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### **MS-4787: Abba Hillel Silver Papers, 1902-1989.**

Series I: General Correspondence, 1914-1969, undated.

Sub-series A: Alphabetical, 1914-1965, undated.

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Jewish Agency, Eban, Abba, 1948-1949.



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77 Great Russell Street  
London, W. C. 1.

19 July, 1948

ALS

Aubrey Eban, Esq.,  
16 East 66th Street  
New York, N. Y.

Dear Aubrey,

I must apologise for not having answered - or even acknowledged - earlier your very interesting letter of June 22nd, for which I thank you very much.

The situation here is briefly the following:

The Government has acquiesced in the idea of the existence of Israel, and wants to find a peaceful solution based on that. But at the same time, Britain does not want to endanger her position with the Arab world. They feel, therefore, that they must give the Arabs plenty of time to get used to the fait accompli of Israel, and secondly that some concessions will have to be made to them, to enable them to "save face". They are afraid that if the Arab Governments are forced to recognise Israel overnight, public opinion will sweep them away, and more extreme Governments will come into power. (Eliahu Sasson, who as you will certainly know, is in Paris, shares this view). Nobody here has yet specified exactly what they mean by "concessions", but certainly they have in mind the larger part of the Negev, and maybe something more. The question of Haifa was not raised in any talks with me. Naturally, they take up the position that all this is Bernadotte's business, and they do not interfere. As for Jerusalem, at the beginning they thought it might be as well for Abdullah to have it, but in the meantime they have come to realise that neither Jews nor Christians would accept this, and so have given up the idea. They even criticise Bernadotte for having made this proposal, and deny having had anything at all to do with it.

They pressed the Arabs very hard to renew the cease-fire. They indicated clearly to them that they could not protect them any more in the Security Council, nor make any further deliveries of arms, if the Arabs defy the Security Council resolution - in which case the U.S. would lift the embargo in favour of the Jews. The readiness of the British to support the American resolution in the Security Council last week is regarded by many here as the turning-point in British policy with regard to Palestine, and indeed, as compared with their opposition of a few weeks ago, when they were dead against such a resolution, it certainly marks some development. The Arabs here are very angry with the British, and accuse them of having gone over to the Jewish camp.

For all these reasons, the Government here is going very slow on the question of de facto recognition. A few weeks ago McNeil thought that the matter was practically settled, but in the meantime they have decided to hold back, and it seems that the officials of the Near East Department have influenced Bevin. They are ready to let us open an office here as the Office of the Provisional Government, but they are not yet ready to exchange letters in this respect, or to address written communications to us in this style. They are ready to discuss everything with us orally, as representatives of the Provisional Government. They have agreed to resume the postal service, we may issue visas, etc., so there is a certain amount of progress, but, as I told McNeil, it is measurable by inches. I presume that once the cease-fire has settled down again, and the excitements of the fighting abates a little, we may get some written de facto recognition in a few weeks.



The business of the five kidnapped has also thrown its shadow over the work here about recognition; it has caused a great deal of irritation both at the Foreign Office and with many Members of Parliament. (When I saw Oliver Stanley, he was very angry about it). I have advised Moshe to liquidate the incident by expelling those of the five against whom there is serious suspicion, and I hope they will do this. A public trial may easily become a cause celebre, and cause a lot of unnecessary irritation.


The real danger of the present situation is that a very long "truce of attrition" may ensue, which in the British view would exhaust both parties and make them more amenable to concessions, - especially if the truce can be dragged out till after the U.N. Assembly and the American elections. If we are able to avert this danger and get the matter settled before or during the U.N. Assembly, it should be all right; but I am not sure whether we shall be able to do that. I presume we cannot ask for admission at the Assembly as we are as yet only a Provisional Government, and have no constituent assembly or permanent authorities, - nor do I see how we can do all this before October. How do you and Robinson feel about it?

With best regards, and hoping to hear from you soon, I am

Yours,

/s/ Nahum

Nahum Goldmann





from the  
editorial offices of

## COMMENTARY

34 WEST 33RD STREET, NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

August 31, 1948

The two articles attached, both appearing in the September issue of Commentary, clarify--we feel--two of the most fundamental problems faced by the state of Israel.

The article by Aubrey S. Eban, Israeli delegate to the UN--his first contribution to an American magazine--throws a penetrating light on the controversial area of Arab-Jewish relations, and on the arrangements possible between Arab and Jewish states in the Middle East.

Mr. Eban states that the only basis for sound relations is the cooperation of equal and separate states. He discusses the various proposals for federation and confederation, both in Palestine and the Middle East, and gives his reasons for believing that proposals for a unitary state or close federation are not only unacceptable to the people of Israel, but would prove unfeasible as well.

In the second article, Hal Lehrman asks: Has Great Britain, despite its failure to recognize Israel and its public unfriendliness, joined in a working partnership with the U. S. to safeguard the sovereignty and future of the new Jewish state?



'from the  
editorial offices of

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## COMMENTARY

34 WEST 33RD STREET, NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

Mr. Lehrman, well-known journalist and political analyst, feels that just such an entente has been created--and he outlines a ten-point program which he declares represents the Arab-Jewish settlement that the American-British entente is striving for. Mr. Lehrman bases his article on information received from the highest political and diplomatic sources. His previous two articles in Commentary have predicted, with a high degree of accuracy, the turns in American and British foreign policy.

We think you will be interested in reading both of these articles, tearsheets of which are enclosed. We look forward to receiving your comments or criticisms for possible publication in our Letters from Readers department.

Elliot E. Cohen  
Editor



# COMMENTARY

## THE FUTURE OF ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS

*The Key is the Cooperation of Equal and Separate States*

AUBREY S. EBAN

THE peace on Israel's borders may be no more than the peace of a quiescent volcano; and the crisis of the state in its immediate external relationships remains unsolved. With this reserve, any friend of Israel would be less than human if he could not look back and indulge at least a brief twinge of pride. No political program in history has ever been assailed with such predictions of woe as partition and Jewish statehood. It would lead, said the

prophets, to chronic war. Yet for the first time in the whole story, Arabs and Jews face each other, with no foreign army between them, in conditions which seem to put war either beyond their political interest or their resources. The Jews would be massacred, said their friends (in tutelary concern) and their enemies (in gleeful and almost genuine belief). There is indeed much loss and bereavement in Israel; unless the black-bordered newspaper notices are kept in mind, the public mood cannot be accurately gauged. Yet by the precedents of history, it is hard to imagine a nation born out of conflict with less bloodshed.

Little is heard these days of holy war. The fire and brimstone of Arab speeches a few months back now appear merely pyrotechnic—as many, not always with confidence, predicted. The Arab chest-beating amidst strident calls for *Jihad* and crusade had become a little tedious even to those who advocated surrender to it. Thus, when the implacable furies, threatening to sweep all before them, become the abject recipients of alms at the very table of the Security Council, poetic justice is upheld.

It was said that a Jewish state could not arise amidst such hostility, or exist in economic separation from Arab Palestine. It has arisen; it exists. The newspapers and the official *Gazette* show the whole process

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AUBREY S. EBAN, the representative of the Israeli government at the UN, has won respect in all quarters for his intellectual ability, the cogency and precision of his advocacy, and his rather unique blend of forthrightness and reasonableness of statement. He came to his present post with the advantages of a life-long absorption and participation in Zionist work, and with five years of service in the British Army. During World War II he was active in political and military service in the Near Eastern countries. Mr. Eban was born in Cape-town, South Africa in 1915 and was graduated from Cambridge University, where he later taught and did research in Arabic and Persian literature. He resided in Palestine and Egypt from 1940 until his present duties began. This is his first published article in an American magazine. He writes here, it must be understood, in an unofficial capacity; and his opinions are not necessarily the official views of the Israeli government.



and routine—judges and registrars being appointed, envoys dispatched and received, stamps and banknotes printed, ministers interrogated, police and army units inspected, men recruited and exempted, officers decorated and promoted, controllers of manpower, industries, diamonds, currency, food supplies appointed. This has all happened in three months. The machine of Jewish statehood has never for a moment looked improvised or transient. Nobody who suggests that all this can be revoked even expects himself to be taken seriously. The Mediator finds the existence of a Jewish government to be the only stable element in a scene where all else is fluid and confused. Where the prophets of disaster foresaw the prelude of a great-power conflict, we have the Soviet and American flags fluttering on the Gat Rimmon—with Israel's mediating banner in between.

**I**N DRAMATIC terms all this forms a well-rounded conclusion. But the curtain has not fallen; there is no assurance yet that Israel will live happily ever after. Support for Zionism in Europe or America can not fully compensate for the absence of a harmony with the immediate world in which Israel must live. This is not to underrate the achievement of Zionism in reconstructing an impressive system of international support starting from its low fortunes and precarious status in the spring of 1947. But when this is duly appraised, the need for a comparable political victory in the field of regional relations becomes even more obvious. Without that victory Israel can hope at the best for an armistice; never for a peace. The requirements of military preparedness and the effects of regional boycott will frustrate the initiative of a developing and thriving society. Having beaten off a violent siege, Israel may honorably aspire not to live besieged forever.

That Arab-Jewish agreement is a Jewish interest may be held a self-evident truth. Zionism cannot be accused of ever doubting that truth, even if its efforts to vindicate it often lacked the conviction and tenacity

which were usually devoted to other agreed Zionist objectives. What may now begin to emerge as a truth equally self-evident is the proposition that Arab-Jewish agreement is an Arab interest as well. Now this has never yet been held by the Arabs even as a perfunctory slogan. And it would be wrong to dismiss the Zionist Congress resolutions about Arab friendship, just because they remained mere words. For these words, rehearsed to the point of platitudes, had a deep educative effect. Every Zionist knew Arab-Jewish friendship to be at least an objective worthy of attainment, even if he did or could do little to attain it. Conversely, the Arab slogans that the idea of peace with Zionism must never for a moment be harbored in any patriotic heart have deeply affected Arab nationalist thinking and paralyzed its flexibility.

There has been no objective Arab attempt since the days of Feisal to weigh up the consequences of permanent conflict with Zionism against those of a harmonious accord. No less discerning a writer than Mr. Albert Hourani could bring himself to believe that the Arabs could live without Jewish friendship, while the Jews, once confronted with the Arabs in the absence of an intermediary, would need Arab tolerance so acutely that they would purchase it on Arab terms.

This view rested on what proved to be a wrong appreciation of the balance of power. The Arab League was deemed so to outweigh the total Jewish potential that all that was necessary was to leave the two parties alone, whereupon a unitary Palestine would arise as an act of Arab will, even without Jewish consent. When the Arab spokesmen were asked how they proposed to prevent Jewish Palestine from seceding, how to drive immigrants from its shores, to establish authority over its economy and industrial machine, to secure the allegiance of Jews for Arab-dominated legislation, they could only point amiably to the colossus of the Arab League which was to carry out these painful but brief operations by the strength of its hands.



It was the failure to prove this appreciation of relative power, as well as considerations of equity and conscience, which discredited the unitary state idea with every tribunal to which it was submitted. It was only by arithmetic that one could prove the theoretical capacity of the Arabs to rule all Palestine. By the really substantial criteria of relative strength they could do no such thing.

When the test came, the Palestine Arab leadership, which had claimed the right to dominate Jewish Palestine in the name of arithmetic, proved itself within a few weeks unable even to rally Arab Palestine into the semblance of an organized national group. It could not feed a village or defend a town or govern a local council. Its leaders, prudently distributed in the more remote and secure Arab capitals, exhorted their followers to "fight for a hundred years." But their followers, by the myriads, refusing to fight for a hundred minutes, followed their leaders into exile and destroyed even the arithmetical basis of their unitary ideal. The roles are now balanced, if not reversed. Arabs and Jews need each other for any progress or any escape from deadlock. If anything, Israel can more afford an attitude of self-sufficiency and plough a lone furrow, though it would be ill advised to seek that solitude or be satisfied with it. But the salient new fact created since May 14 is that the Arab world must either seek an adjustment with Israel or sink ever deeper into a mire of international discredit, social disturbance, and political upheaval.

**P**ARTITION is in essence a theory of Arab-Jewish relations. The theory is that there are two peoples in Palestine, each with separate national aspirations; that neither can do without the full satisfaction of those aspirations, at least in a limited area; that each can best cooperate with the other on the basis of its own integrity and freedom; that the mutual elements of social and economic interest can only assert themselves in free and spontaneous contracts; that a tendency of unified life can only grow up, if at all, from

within and cannot be imposed initially from without; that between two national entities so organically distinct the ideal relationship is cooperation, not unity.

So much of this is axiomatic that it is staggering to reflect how hard the partition idea had to struggle until it overcame, one after the other, all the hurdles of international scrutiny and criticism. In the various United Nations organs the theory of separate national rights was repeatedly weighed in the balance against the formulas of unity—federation and confederation. History can show no federation which ever grew up except by the voluntary union of separate and independent units. "It is hardly possible to impose unity without consent," declared the Canadian representative, with whom a federal way of thinking was the point of departure. A member of the Peel Commission has told me that he and all his colleagues, in writing their report, were conscious of advocating a pro-Arab solution. The United Nations Special Committee too was not absorbed in a pro-Jewish conspiracy. That partition offered something infinitely precious to the Jews should not obscure the gifts which it bestowed upon the Arabs. A new unit of Arab independence was to be created in addition to the seven already existing. Nine hundred thousand Arabs who form three quarters of Palestine's Arab population were offered the chance of living in a purely Arab state. Two purely Arab states—Transjordan and Arab Palestine—were to be established on seven-eighths of the territory originally set aside for the Palestine Mandate with its "primary purpose," as the Royal Commission testified, "of establishing a Jewish national home."

In the approaching weeks many a Palestine Arab may come to compare this prospect, which was peacefully available, with the results of the "holy war." These results include the invasion and decimation of Arab Palestine; the panic-stricken flight of its population with its leaders in the van; occupation by rival Arab armies with frank aims of annexation; social and economic disintegration; and the collapse of all corpor-



ate Arab life. In this manner have Palestine Arabs been saved by their Arab "friends" from their Jewish "enemies."

The rescuers themselves are not unscathed. Nailed to inaction by the Security Council's resolution, they face the clamor of their disillusioned public, the burden of a refugee problem, and the awkward interrogations which are the lot of all those who lose a war, whether "holy" or secular. That an understanding with Israel may hold more benefit than this is a thought that cannot fail to intrude into thoughtful Arab minds. If self-interest is even a subsidiary motive of political action, the Arabs must come to the conference table soon.

ARAB-JEWISH agreement is partly a matter of subjective attitude; partly a function of objective interest. In the former realm, a revolution is necessary on both sides. For several decades Arab affairs were marginal in Zionist politics; and Arab intransigence was a blessed excuse for Jewish inaction. That intransigence was real enough; and in the absence of any Arab will for contact no Jew could do much more than condition himself for the eventual and distant day when he would be required to live a Middle Eastern life. But even this essentially educative process cannot be deemed to have been carried far; there is as yet no adequate sense of Arab environment, although in recent years, as the Palestine-born youth grow to maturity, a franker relation with that environment has come to appear.

There were two schools of thought in the Yishuv on the question of an Arab accord. The predominant school argued that agreement would only follow the creation of accomplished facts. The Arabs would accept the Jews only if the Jewish existence clearly became firm and irrevocable. Therefore any growth in Jewish strength, every token of stability brought the day of agreement nearer. Fortified by this realism, a Zionist could plunge into the tasks of Jewish consolidation with a clear conscience about the Arab-Jewish future; and could even prove that a concession at the expense

of Jewish stability was a factor against agreement. The second school argued for prior consent. It insisted that a formula or device, be it parity, bi-nationalism, federalism, was available whereby Jews and Arabs could be drawn into at least a mood of acquiescence in the main aspirations of each other. If this were so, then a slackening of Jewish consolidation was the road of enlightened self-interest.

The first school could afford to forget about the Arabs; the second often forgot about the Jews, and made the wooing of Arab favor its primary concern. In a just world, those who gathered around Magnes, Kalvarisky, and Hashomer Hatzair might, on the merit of their more specialized and conscientious interest, have deserved to be the architects of Arab-Jewish agreement. But the world is more realistic than just. The doctrine of "accomplished fact" has been entirely vindicated against that of "prior consent." If Arab-Jewish accord is anywhere on the horizon, the credit belongs to those who proclaimed an independent Israel on May 14. In that deed they established the Jews in a status of political equality with the surrounding Arab world; and equality is the keynote, the very crux and core of the Arab-Jewish problem. By defending what they had created, Israel's founders made a strong case for those Arabs who wished to portray the existence of Israel as a dictate of history beyond recall. And let there be no mistake. An Arab cannot sit with Jews until he has proven there is no other way. By its logic and history, Arab nationalism can only seek a solution by peaceful means—when no other means are available.

It is the Arabs, not the Jews, who give validity to the doctrine of accomplished fact.

In September 1947 when I was attempting (with complete failure) to persuade Azam Pasha of the virtues of prior consent, he swept all argument aside with his doctrine of historic fatalism. "The Jews will have no state unless they obtain and hold it. By the logic of our history we shall



fight it. Unless you can first resist the entire Arab world you cannot even be entitled to discuss agreement. We once had Spain and Persia. If anyone had come beforehand and asked us to surrender Spain or Persia he would have received the same negative response as I now give you." In a later moment he confessed that the Arabs had become used to not having Spain and Persia. They might, he said, become used to not having part of Palestine—or else they might attempt a century-old irridentism and work up a crusade. Azzam Pasha, not predicting the sudden collapse of Arab tenacity, advocated the crusade rather than post-factum acquiescence. For prior consent he had only contemptuous things to say. He would never qualify for membership in Ihud.

THERE is no conference table yet, although the Arabs are certainly negotiating with the fatal Provisional Government of Israel, in that they deal with a Mediator who knows no other Jewish body. (It is only in London that the existence of the Provisional Government is veiled in euphemism, though not denied. Anglican worshippers presumably bow down to the God of Abraham, Isaac, and the "Jewish authorities.") At the moment the future of Arab-Jewish relations can only be envisaged in principle and outline.

The principle of political separation of Israel must obviously now prevail. The mystique of Palestinian unity has already done much harm in the decade following the Peel Commission, which reported that to imagine that Palestinian unity has any moral meaning "is a mischievous pretence." Indeed a body calling itself Ihud was sterile by its very name. Unity and cooperation are not kindred ideas; they stand in sharp antithesis—and the former is as false to this relationship as the latter is true.

For years the moral frontiers between Israel and Arab Palestine have existed in every zone of politics, economics, society, and culture. In all but the legal sense, to go from Tel Aviv to Nablus was to cross a wider boundary than from France to Ger-

many. An advocate of Franco-Teutonic unity would rightly be deemed a crackpot, while a champion of Franco-German cooperation is an aid to sanity in a distracted world. Yet high-minded people, cherishing the hope of peace, beguiled themselves for years with the pretence that Israel and the Arabs were or could be *one* people.

Those who argued that they were two peoples, who should recognize their distinctiveness—and having recognized it, cooperate—were called "extremists." One state was regarded as automatically better than two. Sovereignty was "antiquated," although in 1945 it was canonized in the Charter as the basis of the United Nations. Yet all this time the doctrine of political independence and regional cooperation was becoming the typical 20th-century ideal of international relations. In the Benelux Union, the Statute of Westminster, and the Pan-American Union, political separation was accepted as the prior condition of regional cooperation. The Netherlands representative at Lake Success had said this well: "Although our two peoples had very close ties, relations, and interests of a cultural, historical, ethnological, and economic nature, this unitary state ended rapidly and unsuccessfully. The differences between Arabs and Jews are much greater than those between Belgium and the Netherlands. . . . Now together with Luxembourg, those countries are reunited not politically but economically, and what counts now is not our political separation but our union for economic purposes. . . . History has taught our three countries this valuable lesson of independence combined with unity for certain important but limited purposes."

The argument is reinforced nearer home. For even the members of the Arab League, united in language, culture, and religion, make the safeguarding of their separate sovereignties their primary ideal. While Dr. Charles Malik exhorts the Jews to be swallowed up and peacefully digested by the Arab world, his own Republic of Lebanon, far less differentiated than Israel from its Arab environment, clings to its own sepa-



rate independence as an essential condition of its integration into the Arab world.

THE rise of Israel as a non-Arab nation and the existence of large non-Arab groups throughout the Fertile Crescent gives the idea of Near Eastern unity a new direction. It must be unity founded on a regional, not a racial basis. The ideal is not an Arab League constructed, as at present, on the basis of racial exclusiveness; but a Near Eastern League, comprising all the diverse nationalities of the area, each free within its own area of independence and cooperating with others for the welfare of the region as a whole. Once the criterion is geographical and not historical, it becomes possible to envisage Turkey, Christian Lebanon, Israel, and Iran as partners of the Arab world in a league of non-aggression, mutual defence, and economic cooperation. But if this is to be, Count Bernadotte, King Abdullah, and others had better forget about "confederations." The very word recalls the failures of the 19th century to face up to the exigencies of national independence movements. In every modern example of regional cooperation, the members cooperate only provided that they do not have to; a statutory provision or a joint board is fatal. The British dominions consult with increasing intimacy on all problems; but any effort to establish a fixed consultative machine is suspiciously resisted. Yet, once the State of Israel was in existence, the inveterate "unifiers" began to sigh for a set-up along the lines of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Had he been alive at that time, each member of Ihud would not merely have been watching the decline of the Empire; he would have been applauding every secession as a liberal victory. There is no formula valid here except that of separate political independence combined with regional cooperation.

ISRAEL'S economic contribution to Arab progress is a matter of example rather than of direct influence. In her thoughtful study, *Land, Disease and Poverty in the Middle East*, Miss Doreen Warriner takes

exception to the description of Arab society as feudal. She points out that feudalism had a sense of social responsibility, which the typical Arab social structure entirely lacks.

The social disabilities of the Middle East spring from no lack of resources or potentialities, but from obsolete methods of organization, distribution, and technique. The primary changes affecting Arab society are a rapid population increase and a tendency of urbanization, with a consequent shift from primary to secondary and tertiary occupations. Urbanization has not proceeded on anything like the European scale. In four decades of Western contact the urban population in Iraq has risen from 7 per cent to 9 per cent, and in Egypt from 9 per cent to 13 per cent. In Syria and the Lebanon the urban population has remained constant at 20 per cent. In the Arab sector of Palestine there has been a large absolute growth of both rural and urban population, but the relation between the two has remained constant.

Now this growth of population has not been accompanied by an expansion of resources or a development of techniques, as it was in Europe. Increasing multitudes have striven to subsist on static resources of wealth. The 3.5 per cent of Egypt's land which is regarded as cultivable must somehow sustain a population of 17 millions, as against 9 millions fifty years ago. The peasant's allotment grows smaller and smaller, obsolete methods of cultivation persist, and a rock-bottom of decline is reached with an agricultural population, disease-ridden and drowned in debt, living on an average *per capita* income of twenty dollars annually. This Arab poverty is so extreme that instead of becoming an incentive to reform it produces an apathy which forbids all changes. "The vast majority," writes Cleland, "have diseases which enervate their bodies and dull their minds, and diminish their ambitions to a sufficient extent so that they have no courage to face an adventure into some unknown area where they might improve their condition." Here we have the



phenomenon, rare in the Middle Eastern life, of a growing population extracting a dwindling subsistence from static resources. The usual pattern is quite different; it is of vast potential wealth and a population too meagre in numbers and poor in equipment to exploit it. The most startling example is Iraq. In Western terms, here is wealth untold—of hand and power and water. But the social historian turns away from this potentiality to a disappointing reality. "The splendor of the past," wrote Zwemer, "can scarcely be believed because of the ruin of the present." The ruin is more concretely expressed in terms of a 60 per cent infant mortality, an average expectation of life of twenty-seven years, and 80 per cent of the population living below the annual subsistence level of fifty dollars per head. And this is at one extremity of the justly named Fertile Crescent, at whose other end the Lebanese villagers in many parts subsist on four piasters per day per head.

In Palestine there is the unique circumstance that a society based on scientific agriculture, skilled industry, and social cooperation is constructing itself upon the very doorstep of the Arab world. It has all the recommended ingredients of a Western society living in the Middle East; but it is not an Arab society. In a sense the problem of Hebrew culture and society is the mirrored opposite of that which the Arab world confronts. Arab society starts off with an Eastern environment to which it endeavors to adapt Western ideas. Jewish society starts off with Western ideas, which it must contrive to adapt to an Eastern environment. There is an objective historic harmony in this relationship, a basic affinity, more profound than the transient political deadlock which obscures it. The fact is that the Arab East needs scientific agriculture, the development of industry on the raw material of skill, the establishment of cooperative institutions, the harnessing of applied research to regional problems of health and development. No process which exemplifies these things is alien to its interest. Nor would it

be considered so if the political institutions of the Middle East expressed the ethnic and cultural diversity of the area, instead of imposing a spurious homogeneity based on one of its cultures, which has a right to predominance, but not to monopoly, in political rights.

The Near East has no alternative between a New Deal and a revolution. Israel may be the agent of the New Deal; and Arab minds which scoffed at social reform as an ideal in itself may come to accept it as the lesser evil when weighed against an otherwise inevitable upheaval.

THE frontiers demarcated on November 29 were based on the assumed necessity to create a separate and viable adjoining Arab state. If the effective occupation by King Abdullah becomes formalized, the collapse of this assumption will re-open the boundary question. West Galilee, now without its Arab population, is an obvious case for revision. Jerusalem, in effective Israeli control and territorially connected with Israel proper, will be difficult to internationalize, so long as the Trusteeship Council evinces its present apathy and the United Nations cannot even muster a thousand police. The Negev is likely to be the chief counter in territorial bargaining; and Israel's advantage lies in the certainty that nobody else will be able to show promise of development or irrigation there. In any boundary revision, the guiding principles of change are fixed by the military situation and the increase of the Arab hinterland through Transjordan with a consequent possibility of greater self-sufficiency in each of the territories.

The past three months have proved that the economic interdependence of all Palestine was much overrated by the General Assembly; the Israeli administrative services show no sign of handicap through being separate and free. If the neighboring unit is dominated by Transjordan, the contrast between centralized industrial Israel, and the loose-knit village structure of Arab society may be more significant than the need



for common social forms. The economic arrangements between Syria and Lebanon, or the Netherlands and Belgium may be a truer guide than the rigidities of an economic union in the fullest sense. To the task of economic reform is added that of mass resettlement. Nobody would have suggested the uprooting of Arab thousands deliberately in order to fulfill a tidy demographic plan. But after the event it is surely just as quixotic to recreate the huge minority problem which was partition's chief defect, at a time when the underpopulation of Syria, Iraq, and Transjordan are among the main causes of economic paralysis in the Near East.

THE disparate tendencies of Israel and the Arab states in international relations is largely a function of the war between them. Yet when Count Bernadotte advocated coordination of foreign policy between Israel and Greater Transjordan, he invited some scrutiny of the foreign policy of each. As long as Israel can hope to remain astride the gulf between the two worlds, it would be suicidal to abandon that posture. There are special ties and interests in Jewish life affecting Israel's foreign policy which have no application to Transjordan at all. Transjordan's foreign policy is at the moment based on gravitation towards a single ally, and complete military and financial dependence upon it. To "coordinate" this with Israel's United Nations orientation is an act of virtuosity. Here again it would be wise to avoid the determination to tie everything up together, to unite what God has put asunder, to seek an artificial unity where there is a natural divergence.

There is evidently no peaceful adjustment around the corner. The citizens of Israel have to learn to breathe the Eastern air and

be less nostalgic for Warsaw and Vienna. More serious still—the Arab world must undergo the full drastic crisis of recognizing Israel's permanence. Everybody who helps them towards that recognition is, in the historic sense, a friend of the Arabs. Mr. Bevin's attempts to lead a European coalition of Israel's non-recognizers are therefore as disastrous to real Arab-Jewish harmony as all his other efforts in that field.

In every field of Arab-Jewish relations, the keynote is the cooperation of equal and separate states—not the imposed union of divergent elements. In the social and economic problems of its environment, Israel has only to exist and prosper in order to play a catalytic role. Far from disrupting the existing patterns of inter-state cooperation, Israel's function is to broaden them beyond the narrow racial limits of the Arab League. The Arab League attempted unsuccessfully at Geneva to secure a United Nations edict for a Middle East Economic Commission with no Jewish participation. The absurdity of anything but a genuinely regional approach is herein blatantly revealed.

In international relations, it may be Israel's function to teach its neighbors how not to be satellites; a free nation may even refine oil. By strengthening their links with each other, both peoples may come to afford a less restless foreign policy, with the emphasis on economic and commercial interest, rather than a scramble for competitive support. The future of Arab-Jewish relations opens out in wide perspective only when two walls have been surmounted: the replacement of the truce by a peace settlement, and an effective if not a formal act of mutual recognition between Israel and an Arab authority able to guarantee peace on its frontiers.



## THE U.S.-BRITISH ENTENTE ON PALESTINE

### *The Two Powers Join to Safeguard Israel*

HAL LEHRMAN

**D**ESPITE surface indications of ultimate victory over the Arabs, the friends of a Jewish state in Palestine still walk in dread of some sinister diplomatic maneuver to undermine or reverse the happy ending of the first chapter in Israel's brave new history. They are not entirely precise about the nature or the source of the anticipated hostile thrust. Perhaps, they say, it will be the State Department, sabotaging the White House by covert action in the Middle East or delaying a settlement beyond November in hope that a Republican triumph would give Washington's "Arabists" a clean slate for fresh skullduggery. Or it might be the British, awaiting the United Nations General Assembly in Paris in September to make a combined assault with the Moslem potentates on the whole idea of partition and the very existence of Israel. Whatever the source of the blow, it is said, a blow will fall as surely as Albion is perfidious and our Division of Near Eastern and African Affairs a society for the advancement of Islam.

Such forebodings are natural in any venture whose success has been almost too

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IN THIS article HAL LEHRMAN once again offers a prognosis of American and British policy in regard to Palestine, drawing upon the same high sources which enabled him to predict the course of big-power diplomacy with such accuracy. The present article endeavors to outline for our readers the terms of the settlement which the United States and Britain have joined together to implement in Palestine, and which—if Mr. Lehrman again proves correct—should insure the safeguarding by these two powers of Israel's survival. Mr. Lehrman has written for British and American periodicals, and is the author of *Russia's Europe*, an analysis of Soviet expansion in the Balkans. He was born in New York City in 1911 and has been reporting on foreign affairs since 1934.

good to be true. Fear of treachery is especially understandable for the Jews, whose chronicles are measured off and divided by disaster. And it would be foolhardy indeed, in the light of the Great Powers' dismal record of twisting and turning on Palestine, to give hard and fast assurances that there will be no eleventh-hour turnabout, no last-minute conspiracy to plunder Israel of her prize. Nevertheless, there is some reason at this juncture to declare that what seems to be is real, that Israel's prospects for internationally-ratified independence are good, that the United States government is persuaded, the British reluctantly converted, and the Arab League in full retreat. Though the Arabs may continue for a time to go through the angry motions of a fight to the death, it will be mostly hopeful sound and fury to squeeze out a better bargain.

No one would foretell, in the interim month of August, how successfully the Tel Aviv regime would emerge from the wilderness of internal factional perils, economic stresses, and Arab-Jewish antagonisms into which the achievement of clear-cut sovereignty would plunge the fledgling state. But careful conversations with persons in various important places suggested that Israel would at least be given the chance to hack her way out of that wilderness. It was now possible to believe that not only the United States, as reported in these pages three months ago, but Britain and even the Arabs were finally convinced that the State of Israel was in the Middle East to stay.

**U**NCONTROLLABLE incidents and temporary recourse to violence, such as the outbreak after the Latrun explosion, might set the time-table back, but the position and the long-range forecast in mid-August (rely-



ideals they happen to share with American society.

(3) The effects of discrimination are indivisible: semi-consciously and unconsciously, social, economic, and political anti-Semitism work in a continuous interplay.

(4) On the whole, American anti-Semitism is less violent than the characteristically American lack of inhibitions would lead one to expect. It may well be that the petrified and petrifying inflexibility of the segregatory code, by reducing the number of Gentile-Jewish contacts, reduces the number of possible frictions and thereby vouchsafes a lasting safety-valve "harmlessness" to anti-Jewish feelings.

Some European immigrants feel that way. A very well educated friend of mine is wont to sum up our frequent talks on the subject by calling himself a "second-class" citizen, and in the same breath quoting Madame Mère's famous exclamation: "*Pourvu que ça dure!* (If only it lasts!)." WRHS

THIS kind of ironic resignation may account for the refugee's lack of interest in an open, organized struggle against prejudice. Like most continentals, the continental Jew is an individualist and a sceptic. Therefore much of the organized fight against discrimination—whether carried on from a purely pro-Jewish basis,

or within the framework of the fight against every kind of prejudice—is likely to appear to him naive, "unrealistic," or purely rhetorical. Even in the face of insuperable barriers he may prefer to fight alone, to rely on his personal gifts to overcome bias or secure a haven for himself.

As a former victim of the violence of the streets, he often wishes that the "whole question" would not be aired in public or even the word "Jew" pronounced in the marketplace. His own experiences have led him to the conviction that rational arguments have little power to destroy the mystical notions behind Jew-hatred.

But, after all, he forgets that that was in another country. America, when all is said and done, is not Germany. So he is apt to underrate the effect which, in the long run, rational arguments may have on that vast region of emotion, superstition, and semi-conscious pragmatism which is the hunting-ground of anti-Semitism in the United States where it is still an unthoughtful and casual phenomenon—neither intense, politically organized, nor respectable. It takes a European a very long time to understand that both indefatigable public discussion, including the voice of naive equalitarian faith, and the upholding of—and the struggle for—as yet unattained and seemingly unattainable ideals belong to the essence of American democracy.



ing on informants who have not hitherto led this writer astray) could be legitimately summarized as follows:

1. Britain and the United States were now working in harmony and steady consultation for a Palestine settlement.

2. This settlement would have to include the perhaps unpalatable but certainly undeniable politico-military fact that a Jewish state existed.

3. This state could not be asked to suffer any impairment of sovereignty such as limits on its rights to welcome immigrants.

4. Certain territorial adjustments of the partition frontiers would probably be made, by mediation or preferably by direct negotiations between Israel and individual Arab states.

5. Neither the Arab League nor the Arab community in the Middle East would be required formally to ratify or even agree to the settlement, but they would have to observe it at least by refraining from further organized warfare.

6. In the event of refractory behavior by any Arab state, the machinery of the UN would mesh into gear to clamp an arms embargo on the offender.

7. It was hoped, however, that such action would not be needed, and that the Arabs would ultimately recognize the futility of resisting the militarily superior Jews, to say nothing of resisting the firm decision of a world organization.

8. Instead of a signed treaty, there would be an informal and indefinite *modus vivendi*, which would imperceptibly mature into a general peace.

9. The Jews would be expected to cooperate by accepting the internationalization of Jerusalem, giving a guarantee against expansion of Israel's final frontiers, re-admitting a manageable number of Arab refugees, and showing themselves amenable to customs unions, trade treaties, and other devices for attaining good neighborliness and rational economic connections with the bordering Arab countries in a prosperous Middle East.

10. As for the United States and Britain, their long-term objective would be to mend

their fences with Arabs and Israelis, both of whom they had rather thoroughly infuriated, and persuade and assist each of the antagonists to live productively side by side with the other—a policy designed to cement and fortify the wobbling Anglo-American defenses in a key area of world strategy.

THOUGH the repercussions might have been cataclysmic for their mutual and higher alliance on worldwide fronts, the British and the Americans had nevertheless come appallingly close to open rupture this spring over the Palestine dispute. Having escaped, they were now equally determined not to let it happen again. Each side had made an accommodation, since each needed the other in the Middle East.

A natural diplomatic reticence now attempted to conceal the fact that the weaker partner had yielded more than the stronger. Ostensibly, the emphasis was on "team-work": preliminary consultation to avoid contradicting each other in public, examination of every new problem in the light of the "common Anglo-American interest" and, above all, no major unilateral action. Everything was to be done inside and as part of the United Nations.

Actually, the Americans had imposed their main requirement—that Israel from now on must be regarded as a permanent element in the situation. The Americans would be willing to go slow, giving the British time to readjust themselves. On points of detail, such as the British protest to the Security Council in the case of the five Britons, each power would retain independence of action. But on the fundamental issue—Israel's survival—there was to be no more contention and no more cross-purpose.

Out of joint thinking certain conclusions had crystallized. The new entente could not yet know precisely what the outlines of the final settlement would be. But on two things both powers were firmly—one might even say grimly—resolved: that the UN should not tolerate a renewed state of open war in the Holy Land, and that



the Arabs had to make up their minds to accept the disagreeable reality of Israel's presence. And, since Israel was a sovereign entity, there could be no question of requiring her to curtail her sovereign privilege of admitting to her territory as many immigrants as she desired. It was hoped, for the sake of soothing the Arab fear of Israeli expansionism, that many Jewish DP's from Europe would find havens in countries other than Israel, and that her own limited economic absorptivity would place natural restrictions on the influx into Israel. But the *right* of unimpeded immigration had suddenly become so axiomatic and obvious to Anglo-American thinking that questions concerning it were received with wide-eyed surprise, as if White Papers and blockades had never been heard of.

The problem of revising the partition frontiers was frankly regarded as a simple exercise in horse-trading between Semitic peoples renowned for their skill in such matters. Fresh evidence of this talent seemed already discernible in the Arab Higher Committee's professed scheme to set up an Arab government for the whole of Palestine, as if partition and the military abandonment of extensive territory had not occurred. On the Jewish side, the same genius was clear in Israel's decision "permanently" to annex a land strip athwart Arab soil linking Jerusalem and the partition frontiers, and in Foreign Minister Shertok's announcement that the boundaries set by the UN would be changed "by adding territory, not by diminishing it." Britain and the United States would be happy to have Count Bernadotte mediate in boundary discussions. But if the two parties preferred direct talks, they would not object. UN prestige was considered as bound up with the reaching of a settlement, not with getting credit for it.

The partition frontiers, predicated on an economic unity which had not materialized, were now generally thought considerably less than sacred. The most likely modification appeared to be an exchange of Western Galilee for the Negev. By military conquest Israel already held most of the Galilee area

anyway. It offered fertile farmlands and a frontier with Lebanon which the Jews had always claimed to desire. As for the Negev, which is largely desert, UN insiders recalled that addition of this territory to the Jewish portion of partitioned Palestine had been almost an afterthought. Its cession would give King Abdullah his long-coveted access to the sea via Gaza. Egypt might make a bid for a slice of the Negev, but this was not likely to cause trouble in view of the lamentable Egyptian performance in the brief Palestine war, and since Egypt's real interests seemed to extend more logically westward toward Cyrenaica anyway.

A FORMAL peace treaty, it was believed, was improbable, if not impossible. The Arab potentates, who had promised their people so much and earned so little, had, so it was reasoned, become prisoners of their own propaganda. The danger was notably acute in Egypt and Syria. In more backward states like Saudi Arabia, the undeveloped condition of public opinion created less threat of organized popular reaction. But even Abdullah was not thought bold enough to show his lone hand openly. If the Arab League publicly admitted defeat, the least that was expected to happen was a bloody wave of ultra-nationalist, fanatical Moslem rioting. Apart from the ever-present worry about Soviet profit from the overthrow of any Arab government, one had to think too of the mortal risk to Christians and Westerners (not to mention Jews) adrift in the angry Moslem sea.

The best that could be asked was a sullen but decisive passivity from the Arab leaders, implemented by a gradual laying down of arms. In such a tapering-off of belligerence, the wily Abdullah was expected to be the prime mover. The most "pro-British" of all the Arab statesmen because of his dependence on the London exchequer, and the most confident among them because his Legion alone had scored any victory against Israel, Abdullah was also in line to be the heaviest, and perhaps only, Arab winner in any settlement. He would therefore be the



most eager to achieve it. He had already set a precedent for his colleagues in the Arab League by declaring Transjordan's readiness to consider "any possible compromise that secures justice and prevents unnecessary bloodshed."

If resistance were offered, it would come not from the League but from an individual Arab country or countries. For purposes of record I was reminded that it was physically possible for the Jews also to be the aggressor. It was thought, however, that the Israeli government would be competent to keep its own extremists in hand. And nobody seriously believed that the Tel Aviv regime itself, which had played its cards so skillfully at the international poker table, would ever blunder into a position of defiant illegality vis-à-vis the UN, even if goaded by provocations like the Arab sabotage of the Latrun water station under the nose of UN observers.

In the event of resistance, small-bore orneriness such as sniping and minor raids could be augustly overlooked. But operations involving large deployment of troops or artillery would bring the Security Council swiftly into session, I was assured, and make an arms embargo against the transgressor almost a "dead certainty."

When asked what further sanctions were envisaged if this embargo failed to halt a new war, my sources uniformly showed distress that such a question should be posed. This distress was due to the painfulness of trying to imagine what sanctions could be taken that would be effective and not harm the sanctioners more than the sanctionee. Imports of certain foodstuffs and manufactured products could be shut off, of course. But the average Arab was one of the most difficult persons in the world to bring to his knees by sanctions because he needed so little and could get along on even less. On the other hand, sanctions worked two ways, and the West still wanted oil.

**H**OWEVER, I was assured that the arms embargo would be quite sufficient. The Arabs knew the embargo would leave them

powerless to fight and win because it would deprive them of weapons and turn the enemy camp into an arsenal.

In fact, the Arab fear of an embargo seemed to be our ace in the hole for winning of the peace. The card, I was warned, should not be played too soon. In particular, the plank in the Democratic party platform calling for immediate lifting of the embargo on Israel would be a sheer disaster if implemented. It would mean unilateral American action against the Arabs, outside the UN framework. It would upset the delicate mechanism of the present UN campaign of skillful persuasion. It would make more difficult than ever the efforts of moderate Arab leaders to restrain their aroused peoples. Aside from dispersing the last remnants of American influence in the Middle East, the argument continued, our single-handed interference at this point would disperse the hopes for peace. It was therefore not only in the national interest of the United States to refrain from going too fast, but also in the real interest of world Jewry and even of Israel herself.

The Anglo-American entente had, it felt, solid ground for believing that even a UN embargo, or any other punitive action by the world organization, might never be needed at all—because the Arab leaders were beginning to see that they were already licked. The test in battle had exposed the inadequacies of their armies. To make things worse, the Arabs had squandered the initial advantage which they enjoyed in armaments. The world may have excoriated the British for building up the first Arab stockpile for war, but wasn't it clear now that Britain's pledge to halt the arms flow to the Middle East had effectively starved the Arab armies in munitions while Israel had been able to overtake and pass them?

Whatever the validity of this claim of British virtue, the evidence did show that Israel had certainly outstripped her enemies in fighting power. While the Arabs were floundering under financial embarrassments and Oriental inefficiencies, a well-heeled network of Israeli agents on several continents had



purchased and shipped and delivered. Field artillery and fighter planes had come in from abroad, while factories at home clicked into production of small arms, anti-tank guns, Sten guns, mortars, and even make-shift armored cars. Moreover, Israel brilliantly used the lull of the truces to train and expand her army, rationalize its structure, tighten its command, and even create a small navy. Finally, there was nothing the Arabs could do about the steady arrival of Jewish immigrants from Europe—estimated by some at 85,000 already in Israel—with 10,000 more due to enter every month hereafter under American Joint Distribution Committee auspices. These sober realities, it was felt, exposed the absurdity of such pompous pronouncements by Arab diehards as Jamal el-Husseini's scheme for a "federal" Palestine with a grandiose irrigation and reclamation program to be financed by, of all people, the penniless Arab population of the Holy Land itself. The more clear-headed Arab leaders would recognize the impossibility of imposing their will upon independent Israel in the face of the prevailing odds. They were expected to be all the more persuadable when convinced that, in addition to the Jews, stubborn Arab resistance would have to reckon with "broader" problems and "broader" forces—i.e., the displeasure and determination of a UN which, for once, was agreed and ready to act. But the Arabs would also have to hurry up if Tel Aviv was not to harden its attitude toward interminable truces and unending palaver. The explosion of Jerusalem's water-supply pumps vastly strained Israeli patience. The sharp Jewish demand for a definite term to the truce was an ominous storm signal.

**W**ITH a modicum of Arab reasonableness, however, it was felt that Israel would hold off long enough to avoid eruption of hostilities on a scale big enough seriously to damage negotiations. After all, the Jews had enormous gains to make by biding their time. Undisputed statehood and the right of unlimited immigration constituted their two inflexible objectives. And both these require-

ments were already implicitly guaranteed to them in advance by the new joint Anglo-American policy.

In exchange, a major concession to peace would be Israeli agreement to an international trusteeship over Jerusalem. The Jews now held most of the city by force of arms, with a Jewish military governor and a police force integrated into the Israeli defense command. It was argued that relinquishment of authority would not be too large a surrender, since the Jews had already yielded Jerusalem under the original partition plan. The muscular talk from Tel Aviv could be written off as mostly bargaining tactics to prepare the way for a grand gesture of conciliation when Israel, at the proper moment, gave up a claim to Jerusalem which she had not actually intended to push. It was highly unlikely that she would risk alienating world opinion by insisting that Jerusalem, sacred to three religions, be under the domination of one.

**A** The energetic stand already taken against Irgun and other extremist tendencies indicated that Israel would also be agreeable to quieting the Arab concern about future Jewish aggression by guaranteeing whatever frontiers emerged from the peace talks. And once the main issues were regulated, Israeli objections to taking back the Arab refugees—their menace as a fifth column and as a drain on the resources of a Jewish state at war—would lose their cogency, although it was clear that much fewer would return to Israel than had fled.

As for good neighborliness toward the Arab countries beyond the borders, any objective observer would have to admit that the organized Jewish community in Palestine had long demonstrated its desire for the opportunity to establish business-like and mutually profitable economic relations with the Arab world. In the past, unquestionably, the Jews had done overwhelmingly more for the Arab economy than the Arabs for the Jewish. There had been indication even in the middle of war that Israel was ready to give free port facilities to the Arabs in Haifa and captured Jaffa when peace came. There was



a genuine Israeli desire for any and all trade arrangements which would be of common benefit in the massive postwar task of reconstruction and stabilization.

THE optimism of the Western powers did not stretch to the point of hoping that more than an uneasy peace, punctuated with intermittent harassments by both sides, could arise from the heat and bitterness of the conflict. But the best prescription was the balm of prosperity, and Anglo-American policy could be expected to encourage economic collaboration to the maximum between the recent antagonists. Only so could Israel avoid isolation and contribute her full potential to tranquillity in the Eastern Mediterranean. And only by the achievement of working relations between Jew and Arab could the West look for improvement of its own ties with both, for otherwise a gesture of rapprochement toward one would be taken as unfriendly by the other.

That relations with the Arabs were at low ebb could be seen in the almost pathetic British efforts to win favor by small tokens, wherever it was possible to do so without disturbing the general line of the new Anglo-American policy. Thus London, while inwardly reconciled to the inevitability of extending recognition to Israel, was decidedly not rushing to do so a moment sooner than necessary. Some seven thousand Jews of fighting age sat wearily under British guard in Cyprus until their release to Israel could no longer be resented by the Arabs. And at Lake Success, Sir Alexander Cadogan, who had remained fairly calm before the spectacle of two hundred and fifty thousand Jews languishing for years in European DP camps, now suffered publicly and eloquently over the hardships of a slightly larger number of Arabs made into refugees a few months ago chiefly through the bellicose ambitions of their leaders. Similarly, the United States felt under compelling need to make what amends it could for the "betrayal" which the Arabs had already laid at Washington's door. As one American official plantively put it to me, "we hope the Jews will appreciate

that we have to get along with the Arabs too."

But the democracies would also have to devise some way of "getting along" with Israel. Israel nursed too many dour memories of Allied coldness, and too many sentimental memories of Soviet aid in her recent travail, for her to be counted entirely within the Western camp in any future global alignment.

Not that there was any present danger of Israel's taking on the complexion of a Poland or Bulgaria. There were too many genuine democrats and realists in high Israeli councils for that. But there were also factions of considerable weight which leaned toward Moscow out of a mixture of ideology, gratitude, and the habit of being anti-British. The best that could be awaited from Israel for the moment was the assumption of a middle or "neutral" position. Considering the Soviet adroitness in profiting from such situations, Allied policy could scarcely regard this arrangement as eminently satisfactory.

THE Kremlin, however, had considerably larger reason to contemplate with relish its new status in the Middle East. Only in one phase of policy had the Soviets met complete frustration. The UN last Winter had been lugubriously contemplating the distasteful subject of military intervention in Palestine, and the Russians, although never really close to seeing a Red Army contingent in an international police force, did get a brief glimpse of its possibility. In the end, by a combination of dexterity and accident, this bogey had been exorcised. The Palestine "mediator" was a Swede accompanied mainly by Swedes. The UN Truce Commission, an emergency outfit based on the available consuls in Jerusalem, was composed of the American, French, and Belgian consuls. There was no Russian consul. If the extra observers and police for whom Count Bernadotte had been clamoring were recruited, conceivably some Russians might be selected on the basis of equitable geographical distribution. But, barring the unlikely resurgence of the need for a large international force in Palestine, the possibility of a Red



Army detachment there in the near future was ended.

Nevertheless, Moscow had plucked substantial benefits from the *Sturm und Drang* attendant on the birth of Israel. Once upon a time the Eastern Mediterranean had been ruled by a Pax Britannica. This control had been a troubled one, but it had kept the area in a degree of stability. Now the area was in upheaval, the future chaotic and uncertain. Soviet Russia could now angle for the Jews, for the Arabs, or for both. The greater the unrest, the larger and more tempting her assortment of bait. Russia had also seen the Marshall Plan set back by interruption of oil shipments to the thirsty West and by serious delays in the exploitation of the area's oil-producing potential. Russia's reversal of policy toward a Jewish state—her championing of the cause at Lake Success, her help to the "underground" of immigrants and armaments—had given her more good will among Zionists and in Israel than a decade of propaganda. When Moscow's minister Pavel Yershov reached Tel Aviv in early August to open the first Soviet diplomatic mission there, the Hebrew press resounded with salutes to the "great event in the life of our young state."

Had Moscow not elected to abandon its anti-Zionist line, the outlook would have been black for a Jewish state in the Security Council debate before partition and in the dangerous months following. Israel certainly was grateful. Yet the men who led Israel's councils also knew that the Soviet change of line had come, not because of a sudden passion for Jewish freedom, but because of cold calculation on distant objectives. And Israel proudly felt that, though Russia had given her the opportunity, it was Israel who had grasped that opportunity and by her vigorous use of it had been able to turn a dream into a reality.

**I**f the UN now seemed at last determined to fulfill its function of safeguarding peace with justice, the Israelis considered that they deserved the credit for it. Israel, not the UN, had implemented the UN's decision on partition. Because of her resolution and sacrifice,

Israel now occupied the level in the UN's scale of values which the Arabs formerly had enjoyed. Once it had been the Arabs who needed to be accommodated, the Arabs whose rights in Palestine were an international obligation, the Arabs whose presence in Palestine was a factor limiting Jewish claims. Now, thanks to the valor of Jewish resistance, it was the other way around. Now it was Israel whose presence in Palestine was viewed by the UN (and by Anglo-American policy) as a limit on Arab claims. It was now up to the Arabs to adjust themselves to Israel and the UN.

This agreeable reversal, the Israelis believed, had not been inspired by abstract reasoning but by Israel's unremitting capture of one political and military position after another in a bloody test of strength. In particular, it was said, the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force had been astonished, impressed, and convinced by the clear evidence of Arab impotence and Jewish power. According to report, Defense Secretary Forrestal was now busy explaining that he had been deceived by his advisors.

Under the circumstances, Israel's appreciation of the new American benevolence was seasoned with a dash of cynicism. And, although the friendly attitude of the American delegation in recent UN debates was a matter of deep satisfaction, the Israelis still found several harsh irritants in Washington policy: the delay in *de jure* recognition, the slowness of a loan to Israel, and the behavior of certain officials in the Middle East.

According to an American view, *de facto* recognition of the provisional government had been swift and effective, and there was no need for the further step until the regime had been endorsed by admission into the UN or, better still, by a regular election in Israel. But Israel wanted to know why the United States had lately become such a stickler for formalities. Hadn't the United States frequently given full recognition in the past to provisional governments, such as Keren-sky's and de Gaulle's? Wasn't the present reticence a sign of a lingering pro-Arabism?

Israel urgently needed funds to finance her



vast program of immigration. I was authoritatively told that when a detailed loan project had been submitted by Israel to the Export-Import Bank, the Bank had replied that nothing could be done about it "for the time being." It was not true, as asserted in the press, that a Marshall-Truman break loomed over the loan question, but it did appear—or at least so the White House privately indicated—that the Bank had taken its go-slow decision without the President's knowledge. The President, having reacted promptly, as soon as the facts were disclosed to him, the Bank once more took the hundred million dollar project "under consideration."

Finally, the Israelis were complaining that the Arabs were deriving comfort and encouragement, not only from Washington's "legalistic" attitude on recognition and the loan, but from the strange conduct of American representatives in the field. There was a dangerous tendency abroad to give the Arabs "private" assurances that the United States really did not care much about the preservation of Israel, whatever might be said to the contrary at Lake Success. One of the most vocal in this campaign reportedly was George Wadsworth, who is to be our new ambassador to Turkey and who is a long-time outstanding "Arabist" in the State Department. The campaign was counteracted by the hard facts of American declarations at the UN, but it was feared that out in the Oriental deserts, where politics is traditionally devious, the Arabs might nevertheless be misled into further resistance by the delusion that our pro-Israel policy was merely a trick to win a domestic election.

THESE were some of the inconsistencies, as Israel saw them, between the public and "secret" diplomacy of the United States. Nor did Israel hope for noticeable improvement if and when a Republican President took office. A new administration, to be sure, could start life without the embarrassments of the present administration's old pro-Arab dossier and, in that limited sense, might feel free to act with brisker imagination. But pronouncements on Palestine by Republican

spokesmen had been no less "political" than those of Democratic orators. It was asserted that the first Philadelphia version of the Republican platform plank on Palestine, drafted by Senator Vandenberg, had been cautiously cold and formalistic toward Israel. Israel expected that a change of administration would merely prolong the existing so-called "bipartisan" policy with its disturbing brew of friendship above and intrigue below.

More neutral observers, however, might draw somewhat different conclusions from the general American attitude. No matter how slender a reed pan-Arabism had demonstrated itself to be, the Middle East was still predominantly peopled by Arabs. This was a phenomenon which American diplomacy, however resolved in support of Israel, could not safely ignore, it was contended. A loan and full recognition of Israel would come in good time. Meanwhile, prudence dictated avoidance of large pro-Israeli gestures except when these were not only opportune but decisive. In addition, whether tactically right or wrong, delay in granting urgently desired favors to the Jews could be useful in bargaining, and might render the Israelis more pliable to a settlement which would let the Arabs off as easily as possible. If the United States gave away too much too soon, there would be little left to trade for generous terms from a triumphant Israel toward her scattered and dispersed enemies. The United States had two clients in the Middle East, the argument went on. Her future status there depended in large measure on her success in persuading these two to live amicably with one another on the basis of a reasonable peace settlement.

Yes, the great and historic fact was that now there were indeed two clients. Formerly it was the Arabs who needed to be cajoled while the Jews sat outside, hat in hand. Now the hat had been replaced by a rifle. Once only a supplicant for benefits on grounds of justice and humanity, Palestine Jewry had grown able to demand and obtain its due on the strength of its achievement as an army, as a state, and as a new and pivotal element of power in the vital Eastern Mediterranean.



## PERETZ: THE HEART'S SECRET PLACES

### *A Great Yiddish Writer on the Mystery of Evil*

MAURICE SAMUEL

OF MAN'S first disobedience, of the dark corners of the human heart, of the small beginnings of great transgressions—of these and of similar things Yitzhak Leibush Peretz sang at length in his folk tales. He was endlessly fascinated by the problem of evil, by that human power of self-deception which covers the first departure from the right path, and by the subtle disguises which the Enemy of Mankind assumes. Sometimes he treated the subject somberly; sometimes his tone was light; somber or playful, he was always serious. The moral nature of man was the fundamental substance of his meditations.

It began in his boyhood. At the age of fourteen, a Talmud student in his native

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ISAAC LEIB PERETZ (1851-1915) is, after Sholom Aleichem, the outstanding figure of Yiddish literature. A prolific author of poems, stories, essays, dramas, allegories, and satiric sketches, he is the realistic artist of Jewish poverty, the lyrical poet of Hasidism, a writer of social protest, a critic of institutional religion, a devout believer in the ethical-religious message of Judaism, and, above all, the great Yiddish folk-educator. When Peretz died in 1915, over a hundred thousand people wept at his funeral. MAURICE SAMUEL, who here writes on Peretz's early life and work, wrote the widely praised article, "Who Can Translate Yiddish?" in the June COMMENTARY. He is an outstanding translator and interpreter of Yiddish literature, and is the author of *The Great Hatred* (1940), considered one of the two or three best books in English on anti-Semitism; *The World of Sholom Aleichem* (1943), the recent novel *The Web of Lucifer*, and many other books. Mr. Samuel was born in Rumania in 1905 and was educated in England; he came to this country in 1915. This essay contains material which will appear in his forthcoming book on Peretz, *Prince of the Ghetto*, to be published this fall by Knopf.

Polish village of Zamoshch, he already knew the torment of doubt and self-questioning. He tells us, in his unfinished autobiography: "I went about distracted, a wanderer in the upper worlds, steeped in gloom, my thoughts and dreams occupied with the cosmic tragedy." *The Guide to the Perplexed* of Maimonides was his first handbook to the eternal riddles. "What is the purpose of man?" he asked himself. "Whence come sorrow and suffering, and what end do they serve? Is there such a thing as free will in man?"

AMONG his mature works there is a humorous sketch of two youths who, on a hot summer's day, steal away from *cheder* to bathe in the river; but while undressing on the bank they become so absorbed in philosophic discussion that they forget entirely what purpose brought them to this place. Much of Peretz's work is autobiographical; in the actual biography he himself frankly furnishes the key to a great variety of pieces—this particular sketch, *Back to School, You Rascals!*, among others. It is himself and a friend he is describing. There they sit, the two boys, their stockings half-way off, the cool water lapping at their feet, the sun blazing overhead, completely abstracted from the world about them.

"Do you know, Berel," says one of them, "I just can't understand what the great Rabbi Tam is driving at. According to him the Almighty doesn't want to humiliate man by offering him Paradise for nothing, as if it were a piece of charity. The point is, says Rabbi Tam, that man ought to *earn* Paradise without losing his self-respect. But what sort of humiliation is he talking about? When God gives me something, am I tak-



C O P Y

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SHERTOK MEMISRAEL TELAVIV

UN61

~~MM~~ MCNEIL SUMMONED ME TODAY SAYING HE INSTRUCTED BY BEVIN CONVEY THE FOLLOWING OFFICIALLY ONE BRITAIN SUPPORTS SETTLEMENT ADVOCATED BY MEDIATOR AND WILL WORK FOR ASSEMBLY RECOMMENDATION THAT BASIS TWO DID NOT EXPECT SUPPORT BY EITHER SIDE BUT EXPECTED ACQUIESCENCE IN SETTLEMENT FINALLY RECOMMENDED THREE WOULD SUPPORT STRONGEST RESOLUTION BY SECURITY COUNCIL AGAINST EITHER SIDE REPEAT EITHER SIDE ATTEMPTING TO SET ASIDE ASSEMBLY RECOMMENDATION BY MILITARY FORCE STOP ADDED UNOFFICIALLY WITH QUOTE COMPLETE CERTAINTY UNQUOTE THAT SETTLEMENT THESE LINES WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY BRITISH DE JURE RECOGNITION AND ADVICE OTHER POWERS ACT SIMILARLY STOP MYSELF REPLIED WOULD CONVEY THIS MOST IMPORTANT DECLARATION AND COULD ONLY REACT PERSONALLY THIS STAGE STOP DREW ATTENTION NEGEV PROBLEM SHOWING MAP EMPHASIZING THREE POINTS NORTHERN SETTLEMENTS AKABA AND DEAD SEA AS VITAL JEWISH INTERESTS STOP HE SHOWED SYMPATHY ONLY FOR FIRST STOP I ADDED HOPE THAT HIS ACCEPTANCE PRINCIPAL REPORT WOULD NOT COMMIT THEM RIGIDLY ITS TERRITORIAL DETAILS HE REPLIED WOULD BE LESS THAN HONEST IF HE HELD OUT HOPE OF MORE THAN SECONDARY MODIFICATIONS STOP CONCLUDING HE EXPRESSED PERSONAL CONVICTION THAT NORMAL RELATIONS OURSELVES A VITAL BRITISH INTEREST MADE FURTHER COMMENTS MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS WHICH AM TRANSMITTING SEPARATELY STOP EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS RECEIVE ME ANY TIME INFORMALLY I CONCLUDED INFORMING HIM YOUR IMMINENT ARRIVAL WHEREUPON MIGHT SEEK FURTHER CONVERSATION STOP BRITAIN WILL PROPOSE SPECIAL COMMITTEE DEAL WITH PALESTINE AND THEN ITALIAN COLONIES ALLOTING FOUR WEEKS MAXIMUM TO EACH

EBAN



מדינת ישראל  
קונסוליה כללית  
CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

MEMORANDUM

September 23, 1948

TO: Dr. Silver

FROM: Arthur Lourie

Enclosed for your private information is a copy of a cable which we have received from Mr. Eban.

AL:gr  
Enc.



CONFIDENTIAL CABLE FROM MR. EBAN TO MR. LOURIE

PARIS  
SEPTEMBER 29, 1948

HAVE RECEIVED DETAILED CIRCUMSTANTIAL REPORT FROM SCHULSON ON JESSUP'S ACCOUNT OF MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM: THOUGH THIS TALK HAD BEEN ARRANGED IT NEVER TOOK PLACE. I DO NOT NEED TO EMPHASIZE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS INCIDENT, ESPECIALLY AS REPORT WAS TENDENTIOUS AND PURPORTED TO INDICATE THAT OUR DELEGATION WAS IN MOOD FOR CONCESSIONS. I HAVE, THEREFORE, INQUIRED INTO REPORTS BY SCHULSON OF OTHER CONVERSATIONS, FIND CONTENTS HAVE BEEN INACCURATELY REPRESENTED, INVARIABLY WITH THE SAME TENDENCY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY NOTICEABLE IN UTTER FALSITY ACCOUNT OF MCNEIL CONVERSATION. ALTHOUGH I AM UNCERTAIN AT EXACTLY WHAT LINK OF CHAIN THIS MISREPRESENTATION TAKES PLACE, I AM, UNFORTUNATELY, UNCONVINCED THAT SCHULSON BEARS NO RESPONSIBILITY AND HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO INDICATE THIS TO HIM FRANKLY.



**COPY**

**PARIS**  
**SEPTEMBER 29, 1948**

**LOUIE MEMORIAL NEWYORK**

**UN107 FOR SILVER EPSTEIN SITUATION TODAY AS FOLLOWS STOP UNMISTAKEABLE SIGNS  
OF GREATER RESERVE BY DELINEATIONS RELUCTANCE FOLLOW AMERICANS INTO  
PRECIPITATE COMMITMENTS STOP FRENCH TOOK ATTITUDE UTMOST RESERVE CANADIANS  
WITHDREW FROM PREVIOUS DECISION ANNOUNCE UNRESERVED ACCEPTANCE AUSTRALIA  
NEW ZEALAND SOUTH AMERICANS REMAINED SILENT STOP AMERICANS WORRIED THIS  
TENDENCY SOMEWHAT ANNOYED WITH US FOR OUR PART THEREIN STOP BUNCHE LETTER  
ON ASSASSINATION CIRCULATED TODAY OUR VIEW WE SHOULD REACT IF AT ALL ONLY  
IN COUNCIL IF MATTER RAISED WHICH NOT CERTAIN OF NO ACCOUNT PRODUCE  
ATMOSPHERE OF GUILT STOP NOW PSYCHOLOGICALLY EASIER EXPRESS SEVERE CRITICISM  
MEDIATORS TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS**

**EDAN**



# CLASS OF SERVICE

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# WESTERN UNION

JOSEPH L. EGAN  
PRESIDENT

# SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LC = Deferred Cable

NLT = Cable Night Letter

Ship Radiogram

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

TS-CL409 INTL FR=CD PARIS VIA RCA 27 29 2120=  
1948 SEP 29 PM 5 5c

SILVER TEMPLE=

=CLEVE=

UN109 REFERENCE MY TELEGRAM SCHULSEN AM NOW COOPERATING  
WITH HIM CLOSELY AGAIN ON ASSUMPTION YOU SO DESIRE AND  
IN EXPECTATION MORE SCRUPULOUS JUDGMENT=

EBAN=



COPY

NOTE OF CONVERSATION WITH MR. HECTOR MCNEIL, UNITED  
KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, PARIS,  
29 SEPTEMBER 1948.

After the meeting of the Political Committee, Mr. McNeil, in a short and casual conversation with me, did not conceal his dissatisfaction with what had occurred. He said he could not see what the people there were driving at. I replied that the result might have been influenced by the fact that most of the delegations with whom we had had contacts regarded our territorial case as serious. He replied that even if that was so, they could easily have had a Committee to go into the details.

Mr. McNeil had previously told journalists that if the plan was to be adopted as a whole, there would have to be a Commission almost immediately.

ASE

Paris,

30.9.48.



**CLASS OF SERVICE**

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# WESTERN UNION (27)

JOSEPH L. EGAN  
PRESIDENT

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Q357 INTL=CD PARIS VIA RCA 16 2 2050=

1948 OCT 2 PM 4 30

DR SILVER TEMPLE=CLEVE=

UN 143 SHANA TOVA HEARTIEST GREETINGS TO YOU AND YOURS=

AUBREY EBAN=

:143=



CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
DOMESTIC	CABLE
TELEGRAM	ORDINARY
DAY LETTER	URGENT RATE
SERIAL	DEFERRED
NIGHT LETTER	NIGHT LETTER

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise the message will be transmitted as a telegram or ordinary cablegram.

# WESTERN UNION

1207

A. N. WILLIAMS  
PRESIDENT

\$	CHECK
\$	ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
F	TIME FILED

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

SEPTEMBER 30 1948

To MAJOR EBEN

Care of or Apt. No. ISRAELI DELEGATION

Street and No. 15 AVENUE THEOPHILE GAUTIER

Place PARIS, FRANCE

PLEASED WITH MARKED IMPROVEMENT OUR POSITION PARIS STOP ORGANIZED ACTIVITY

HERE BEGINNING SHOW RESULTS STOP MY CABLE TO YOU BASED ON NO INFORMATION SENT

TO ME FROM PARIS BUT MY DESIRE TO SHARE WITH YOU MY REACTION WHICH ALSO

REACTION OF ALL MEMBERS AMERICAN SECTION STOP I HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN

YOUR CAPACITY JUDGMENT AND LOYALTY LESHONO TOVO

SILVER

Sender's name and address  
(For reference only)

Sender's telephone  
number



*Confidential*

COPY

OCTOBER 9, 1948

TELETYPE TO LOURIE FROM HEYD:

THE FOLLOWING CABLE RECEIVED FROM ERAN:

"UN184 CONVERSATIONS AMERICAN DELEGATION REVEAL FOLLOWING POSITION STOP  
LESS CERTAIN~~XX~~ THAN BEFORE OF POSSIBILITY ADOPTION BERNADOTTE PROPOSALS  
AS THEY STAND STOP THEY ENVISAGE POSSIBILITY ACCEPTING SPECIFIC PARTS REPORT  
LEAVING CONCILIATION COMMISSION INVESTIGATE THOSE POINTS ON WHICH  
AGREEMENT ASSEMBLY UNOBTAINABLE STOP THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ATTEMPT OBTAIN  
ASSEMBLY DECISION IN PRINCIPLE FOR EXCLUSION NEGEV ISRAEL IF FAILING  
LEAVE THAT ISSUE OPEN FOR COMMISSION STOP CONCILIATION COMMISSION  
ENVISAGED BY THEM AS HAVING VERY WIDE POWERS STOP TO MY QUESTION WHETHER  
ASSEMBLY COULD NOT CONTENT ITSELF RATIFYING MEDIATORS CONCLUSION  
EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND ORDERING TERMINATION HOSTILITIES WITHDRAWAL  
INVADING ARMIES THEY REPLIED CAUTIOUSLY AND ON WHOLE NEGATIVELY  
OBVIOUSLY FEELING THEIR CAPACITY FOR PRESSURE ON US WOULD BE REDUCED  
IF THESE POINTS ACCEPTED WITHOUT TERRITORIAL PRICE STOP ATTITUDE RESERVE  
OTHER DELEGATIONS CONTINUING TO DEVELOP ASSISTED BY FAVOURABLE RESPONSE  
AMERICAN PRESS OUR CASE ON NEGEV AND RUMOURS US DELEGATION NOT UNITED  
BEHIND PLAN STOP IN CONVERSATIONS WE STRESS IN ADDITION PREVIOUS POINTS  
DANGER INHERENT CONCILIATION COMMISSION WITH EXCESSIVELY WIDE POWERS  
BELIEVE THIS SHOULD NOW BECOM~~MAJOR~~ MAJOR POINT UNQUOTE



מדינת ישראל  
STATE OF ISRAEL  
MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

No. 3480

October 21, 1948


PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Dr. Silver:

I am enclosing copies of two telegrams received  
from Mr. Eban.

With cordial personal regards,

Sincerely yours,



Eliahu Epstein  
Special Representative

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver  
The Temple  
East 105th Street at Ansel Road  
Cleveland, Ohio

Enclosures



C O P Y

RCA

OCT 21 1948

YW989 RCF 922 PARIS 66 20 2140 PGE1/50

NLT EPSTEIN MEMISRAEL WASHINGTON DC

UN 255 RECENT TALKS DELEGATIONS AS FOLLOWS CHINA FAVOURS BERNADOTTE  
REPORT THOUGH MIND NOT MADE UP ON NEGEV CANNOT CONTINUE SPONSOR ARAB  
LINE IN FACE PATENT FACTS STOP INDIA NONCOMITTAL OWING TO MOSLEM  
MINORITY WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE ABSTENTIONIST STOP CANADA HEARD  
OUR VIEWS CAREFULLY THEIR FIXING POSITION AWAITING PEARSONS ARRIVAL  
STOP NORWAY FAVOURS OUR ADMISSION RELUCTANT FOLLOW BERNADOTTE FRONTIER  
RECOMMENDATIONS

EBAN



C O P Y

RCA

OCT 21 1948

YW960 RCF 923 PARIS 82 20 2140

NLT EPSTEIN MEMISRAEL WASHINGTON

UN 253 LUNCH MICHAEL AND SELF WITH BUNCHE TODAY FOUND HIM CHASTENED  
DOUBTFUL WHETHER ANY COUTCOME ASSEMBLY LIKELY IN ANY CASE ONLY VERY  
GENERAL RESOLUTION FEASIBLE STOP HINTED HIS DISSATISFACTION COUNCIL  
WEAKNESS ESPECIALLY AMERICAN COMPLACENCY AT ISRAELS ADVANCE STOP WEAK  
RESISTANCE HIS PART TO ALTERNATIVE IDEA ASSEMBLY MERELY CONFIRM JURIDICAL  
FACTS STOP RETICENT ON NEGEV ADDING SIGNIFICANTLY ISRAEL INTEREST LIES  
ALLOWING EGYPTIANS SOME FOOTHOLD PART OF NEGEV STOP EXPRESSED CONCERN  
POSSIBILITY SUBCOMMITTEE WHICH WOULD COMPLETELY WRECK SCHEME

EBAN



COPY

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

15, Avenue Theophile Gautier  
Paris, XVI.

25th October, 1948.

Arthur Lourie, Esq.,  
16, East 66th Street,  
NEW YORK, N.Y.

Dear Arthur,

I enclose a copy of a draft resolution for which the British Delegation is attempting to secure American support. You will understand the danger of this proposal. It amounts to a blanket authorisation for the Bernadotte Report as it stands. The resolution would be completely impracticable, and if adopted would collapse for lack of enforcement. But it would secure its political objective: which is to secure an alignment of conflict between ourselves and the United Nations.

I would be glad if you would let Dr. Silver see this document, and send a copy to Eliahu. I suggest that the Administration be made aware that we know of this plan. If the President is asked to express his views on it, he should know that it is suggested that boundary changes should not at all be made dependent on Israel's consent.

Should you esteem that the work against this resolution would benefit from publication, I do not object.

Yours ever,

/s/ Aubrey

Enclosure.

AEldm



S E C R E T

Confidential  
Second Draft.

DRAFT RESOLUTION

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

HAVING ADOPTED on 14 May 1948 a decision (resolution 186 (S-2) empowering a United Nations Mediator in Palestine to exercise certain functions including the use of his good offices to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine:

HAVING RECEIVED AND EXAMINED the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine (document A/648) submitted by the late Count Folke Bernadotte;

HAVING TAKEN NOTE of the resolution of the Security Council of 15 July, 1948 (document S/902) which "orders the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further military action....", and which also provides "that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force, in accordance with the present resolution and with that of 29 May, 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached;"

AND TAKING ACCOUNT of the fact that the Governments and authorities concerned have complied with the order of the Security Council of 15 July;

1. EXPRESSES its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life.
2. APPROVES the Progress Report of the late United Nations Mediator, and ADOPTS the Conclusions to Part One of that report, which are attached hereto, as the Basic Plan for the Peaceful Settlement of the Situation in Palestine;
3. DECIDES that the mediation function has served its purpose and that the position of United Nations Mediator shall be discontinued when the Conciliation Commission established by this resolution enters upon its duties.
4. DECLARES that, since resort to military action as a means of settlement in Palestine is precluded by the Security Council resolution of 15 July, the hostilities between the States members of the Arab League on the one side, and Israel on the other side, must be considered as at an end.
5. ESTABLISHES a United Nations Conciliation Commission consisting of three members to carry out the functions assigned to it by this resolution in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Plan attached hereto, and such instructions as the General Assembly or the Security Council may issue. The members of the Conciliation Commission shall be appointed in their individual capacities having regard to their special qualifications, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General by a committee of the General Assembly composed of representatives of the Permanent Members of the Security Council. The members of the Conciliation Commission shall be appointed by a committee of the General Assembly composed of representatives of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, from among the Member States which are represented on the Truce Commission. Their appointment shall be on the basis of their special qualifications and experience.
6. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to appoint a Technical Boundaries Commission to delimit on the spot the frontiers between the State of Israel and adjacent territories, and of the City of Jerusalem, in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Plan attached hereto.



7. REQUESTS the Trusteeship Council to approve a Statute for the future administration of the City of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under a Special International Regime, and to supervise its administration. At the request of the Trusteeship Council, the Conciliation Commission shall give such assistance as may be possible in establishing the Special International Regime in the City of Jerusalem.

8. DECLARES that, in the interest of peace in the Middle East, the United Nations has a continuing interest in and concern for the maintenance of the frontiers as delimited by the Technical Boundaries Commission, and that those frontiers shall not be altered except by agreement between the States whose boundaries would be involved.

9. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council any attempt to alter the frontiers by means other than mutual agreement.

10. DECLARES that, within the respective political entities of Palestine, Arabs and Jews shall enjoy equal political, economic, social and religious rights.

11. RECOGNISES fully the right of refugees from the conflict in Palestine to return to their homes at the earliest possible date, and to be adequately compensated for any losses suffered by them as a result of confiscation or destruction of property not resulting from military necessity, and INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to assist and supervise the repatriation of such refugees as may choose to exercise this right, and their resettlement.

12. RECOGNISES that for various reasons members of the refugees may not exercise the right to return to their former homes, and therefore INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to establish as an urgent measure appropriate machinery to study the problem and to take such action as it may deem appropriate to facilitate the re-settlement of refugees elsewhere, and to supervise the payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return to their homes.

13. DECLARES that in the absence of a formal declaration of peace by the parties, the existing truce and the functions of the United Nations Mediator relating to the supervision of the truce shall continue until the Conciliation Commission enters upon its duties.

14. AUTHORISES the Conciliation Commission to take over such of the personnel and equipment of the present truce supervision organisation as it may require for the purposes of supervising frontier arrangements and assisting in the discharge of its other functions.

15. INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports monthly or more frequently as it deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations. The Conciliation Commission shall make a full report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.

16. CALLS UPON all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this resolution.

17. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of this resolution.



**BASIC PLAN FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT  
OF THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE**

\*\*\*\*\*

"a. Since the Security Council, under pain of Chapter 7 sanctions, has forbidden further employment of military action in Palestine as a means of settling the dispute, hostilities should be pronounced formally ended either by mutual agreement of the parties, or failing that, by the United Nations. The existing indefinite truce should be superseded by a formal peace, or at the minimum, an armistice which would involve either complete withdrawal and demobilisation of armed forces or their wide separation by creation of broad demilitarised zones under United Nations supervision.

"b. The frontiers between the Arab and Jewish territories, in the absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews, should be established by the United Nations and delimited by a technical boundaries Commission appointed by and responsible to the United Nations, with the following revisions in the boundaries broadly defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November, in order to make them more equitable, workable, and consistent with existing realities, in Palestine.

(i) The area known as the Negev, south of a line running from the sea near Majdal east south-east to Faluja (both of which places would be in Arab territory) should be defined as Arab territory;

(ii) The frontier should run from Faluja north north-east to Ramlah and Lydda (both of which places would be in Arab territory), the frontier at Lydda then following the line established in the 29 November resolution of the General Assembly;

(iii) Galilee should be defined as Jewish territory.

"c. The disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State should be left to the Governments of the Arab States in full consultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, and with the recommendation, however, that in view of the historical connection and common interests of Transjordan and Palestine, there would be compelling reasons for merging the Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Transjordan, subject to such frontier rectifications regarding other Arab States as may be found practicable and desirable.

d. The United Nations, by declaration or other appropriate means, should undertake to provide special assurance that the boundaries between the Arab and Jewish territories shall be respected and maintained, subject only to such modifications as may be eventually agreed upon by the parties concerned.

"e. The Port of Haifa, including the oil refineries and terminals, and without prejudice to their inclusion in the sovereign territory of the Jewish State or the administration of the city of Haifa, should be declared a free port, with assurances of free access for interested Arab countries and an undertaking on their part to place no obstacle in the way of oil deliveries by pipeline to the Haifa refineries, whose distribution would continue on the basis of the historical pattern.

"f. The airport of Lydda should be declared a free airport with assurance of access to it and employment of its facilities for Jerusalem and interested Arab countries.



"g. The City of Jerusalem, which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November (document A/516) should be treated separately, and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites, and free access to them, and for religious freedom.

"h. The right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem, by road, rail or air, should be fully respected by all parties.

"i. The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations Conciliation Commission described in paragraph k below.

"j. The political, economic, social and religious rights of all Arabs in the Jewish territory of Palestine, and of all Jews in the Arab territory of Palestine should be fully guaranteed and respected by the authorities. The Conciliation Commission provided for in the following paragraph should supervise the observance of this guarantee. It should also lend its good offices on the invitation of the parties to any efforts toward exchanges of population with a view to eliminating troublesome minority problems, and on the basis of adequate compensation for property owned.

"k. In view of the special nature of the Palestine problem and the dangerous complexities of Arab-Jewish relationships, the United Nations should establish a Palestine Conciliation Commission. This Commission, which should be appointed for a limited period, should be responsible to the United Nations, and act under its authority. The Commission, assisted by such United Nations personnel as may prove necessary, should undertake:

- (i) to employ its good offices to make such recommendations to the parties or to the United Nations, and to take such other steps as may be appropriate, with a view to ensuring the continuation of the peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine;
  - (ii) such measures as it might consider appropriate in fostering the cultivation of friendly relations between Arabs and Jews;
  - (iii) to supervise the observance of such boundary, road, railroad, free port, free airport, minority rights, and other arrangements as may be decided upon by the United Nations;
  - (iv) to report promptly to the United Nations any developments in Palestine likely to alter the arrangements approved by the United Nations in the Palestine settlement or to threaten the peace of the area.
-



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# WESTERN UNION

JOSEPH L. EGAN  
PRESIDENT

1201

## SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

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Ship Radiogram

The filing time shown in the date line on telegram

CTA116

STANDARD TIME at point of origin Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

CT. CDU030 / NLT=CD PARIS VIA RCA 26 26=

NLT SILVER TEMPLE=

*East 105 & Cansel*

OCT 27 AM 3 16

CLEVELAND (OHIO)=

*DR 1090*

UN 301 FAHY HERE IN CLOSE CORDIAL COOPERATION THIS  
DELEGATION STOP HOPE YOU SEE ALL OUR CABLES ADDRESSED  
EPSTEIN LOURIE REGARDS=

EBAN=

*Ce 0862 orders*  
*Ce 4360*

*Rabbi S**10/27 Co. 8484 Mel*

UN 301=

1 DA817AN-1 DA833AAN

2 NOT REG AM 819A

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

10 / 27



PARIS  
~~OCTOBER 17~~ 1948

RHS  
From A.L.

EPSTEIN MEMISRAEL WASHINGTON

SUN618 FOR YOUR BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE UNSAVOURY ATMOSPHERE THIS  
MORNING'S INTRIGUE HAS AROUSED DEEP RESENTMENT MANY DELEGATIONS  
INCLUDING WEST EUROPEANS AND DOMINIONS ESPECIALLY AUSTRALIA STOP  
TWO WEST EUROPEANS CONVERSING WITH US CONTRASTED ASSEMBLY  
HESITATIONS WITH OUR PURPOSEFUL ATTITUDE NEGEV WHICH WIDELY PRAISED  
STOP HIGH OFFICIALS MEDIATORS STAFF ASKED US QUOTE WHY DO YOU TAKE  
NOTICE UN AT ALL UNQUOTE SUGGEST POINT OUT DEPARTMENT DEEPENING  
CRISIS OF CREDIT FOR UN IN ISRAEL WITH OBVIOUS RESULTS STOP AMERICAN  
DELEGATION HAS EVIDENT DESIRE AVOID POLICY POPULAR WITH AMERICAN  
PEOPLE STOP RUSK AND ROSS FRANKLY US ELECTIONS WERE MOTIVE THIS  
MOVE

EBAN



COPI

PARIS  
OCTOBER 31, 1948

BW  
NF

ELT LOURIE MEMORIAL NEWYORK

UN340 [SECURITY COUNCIL SUBCOMMITTEE DOMINATED BY BRITAIN CERTAIN TO PRODUCE DRAFT NO MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN PREVIOUS ONE STOP CURRENT TEXT ORDERS WITHDRAWALS AND GIVES MEDIATOR WIDEST POWERS TO FIX TRUCE LINES AND DICTATE TROOP MOVEMENTS STOP IN VIEW OF BUNCHE'S UTTER LACK IMPARTIALITY AND DETERMINATION TO ASSERT HIS AUTHORITY AND PREJUDICE ISRAEL'S INTERESTS AT ALL COSTS, THIS RESOLUTION IS BOUND AND INTENDED TO CREATE NEW CONFLICTS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND SECURITY COUNCIL STOP BUNCHE'S ACTION IN FLOUTING OCTOBER NINETEENTH RESOLUTION AND PROVOKING SHOWDOWN WITH OURSELVES WAS BACKED BY BRITISH-LED GROUP ON COUNCIL AND DIRECTLY CAUSED PRESENT HUMILIATING SITUATION OF AMERICANS STOP TO CONFIRM HIS HIGH-HANDED CONDUCT AND BESTOW FRESH ARBITRARY POWERS UPON HIM IS A BRITISH MANEUVER TO EXPLOIT BUNCHE'S IRRESPONSIBLE SELF-ASSERTIVENESS IN ORDER TO EMBROIL SECURITY COUNCIL GENERALLY AND AMERICANS PARTICULARLY IN OPEN CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL AND LEADS TO ENDLESS EMBARRASSMENT UNITED STATES POLICY STOP EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE SECURE FOLLOWING AMERICAN ATTITUDE ONE IMPLEMENTATION OCTOBER NINETEENTH RESOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH AUSTIN'S RULING ON NECESSITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON ALL OUTSTANDING POINTS WITHOUT COUNCIL PREJUDGING ISSUES TWO CONSEQUENT REFUSAL TO SUPPORT SUBCOMMITTEE'S DRAFT PREJUDGING PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL IN ADVANCE AND GIVING MEDIATOR ARBITRARY POWERS THREE AMERICAN OBJECTION TO DISCUSSING SANCTIONS IN FAVOUR OF INVADING ARMY WHOSE PRESENCE RESULTS FROM "AGGRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER" AS STATED BY AUSTIN IN COUNCIL MAY TWENTYSECOND, AND WHOSE DEFEAT RESULTS FROM DEFIANCE OF TRUCE RULINGS SINCE JUNE TWENTYFIFTH PARAGRAPH HOPE PUBLIC OPINION RECOGNIZES FANTASTIC SITUATION OF FIRST APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SMALL STATE DEFENDING TERRITORY AWARDED IT BY UNITED NATIONS ALSO SITUATION WHEREBY DELEGATION HERE COMBATS ITS SUPPORT TO POLICIES CONTRARY TO VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE STOP STRONG PUBLIC ECHO LATTER POINTS MOST VALUABLE.

EDAN ]

(with Caffarelli)



TELEGRAM

JANUARY 20, 1949

MR. ABRAHAM GOODMAN  
1261 WASHINGTON AVENUE  
MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA

HAVE SPOKEN TO EBAN. BELIEVE THAT HE WILL ACCEPT INVITATION  
SUBJECT OF COURSE TO AN UNFORESEEN EMERGENCY IN HIS WORK  
WHICH MIGHT COMPEL HIM TO CANCEL AT THE LAST MOMENT. KINDEST  
REGARDS





# TESTIMONIAL DINNER

TO

The Honorable AUBREY S. EBAN

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE  
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

UPON HIS RETURN FROM THE  
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND  
SECURITY COUNCIL SESSIONS IN PARIS

TENDERED BY

THE PRESIDENT AND OFFICERS  
OF THE  
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

HOTEL PIERRE

JANUARY 26, 1949



# MENU

2

SUPREME OF FRESH FRUIT

2

CHICKEN CONSOMME WITH BARLEY

2

HEARTS OF CELERY

RIPE AND GREEN OLIVES

RADISHES

SALTED ALMONDS AND PECANS



2

ROAST FILET OF BEEF HUNTER STYLE

POTATOES RISSOLEE

ASPARAGUS TIPS MIMOSA

2

CHIFFONADE SALAD

2

STRAWBERRY TART

2

DEMI TASSE



Ernest E. Barbarash, Director  
Public Relations Department  
Zionist Organization of America  
41 East 42nd Street, New York, N. Y.  
MU 2-3205

FOR RELEASE ON RECEIPT

## UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVES ADDRESS

### ZOA TESTIMONIAL TO EBAN

#### WARM TRIBUTES TO ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE PAID BY SILVER AND NEUMANN

New York.- Aubrey S. Eban, Israeli representative to the UN, was tendered an impressive testimonial dinner by the Zionist Organization of America last week at the Hotel Pierre, New York, with six hundred Zionist representatives and leaders in all walks of life in attendance. The dinner was presided over by Dr. Emanuel Neumann, ZOA president who together with Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Judge Morris Rothenberg led in the American Zionist tribute to Mr. Eban. Addresses were also made by Charles Fahy, former U.S. Solicitor General; Dr. J.D.L. Hood, head of the Australian Mission to the UN; Finn Moe, representative of Norway before UN; Ernest Chauvet, representative of Haiti, Bartley Crum, publisher of the New York Star, and other notables.

Messages of tribute were read from Dr. Jorge Granados, Guatemalan representative to the UN; Eliahu Epstein, Israeli envoy to the United States, and many other representatives to the UN and leading personalities throughout the country. Jacques Torczyner, chairman of the Testimonial Dinner Committee, opened the function.

#### Eban Stresses Need for Arab-Jewish Cooperation

In his address, Mr. Eban, contending that it is now "a fairly certain prospect" that Israel will become a member of the UN, however emphasized that "the most crucial test confronting Israel was the establishment of normal relations between that country and the Arab world.

In a review of the political situation and the events in Israel, Mr. Eban said that "in modern Israel we see the co-existence of two economic and social systems. We find free enterprise existing side by side with the most advanced forms of social cooperation. If we prove that this synthesis can endure; if we infect the Middle East with that dynamic example; if we thereby prove that these two systems can live peacefully together in the world; shall we not, within the small compass of our little state, have made some contribution to the wider cause of universal peace?"

#### Pays Tribute to Silver and Neumann

Mr. Eban further declared that "the achievements of Israel would not have been possible but for the support and counsel from the government and people



of the United States, nor would this support have reached notable proportions but for the determined and indefatigable efforts of your movement led by Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Dr. Emanuel Neumann, to vindicate the principles and ideals of Zionism in the eyes of the American people. We shall continue to have need of that support".

#### Neumann's Address

Dr. Emanuel Neumann in his address emphasized the "revolutionary change" that has characterized recent events in connection with Israel "has led the way toward a new orientation in Near Eastern policy". The ZOA president voiced the hope that "this marks the dawning of a new day, not only for Israel but for the Arab peoples as well; a new day, let us hope for all backward regions and the underprivileged peoples of the earth". Dr. Neumann highly lauded President Truman who "in largest measure is personally responsible for the firm and constructive policy which has replaced the vacillations, the ambiguities and contradictions which have plagued our State Department for so long". Paying tribute to Mr. Eban, Dr. Neumann said:

"If the State of Israel is extending and consolidating its diplomatic position, if it is winning such diplomatic victories, surely it is due in no small measure to the effectiveness, the adroitness and the brilliance with which our case is being presented in the forum of the UN by the accredited representative of the State of Israel, Major Aubrey Eban".

#### Silver Calls for Strengthening of Movement

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, as chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and as director of the activities of the case for the Jewish State before the UN, paid high tribute to Mr. Eban for "the extraordinary, effective, skillful and impressive manner in which he argued the case of Israel before the Security Council and the Assembly of the United Nations. He represents that quality of constructive statesmanship", Dr. Silver said, "which the new State of Israel requires at this time and values too highly. In spite of his relative youth, Mr. Eban by his scholarship and clear and incisive thinking, has already established himself as one of the most significant representatives at the UN".

Dr. Silver emphasized that "the task of American Zionists has just begun and must be carried out with accelerated tempo. The establishment of the Jewish State confronts the movement in this country with a renewed challenge. The problems facing the infant state in the economic upbuilding of the country, in the absorption of hundreds of thousands of newcomers, staggers the imagination. The major burden of aiding the economic upbuilding of the State, the colonization and settlement of the vast numbers of immigrants, falls upon us in this country".



Israel's Vindication Inevitable - Fahy Declares

Mr. Charles Fahy, former U. S. Solicitor General, paying tribute to Mr. Eban for his abilities which had been devoted "to the cause of his people and the inception of a new State in the community of nations" declared that the marshalling of world opinion behind Israel has grown so in magnitude that Israel's vindication is now inevitable in its essentials". "The matter of statehood conferred by the UN has now been redeemed by the heroism of Israel's people. Her gains in freedom and stability are gains for the UN as well. The strength of the two are bound up together".

Mr. Fahy also paid tribute to Dr. Silver, Dr. Neumann and their co-workers for their efforts in behalf of Israel. "All may take pride in this task, not yet completed, of building a rightful place for Israel in the family of nations".

Judge Rothenberg

Judge Morris Rothenberg, president of the Jewish National Fund, stated that "the adroit and effective manner in which Aubrey Eban handled the interests of Israel in that international forum in relation to the many acute and delicate problems which came before that body, not only reflected great credit upon Mr. Eban but also upon his country and bespeaks for Mr. Eban a brilliant and useful career in Israel's diplomatic service".

Messages from Granados and Eliahu Epstein

In his message, Dr. Jorge Granados, stressed that "we see now that even Israel's bitterest foes have to give up and recognize the inexorable fact of the existence of the Jewish State". The Guatemalan diplomat praised Mr. Eban as a real exponent of Israel's young statesmen.

In a message from Washington, Hon. Eliahu Epstein, Israeli envoy to the United States, paid tribute to the great contributions Mr. Eban has made and continues to make to the success of Israel's cause in the UN. Throughout those critical times he has shown admirable statesmanship and unusual skill in dealing with crucial problems firmly establishing Israel's position in the international forum".

The Testimonial Dinner Committee which was headed by Mr. Torczyner, included Rabbi Irving Miller, Benjamin G. Browdy and Joseph W. Greenleaf.



March 5, 1949

TELEGRAM

Andrey S. Eban  
Israeli U. N. Delegation  
11 East 70th Street  
New York, New York

CONGRATULATIONS ON AN HISTORICAL ACHIEVEMENT.

ABBA HILLEL SILVER





AUBREY EBAN  
ISRAELI CONSULATE  
11 East 70 St.  
New York

Will be pleased to meet you at consulate Monday 11:30. Regards

Abba Hillel Silver





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# WESTERN UNION

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

1201

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1949 APR 22 PM 8 09

P. UDA785 NL PD=UD NEWYORK NY 22=

DR ABBA HILLEL SILVER=

THE TEMPLE CLEVE=

EBAN HAS BEEN CALLED TO MEETING LAKE SUCCESS ON MONDAY  
CAN YOU ARRANGE YOUR VISIT TO CONSULATE FOR ELEVEN THIRTY  
INSTEAD OF TWELVE THIRTY=

HARRY STEINBERG=...



C  
O  
P  
Y

Office of the  
Representative  
to the United Nations

11 East 70th Street  
New York 21, New York

TRafalgar 9-7600

15 May, 1949

Dr. Dr. Silver,

On the occasion of Israel's admission to membership in the United Nations I feel impelled to send a word of respectful greeting to you who began the great international journey of which Wednesday's vote was but the culmination. I like to think that there was no deviation from the attitude which was adopted at the very first Jewish appearance on the international scene - an attitude which consisted of regarding our claim to equality as a right and not as a favour. I hope that we have now put ourselves well beyond the pressures and menaces inherent under conditions of inequality.

I should like you to know that you were often in my mind in recent difficult and treacherous hours, and that those of us who have followed the whole of this chapter are the least likely to forget how proudly our cause was upheld in the days before status or sovereignty were achieved.

With very cordial wishes,

Yours ever

/s/ Aubrey S. Eban

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver  
The Temple  
Cleveland, Ohio



מדינת ישראל  
ISRAEL

OFFICE OF THE  
REPRESENTATIVE  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

11 EAST 70TH STREET  
NEW YORK 21, NEW YORK  
—  
TRAFALGAR 9-7600

15 May, 1949


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With very cordial wishes,

Yours ever



Dr. Abba Hillel Silver  
The Temple,  
Cleveland,  
Ohio



1) Too close - 34 - Mile-stone.

Not too close - forces - under - of the forces -  
for a moment - It was on the Battlefield - 1950  
B. & M. did not stand alone. J. could  
support it - mobilized.

And in V.N. many noble countries  
- rallied - 33 - + the hostile -

We are an ancient - Our records  
have a way

Israel will treasure - who came to its  
- day of decision

2/ We also treasure - names, and  
then when Redemption came

Relat. importance of certain history  
at the moment many people

3/100/11 JK - No matter  
what is important

And a grateful people - eager  
- who placed it in service

3/ And a grateful people - (Elav)  
- festival day

I did not know - a significant  
event -



Some - his Unusual softs - 12  
steadily - by authority used  
general public like 12/1

- ① After May 14 - came into his  
inheritance
- ② Since then - dignity - command  
respect - apprehension  
competently - dogmatically

4/ Just as the Emergency found  
- without adequate - wisdom  
and with delay.

5/ Many knew - unutterable  
anguish - Few suspected  
unfathomable strength - Undeclared  
resourcefulness

Few still - the ready skills  
- war-torn hour

6/ I am reassured - We shall  
use our power

Among virtues select for  
civilization - new situation



When are - Marshall things (3  
- business - master patient  
wisdom

In periods of slow newshaking  
1, 2, 11 17, 36 2017

Elan possesses - (Shuf, Nakh)

7/ You takes not over

No refers - No relaxation 2, 3, 3  
Our problems - Our enemies

Tribute her - to stay then  
with you Joy in interest,  
renewing love

8/ Good to identify

9/ Your notable career began  
with the end, the light

Way of our day the day of

How ever were in fullness  
& in splendor -







# The Sulgrave

Park Avenue at 67th Street, New York 21, N.Y.

- 1) Too close - evaluate - altho discern - one of 3-4  
Destined to mark mile - stone - turning pt
- 2) 13.1 ~~at~~ we are not too close to reach the  
forces - + the indiv. - played a role  
of the forces - not + with - much has been said  
greatest of all - <sup>untested</sup> ~~undisputed~~ + undepicted  
I. need - of million ~~person~~ <sup>untested</sup> ~~duration~~ - reaching  
catapult. preparation in one day - and the  
renewal capacity, the ~~will~~ to seize  
the ~~spot~~ of fortune movement of the ~~deem~~  
~~before~~ of victory resulting from  
2nd W.W. - to demand ~~travels~~  
Card to claim to not. Dev.  
+ end of. -
- It was on the battlefield that the  
issue was finally settled - and this  
is in keeping with all best precedents.  
Freedom is never given -  
It is always won - and the  
price is always high.
- But the 2/3rds of the world stand alone  
in its great hr. of destiny



# The Sulgrave

Park Avenue at 67th Street, New York 21, N.Y.

J. Carr. thought could - ref V.S. -  
suffered it phys reversally - +  
unobeyed pol. and in many quarters  
and in the U.N. - many noble countries  
- some, themselves, been in a sort  
they do for freedom - called to  
it suffert - to have - 33  
+ the humble press - 14m - freedom  
+ by violence - causing vaccination,  
removals - the home good-will  
finally triumphed.

We are an ancient slay - rem people  
+ our records - included Israel

Israel will treasure the names  
these <sup>native</sup> - whose hearts was toward  
~~the~~ <sup>who</sup> in the day of Dea ruin -  
and Came to the help -

3/. And it will also treasure names under  
than whom, after a long + difficult struggle



*The Sulgrave*

*Park Avenue at 67th Street, New York 21, N. Y.*

reduplication cause =

Reduplication cause =  
Relat. importance of Constitutional  
at the moment many people put in  
claims - for all or part of Victory  
Saw with books 3/8 - 10/11 etc

Saw white bark 3/8 102/11 n/c

It does not matter - really. Beards

an all here - + time can be trusted  
to under the time <sup>first</sup> ~~first~~ <sup>second</sup> ~~second~~

What is important in the achievement

And a putting people will not be  
is eager to express the fact to  
all, the was dangerous - who

placed at its service - whether  
left heart - under + outside  
which they passed.

4/ Amel + a lighter light burning day  
 + on the festival day then here with kind  
 ① I did not know E - until he  
 came - His assumption at first  
 was - gentle market - as 50 quads



# The Sulgrave

Park Avenue at 67th Street, New York 21, N.Y.

Soon - his unusual gifts - clarity, the  
sound ~~quality~~ <sup>logic</sup> - & clarity, & experience  
- the power of his past - close  
friendship - ~~relationships~~ - & steady  
- by authority of example - ~~world~~  
friend - / OK / pl -

(a) When May '4 - or on who  
has partly been with his ~~whitely~~

(b) Since then - ~~dynasty~~ -  
seemingly ~~expected~~ - we never had  
a moment's apprehension - ~~celebrity~~  
order preserved.

(c) Just as in the emergency  
found the vibrant ~~system~~ - its  
utopian ~~building~~ - its inherent  
advocate - to ~~what~~ <sup>what</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~taken~~ <sup>taken</sup>  
challenge & ~~under~~

5/ Many ~~what~~ know the ~~un~~ <sup>un</sup> ~~altered~~ <sup>altered</sup>  
any such, no people.



# The Sulgrave

Park Avenue at 67th Street, New York 21, N.Y.

Few suspected the unfathomable  
strength - the unfathomable power

Fewer still - the ready skills,  
the org. abilities - & the high order  
of state work - which the world  
has been unable to produce

6/. I am reassured - for the tests  
of to-morrow.

we shall next see more of the  
type of leader. Among the values  
- select for contribution - new technical  
work.

When we had to work all  
the through - & lose the balance  
in our rest, paper, & action

We shall now need to have an  
energy - with an active  
face vacuuming labor