



Abba Hillel Silver Collection Digitization Project

Featuring collections from the Western Reserve Historical Society and
The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives

MS-4787: Abba Hillel Silver Papers, 1902-1989.

Series I: General Correspondence, 1914-1969, undated.

Sub-series A: Alphabetical, 1914-1965, undated.

Reel

77

Box

27

Folder

1676

United States State Department, 1953-1954.

Western Reserve Historical Society

10825 East Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio 44106
(216) 721-5722
wrhs.org

American Jewish Archives

3101 Clifton Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio 45220
(513) 487-3000
AmericanJewishArchives.org

Bullis
MacDonald
Schulson, Hyman

US State Dept

Cable: MEACONSULT NEWYORK

JAMES G. McDONALD

5910 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING

NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

BRYANT 9-7565

September 8th, 1953

WRHS
Rabbi Abbe Hillel Silver
The Temple
East 105th Street at Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio



Dear Rabbi Silver:

I am not telephoning you again this week, as I suggested I might do when we talked last week. The reason is that I expect to be in Washington this week-end, and then to learn more definitely about plans and possibilities for the successor to Davis.

I shall call you then next week.

Cordially yours,

JAMES G. McDONALD

5910 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING

NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

BRYANT 9-7565

September 16th, 1953


Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Euclid Ave.,
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Rabbi Silver:

On the telephone today, with a former colleague, I was told that Ambassador Davis has shown a remarkable recovery from his serious heart condition, and that there has been no official decision that he is not to return to Israel.

Despite this information, however, I still feel that his return is very unlikely.

Cordially yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. McDonald", with a large, loopy flourish extending from the bottom left.

TELEGRAM

October 25, 1953

Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

WHEN I TELEPHONED YOUR OFFICE YESTERDAY FOR AN APPOINTMENT I DID NOT KNOW THAT CONGRESSMAN JAVITZ AND MR. KATZEN HAD MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A DELEGATION TO CONFER WITH YOU ON MONDAY. THAT BEING THE CASE THERE IS NO NEED FOR ME TO IMPOSE UPON YOUR TIME AT THE MOMENT. I'M SURE THAT YOU WILL DO ALL THAT YOU CAN TO CORRECT THE UNFORTUNATE IMPRESSION WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SUSPENSION OF FINANCIAL AID TO ISRAEL. THIS IN MY JUDGMENT IS A MISTAKE FROM EVERY POINT OF VIEW.

IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE LARGER ISSUES WHICH ARE NOW BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL I FEEL CERTAIN, KNOWING AS I DO YOUR DEEP SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL AS WELL AS FOR THE ARAB PEOPLES AND YOUR EARNEST DESIRE TO BE CONSTRUCTIVELY HELPFUL, THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WILL POINT THE WAY TO A SOLUTION OF THE BASIC PROBLEM INVOLVED IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS THAT OF A SETTLED PEACE. WITHOUT SUCH A PEACE SERIOUS DEPLORABLE INCIDENTS ARE BOUND TO OCCUR TIME AND TIME AGAIN ON THEIR UNEASY BORDERS WHICH WILL LEAD TO A STILL FURTHER DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION.

I SEND YOU MY WARMEST GREETINGS.

Abba Hillel Silver

CONFIDENTIAL

Report on Meeting with Department of State on February 1, 1954

Present: Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade, Chief of the Bureau on Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, and Fred Waller of the Israel desk;

Louis Lipsky, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Council;

I. L. Kenen, Washington Representative.

The meeting was an outgrowth of an inquiry by Mr. Lipsky to Secretary of State Dulles in connection with published reports that the United States intended to make arms available to the Arab states. Mr. Dulles, who was leaving for the Berlin Conference, wrote asking Mr. Lipsky to meet with Mr. Byroade.

At the outset, Mr. Lipsky stated that he came on behalf of hundreds of thousands of American Jews who had labored for many years to help build a Jewish state and to bring Jewish refugees to that state. Recent reports that these people were now to be exposed to new danger because of the proposed shipments of arms had aroused great alarm throughout the United States. Accordingly, we felt it necessary to come to the Department to find out what it plans.

Mr. Byroade said that he was most anxious to explain to American Jews what the Department has in mind, for he is conscious of and appreciates their concern over the danger.

Much of the newspaper speculation and report had been inaccurate. For a long time, the United States has hoped to strengthen the Near East against Communist aggression. First, it had been proposed to establish a Middle East Defense Command. This had happened before he (Byroade) had come into office. This plan had been ill-advised. It aroused the suspicion and antagonism of all the countries, which did not wish to put their armies under British command because it might affect their sovereignty. This had been followed by another unacceptable proposal -- MEDO.

On his trip to the Middle East last spring, the Secretary of State had decided that something had to be done without further delay. It was decided to work for an alliance between Turkey and Pakistan, which intervening countries in the neighborhood could join if they wished to do so. Accordingly, last year Byroade had asked Congress for \$100 million in arms for this entire area, but he had a very difficult time on the Hill, for Zionist pressure had cost him \$70 million dollars. Congress had reduced the amount to \$30 million. This would not stretch very far, since it was supposed to cover the whole region, including Pakistan. At that time the State Department thought it might begin with Egypt. It had been felt that if Egypt could be won over to American thinking and influence, it might be the first country to break the Arab League's anti-Israel front. Byroade felt that a great opportunity was missed in Egypt because the impasse over the Suez Canal blocked the arms program.

While it is intended, apparently, to provide arms to Naguib sometime in the future, there is no current proposal. Byroade conceded that the countries in the

neighborhood could put up little resistance to a Soviet invasion for any length of time. At best, arms might be useful to hold the Communists at mountain passes, etc. The real purpose of our program was to win these people away from neutralism.

It had been a miracle that we had kept Iran on our side. It was due to the fact that we had had a Point 4 and military aid program in that country in the past. Therefore, it was the Department's hope to put some arms in the hands of Arab rulers who were considered to be friendly to the United States. He made it clear that he preferred the military rulers to civilian politicians, and he thought that pro-American sentiment could be strengthened by giving some equipment to these generals.

No arms were going to Saudi Arabia. There had been an agreement at the time the United States established an air base in that country to make arms available but the United States had never kept the agreement. Byroade regretted this. There had been some premature reports associating Saudi Arabia with this over-all defense program, but the Saudi Arabians themselves had told the United States only last week that they would not accept the obligations imposed by the Mutual Security Program (to join in the defense of the free world -- a condition precedent to the supply of arms) because apparently they felt that this in some way abridged their sovereignty. On the other hand, there was a possibility that Iraq would come into the picture. Jamali had given instructions to the Iraqi delegation at the U.N. to stand with the West, and Jamali felt the nearness of the Russians but, he continued, Iraq still maintained its hostility to Israel.

Byroade discussed whether the United States could insist on peace before it made arms available. The Department had canvassed this, but felt that this was impractical. Arab hostility was so intense that any negotiations for the supply of arms would immediately be exploded were the United States to interject any notions that peace with Israel was necessary. However, the Arabs would have to give commitments that our arms would not be used against Israel.

Byroade had no illusions about the strength or capacity of Iraq in the light of past history, but on the other hand, he pointed out that if Iraq accepted arms, it would involve a break with the Arab League, and from his general attitude it appeared that Byroade thought that the Arab League was of little value. He felt that Jamali, were he offered arms, would not resist such a break.

He agreed that the Saudi Arabian statement was stupid, but neither he nor Waller appeared enthusiastic over the suggestion that they might protest to the Saudi Arabians. They insisted that no such protest could be made in the absence of verification. They had been trying to establish the precise statement, and so far had been unable to confirm the part relating to the destruction of the 10 million Arabs. It had been confirmed that Saud had said that Israel was a cancer.

Byroade felt that Israel put the United States in a difficult position because the alternatives were not practical. The Israelis urged the Department to provide Israel with arms on the theory that if Israel received arms, the Arab states would break their neutral front and would follow in lining up with the West. Byroade was not convinced that the Arabs would. On the other hand, he questioned the military value of giving arms to Israel from the standpoint of regional defense because, he said, the Israelis would not be allowed to move their army outside their own territory, since the Arabs would regard any such maneuver as a mask for Israel aggression.

In discussing military aid for Pakistan, Byroade pointed out that this had been a most gratifying development because Pakistan had come forward courageously to associate itself with the West, and it would be wrong for the United States to refuse to supply it with arms, since its position had certainly alienated and provoked the Russians. Therefore, the United States wanted to encourage the Pakistan-Turkish alliance. However, there had been premature publicity, and this had been very harmful.

Byroade agreed that there had been a deterioration in the situation between Israel and the Arab states, but he attributed this basically to Kibya and the canal. Israel's actions had set us back a full year. There was no doubt that the Arabs feared Israel. They believed that the Israel army, which Byroade thought was quite strong, could be in Damascus within three hours.

In their private conversations, the Arabs were not as hostile or as violent as in their public declarations. There had been an improvement in the border situation up to the Kibya incident. If there were military aid in the area, it would not upset the balance.

When we kept on insisting that the United States should use its influence with the Arab states -- Mr. Lipsky mentioned, for example, the Suez blockade -- Byroade said that the United States had been trying to get the Egyptians to modify their position. He conceded that the Israelis had a right to go to the Security Council and make their case. They could win their case because it was just. But, in fact, they would fail because the Egyptians would stiffen their attitude and would not do anything. But quiet negotiations could lead to progress, for the United States had secured the agreement of the Egyptians to discontinue the recent food blockade.

Byroade indicated that economic aid would continue as it has in the past. There had been no decisions on the amount, but he indicated that there ought to be a reduction, since Israel was making some economic progress. He did not agree with the view that Israel was on the verge of economic collapse.

Mr. Lipsky suggested that while economic aid was important, it might be worthwhile to take several million dollars and spend it on the promotion of good will and peace in the region. Neither Byroade nor Waller quite knew how to take this suggestion and were bewildered at the prospect of implementing it.

It was most evident that Byroade believes that the United States must do nothing to offend the sensibilities of the Arabs, that it must continue actively to pursue their friendship and good will for military and petroleum reasons, and that any pronounced effort on our part to bring the Arab states to task for their anti-Israel attitude would be a reckless blunder which we could not afford.

On the other hand, he is vigorous in affirming that America continue to be Israel's friend.

ILK
2/4/54

HYMAN A. SCHULSON
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW
55 LIBERTY STREET
NEW YORK 5, N. Y.
—
BARCLAY 7-6786

July 28, 1954

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
Samoset Hotel,
Rockland, Maine

Re: Dean Alfange

Dear Dr. Silver:

Supplementing my telephone call to you of last Tuesday re Alfange, Alfange again spoke to Dewey and Dewey suggested that he get your backing.

Alfange saw Senator Ives in Washington on July 27, 1954 and spent about an hour with him. Ives thought very well of Alfange's candidacy for the Byroade post and promised to speak to Dulles and Sherman Adams about it, but he suggested to Alfange that he get Dewey to move first with Dulles and Adams, and then Ives' weight would receive more sympathetic consideration.

Alfange communicated this to Dewey's Secretary in Albany because Dewey was out of town and Alfange also wrote Dewey today asking him to speak to Dulles and Adams and strongly push for his nomination.


I feel that if Alfange can be helped to get the post, it would solve a number of the problems of the Zionist movement and Israel. Alfange can be trusted to help.

May I suggest that you communicate with Dewey and ask him to sponsor Alfange's candidacy strongly with Dulles and Adams, and that you also speak to Dulles and Adams when you are in Washington.

Please keep me informed of any developments and I will keep you informed of any developments from Dean Alfange's end. Have you anything further to suggest that Alfange do?

I hope you have a pleasant summer. My regards to Mrs. Silver.

Cordially,


Hyman A. Schulson

August 30, 1954

Mr. Hyman A. Schulson
55 Liberty Street
New York 5, New York

My dear Hy:

When I was in Washington on Monday, August 16th, I spoke to Gen. Bedell Smith. When I mentioned the successor to Mr. Byroade and expressed the apprehension lest Lloyd Henderson succeed him, he replied that a successor had already been agreed on, but it was certainly not Henderson. I gathered the impression that it would be some career man in the State Department.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

AHS:rlh

HYMAN A. SCHULSON
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW
55 LIBERTY STREET
NEW YORK 5, N. Y.
—
BARCLAY 7-6786

September 2, 1954

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
The Temple,
Cleveland 6, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

Many thanks for your letter of August 30, 1954.

While I was delighted to learn that Loy Henderson would not succeed Byroade, I regret to inform you that George V. Allen is just as hostile to Zionist aspirations, if his past record is any guide.

I know George V. Allen and conferred with him several times in 1940-42, and in 1946, and in 1948-50 when I served the old Emergency Committee in 40-42 and also when I served under you in 1946, and in 48-50. Allen served as one of the top men in the middle-east division between 38-46 and served with Wallace Murray and later with Loy Henderson. During that period he was hostile to the Zionist cause, was strongly pro-White Paper, and anti Pro-Palestine resolutions in Congress. During that period we were never able to get him to do anything friendly. In 1948-50, he served as Assistant Sec. of State for Public Affairs. Although Israel was then not his direct concern, he went out of his way during that period too to poison the atmosphere against Israel with members of Congress and the press with whom it was his duty to deal in that post.

When Shiloah and Manson mentioned to me on Sunday at the ZOA conference that Allen was an unknown person to them as far as Israel or Zionism was concerned, I was rather surprised at their lack of knowledge of his record in the past.

The foreign service officers of the Dept. of State have a genius in succeeding to get placed men who are anti-Israel and anti-Zionist in the key spot. Until we learn how to get friends placed in such key spots, I am sure we will always have very difficult times with the State Dept. on Israeli and Zionist affairs, and we will constantly have to run to and pressure the Sec. of State or Under-Sec. of State or the White House to reverse the hostile policies of the underlings.

If you have time on your next visit to N.Y.C., I would very much like to chat with you.

With all good wishes for a happy and prosperous New Year, I am,

Most cordially yours,

HS

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

WESTERN
UNION

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

FX-1201

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LT = Int'l Letter Telegram

VLT = Int'l Victory Ltr.

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

R02 DL PD=NEWYORK NY 9 1212P

RABBI ABBA HILLE SILVER=SAMOSSET HOTEL=

SINCE OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH
AN OLD COLLEAGUE IN WASHINGTON WHO AGREES THAT THE RUMORED
APPOINTMENT WOULD BE FROM THE DEPARTMENT POINT OF VIEW QUOTE
LOGICAL UNQUOTE HE ADDED HOWEVER THAT HE HAD NEVER CONSIDERED
HENDERSON TO BE PERSONALLY QUOTE ANTI SEMETIC OR
=OR ANTI ISRAEL UNQUOTE=JAMES G MCDONALD= (OO)

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE