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Jewish Agency, American Section minutes, 1948.

MINUTES OF MEETING

AMERICAN SECTION OF THE EXECUTIVE OF THE
JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

Monday, December 27, 1948

PRESENT:

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver (presiding)
Dr. Nahum Goldmann
Mr. Meir Grossman
Mrs. Samuel W. Halprin
Mr. Zvi Lurie
Dr. Emanuel Neumann
Dr. Joseph Schechtman
Mr. Baruch Zuckerman

Mr. Gottlieb Hammer
Mr. Edwin Rosenberg
Mr. Harry L. Shapiro
Mr. Abraham Tuvim
Mr. Herman L. Weisman

CHAIRMAN SILVER: With your kind permission we will call the meeting to order. We have a rather heavy agenda and would like to transact as much business as we can this evening. The first item is a matter that has been referred to us by the Executive Board of the UPA, and it concerns the question of the reinstatement of five members of the staff who resigned during the recent controversy. The UPA considered the matter at its last meeting and resolved that inasmuch as the negotiations with reference to a settlement of the differences first took place here, that the Executive of the Jewish Agency, and inasmuch as this question involved matters of fact with reference to the agreement, that agreement that was finally reached, that the Executive of the Jewish Agency be asked to consider the matter in the first instance. As you will remember, I brought up this matter at our last meeting on Thursday and it was decided to put this item as the first item on our agenda for the meeting this evening and to invite Mr. Rosenberg and Mr. Weisman of the UPA along with Dr. Neumann, who is a member of our Executive, and such others as may have anything to contribute to the question to be present. And so we are now considering the matter. I do not know who desires to open this

subject -- Mr. Rosenberg, or Mr. Weisman, or Dr. Neumann. Perhaps as Chairman of the UPA, Mr. Weisman, you will make the introduction.

MR. WEISMAN: I would be glad to.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: I think Mr. Dewey Stone also was invited by you.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Mr. Dewey Stone was invited, but could not make it.

MR. WEISMAN: Mr. Chairman, I feel that in view of the way my name has been used in documents, telegrams that have been circulated around -- not by Mr. Rosenberg -- I ought to present this matter in what I consider the proper factual setting, without, so far as I am able, indulging in any characterizations or opinion. I have prepared this statement which the stenotypist need not record. I will give you a copy.

(Statement read by Mr. Weisman as follows:)

1. Mr. Rosenberg's letter to the acting chairman of the UPA, dated December 14, 1948, and received on December 17, deals with the status of the five members of the staff who had resigned from the UPA on November 15 and recommends "That the five men be returned to their former posts in the UPA as of Monday, December 20." (Copy of the full text of the letter will be available.)

2. It will be noted that the letter is written by Mr. Rosenberg on the premise that he holds the "official position as an individual arbitrator to resolve the questions regarding the five staff persons who resigned from the United Palestine Appeal". This premise is presumably derived from a telephone conversation had between Mr. Rosenberg and myself during the morning of Sunday, December 5.

The telephone conversation between myself and Mr. Rosenberg on December 5 cannot properly be understated without reference to the discussion concerning the status of the five members of the staff which was had during the night of November 22-23, as part of the negotiations between representatives of the Committee of Contributors, on the one hand, and Dr. Newman and myself,

on the other hand, in the presence of the Conciliation Committee of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds. Mr. Philip Bernstein kept a record of what took place on all subjects during these negotiations including this particular subject. The record of the discussion concerning the five men has not been made available to me despite repeated requests of myself and Mr. Shapiro. I believe it has been made available to Mr. Rosenberg.

3. The discussion concerning the status of the five men on November 23: About 4:30 a.m., the negotiators for the Committee of Contributors brought up the subject of the reinstatement of the five men. Dr. Neumann and I never qualified our position that these former members of the staff could bring about consideration of their reinstatement by making application to the UPA by withdrawing their resignations, and writing letters containing suitable retractions of the statements which they had made on November 15 and released to the general press on that day and thereafter. Dr. Neumann and I emphasized that these former members of the staff in addition to resigning interjected themselves, publicly in the newspapers and otherwise, into a controversy in a manner calculated to subject the United Palestine Appeal to a loss of prestige and to an undermining of public confidence in the management of the affairs of the UPA. The Committee of Contributors took the position that they had a sense of responsibility for the men who had resigned and while they had not discussed the matter of reinstatement with those men, felt it necessary to request their reinstatement as part of the settlement of the controversy. Under these conditions the following procedure was developed after a lengthy discussion:

a. Messrs. Lurie and Bernstein were first to interview each of the men to ascertain his desire to be reinstated.

b. Those who expressed a desire for reinstatement would be asked to write to the UPA withdrawing their resignations and making suitable retractions to the UPA of statements which they had made in terms satisfactory to

the Executive Committee of the UPA.

3. In the event that the Executive of the UPA, upon receipt of such letters, would find them unsatisfactory or would decline reinstatement, the matter would at that point be treated as a grievance between an organization and a member of the staff. It was further agreed that under such circumstances the aggrieved person could resort to the Council in a manner customary in such disputes. It should be noted that in this connection the words "mediation", "Conciliation" and "arbitration" were employed by various people who spoke, and I have no recollection as to what word was used when the final understanding was reached about 5:45 a.m. on November 23.

4. Late in the afternoon of November 23, Mr. Philip Bernstein informed me that the whole matter of the status and reinstatement of the five men who resigned must be removed from the record, saying that the negotiators reported to him that it was the wish of these men not to have their personal employment made part of any settlement of the controversy. This accounts for the fact that the original draft of the agreement, dated November 23, 1948, prepared by the Council, contained no reference whatever to the five men.

5. On Friday, December 3, Dr. Neumann read to me over the telephone the text of three additional paragraphs, which had been read to him by Mr. Dewey Stone, representing the additional requests of the Committee of Contributors, acceptance of which would lead to complete agreement.

Mr. Dewey Stone also telephoned me in order to give me the text of those three paragraphs, but instead I read to him the text which Dr. Neumann had furnished me and found the same to be correct. It was in the course of that conversation that Mr. Dewey Stone stated to me that at the conference which took place in his room at the Waldorf on December 1, Mr. Monter again reiterated the position that the status or reinstatement of the five men must be completely left out of the settlement of the controversy. Mr. Stone made no other statements to me on that subject. He did go on to say that if the

additional three paragraphs were deemed acceptable by Dr. Neumann and myself, then the "ratification" meeting, which the Committee called for Sunday, December 5, "would become a mere formality".

6. On Saturday, December 4, I received from the Council a proposed release to the press together with a draft of the agreement containing the three additional paragraphs. The text of the agreement supplied on December 4 included what later came to be known as Paragraph 5, referring to the prompt suspension by the Committee of Contributors of its activities and its dissolution in due course. On the same day, Mr. Rosenberg, in response to the request made of the Council by the UPA, provided assurances that (1) Dr. Neumann and I were correct in regarding the three additional paragraphs dealing with corporate procedure of the UPA as "recommendations" to the UPA, whose governing board would be constituted in accordance with the agreement, and (2) that we were also correct in construing paragraph 4, dealing with the cancellation of the December 12 conference, and the above-mentioned paragraph 5 as of cardinal importance to the agreement as a whole.

7. On Sunday, December 5, I received a telephone call from Mr. Rosenberg at my office. He stated that the Committee of Contributors re-opened the issue about the reinstatement of the five men, that it was too late for the Conciliation Committee of the Council to deal with the matter, that he therefor offered himself in his personal capacity as sole arbitrator. I flatly declined and protested against this new condition after being told that approval by the Committee of Contributors would be a mere formality. After some discussion I stated (and to the best of my recollection in these words):

"The most I could do would be to stand on the record which Phil Bernstein made that night (November 23rd). If you want to act personally in lieu of the Council, that is agreeable. Go ahead and interview the men and get letters from them. If the UPA refuses to reinstate the men, you can act in whatever capacity we agreed to as shown by Bernstein's record. I cannot

remember whether the record says mediator or arbitrator, or what -- but whatever it is -- you are "it". That's all I can do."

Mr. Rosenberg thanked me and then said the UPA has nothing to worry about because "After all my experience in such things is from the point of view of an employer, and I'm going to take the attitude of an employer in this matter." Mr. Rosenberg also said that if the men were reinstated it would be until December 31, 1948, that "the new Board could do what it liked."

So the matter was left. What appears above may have taken place in two telephone conversations on Sunday, December 5th, within a few minutes of each other.

I find the following cryptic entry in my diary made that very day:

"Sunday: Re 5 employees: Record made by Bernstein stands; willing for Rosenberg to speak to men, to replace Council; handled on individual basis for each who sends letter making amends, N.R. to take attitude of employer December 5th."

8. That night, December 5th, we learned that the Committee of Contributors did not ratify the agreement as written, but no further details were available. On December 6th, we learned that the Committee had failed to ratify Paragraph 5, but no further details were available. That evening Mr. Bernstein met with Dr. Neumann, Mr. Shapiro and myself and advocated our acceptance of the omission of Paragraph 5, representing that according to the information which he received from a number of people present at the meeting of the Committee, there was a consensus of opinion that "de facto" the Committee was actually going to suspend activities. The matter of the five men was not mentioned. On Tuesday, December 7th, during the day, both Mr. Bernstein and Mr. Rosenberg again assured me of the de facto suspension of activities by the Committee of Contributors. The five men were not mentioned.

It was on that basis that the whole subject was presented to the Agency the evening of December 7th, when no mention whatever was made of the subject

of the five men.

9. More than a week after the meeting of the Agency on December 7th, the Committee of Contributors circulated a letter containing a number of enclosures, including copy of a letter dated December 6th from the Committee of Contributors to Mr. Edwin Rosenberg. It is true that this letter makes it very plain that there was no intention of the Committee to suspend activities on a de facto basis, or otherwise. It is also true that every aspect of the agreement is reviewed in that letter, but the subject of the five members of the staff was not referred to in any way.

We were told nothing whatever about this letter, although Dr. Neumann in his office on December 6th asked Mr. Bernstein in so many words, whether there were any collateral communications or letters between the Council and the Committee of Contributors. The answer was in the negative that evening and we were told nothing about it during the day of December 7th or thereafter. It should be stated that when this letter came to light, both Mr. Rosenberg and Mr. Bernstein told me that they did not feel it necessary to reveal the receipt or the contents of the letter, because it was not written to the Council, but to Mr. Rosenberg in his personal capacity to his private business office.

10. On Thursday, December 9th, I walked with Mr. Rosenberg from the Harmony Club where we had a HJA meeting, to his hotel. We discussed the subject of the five men whom he was meeting that very night. I stated our position in the same terms set forth in this memorandum and urged Mr. Rosenberg to handle the matter in such a way as to have each of the men who desire to return write appropriate letters to the UPA.

In response to a telephone call from Mr. Rosenberg, I talked with him Sunday evening, December 12th at the conclusion of the meeting of the ZOA. Administrative Council. In that conversation he took the position that the HPA must take the five men back and that he was going to write me a letter on

the subject. I protested against the procedure, stating that we expected to receive letters from the men who wanted to come back. In arguing the necessity for a retraction, I made reference to a newspaper article in the New York Star under date of November 17th. Mr. Rosenberg hadn't seen it and asked me to send it to him, which I did that very evening. I discussed this matter with Mr. Rosenberg again on December 14th. He told me he had prepared a letter in which he was stating the conditions on/which the men should be reemployed. Again I protested and urged him not to send me such a letter because it was not in accordance with our understanding.

11. The letter came to my private office on Friday, December 17th, but I was not in the office that day. On Monday, I was tied up in the morning in Court and went directly to a UJA meeting. When I saw the letter finally, I didn't see any point in writing any answer, since I had not succeeded even before getting the letter to persuade Mr. Rosenberg that his procedure was not in accordance with our understanding.

12. I have had an opportunity to examine the contents of certain telegrams sent to members of the Executive Committee of the UPA., signed by Rothberg and Venesky, as well as the telegram to this body sent by Mr. Feinberg. If the Committee were told by anybody that I had agreed to the reinstatement of the men if they desire to come back, it was not on my authorization. There was not even a hint to me that any such statement was requested by, or made to the Committee of Contributors.

13. It seems necessary to say now that the understanding which I did reach with Mr. Rosenberg on the morning of December 5th, was premised on the ratification by the Committee of Contributors of the agreement as it stood. I agreed to the reintroduction of the subject of the five men only on the promise that ratification of the agreement with all the paragraphs, including paragraphs 4 and 5, would indeed be a mere formality. Were I to have known or even suspected that the Committee of Contributors would not suspend its

activities, I would not have agreed to let the matter of reinstatement stand on the record made by Mr. Bernstein. It will be observed that that record was made between 4:30 and 5:45 A.M. on November 23rd, after agreement was reached on all points, including the paragraph dealing with suspension by the Committee of Contributors of its activities and its dissolution in due course.

(End of prepared statement)

MR. WEISMAN: I want to say a few words now immediately proceeding the act of resignation by the men and what happened thereafter. On November 9th I had arranged for a staff luncheon. This was immediately following the UPA Conference in Chicago which ended, I believe on Sunday, the 7th. At that luncheon I told the staff, which included the five men whom we are discussing tonight, that there was no thought in anybody's mind of making any changes in the staff. They were perfectly welcome to stay, but if they were going to stay, I feel I have a right to ask two things; first, I would like to know whether in their work they would be prepared to make loyalty to the UPA paramount to any feeling of friendship or loyalty that they may still have for a former chief in the person of Mr. Montor, and secondly, I wanted to know whether they were prepared to go along with the position of the Executive Committee of the UPA, that the threatened calling of a Conference for the purpose of organizing an independent campaign for Israel was against the best interests of the Movement. Both of these questions the reply -- particularly of the five men in question -- was that they would let me know by Friday. That is to say by November 12th.

I must tell this body, and perhaps one particular member of this body will understand something that he had not understood before, that it was that statement about which I have not talked previously, which led me to feel that we must do something promptly about getting a successor to Mr. Montor in the position of Executive Director of the UPA. On November 10th, through a sub-committee of the UPA we explored the possibility of retaining Mr. Shapiro

for the UPA as our representative in the UJA and making some arrangement whereby the pattern of the JDC would be followed in having an Executive Director, or Acting Executive Director of the UPA. That was the evening of November 10th. The morning of November 11th when I explored the possibility in a conversation with Mr. Seave, it became apparent that he was not prepared to cooperate. He wanted to be Executive Director of the UPA. He did not recognize the difficulty created by the fact that on Morgenthau's request Mr. Montor was staying in the UJA until the end of the year, and that therefore it was impossible as of that moment to carry out this notion of following the JDC pattern, even assuming that the Executive Committee will be prepared to adopt it. I spent three or four hours with Mr. Seave on November 11th, trying to persuade him to play along, to stay with the organization. I looked into the records and found that his title was that of an Administrative Assistant, and I found that not to be consistent with the duties that he had as he described them. I thought he was more in the nature of an Assistant Executive Director or perhaps an Associate Executive Director, and I suggested to him that under the new set-up, the UPA Executive Committee would in all probability approve of a change in title from that of Administrative Assistant to that of Associate Director, or Assistant Director. He said he would let me know in the morning. That was Friday. I talked with him again on November 12th. That was the day when there was released to the country in my name, as Acting National Chairman, a summarization of the events, of how the controversy was precipitated, of what action was taken by the Executive Committee on November 11th and what happened in Chicago. All of that was written by Mr. Seave. I simply endorsed and adopted the report which he made, which I found factual, although had I written it myself I might have written it somewhat differently. There was no hint in the course of my discussion with him about that report. He felt the UPA lacked sincerity in its desire and its decisions in favor of strengthening its organization by in-

cluding public representatives and other ways. I got no answer from him on the main subject on November 12th. Since I told the staff on November 9th that it was not I who made Friday any deadline, it was they who mentioned Friday, I was prepared on November 12th to wait further. I should say that November 12th is not of accidental significance, because it happens that on the evening of November 11th there was scheduled to take place a meeting of the Committee of Contributors, which was postponed. Instead of being held before the Chicago Conference, where some decision could be reached in time for the Conference, it was held afterwards. On November 13th, that was the very day when Mr. Locker arrived, I read a report in the Times coming down on the train in which the Committee of Contributors had issued their statement that they had actually decided to call the Conference in Atlantic City on December 12th, explaining in this release that the purpose of the Conference was to find ways and means for raising the most money possible for immediate transmission to Israel. The release is available. Everybody probably read it. But those who do not remember it can have their memory refreshed by reading it. Upon getting off the train therefore, On Saturday, November 13th, instead of going to my office, I went to the UPA office and found Mr. Seeve there, showed him the release and said, now I really had to have an answer to the original two questions that I had put to the staff on November 9th. Well, he was not quite prepared, he said he would let me know Monday. On Monday, which day I was not in my office until late in the afternoon, although by telephoning in I realized that Mr. Seeve was calling me, within a few minutes of the time the letter of resignation by the five men, one letter signed by five men -- incidentally, signed by Mr. Seeve as Acting Director -- it was within a few minutes of their handing me that letter, together with another mimeographed release to the newspapers, that all five men physically packed up and left the quarters of the UPA. On November 16th we had a meeting of the rest of the staff, including the girls, tried to build up the morale of the

staff. Mr. Shapiro was there for the first time. We thought we made some progress. Opportunity for questions was given. There were no questions, but within three or four hours after directions were given to the secretaries of the men who had left to carry forward certain work which was pending, we found that the secretaries of these respective members of the staff were resigning their positions and I am informed that they have gone and are still working for the Committee of Contributors. On November 17th there appeared in the New York Star the article to which I made reference before, and a copy of which I sent to Mr. Rosenberg. It was later corrected, but the heading is, "UJA Split Will Widen, Ex-Aide Says." There was a correction the following day, indicating that what was meant was UPA, not UJA. Parenthetically, I may say that throughout the Anglo-Jewish press in the United States, the phrase, "UJA Split" was used during these weeks. Now this article quotes Mr. Seave, saying that "the funds should be sent directly to Israel where the Israelis could divide the funds as they see fit." Seave said, "very probably the five Executives would join the Committee of Contributors and Workers, a group of dissenters which consists of about 300 fund-raisers from at least 30 Jewish communities. This group says it collected \$150,000,000 in UJA's last campaign."

On November 17th, the same day, but it came to my attention some days later, the Committee of Contributors circulated a letter. This letter came to me from a small contributor in Ohio and I therefore judge that the list that was used is the big list of 100,000 names. On November 17th the five men themselves mimeographed copies of their letters of resignation and sent it around to members of the Board of the UPA, as well as the Executive Committee. But this letter of the Committee of Contributors has a significant sentence in it. "That they," referring to the men who resigned, "took the bold step they did is the best evidence of the deterioration that is taking place in the structure of the UPA. We feel", the Committee says, "their letter of resigna-

tion is an important public document and we take the liberty of sending you a copy."

In another communication of the Committee where their whole case is stated, I do not have a copy of that with me, but which was circulated around the same time, it was the very day in which we had come to an agreement about the first paragraph and it was a call to the Conference. They had, I think, a four-page fold-over closely printed circular letter and at least a page was devoted to the fact of the resignation and the significance of the resignation, much in the same context as the few words that I read to you. I do not know the part which these men play, if any, in preparing these circular letters that have been distributed by the Committee of Contributors since the agreement was made public on December 8th. I know that the letter of December 14th containing an analysis in columns of what the condition was before and what the condition is now under the agreement, was something which the Committee should not have sent before exhibiting to the Council in accordance with the agreement, and I am assuming that it was not shown to the Council, that it would be interesting to know to what extent any of these five men participated in the preparation of such material. In any case, it seems to me unthinkable that an organization like the UPA would consider the reinstatement of these five men without hearing a single word directly from them as to their wish to come back and work for the UPA and what the UPA on their own statement may expect from them in terms of devotion and dedication to the service and the subversion of any personal ideas that they may have and that anybody can express, but which people in their position ought not to use publicly for the purpose of undermining the morale of an organization and the prestige and reputation of an organization like the UPA.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Thank you very much, Mr. Weisman. Mr. Rosenberg?

(Pages fourteen through twenty-two includes full text of report of Mr. E. Rosenberg, copy of which was forwarded to Dr. Silver and Mr. Rosenberg)



Dr. Neumann, you were one of the negotiators. Would you like to add anything?

DR. NEUMANN: I would, if you will permit me. I would like to clarify in my own mind one or two questions. Before I say anything at all I want to express what I have already done previously at the meetings of this Executive, my own deep appreciation of the almost super-human efforts of the Conciliation Committee, and particularly of Mr. Rosenberg. The meetings that I have attended with him have been a monument of patience and a model of objectivity and fairness on his part, and whatever you may think about this apparent misunderstanding will not change my appreciation in any way of the great services which Mr. Rosenberg has rendered, and of the amazing qualities that he displayed during those long hours that we sat together.

Now I would like to ask whether Mr. Rosenberg, when he discussed the matter of re-employment of these men on December 5th, whether he regarded whatever understanding he reached, or believed to reach, with Mr. Weisman as being an outgrowth to the continuation of the discussions which we had

on the 23rd of November, or whether he regarded this as a new matter, as something new and an entirely new endeavor at an agreement, without any reference to what had been before?

MR. ROSENBERG: Well, let me put it this way, Dr. Neumann. Having been present at that meeting, and knowing your and Mr. Weisman's desires, I would say that I felt that I was not injecting anything new into the picture, and that I knew it fairly well and knew what your desires and Mr. Weisman's were, and I am sure if and when you get the minutes that you certainly discussed it at great length and pointed out how you felt about it, etc. I want to say one more thing, if I may, and that originally when I said that I could look at it from an employer's point of view, I did to a certain extent change my mind, because I felt that by and large this was actually not an employer, but a custodian. I am trying to tell you how I saw things.

DR. NEUMANN: I was not particularly referring to that phrase.

MR. ROSENBERG: That is one reason that I felt that I could deviate somewhat from the position that I had stated, that I would have as an employer, but I would say that I distinctly remember that you did talk at long length, Dr. Neumann, and not badly at all, regarding the responsibility that these men had towards the organization that they left, and as I say, I tried very hard to put this in a way whereby the UPA in no way could be harmed, on the other hand, could demand of these people, even Montor then if they had written a letter of apology, that the acceptance by them -- I am telling you of my feeling -- the acceptance by them of these two statements about as strong a worded document as I think I could have written for them to have accepted and take their position under these statements. That letter was written to them, and I sent Mr. Shapiro a copy of a letter that was sent to them so that they should understand what they have been told.

DR. NEUMANN: Well, I understand that you felt that morning that in view of the fact that the Committee of Contributors were meeting and that no

one could foretell what would be the outcome of that meeting and felt strongly the need of getting them to accept the meeting, etc., Mr. Weisman felt the same way.

MR. ROSENBERG: Well, very frankly, it was very frightening to me, after all we went through, that it might be objected. Whether I acted badly or not, I did it with -- you know of course, Hell is paved with good intentions. But maybe that is my problem.

DR. NEUMANN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say this then, there are several questions involved here, one which I consider to be at least as important as any other aspect, and that is the recurrent challenge of the good faith of the UPA and the leadership. This recurrent challenge is something which I am beginning to revolt against with every fiber of my being, and with every drop of blood in my system. It is intolerable and I would rather step out of the Zionist Movement than to have our good faith and our honor challenged, impuned at every step and broadcast to the country and abroad whenever a group of people, ^{for} some of whom I have respect, some of whom I have loathing and contempt, take ^{it} into their hands to throw out such a challenge. Whenever it suited the convenience of some of these men, at any step of the negotiations, they proceeded to charge us with breach of faith and God knows, if one were to examine the thing properly the charge would probably be made on the other side. We had acted, as I know, we leaned backwards. And so I say, one aspect of this matter which concerns me very, very deeply is this question which I saw referred to in telegrams by Feinberg and Venesky and his other companion there in Peoria, Rothberg, as if we had committed ourselves, we had promised certain things and then we had gone back on our promises. It is these people who repeatedly went back on their promises and are doing it every day. They are violating the agreement every day by continuing their activity. It is these people who want to put us in the position of having broken promises and broken faith, and that is some-

thing which I feel must be cleared up. It is not, therefore, a question of Mr. Rosenberg or Weisman or anybody else. It is a question of whether we have or have not engaged ourselves before we decide what we are going to do with these people. That is in my mind perhaps a secondary question, and just to say, yes, we have to take them, is in my mind an admission of moral laxity on our part, which I do not think is deserved. I do not think we should do it at the point of a gun, because the same group who was trying to blackmail us time and again, is using the same methods over again.

Now I want to say a word about our discussions on the 23rd. I reported briefly at that time here, and I think I said to Dr. Silver and others, that as far as this question is concerned, it remains pretty much in the air after all our discussions. The question was raised at something like four o'clock, four-thirty in the morning, and I threw up my hands and I said I am not going to enter into a consideration of this question. It had never been raised, it had never been placed on the agenda, we had no notice on it, and at the last moment, after we had sweated out and made all kinds of mutual concessions, they came along with a new gun to our head, you either do this or it is off, and I said very definitely, if you want to break off the whole discussion on this business, all right. Our friends of the Council went back and forth and there were all kinds of proposals made. There was a proposal that there should be an arbitration, we should agreed upon an arbitrator. They said they were not prepared to do so, were not prepared to abdicate on the part of UPA the right to determine who shall work for them and under what conditions, and then I said, if you ask my advice, I can only give advice, I cannot enter into negotiations on this, but my advice would be to tell those boys that they should write letters applying for re-employment. The letters should contain proper apologies for aspersions they had cast upon the UPA, again upon the good faith of the UPA, and then my recommendation to the UPA would be to appoint a committee and to examine each case on

its merits and then recommend what action should be taken. It developed subsequently that we said that if, thereafter, they had made proper amends and their cases were considered by a proper committee of the UPA and either employment were offered to them on certain conditions or not, then if any of them had grievances they had a proper case for arbitration of grievances. Well, that did not seem to be acceptable to these people. I finally took my hat and coat, announced that I was exhausted physically and psychologically and any other way, that I could not go into this matter any further at that time, and my last recommendation was that the agreement as we had worked out should be the agreement, and that this question should be left for a further stage and that the Council should endeavor to mediate on this question, and mediation had a certain well-established connotation; that is that they would talk to them, they would talk to us, and they would see whether a procedure could be found which would be agreeable and which would lead to some solution. That, I believe is how it was left. I do not know whether the other men agreed to that, the other party, but it was left in the air in the form which I now describe it, and we certainly did not agree at that time that the Council, as a body, or anybody else should sit as arbitrator and decide this issue. Even if we had agreed upon this method and gone ahead, there are certain well established procedures for arbitration. Arbitration means that the views of both sides are heard, grievances are ventilated, proposals of both sides entertained, finally there is some decision. But we did not agree to arbitration. We did not even formally agree to mediation, but I threw that out as a final suggestion as to how that matter could be handled.

Well, subsequently I heard nothing further about this matter whatsoever, from anybody, not from a soul. At a meeting of the Committee of Contributors on December 5th, all I knew was there were new points which the Committee of Contributors were raising which we had not discussed. Some of them had been

discussed but they were not included in the agreement as summarized by the Council and as initialed by us at the request of the Council. They had refused to initial it and they had new demands, new points. In fact, on the Friday before that Sunday, I found on my desk within a quarter of an hour two different versions of the three additional points that they wanted to have included. First there was one draft and then they were told that they were not satisfied with that draft and then there was a new draft. Then I was also told about the conversation that took place in Mr. Dewey Stone's room to which we were ^{not} a party. It was a one-sided affair. It was a meeting only with the other group. It was the Conciliation Committee meeting with those people in Mr. Dewey Stone's apartment and certain things transpired there. When Mr. Dewey Stone left he thought there was an agreement and Mr. Rosenberg reported to me, and half an hour later there was no agreement and even Mr. Rosenberg lost his patience, his monumental patience and lost perhaps, his temper with him, for these constant changing positions. Then we were told, subsequently, and he came to me. Mr. Phil Bernstein pleaded that we we accept these additional points, then everything is settled, there are no questions, there are no issues, the whole business is finished and he sat and he pleaded with me very earnestly, why should we endanger this whole business, that can be accepted and we should swallow that too, and that we were assured that if that is agreed to, the rest is a formality of the meeting on Sunday. Word was not said to him by me or anybody else, that there was not an additional condition that these people must be returned. You felt on Sunday morning that unless they, the Committee of Contributors, had the feeling of assurance that these men would be re-employed, that the whole agreement was in danger, and I fully appreciate Mr. Rosenberg's apprehension after all the labors that have been put in on that score, and his anxiety to find a way of reassuring them too on that score, but as I say, so far as we were concerned, so far as I was concerned, I had no knowledge at all of

this new condition, and the first I heard of it was in connection with the letter that Mr. Rosenberg was about to send, or had sent to Mr. Weisman, which I read for the first time the other night at a meeting of the UPA. I want to say that I requested the Council, I do not want to belabor the point, it is not for the purpose of criticising, I had requested the Council several times to let us have their own record, their own record, not my record, of our discussions on this point on November 23rd. I repeated it to Mr. Rosenberg and I repeated it again to Mr. Philip Bernstein, because I felt that it would be helpful in considering the matter we had before us that record. My discussion with Mr. Bernstein he took this position and I think I ought to tell you.

MR. ROSENBERG: I have not seen him.

DR. NEUMANN: He took the position that having this record was irrelevant because this was not the old idea, but this was something new which was concocted apparently between Mr. Rosenberg and Mr. Weisman on the morning of December 5th, because he said at that time the only thing that was talked about as a possible function for the Council was mediation, whereas this new thing was a question of arbitration, and arbitration by one officer of the Council rather than the whole group, and so in his opinion it was unnecessary to have that record and apparently the other people had repeatedly insisted that that part of the minutes be not made part of the record. I did not understand, nor do I quite understand now, why they have so insisted. Perhaps because they did not like to contemplate the kind of announcement that might be made. But I must say that it is difficult for me to accept the position and I cannot accept it, that we who negotiated this agreement, the Agency Executive and the UPA, have bound ourselves to re-employ these five men, or had intended to and did in fact abdicate all authority in regard to that matter leaving it in the hands of some other person. That was, I think, never our intention, and to me it is evident from the dis-

cussion that just preceded, that it was not the intention of Mr. Weisman and that Mr. Rosenberg was acting rather as a friend of both sides and assumed certain things for the sake of bringing the matter to a close, and I am not criticizing at all his taking that position. But it is one thing to endeavor to settle a thing that way. It is quite another thing to have us charged with having first made a deliberate commitment and then deliberately broken the commitment. I think that that really is a charge that cannot lie against us in this regard. What should be done with regard to the five men is another matter. That is something which you should consider, and I would have certain ideas on the subject. I want, first of all, to clarify in my mind to the best of my ability where the matter stands so far as the obligation of the UPA is concerned under the agreement. I do not want to refer, Mr. Chairman, to the final point which is very important too, that even if there had been a clear and explicit commitment on our part on that Sunday morning, which I cannot find even on the basis of the discussion which took place there, supposing that was thrown in as an additional inducement for the Committee of Contributors to ratify the agreement and make no further difficulties, the fact is that they did not ratify the agreement as it was drafted by the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds and as we initialled it ^{but} upon their request, they arbitrarily made changes which suited them and after having done that, after having repudiated the unanimous recommendation of their five negotiators, which was a written form, very clear, very explicit, they turn around and want to charge us with a breach of faith without further ado to employment of these five men. Nothing at all in writing, nothing had been written, nobody had been appointed, and the whole thing rests upon a telephone conversation or two upon the matter in which these Welfare men might be handled by the Council and my conclusion, Mr. Chairman, therefore is that such a charge cannot lie against us or against the UPA, and if there is any doubt whatever on that score, I would very much

want to have the record of our discussions that morning and examination of that record and our minutes here, or anybody whom we designate to determine that question, because my action with regard to the further question as to what we should do about these men would depend in the first place upon a clear understanding of our moral and legal position in the matter.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I think while Mr. Rosenberg and Mr. Weisman are here and before the members of the Executive proceed to discuss among themselves what action they want to take, I think if you have any questions of fact that you want to ask Mr. Rosenberg or Mr. Weisman, please do so now.

MR. ROSENBERG: I just want to say one thing which may or may not be of interest to you all, and that is this; that in my dealings with these members of the Committee of Contributors, I have found out by and large that outside of one or two, they are very anxious, very desirous of having this thing settled in an amicable way. It is unfortunate that some of them have been misled by the actions of one or two individuals and these one or two individuals have made themselves so very voluble and made such very really bad statements, it was very difficult for me to keep my own temper ^{not} at times. Dr. Neumann was present at all of the meetings, so he may not understand exactly what I am saying, but at Dewey Stone's room that night, or that afternoon, Dewey Stone saw very well what went on and I think that really, from the angle of the best interests of the UPA, it should be understood that very many of these men are very desirous of working in the UPA. It was in Dewey Stone's own room that day that one of the members said to me, he said, after all, I am perfectly willing to tell you outside, but I cannot tell you in the presence of another member of this Committee, so that by and large I want to say that you should not treat them all the same way. They have been really, some of them have been terribly mishandled and this matter of rushing into print and having names on the bottom of statements is one that people who having first found the ability to get their names

discussed feel that it is a wonderful marvelous thing for them to have. I only say that to you from my experience with quite a few of these people.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I would like to ask one or two questions, just for clarifying my own mind. From what you say, the only reason why you did not ask these five to send in letters of retraction was that you thought it would be difficult to draft that kind of a letter.

MR. ROSENBERG: No, that was not the only reason. I said that was one of the reasons. I thought that the action that I was taking wherein I made the conditions, that these conditions were so clear that it would be tantamount, I thought even better than a letter from the angle that they are agreeing to the conditions and those conditions I thought were very crystal clear.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Well, in the letter that you wrote to the UPA in giving your conclusions as an arbitrator, you did not elaborate on quite a number of the things that you elaborated on this evening, especially in terms of what you said to these five and what they agreed to what you said. I wonder whether it would not be much more helpful for that matter whether it is not yet too late, that in giving your recommendations as arbitrator to the UPA, that you had quoted in that letter, having made up your mind that letters are undesirable, what you said to them and what they said to you. And I am wondering also whether at any stage in the game you requested these men to retract the charges that they made publicly, or whether in your letter to the UPA you might not have indicated if you had asked that question of the five men that they do retract the statement which they have made, in other words if your letter had been a little fuller and had given the members of the UPA fuller picture of your discussions with these five, and what the understanding was between you and these five as regards their past and future relationship to the UPA, that might have ceased and might still cease, the final solution of the problem. As has

already been indicated, to ask an organization to take back men who have made public charges which in their own words has become a public document involving the integrity of the organization and the chief under whom they are going to work, that he is under political obligations to the leaders of the ZOA and that he has to pay off debts, unless an organization gets some kind -- it does not have to be humble, -- but some kind of a retraction, it makes it extremely difficult for such an organization to do what you think and what some of us think the organization should do. To send a copy of a letter that you had sent to these men to the Chairman of the Executive Director of the UPA, I do not think meets the situation, especially in view of the fact that as arbitrator desiring to make a short cut to a solution, and I appreciate your eagerness to do that, you did not call the Executive Director to sit down with these five, because he will have to work with them, or the Chairman to sit down with you and with them, for real arbitration. Arbitration does not mean merely that a man renders a decision. I am not going into the question of whether these men agreed that you should be the sole arbitrator. I accept that for the sake of argument, but it might have been helpful if prior to your rendering the decision you had called in Mr. Shapiro and Mr. Weisman and sat down with these five men and given them a chance to talk over the situation, given Mr. Shapiro a chance to ask them some questions. And on the basis then of having heard both sides on this issue, not as a side issue of a general settlement, but as an issue of their general re-employment, that perhaps it would have been a little slower procedure, perhaps a more satisfactory one. Anyhow, the point that I am making is that your letter as it was read to us the other night was a very cold one and left many doubts in the minds of people. Some of these doubts have been dispelled by what you said tonight. You said many important things this evening of what you said to these men in order to make them proper servants of an organization. Now the Executive would like to know

those things. Now of course we can take a copy of this (referring to record) and turn it over, but that is not the adequate way of doing it. If you have assumed the responsibility of sole arbitrator, it seems to me a comprehensive statement written to the UPA embodying your decision and all that went with it upon which your decision was built and conditions under which this decision will operation, would be tremendously helpful and I am wondering, before the UPA comes to act on this thing because the final decision is not with us, we have to make recommendations here the UPA employs people. We do not employ people or discharge people. Prior to that decision you would not think it advisable, and I do not want you to answer that question now, you might want to think about it, you would not think it advisable to write a fuller statement of what you told us this evening, and embodying again the statement in your letter which you sent to the UPA.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: The impression that I had from the various implications that came to me was that a clear understanding was between you and Mr. Weisman. I am not so sure whether this also referred to Mr. Neumann. My clear understanding that the Council should be the sole, not arbitrator, but the sole body to decide on conditions of re-employing the five. Then a change has taken place, that instead of the Council your name was inserted. It means that you got the sole right, not as an arbitrator, but as a decider. As the chief justice to decide what is to be done. It went even to such a degree that in your letter the word "recommend", someone tried to explain to me when I asked them about recommendation, it does not mean that I have decided, it is merely language that is being used in the arbitration in unions. But everybody knows that the arbitrator, when he says recommends, it means decided. Now the question is whether such an understanding, maybe I lost some of what you have told us now, but the question is whether there was an understanding that there either the Council or you are to decide the conditions of the re-employment of the five, if there was such an under-

standing, then the whole situation is an entirely different one. If it is merely arbitration, then the whole situation is an entirely different thing.

MR. ROSENBERG: Well, all I can say to you is this, that in the last analysis I felt that I was in a position where I was authorized to make the conditions under which these men would have their positions back that those conditions would have to be accepted by the men and also by the UPA, if they had accepted me as the arbitrator. Now if they did not accept me that certainly is a very devious error on my part, because certainly I would not have gone to the extent of making public statements which I did, unless I really thought I did have it. I feel that I understood that I did have that position. Mr. Weisman tells us that I did not and Dr. Neumann feels that the conditions which existed that night should have been the prevailing conditions. That is Dr. Neumann's and Mr. Weisman's opinion. I have my opinion. Now if I am incorrect, I had that opinion and it was on the basis of that opinion that I made the decision that I did. I want to answer Dr. Silver for a moment. The fact that it may have been better or more palatable for me to have made the statement to the UPA instead of having written them to the men, well, let me put it this way; it was unfortunate possibly that I was selected as that individual or that I thought I was selected that individual from the angle that I have absolutely no legal training whatsoever. All I did was to write a letter to the men of which I sent a copy to Mr. Shapiro, because they were told by me, and I think Mr. Shapiro was told, that they would go to see him, so that Mr. Shapiro would have a copy of the letter that had haunted these men and he would know the conditions under which these men were to go back to the UPA and I tried to make it as simple as possible and when you say that some of the discussions which I had with the men should possibly have been embodied in the letter, maybe second thoughts are better, maybe I would have thought that possibly. I have not even got a copy of my own letter that I wrote. I start in here with the

statement that in my official position as arbitrator, I start in that way, so that I can say I recommend something. I am not used to being in a position where I say I demand something to be done. I do not have that method of talking, nor do I have that method of writing, but I thought I was trying to make that position as clear as possible in the very first few words in this letter. I start that way, so when I say in the end, I recommend, I think that that is as strong as I would want to put it, if I feel that I have that authority. I am terribly sorry that letter is not here because I thought that I had written it in as clear and concise language as I could, and if it is a question that I should write that same letter, or maybe a letter of further explanation that I have sent as a copy to Mr. Shapiro, that is something of course, that I can very easily consider doing, and if it were available to me, I would like to see the minutes of the statement that I made here, so that I could use that as a basis of what I could write, so that I would not again be misquoting myself on having any data from which to use any language that I may desire to use.

MRS. HALPRIN: It seems to me that the discussion boils down to three points now; the question of the re-employment is really a subsidiary point. The main point, in any event before this body is this; what area of disagreement, how large is the area of disagreement. For example, when Mr. Weisman the other day said that no agreement had been reached, there was a telegram that had been sent in the hands of some people which contradicted Mr. Weisman's statement for the telegram reads as follows.

MR. ROSENBERG: To whom was this telegram sent?

MRS. HALPRIN: To all of us in the UPA. This makes a very categorical statement, it says that "On Sunday, December 5th, the undersigned, representing the Committee of Contributors, were informed by Mr. Edwin Rosenberg that he had reached an agreement with Mr. Weisman to the effect that the question of the five men be settled as follows: that they return to their posts if they

so desire on conditions made by Mr. Rosenberg, and that Mr. Rosenberg have full and sole authority to make such conditions and determine procedure of their return." Now I want to agree a little bit, because the fact that you are here and Mr. Weisman is here, came as a result of that discussion that night in which Mr. Weisman said no agreement had been reached, and this telegram quoting you, and, if I am not mistaken, people said that they had showed you this first.

MR. ROSENBERG: That is not correct. What they did was they called me up and asked me whether I would want to make any statement. I said absolutely no. I would make no statement. Could they say for me, so-and-so. I said they could say nothing for me. I certainly was not going to allow them to start using my name or any statements of mine.

DR. NEUMANN: I want to tell you, for your information, that I was called up frantically last week and told, you have got to have a meeting of the Executive at once before the meeting of the UPA, because if we do not do it and ratify this thing, Mr. Rosenberg is going to go to the press with a statement denouncing the UPA and denouncing the Executive.

MR. ROSENBERG: Do you believe that?

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I did not believe it and that's why no meeting was called.

DR. NEUMANN: I said to Hayim Greenberg, go home and sleep. I know Mr. Rosenberg and I know he is not going to have that kind of statement in the press without even consulting us.

MRS. HALPRIN: It stated that there had been an agreement reached between you and Mr. Weisman to the effect that the employment of the five men be settled in the following manner.

MR. ROSENBERG: That was denied by me. I said I was making the conditions.

MRS. HALPRIN: That asserted agreement between you and Mr. Weisman.

Now tonight you heard Mr. Weisman. I think you would then concede that there is an area of disagreement.

MR. ROSENBERG: Definitely.

MRS. HALPRIN: If then, one takes this question as the prior question coming much before whether we do or do not take back the five men, and the opinion most of us have, this is the important question. The other is a subsidiary question which can be dealt with in one or two ways. Then we have here nothing which has been said tonight really clarifying it for us. A statement of Mr. Weidman, Dr. Neumann, giving us one point of view, and a statement by you giving another, you acknowledging that there might have been a misunderstanding, they acknowledging the same thing.

MR. ROSENBERG: I cannot look inside the head of anybody. I can only say that I thought there was an agreement and I so stated and I stated it not only to the Committee, I stated it publicly to the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds. I, in my own mind, was under no apprehensions as far as I myself was concerned. I was under no misapprehensions.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: The statement which you made to the Executive of the Council reads as follows. I got the Minutes because I was still a member ^{Executive} of the/Council: "With reference to the five staff people who resigned from the UPA, I was asked as an individual to help resolve that situation and I am in the process of trying to do so."

MR. WEISMAN: I certainly would agree with that.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: That is a long way from the statement in this telegram.

MR. ROSENBERG: ^{that} When/was read, because very frankly the statement that was read to them later evoked a good deal of other discussions, and when Mr. Goldenberg got up and referred to this statement saying that I had passed it by very lightly. It was then that I explained to the Council people verbally what my position was, where he was incorrect in stating that these

men had the privilege of going back. I thereupon said to Mr. Goldenberg and to the Council people that that was not the case at all, that these men had no right to go back, that I had the official position of making the conditions under which these men could be taken back.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: Is that part also in the minutes?

MR. ROSENBERG: This is part of the statement that I made, but the other is part of the Minutes of the meeting of Council. This was just my official statement.

MR. WEISMAN: I would like merely for the sake of accuracy and still continuing my policy of not making characterizations, to say this: Mrs. Halprin is wrong in asserting that I ever said Mr. Rosenberg and I did not reach an agreement. I said that we did not reach the kind of an agreement that the telegram describes. We did reach an agreement and Mr. Rosenberg's original presentation I did not hear him say anything that was particularly inconsistent with my own recollection of what took place that Sunday morning. I am not in a position to know what Mr. Rosenberg, acting under great pressure and with an overbearing desire to bring about peace and the conclusion of this agreement, may have said to the Committee. I therefore am not able to characterize what the Committee says is right or wrong. I have no information about the thing. I do know that this entry in my blotter, which is very brief, bears out everything that I have said consistently on this matter.

"Sunday: Re 5 employees: Record made by Bernstein stands; willing for Rosenberg to speak to men, to replace Council; handled on individual basis for each who sends letter making amends, e.r. to take attitude of employer December 5th."

Now it was not a new thing, to put it very briefly. The only change was that we stood on the record made by the Council except we substituted Mr. Rosenberg at his suggestion, because he said that would be agreeable to the Committee for the Council; instead of the Council interviewing a man, Mr.

Rosenberg interviewed a man. Instead of going to the Council, we would go to Mr. Rosenberg. In that sense, Rosenberg was the sole person who would be resorted to.

DR. NEUMANN: Sole as distinguished from a group of three or four.

MR. WHISMAN: Now I was not present when Mr. Rosenberg made the statement that he thought he had the power to make the conditions. I heard about it from Mr. Shapiro when I arrived at that meeting immediately after lunch. At meeting of the Council. At the very first opportunity which I had to see Mr. Rosenberg, I think I made it plain. I tried to assert the consequences of this letter by having these discussions with Mr. Rosenberg. Now there is one thing. This record is going to be very incomplete, unless, and I think it is relevant, but it will take time and perhaps it should be made part of the record, unless you had a copy of the letter that the Committee of Contributors wrote to Mr. Edward Rosenberg on December 6th, which has a great bearing on this whole question, first because of the substantial nature of the change which the Committee made in the agreement, secondly, of what amounts to misrepresentations that I made to this body that paragraph 5, in its elimination meant only that they did not want that written in the agreement, but that de facto too that they were going out of business. That statement is an absolute error, in view of the behavior and the claims which this Committee makes, when they write and begin by saying on November 6th:

"I have been instructed to convey to you the decisions and the feelings expressed by the Executive Committee of the Committee of Contributors and Workers, at its meeting in New York on December 5th, 1948.

"1) It accepts the recommendations made by its sub-committee on proposals for the reconstitution of the United Palestine Appeal.

"2) It agrees to the cancellation of the national conference scheduled for Atlantic City on December 11th and 12th.

"3) The Committee of Contributors and Workers will continue to function."

And then there are many other things in the letter reviewing the whole spirit of the agreement, which is related to the matter of taking back these five men without hearing from them how they felt, inasmuch as they have been employed and were working for the Committee and so far as I knew, are working for the Committee right now.

Now with regard to Mr. Dewey Stone, I am really perplexed. In making my statement I have no knowledge of the contents of his letter, written to the American Section, dated December 26th.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I think it would be wiser to let the group here ask questions, because we do not want to go into a discussion of action. We do not want to impose upon the time of Mr. Rosenberg.

MRS. HALPRIN: I had been interrupted actually. There is an area of disagreement. I want to understand clearly what that area of disagreement is. Is it according to your idea of what transpired -- these men were to write a letter -- is that the point? Is it one of the points? Mr. Weisman just said that he understood you would take the place of the Committee as Mediator or Arbitrator. Then is the full power the terms of reference of Mr. Rosenberg?

CHAIRMAN SILVER: It is both. There are three items involved, as I understand it. The whole procedure, the procedure was agreed to, namely, that these people were to write the letters individually to the UPA retracting their resignations, failing which they would then have recourse to arbitration, and it was agreed that Mr. Rosenberg would then serve as the sole mediator or arbitrator. That is Mr. Weisman's understanding. That is not the understanding of Mr. Rosenberg.

MRS. HALPRIN: Mr. Rosenberg then gave his interpretation to the Committee of Contributors.

MR. ROSENBERG: But I would like to say, if I may, Mrs. Halprin, that I did give it to the Committee of Contributors, but tried to convey what my opinion was to Mr. Weisman in the various talks I had with him, and I thought

I had conveyed it accurately. I thought you understood that these were my powers.

MR. WEISMAN: When you were saying to me what you were going to write at that time, you did claim that you had these powers, and I disputed that. I tried to talk you out of doing it.

MR. ROSENBERG: The point I am trying to make is this; I distinctly remember that I did hold up the letter and my reason was that I thought you did not want it received before the Executive Committee of the UPA had had their meeting on that evening.

MR. SHAPIRO: We never had the meeting.

MR. ROSENBERG: Certainly I acted on the assumption that I did have these powers.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: But you said yourself that you interpreted a decision that you were to come in a step later, but you eliminated a step because you decided in your own mind -- am I wrong in that?

MR. ROSENBERG: Yes, I would say it in this way. I was giving you my thinking of why I wrote this letter.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: But it was back in your mind that letters were to have been written.

MR. ROSENBERG: At that evening meeting which Dr. Neumann referred to the matter of letters was discussed. I had that background and heard all the conversations that went on and I knew at that meeting that Dr. Neumann had asked that letters be written by these men.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Did you, at any time, get the impression that Mr. Weisman or Dr. Neumann had waived that question of letters?

MR. ROSENBERG: At the time that I was informed, as I understood it, by Mr. Weisman that I could have that authority, I felt that then there was no longer the matter of whether I should waive or not waive it. It was my privilege to make that decision.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: The point was that Dr. Neumann and Mr. Weisman had agreed.

MR. ROSENBERG: I did not talk to Dr. Neumann. Dr. Neumann was not in my conversations at all after that.

MR. WEISMAN: Would you mind, Mr. Chairman, asking this question; whether, in the conversation on December 5th, Mr. Weisman said that he stands on the Bernstein record?

CHAIRMAN SILVER: There was no question about that.

MR. ROSENBERG: Well, now you know, you are getting me a little confused with reference to dates. I would not want to answer that one way or another.

DR. GOLDMANN: Mr. Weisman says that in the afternoon, at the meeting of the Council, when Mr. Shapiro informed him that you had made the statement, that you had been given the role of the sole arbitrator, he went to you and stated that you are saying it under misapprehensions. That is what you stated. If he told you that he does not accept your position as sole arbitrator, how could you then write this letter to the UPA?

MR. ROSENBERG: That letter had already been written. That meeting was Friday, the letter had been sent on Tuesday. That had already been received by them on Friday.

MR. WEISMAN: The meeting of the Council took place on December 10th. We had a meeting on Saturday and Sunday of the Administrative Council of the SOA. I heard from Shapiro about the statement, but that I did not want to raise a rumpus by getting up at the Board Meeting of the Council, and so when I answered you call Sunday night, that was the night I sent that piece of literature to your office, but it was in that conversation when you told me you had come to a decision that the men should return and I kept arguing with you that it was not the right procedure.

MR. ROSENBERG: These men also discussed the fact that this statement,

the way I made it should be somewhat alleviated. But after all, if I was in a position of an arbitrator I did listen to both sides.

MR. SHAPIRO: Did you ask Mr. Weisman what were the conditions that the UPA would want as a return to their position? What were the UPA conditions, or do you decide them yourself?

MR. ROSENBERG: Mr. Weisman had quite a long talk with me the day that we left the Harmony Club after a New York UJA meeting. I said I wanted to talk to him and I did. We walked all the way from the Harmony up to my hotel and then we sat downstairs for about an hour. So I heard fairly well.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: May I assume that there are no further questions? In that case I want to thank Mr. Rosenberg most decidedly for giving us of your valuable time and for coming to share your thinking with us. We are indeed grateful and I want to repeat what was said earlier about your generous service throughout all this difficulty. Thankyou ever so much.

MR. WEISMAN: This is a letter from Dewey Stone, dated December 26th, addressed to the American Section:

(Copy of above-mentioned letter attached. Please see following page.)

C
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P
Y

DEWEY D. STONE
53 ARLINGTON STREET
BROCKTON 8, MASSACHUSETTS

December 26, 1948

The American Section of the
Jewish Agency:

Dear Friends:

I have been confined all week-end with a bad cold, and fearful that it may prevent my personal appearance at the meeting on Monday evening I would like to make the following statement which I hope you will take into consideration when discussing the U.P.A. problem referred to you by the U.P.A. board last Wednesday.

In order to avoid an unreasonably long letter I must avoid saying here much that I would have said by way of background material if I were talking to you instead of writing. I understand and hope that Mr. Rosenberg will speak to you, and I am sure he will fully cover the subject.

After much personal and telephonic discussion it is my firm belief that the final agreement between the U.P.A. and the committee of contributors called for the settlement of the problem of the five resigned employees of the U.P.A. by Mr. Rosenberg as the sole arbiter as to the terms and basis on which they would be reemployed. My understanding of this fact is unequivocal. I definitely discussed the matter with Mr. Weisman, the chairman of the U.P.A., and had his acceptance of this arrangement before I informed the Council Committee and the negotiators for the committee of contributors that this arrangement for the handling of this problem of the five former employees was agreeable to the U.P.A.

I now feel very strongly that regardless of our feelings as to the decision of Mr. Roxenberg in regard to the five men we, of the U.P.A., cannot morally refuse to accept his decision in the spirit of our agreement. Any other action at this time would, in my humble opinion, destroy the last hope of a successful, united U.P.A. and U.J.A. for 1949.

After my conversation with Dr. Neumann on Wednesday evening I can understand that he may not have clearly understood the arrangements agreed to with Mr. Rosenberg. This is regrettable, but should not influence your action at this critical juncture. I find it impossible to understand how Mr. Weisman can say that he did not clearly understand that Mr. Rosenberg - the other council members - the committee of contributors, negotiators and I all understood very specifically that Mr. Rosenberg was to be the sole arbiter of this matter. I hope after my conversation with him the other day refreshing his memory regarding our several discussions on this very point, and his further talks with Mr. Rosenberg, that he will recall the facts and report an agreement with me on these facts.

I sincerely urge, therefore, that you will advise the U.P.A. to accept the decision of Mr. Rosenberg. He has rendered a great sacrificial service to U.P.A. in a most difficult role of peace maker. I hope we will show our proper appreciation.

With kindest regards to all, I am

Sincerely,

/Sgd/ Dewey Stone

Now I can say in one sentence this; it is obvious, from the discussion which we just had, in which Mr. Rosenberg and I and others participated, that Mr. Rosenberg and I are at least agreed on one fact, and that is that the first time we ever discussed his role as sole arbitrator was on Sunday, December 5th, and the last time I ever discussed with Mr. Dewey Stone with regard to the three points was, to my recollection, Friday, or maybe Saturday, when nobody, not even Bernstein, had any inkling that the question of the five men would be reintroduced by the Committee of Contributors. Mr. Rosenberg's statement was that the matter was introduced, so far as he was concerned, Sunday, December 5th. Therefore, I do not have to answer any more. I never talked with Mr. Dewey Stone about it.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Well now, we have got to come to some conclusions about this. This thing has been discussed for two and a half hours. We have gotten as clear a picture as we are ever likely to get of the situation. What is indicated now is a course of action.

DR. NEUMANN: I do not want to appear doctrinaire, but I consider the course of action as secondary to what has become a moral question. I must say that having heard what Mr. Rosenberg had to say this evening, and I know him, I respect him, I admire him, I have contracted a real affection for him in the course of working together, but I think that he simply, very naively assumed certain things that to me are incredible. That is that he assumed that the UFA, after we had fought over this matter when I was present there in the small hours of the morning for an hour and a half, and we did not agree to anything on this question, that we suddenly agreed to put up the whole matter to his single discretion or whatever he would say.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: May I ask a question? At the time that this body discussed the matter and decided on it, which was when?

DR. NEUMANN: On December 7th.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Why wasn't some mention made of such an agreement, if

there was an agreement, to this body?

MR. WEISMAN: Even now Bernstein will say that the Council has nothing to do with this. This man is acting as a sole individual. It was made that we stood on the record accept that he would do. That is all there was to it. I did not think it was necessary to involve that question here, because it was not made part of the agreement.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I think it would have been helpful if we had been given some inkling of what was in the air.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: If I am not mistaken I asked the question after the report, whether the question of the five was ever discussed, and the answer was no. But you will have to look it up in the minutes.

DR. NEUMANN: Perhaps I answered it, and if I answered no it was absolutely a truthful answer. I spoke several times with Mr. Bernstein. Bernstein is a gentleman who acted as the rapporteur, took the minutes, made the records, made the summaries, made the drafts of the summaries, etc. I spoke to him at length on the telephone on Saturday, trying to get a clear picture of what it was all about. He spoke to me again today. On both occasions I asked him if he would not let us have that part of the record.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Mr. Rosenberg stated this evening that he would make that available, so it is settled.

DR. NEUMANN: I would like to explain why Bernstein said that he did not, could not give us the record. The reason he gave was that this had nothing to do, this subsequent agreement, if it was made, had nothing to do with the agreement reached, and that there was an entirely different agreement that we talked about, the possibility of their mediating and that Rosenberg subsequently in his talk with Weisman evidently came away with the idea that he was not a mediator, he was to be the sole arbitrator, make the decisions himself on the whole business.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: There is much more involved there. It is not that

he was appointed as sole arbitrator, but he claims, or they claim for him, that it was understood that these men were to come back, but he was only to define the conditions of their return. He was not even an arbitrator.

DR. GOLDMANN: As far as the conditions were concerned, he was.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: The point we have the right to ask of either of you is, was it at any time in your mind that the return of these five was accepted as fact, and that Mr. Rosenberg was only to define the conditions of their return?

MR. WEISMAN: That statement is about as remote as any statement can be.

MRS. HALPRIN: Mr. Chairman, is that really the crux? I see the crux as something different. There is an apparently obvious area of disagreement and one has to assume that Dr. Neumann and Mr. Weisman are giving the facts as they see them and this man is giving the facts as he saw them, and take what happened as a result, rather than try to determine, because it is quite clear that each side thought they were deciding something else. Now supposing you assume Rosenberg, and anybody who saw the man would know that he is not dishonest, he misunderstood. Therefore, he told these people that he had the right to bring them back, that he would set the conditions, and they thought he set very strong conditions when he talked about loyalty, etc. He thought he was acting in good faith and that they now charge this breach, that they were told that they could come back on the basis of his conversation with them. In other words, the misunderstanding arises from the fact that everybody is telling the facts as he saw them.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I am concerned with the fact that our representatives negotiators gave us a faithful and honest account of what they stood committed to in the negotiations, and that this charge of bad faith against our negotiators which is implied in this telegram and in others, is not substantiated.

MRS. HALPRIN: The focal point is not what they said, it is what he

said. It is a peculiar situation, but that is the way it comes out.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I do not have to accept his version or their version. I am interested in knowing whether the statements of Weisman and Neumann hold water.

MRS. HALPRIN: Look here, Dr. Silver. our people did not negotiate on this question after December 5th. They never talked with the Committee of Contributors. Now in his talks he said, I am the sole arbitrator and I have these powers. Therefore from their point of view they did not question his honesty or the correctness of his interpretation. Therefore the bad faith is directed towards us only because of what he said, and did. Therefore he has to in some way, he cannot break altogether.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I do not want to break altogether. I listened to him very attentively, as I did to the other statements, and I am under the impression that he jumped to certain conclusions. Now I am not going to punish him for this and I am not going to denounce him for it, but ^{it} is important for us to know it, because if our people had agreed that these five men should come back and he would have presented the evidence that that was so, then we have nothing before us but to accept these five men immediately, by resolution of this body, because the integrity of our institution must be maintained. But, if there is a difference of opinion, if there is a possibility that he made a mistake, or that he jumped to conclusions, or that he overreached himself, then there is a different procedure that we can develop and I have tried to indicate to him a procedure that can be developed, and I think he grasped the point and he is ready to meet that situation. This conclusion that he arrived at in his mind, that these people should not write letters, is something I cannot understand. Suppose it was his organization?

DR. NEUMANN: It is because the people did not want to write letter.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Suppose it was the Council that was involved. He would be the first man to demand, Gentlemen, sit down and write a letter re-

trusting your statement. What organization would not do that? He argued. I tried to follow his reasoning, I could not get it.

Well, it is too late now, but on the other hand this business of simply sending us a piece of paper and say, I have decided that these men have to come back, is not enough. The UPA will take them back. What else is there in this situation, at this late date?

MR. ZUCKERMAN: Suppose we accept this as our consensus of opinion?

DR. NEUMANN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that we first of all confirm our understanding, that the agreement reached between the UPA and the Committee of Contributors with the help of the Conciliation Committee, does not involve the obligation on the part of the UPA to re-employ these men at this time. There is no such clear obligation. Then, consequently, the UPA is not bound by his agreement, he is a free agent.

Then comes the second question of procedure and on that I will have some suggestions to make. But I think that the first step is to adopt such a position. After having heard I want to add this, for our own sakes, even if -- which is to my mind the best of my belief furthest from the truth -- even if there had been an agreement made on that Sunday morning that the men were re-employed, provided that agreement was accepted by the Committee of Contributors, their failure to accept the agreement as had been agreed upon by the negotiators and as had been drawn up by the Council of Federations, makes a very material change.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: How will that advance our case?

DR. NEUMANN: These people come in there with that Committee of Contributors still alive and behind the scenes, I tell you it is bringing the enemy within your gates. What we need in the UPA now is to clear up some of this poison which has been spread around and I would like to know how we are going to do it. Why haven't they written these letters? Why have these men declined to write such letters? What in the world is there to prevent them

from doing the only decent thing for them to do? We have the pattern before from their master, who week after week was pleaded with by some of his best friends, retract these false accusations, be a man and enable us to deal with you on a free basis. No, no, no, no, no. And he is the one who is instructing them. They are still acting under the instructions. They have resigned, they have attacked the UPA publicly, they have not withdrawn an iota of what they have said, but through the same Committee of which they are now the employees, they are forcing them, not because we want them or agreed to take them, but because all this pressure has been exerted. Now I want to tell you one or two things that you do not know, perhaps. This man, Harry Seave, here we were in the midst of negotiations. It was postponed until Monday. We had agreed definitely to meet on Saturday night. Subsequently it transpired, because in between the two meetings another meeting was called of the Committee for Progressive Zionism at which Harry Seave was present, and there a statement was adopted and Harry Seave drew up the release to give to the press. Lipsky explained to me bitterly about it. He said he did what he had no business to do. He said he does not want Seave back in the UPA. He is not the kind of person to have around. He distorted the whole business and that was published on Monday morning prior to our meeting. And they are continuing to work there. They are drafting these telegrams which we are getting. And to have these people come in just like that with that Committee still there functioning, and will continue, as I warned this Committee in the past. They will continue to hold a gun to our heads. Dewey Stone can write here so hysterically that if we do not promptly re-engage these men, it will destroy the last chance for UJA in the United States. What kind of hysteria is that? To deprive the UPA of the last vestige -- they will go out, they will come back, they will do as they please. Did they say anything to Mr. Rosenberg? Did they write to us? Did they write to him? Did they accept even his conditions? Nothing! Simply demands must come, we must yield. I cannot agree to that kind of pre-

cedure.

DR. GOLDMANN: I cannot accept the approach of Neumann. The matter of details is for me really of no great importance. I was not here most of the time, and after having listened to Rosenberg and Weisman, I am not prepared to say who is right. It is clear it was a misunderstanding. I do not doubt the good faith of Weisman. It was a clear misunderstanding that Rosenberg was convinced that he has been given by Weisman the right of sole arbitrator. He so informed the Committee of Contributors. Twice he informed them this Sunday before they ratified the agreement, and Weisman was under the impression that they never agreed to it. So nobody can say. It is simply a misunderstanding. It is not a question of bad faith, but the whole thing for me, at least, my approach is not decisive. What is decisive is do we want a UPA and UJA or do we want a fight. If you regard the whole group as enemies within the gates --

DR. NEUMANN: I am speaking of employees who do not retract their accusations.

DR. GOLDMANN: You spoke of a group representing our enemies. Then you should have adopted a course of action that you have to fight it out and maintain the prestige and make very good arguments for it. I do not think the argument means very much in this situation. I do not think they will destroy the UJA. They will certainly do a colossal job in hampering the UJA and reduce the income of the UJA -- I do not know by how much. I am not an expert. But many of them were very active workers in the UJA. So either we want to save certain peace in the corporation of the UJA or we do not. If you do not, if you continue to regard the five men as agents of an enemy, then certainly do not accept them. Now I think that the procedure which the Chairman indicated, I think that is the only procedure, that Rosenberg, who after all played a certain role, and I think the consideration should be his, not just to insult him, but that he should elaborate both in a letter to the five men, I have not

seen the letter, I do not know it, but from what you said, naturally what can he say, these people must pledge themselves to work for the UPA under the Executive and whoever are the heads of the organization with undivided loyalty.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: You can ask them to retract.

DR. GOLDMANN: I am speaking now of procedure. That we should make it clear to them and in a letter to the UJA that they have to accept the conditions which we are laying down, because they certainly accepted ^{him} as arbitrator. Weisman did not accept him, but they are ready to accept him, and then we should advise the UPA to have them re-employed. What will happen later, once the Board is reorganized and they can reorganize and shuffle the whole machinery, is another story. You will organize the Board of the UPA and make many changes. The question is only the settlement of the position at this moment.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: He gave away his case, I am afraid, when he said that he changed his mind. At first he said he was going to arbitrate as an employer, and he realized that he did not arbitrate as an employer, because he violated every principle of arbitration. An arbitrator first of all calls in two sides, outlines a decent procedure so that the people who come in come into an organization where you know that they will behave themselves and where the chief can work with them, so he substituted another word, "custodian". What kind of language is that? What is that, a janitor? These men are being employed by a national organization at fancy salaries. Each one has ^{an} assigned job to do, and each one should devote himself loyally to his job, instead of playing politics with this organization.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: I merely want to add to what Dr. Goldmann has said, that we cannot accept the line that Dr. Neumann proposed. We should say that when we decided to accept the agreement it did not involve an obligation to take back the five. I do not think that this can be accepted. It depends again on whether we take the word of Mr. Rosenberg, or the word of Mr. Dewey Stone, or you. And I cannot say which. The best that we can say is that there was

a misunderstanding. If there was a misunderstanding, so there is a possibility that they were justified in thinking that there was an agreement. If there was an agreement we cannot say that it did not involve an obligation. It is an entirely different thing to say that we did not touch upon this question, but whether it involves an obligation or not, I cannot say. It does not involve an obligation of our representatives did something that made the other side think that there was an obligation. It seems to me that if we will entertain a long discussion, it will merely lead again to very very great troubles on all sides, and I think that the Chairman gave us a very good way out and we should take this way. It seems to me that if Mr. Rosenberg will accept it, and there is no doubt in my mind, that he will accept it, they whatever they have in mind they will be forced to accept a new form of procedure in regard to their re-employment. So I would say that we should accept the idea of Dr. Silver and abide by it and act by it.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Mr. Shapir, what do you think about it?

MR. SHAPIRO: Well, I am rather prejudiced because I happen to know that these men helped Henry Monter draft his letter, the letter that he wrote to the UPA. The original Monter letter. That is the thing that still bothers me. I will find it rather difficult to work, because this is not peace, this is an armistice, you are going to have another outbreak. You are going to have those five boys step out again. It is not going to be complete peace. And I will be deferred in my work in the UJA because I know these things. It will have to serve.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I understand that this agreement holds good only if they are reinstated, holds good only until the new Board.

MR. WEISMAN: They will use the same means on the new Board.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Yes, but I want it clearly understood, because at some future time they will not be able to say that--

MR. SHAPIRO: It will be difficult to see that they carry out orders

in the spirit that an Executive carries out orders on receiving them from his superior, because I think that they will be, I was very nice to these men when they came to see me about whether they would be able to return. I told them that I regretted the fact that I did not have the authority to reinstate them in my position. I do not think that we will have very friendly relationships there. I think that the work will suffer, as a result I do not have very much to say.

MR. WEISMAN: It will be very hard to persuade our people. Elias Radinsky, who used to work for the Council, is supposed to be in charge of community contacts and if the community contacts would, it would hardly be possible. He is an agreeable fellow, but I find that he is supposed to be in the field where Seave, who has the ability on the platform and in dealing with people, is the one. Nevertheless, I feel that the suggestion of the Chairman offers a way out with one proviso -- I think we have left it too much in the air as to what Mr. Rosenberg should add.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I was going to come to that. The resolution has to be quite specific. I do not think we ought to act so politely that we cannot make some conditions of our own as a respectable body, first as the Jewish Agency, and then as the UPA.

MR. SEAPIRO: I think that these five men could be supplanted by two men.

MRS. HALPRIN: Let all those questions of reconstitution come from the reconstituted body.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: It is understood therefore, that we advise the UPA that upon the receipt of the letter from Mr. Rosenberg, which would, along with the recommendations that he makes, likewise embody the things which he stated to us this evening, and which are part of the record. Touching the things which he said to the five and that these conditions which he laid down for the five have been accepted by the five. When such a letter is received that it

is our judgment that the recommendation of the arbitrator be accepted, the recommendations of Mr. Rosenberg be accepted. Have I, in my stumbling way, stated what is the situation?

MR. WEISMAN: One more thing, Dr. Silver. I think Mr. Rosenberg stated that Mr. Montor said that his own troubles began when he interrupted Zionist politics. I think that men who worked for the UPA or, for that matter, for any fund-raising agency which is supposed to appeal to Jews of all beliefs and factions of all parties, should undertake a certain action of self-denial; namely, the joy of being active in Zionist politics.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: Including the Chairman of the Board

CHAIRMAN SILVER: This has nothing to do with the resolution.

DR. NEUMANN: Mr. Chairman, I take it that you believe that we do not concern the question of their employment or non-employment. I take it that we advise the UPA that after having listened to reports, that we are of the opinion that there is not a meeting of the minds and that therefore there is no --

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Dr. Neumann wants the position of our negotiators which has been attacked and whose veracity has been called into question by telegrams sent, / and at least we ought to express our confidence in them.

DR. NEUMANN: Mr. Chairman, for the benefit of Mr. Zuckerman, I said that there was not an agreement. He said that there was. He said there was evidently a misunderstanding. I accept that point of view. If there is a misunderstanding then there is no agreement. An agreement is an agreement of both parties. Then the same thing is the same thing. That is why all the other matters we argued every point, every comma. In those circumstances legally speaking there is no agreement. And now the first thing we ought to say, we are under no obligation.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Trust your Chairman to include a sentence or two that will represent the spirit of the whole body.

DR. NEUMANN: And secondly, we should recommend to the UPA nevertheless that they confer with Mr. Rosenberg with a view to having a formula under which it may be possible to re-employ the men and the matters will be satisfactory. If the formula can be found all right, that is.

DR. GOLDMANN: Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that is quite a different resolution from the one you suggested, and I have my doubts about this form of resolution. One of the reasons, I will explain, one of the reasons is that it is a great delay, if you begin to work out new formulas. The 12th the UJA Conference is going to take place, but I would like to see that the Committee of Contributors should be there and pledge their full cooperation. I think there is a chance that they will do it. Because that is the full purpose. If you begin now to negotiate with Rosenberg --

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I made myself very clear. As to the first part, I would trust you with the formulation. I only want one thing. If there should be an expression that we have an impression that there was a misunderstanding, I would accept it, but I would not accept any judgment on who of the two is right.

MRS. HALPRIN: I move we accept the Chairman's resolution.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: All in favor, contrary? So ordered.

The next item is the report of the Committee on Personnel.

DR. NEUMANN: The Committee held one meeting on Saturday evening, Saturday after dark. We discussed the question primarily of an Executive Director and secondly, the question of Public Relations Director. But we concentrated upon the question of an Executive Director. There is really no report from the Committee, except various opinions expressed.

DR. GOLDMANN: So let's hear the opinions.

DR. NEUMANN: There may have been four or five. One recommendation which came from me was that Mr. Harold Manson be engaged for that position. That Mr. Zuckerman raised certain objections to. Mr. Lurie thought that Mr.

Hammer might take on additional duties in addition to those which he had. Mr. Zuckerman thought that some other candidate might be found and he thought of proposing Mr. Kenen. There was no agreement. With regard to Mr. Hammer, I confirmed subsequently what I recall, I confirmed from writing, that Dr. Goldstein had made a statement here before he left that he desired to have Mr. Hammer serve as the Treasury Official, be responsible to him for all Treasury matters under the general supervisory functions of the Executive here, and that he was not to be assigned other administrative duties, so as to be free to attend to those matters. Subsequently he wrote a letter before he departed, a letter to Mr. Hammer, outlining his duties, etc., and that position which he proposed to the Executive we approved, by a vote. Subsequently he wrote a letter to Hammer in which he outlined his duties and when he repeated this injunction, that he should keep himself free from general administrative functions, etc., and he made an exception that ^{he} may cooperate with the Economic Department insofar as the matters of finances are involved and the Treasury is interested, etc. Regarding Mr. Kenen, I have objections as does Mr. Zuckerman to engaging Mr. Manson. I did not know at first, as a matter of fact whether he would be available. He had been in our employ and went over to the employ of the State of Israel. That is where the matter has rested. I regret that I have no more encouraging report than that.

MR. LURIE: (Reported in Yiddish)

MR. ZUCKERMAN: I have not very much to add to what has been reported now. Chaver Lurie covered the discussion as it was at the meeting of that Commission. If the Executive will accept the line proposed by Chaver Lurie, then I do not think we have to now discuss personalities here and I do not deem it my duty to tell the whole body why I think Kenen should be the man or why I have some objections to this one or the other one. If we accept that point of view of the organizational structure that Chaver Lurie has proposed, I think if this is accepted, then this Committee should be instructed, or

somebody else if it is necessary, to work out a plan in the line proposed by Chaver Lurie and bring a full plan to the next meeting of the Executive Committee.

DR. SCHUCHMAN: As far as I understood Dr. Goldmann's proposal, which was accepted at the last meeting, it was not the duty of this Committee to make specific proposals as to that candidate or another one. They would prepare a kind of a structure, more or less, establish the number of employees, the budget, and then, and only then we could intelligently discuss the problem of who should be employed and in which capacity, and I believe it was also understood, it was also my correction to Dr. Goldmann's proposals, that as far as single departments are concerned, personnel questions must be first discussed by the corresponding committees for each department, and then submitted for approval to the full meeting of the Executive.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I do not think that is quite the scope of the ad hoc committee that was appointed. It was appointed not alone to define a structure. The structure is already defined. We know what our departments are, but to recommend personnel, the professional heads of these departments, leaving it then to the sub-committees plus the professional heads to select subordinates who will be needed in the department. The principle which Mr. Lurie has enunciated, as far as it applies to having representation of all the parties in the departments I think satisfactory, very sound, because after all, this is a coalition Executive and we all want to be represented, and of course, we just do not want to put people in, we want to put competent people in, but I assume that each party has competent candidates to put in. I think that is a sound principle to guide us. Now as far as his other outline, if I may be permitted to make my observations on it, I think it is perfectly proper to bear in mind that this is an arrangement for six months, seven months, Mr. Lurie is entirely correct. We are not setting up a permanent machinery here

because we do not know what the next Congress will do, what it will do with the American Section, expand its activities, contract them, recast them. Any decision will naturally involve a regrouping and a rearranging of personnel. That goes without saying, so I do not think we ought to break our heads in great ideological battles about this particular problem. As far as I am personally concerned, because I am Chairman of this Section, I should like to have a Director or an Executive Director who would be acceptable to me. I am sure if you sat in my place, he would make the same request. After all, I accept a certain responsibility, and my Executive arm ought to be one who works best with me. I am sure if Mr. Lecker were sitting here, or a year ago Mr. Ben-Gurion, he would make the same request and a person ought not to be forced upon the Chairman, who is not entirely acceptable to him. Now I do not think this is an unreasonable request to make, unless the person is unqualified. Now if an Executive Director is indicated, what you call an administrator, that means a secretary, that means a man who will check up with the other heads, a man who will keep the minutes, if that is indicated in this set-up, then I have suggested a person whom I think could best work with me for the next six months. One whom I know and whom I have worked with for years, and who knows all about Palestine and would give faithful service to this Agency, and I suggested the name of Mr. Hanson. Now of course Hanson has, in the eyes of certain people, certain handicaps. He is and has been, too much of a pro-Silver man. It happens that Silver is the Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency. To punish a man because he has been standing along side of me in my political battles in the last few years is not quite indicated at this moment. If he has not got the qualifications, then he should not be appointed. If he did not have the qualifications I would not recommend him. I think he has the qualifications and I think he would make an excellent man and I think that a very objective and neutral man, quite as objective as I have tried to be in this body ever since I became Chairman, despite my political riots in

one way or another, and I am quite sure if he accepts the position and if it is offered to him, will understand that he is coming into a coalition Executive made up not of one party, but of six parties. Then a Director of an Organisation Department for whom I have no candidate, and a Director of Public Relations, and a Director of the Economic Department, you will have four men, four key men who will do the day-by-day work of the organisation. I will work whenever I am not in the City -- and I have been, I must say, every four or five days, I was here Thursday, I am here again Monday, it has been a hardship and it will relieve me to have that type of a man to whom I can work, who can attend to my correspondence here, meet people here, who want to see me, and transmit to me as we have been working ⁱⁿ the Emergency Council for years. I think that would be a better solution. It would be for me a more pleasant solution. On the other hand, there is, if you are so determined not to have Hanson, if he has become one of these life-and-death issues, as some issues do become in our movement, for that particular position, then I would suggest a different kind of an arrangement, where there would be no Executive Director, where there will be just a Secretary for the Chairman, an assistant to the Chairman who will keep minutes, call meetings, answer my correspondence, and then you will have a Director of ^Public Relations, etc., and inasmuch as we do meet every week, because it is a small body, there are not likely to be such terrific problems of such magnitude that it cannot wait from one Monday to the next, and if there are some important problems, they a special meeting can be called. I would not favor loading any additional responsibility on Hammer. I have no objections to Hammer, none at all. Hammer has a colossal responsibility in the position which he now has. He knows it himself, and Dr. Goldstein, as Neumann reported, spoke to me a few times about it, has begged that this man be disassociated, that this man be freed from any other activities of this body and limited to the finance work of the organisation, which is an enormous job and finance in this instance means close contact also with the

Economic Department. Now that would be a less satisfactory arrangement, where you would give me a secretary, which a Chairman should have, and you would have heads of these four departments, or three departments. In that case I would suggest Manson for the Public Relations Department, although I do not know that he would be satisfied to take that position, and two other men who you will select for the two other departments. I would urge you not to try to force a man on me as an Executive Director with whom I will not be entirely happy for the next six months.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: Mr. Chairman, first of all, when the name Kenen was proposed by me it was understood immediately and so Dr. Neumann took upon himself to get in touch with you. I never spoke to Kenen, I do not know whether he will accept or not, and I think that you know that Kenen is not a Chaver of our party, so it has absolutely nothing to do with various party representatives here, while I also agree to the principle, the same as you agree to the principle enunciated now by Chaver Lurie, that we should have in mind the fact that we are a coalition body, so as far as I am concerned any candidate that was proposed outside of Hammer and Manson, and it was immediately understood that Dr. Neumann should take up the matter with you, so this necessity of having a person that could work with you, this we understand and we accepted it. I proposed Kenen because I know that you worked with him, that he was here. There might have been preferences, one man is 100% and the other is only 90% or 80%. Let me tell you very openly why I opposed Manson. It is not because I have anything against his ability. Just as I did not have anything against the ability of Shapiro when I opposed him there. These people went through a school for years, and I do not believe that people can relive themselves so easily from a training that they went through for several years. We, my group opposed that system even in the Emergency Council. You had there a principle, I am not discussing now whether this was a good one or not. You considered that the larger party was sort of a Legislative body, so I say that these

people who worked under such a training are to my mind not psychologically adopted to work in a place where there is really a coalition. In principle there is a coalition in the Emergency Council also. However, there, because of the importance of the daily work and because of the great task that you, together with those that helped you had to carry upon yourselves, while we expressed from time to time our dissatisfaction with it, we never made a quarrel out of it, never an issue, but here we are building a new thing. So if you cannot get people that are not, to my mind, under this training of years, then we will have to take this. But I personally consider Kenen as one of those who can work with everybody, he knows Zionism, knows the political field, knows also very much about public relations, and I thought that if you will agreed that you can work with him, then it is a very good candidate. I do not insist on this candidate and we are not going to make any issue of any candidate. I am glad to hear what you have proposed now. It seems to me that there is a solution. I certainly do not want to punish Hanson for anything. To put him in charge of the Public Relation Department, I too would be for it, but to put him as Executive Director, I am giving you the reason why I opposed it, not because I have anything against Hanson personally. I think that after this discussion the Committee should meet again and then it has, it seems to me a way out in what you have proposed, or a way out in some way. If we follow the Lurie proposal there is one way for everything. There is one Director over everything. If we follow your proposal, there is no such person. Maybe you are right. Maybe we do not need it. So let the Committee sit again for one more session and go through this question, which is more preferable. It seems to me that either way, an Executive Director or that you should have your secretary. I think we can find a way.

MRS. HALPERIN: Mr. Chairman, I think that the alternative that you propose is not good. We may have to come to it, but it is not an ideal arrangement. You need a man who stands at the administrative end. One might have to

come to it. I would like to say a word on the Manson business. Mr. Zuckerman has said much that I had in mind. I am glad you were frank. You yourself just said something that you were not quite aware of, I am sure. It is what you said, that the pattern would go on. You said you would like a man who could do your work, ^{people} see/that you wanted him to see, that is the Emergency Council pattern and we are all mature people, Dr. Silver, so we have to talk as mature people. The pattern in the Emergency Council was for all of us an almost unbearable pattern. Now the frictions were there all the time. I am going to be frank. There is no purpose in not being frank. For example, things happened quite recently that from the point of view of those who sat in the Emergency Council, really it could have landed us in a blow-up, but it did not. Just before the election when you did what you did with the Dewey thing. Well, we were all sitting there as a coalition group in the Emergency Council. Nobody knew, nobody heard until things were done. I can tell you that, after all, I have been connected with the Emergency Council for years. You could never break through. You never knew what happened. It was not a coalition. We were sitting there and you were the leader. You had your staff, you carried on. Well, it is water over the dam. After all, the Emergency Council was an emergency, it will go on for a little while. It is ^{last} finished and in the years of your life you do not have the virility to fight. We did it for a while, but there it was. But in any event, there was under the surface all the years the tug of war. We were licked. You won the pattern and at one time we decided we were licked, so we accepted it. Until the time we thought we were licked we did not accept it. This is a different thing, it is a small group which carries much more responsibility. All of us carry terrific responsibility, and you will remember last year when we sat up all night many, many night.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: You are arguing against yourself.

MRS. HALPRIN: No, it was the nature of the thing, and it will be in the

nature of the thing. It had nothing to do with the secretary. It came because we are what we are, an Agency that had to meet certain situations, but eventually we all carried responsibility and we are now setting up a division of work ^{is} which/bringing many of us here into the office very frequently. It may be day by day. Now I think you are right when you say we cannot impose upon you somebody that you cannot work with, but I do believe the converse is true, that you cannot impose upon us somebody we cannot work with. That one must choose ^{who} a person/is acceptable to all of us. And I do not think it is impossible that you cannot find a person that is acceptable to you. Maybe not 100%. Mr. Zuckerman is right. Manson, it is not because they are pro-Silver, that day has passed.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I am delighted to hear it.

MRS. HALPRIN: Not that there were not years in the Emergency Council when that was an issue, but not here and now, but the pattern, yes, the pattern is a direct line from Manson to Silver and we will be in this office every day, we will not be able to break the pattern, we will not be able to break the line, if you have a different kind of pattern -- look here, Lourie was in this office, he was in the best sense of the word, I think the true civil servant. He had no personal loyalties. We could all come in, feel at ease with him. From my point of view he was the perfect type of man. I do not think he was perfect in everything he did, but I mean in his approach from the thing.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: He also came from the Emergency Council.

MRS. HALPRIN: I know, but he was different there. When he left it he left it with much happiness. Now insofar as we can get a man who has loyalty to the group, not the person, who is available to all of us on equal basis, to you as Chairman doubly so, but I think you have to respect the feeling that we have that we cannot let ourselves get involved in a pattern that really destroyed any semblance of a real Emergency Council, and that could destroy this. You talk about six months. Now unless the Zionist Movement is so

revolutionized that there will be no body here, then the persons that we select must continue and will continue. First of all, it is impossible to ask a man to leave a job for six months without even the assurance of all being well. What kind of people can you get? You establish the pattern. I take it that there will be either the American Section of the Jewish Agency, there will be a group of people here responsible for work. We start an Economic Department for six months and then we give it up. It may change its character, certainly, characteristically it may be different, but one cannot really conceive that you start serious work and then drop it at the end of six months, so I take it that these people that we now employ, if they are good in the work will continue to stay on, even if the composition of this body changes.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Any further discussion.

DR. NEUMANN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to be against referring matters to sub-committees. I think that we all know each others minds and we are all around the table, we might as well face these questions and dispose of them, rather than go shuffling back and forth. It is the end of December and we have got to do some work and a makeshift solution is better than none. We have got to get going. Now we can have two patterns of organization, either a highly centralized administration with an Executive Director having great authority, responsibility to direct or coordinate all departments of work, or you have a more decentralized type of administration. Each has its advantages and its disadvantages. The normal American system is a centralized type of administration. You have an Executive Director and it heads all the departments. The department heads work in constant touch with the Committees, but in their daily work they work with the Executive Director, etc. There are other systems which are different, and I know for example, that the Executive in Palestine never had an Executive Director, never had one. There was a Secretary of the Executive there who has no real executive functions, who takes care of certain matters. I do not say it is so good. I do not say the

system is so good, but it is a system nevertheless under which the Executive has functioned there for many years. I think in London too we never had an Executive Director. We had members of the Executive who were in general charge and we had different people who were in charge of different departments. And if we cannot agree, which I would very much regret, upon one person as the Executive Director, in whom all may have sufficient confidence, etc., then we will have to adopt another pattern, and to appoint two or three people to various responsibilities and coordinate their work the best they can. The Chairman will coordinate it to the best of his ability and there will be reports rendered here directly to the Executive, and we will carry on, but let's get going. In our sub-committee the question of the Organization Department was also touched upon, but Mr. Zuckerman said the Organization Committee was not sure whether they wanted to recommend having a special man, a special Executive, so we did not press it, but there are certain Departments, there is Finance and that department is understood generally to be a little broad. Hammer does take care not only of the finances, but also of all business matters that we have here. We have houses, we have property, we have bills, we have all kinds of things. So you have Treasury. You may have Organization, you have the Latin American Department, where we have some kind of an arrangement which the Latin American Department Committee will have. We have Public Relations. We have the Economic Department. We ought to proceed to fill these positions. So far as this secretary that Dr. Silver has suggested, I do not think that there need be much question of that we do not concede, as this is not a high salaried job like the Director, but as somebody who will be at the disposal, also keep the minutes, tend to certain correspondence, serve as the link between the Chairman and the whole group. That can be done. Get a young man, rather inexpensively for that sort of thing or possibly a young woman.

MR. GROSSMAN: While discussing patterns, I just witnessed the working of a certain pattern in Palestine. There is also a Chairman. Perhaps because

he spends his whole time in Jerusalem and in Tel Aviv, but he has no secretary. He is the only man who has no secretary, who has no director who is under him. Every other member of the Executive has actually a man in charge, a secretary. They are not called Directors. He has not. But we have a General Secretary. That is Eisenberg. He is the administrator and he is at the disposal of every member of the Executive, but primarily the Chairman. He opens the mail, he keeps the minutes. If we have any question besides there is always an administrator. Dobkin is in charge of administration, but there is a tremendous administration of course, there are hundreds of people working. Eisenberg cannot come in my department and tell me what I have to do or anything. He sends me an invitation to meetings. Thus far, as I have seen, several months have gone by and it was very nice, there were no conflicts. The Chairman is the Chairman. Sometimes he wants to speak with us. He calls us in. Every week we have a meeting. I do not say that perhaps we would like to have a stronger personality than Eisenberg, but it is quite all right. I believe that is what you need here. I know a bit of American conditions and organizations. You need a secretary. I would not have Directors. First of all, when new departments were opened in Jerusalem, we did not invite people, every contract is for ten months. Every man that I have has a contract expiring in ten months, until the Congress, without any rights to apply for any extension because we do not know. And therefore I would advise you to be very careful with regard to this. I think you ought to have a Secretary and a good Secretary and of course one of his main duties is being in contact with the Chairman. But he is the Secretary of the body and through him you clear, but there is another question. You want to appoint directors of the departments. If you do not want to have conflicts with the members of the Executive, a member of the Executive must be the head of the Department. Otherwise you will have immediate conflicts. Let us say you will appoint a committee. I know what directors are. I saw directors in various organizations. If you will have a

committee he will consider himself to be the head and in the course of a fortnight you will have a conflict. The American Jewish Conference never had a Director.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: That is why it ended up the way it did.

MR. GROSSMAN: It ended up for other reasons. It was many other reasons. There was a Secretary and he worked very nicely and I believe this is way you have to do it.

DR. GOLDMANN: I think there is a difference of opinion and I want to make a few observations to your suggestion. I do not insist that there must be an Executive Director. I think it would be better here, but if you feel that we cannot agree all of us on one acceptable to the whole group, and to you, then maybe it is no use insisting on it. But, on the other hand, not to have anybody, I take it for granted that naturally you have the right to have a Secretary who is at your disposal, that is an obvious thing and select whomever you want. But, on the other hand, to have nobody, speaking of this I would advise not to call him an assistant to the Chairman. This is very easily misunderstood. The President has assistants here in Washington, but you see what happens. He is Secretary to the Chairman, do not call him assistant. The terminology may raise all kinds of problems. Maybe at the Congress they will decide, they will have to elect him. It is bad enough in Washington where the President has four assistants who are really only civil staff officials. On the other hand, you must have a kind of administrative secretary of the whole staff. Decentralization may have certain advantages, but if you have five different departments, then it is perfect chaos. One man who is in charge of the Administration, he has a pattern for a contract. The department tells him it needs so many people, the committee is agreed that he is in charge of it. There must be some administrative center and I think that really, without giving him Executive Director titles, Hammer could do very well. He is a good administrator. It does not give him any political position, nothing at

all, and just being the man in charge of finances is naturally the man to do it because he knows the budget. Every department should not get out of its limits. When you leave to every Director of a department to engage people and there is really no administrative check-up, they will get out of bounds.

DR. SCHROTHMAN: A budget must be set up anyway.

DR. GOLDMANN: He is to check that budget, see that it is observed. Weiser is already asking for twenty people. If every department goes its own way there is nobody except the Chairman, and you cannot be bothered with all these details.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: That is what I had in mind for a secretary.

DR. NEUMANN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out, there are certain things which are already established here. There are certain things which clear through the Finance Committee. Mr. Hammer acts, naturally, as the secretary, Executive Secretary to the Finance Committee. Such questions as employment, contracts and the question of space, he does it under the direction of the Finance Committee and he will continue to do that. That does not involve questions of policy and a lot of other matters. There may be correspondence of various kinds, etc. I think if the Chairman has a Secretary, some bright young man, if Hammer continues to serve in the capacity in which he is serving with the Finance Committee, through which we clear a lot of these matters which are of a business character, business administration, he does not undertake, however, to run the various departments and to tell the Directors how to run the department and I think it will render him a great service if we do not encourage him to try to do it and I think we should have no difficulty then. We have to call them Directors here, Meir, because we have to give them considerable responsibility, these people. Just as Hammer is the Director of Finance and what is the difference, what you call them? The Finance Committee will exercise certain controls and general policy will have to be coordinated by the Chairman himself, with the help of the staff.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: And the Executive.

DR. NEUMANN: You will get reports here every week. I must say that with regard to actual work, whatever may have been the case in the Emergency Council, we have had now experience of more than two years working here, and it is just two years and we had fairly good experience. We have had sometimes some real battles here over the questions of high policy, which all of us enjoyed very much, because you are talking about something which is really vital. Otherwise we have not had serious frictions and we are a small group. We can get together frequently. We have gotten together many times when necessary without the Chairman being here on emergency. And certain sub-committees are functioning. We ought to be able to manage with a sense of good will and a desire for cooperation and giving responsibility also to our committees, and I therefore would strongly urge that the appointment that we can make now we should make. It should be understood that Hammer should operate as the Finance Officer and in that capacity he will have considerable responsibility with regard to various administrative matters and financial matters, etc. And the business management, so to speak. I think he is very good for that. You will have a Director for Public Relations. I hope we can now agree upon engaging Hanson for that position, and there too there is to be a committee. There is to be a Director for Organization, if the Organization Committee comes along with a definite idea on the subject of what is to be done. We do not know yet what the Organization Department should do. With regard to Youth and Chaldeans, there is an official who was sent from Palestine actually, Mr. Asculai, and he will have to work with the Committee. The Economic Department is something which we have to build up with the help of Nathan, and there too Hammer will have to cooperate with that. He wants to cooperate with it. He wants to engage a certain person. He has suggested a person. First I thought he wanted him really strictly for the Economic Department. I now understand that he had wanted this man to help out in his own Finance

Department in order that he should be able to devote some time also to the Economic Department.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Well, what is your pleasure. It is getting late. It is after midnight. Are you--

DR. NEUMANN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one thing more. Since we have been talking about the past, and since you have been talking about the Emergency Council, I hope that some of our friends around the table will not have the impression that during the last couple of years all of us were altogether happy about the set-up. Far from it. There were times when I was quite unhappy about many things and I know that Dr. Silver was not so happy, so many times, about certain persons or certain things or how they were done, but for the sake of the great political struggle a great many things were overlooked and a lot of things which might have been irritating, a great deal was taken in our stride that way. Don't think that it was altogether completely happy.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I have refrained from going into that particular phase of the subject because there are other things to attend to. I have my own version of what took place in the Emergency Council in the last few years and the whole thesis of what was built up here about training people a certain way is in my humble judgment made of thin air. I followed the customary American procedure of organization. And I think America has given us guidance in how to organize and how to work efficiently and I have not permitted interference with an emergency program by inefficient methods. However, I do not want to go into this thing now. I will let the record of the Emergency Council speak for itself and what we did on the American scene I will stand on that record. However, this is a different type of organization. This is an organization made up of six people which meets every week, sometimes two or three times a week, and which is in the closest touch with the work and this is the line we have followed ever since the organization began. There were

times when we met three or four times a week, when there was an emergency and it is not my intention to build up a new type of an organization than we have had right along. Far from it.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: Mr. Chairman, may I formulate in some form of a motion? As to the status of Hammer, I think we understand, everyone of us what his status will be, as Administrator of the Financial Department, and, so to say, the whole economy of the business is in his hands, the business of the American Branch, American Section. He belongs to the Finance Committee and he is their Director.

DR. NEUMANN: Executive Office of the Finance Committee.

DR. GOLDMANN: And also representative of the Treasury in Jerusalem.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: We have no such position in the set up. We adopted at the last meeting, we have no such position. You may wish to create it. We have no such position. We have no special department for finances. You agreed at your last meeting, unless I am wrong, to have --

MRS. HALPRIN: A Committee on Finance.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Yes, a committee, but not a department. You would have a department on Economics, Organization, Public Relations, and Latin American Department, and we appointed committees, three on each one of these departments and we also said that we will need a Finance Committee to run the finances of this house as it were here. Now if this Finance Committee wants to appoint a Secretary to work with it is perfectly all right, but you are not appoint now a new department called Finance Department.

DR. NEUMANN: We do not have to formalize it much.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I do not want any confusion later on.

DR. NEUMANN: There is an existing procedure whereby Hammer sits with the Finance Committee and is at our disposal at all times.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: If the Finance Committee wants to engage him or invite him to be Secretary, there is no objection at all.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: But the budgets of all the committees belong to the Finance Committee. The Finance Committee cannot operate without some official to head it. So we will use him.

DR. GOLDMANN: It is nothing new, it is an old procedure.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: We did not have any department up until now. Now each department will have to have a project. The Finance Committee together with Mr. Hammer are responsible.

DR. NEUMANN: He will carry out such functions as the Finance Committee requests him to.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: It is understood then, Number two, that as far as Public Relations Committee Manson is proposed. It is understood that no one of the various departments^{are} in a position subordinate to anybody, but to their commissions. There is no person which assumes here in the office first place.

DR. NEUMANN: That's right, there is no Executive Director.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: Just as Hammer is under the auspices of the Finance Committee, so is Manson under the auspices of the Public Relations Committee. That is number two. It is understood that you will get a Secretary for the technical work, first communicating with you, keeping you constantly informed of what is to be done and bringing to the various departments your opinions on various things, that you will find necessary to tell this department that has to be done, etc., and he takes care of the minutes, of the technical things of the organization side. Then there remains two more people that have to be engaged, one will be the man for the Economic Department, we will ask the Economic Committee to nominate for us as soon as possible a proper candidate for that, and then we have for the Organization Department a Committee to take care of that. There are a few points in the report, I understand, that we cannot go into details, but there are at least a few points which we have to go into tonight. There is the matter of Asculai.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I must say in that connection, it would have been more

protocol if the office in Jerusalem had consulted us first whether Mr. Asculai -- I do not know the Gentleman, I have nothing against him -- whether he was persona grata with us.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: The only thing we can say in justification of Jerusalem is that we did not do anything up until now and so they sent him.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: That is no reason why they could not have asked us.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: The way the Committee recommends it is the following: Asculai has now been taken and is without any specific status. If, in the development of the work it will be found that we need a person of higher stature, then the Committee on Youth and Chalutz will propose such a name and this Committee will either put him above Asculai or give Asculai an assistant. This is the formula which our Committee proposes as far as the candidate of Asculai is concerned. If we will need a person above him we will name one above him. If he will develop into the proper person and will need persons to help him, we will name such persons to help him.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: May we then--

MRS. HALPRIN: There is a question of salaries involved.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: May we then assume that this formulation of Mr. Zuckerman's is acceptable to this body. If so it is a vote. The matter of salaries will be recommended by the Finance Committee.

Mr. Grossman has the floor.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: We have a very elaborate report, but there is one question which might be necessary to say something about today, that is the business of shekelim. I want to say a few words about it. We will be in a very great dilemma as far as the shekel is concerned. Here is the dilemma; the legal authorities in Jerusalem sent circulars, I do not know whether you read such a circular, it is a very important circular. They discussed the matter, since we will have three years from one Congress to another, how will we go about the decision of the Congress that one will pay for three shekelim. They made a

compromise. The 1948-49, but this compromise hits us, especially in America because we did not have any elections last year and because of that no shekolim were distributed to those that bought shekolim. I am not so sure that even a list of the buyers of shekolim exists, so if we go to elections and we will have first^{of}/all to assume that we will have to have elections.

DR. GOLDMANN: We must be able technically to have elections.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: But the shekel is the basis for elections, so I move that our Section should recommend to the Jerusalem Executive that they should make an exception with the United States for the coming year, that one shekel of 1949 should give the right to vote to every one that will have that shekel.

MR. GROSSMAN: They will make that exception for the entire world.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: There will be a meeting. We sold 150,000 shekolim. Ress said they have no list.

MR. GROSSMAN: May I suggest a change in your proposal?

CHAIRMAN SILVER: You make mandatory a shekel campaign in 1949. If you limit the payment of a shekel to 1949 then it means that we must have it in 1949.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: We must have it in 1949.

MRS. HALPERIN: Actually the Congress was supposed to have taken place in 1948. Nobody knew in the beginning of 1948 that the Congress would not take place sometime at the end of the year. Therefore, presumably people paid in 1947 for two years to go to the Congress. You could not have known at the early part of this year that there would not be a Congress this year. Therefore, you had to be prepared to go to a Congress this year.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: This is only a postponed Congress. The shekel is still valid. If the Executive will agree that there is no shekel this year there is no problem, but if they insist on a shekel and for the purpose of this election they should rule for us in 1949 that this shekel should be valid. I do not think that our organization is prepared. We would like to think

about it a bit.

DR. GOLDMANN: I think we should not rush so much. I think, first of all, the shekel commission should make proposals. They are the first body. If they will come with a unanimous proposal, I am sure you will accept, because after all, all parties sit there. If there will be difference of opinion then the Executive will have to rule as a whole, but as it is a complicated problem, first bring it to the Shekel Commission.

MRS. HALPRIN: I honestly cannot understand how we are going to explain to an American public. The state of Israel is going to its elections. We are going to elections. We have just separated church and state. They have our two shekelim, at this point we are going to be holding elections while they are going to be holding elections there.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: The matter is referred to the Shekel Commission.

MR. GROSSMAN: I was not here at the last meeting of the Executive.

DR. NEUMANN: Excuse me, I would like to add one word on this matter before you go on. Maybe you can convey to your friends over there. I want to tell you that Hadassah and the ZOA, I cannot speak of the other parties.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Since when are you speaking for Hadassah?

MRS. HALPRIN: I'm anxious to hear what he has to say for Hadassah.

DR. NEUMANN: This business of another shekel campaign is something which from the general Zionist standpoint, from the standpoint of the movement generally, is a nuisance, a terrible burden, costs a lot of money. That is the least of it, but it involves in this country without doubt a serious neglect of serious Zionist tasks.

MR. GROSSMAN: I can promise you that I will tell them.

DR. NEUMANN: I know.

MR. GROSSMAN: I will submit it with all arguments against your point of view.

MRS. HALPRIN: You are just dying for an election.

MR. GROSSMAN: In exactly two years you will not have any Zionist organizations in this country, if you do not make an election and make your point clear.

The Revisionist Organisation submitted here a request for an advance or guarantee or anything with a reasonable argument that either you permit us to have, as you permitted other organization, a campaign, which we are prepared to start immediately, or you have to give us, or let us participate in the UPA. If you cannot make an arrangement you have to assist us by giving us a guarantee. I sent, at the same time, a request to the Palestine Executive. I sent cables to Locker and to Goldstein. Now I receive a cable for Grossman from Locker and Goldstein: "Unwilling bring up matter before Executive without recommendation from Agency New York". Today I met Rothernberg, so he said, what are you excited about? He said we are willing to act, but we cannot act until we hear from the Jewish Agency. So I said, but the Jewish Agency wrote you a letter sometime ago. He said I have not seen any letter. This is a very complicated jurisdictional business. Palestine says they cannot discuss questions without recommendations, you say that this is the business of Palestine.

DR. GOLDMANN: No of the funds here.

MR. GROSSMAN: Rothernberg said he had to have--

CHAIRMAN SILVER: The thing must be referred to the UPA. The UPA has the recommendation of the body to consider this matter. Up to now they have been fighting like cats and dogs over other things. Now the next meeting of the UPA you matter has to come up and then they will recommend.

MR. GROSSMAN: The position is this; until the matter will come up we may be in a very difficult position, and we will be compelled. I want you to do a thing that the Zionist Executive in Palestine once did in another matter. I want you to help us in this matter. Either you decide that the Revisionists are authorized to make a campaign for its fund, or at least do something. You support our application, give us a guarantee for a certain sum

under two conditions. We do not want your money, either we are under obligation to the paying of this money in the course of the year, or this is the first charge on the amount which we will receive from the UPA. I will be quite frank about the position. Here we are in the Zionist organization. I speak now about it. We are in the Zionist Executive. We cannot work independently. For instance my name was used here and I cabled my orders not to use my name ^{I am} because/in the Executive. We do not get a budget of any kind. We have our trouble. People begin to ask, after all, what are we doing in the Zionist organization, we are not getting any assistance and we have our serious difficulties and I speak here quite frankly and I want you to do something for us. The least you can do is to give us a guarantee, we can get the money from a bank for one year. The guarantee either we pay you the money back. We raised money in various countries, or give us the money. You have no money, that I understand, but the thing you could do, you can refer it to Palestine. If you say we recommend to advance to the Zionist Revisionists \$100,00 or whatever you will decide or to give them a guarantee, but something has to be done. We are in an impossible position and this is more than an emergency. It has to do with our difficulties with people who are very skeptical about our participation in the Zionist organization. I do not want to deny the facts. Something has to be done. What I am asking now, and I am prepared even to reduce the amount, we want the Jewish Agency here, since we are working here, and this is American and we can raise money in other countries, give us a guarantee for \$75,000 which means either we pay you the \$75,000 in the course of the year, or this is the first charge on the amount the UPA will allocate us.

DR. NEUMANN: Mr. Chairman, it is clear to me that this question of inclusion or non-inclusion of the Revisionist Fund is a doubtful issue, especially with the reconstituted UPA. I doubt very much whether the Executive will want to take jurisdiction with regard to allocations before there is a reorganization of the Board in view of all that has transpired. Incidentally, the funds

also have concurrent jurisdiction. They can also initiate a proposal. The UPA will then express itself upon it. Something may come of it, but I do not know. On the other hand, it is clear that the Revisionists must be entitled to raise money for their Fund, as all other parties are. I do not see why we should not in these circumstances, knowing the difficulty here with the UPA, I do not see why we should not help try to help the Revisionists to some extent by recommending to our colleagues on the Executive that an advance, simply a matter of advance. I am not speaking now of an American situation, that some advance be made to them on account of monies which they will raise in the course of the next year. If they get money from the UPA they can repay it from that. If not, they have to repay it anyhow, out of their collections. The amount advanced should be such in relation to what they have been raising as to give a reasonable prospect of repayment. We have to know how much they have raised.

DR. SCHUCHTMAN: We have raised last year \$430,000.

DR. NEUMANN: Taking into account what they have raised in various countries and then making a conservative bankers estimate of what we can afford to advance to them, and to say to our colleagues that if the Treasury cannot afford to advance the money, then we will be prepared here insofar as it may be possible to help by means of our assurance to some bank if such a loan can be made. I cannot speak, but I think we ought to point this way to our colleagues over there and make such a recommendation to them.

DR. SCHUCHTMAN: There is also a third part of this scheme.

DR. NEUMANN: We have done things of this kind in the past, in various forms. I know our action with regard to an organization like the Aguda, which is not even affiliated with the Zionist Movement. I think if it is a matter of an advance which the party undertakes to repay out of their collections, that much of a risk we should be willing, we are not so poor that we cannot do something.

DR. GOLDMANN: Well, I would not oppose the recommendation for the

Treasury and the Executive there to make an advance. I have my doubts about the readiness to give the guarantee because of this issue now. It is a precedent. The Finance Committee should discuss it. We have never done it here.

MR. GROSSMAN: I think the proposal of Neumann is--

MRS. HALPRIN: Could we not take this thing back to the Finance Committee? I think whatever we do we have to do through Palestine.

DR. NEUMANN: I say we should recommend to our colleagues in Palestine that they should make an advance of \$75,000 to the Revisionists and we will say to them that in the event that we find it difficult we will explore the possibility here.

MRS. HALPRIN: We have to have a Committee meeting tomorrow.

DR. SCHECHTMAN: Well, put it this way; that should the Finance Committee find it possible, they have the blessings--

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Any further discussion?

DR. SCHECHTMAN: But there is also a third point.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: If for instance we recommend this, we recommended something which might precedent, maybe we will have to renew again all the applications with the Mizrachi and with the General Zionists, etc.

DR. NEUMANN: Mizrachi you dealt with already

MR. ZUCKERMAN: If they are going to get it certainly the Revisionists have a right to get it and my threat still is there. When we come to it I will tell you, I would advise the Finance Committee that if they can find a way, if they can borrow the money here, not in the name of the Agency, and not in the name of the UPA.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I understand then that it is the consensus of opinion to recommend to the Finance Committee for favorable action to make it possible for the Revisionists to obtain a loan of \$75,000.

DR. NEUMANN: I take it that the motion is that we recommend to our colleagues in Jerusalem that the Executive make such an advance and at the same

time we authorize the Finance Committee to examine the question of whether or not something can be done here.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I do not get it, restate that resolution.

DR. NEUMANN: Recommend to our colleagues that the Executive make an advancement of \$75,000 repayable by the Revisionists or their institutions within a year, and at the same time we instruct the Finance Committee to explore the possibility of securing the money here in the event that the Executive is ready to make the advance, but is not in a position to give the case. We will advise the Executive, incidentally, that at the same time our Finance Committee has been instructed.

MRS. HALPRIN: But that first part, first bring it to the Finance Committee. Are we making a mistake in bypassing the UPA?

CHAIRMAN SILVER: It has nothing to do with the UPA.

MR. GROSSMAN: It is an internal loan.

MR. LURIE: (Yiddish)

MRS. HALPRIN: If the General Zionists get \$500,000 in America and the General Zionists raise the UPA fund, then what you are in fact saying--

CHAIRMAN SILVER: You must decide here whether you want another meeting this week or whether you are going to wait until next Monday.

MR. GROSSMAN: I was told by Mr. Hammer that Robert Nathan wants to see me and wants to discuss his work with me and I am not prepared to meet Mr. Nathan.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I would advise that you should not meet with Mr. Robert Nathan because we have not met yet. That will just have to wait until we get around to it.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: Can we again make an attempt to dispose of this matter to the two people.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: I have asked the question whether you want another meeting this week or whether you would like to wait until next Monday? If it

is this week I will not be able to be present any more, but if it is next Monday I will be able to be here. You can have a meeting anytime this week if you want to.

DR. NEUMANN: We are having a meeting of the Finance Committee and in the afternoon we have a meeting on this tourist business. I would like to put on record, if I may, this statement.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: Will it provoke discussion?

MR. ZUCKERMAN: Refer this matter to the Economic Committee together with Mr. Grossman if they find a way it is all right.

DR. NEUMANN: Provided that Greenberg will be available.

CHAIRMAN SILVER: The next meeting of the Executive is at Monday at 3:00 P.M. Generally speaking it is better to have it in the afternoon.

(Meeting adjourned at 1:00 A.M.)

