Geneva and in Berne some other high officials of the Political Department (M. de Haller) and of the Department of Interior (Messrs. Rothmund and Baschtold) and shall see again next week Min. Zehnder and other personalities in Berne.

My first impression is that the atmosphere in official circles is a very favourable one and that - if acting tactfully and patiently -- we will be able to establish normal relations with Switzerland much sooner than one could expect it before.

I shall report separately about my contacts with the International Red Cross Committee. I am attaching a press cutting of a notice which appeared to-day in the whole press of Switzerland announcing my nomination.

