



Abba Hillel Silver Collection Digitization Project

Featuring collections from the Western Reserve Historical Society and
The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives

MS-4787: Abba Hillel Silver Papers, 1902-1989.

Series I: General Correspondence, 1914-1969, undated.

Sub-series A: Alphabetical, 1914-1965, undated.

Reel
37

Box
13

Folder
905

Jewish Agency, United Nations Security Council bulletins, 1948.

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Press Release No. 394
February 24, 1948

HOLD FOR RELEASE

CAUTION

ADVANCE RELEASE

HOLD FOR RELEASE

CAUTION:

The following statement by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, which is to be delivered in the Security Council, Tuesday, February 24, 1948, MUST BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE UNTIL delivery has begun.

NOTE:

No portion, synopsis or intimation is to be published or given out in any way until that time. The same terms of release apply to press and radio.

EXTREME CARE MUST BE EXERCISED TO PREVENT PREMATURE PUBLICATION

The Security Council is now confronted with the complex problem of Palestine as presented to us in the General Assembly recommendation of November 29, 1947 and the two reports from the Palestine Commission. The Council now has before it a number of important questions concerning Palestine for which it must endeavor to find an answer; the situation does not permit any further delay.

The problem has been before the United Nations as a matter of special concern since April 2, 1947. The United States, as a Member of the United Nations, has supported since that date those United Nations procedures which we considered most adapted to obtaining a broad and impartial expression of world opinion on the problem, which would result in a just and workable solution commending itself to the mandatory power and to the people of Palestine.

As a result of the recommendations of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947, Palestine is now before several of the principal bodies of the United Nations for various types of action under the Charter. The United States as a Member of the United Nations and of those bodies will continue to deal with the question of Palestine as a Member of the United Nations in conjunction with other Members. United States policy will not be unilateral. It will conform to and be in support of United Nations action on Palestine.

While we are discussing the problem of Palestine it is of first importance to the future of the United Nations that the precedent to be established by the action taken in this case be in full accord with the terms of the Charter under which we operate. The interpretation of the terms of the Charter given in the Palestine issue will seriously affect the future actions of the United Nations in other cases.

Let us turn now to the first and most important document before us, namely, the General Assembly resolution of November 29. The recommendations of the General Assembly have great moral force which applies to all Members regardless of the views they hold or the votes which they may have cast on any particular recommendation. Similarly, the Security Council, although not bound under the Charter to accept and carry out General Assembly recommendations, is nevertheless expected to give great weight to them.

Attempts to frustrate the General Assembly's recommendation by the threat or use of force, or by incitement to force, on the part of states or people outside Palestine are contrary to the Charter. You may recall that when the representative of the United States expressed the views of my Government to the General Assembly on the Palestine question on October 11, 1947, he said

CAUTION

ADVANCE RELEASE

CAUTION

CAUTION

ADVANCE RELEASE

CAUTION

we assumed that there would be Charter observance. The life of this Union depends upon obedience to the law. If any Member should violate its obligations to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force, the Security Council itself must act.

The recommendation of the General Assembly makes three separate requests of the Security Council. The first -- (a) -- is that the Council "take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation". To determine what these measures are, it is necessary to turn to the plan itself. It will be seen that these are: (1) to give guidance to the Palestine Commission; (2) to take such action as the Security Council may deem proper with respect to either the Jewish or the Arab State if by April 1, 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for that State, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions; (3) to issue such instructions to the Commission as the Security Council may consider necessary; (4) to receive and consider periodic progress reports, special reports and the final report of the Palestine Commission; (5) to give sympathetic consideration to the application for membership in the United Nations made by either the Arab or the Jewish State when a certain stage in the plan has been achieved.

We believe it is clear that the Security Council can undertake the above-mentioned measures. It is further clear from the terms of the resolution of November 29, 1947 that the Palestine Commission is bound by whatever instructions the Council gives to it pursuant to the Assembly's requests.

We come now to the two following requests of the General Assembly as set forth in the resolution of November 29. These invoke the wide peacekeeping powers of the Security Council under the Charter. Request (b) in the resolution asks the Security Council to consider whether the situation in Palestine during the transitional period constitutes a threat to the peace.

The third request of the General Assembly -- (c) -- asks that "the Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution".

I am sure that every Member of this body is deeply concerned with the tragic events which have taken place in Palestine since last November 29. Our hearts are saddened by the internecine hostilities, the interracial strife, the interreligious conflict, which in these past three months have stained the soil of the Holy Land with the blood of Briton, Jew and Arab. If these conditions continue this Council must consider whether or not the situation in Palestine is a threat to international peace. The Council would have to do this even if the resolution of November 29 had never been written, because under the Charter it must take steps "to prevent or remove any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression".

In considering whether or not the situation in Palestine is a threat to international peace, the Security Council should consult with the United Kingdom which as Mandatory Power is responsible for the protection of Palestine and the maintenance of internal order therein.

Requests (b) and (c) of the Assembly's resolution, mentioned above, raise constitutional questions of the Security Council's powers under the Charter. What are the powers of the Security Council?

The Security Council is given the responsibility under the Charter to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression". If it makes such a determination with respect to the situation in Palestine, The Council is required by the Charter to act. Its finding and subsequent action might arise either in connection with incursions into Palestine from the outside or from such internal disorder as would itself constitute a threat to international peace.

If the Council finds that a threat to international peace or breach of the peace exists, the Charter authorizes it to follow various lines of action. It is empowered to make recommendations, or to take "provisional measures" under Article 40, or to impose economic and other non-military sanctions under Article 41, or to take military measures under Article 42. The Council is required to follow one or more of these lines of action. It may pursue these lines of action in any sequence it deems proper.

Although the Security Council is empowered to use, and would normally attempt to use, measures short of armed force to maintain the peace, it is authorized under the Charter to use armed force if it considers other measures inadequate. A finding by the Security Council that a danger to peace exists places all Members of the United Nations, regardless of their views, under obligation to assist the Council in maintaining peace. If the Security Council should decide that it is necessary to use armed force to maintain international peace in connection with Palestine, the United States would be ready to consult under the Charter with a view to such action as may be necessary to maintain international peace. Such consultation would be required in view of the fact that agreement has not yet been reached making armed forces available to the Security Council under the terms of Article 43 of the Charter.

The Security Council is authorized to take forceful measures with respect to Palestine to remove a threat to international peace. The Charter of the United Nations does not empower the Security Council to enforce a political settlement whether it is pursuant to a recommendation of the General Assembly or of the Council itself.

What this means is this: The Council under the Charter can take action to prevent aggression against Palestine from outside. The Council by these same powers can take action to prevent a threat to international peace and security from inside Palestine. But this action must be directed solely to the maintenance of international peace. The Council's action, in other words, is directed to keeping the peace and not to enforcing partition.

The United States Government believes that the first of the three requests made by the General Assembly to the Security Council under its resolution of November 29, 1947 can properly be complied with by the Council. With respect to the second and third requests of the Assembly's resolution -- requests (b) and (c) -- the Council must act if necessary to preserve international peace and security or to curb and repel aggression as provided for in the Charter.

We come now to the second of the documents before us, namely, the First Monthly Report of the Palestine Commission to the Security Council dated February 2, 1948. It reflects the seriousness and the diligence with which the Commission has addressed itself to its difficult task in the course of its 26 meetings in January. The report contains a useful and practical analysis of the tasks set for the Commission by the General Assembly and lists the significant dates which constitute the framework of implementation. Two elements in the report are deeply disturbing to my Government. The first is the refusal of the Arab Higher Committee to designate representatives to consult with the Commission. The other is the continued deterioration of the situation in Palestine. The report shows the need for continued negotiations by the Commission with the Mandatory Power, and with representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine, if the Commission is to proceed with its task.

My Government believes that, with respect to this first report, the Security Council might wish to inform itself of the situation to determine what guidance or instructions it might usefully give to the Palestine Commission. To that end, we suggest that the Security Council itself consult at once, by means of a committee, with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power and the representatives of the communities of Palestine.

The third document before us is the First Special Report of the Palestine Commission to the Security Council on the problem of security, dated February 16,

CAUTION

ADVANCE RELEASE

CAUTION

1948,. This Report contains an appraisal by the Commission of the security situation in Palestine as well as the Commission's estimate on the security situation which it believes can be expected upon the termination of the mandate. This Special Report on security does not allege that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression has occurred in Palestine. It reports facts which, if accepted or substantiated by the Security Council, would appear to lead to the conclusion that a threat to international peace is present in that situation. With this Special Report before it, the Security Council must, in our opinion, look into the matter immediately to determine whether such a danger exists.

The Report looks ahead to what it considers will happen in the future and clearly implies that a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace will occur if the Commission continues its effort to carry out the Assembly's resolution. Perhaps the most emphatic illustration is found at page 18, VIII, CONCLUSION, sub-paragraph 5:

"It is the considered view of the Commission that the security forces of the Mandatory Power, which at the present time prevent the situation from deteriorating completely into open warfare on an organized basis, must be replaced by an adequate non-Palestinian force which will assist law-abiding elements in both the Arab and Jewish communities, organized under the general direction of the Commission, in maintaining order and security in Palestine, and thereby enabling the Commission to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly. Otherwise, the period immediately following the termination of the Mandate will be a period of uncontrolled, widespread strife and bloodshed in Palestine, including the City of Jerusalem. This would be a catastrophic conclusion to an era of international concern for that territory."

The Commission has reached the conclusion that it cannot fulfill its functions under the General Assembly resolution unless armed forces are provided to the Commission by the Security Council. In its final conclusion it refers to "that effective assistance without which, it is firmly convinced, it cannot discharge the great responsibilities entrusted to it by the General Assembly".

The three documents before us raise the broad question of what action the Security Council should now take with respect to Palestine. The United States believes that such action should be of two kinds. In the first place, the Security Council should go immediately into the question of the maintenance or restoration of international peace. The information which is officially before us, as well as unofficial reports from Palestine, indicates that a major security problem is involved. In our view there is no question either about the Security Council's obligations or about its powers to deal with dangers to the peace. The second type of action should be directed toward giving effect to the recommendation of the General Assembly with the full use of, but within the limitations of, the powers of the Security Council under the Charter. While taking necessary measures to maintain international peace, the Security Council should make every effort to get an agreement on the basis of the General Assembly recommendation for the underlying political difficulty. For this purpose the Security Council should begin at once its consultations with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine. These consultations should, we suggest, be held in New York in order that the Council itself may be kept closely advised at all stages.

ADVANCE RELEASE

CAUTION

ADVANCE RELEASE

Although we do not wish to place specific resolutions before the Council at this early stage of the discussion, my Government believes we should have in mind the desirability of the following specific steps which the Council might take at once: (a) to accept the tasks which the General Assembly asked the Security Council to accept in its recommendation of November 29, 1947 on Palestine subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter; (b) to establish a committee of the Council, comprising the five permanent members, to look at once into the question of the possible threats to international peace arising in connection with the Palestine situation and to consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine concerning the implementation of the General Assembly recommendation; (c) to call upon all governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce the disorders now occurring in Palestine.

There is no reason to believe that the Security Council will find this problem any less difficult than others have found it. But there is also no reason for excessive pessimism merely because the question is complicated and involves violence. The responsibilities of the Security Council in this situation are great. We feel confident that all of the members are ready for the Council to address itself at once to its task.



United Nations

SECURITY
COUNCIL

Nations Unies

CONSEIL
DE SECURITE

Phone Return / FILE COPY

UNRESTRICTED

S/685

25 February 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY FIFTH MEETING OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING received the resolution of the General Assembly of
29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations
Palestine Commission its First Monthly Report, and its First Special Report
on the Problem of Security in Palestine;

RESOLVES:

- X 1. To accept, subject to the authority of the Security Council
under the Charter, the requests addressed by the General Assembly
to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the General Assembly
Resolution of 29 November 1947;
2. To establish a committee of the Security Council comprising the
five permanent members of the Council whose functions will be:
 - (a) To inform the Security Council regarding the situation
with respect to Palestine and to make recommendations to it
regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might
usefully give to the Palestine Commission;
 - (b) To consider whether the situation with respect to Palestine
constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and
to report its conclusions as a matter of urgency to the Council,
together with any recommendations for action by the Security
Council which it considers appropriate;
 - X (c) To consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory
Power, and Representatives of the principal communities of
Palestine concerning the implementation of the General Assembly
recommendation of 29 November 1947.

APPEALS to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around
Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders
as are now occurring in Palestine.

United Nations

**SECURITY
COUNCIL**

Nations Unies

**CONSEIL
DE SECURITE**

UNRESTRICTED

S/685
25 February 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY FIFTH MEETING OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING received the resolution of the General Assembly of
29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations
Palestine Commission its First Monthly Report, and its First Special Report
on the Problem of Security in Palestine;

RESOLVES:

1. To accept, subject to the authority of the Security Council
under the Charter, the requests addressed by the General Assembly
to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the General Assembly
Resolution of 29 November 1947;
2. To establish a committee of the Security Council comprising the
five permanent members of the Council whose functions will be:
 - (a) To inform the Security Council regarding the situation
with respect to Palestine and to make recommendations to it
regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might
usefully give to the Palestine Commission;
 - (b) To consider whether the situation with respect to Palestine
constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and
to report its conclusions as a matter of urgency to the Council,
together with any recommendations for action by the Security
Council which it considers appropriate;
 - (c) To consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory
Power, and Representatives of the principal communities of
Palestine concerning the implementation of the General Assembly
recommendation of 29 November 1947.

APPEALS to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around
Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders
as are now occurring in Palestine.

United Nations

**SECURITY
COUNCIL**

Nations Unies

**CONSEIL
DE SECURITE**

UNRESTRICTED

S/P.V.260

2 March 1948

English

SECURITY COUNCIL

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH MEETING

Lake Success, New York
Tuesday, 2 March 1948, at 2:30 p.m.

President: Mr. Ting-Fu TSIANG (China)



NOTE. Any corrections of the originals of speeches in this record, provided for in rule 50 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, should be submitted in writing within two working days to Mr. E. Delavenay, Director, Editorial Division, Room CC-87, Lake Success. Corrections should be accompanied by or incorporated in a letter written on headed notepaper and enclosed in an envelope marked "Urgent" and bearing the appropriate document symbol number.

(Interpretations of speeches will be replaced in the official records by full translations from the originals.)

The PRESIDENT: I declare the two hundred and sixtieth meeting of the Security Council open.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

The agenda was adopted without discussion.

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

- (a) FIRST MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION (DOCUMENT S/663).
- (b) FIRST SPECIAL REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL: THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY IN PALESTINE, SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION (DOCUMENT S/676)

On the invitation of the President, Mr. Lisicky, Chairman of the United Nations Palestine Commission; Mahmoud Bey Fawzi, the representative of Egypt; and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, took their places at the Security Council table.

Mr. el-KHOURI (Syria): In the opinion of my delegation the draft resolution on the Palestinian question submitted by the representative of the United States on 25 February and distributed in document S/685 is not in harmony with the capacity of the Security Council or with the fundamental principles and purposes of the Charter for the following reasons.

The representative of the United States proposes that the Security Council, subject to its authority under the Charter, should accept the request addressed to it by the General Assembly in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the Resolution of 29 November 1947. I believe that before accepting these three requests it is our duty to ascertain whether they are or are not within the framework of the Security Council as limited by the Charter. If it is found that they are not, we should decline to accept them.

Our functions are well known to us. The three requests are before us, and before accepting them we are, presumably, required to examine them with a view to deciding how they apply to our functions. If we failed to do that we should be prejudging the case and committing ourselves to the wrong process.

So long as this examination is to be made, the question arises by whom it is to be made. Is it to be left to the proposed committee of the five permanent members of the Security Council? But acceptance is supposed to be by the Security Council as a whole, and not by five of its members only.

During our meeting on 27 February the representative of Belgium made a brief analysis of these three requests and came to the conclusion that, for the time being, they should be deleted from the United States proposal. He submitted an amendment to that effect and I explained at the time why I agreed with him that the passage in question would prejudice the conception of the Security Council and, therefore, would be better omitted. I should like to explain to the Security Council now the reasons for the attitude which I have taken in this matter.

The first of these requests --(a) -- is that "The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation." In this respect, we already have two facts: One of them is that the implementation of the partition plan with economic union cannot be achieved without an adequate international force. This fact was established beyond doubt by the Chairman of the Palestine Commission in a statement before the Security Council on 24 February, confirming the strict opinion of the Commission as clearly stated in its First Special Report to the Security Council.

It was also confirmed by the representatives of the mandatory power in their statements to the Commission and to the Security Council. It is also substantiated by the explosive attitudes of Arabs and Jews in Palestine.

The other fact is the incapacity of the Security Council to undertake by force the implementation of political recommendations. Mr. Austin recognized this fact himself when he said, "The Charter of the United Nations does not empower the Security Council to enforce a political settlement whether it is pursuant to a recommendation of the General Assembly or of the Security Council itself." It would follow from this undeniable fact that any recommendation on a political settlement can be implemented only if the parties concerned willingly accept and complement it. Such a position is far from being expected in the case of Palestine.

Under these circumstances, no measures whatever can be taken by the Security Council in compliance with the first of the three requests addressed to the Security Council in the General Assembly resolution; and, therefore, this proposed acceptance of the request cannot be justified.

The second request in the General Assembly resolution of 29 November -- (b) -- asks the Security Council to consider whether the situation in Palestine, during the transitional period, constitutes a threat to peace. This request is rather vague. We cannot accept it in this form. We know very well -- and we were warned by many well informed delegations in the General Assembly -- that the partition plan itself constitutes a threat to the peace, being openly rejected by all those at whose expense it was to be executed.

It is obvious that the term "peace" in this paragraph means international peace and not public order in the territory concerned. It is also to be noted that the Arabs of Palestine, being the lawful owners of that territory, consider that the intrusion in their midst of foreign elements, authorized to appropriate by force sixty per cent of their land, and to dominate a very large portion of the Arab population, is a flagrant aggression upon the rights of those Arabs. It is an aggression which has no justification in any law or by any principle of justice. The Arabs consider that they have the full right and obligation to resort to force in self-defence against the implementation of this scheme.

Under the present circumstances, the Security Council is bound to eliminate the causes which gave birth to this disorder in Palestine, and to condemn them publicly and officially. The disorders now taking place in Palestine are the sure and imminent symptoms of a disease. They cannot be eliminated as long as the gangrenous disease is there. We cannot expect a person to stand still while a terrible explosive lies under him, its fuse already lit and threatening to blow him sky-high any minute.

The third request of the General Assembly -- (c) -- in its resolution of 29 November is as follows: "The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution." This means instructing the Security Council to interpret its functions, clearly stated in the Charter, in a special way serving the intentions of the authors of the partition plan.

In this recommendation the General Assembly exceeded its authority, as limited in Article 14 of the Charter, which confines recommendations of the General Assembly only to peaceful settlements of any situation as outlined in Chapter VI of the Charter. The General Assembly acted excessively in the exercise of its power when it recommended the application of Article 39 in this paragraph, and of Article 41 in another paragraph of its resolution. Both Articles, together with the phrase used, are assigned exclusively to the Security Council in Chapter VII of the Charter, to ^{be} applied by the Security Council at its own discretion. This Chapter is described by its heading as "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." According to Articles 39 through 51, the General Assembly is acting outside of its authority when it recommends the application of its provisions in one way or another. Therefore, the proposal of the representative of the United States to accept this request is likewise definitely out of order.

The Security Council knows what acts are to be determined as threats to peace or breaches of peace or aggression under Article 39. It cannot accept such a request as that of the General Assembly specifying a particular situation to be thus determined. The main objective in this request, as framed by the authors of the partition plan, is the desire to obtain the free, unopposed implementation of the plan and to suppress any opposition by force to it by the Arabs. It is also to level off the road before the execution of a political, aggressive settlement. The authors of the resolution intend to use the capacity of the Security Council to hold at bay the rightful owner of the property, and to prevent the Arabs from defending their land so that the aggressor may continue to rob the country and appropriate what he covets.

It is quite obvious that forcing the Arabs to lie down and to offer no opposition only means implementing the partition plan by force. The peace in Palestine, as desired by the United States proposal, and the implementation of the partition plan are linked together as one action. It is quite clear that the only way to implement partition under the present circumstances is to subdue the Arabs and silence their defensive action by force, something which the Security Council has no legal capacity to do.

Consequently, the three requests by the General Assembly are not acceptable to the Security Council for the reasons which I have explained. I think that the representative of the United States will agree to delete this paragraph from his proposal. Otherwise, if he does not wish to delete it and persists in its remaining there, I hope he will kindly show us in what way he wishes to harmonize its acceptance with the contentions which the representative of Belgium and I have raised.

It has been alleged, furthermore, that when the United Kingdom gives up its mandate over Palestine, the United Nations assumes responsibility for that country. It is obvious, however, that the United Nations organization is not empowered by the Charter to exercise any administering authority in any territory, except under the trusteeship system as set down in Chapter XII of the Charter, on non-self-governing territories, mandated territory or territory which may be detached from an enemy state, or territory voluntarily placed under the system of states responsible for its administration, as stated in Article 77 of the Charter.

In the resolution of 29 November, the General Assembly did not adopt this process. Consequently, it did not secure any form to justify its intervention and its delegation of an authority which the General Assembly itself does not possess to a commission of five members. Likewise, it lacks authority and justification for requesting the Security Council to render assistance in implementing an illegal settlement.

Palestine is the property of its inhabitants, who have been in free possession of that country for many centuries, since long before the time of the Philistines of the Bible and up to the present time of the Palestinians, who are the same people.

Neither Lord Balfour, in his declaration of 2 November 1917, nor the thirty-three delegations which voted for the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947, have any right to bestow that country, or any part of it, on foreign groups of alien immigrants forcibly introduced there. Nor are the people of Palestine serfs of a feudal lord to be transferred from one vassal to another together with the land which they cultivate. They are free people entitled to live freely and to defend their sacred rights with all the means at their disposal.

No power in the world has the right to sterilize by force the
of the people of Palestine
potentialities and activities/in order to enable alien invaders to
materialize their criminal greed. The Zionists and their supporters,
having lost the first round to implement their iniquitous scheme by
using an international force, are now trying, in a roundabout way,
to use another approach. When they find the front door closed, they
try to open the back door -- and Jesus Christ said in the Gospel that
those who do not enter by the front door are robbers and thieves.
The Zionists are now asking the Security Council to secure peace in
Palestine and, under the shadow of peace, to carry out their atrocious
plot. They seek to jump over a gap of two thousand years in order to
renew an aggressive dynasty of their ancient history. No rational
man, however, should allow himself to be stung twice from the same
snakehead. Rabbi Silver boasted last December that the Zionists
forced a decision from the General Assembly. He must be made to
understand, however, that they cannot force a similar one from the
Security Council.

The composition of the committee, as proposed by the United
States delegation--to comprise the five permanent members of the
Security Council--has no justification at this preliminary stage
of discussion.

The Security Council as a whole is supposed to study all
situations and disputes, and to determine whether they constitute
a threat to international peace and security. It is not the function
of the permanent members alone to do so. It is patently unfair to
adopt proceedings which may lead the Big Five to bring their weight
to bear on the other members of the Security Council.

Furthermore, the Security Council is not in a position to undertake the matter of the implementation of the partition scheme. The consultations suggested in paragraph (c) of the draft resolution, as limited to the implementation of the General Assembly recommendation of 29 November, are not in compliance with the functions of the Security Council, which are limited to international peace and security, and do not include the implementation of a political settlement.

The appeal to the people of Palestine to take all action possible to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine can have no effect as long as the cause of the trouble still stands. The attitude of the Arabs of Palestine has become very clear regarding the partition scheme. They consider it detrimental to their very existence, and it is not imaginable that they would accept consultation on the basis of the implementation of that scheme, although they may be ready, if that scheme is abandoned, to participate in and to contribute helpfully to the consultations and to the re-establishment of order in Palestine. These consultations, however, must aim at finding another plan on the basis of justice, equity and workability for a unified future government of Palestine, guaranteeing to all sections of the population due respect for their legitimate aspirations.

Mr. AUSTIN (United States): The pending business is the Belgian amendment to the draft resolution on the Palestine question, submitted by the United States, document S/685.

The representative of Belgium, in speaking upon his amendment, said, among other things, the following.

"I have submitted an amendment to the draft resolution of the delegation of the United States. This amendment tends to eliminate from the proposal any provision which constitutes a position on the substance of this question " -- that is, partition. "Amended in this way the draft resolution would remain within the limits of the present stage in which we find ourselves, the stage of investigation and elucidation of the possibilities. In this way, the committee of five would have the greatest possible freedom. It would nonetheless be obliged to take into consideration all the elements of the problem, particularly the existence of a resolution of the General Assembly and a partition plan recommended by the General Assembly." (S/P.V.258, p.43-45)

The representative of Belgium then stated: "My amendment has but one objective, and that is that the Security Council might avoid pronouncing itself at the present stage of the discussion of this question while it is still insufficiently informed. This amendment does not in any way prejudice the position which the Security Council will take when the proper time comes. The Security Council will not be in a position to pronounce itself properly and usefully as long as the Committee has not expressed itself on the results of its investigations." Document (S/P.V. 258, page 46).

I have come to the understanding that Belgium is opposed to paragraph 1 of the United States draft resolution for the time being. It is understood to be opposed only because Belgium considers that the moment has not yet come to take a position on it as the committee of five has not yet submitted its reports following its contacts with the parties.

Notwithstanding this position, the United States cannot support the Belgian amendment. The substantive issue is on the adoption or postponement of paragraph 1 of the draft resolution submitted by the United States, which reads:

"Resolves:

"1. To accept, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, the requests addressed by the General Assembly to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947."

Paragraph 2 implements paragraph 1. A vote for paragraph 1 would be a vote for partition as a Palestine solution.

The General Assembly voted for partition as a Palestine solution. The United States of America voted for that solution, and still supports it.

Para. 2

As we have stated before, the United States supports the General Assembly plan for partition as the framework of implementation by pacific means.

Paragraph 1, under consideration, containing the reservation "subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter", expresses a Charter principle implied -- we say it must be implied -- in every part of the General Assembly Resolution. This paragraph 1 in our draft resolution, therefore, interprets the acceptance of the General Assembly requests in the following manner -- and I intend to take each point up one by one ^{seriatim} and give our interpretation of the effect of the adoption of this paragraph 1:

Request (a) of the General Assembly Resolution is:

"Requests that

A | "(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;"

This is accepted, subject to the limitation that armed force cannot be used for implementation of the plan because the Charter limits the use of United Nations force expressly to threats to and breaches of the peace / and aggression affecting international peace. Therefore, we

must interpret the General Assembly Resolution as meaning that the United Nations measures to implement this resolution are peaceful measures.

Request (b) of the General Assembly Resolution is:

"Requests that

"(b) The Security Council consider if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace.

If it decides that such a threat exists and, in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this Resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this Resolution;"

Paragraph 1 of the United States draft resolution, with the qualifying clause "subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter", does not authorize use of enforcement under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter to empower the United Nations Commission to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by the Resolution, because the Charter does not authorize either the General Assembly or the Security Council to do any such thing.

On the other hand, the passage of paragraph 1 of our draft resolution accepts request (b) with the clear interpretation that is made by this reservation in paragraph 1: "subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter."

p. 32

Thus, the duty which is accepted, if we pass paragraph 1 of this resolution, is to consider under Request (b) whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. Acceptance of it requires consideration of whether such a threat exists.

If the Security Council finds that there is a threat to international peace, it may, of course, empower the United Nations Palestine Commission to assist the Security Council in maintaining peace.

If the Security Council should find that a threat to international peace or breach of the peace exists, it is empowered to make recommendations, or to take provisional measures under Article 40, or to impose economic and other non-military sanctions under Article 41, or to take military measures under Article 42. The Security Council would be required to follow one or more of these lines of action. It might pursue these lines of action in any sequence deemed proper.

This is an obligation that exists without the General Assembly Resolution, because the Charter requires it.

This paragraph 1 in the draft resolution interprets Request (c) of the General Assembly Resolution as follows:

Under Article 39 the Security Council is under a mandate to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. It may regard attempts to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this Resolution as constituting such threat. The obligation must be carried out by the process of determination, and not solely at the request of the General Assembly.

As we have stated before, the Special Report of the Palestine Commission dated 16 February 1948 "reports facts which, if accepted or substantiated by the Security Council, would appear to lead to the

conclusion that a threat to international peace is present in that situation." Acceptance of Request (c) through the adoption of paragraph 1 of the United States draft resolution is an undertaking by the Security Council to look into the matter immediately to determine whether such a threat exists. Our subsequent paragraph 2 provides a way of investigation.

Note the language of Request (c). It reads:

"Requests that the Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution."

One cannot drop a word from that and still retain the same meaning.

The language of Request (c) had a current construction by my Government at the time of acceptance of it by my Government in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question. It excluded the hypothesis that if an attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by the Resolution should occur, the Security Council must determine that it constitutes a threat to the peace. That practical current construction was made in the following language by Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, who was then acting in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, from the record of which I take the following quotation:

"My delegation, I must say quite frankly, would not have been able to support the original amendment put up by the delegation of Denmark. We are prepared, however, to accept this revised version. The revised version does not ask the Security Council to act upon a hypothetical situation, but requests that it act in the event that a situation which constitutes a threat to international peace and security should arise. This, at best, can only be an

admonition to the Security Council. The Security Council by its own constitution has the duty to exercise surveillance over such situations, and to determine when a threat to international peace and security exists."

The reservation "subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter", in paragraph 1 of our resolution, rests upon the principle upon which the United States stood, as stated by Mr. Johnson.

As we see it, interpreted in this manner, the acceptance of Request (c) requires determination of the question of fact of threat to international peace, and if such threat is found, action under Chapter VII.

Taken altogether, paragraph 1 of the United States resolution means that the Security Council will do everything it can under the Charter to give effect to the recommendation of the General Assembly.

Mr. CREECH-JONES (United Kingdom): In less than eleven weeks from now the United Kingdom Government will cease to be the responsible mandatory authority in Palestine, and only a limited area of that country will still be occupied by British troops. The conflict between extreme elements in both the Jewish and Arab communities has grown more savage and destructive, while public order has degenerated and the toll of British, Jewish and Arab lives continues to mount.

The two Reports of the Palestine Commission have described the formidable tasks confronting it, and their views have been emphasized in the debate in the Security Council. Their firm conclusion is that implementation of the General Assembly's recommendation depends on the creation of a non-Palestinian security force to protect the Commission and to enable it to carry through the partition plan.

The representative of the United States has proposed that the Security Council should proclaim its acceptance of the plan recommended by the General Assembly, but that the Security Council should recognize that, while able to give advice and guidance to the Palestine Commission, it cannot impose the partition plan by force. At the same time, he declares, it is the Security Council's duty to consider the situation in Palestine in order to determine whether a threat to the peace exists, and to take appropriate action. The Belgian amendment, on the other hand, seeks to eliminate mention of acceptance of the plan at this stage, but follows the United States resolution in its proposal that a committee composed of the permanent members of the Security Council should consult and report.

For reasons which have often been stated, I do not propose to express on behalf of the United Kingdom any opinion on the adequacy of these proposals. Nevertheless, I feel bound once more to emphasize the increasing gravity of the situation in Palestine. I must point out that, whatever procedure the United Nations may decide to adopt with a view to assuming responsibility for the government of Palestine on 15 May, that country is likely to become disorganized, disintegrated and even more violently disrupted by that date. In addition, the peace and security of Jerusalem after 15 May is exciting the anxious interest of people throughout the world. We have been reminded in forceful terms of the urgency of the matter by the Chairman of the Palestine Commission.

Another aspect of which I feel it my duty to warn the Security Council is that the danger to security in Jerusalem proceeds in no small part from the ever present rivalry of turbulent Christian sects and that, owing to the incidence of religious festivals, this danger will reach its peak during the months of April and May.

The untractable problems facing the Palestine Commission are rapidly becoming insoluble as delay is further protracted and hope recedes that the Commission will be adequately equipped to take up the immense responsibilities imposed upon it. Short of implementation -- and international responsibility -- the United Kingdom Government has tried to meet the realities of the situation. It has done its utmost to furnish the Commission with the information it needs and to discuss with it the numerous problems of security, communications, administration, maintenance of services, transfer of assets and financial liabilities, and similar problems in which immediate decisions are necessary. In Palestine itself the Government has devolved many responsibilities upon

local Arab and Jewish authorities, and has established local police forces so that there may be some hope of maintaining essential services and preserving good order with a view to effecting transfer of authority to the United Nations without a complete collapse of organized government throughout the country.

It is necessary for me to repeat this because of the statements spread about which accuse my Government of making the transfer as difficult as possible and of denying assistance to the United Nations. It has even been suggested that we have preferred to undo all our work of the past twenty-five years in order to reduce the administration to chaos and see disorder reign in Palestine. On the contrary, we have taken all the practical steps in our power to prevent disorder overtaking Palestine and the authority of the United Nations being made abortive when British administration ends on 15 May. Our fervent hope is that the Security Council will now find a way to secure effective assumption of authority in Palestine by the United Nations when the mandate is terminated.

The distinguished Chairman of the Palestine Commission, in his speech to the Security Council, has drawn attention to certain aspects of the problem which the Security Council, I am sure, will not wish to ignore. Even under the most favourable conditions the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November is no adequate or satisfactory charter for enabling the Palestine Commission to carry out its task. Whatever may be the merits or demerits of the General Assembly's recommendations, their workability essentially depends upon some measure of co-operation between Jews and Arabs. This co-operation, on which the maintenance of the essential services and normal life of the country depends, cannot be secured by coercion.

Any forces sent into Palestine from outside to impose any plan not acceptable to one or other community would have to be kept there for a long and indefinite period. It is not for me to comment on certain obvious defects in the partition plan, some of which arose from its being conceived in conditions of strong partiality. In the steady deterioration of the situation in Palestine, as the Chairman of the Palestine Commission has pointed out, some of its impractical features have become increasingly apparent. The plan makes far too little allowance either for Arab reactions or for the immense difficulties which the terms of the General Assembly's resolution themselves impose on the mandatory power in transferring authority under such disturbed conditions. Nevertheless, my Government has accepted the plan, has declined to pass judgment on it, and, for reasons which have been repeatedly emphasized, has advocated no alternative solution of its own, trusting that the collective wisdom and fair-mindedness of the United Nations would find a greater measure of success than that which attended our own efforts in the past.

The statement made by the representative of the Jewish Agency on 27 February is scarcely relevant to discussion of the problem before us. Its principal features were suppressions, distortions and half-truths, and a desperate effort to divert our attention from the Jewish Agency's political ineptitude and moral weakness which have discredited the former bright hopes of a great cause. The Jewish Agency's spokesman knows the immense difficulties of the Palestine Government in endeavouring to maintain order during the process of winding up its administration in a community one section of which has consistently shirked the elementary responsibilities of citizenship. The administration is working against a background of violence and terrorism, outrages, and reprisals,

hatred and frenzied passion. Both Arabs and Jews are anxious about their future security; and the British forces have to be deployed to prevent civil war at the very moment when they are trying to effect an orderly withdrawal.

I do not propose to employ the time of the Security Council by a detailed reply to the charges made against the mandatory power by the representative of the Jewish Agency. I would refer members of the Security Council to the statement issued by the Government of Palestine on 1 March, in which the equivocal policy of the Jewish Agency is exposed.

There are, however, one or two misstatements in the speech of the Jewish Agency representative which I feel I must correct. In his endeavour to represent the current activities of Jewish organizations in Palestine as "self-defence", the Jewish Agency representative contended that it was only after Arab provocation and failure by the security forces to enforce law and order impartially that "isolated acts of indiscriminate bloodshed on the part of dissident Jewish groups occurred."

Members of the Security Council will hardly need to be reminded that these outrages by the Jewish terrorist organizations, so politely now described as "dissident groups", have been going on for years. The Jewish community has made negligible efforts to prevent these outrages or to root out the organizations responsible for them. I will not horrify the Security Council with a list of the atrocities committed by Jewish terrorists in recent years against defenceless men and women and against the British civil and military personnel. The events of the last week have starkly revealed the irresponsible wickedness of these organizations. What action has the Jewish Agency, so strong before this Security Council in the

role of supporter of impartial justice, taken to check these ruthless murders which have so greatly harmed the Jewish cause the world over? The Agency has, I fear, consistently subordinated moral considerations to political expediency. They have certainly made expressions of disapproval and regret, but they have supported them by little positive action. In attempting to explain and justify terrorist activities as the natural response to Arab violence and British partiality, they descend to the last ignominy of condoning them.

But, as I have said, the great part of the Agency's contribution to the Security Council's debate is irrelevant. The question at issue is not British partiality, Arab intransigence or Jewish terrorism; it is the problem which the Chairman of the Palestine Commission has put before us: the practical steps which are to be taken to meet the situation which has developed in Palestine.

In particular, my Government recognizes that it is important that the Security Council should carefully examine whether a threat to the peace exists. In our judgment this is not a task only for the permanent members of the Security Council; other members of the Security Council should share it.

We endorse the appeal in the last paragraphs of the United States and Belgian resolutions that all the powers and peoples involved in Palestine should lend their influence to prevent further violence.

With the operative clause of the resolutions before us, however, we have some difficulty. The United States asks us to endorse the plan adopted by the General Assembly. For the reasons which we have so often explained to the United Nations, we cannot do this. Further, both the United States and Belgium ask us to assist in giving instructions

and guidance to the Palestine Commission regarding the implementation of the General Assembly's plan. I must again repeat that we cannot participate in any way in the implementation of a plan which involves the coercion of one of the communities -- and in Palestine that is the larger community -- or the assumption of further commitments in Palestine by the British Government.

For this reason, my Government cannot agree to take part in the Committee which the two resolutions propose to set up. But, although my Government cannot, therefore, vote for either resolution, it will assist any committee which may be appointed with all the information and experience at its disposal. Furthermore, we shall welcome any effort to find a bridge, even at this late hour, across the gulf which now separates the two communities in Palestine. Finally, I must repeat that the United Kingdom cannot enter into any new or extended commitment in regard to Palestine. Our contribution has already been made over the years and the date of termination of our responsibility is irrevocably fixed

Mr. GROMYKO (USSR) (Interpretation from Russian): I shall limit myself for the present to a short comment only on the question of consultation raised in the United States proposal. In principle, the Soviet Union delegation is agreed that there should be consultation among the five permanent members of the Security Council upon the questions arising from the reports submitted by the Palestine Commission, and in particular on the question raised in the Special Report of this Commission.

I cannot agree, however, that these consultations among the five powers should be carried out necessarily in a committee, as is proposed by the representative of the United States. In our opinion, the five powers should be able to consult one another directly, outside the bounds of any committee.

In so far as the permanent members of the Security Council have hitherto not taken any initiative in this connection, the Security Council can address itself to them and appeal to them to carry out immediately consultations of this kind, and to communicate to the Security Council the results of their consultations in the course of some ten to fifteen days. For, indeed, if this or that great power were to take up a definite position on the Palestine question in general, and in particular upon the questions raised in the reports of the Palestine Commission, there is no ground for considering that this power would be able to state this position only in a committee. With just the same success, this power could explain its position outside a committee in direct negotiations with the other states permanent members of the Security Council. None of the great powers should hide behind a committee, since this might only complicate and drag out the settlement of the questions raised in connection with the

situation in Palestine. But the position is such that any delay in the consideration of these questions cannot be justified by any means whatever.

As regards the proposal of the United States for the carrying out through the proposed committee of consultations with the Palestine Commission and also with the Jews and the Arabs, it is not difficult to note that this proposal is artificially put forward and cannot be justified. It is known that consultations with the Jews and the Arabs have been entered into by the Palestine Commission, so that it is unnecessary as a result of this to create any supplementary parallel channel of consultation with the Jews and the Arabs. Can it be that the Security Council feels any kind of difficulty regarding the receipt of information concerning the results of such consultations? No, there are no difficulties of this kind for the Security Council. The Palestine Commission has placed before the Security Council detailed information on this question.

In the same way the Security Council does not feel any difficulties whatever not only as regards the receipt of information from the Palestine Commission concerning the results of consultations with Jews and Arabs, but also statements of opinion of the Palestine Commission itself upon the whole of the important questions relating to the implementation of the Resolution of the General Assembly concerning the partition of Palestine. In its reports, the Commission has submitted to the Security Council its own findings and its own conclusions. Furthermore, the members of the Palestine Commission are sitting with us at the Security Council table, and at any time they are ready here in public to answer any questions put to the Commission or to give further explanations. The Chairman of the Palestine Commission,

Mr. Lisicky, has already given us a report in the name of the Palestine Commission. If any one of the representatives of the Security Council, or the Security Council as a whole, wishes supplementary consultations to take place with the Palestine Commission, the individual representatives or the Security Council can carry out such consultations directly and immediately, beginning with the present meeting.

On what grounds is the question raised of the necessity of consultations with the Palestine Commission and with the Jews and the Arabs, since such consultations have already been going on for a long time and are still going on. All those who desire to take part in such consultations are taking part in them now. The United States proposal, for this reason, complicates and confuses the whole question of consultations at the very time that our task would seem to be to simplify the procedure of consultation and to make it more effective.

Thus, all that part of the United States resolution which is devoted to the question of consultations should be deleted, since its adoption would cause delay in the consideration of the whole of this question, which, of course, would not be in the interests of the Security Council nor in the interests of the organization of the United Nations as a whole.

I would ask the representative of the United States and also the other representatives on the Security Council to express their attitude towards the idea that I have put forward regarding the carrying out of direct consultations among the five great powers, outside the bounds of any committee, having in view the fact that, in principle, the proposal for consultation among the five powers is evidently acceptable to all.

AC/88

S/P.V.260
54-65

I have no objection to paragraph 1 of the United States draft resolution, which has in view that, "subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, the requests addressed by the General Assembly to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947" should be accepted.



The PRESIDENT: I have no more speakers on my list. I propose that we should resume our discussion of the Palestine question tomorrow at 2:30 p.m.

As there is no objection, we shall meet tomorrow at 2:30 p.m.

Before I adjourn the meeting, I should like to call the attention of the members of the Security Council to a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Ambassador of Burma, dated 27 February 1948. It is an application for membership.

I do not propose to discuss this letter today because it is not on our agenda. I suggest that we put this matter on our agenda for tomorrow. It can be disposed of in five minutes according to our usual procedure. It seems to me that a matter of this kind, an application for membership, requires some formal attention on our part as early as possible to show our courtesy to the applicant.

As there is no objection, this matter will be put on our agenda for tomorrow.

The meeting rose at 4:45 p.m.

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION
SPEECH BY THE COLONIAL SECRETARY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
TO BE DELIVERED MARCH 2ND, 1948

In less than eleven weeks from now the United Kingdom Government will cease to be the responsible mandatory authority in Palestine, and only a limited area of that country will still be occupied by British troops. The conflict between extreme elements in both the Jewish and Arab communities has grown more savage and destructive, while public order has degenerated and the toll of British, Jewish and Arab lives continues to mount.

The two reports of the Palestine Commission have described the formidable tasks confronting it, and their views have been emphasised in the debate in this Council. Their firm conclusion is that implementation of the Assembly's recommendation depends on the creation of a non-Palestinian security force to protect the Commission and to enable it to carry through the partition plan.

The distinguished Representative of the United States has proposed that the Security Council should proclaim its acceptance of the plan recommended by the Assembly, but that the Council should recognise that, while able to give advice and guidance to the Palestine Commission, it cannot impose the partition plan by force. At the same time, he declares, it is the Council's duty to consider the situation in Palestine in order to determine whether a threat to the peace exists, and to make recommendations for appropriate action. The Belgian amendment on the other hand seeks to eliminate mention of acceptance of the plan at this stage, but follows the United States resolution in its proposal that a Committee composed of the Permanent Members of the Council should consult and report.

For reasons which have often been stated, I do not propose to express on behalf of the United Kingdom any opinion on the adequacy of these proposals. Nevertheless I feel bound once more to emphasise the increasing gravity of the situation in Palestine. I must point out that, whatever procedure the United Nations may decide to adopt with a view to assuming
/responsibility.....

responsibility for the government of Palestine on May 15th, that country is likely to become disorganised, disintegrated and even more violent and disrupted on that date. In addition the peace and security of Jerusalem after May 15th is exciting the anxious interest of people throughout the world. We have been reminded in forceful terms of the urgency of the matter by the Chairman of the Palestine Commission. Another aspect of which I feel it my duty to warn the Council is that the danger to security in Jerusalem proceeds in no small part from the ever present rivalry of turbulent Christian sects and that owing to the incidence of religious festivals this danger will reach its peak during the months of April and May. The untractable problems facing the Palestine Commission are becoming rapidly insoluble as delay is further protracted and as hope recedes that the Commission will be adequately equipped to take up the immense responsibilities imposed upon it. Short of implementation - an international responsibility - the United Kingdom Government has tried to meet the realities of the situation: it has done its utmost to furnish the Commission with the information it needs, and to discuss with it the numerous problems of security, communications, administration, maintenance of services, transfer of assets and financial liabilities, and similar problems on which immediate decisions are necessary. In Palestine itself the Government has devolved many responsibilities upon local Arab and Jewish authorities, and has established local police forces so that there may be some hope of maintaining essential services and preserving good order with a view to effecting transfer of authority to the United Nations without a complete collapse of organised government throughout the country.

It is necessary for me to repeat this because of the statements spread about accusing my Government of making the transfer as difficult as possible and of denying assistance to the United Nations. It has even been suggested that we have preferred to undo all our work of the past twenty-five years in order to reduce the administration to chaos and see disorder reign in Palestine. On the contrary, we have taken all the practical steps

/in our power.....

in our power to prevent disorder overtaking Palestine and the authority of the United Nations being made abortive when British Administration ends on May 15th. Our fervent hope is that this Council will now find a way to secure effective assumption of authority in Palestine by the United Nations when the Mandate is terminated.

The distinguished Chairman of the Palestine Commission, in his speech to the Council, has drawn attention to certain aspects of the problem which this Council will not wish to ignore. Even under the most favourable conditions the Assembly's resolution of November 29th is no adequate or satisfactory Charter for enabling the Palestine Commission to carry out its task. Whatever may be the merits or demerits of the Assembly's recommendations, their workability essentially depends upon some measure of cooperation between Jews and Arabs. This cooperation, on which the maintenance of the essential services and normal life of the country depends, cannot be secured by coercion. Any forces sent into Palestine from outside to impose any plan not acceptable to one or other community would have to be kept there for a long and indefinite period. It is not for me to comment on certain obvious defects in the partition scheme, some of which arose from it being conceived in conditions of strong partiality. In the steady deterioration of the situation in Palestine, as the Chairman of the Palestine Commission has pointed out, some of its impractical features have become increasingly apparent. The scheme makes far too little allowance either for Arab reactions or for the immense difficulties which the terms of the Assembly's resolution themselves impose on the Mandatory Power in transferring authority under such disturbed conditions. Nevertheless, my Government has accepted the plan, has declined to pass judgment on it, and for reasons (which have been repeatedly emphasised) has advocated no alternative solution of its own, trusting that the collective wisdom and fair-mindedness of the United Nations would find a better solution than that which attended our own efforts in the past.

The statement made by the Representative of the Jewish Agency

/on 27 February.....

on 27 February is scarcely relevant to discussion of the problem before us. Its principal features were suppressions, distortions and half-truths, and a desperate effort to divert our attention from the Agency's political ineptitude and moral weakness which have discredited the former bright hopes of a great cause. The Agency's spokesman knows the immense difficulties of the Palestine Government in endeavouring to maintain order during the process of winding up its administration in a community one section of which has consistently shirked the elementary responsibilities of citizenship. The Administration is working against a background of violence and terrorism, outrages and reprisals, hatred and frenzied passion. Both Arabs and Jews are anxious about their future security; and the British forces have to be deployed to prevent civil war at the very moment when they are trying to effect an orderly withdrawal.

I do not propose to employ the time of the Council by a detailed reply to the charges made against the Mandatory Power by the representative of the Jewish Agency. I would refer members of the Council to the statement issued by the Government of Palestine on March 1st, in which the equivocal and pusillanimous policy of the Jewish Agency is exposed.

/There are, however.....

There are, however, one or two misstatements in the speech of the Jewish Agency representative which I feel I must correct. In his endeavour to represent the current activities of Jewish Organisations in Palestine as "self-Defence", the Jewish Agency representative contended that it was only after Arab provocation and failure by the Security Forces to enforce law and order impartially that - I quote - "isolated acts of indiscriminate bloodshed on the part of dissident Jewish groups occurred."

Members of the Council will hardly need to be reminded that these outrages by the Jewish terrorist organisations so politely described as "dissident groups" have been going on for years. The Jewish community has made negligible efforts to prevent these outrages or to root out the organisations responsible for them. I will not horrify the Council with a list of the atrocities committed by Jewish terrorists in recent years against defenceless men and women and against the British civil and military personnel. The events of the last week have starkly revealed the irresponsible wickedness of these organisations. What little action has the Jewish Agency, so strong before this Council in the role of supporters of impartial justice, taken to check these ruthless murders which have so greatly harmed the Jewish cause the world over. The Agency has, I fear, consistently subordinated moral considerations to political expediency. They have certainly made expressions of disapproval and regret, but they have supported them by comparatively little positive action. In attempting to explain and justify terrorist activities as the natural response to Arab violence and British partiality, they descend to the last ignominy of condoning them.

But as I have said, the great part of the Agency's contribution to the Council's debate is irrelevant. The question at issue is not British partiality, Arab intransigence or Jewish terrorism; it is the problem which the Chairman of the Palestine Commission has put before us - of the practical steps which are to be taken to meet the situation which has developed in Palestine.

In particular, we recognise that it is important that the Security Council should carefully examine whether a threat to the peace exists.

/In our

In our judgment this is not a task only for the Permanent Powers on the Security Council; others should share it.

We endorse the appeal in the last paragraphs of the United States and Belgian resolutions that all the powers and peoples involved in Palestine should lend their influence to prevent further violence.

With the operative clause of the resolutions before us, however, we have some difficulty. The United States ask us to endorse the scheme adopted by the General Assembly. For the reasons which we have so often explained to the United Nations, we cannot do this. Further, both the United States and Belgium ask us to assist in giving instructions and guidance to the Palestine Commission regarding the implementation of the Assembly's plan. I must again repeat that we cannot participate in any way in the implementation of a scheme which involves the coercion of one of the communities, and that the larger, in Palestine, or the assumption of further commitments in Palestine by the British Government.

For this reason, My Government cannot agree to take part in the Committee which the two resolutions propose to set up. But, although my Government cannot, therefore, vote for either resolution, it will assist any Committee which may be appointed with all the information and experience at its disposal. Furthermore, we shall welcome any effort to find a bridge, even at this late hour, across the gulf which now separates the two communities in Palestine. Finally, I must repeat that the United Kingdom cannot enter into any new or extended commitment in regard to Palestine. Our contribution has already been made over the years and the date of termination of our responsibility is irrevocably fixed.

United Nations

SECURITY
COUNCIL

Nations Unies

CONSEIL
DE SECURITE

UNRESTRICTED
S/P.V. 263
5 March 1948
English

SECURITY COUNCIL

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD MEETING

Lake Success, New York
Friday, 5 March 1948, at 3:30 p.m.

President: Mr. Ting-Fu TSIANG



NOTE: Any corrections of the originals of speeches in this record, provided for in rule 50 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, should be submitted in writing within two working days to Mr. E. Delavenay, Director, Editorial Division, Room CC-87, Lake Success. Corrections should be accompanied by or incorporated in a letter written on headed notepaper and enclosed in an envelope marked "Urgent" and bearing the appropriate document symbol number.

(Interpretations of speeches will be replaced in the official records by full translations from the originals.)

The PRESIDENT: I declare the two hundred and sixty-third meeting of the Security Council open.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

The agenda was adopted without discussion.

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

- (a) FIRST MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION (DOCUMENT S/663)
- (b) FIRST SPECIAL REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL: THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY IN PALESTINE, SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION (DOCUMENT S/676)

On the invitation of the President, Mr. Lisicky, Chairman of the United Nations Palestine Commission; Mahmoud Bey Fawzi, the representative of Egypt; and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, took their places at the Security Council table.

The PRESIDENT: Before this morning's meeting was adjourned, we were about to vote on the draft resolution of the United States delegation and the Belgian amendment thereto. Suggestions were made with regard to changes in the text of the United States resolution, and members now have an amended draft of that resolution before them. I shall ask either the representative of the United States or the representative of the Soviet Union to report on the draft.

Mr. AUSTIN (United States): I think that the first thing that I ought to do is to point out in what respects the original proposal submitted by the United States is now proposed to be changed.

We struck out of paragraph 2 the words, "establish a committee of the Security Council comprising", and inserted in lieu thereof the words "call on." Then, in the next line, we struck out the word "five" and the words "whose functions will be", and inserted in lieu of the latter words the words "to consult and:"

In the second line of sub-paragraph (a), after the word "make" and before the word "recommendations", we inserted the words "as the result of such consultations." Then, at the end of that sub-paragraph, we struck out the semi-colon and added the following:

"with a view of implementing the Resolution of the General Assembly. The Security Council requests the permanent members to report to it on the results of their consultations within ten days."

In the third line of sub-paragraph (b), we struck out the pronoun "its", and inserted in lieu thereof the pronoun "their." In the last line of sub-paragraph (b), we struck out the pronoun "it", and substituted therefor the pronoun "they."

I should like to offer just a few words of explanation. The time of reporting, which is stated in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended text to be within ten days, applies to all consultations, not to one alone. This is an agreed application, although the sentence is put in at the end of sub-paragraph (a). The two changes in sub-paragraph (b) are necessary in order to conform that sub-paragraph to the changed text of paragraph 2.

The total effect of these changes is that the amended resolution reads as follows:

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

"HAVING received the Resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations Palestine Commission its First Monthly Report and its First Special Report on the Problem of Security in Palestine;

"RESOLVES:

"1. To accept, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, the requests addressed by the General Assembly to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947;

"2. To call on permanent members of the Council to consult and:

"(a) To inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make, as the result of such consultations, recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission with a view of implementing the Resolution of the General Assembly. The Security Council requests the permanent members to report to it on the results of their consultations within 10 days.

"(b) To consider whether the situation with respect to Palestine constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and to report their conclusions as a matter of urgency to the Council, together with any recommendations for action by the Security Council which they consider appropriate;

"(c) To consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power, and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine concerning the implementation of the General Assembly recommendation of 29 November 1947.

"APPEALS to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine."

The PRESIDENT: I intend to put the Belgian amendment to the vote first, paragraph by paragraph. But before I put that amendment to a vote, I shall allow time for discussion, not only on the amendment but also on the amended text of the United States draft resolution.

Mr. GROMYKO (USSR) (Interpretation from Russian): The President desired the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union to consult together during the lunch interval, and this we did.

Mr. Austin has, in substance, given the results of our discussion regarding, in particular, the changes introduced in the United States draft resolution. The proposal that direct consultation should take place between the permanent members of the Security Council does not meet, I think, with any objection in the Security Council. The United States delegation, at any rate, has accepted it and in its draft resolution the original proposal for a committee of permanent members has been deleted.

Some changes have been made in document S/685, paragraph 2 (a), and Mr. Austin has now reported to the Security Council on these changes. As regards paragraphs 2 (b) and (c), these remain, even after the consultations that have taken place, as items upon which we do not agree.

It is the opinion of the Soviet Union delegation that there is no need for sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) and that they entail a danger of causing delay in the consultations and, furthermore, are not likely to promote good results in the consultations. Therefore, there is agreement with respect to paragraph 1; the preamble of paragraph 2, which is now fully in accordance with the Soviet Union proposal that there should be direct consultations; and paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), with the changes that have been reported. With regard to paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), there is, as I say, no agreement between us.

Mr. PARODI (France) (Interpretation from French): I have only one simple observation to offer. If I understood correctly the statement just made by the representative of the United States, the clause concerning the time limit within which the permanent members of the Security Council must report upon their consultations relates to the whole of paragraph 2. If that is the case, I suggest that it might be better to place the clause in question at the end of paragraph 2 rather than at the end of sub-paragraph (a). On the other hand, if there is any particular reason for its being placed in its present position I shall be prepared to revise my view.

Mr. GROMYKO (USSR) (Interpretation from Russian): We had indeed envisaged the placing of the sentence referred to by the representative of France at the end of paragraph 2 as a whole, but we concluded that it would be better to insert it at the end of sub-paragraph (a) because that sub-paragraph is of a general character. We contemplated saying, in sub-paragraph (a), "...to make, as the result of such consultations, recommendations to it regarding the guidance," and so on, because, as I have said, sub-paragraph (a) is of a general character, unlike sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) which state certain concrete points regarding the consultations. Sub-paragraph (a) does not contain any concrete enumeration of subjects to be taken into account during the consultations, but is, as it were, a continuation of the preamble to paragraph 2. I think, therefore, that there should not be any misunderstanding, and if all representatives feel able to accept this interpretation of the structure of the document as it now stands, the doubts expressed by the representative of France may be regarded as having been dispelled.

Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (Interpretation from French): I should like to say that I accept the new paragraph 2 contained in the amended United States draft resolution except for the words "with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly." That phrase is incompatible with the thesis contained in the Belgian amendment, according to which the question of the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly should be left in suspense until the Security Council has received the report on the consultations between the permanent members. My position is therefore that I accept the new paragraph 2, subject to the deletion of the phrase "with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly."



Mr. McNAUGHTON (Canada): The representative of Belgium has called the attention of the President to a very important alteration made in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2, and he has asked the sponsors of the revised draft resolution whether they would accept the deletion of the words, "with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly." I think that question should be answered.

Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (Interpretation from French): That was not exactly the sense of what I intended to convey. I wish to say that I am prepared to modify the draft submitted by the Belgian delegation by replacing the entire paragraph under the word "Resolves by the new/ paragraph 2 of the amended draft resolution submitted by the United States, but I would do this only if the words "with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly" were deleted from this new paragraph. My remark refers only to the text of the Belgian amendment. I have not requested the representative of the United States to modify his draft resolution.

The PRESIDENT: In order to make the matter perfectly clear, I wish to state that it is my understanding that the representative of Belgium accepts the text of the amended draft resolution submitted by the United States as a substitute for his text, with the exception of the phrase "with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly." Is my understanding correct?

Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (Interpretation from French): That is not subject to the qualifications I have stated, quite the position. I accept paragraph 2, but I request the deletion of paragraph 1. My amendment envisages the deletion of paragraph 1.

Mr. GR6MYK9 (USSR) (Interpretation from Russian): I wish to say that the deletion of the phrase from sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 suggested by the representative of Belgium does alter somewhat the meaning of that paragraph, and therefore alters the attitude of the Soviet Union delegation towards it.

Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (Interpretation from French): The representative of the Soviet Union may express his attitude on the Belgian amendment when it comes to the vote.

The PRESIDENT: In order that we may know to what extent we are committing ourselves, I shall first read a paragraph and then put that paragraph to a vote. We shall now vote on the Belgian amendment. The first paragraph reads:

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

"HAVING RECEIVED the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations Palestine Commission its First Monthly Report, and its First Special Report on the Problem of Security in Palestine;"

Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (Interpretation from Spanish): That is exactly the same as the first paragraph of the United States draft resolution, word for word.

A vote by show of hands was taken. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Belgium
Canada
China
France
Syria

Against: None

Abstained: Argentina
Colombia
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
United States of America

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is: five in favour, none against and six abstentions. The paragraph is rejected.

The next paragraph of the Belgian amendment reads:

"RESOLVES,

"(a) To call on permanent members of the Council to consult and to inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make, as the result of such consultations, recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission. The Security Council requests the permanent members to report to it on the results of their consultations within ten days."

A vote by show of hands was taken. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Belgium
Canada
China
France
Syria

Against: None

Abstained: Argentina
Colombia
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
United States of America

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is: five in favour, none against and six abstentions. The paragraph is rejected.

"(b) To consider whether the situation with respect to Palestine constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and to report their conclusions as a matter of urgency to the Council, together with any recommendations for action by the Security Council which they consider appropriate..."

A vote by show of hands was taken. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Belgium
Canada
China
France
Syria

Against: None

Abstained: Argentina
Colombia
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
United States of America

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is five in favour, none against, and six abstentions. The paragraph is rejected.

"(c) To consult with the Palestine Commission, the mandatory power, and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine concerning the implementation of the General Assembly recommendation of 29 November 1947."

A vote by show of hands was taken. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Belgium
Canada
China
France
Syria

Against: None

Abstained: Argentina
Colombia
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
United States of America

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is five in favour, none against, and six abstentions. The paragraph is rejected.

"APPEALS to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine."

A vote was taken by show of hands. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Belgium
Canada
China
France

Against: None

Abstained: Argentina
Colombia
Syria
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
United States of America

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is four in favour, none against, and seven abstentions.

The draft amendment introduced by the Belgian delegation is lost because none of its paragraphs has been adopted.

Now we shall proceed to vote on the amended draft resolution of the delegation of the United States.

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

"HAVING received the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations Palestine Commission its First Monthly Report and its First Special Report on the Problem of Security in Palestine..."

A vote was taken by show of hands. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Belgium
Canada
China
France
Syria
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United States of America

Against: None

Abstained: Argentina
Colombia
United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is eight in favour, none against, and three abstentions. The paragraph is adopted.

"RESOLVES:

"1. To accept, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, the requests addressed by the General Assembly to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947..."

A vote was taken by show of hands. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Belgium
France
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United States of America

Against: None

Abstained: Argentina
Canada
China
Colombia
Syria
United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is five in favour, none against, and six abstentions. The paragraph is rejected.

"2. To call on permanent members of the Council to consult and

(a) To inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make as the result of such consultations recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly. The Security Council requests the permanent members to report to it on the results of their consultations within 10 days."

Mr. GROMYKO (USSR): I ask that we take a separate vote on the preamble of this paragraph.

The PRESIDENT: The representative of the Soviet Union wishes to vote first on the phrase which reads: "To call on permanent members of the Council to consult..."

Mr. GROMYKO (USSR): I wish to add the words "among themselves".

The PRESIDENT: The words "among themselves" are not in the text.

Mr. GROMYKO (USSR): I propose to amend the preamble of this paragraph to read: "To call on permanent members of the Council to consult among themselves..." I should also like to have this phrase voted on separately.

The PRESIDENT: Is that amendment acceptable to the representative of the United States?



Mr. AUSTIN (United States): I regret that I cannot do that. If sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) should be acceptable to the Security Council, that limitation would be in conflict with the authority contained in (b) and (c), for in sub-paragraph (c) they are called upon to consult with the Palestine Commission, the mandatory power, and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine, so that I believe that our agreement should stand as it was; that is, "to call on permanent members of the Council to consult and..."

Mr. GROMYKO (USSR) (Interpretation from Russian): I shall not insist. I think it would be more logical to vote this preamble separately since it refers to sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), and not just to sub-paragraph (a). Why should we vote on it together with sub-paragraph (a)? But I repeat that I do not insist on voting upon it separately if that is not the wish of the Security Council.

A vote by show of hands was taken. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Belgium
Canada
Colombia
France
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United States of America

Against: None

Abstained: Argentina
China
Syria
United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is: seven in favour, none against, and four abstentions. Paragraph 2 (a) is adopted.

Sub-paragraph 2 (b) of the amended draft resolution on the Palestinian Question submitted by the representative of the United States reads as follows:

"(b) To consider whether the situation with respect to Palestine constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and to report their conclusions as a matter of urgency to the Council, together with any recommendations for action by the Security Council which they consider appropriate;"

A vote by show of hands was taken. The result of the vote was as follows:

<u>In favour:</u>	Belgium
	Canada
	China
	Colombia
	France
	United States of America
<u>Against:</u>	None
<u>Abstained:</u>	Argentina
	Syria
	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
	United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is::six in favour, none against, and five abstentions. The sub-paragraph is rejected.

We shall now vote on sub-paragraph 2 (c) of the amended draft resolution on the Palestinian Question submitted by the representative of the United States, which reads as follows:

"(c) To consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power, and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine concerning the implementation of the General Assembly recommendation of 29 November 1947."

A vote by show of hands was taken. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Belgium
Canada
China
Colombia
France
United States of America

Against: None

Abstained: Argentina
Syria
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is: six in favour, none against, and five abstentions. The sub-paragraph is rejected.

We shall now vote on the last paragraph of the amended draft resolution on the Palestinian Question submitted by the representative of the United States, which reads as follows:

"Appeals to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine."

A vote by show of hands was taken. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Belgium
Canada
China
Colombia
France
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United States of America

Against: None

Abstained: Argentina
Syria
United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is: eight in favour, none against, and three abstentions. The paragraph is adopted.

With regard to the amended draft resolution on the Palestinian Question submitted by the delegation of the United States, we have adopted the preamble, sub-paragraph 2 (a), and the final paragraph. I propose to read those paragraphs which we have adopted and put them to a vote as a whole.

Mr. GROMYKO (USSR): The letter (a) should be omitted since there is no (b).

The PRESIDENT: The paragraphs we have adopted read as follows:

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

"HAVING received the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations Palestine Commission its First Monthly Report and its First Special Report on the Problem of Security in Palestine;

"RESOLVES:

"1. To call on permanent members of the Council to consult and to inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make, as the result of such consultations, recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly. The Security Council requests the permanent members to report to it on the results of their consultations within ten days, and

"APPEALS to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders, as are now occurring in Palestine."

Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): I should like a point of clarification in connection with my vote. As the draft resolution reads, "To call on permanent members of the Council to consult...", etc., I shall not vote for it. If this part of the draft resolution is to read, "To call on all the permanent members of the Council...", I shall vote for it. I wish to have that point clearly understood. If this part of the draft resolution concerns simply some members of the Security Council, that is one thing; if it concerns all the members of the Security Council, that is a different thing.

draft

Mr. AUSTIN (United States): The article "the" is in the/resolution. This typewritten copy, which I have before me, shows that it is not in the draft resolution, but that is a mistake. The verbatim record will show that, when I read the amendments in detail, I read them/ as follows: substantially
In line one of paragraph 2, strike out the phrase, "establish a committee of the Security Council comprising", and insert in lieu thereof the words, "call on." In line 2 of paragraph 2, strike out the word "five" and the words, "whose functions will be", and insert in lieu thereof the words, "to consult and", so that the paragraph as actually amended was as follows: "To call on the permanent members of the Council to consult and...".

A vote by show of hands was taken. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Belgium
Canada
China
Colombia
France
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United States of America

Against: None

Abstained: Argentina
Syria
United Kingdom

JC/gv

S/P.V.263
42

The PRESIDENT: The result of the vote is: eight in favour,
none against, and three abstentions. The Resolution is adopted.

The meeting rose at 4:55 p.m.



United Nations

**SECURITY
COUNCIL**

Nations Unies

**CONSEIL
DE SECURITE**

UNRESTRICTED

S/691

5 March 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

RESOLUTION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION ADOPTED BY
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD
MEETING 5 MARCH 1948

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING received the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations Palestine Commission its First Monthly Report and its First Special Report on the Problem of Security in Palestine;

RESOLVES to call on the permanent members of the Council to consult and to inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make as the result of such consultations recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly. The Security Council requests the permanent members to report to it on the results of their consultations within ten days.

APPEALS to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine.

True - political - Stamp the
way is
signature but attacks
& attacked

① Background ST. papers
- Efforts -

② Matters -

WRHS



NOT TO BE RELEASED UNTIL DELIVERY.

STATEMENT BY DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER, BEFORE THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

The proposal of the United States Government to suspend all efforts to implement the Partition Plan, approved by the United Nations General Assembly last November under the leadership of the United States, and to establish a temporary trusteeship for Palestine, is a shocking reversal of its position.

Up to the last few days, the spokesman of the United States Delegation told the Security Council that the American Government firmly stands by Partition. Both the President of the United States and the Secretary of State have repeatedly within recent weeks maintained that the position of the United States on Partition remained unaltered.

We are at an utter loss to understand the reason for this amazing reversal which will bring confusion, is likely to lead to increased violence in Palestine and will incalculably hurt the prestige and authority of the United Nations for whose effectiveness the President of the United States pleaded again as recently as Wednesday last.

It is clear, from the statement of the American Delegation that the reason for scrapping a decision of the United Nations General Assembly -- overwhelmingly approved by its members -- was the threat on the part of some member states to alter that decision by violence. This will be a fateful capitulation on the part of the world organization to threats and intimidation which will completely destroy all of its future effectiveness as an instrument for the settlement of international disputes and the maintenance of world peace.

It should be clear to everyone that the establishment of a Trusteeship by the United Nations in Palestine will not automatically insure peace in that country, and that force will have to be used to maintain that arrangement, just as it would have been necessary to carry out the partition decision of the United Nations.

The statement that the plan proposed by the General Assembly is an integral

MORE

plan which cannot succeed, unless each of its parts can be carried out, is incorrect. This conception was never part of the plan. Indeed it is contrary to the statement made by the representative of the United States during the General Assembly.

It is clear that an attempt is being made to force a solution upon the Jewish people of Palestine which would diminish its sovereignty, territory and immigration as was provided for in the partition plan. Otherwise no new proposals would now be made by the United States delegation looking towards a new solution. The United States knows full well that the Arabs have opposed and continue to oppose every solution which offers any satisfaction to the legitimate rights of the Jewish people in Palestine.

The Jewish Agency has repeatedly been under necessity of stating that the Partition Plan represented maximum sacrifice on the part of the Jewish people beyond which it cannot go. Any proposals calling for further sacrifices will have to be imposed upon the Jewish community of Palestine by force.

We hope that the United Nations will not knowingly assume the role of the British Mandatory in an effort to carry out the kind of restrictive crippling and discriminatory measures under which the country has been administered in recent years.

We are under obligation at this time to repeat what we stated at the session of the Security Council last week. The decision of the General Assembly remains valid for the Jewish people. We have accepted it and we are prepared to abide by it. If the United Nations Commission is unable to carry out the mandates which were assigned to it by the General Assembly, the Jewish people of Palestine will move forward in the spirit of that resolution and will do everything which will be dictated by considerations of national survival, as well as the considerations of justice and historic rights.

The world will not profit by the lesson which is now being read to it by the United States that a revision of an international judgment maturely arrived at after prolonged and objective investigation and discussion, can be extorted by threats and defiance.

United Nations

**SECURITY
COUNCIL**

Nations Unies

**CONSEIL
DE SECURITE**

UNRESTRICTED
S/P.V.274
24 March 1948
English

SECURITY COUNCIL

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH MEETING

Lake Success, New York

Wednesday, 24 March 1948, at 10:30 a.m.



President: Mr. Tingfu F. TSIANG (China)

NOTE: Any corrections of the originals of speeches in this record, provided for in rule 50 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, should be submitted in writing within two working days to Mr. E. Delavenay, Director, Editorial Division, Room CC-87, Lake Success. Corrections should be accompanied by or incorporated in a letter written on headed notepaper and enclosed in an envelope marked "Urgent" and bearing the appropriate document symbol number.

(Interpretations of speeches will be replaced in the official records by full translations from the originals.)

The PRESIDENT: I declare the two hundred and ~~seventy-fourth~~ meeting of the Security Council open.


ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

The agenda was adopted without discussion.

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

- (a) FIRST MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION (DOCUMENT S/663).
- (b) FIRST SPECIAL REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL: THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY IN PALESTINE, SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION (DOCUMENT S/676).
- (c) SECOND MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION (DOCUMENT S/695).

On the invitation of the President, Mr. Lisicky, Chairman of the United Nations Palestine Commission; Mahmoud Bey Fawzi, the representative of Egypt; Mr. Chamoun, the representative of Lebanon; and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, took their places at the Security Council table.



Mr. el-KHOURI (Syria): As no one wishes to speak now, I should like to take this opportunity to touch on the question which was referred to yesterday by the representative of Argentina with regard to the religious character of this week, and the events which took place in Palestine about nineteen centuries ago. In view of those events, which have given birth to great changes in world history during the last nineteen centuries, in view of the fact that Christians all over the world have spiritual ties with Palestine and their sympathies and feelings are concentrated on the Holy Land during this week, and in view of the present situation in Palestine, I should like to read a cable which I have received from Palestine. It reads as follows:

"The painful and regrettable situation now prevailing in Palestine has prompted representatives of all Christian Communities of the various denominations to hold a joint meeting for the purpose of discussing the abnormal position which the country has reached, realizing, as they did, their responsibility towards members of their respective communities, spiritually, morally and materially. The meeting was attended by representatives of:

The Orthodox Patriarchate,
The Latin Patriarchate,
The Armenian Orthodox Patriarchate,
The Custodian de Terra Sancta,
The Vicar of the Melkite Patriarchate,
The Arab Evangelical Episcopal Community,
The Coptic Patriarchate,
The Vicar of the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate,
Metropolitan of the Syriac Orthodox Community,

The Vicar of the Syriac Catholic Patriarchate,
The Arab Lutheran Community in Palestine.

"Having given careful consideration to the situation now prevailing in Palestine, they decided to address this statement to all world religious and political bodies, in which they seek to give expression to their deep sorrow and strong indignation at the lamentable situation in which the Holy Land, the cradle of peace, has been placed as a direct result of the erroneous policy which has been imposed on the country and which has culminated in the partition plan.

"It is our firm conviction that peace will not be restored nor would any endeavours made for the promotion of the 'peace of Jerusalem' be crowned with success unless those bodies who undertake the determination of the future of Palestine would remove the causes which have made a battlefield of the Holy Land, re-establish the principles of justice, and maintain the right of self-determination as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.

"The Christian Union wishes to declare, in unequivocal terms, that they denounce the partition plan, being of the strong conviction that this plan involves a violation of the sacredness of the Holy Land which, by its nature and history, is indivisible, and represents an encroachment on the natural rights of the Arabs, the people of the country.

"The Christian Union wishes further to declare that any attempt to enforce the erroneous policy by force will inevitably be doomed to failure: for 'right' is a stronger weapon than 'might'.

"In view of our close contact with the various classes of our communities, we deem it our duty to draw the attention of all responsible authorities to the fact that the Christian Community in Palestine of all denominations is in complete agreement, in principle and deed, with their Moslem Brethren in their endeavour to resist and ward off any violation of their rights or any encroachment on their country.

"We therefore appeal to all those in power and authority to make their best endeavours for the restoration of peace and tranquility to the Holy Land by revoking the partition plan, ensuring the unity of Palestine and promoting the welfare and prosperity of all its people."

This statement was made by all the communities and organs in Palestine representing world Christendom. Having had experience with the situation in Palestine, their judgment will certainly be sounder and more valuable than the judgment of outsiders who go to Palestine and who are so involved in special principles and special aspirations which are incorrect and fallacious.

General McNAUGHTON (Canada): I think the situation in which we now stand calls for some review.

The Plan of Partition with Economic Union, which was recommended by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947, is based on a number of important assumptions which it is very important to remember.

Events which have taken place since that date, and in particular the information which the Security Council received last week concerning consultations which had taken place among the permanent members of the Security Council, have made it clear that the expectations of November last have not been realized. In the first place, it was assumed that the two communities in Palestine would co-operate in putting into effect / solution to the Palestine problem which was recommended by the General Assembly. The manner in which it was proposed to distribute the territory between the two communities was based on the expectation that common economic policies and common fiscal services would be adopted in with a high degree of integration between the Jewish and the Arab States, and that without this integration and economic union neither state would be able to organize satisfactorily even such elementary matters as road and rail communications, telephone services and telegraph lines and the electric power and water supply. The responsibility for making the Plan of Partition with Economic Union work was to depend primarily upon the people of Palestine themselves and on their willingness to work together, particularly in economic matters.

It has now become clear, however, that co-operation between the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine to the extent assumed in the Plan of Partition is not realizable under the conditions which exist at the present time.

In the second place, it was assumed, during the discussions on Palestine at the General Assembly, that the Mandatory Power would be able to give assistance in bringing the recommendations of the General Assembly into effect; and when the Plan of Partition was first prepared by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, it was provided that the Mandatory Power should, over a period of some two years, supervise the transitional arrangements which were necessary for the realization of the Partition Plan. After the General Assembly had met, however, the Mandatory Power indicated that it would not play a major role in implementing a plan which was against the wishes of either the Arabs or the Jews of Palestine. After the General Assembly rose, the Mandatory Power confirmed the indications it had given during the discussions in the Sub-Committee stage that it could not permit the delimitations of boundaries and the recruiting of local militia until after the Mandate was terminated, since these activities would increase the problem of maintaining the public order. For the same reason, it could not allow the United Nations Palestine Commission to go to Palestine until after 1 May of this year. Preparations essential to the fulfillment of the Plan of Partition have therefore been impossible to carry out, and it is now clear that the co-operation of the

MA/gd

S/P.V. 274

13-15

United Kingdom in the execution of the Partition Plan of the General Assembly cannot be expected beyond accepting the recommendation that the Mandate itself be laid down and permitting an advance party of the Secretariat of the United Nations to undertake preparatory work in Jerusalem.



The third assumption made in adopting the plan of partition was that a resolution of the General Assembly on this subject would be accepted even by the members of the United Nations which voted against it in plenary session. And thus, in spite of the opposition of the Arab States, the General Assembly acted in the belief that a recommendation supported by at least two-thirds of the members of the United Nations present and voting would have a position close to the law and would not be opposed by any member states.

An active minority of the members of the United Nations has refused to accept the recommendation of the General Assembly, and this minority includes all states adjacent to Palestine. The nations in question are now said to be assisting in the organization of regular forces to resist partition, and they have indicated that they are prepared even to use their own armed forces if outside forces come to the aid of the Jews.

It was also assumed, when the plan of partition was adopted by the General Assembly, that it would be possible to transfer authority for the Government of Palestine rapidly and progressively from the mandatory power to the Provisional Councils of Government of the new states, and for this reason it was not expected that the Palestine Commission would be required to do more than superintend the acceptance by the Provisional Councils of Government of the administrative and protective responsibilities which the mandatory power was surrendering.

In effect, it was expected that the role of the United Nations would be no greater than to assist in the transfer of authority from the mandatory power to independent Arab and Jewish States. In practice, however, it has not proved possible to put this procedure into effect.

The progressive transfer of authority to the Provisional Councils of Government was not possible because the mandatory power did not consider that the situation in Palestine was such that the Palestine Commission could be permitted to enter Palestine until a fortnight before the termination of the mandate, and it was itself unwilling to take steps towards the establishment of local authorities to take over its administrative responsibilities. The Palestine Commission, therefore, if it were to function at all, would now have to undertake much wider responsibilities for administration following the termination of the mandate than was ever intended by the General Assembly.

Finally, it was assumed in November that the Security Council would be in a position to take the initiative in maintaining peace in Palestine if difficulties arose there during the period of transition following the surrender of the mandate. It was recognized, by some states at least, that disorder might break out in Palestine, and it was assumed that agreement could be reached in the Security Council as to the measures necessary to be taken in that event.

The report which we have recently received of discussions among the permanent members of the Security Council indicates quite clearly, however, that agreement cannot be reached under present arrangements to take effective military action to keep order in Palestine. What, then, are we to do? It seems clear that if nothing is done, either by the organized community of nations or by the states directly concerned, Palestine will become a scene of ever increasing violence and disorder. Both Jews and Arabs are prepared to fight for control of the country, and a bitter civil war seems likely to break out when the United Kingdom surrenders the mandate, unless some alternative authority is established.

The peace, not only of Palestine but of the whole Middle East, would be in danger and the interests of all members of the United Nations -- and particularly of the peoples who reside in this area -- would be seriously endangered by such a calamity.

A brief but vigorous effort has been made to give effect to the plan of partition. It is now proposed that this effort should be suspended, at least temporarily, and in considering this proposal we should not overlook the conscientious and the intelligent manner in which the Palestine Commission has endeavoured to carry out the task given to it by the General Assembly. I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the Palestine Commission and to its advisers.

The experience of the Palestine Commission has demonstrated, I think, that major tasks in the United Nations, involving heavy responsibility, should not be entrusted to commissions consisting entirely of small powers, especially if the larger powers are not in agreement that these tasks should be carried out. It is to be hoped, therefore, that if new plans for Palestine are to be considered, the responsibility for them will be assumed more directly by the powers which have major interests in that area.

There can be no doubt that the United States proposal for establishing a temporary trusteeship in Palestine presents certain difficulties^{which}/would have to be overcome. It is possible that the proposal might be resisted by both elements of the population, despite the fact that a temporary trusteeship would not prejudice in any way an eventual settlement. It was not expected by either community that the period of mandatory power would be replaced by that of some other external authority after the termination of the mandate. Neither may be expected to welcome a decision

which would mean that independence cannot now be granted to their people or that they must endure a further period of tutelage.

On the other hand, the cooling-off period which a temporary trusteeship would provide would, however, have the great merit of presenting an opportunity for moderate Jewish and Arab leaders to work out in a less unfavourable atmosphere a settlement of their common problems within the framework of the United Nations Charter. This period could be of short duration if these leaders were to address themselves with vigour and a mature sense of responsibility towards the settlement of their own problems by direct negotiation.

A Alternative plans should be considered, but there is an obvious danger, in the opinion of the Canadian delegation, that if the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, is to turn from one course of action to another without some assurance that the greatest possible amount of agreement and co-operation will be forthcoming from the countries most directly concerned, we shall again encounter serious difficulties of implementation. Therefore, in the circumstances, the Canadian delegation is not at the present stage prepared to declare itself in favour of one course of action rather than another until we have some evidence that there is a meeting of minds, on the part of the countries most directly concerned, on what the best course of action should be.

See V. 35

Mr. PARODI (France) (Interpretation from French): I had not intended to speak this morning, and I must confess that I was not prepared to present my views. If I have now decided to submit such considerations as I have in mind on this question it is because no other representative appears to wish to speak at the present stage, because the time before us is short, and because I am acutely aware of the very great responsibility that rests upon us in this matter. I must apologize to the President and to my colleagues if what I say is somewhat incoherent and if I repeat some of what I have said on previous occasions.

The general position of the French delegation in this difficult question is well known. It was formulated at the beginning of the last session of the General Assembly by the Foreign Minister of France himself. It is that we are in favour of any solution of this problem which contains elements of a conciliatory character and which envisages agreement between the parties. If this matter has now reached a stage at which it is surrounded by considerable nervousity it may be questioned whether a proposal for conciliation is reasonable. It can be suggested that a proposal to seek conciliation means a proposal which will not lead to any solution at all, but that is not so. It is not so because of the very character of the problem, which concerns these two communities in Palestine. The two communities of Palestine are closely inter-related -- so closely inter-related, in fact, as to make it impossible to envisage any solution which is not a solution of conciliation and agreement between them.

It would be impossible for these two communities, which are in such close contact with each other and which need each other for the very purposes of living, to exist together except as a result of agreement between them.

There is, of course, the other solution which is conceivable: the solution of general massacre. But no one can consider admitting such a solution. If there are massacres as a continuation of the present bloodshed, such massacres certainly would not tend to promote the cause of that agreement which must ultimately come. We must seek, therefore, the maximum measure of agreement between the two parties.

It was for this reason that on the last day but one of the last session of the General Assembly, I proposed to the General Assembly -- pointing to the more conciliatory attitude adopted in the later stages of the General Assembly by some of the Arab States -- that we should delay the decision on this matter in order to enable the more conciliatory attitude of the Arab States concerned to become more clearly formulated. I also said that the plan on partition, if adopted, would be adopted under unsatisfactory conditions. I do not wish to repeat what I said then, as I do not think that is necessary. But I do wish to say that I still feel that the General Assembly studied the various possible solutions of the question in circumstances which were not the best and which did not give us all the possible guarantees that every possible avenue was fully explored. for delay made

My proposal/on 28 November 1947 came too late. That was the opinion of the General Assembly. It was necessarily so because my proposal arose and derived from the more conciliatory attitudes adopted at the last moment by certain delegations and, also, because it is at the last

moment, before the final solution is adopted, that the parties are most ready to come to agreement, to make those concessions which are needed in order that agreement may be reached.

The opportunity that I saw at that time was not used by the General Assembly. On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly voted, by a two-thirds majority in favour of the plan which the Security Council now has before it. ^{however} The French position ~~has not~~ changed. We shall still be in favour of utilizing any possible opportunity ~~for~~ conciliation or agreement. That is the position that the French delegation has held in the past, and the position that we shall continue to hold. This is our general position.

Now, what is the present status of the problem before us? The United States delegation submitted a new proposal a few days ago which changes the situation very considerably. The French attitude to the United States proposal is favourable in the measure in which this proposal contains the possibility of delay, of providing time in which agreement may be reached between the parties, and in the measure in which it constitutes an effort to set up a regime which shall take the place of the mandatory power when the mandate ends in a very short time.

Having recognized these general advantages of the United States plan, I think I must point to a number of difficulties which it seems to involve. I think the Security Council must face up to these difficulties and must measure them before embarking upon the course proposed.

An interim trusteeship raises a number of questions. If a trusteeship allocated to one state is envisaged, we must ask ourselves whether there is a state ready to assume trusteeship. The time is too short to allow of the Security Council's discussing the possibility of trusteeship under one state unless there is a state which is definitely prepared to accept that responsibility. If, on the other hand, an international trusteeship is envisaged -- and that is the only other possibility -- I must say that that is a course which has not yet been explored. The United Nations has not yet had any experience of an international trusteeship. It is a difficult problem and, certainly, many difficulties would arise in connection with it.

Whatever trusteeship regime is adopted, it is certain to raise a number of important legal and political problems. One problem, for instance, would be in connection with the interpretation of the Charter provision concerning trusteeship agreements, which states that trusteeship agreements shall be concluded between all the states directly concerned. It is a difficult question to decide what are the states directly concerned. About a year ago, I think, we discussed this problem at some length without reaching any unanimous agreement upon the interpretation of this portion of the Charter. Probably we should regard all the neighbouring states of Palestine as states directly concerned in this question, but this raises a number of problems.

I refer these difficulties to the President's attention because they are very serious difficulties and because the Security Council can follow the United States' suggestion only if it knows clearly whither it is going.

I do not think I shall be saying anything revolutionary if I say that the discussions that have taken place in the Security Council during the last few weeks have not increased the authority of the United Nations. There is only one organ of the United Nations which has retained its authority; that is the General Assembly. It has retained its authority because, generally, it is wide in its composition and because it has succeeded in taking important decisions on a number of questions. But to convene the General Assembly now, without having first arrived at a clear view as to what the General Assembly should do, would be to incur the risk of placing the General Assembly in a very difficult position, a position which might result in the authority of the sole organ of the United Nations which has still retained its authority being diminished.

What would the General Assembly do if it were convened in accordance with the proposal before us now? The General Assembly would clearly be in a very difficult position; it would have a knife at its throat, as it were; it would have only a very short time to take its decision. It would be asked to go back on a decision which it had taken only three months ago, and I do not know whether agreement could be reached in the General Assembly to go back on that decision.

But let us suppose that the General Assembly does decide to go back upon its decision. That is only a negative solution. Something has to be substituted for the decision which is rejected.

I would ask the President whether there is any chance of there being a majority of the members of the General Assembly in favour of the proposed trusteeship solution of this problem. I submit that it will be very dangerous for us to embark upon this course without knowing whither we are going and without being sure that we shall not launch the General Assembly on a course which might prove tragic for the United Nations.

Nevertheless, I consider that the United States proposal does contain elements which deserve the most serious consideration. In the first place, a provisional trusteeship regime might provide time for a cooling off, a calming of minds. It would provide time in which agreement between the parties might be sought, that agreement which, as I have said, must come one day.

One of our concerns a few days ago -- and I think this is one of the principal concerns in the mind of the United States delegation -- is that there should be a truce, a cooling off, and that there should be an end to this increasing bloodshed in Palestine. In the measure in which the United States proposal would promote such a truce, such a cooling off, we should be in favour of this proposal, but we regret that careful study of the proposal is needed. It contains certain psychological dangers; it might render one of the parties more exacting and the other more exasperated.

In a part of the world which is particularly sensitive the United Nations has exercised changeful influences. The Security Council must see to it, therefore, that if the United States proposal is adopted, it shall tend to a pacification, a cooling off of the situation in Palestine, and here I find myself closely in agreement with what the representative of Canada said earlier this morning.

My conclusion, which I formulate in the name of the French delegation, is that we are not able, at the present time, to pronounce ourselves either for or against the United States proposal. We have referred to those elements in it which we consider to be positive and we have said that we consider that the proposal needs further study. In addition to the difficulties which trusteeship would involve for the General Assembly, there is the problem of whether a trusteeship system would be used for the purpose of promoting agreement and conciliation between the parties. There is the question whether the proposal would be understood by the two parties as intended as a measure to bring about a relaxation of tension.

Perhaps the United States plan might be extended in order to stress the purpose of promoting an increase in that conciliatory attitude which was taken by the Lebanese delegation both in the General Assembly and here in the Security Council, the proposed possible extension of the United States plan being along the following lines: the provisional trusteeship should be administered in such

a way as to organize the several parts of Palestine. For instance, Jewish and Arab cantons might be organized, enjoying a wide measure of autonomy. A provisional immigration system might be elaborated which would be equitable and which would give satisfaction to one party and safeguards to the other, a solution which we do not consider impossible.

If such an extension were worked out, perhaps the United States proposal, in that extended form, might be acceptable. The organization of Jewish and Arab cantons in Palestine need not in any way prejudice the final settlement of the Palestine problem. It would not, of course, prevent or preclude partition; on the contrary, it might even take the form of a preparation for partition, since the cantons could be formed, if such a decision were taken, into states, Jewish and Arab. On the other hand, if the final decision was in favour of a single state with guarantees for the minorities--the other solution which is envisaged-- then this organization of Arab and Jewish cantons would still hold certain valuable possibilities.

Perhaps I am going too far on the substance of this matter which might better perhaps be discussed in conversations. I wish only to indicate the direction in which the Security Council may perhaps find a solution. The position of my delegation, therefore, is that we are not able at present to vote either in favour of or against the United States proposal, and here we are in agreement with the Canadian delegation. We consider that the United States proposal needs to be more precisely formulated and elaborated, and needs to be extended perhaps by means of conversations.

I now come to my last proposal. The time before us is very short and we are more or less in a deadlock. Therefore, it seems to me that the Security Council might be well advised to hold one or two meetings which would not be public. In these meetings, the United States delegation would be asked to elaborate the proposal it has submitted and to make its views clearer and more precise. We should then be in a better position to decide the question of whether we can assume the very great responsibility of convening a special session of the General Assembly, in view of the very short time which remains.

These are the few remarks which I wish to submit regarding the method by which the Security Council should proceed.

Mr. CHAMOUN (Lebanon)(Interpretation from French): My delegation has listened with great interest to the statements made by the representatives of France and Canada. Before making the statement that I wish to make, I would draw the attention of the French delegation and of the Security Council itself to that part of the French representative's statement in which the desire is expressed that the Security Council be informed in greater detail of the United States plan, so that the Security Council would be in a position to make its decision with a full knowledge of the facts and of the proposal.

This would mean, as I understand it, that the Security Council, after hearing a detailed exposition from the representative of the United States and after discussing the matter, would make its recommendations, possibly for the convening of a special session of the General Assembly.

But I think that this way of looking at the matter fails to take consideration into / what may happen when the special session of the General Assembly is convened. The Security Council has no authority to order the General Assembly to adopt one solution or another. Under the terms of the Charter, the General Assembly is free to adopt recommendations made to it by the Security Council or to reject such recommendations. It would be free to adopt or reject the trusteeship plan. It would be free to go back on its own recommendation for partition or to maintain that recommendation.

Therefore, a detailed study of the plan submitted by the United States delegation does not seem to me to be necessary at the present stage; at any rate, it seems to me to be somewhat premature, since the General Assembly would decide freely as to what recommendation it wished to make in respect of Palestine.

I wish now to make two affirmations. In the first place, the Arab countries -- including Lebanon, of course -- are prepared to help in the maintenance of order and security in Palestine, and even to go to the length of asking the Arabs in Palestine to cease hostilities when a recommendation is adopted by the Security Council.

But this result can be achieved only if no provocative action is taken by Zionist organizations or by the Zionist population.

As regards the United States suggestion, the position of Lebanon and of all the other Arab states remains unchanged. We insist upon the total independence of a Palestine which will be undivided and democratic. If the General Assembly is called into special session, as proposed by the United States delegation, my delegation would be prepared to discuss the suggestion in a spirit of good will, in the measure in which it did not imply a delay or prevention of the achievement of the aim of independence.

The PRESIDENT: As no other member wishes to speak, I suggest that we adjourn at this point and meet again next Tuesday at 2:30 p.m.

Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): I am not prepared to speak on the matter under discussion. However, it appears to me that this is a very queer position to take; that is, that we should adjourn without respectfully requesting the United States representative to circulate, as soon as possible, the draft resolutions which he announced last Friday ^{that he would circulate} in order to give effect to his suggestions for the consideration of the Council. As a matter of fact, I think that it would have been more in order to wait until we were familiar with the draft resolutions before embarking on any discussion of the suggestions which are to be embodied in them.

There is another point which I should ^{like} respectfully to submit to the Security Council. It is that by common agreement, this matter has been placed, and should be left, in the hands of the permanent members of the Security Council. We all more or less believe that it is their responsibility, and, when other proposals have been submitted with a view to the participation of the non-permanent members in the discussions, they have been voted down. Therefore we know that it is really up to the permanent members of the Security Council to go ahead with the discussion of these matters and proposals.

Some twenty days ago we passed a resolution which requested "the permanent members of the Council to consult and to inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make as the result of such consultations recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly." I do not know whether we could truthfully consider that we have received this report. What we have received

is a memorandum from the United States delegation in which the new point of view was expressed that a trusteeship system or plan should take the place of the Plan of Partition.

In the first place, it seems to me that it would perhaps be in order to request the permanent members to submit their report on their conversations. In the second place, knowing as we do that this matter should preferably be left in their hands, we should request the permanent members to go on with their conversations and not to delay investigating or ascertaining the possibility of an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews. As a matter of fact, it will be recalled that I made a suggestion to that effect, and it was voted down, notwithstanding which it was decided immediately afterwards to invite the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine to discuss the possibility of such an agreement.

Why not go on with those consultations and lose no time in getting a report on the possibility of that agreement? Some twenty days ago, before the adjournment of a meeting of the Security Council, I proposed that we adjourn with the understanding that the representatives of the great powers should carry on these conversations. I do not like to appear obstinate, but, rather than adjourn as it has been suggested that we do, I should like to make free to submit again the same proposal: that we adjourn with the understanding that the representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council will take the matter up and go on with their conversations until they are ready to report to the Security Council. Then we shall have a basis for carrying on discussions.

The PRESIDENT: The resolution of the Security Council adopted on 5 March 1948 requested the permanent members of the Security Council, first, to consult and to inform the Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine, and, second, to recommend instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission.

On Friday last, 19 March 1948, the permanent members reported to the Security Council with regard to the first part of this resolution. The representative of the United States reported on behalf of his delegation as well as the delegations of France and China. The representative of the Soviet Union reported for himself.

At that time, on the afternoon of Friday last, the representative of the United States placed before the Security Council certain broad proposals which were to be followed by resolutions. Since Friday of last week, the consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council have not taken place.

It seems to me that at the present stage nothing will be gained by a renewal of those consultations. It would be better for the Security Council to await such detailed proposals as the delegation of the United States may place before it, or such proposals as other delegations may place before it.

Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): I am very happy that my remarks have elicited from the President the statement that he has just made, namely, that these conversations among the permanent members of the Security Council cannot usefully be renewed. Some of the representatives on the Security Council thought that would come to pass, and that is actually the trouble: that the problem was in the hands of the permanent members of the Security Council and we did not get any solution from them.

Of course, we have to go ahead with our work. The Security Council has to discharge its responsibilities -- and they are not light responsibilities -- and it is extremely useful to have the situation clarified, as the President has just done in stating that we cannot go proceed on the assumption that the conversations among the permanent members of the Security Council can be usefully carried on in this connection.

Rabbi SILVER: (Representative, Jewish Agency for Palestine): The Jewish Agency for Palestine at this moment does not wish to enter into a discussion of the proposals because these proposals have not yet been submitted, as I understand it, to the Security Council. When and if they are submitted, I am sure that we would wish to ask for the privilege of making our observations on them.

At this moment I have the honour to submit to the Security Council a statement which was adopted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the National Council of the Jews of Palestine, the Vaad Leumi, on 23 March 1948. This statement is as follows:

"The Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Vaad Leumi have learned with regret and astonishment of the attitude adopted by the United States representative in the Security Council concerning the United Nations decisions on Palestine.

"The Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi declare:

"1. The Jewish people and the Yishuv in Palestine will oppose any proposal designed to prevent or postpone the establishment of the Jewish State.

"2. We categorically reject any plan to set up a trusteeship regime for Palestine, even for a short period of time. A trusteeship would necessarily entail a denial of the Jewish right to national independence. It would leave Palestine under a foreign military regime.

"3. The failure and disintegration of the mandatory administration, the continuation of which was unanimously rejected by the United Nations, necessitates the early arrival in Palestine of the United Nations Palestine Commission. The Provisional Council of Government of the Jewish State should be recognized without delay by the United Nations Palestine Commission so that authority may be transferred to it as envisaged in the United Nations decisions.



"4. Upon the termination of the mandatory administration and not later than 16 May next, a provisional Jewish government will commence to function in co-operation with the representatives of the United Nations then in Palestine. In the meantime, we shall do our utmost to minimize the chaos created by the present government, and we shall maintain, so far as lies in our power, the public services neglected by it.

"5. The Jewish people extends the hand of peace to the Arab people and invites representatives of the Arab population of the Jewish State to take their rightful place in all its organs of government. The Jewish State will be glad to co-operate with the neighbouring Arab States and to enter into permanent treaty relations with them to strengthen world peace and to advance the development of all the countries of the Near East."


Lahmoud Bey FAWZI (Egypt): The hour is late and I have^{only} a short statement to make. I do not need to remind the members of the Security Council that from the time partition was spoken of, and particularly from the time the resolution was adopted by the General Assembly in favour of partition, we have seen in and around Palestine nothing but strife and trouble.

It is also not necessary for me to remind the members of the Security Council of, or to speak at great length about, the position of the Arabs.

The Arabs will not swallow partition no matter how great the sugar-coating. It will make no difference whether partition is administered in one big pill or in two smaller ones. Having seen the strife that partition -- or even discussion of partition or a recommendation concerning it -- has brought, it is only normal to return the whole

question for review and reconsideration and not to proceed at the present at the moment with the particular proposal or suggestion that was made by the representative of the United States. However, I wish to say that any decision which means, to begin with, suspending the implementation of a solution which brought only trouble, would be a decision in the proper direction.

I shall not comment any further on the general aspect of the statements made this morning. However, before concluding, I wish to comment on the statement just made by the American representative or spokesman of the Jewish Agency. There is a part of his statement which is principally the concern of the Security Council itself in connection with its own prestige. The Security Council is certainly capable of taking care of its own prestige. I do not wish to comment in full on the rest of the statement at this time. I shall simply say that the road to order, in view of what the spokesman of the Jewish Agency has said, points entirely in another direction.



JC/gpr/ec

£/P.V.274

56

The PRESIDENT: I wish to announce that the meeting originally scheduled for tomorrow afternoon to discuss the Pakistan-India question has been postponed to Monday afternoon, 29 March. The discussion of the Palestine question will be resumed Tuesday afternoon.

The meeting rose at 12:53 p.m.

