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### **MS-4787: Abba Hillel Silver Papers, 1902-1989.**

Series II: Harold P. Manson File (Zionism Files), 1940-1949, undated.

Sub-series A: Main Manson File, 1940-1949.

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American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, minutes,  
1943.

**AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS**

**Statement of Receipts and Disbursements**

**Six months January--June 1943**

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|  |               |               |
|--|---------------|---------------|
| Bank Balance 1/1/43                              | 5083.90       |               |
| Cash on Hand                                     | <u>100.00</u> | 5183.90       |
| <b><u>INCOME</u></b>                             |               |               |
| Keren Hayesod                                    | 18750.00      |               |
| Keren Kayemeth                                   | 18750.00      |               |
| Contributions                                    | <u>30.00</u>  | 37530.00      |
| Refund on Travel Expenses of<br>R. Lewin-Epstein |               | 1986.00       |
| Victory tax due to Revenue Dept.                 |               | <u>285.74</u> |
|  |               | 44985.64      |
| Less Exchange Palestine Defense Fund             |               | <u>210.00</u> |

**TOTAL RECEIPTS**

**44,775.64**

**DISBURSEMENTS**

**Recurrent**

**Salaries**

|                                      |                |          |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|----------|
| Administrative                       | 6498.25        |          |
| Public Relations                     | <u>9735.60</u> | 16233.85 |
| <b><u>Public Relations Dept.</u></b> |                |          |
| Educational Material                 | 133.62         |          |
| Travel & Entertainment               | 487.77         |          |
| Research                             | 20.00          |          |
| Balfour Day 1942                     | 50.00          |          |
| Maps, Pictures, etc.                 | 96.88          |          |
| Luncheon Meetings                    | 129.08         |          |
| Lowdermilk Book                      | 10.00          |          |
| American Palestine Committee         | <u>557.22</u>  | 1484.57  |

**PAMPHLETS**

|  |               |
|--|---------------|
| Why a Jewish State                     | 775.58        |
| Test of Fulfillment                    | 164.00        |
| Zionism an Affirmation of<br>Judaism   | 296.11        |
| Jews After the War                     | 116.00        |
| Common Purpose of Civilized<br>Mankind | 807.55        |
| Brandes on Zionism                     | 375.00        |
| Hanna Book                             | 21.00         |
| McDonald Reprint                       | 55.20         |
| Jews of Europe                         | 900.51        |
| What Hope for the Jews                 | 33.33         |
| Conflicts                              | <u>300.00</u> |
|  | 3844.28       |

|                       |               |         |
|-----------------------|---------------|---------|
| Less Misc. books sold | <u>136.80</u> | 3707.43 |
|-----------------------|---------------|---------|

**Economic Dept.**

|  |               |        |
|--|---------------|--------|
| Rent   | 10.00         |        |
| Secretarial service                                      | 45.00         |        |
| Telephone  | 43.67         |        |
| Travel   | 54.66         |        |
| Expenses in connection with<br>death of R. Lewin-Epstein | <u>395.53</u> | 548.86 |

|                                 |             |
|---------------------------------|-------------|
| Light                           | 136.58      |
| Maintenance & Repairs           | 126.91      |
| Postage                         | 1059.31     |
| Rent                            | 2259.98     |
| Stationery, Printing & Supplies | 634.50      |
| Telegraph                       | 1026.11     |
| Telephone                       | 1378.61     |
| Administrative Travel Expenses  | 1221.24     |
| Relief to Zionist Refugees      | 435.00      |
| Rented Equipment                | 32.50       |
| Messenger Service               | 37.40       |
| Expressage                      | 15.85       |
| Misc. Administrative Expenses   | 182.45      |
| Palcor & J. T. A.               | 366.00      |
| Equipment Purchased             | <u>5.00</u> |

**TOTAL RECURRENT EXPENSES**

**30,862.21**



Statement of Receipts and Disbursements  
Six months January--June 1943

(cont)

|  |               |                  |
|--|---------------|------------------|
| TOTAL RECURRENT EXPENSES (brot. ford.) | 30,862.21     |                  |
| <u>NON Re-CURRENT EXPENSES</u>         |               |                  |
| American Jewish Conference             | 255.53        |                  |
| Reception to M. Shertok                | 1920.06       |                  |
| Grant to Family of<br>R. Lewin-Epstein | 1000.00       |                  |
| Bermuda Conference                     | 251.00        |                  |
| Stop Hitler Rally                      | 244.00        |                  |
| Special appropriations                 | 3000.00       |                  |
| Near Eastern Conference                | 371.09        |                  |
| Christian Council                      | 2623.02       |                  |
| Dinner to Gershanoff                   | <u>126.10</u> |                  |
| TOTAL Non-Recurrent Expenses           | 9,790.80      |                  |
| TOTAL EXPENSES FOR SIX MONTHS PERIOD   |               | <u>40,653.01</u> |
| Balance                                |               | <u>4,122.63</u>  |

Note: This statement is not based on an audited report.

MINUTES OF MEETING  
AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

Thursday, January 7, 1943

PRESENT: Judge Levinthal (presiding), Miss Benjamin, Mr. Publick, Mrs. Epstein, Mr. Furmansky, Mr. P. L. Goldman, Dr. Goldstein, Mrs. Halprin, Mr. Itskowitz, Mrs. Jacobs, Rabbi Kirshblum, Rabbi Kowalsky, Rabbi Levinthal, Mr. Lipsky, Mr. Naiditch, Mrs. Peol, Mr. Quittman, Judge Rosenblatt, Judge Rothenberg, Mrs. Schoolman, Mr. Segal, Mrs. Shapiro, Mr. and Mrs. Shulman, Mr. Szell, Mr. Wertheim.

Dr. Goldmann, Miss Leibel, Mr. Lourie.

**POLITICAL COMMITTEE:**

It was reported that in accordance with the proposal of the Emergency Committee, a sub-committee had met with Dr. Weizmann in regard to the appointment of a small political committee to work with him and members of the Executive on political matters. The committee was to be a working committee, available whenever Dr. Weizmann convened it for day to day work. The sub-committee had reported back to the Office Committee recommending a small working body of three members of the Emergency Committee (see minutes previously circulated). However, the recommendation had not been accepted by the Office Committee, because the parties had taken the position that on such a committee, parties must be represented.

Judge Rothenberg reported Dr. Weizmann's distress that the Emergency Committee had thus far made no decision in this matter.

After a brief discussion it was unanimously agreed that the chairman of the Emergency Committee and the Chairman of the Office committee be authorized to appoint a committee of five to act together with themselves as a political committee with Dr. Weizmann. In making up the composition of this committee consideration will be given to the parties, but it is understood that members of the committee shall represent the Emergency Committee and be responsible to it, and that members of the committee shall not act as party representatives.

**POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS:**

Dr. Goldmann reported that negotiations with the State Department would be begun about the middle of January. The Under-Secretary had appointed a representative to be available for preliminary discussions, but the final discussions would be conducted by the Under-Secretary himself. In view of this, the Office Committee had initiated discussion on the post-war program, based on a questionnaire prepared by Mr. Neumann (previously circulated).

Dr. Goldmann summarized the discussions of the Office Committee;

There had been agreement on the following points:

1. That discussions be started with the United States government rather than with the British Government, because the State Department had expressed a willingness to start such discussions now, whereas the British Government had taken the position that they are not yet prepared to discuss postwar problems. It is Dr. Weizmann's opinion that within the next few months in England the situation will make it possible to open talks there and he plans to return to England in the spring.
2. The British Government, will be kept fully informed by us of the impending conversations.
3. We will also urge upon the State Department that in any discussions that may take place with Arab representatives, Palestine be considered apart from the Arab countries and we shall inform them that we do not recognize the Arab states as having any official status in considering the problem of Palestine.
4. For all practical purposes the term "Commonwealth" is identical with "State". We will ask for a Jewish Commonwealth with the same kind of sovereignty as will be given to all states after the war. "Commonwealth" had been chosen rather than "state" because it had more liberal and democratic connotations, but it implies the setting up of a Jewish State in Palestine as and when there is a Jewish majority.

On a number of other questions affecting the future of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth, various possibilities had been discussed:

1. A tie-up with the British Commonwealth of Nations.
2. A tie-up with a Near East Federation which need not be identical with an Arab Federation, although it may be.
3. Palestine to occupy a unique position of permanent neutrality internationally guaranteed and protected.

The basis of the discussion was what we want and not what we might have to accept. Those who took the position that a tie-up with the British Commonwealth of Nations was the most desirable had argued that culturally, economically and socially Jewish Palestine was logically associated with the western world; that it would be protected by Great Britain and that if it could be autonomous within that association, as is Canada, it would be a highly desirable arrangement.

Others preferred a tie-up with a Near East Federation on the grounds that Jews should not lend themselves to a position in which they may be deemed to be going to Palestine as representatives of British Imperialism, but in order to take their rightful place among the peoples of the Near East. Moreover, in view of the position of Jews in other countries, it might be unfortunate if Palestine were part of a great "power-politics" Empire.

Some expressed a preference for (3): that the permanent neutrality of Palestine should be guaranteed by all the nations of the world.

Another question discussed was: What should be the nature of the transitional regime, until there is a Jewish majority? It was generally agreed that the main aim should be to shorten the transitional period as much as possible. We should transfer all those who are able and willing to go, as fast as possible with the assistance of the United Nations. This is the most important aspect of the immediate postwar program. It is possible that a majority can be achieved in two or three years. Based on these assumptions there are various proposals for the political set-up during the transition period.

It is assumed that whatever the set-up there should be Jewish control of immigration and colonization, since it is believed that no other authority can successfully undertake to do it.

1. Continuance of status quo: Great Britain should remain in power with a clear directive to facilitate Jewish colonization and immigration as fast as possible.

Those who took this position believe that Great Britain will in any case remain in Palestine and the dominant power in the Near and Middle East. Therefore, the only thing we can do is to ask Great Britain to pursue a Zionist policy.

2. A neutral country should be asked to assume the administration of Palestine: The United Nations should entrust a neutral country, with no commitments in the Near East, to administer Palestine until the Jews will have become a majority.

3. Mixed Commission which will be in charge of the administration: This possibility was deemed to be inadvisable since such a mixed commission would involve a cumbersome and complicated administrative machinery and difficulty in fixing responsibility.

4. Jewish Provisional Government: Such an arrangement would enormously simplify matters. In any event, we will demand that the population of Palestine, both Arabs and Jews, should immediately participate in the government. This will educate the local population and give them a share in the routine administration from the beginning.

Dr. Goldmann's report was warmly received. It was agreed that the full minutes of the discussion which he summarized be sent to all members of the committee and that a full meeting be called to continue the discussions after the Office Committee shall have had further preliminary discussions along similar lines.

Mr. Neumann added to Dr. Goldmann's report the following points:

1. It had been considered desirable to propose to the State Department that in dealing with the Arabs the independence of Palestine be considered a quid pro quo for various benefits which might be given to the Arabs, along the lines proposed by Dr. Niebuhr.

2. In connection with the current discussions, Mr. Neumann said that he had met in Washington a member of the King-Crane Commission (William Yale) who is now making a study of Palestine. Mr. Yale had represented the minority opinion of the King-Crane Commission.



Judge Rosenblatt cautioned that the moment immigration to Palestine starts, land prices will sky-rocket. A similar situation had to be faced after the last war. They had already risen greatly as compared with three years ago. We must be prepared to demand that a very heavy land tax be levied so as to keep land prices within the possibilities of purchase by the JNF and by private people coming to Palestine. The prices as of September 1, 1939 should be considered the norm.

It was suggested that this matter be borne in mind in the discussion of the Office Committee.

#### JUDGE ROTHENBERG

It was unanimously agreed that Judge Rothenberg be invited to become a member of the Office Committee.

#### UNITED NATIONS

The question of the Jewish people asking for inclusion as one of the United Nations was referred back to the Office Committee.

#### MR. MONSKY'S INVITATION

Mr. Wertheim reported the receipt of the following invitation from Mr. Monsky.

"As President of B'nai B'rith, I have the honor to invite you to a preliminary conference to be held at the William Penn Hotel, Pittsburgh, Penna. beginning Saturday evening, January 23, 1943, at 8 P.M. and continuing Sunday, January 24th.

American Jewry, which will be required, in large measure, to assume the responsibility of representing the interests of our people at the Victory Peace Conference, must be ready to voice the judgment of American Jews along with that of the other Jewish communities of the free countries with respect to the postwar status of Jews and the upbuilding of a Jewish Palestine. Every thoughtful Jew interested in the present critical situation with which we are confronted, must be profoundly concerned with the distressing conflicts which threaten to impede concerted action. The purpose of the conference is to bring together the representatives of major national Jewish membership organizations, in order that they may consider what steps should be taken to bring about some agreement on the part of the American Jewish community.

Your organization is invited to designate one or more representatives, not exceeding three, to attend this conference. If you will advise the office of B'nai B'rith, 1003 K St., N.W., Washington, D.C., the names and addresses of your representatives, we shall make all necessary arrangements for hotel accommodations.

Will you be good enough to advise that office promptly of your acceptance of this invitation."

Mr. Wertheim said he could not understand how such an invitation could have been sent out by Mr. Monsky without consultation with the Emergency Committee. Mr. Segal said he believed the matter extremely serious and fraught with danger. He foresaw that a similar situation would be created as when the General Jewish Council had been formed with the intention of bringing the issue of Palestine before the masses of American Jewry. It had not worked out that way.

A discussion followed on the procedure which had resulted in the issue of the invitations to the Conference by the B'nai B'rith and not by the Zionist bodies. Strong criticism was expressed of the failure of those who were aware of the planned gathering to keep the Committee informed.

It was pointed out in reply that the contacts with representatives of the B'nai B'rith had been informal and unofficial; that it was considered important that a neutral body convene the conference so as to seek to insure the attendance of all Jewish organizations; and that whether the procedure was right or wrong, we were faced with certain facts and it was recommended that the meeting devote itself to a consideration of the invitation. It was urged that the Conference proposed by Mr. Monsky represented a step toward arranging a united conference of American Jewry such as we had contemplated and was in line with our plans and program, and that however irregular the procedure may have been, Zionists should welcome the fact that Mr. Monsky had taken the initiative in convening the preliminary conference.

The bodies invited to attend the preliminary conference were the major national membership organizations including the American Jewish Committee and the National Labor Committee.

It was Mr. Monsky's proposal that the delegates to the large conference be based on the following scheme: 75% local representation and 25% national representation.

The Conference in Pittsburgh would discuss only methods and plans for the convening of the large conference and would bind no one to any program on Palestine or general Jewish problems.

Discussion followed these explanations:

Although there was unanimous criticism of the procedure adopted, many expressed the point of view that we should cooperate and that Zionists be asked to attend the Conference.

Mr. Segal, in opposition, warned of the many dangers he could foresee in such a conference. He was convinced that the American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor Committee would attend the Conference and while seeming to agree to various proposals for unity, would so manoeuvre the situation as to force us into the position where they can come to the public and say that it is the Zionists who are making united action impossible; they will tie our hands and paralyze any possibility for action or a direct appeal to the Jewish masses.

Mrs. Pool said that we must profit by our mistakes. She believed that the Conference might be valuable, but deplored the fact that it was to be held before the annual meeting of the American Jewish Committee. She moved that Mr. Mensky be asked to postpone the Conference in Pittsburgh until after January 31.

Mrs. Halprin amended the motion, which amendment was accepted by Mrs. Pool, as follows: The matter be referred to a special meeting of the Office Committee to be called the following day with full power to act. Mr. Lipsky moved that the Emergency Committee recommend to its constituent bodies the acceptance of Mr. Mensky's invitation.

A motion to table Mr. Lipsky's motion was carried by a vote of five to three.

Mrs. Pool's motion as amended by Mrs. Halprin was carried by a unanimous vote.

A.L.





MINUTES OF OFFICE COMMITTEE MEETING

AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

January 12, 1943.

A meeting of the Office Committee of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Tuesday, January 12 at 4:30 P.M. at 41 E. 42nd Street.

PRESENT: Mr. Szold (presiding), Mr. Bublick, Mrs. Epstein, Mr. Gellman, Dr. Goldstein, Mr. Greenberg, Mrs. Halprin, Mr. Shulman, Mr. Wertheim, Dr. Wise.

Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Lourie, Mr. Neumann, Mr. Weisgal.

By invitation: Mr. Brodie.

RESOLUTION OF SYMPATHY

The Committee expressed its grief at the death of Mr. Maslionsky and voted to send a resolution of sympathy to his family.

CONFERENCE IN PITTSBURGH

It was reported that in accordance with the decision of the Office Committee, Dr. Wise had requested Mr. Monsky to postpone the date of the preliminary conference called for January 24 to a date later than January 31. However, Mr. Monsky said that it was impossible to postpone the conference now which will be held as scheduled on January 24 in Pittsburgh.

It was again made clear that the purpose of the Conference is to discuss organizational methods for the convoking of an all-Jewish Conference in the spring. It was agreed that the sub-committee meet as soon as possible to consider methods of informing all Zionist organizations that they should attend the Conference and to work out a program for presenting a unified program in Pittsburgh.

ESCO FOUNDATION

Mr. Szold reviewed the situation as follows: At the last meeting of the Office Committee, a committee had been appointed to take up with the Esco Fund the matter of studies which they were proposing to undertake. Yesterday there was a meeting between the Esco Fund representatives and representatives of the Emergency Committee at which the representatives of the Emergency Committee had stated that they were exploring a way to reaching a mutual accommodation between the Fund and the Emergency Committee, but had no power to make final decisions. It had been decided at that meeting that the Office Committee make definite

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proposals to be submitted to the Esco Foundation,

Dr. Goldmann reported the meeting as follows: The representatives of the Esco Foundation stated that Esco had undertaken the research project because they felt that they could thus do a useful piece of work for Palestine. They have no desire to duplicate the work of any other organization or to undertake work which any other organization is prepared to do. They had learned about this project (the JVA) through Mr. Neumann. Mr. and Mrs. Cohen of the Esco Foundation had met with Mr. Brodie and Mr. Szold and, later, with Dr. Weizmann and had thought them to be in agreement with the plan that Mr. Neumann be made executive director of the research project with an advisory board on which would be invited to serve some leading Zionists. Mr. and Mrs. Cohen had made it clear that (a) if the Emergency Committee wanted to undertake this project they would be very glad; (b) they do not give money to other organizations for research work, though they may cooperate with other organizations; (c) the work is being done under the legal, administrative and financial responsibility of the Board of Trustees of the Esco Fund. (d) It is their intention to have an advisory board and to call in Zionists to serve as members of this board.

Mr. Szold at that meeting, on behalf of the Emergency Committee, had expressed the gratitude of the Committee for the interest of the Esco Foundation in this project, which we appreciate was undertaken by them as a service to the Zionist cause. However, it had been explained that the Emergency Committee believed that final supervision and control of the implementation of the project had to be in the hands of the authoritative Zionist bodies. The Emergency Committee did not believe that there was a clearly marked distinction between pure research and actual contacts and undertakings which would have to be made in connection therewith. The Emergency Committee was, therefore, eager to find a way whereby the Esco Fund might still undertake the research for the JVA project, with the understanding that the Emergency Committee have ultimate control over it.

Dr. Berkson, who presided at the meeting, thought the whole matter would have to be referred back to the Board of Trustees since the conditions under which the money for the research had been appropriated, had changed. Dr. Berkson had, however, agreed not to take the matter up with the Board of Trustees until some concrete proposal had been worked out.

Dr. Goldmann then said that in his opinion no fruitful discussion of concrete proposals could be made by the Office Committee. He therefore recommended that if it was the consensus of opinion that a proposal be worked out whereby, on the one hand, the Esco Foundation could remain in the work, and, on the other, there would be official control by the Emergency Committee, the sub-committee appointed to deal with the matter be authorized to work out such proposals as would lead to the desired arrangement. The sub-committee's proposals should be brought back to the Office Committee for approval.

In this connection Mrs. Epstein referred to the reorganization plan, part of which, she believed, was relevant to this issue. One of the departments envisaged was that of Resources and Planning, which would deal with economic research. Mr. Brodie had been asked to undertake the chairmanship of this committee. She pointed out how inconsistent it would be with the plans for this department if another organization undertook to do research work which involves negotiations and contacts such as had been envisaged would be undertaken by the Resources and Planning Department of the Emergency Committee.

Dr. Goldstein said that as he understood the matter, we were planning to make a compromise because of the money which the Esco Fund would make available for this study. He thought it too high a price for the loss of control of one of our most important projects. He therefore proposed that the matter be approached thus: that the Emergency Committee accept the offer of the Esco Fund to cooperate with us in making these studies, but that there be no compromise of any kind on the question of control. It must be understood that the Emergency Committee will be in charge.

Judge Rothenberg supported Dr. Goldmann's proposal to refer the matter to a sub-committee. He paid tribute to the fine spirit of Mr. and Mrs. Cohen of the Esco Fund and hoped that some way could be found to work in cooperation with them.

Mrs. Halprin said she thought the question should be decided on its merits and that not the question of funds, but of relations, was the pivotal one. Mr. Wertheim said that if Zionist interests could be safe-guarded through some arrangement with the Esco Fund he would approve such an arrangement. However, if there were no way of so safeguarding these interests, then there was no basis of discussion with the Esco Fund.

It was also pointed out that the undertaking was not one of pure research, but was of such a character that contacts with official authorities would have to be made.

Mrs. Jacobs expressed the view that it seemed to her that it was drawing the line too far if we think that we should never delegate a particular piece of work to a group that wants to make a Zionist contribution. We call everything "political". But the Zionist Organization surely did not want to take unto itself all the work in a system of totality. She wondered whether we had the right to think we have all the personnel and all the wisdom necessary to carry out our tremendous program. She would suggest that we do not always feel that we must take everything upon ourselves. We must have the goodwill of other Jews and Zionists and get their cooperation. Mr. and Mrs. Cohen were good Zionists and very well-informed Zionists and we should not be afraid to let others make a contribution to the sum total of Zionist needs.

Mr. Neumann said that he would like to have recorded his understanding of the re-organization plan referred to by Mrs. Epstein, as it related to this problem: The original plan was to have a department of research and the intention had been that this research would be concentrated on political studies and political research. He had himself made this proposal several times. The committee had done him the honor of asking him to be the chairman of such a committee and he had explained then that because of his having assumed this new task, he did not think he should undertake the chairmanship of such a committee. Subsequently the committee had been changed to one on resources and planning with the emphasis on the economic aspects. This change had been made subsequent to his agreement with the Esco Foundation. It appears now that the political aspect of that committee has been altogether dropped and it was planned to concentrate on economics. Mr. Neumann added that when Mr. Brodie had been proposed as the chairman of this new committee, he, Mr. Neumann had said that there was no one in the country better qualified to assume such a position and hoped that he would accept it.

One or two members wished to pursue the discussion on this point but the motion was called for and it was agreed that the sub-committee work out a proposal along the lines suggested by Fr. Goldmann and refer the proposal to the Office Committee for approval before taking it up with the Esco Foundation.

#### AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR JUDAISM

It was agreed to abide by the decision taken at a special meeting of the Office Committee on January 7 whereby no direct attacks against the Council for Judaism be encouraged for a further period of two weeks, in the hope that the Council would be dissolved. Dr. Wise said he would write to Rabbi Heller to ascertain exactly what the understanding is.

#### MR. SHERTOK'S VISIT

Dr. Goldmann reported that a cable had been received informing us that Mr. Shertok would come here at the end of the month.

He further reported that a cable had been sent to the Executive explaining the reasons why it was deemed inadvisable for Mr. Gruenbaum to come here now on the matter of saving the Jews of Europe.

A.L.





MINUTES OF OFFICE COMMITTEE MEETING

AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

January 15, 1943.

A special meeting of the Office Committee of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Friday, January 15, 1943 at 2:45 P.M., at 41 East 42nd Street.

PRESENT: Judge Levinthal (presiding), Mr. Greenberg, Mrs. Halprin, Mrs. Jacobs, Mrs. Pool, Mr. Shulman, Mr. Wertheim, Mr. Szold.

Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Lourie, Mr. Neumann, Mr. Weisgal.

ESCO FOUNDATION

It was reported on behalf of the sub-committee dealing with the Esco Foundation that two proposals had been made:

1. That the work of the JVA investigation be conducted under the auspices of the Esco by a committee of five to consist of Mr. Brodie, Mr. Szold, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Neumann and a fifth person. Mr. Neumann is to be Executive Director. This committee should be under the ultimate direction of the Jewish Agency or the Emergency Committee as its representative. The report itself, plus any interim reports, should be made available to the Emergency Committee at all times. All questions concerning the use to which the report shall be put, etc. should be left to the Agency or its representatives.

2. Alternatively, the JVA investigation shall be undertaken by a sub-committee of the Emergency Committee; Mr. Neumann shall be the director; the Esco Foundation shall provide the funds. (This suggestion was not made in the form of a proposal, but it had been suggested by Judge Rothenberg that the possibilities of such an arrangement be explored.)

During the course of the discussion which followed, Mr. Wertheim raised the question of party representation on all standing committees. It was made clear that on standing committees of the Emergency Committee, all the parties would be represented, though on ad hoc committees for special purposes this procedure might not be followed.

It was further made clear that the personnel of all committees is to be approved by the Office Committee.

It was decided that the negotiating committee (Mr. Szold, Mr. Shulman, Dr. Goldmann and Dr. Goldstein on behalf of the Committee . . . and Judge Rothenberg on behalf of Dr. Weizmann) continue to negotiate with the Esco Foundation with a view to finding a mutually acceptable arrangement whereby the Emergency Committee would have ultimate control of the findings of the JVA investigation on the basis of the proposals as outlined by Mr. Shulman on behalf of the sub-committee.

ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Mr. Greenberg reported the meeting of the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee. Professor Baron, Dr. Berkson and Mr. Halkin who had been asked to participate in the research of this committee had questioned the desirability of their undertaking such a task in view of the fact that the World Zionist Organization was already committed to the Jewish Commonwealth program. They doubted whether they could usefully undertake an objective research if they were bound by that assumption.

It had been suggested that they start their research by investigating all possibilities of Arab-Jewish rapprochement within the framework of a Jewish Commonwealth. To this they did not agree. Dr. Berkson, for instance, did not think that the Commonwealth case was a good one. He thought that research on the possibilities of Arab-Jewish rapprochement might on the other hand lead to bi-nationalism as a possible solution.

The research group had also asked for wider powers than had been envisaged: they wanted to be considered an advisory committee to the Emergency Committee and Hadassah on matters of Zionist policy, which includes the political program. They made clear that they were not concerned with political strategy, but with broad questions of policy.

When this matter had been discussed at the Executive Committee of Hadassah, the recommendation had been that terms of reference be drawn up to be submitted to the research committee.

A discussion of the terms of reference followed. It was the feeling of most of those present that the terms of reference should make clear that the co-operation of the research committee would be most valuable were it to concern itself first with exploring all avenues of Jewish-Arab rapprochement within a Jewish Commonwealth. This today is the official Zionist program, and it would be anomalous for the official Zionist bodies to sponsor research not committed to this program. While recognizing the fact that the research group was entitled not to accept the terms of reference, it was believed that it would be thoroughly illogical for us to sponsor research which ran counter to our official program. Another position taken was that it might be well for us to know the case for forms other than the Commonwealth, so that we will be as well-informed on what we don't want and why, as on what we do want. Dr. Berkson had made the point that while he could not confine himself to terms of reference which would limit the research to the framework of a Jewish Commonwealth, he did agree that the research must be done by a group committed to the Basle platform and a Jewish National Home. If what was required was a study to bolster up the Commonwealth platform, then some one person ought to be asked to do research designed to that end.

The Executive Committee of Hadassah had proposed that there be sub-committees on the research board: that persons who believed in the Commonwealth program be asked to investigate along those lines, and that another committee might work on a program of bi-nationalism or other forms.

After farther discussion, it was finally agreed that the terms of reference be as follows: The Arab Jewish Relations Committee shall be asked to devote their attention in the first place to Arab-Jewish relations within the framework of a Jewish Commonwealth and, subsequently, to prepare research studies on bi-nationalism as it exists in other countries and as it has been proposed for Palestine.

ORGANIZATION

Mr. Szold reported on behalf of the sub-committee on organization: It is

be clearly understood that all sub-committees and departments are sub-committees of the Office Committee: the names of personnel, whether voluntary or professional must be submitted to the Office Committee for approval, by the chairmen of all committees; the budget must likewise be submitted. However, department chairmen and their committees shall have a degree of autonomy in the routine plans and procedures of their committees, so that the Office Committee can more and more devote itself to matters of principle and less to matters of routine.

As had previously been reported, it was contemplated to have three departments: public relations, of which Mr. Shulman was chairman, publicity and press and planning and resources.

The candidate proposed for the chairman of the Planning and Resources Department is Mr. Brodie who would concern himself primarily with economic problems. Mr. Brodie would expect a substantial budget and he would also expect to employ a technical assistant, who would work under Mr. Neumann if the JVA project is worked out. While responsible to and rendering his reports to the Office Committee, Mr. Brodie stipulated that it should not be necessary to come back to the Committee for every step taken, and he stipulated also that when the time comes that economic matters and the associated findings are presented to the government, he should be entitled to participate in those discussions.

Opposition was expressed to Mr. Brodie's conditions:

1. The opinion was expressed that, generally speaking, a chairman of a committee should impose no conditions.

2. It was unreasonable to lay down conditions predicated on the future by which time the situation may have changed radically.

3. It was proposed that the matter be brought before the political committee for discussion. (In this connection, it was reported that the political committee had been organized as follows: The members of the Executive: Dr. Weizmann, Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Lipsky and Mrs. Jacobs; the representatives of the Office Committee, Mr. Gellman, Mr. Greenberg, Mrs. Pool, Judge Rothenberg and Mr. Szold and Dr. Wise and Judge Levinthal, ex-officio, as officers of the Emergency Committee.)

This proposal was opposed on the grounds that it did not properly fall within the purview of the political committee, which apart from Dr. Weizmann comprised the bulk of the Office Committee; also that it would involve delay.

No action was taken.

#### MR. NEUMANN

It was reported that the ZOA had elected Mr. Neumann to represent it on the full Emergency Committee. He was invited to attend meetings of the Office Committee.

#### NEXT MEETING

It was decided to hold the next meeting of the Office Committee on Thursday, January 21, at 4:00 P.M.



MINUTES OF OFFICE COMMITTEE MEETING  
EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

January 28, 1943

A special meeting of the Office Committee of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Thursday, January 28, at 7:00 p.m. at 41 E. 42nd Street, New York.

PRESENT: Judge Levinthal (presiding), Mr. Bublick, Mrs. Epstein, Mrs. Jacobs, Mr. Neumann, Mrs. Pool, Judge Rothenberg, Mr. Szold, Mr. Wertheim.

Dr. Goldman; Mr. Weisgal.

YOUTH ALIYAH

The meeting had been called at the request of Hadassah to consider the following problem.

On behalf of Hadassah Mrs. Pool stated that some time ago Hadassah had received a cable from Miss Szold informing them that Government was prepared to grant a large number of B 3 (Youth Aliyah category) certificates. The cable also referred to a cable which Eliezer Kaplan had sent to Mr. Montor, which Hadassah had seen only a few days ago.

At the Welfare Conference in Cleveland, Rabbi Silver had indicated that the UPA regarded the 6,000 children, for whom the Agency had given a guarantee, as their responsibility. He had already discussed the matter with the JDC with a view to securing their cooperation but had not called in Hadassah. The UPA had gone ahead issuing publicity on the 6,000 children.

In the meantime, in response to Miss Szold's cable Hadassah had launched a special emergency campaign of \$500,000 in addition to its regular Youth Aliyah budget of \$360,000, against the additional certificates. The JDC as usual would pay the transportation costs. The National Board of Hadassah felt that while it was ready to assume responsibility with regard to Youth Aliyah to the utmost of its fund-raising capacity, it could do so successfully only if it remains the sole sponsor of Youth Aliyah fund-raising in America. Chaotic fund-raising would be the result of a second agency holding itself as responsible for Youth Aliyah fund-raising and Hadassah had cabled both Miss Szold and the Agency accordingly.

The following facts must also be taken into consideration:

1. Hadassah is the only Zionist agency which is free to launch an emergency campaign now.

2. Over a period of many years Hadassah has become associated in the public mind with Youth Aliyah and has acquired the confidence of the public.

Judge Levinthal explained the position of the UPA as follows: if Hadassah increases its budget for Youth Aliyah it is bound to affect the allocation of the UPA to the UFA. Moreover, if the 6,000 children actually arrive, it will involve an annual budget of over a million and a half dollars, which Hadassah could not include in its budget. Moreover the Jewish Agency had undertaken responsibility for the children as a first charge on its assets, and naturally looked to the UPA to see that that liability was met.

Mrs. Epstein said that the regular budget for Youth Aliyah (\$360,000) was on the basis of the immigration schedules up to now in force. The new emergency

budget for \$500,000 is based on the certificate schedules just issued. Why must the UPA now face the problem? At the moment, it is not known either whether the children will actually arrive. If and when the children do arrive in Palestine, then the question can be reconsidered in the light of Hadassah's receipts and the actual needs. At such a time, the UPA should discuss the matter with Hadassah, which might possibly approach the JDC.

Judge Levinthal said that in any case it would be unwise and undignified for one agency, like Hadassah, to approach the JDC. It is much better, from the Zionist point of view, for the UPA to approach the UJA directly.

Dr. Goldmann said that he viewed the matter thus: The first nine-million dollars has already been allocated by the UJA. There will be no additional money to allocate until the end of the year. The problem is not an immediate one. If by the end of the year, the children actually do arrive in Palestine, then the UPA can go to the Allocations Committee, taking into consideration the amount of money raised by Hadassah, and request a further allocation. Moreover, he pointed out, Hadassah is completely within its rights to start a special campaign for Youth Aliyah and should be authorized to proceed without interference from the UPA.

Judge Rothenberg said it was an illusion to believe that we could go to the communities now for additional money. Both the JDC and NRS budgets are larger this year than last. The allocations committee has already allocated the first nine million dollars and there will be additional money until the end of the year.

After some further discussion it was agreed that no formal action be taken in the absence of Rabbi Silver. He is to be informed that the consensus of opinion of the Emergency Committee is that Hadassah should be authorized to proceed with its campaign and that the UPA be requested to abstain from further publicity with regard to the 6,000 children. If at the end of the year, the 6,000 children arrive in Palestine, then the UPA should approach the UJA for a further allocation, taking into consideration the amount raised by Hadassah. Dr. Goldmann said he would cable to Eliezer Kaplan along those lines.

#### LOUIS D. BRANDEIS VOLUME

It was decided to send the Louis D. Brandeis volume to the members of the American Palestine Committee (cloth bound edition). Senators Wagner and McNary are to be requested to have the distribution made in their names.

#### PETITION

Judge Levinthal reported an enthusiastic response to the ZOA questionnaire on the question of the petition.

Mr. Szold said he believed that the value of a petition was more lasting than any result of the Jewish National Assembly. He approved the procedure of the ZOA in attempting to ascertain the opinion of the districts through the questionnaire and urged that serious consideration be given to the matter of a petition.

On the other hand it was pointed out that the contemplated Jewish National Assembly conflicted with plans for a petition. Zionists could not at the same time engage in trying to secure signatures for a petition and trying to secure majority opinion at the Assembly. Possibly, after the Assembly a petition might be valuable, but not now. It was generally agreed that the plans for a petition should be abandoned for the present.

PITTSBURGH CONFERENCE: It was decided to request the full Emergency Committee to endorse the action of the Pittsburgh Conference and record itself officially as approving and cooperating in the plans for the National Assembly.

MINUTES OF OFFICE COMMITTEE MEETING  
AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

March 5, 1943.

A meeting of the Office Committee of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Friday, March 5, 1943 at 2:00 P.M. at 41 East 42nd St.

PRESENT: Judge Rothenberg (presiding in the absence of Judge Levinthal who arrived later), Mr. Bublick, Dr. Goldstein, Mr. Greenberg, Mrs. Jacobs, Mrs. Halprin, Mrs. Pool, Mr. Shulman, Mr. Wertheim

Dr. Goldmann: Mr. Lourie, Mr. Neumann

Rabbi Berlin.

REPORT ON CONVERSATIONS:

Dr. Goldmann reported on the following conversations which he, Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Shertok had had in Washington. (Minutes on file in the office)

1. With the Under-Secretary of State.
2. With Mr. Murray and his staff.
3. Mr. Shertok with a Senate group under the chairmanship of Senator Elbert D. Thomas and a group of Representatives at lunch on the invitation of Representative Clark W. Baldwin.

MAURITIUS

Mrs. Pool called to the attention of the Committee an item in the New York Times issued by the Embassy stating that "1500 immigrants from Palestine" were included in the list of refugees who had found sanctuary in Mauritius.

It was agreed that for the record a letter be sent to the British Embassy and a copy to the State Department, criticizing the form of this report.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN JEWS

It was agreed that the Emergency Committee send a number of delegates equal to those of other organizations to represent it on the Joint Committee dealing with the European Jewish situation. Mr. Shulman is to continue to represent the committee and the chairman is to appoint one other member. It was understood that conversations would be held with the UPA and the Congress with a view to having all Zionist groups represented to the extent that it is possible.

AMERICAN JEWISH ASSEMBLY

Mr. Shulman reported as follows: Correspondence between Judge Froskauer, President of the American Jewish Committee and Robert Goldmann, of the Executive Committee elected in Pittsburgh, indicated that the American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor Party would come into the Assembly on the following

conditions:

1. That the name be changed from American Jewish Assembly to American Jewish Conference.
2. That organizations be free to ratify any action taken by the Conference and are not to be considered bound by any resolutions passed at the Conference until such separate ratification.

There was considerable discussion on both these conditions and the following points of view were expressed:

1. Name: It was urged by several of those present that to change the name from "Assembly" to "Conference" was a whittling down of the significance and prestige of the meeting. Others, however, thought this relatively unimportant and that it should not be an issue on which to break if the Committee refused to accept the present name. It was resolved by 5 votes to 2 that the Emergency Committee recommend to the Zionist representatives on the Executive Committee elected in Pittsburgh that the name "Assembly" be retained. Mrs. Pool asked to have her negative vote recorded.
2. On the question of the second condition, it was agreed in principle that every organization is free to withdraw from the Assembly. However, the proposal as phrased by Judge Proskauer would vitiate the whole intent of the Assembly. It must be made clear that majority decisions are binding for those organizations which do not withdraw.

It was agreed that the Emergency Committee recommend that the language of the proposal as made by Judge Proskauer be so reworded as to make clear that each organization has the right to withdraw from the Assembly, and must do so if unwilling to accept a decision of the majority. That is to say that decisions are binding on the constituent organizations unless they withdraw.

In this connection the Zionist position in the event of disagreement at the Assembly were discussed.

There might be a majority and a minority report on Palestine. This might be a means of enabling the Zionists to present their maximum program while at the same time permitting united representation on matters on which there was agreement.

Disagreement was expressed with the suggestion of a majority and minority report, which, it was felt, would weaken the whole purpose of the Assembly. It was also urged that the Zionists go to the Assembly prepared to press for agreement on the Biltmore program. The precedent was mentioned of the first American Jewish Congress meeting after the last war, where Zionists carried their program. There was no reason to suppose this might not be done now; if it was found to be impossible to do so when the time came, but not until then, should we consider whether changes might be made in phraseology in order to insure unity.

#### RECONSTRUCTIONIST EDITORIAL

An editorial in the Reconstructionist referring to a press conference at which Mr. Neumann had made various charges against the Emergency Committee was



raised. Mr. Neumann made the following points:

1) He considered his statement a public service to the Zionist cause. 2) The strictures which he voiced were well-founded and to refrain from having made them would not be justifiable. He had made the same strictures frequently, internally, but they had produced no result. He did not think the Emergency Committee was living up to its responsibilities and it was necessary to stir up public opinion. 3) If any Zionist institution deserved criticism, he would feel it his duty to make it. He had set no precedent as others had acted similarly, and he would consider it unwholesome to muzzle any individual or organization from expressing an opinion when the occasion demanded it.

In the discussion which followed the view was expressed by a number of those present that, looked at from the wider point of view, Mr. Neumann's press conference had been a Zionist disservice, rather than service. The statement was one which enemies of the cause had seized on with satisfaction. The appropriate forum for such a discussion would have been the Emergency Committee itself or the governing bodies of the constituent organizations but not the public press. It could be understood if the explanation was that the action had been taken in the heat of the moment. In any case it was desirable as a matter of principle for the future, that such action on the part of a person associated with the Committee should be regarded as a breach of confidence.

#### CORRECTION OF MINUTES

Among those who attended the meeting at the St. Regis on February 25th was Dr. Israel Goldstein.

A.L.

1943

MINUTES OF OFFICE COMMITTEE MEETING  
AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

A special meeting of the Office Committee of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Sunday, March 21st at the St. Regis Hotel.

**PRESENT:** Judge Levinthal (presiding) Mr. Sublick, Mr. Gellman, Mrs. Epstein, Mr. Greenberg, Mrs. Jacobs, Mr. Lipsky, Mr. Neumann, Mrs. Pool, Mr. Rothenberg, Mr. Shertok, Mr. Shulman, Mr. Szold, Mr. Wertheim.

Dr. Goldmann; Mr. Lourie; Mr. Weisgal.

JOINT EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

The chairman appointed Mrs. Halprin, Mr. Shulman and either Mr. Wertheim or Mr. Greenberg, to represent the Emergency Committee on the joint committee dealing with the European situation. X

PUBLIC RELATIONS

Mr. Shulman was authorized to invite Mr. Belth to become a member of the Public Relations Committee.

For Mr. Shertok's information, Dr. Goldmann read the minutes of the full Emergency Committee summarizing the various points of view presented by members of the Office Committee on the post-war program, based on a questionnaire prepared by Mr. Neumann (See minutes of January 7, 1943).

MR. SHERTOK

Mr. Shertok made the following statements:

The primary problem before us is not the working out of a concrete detailed scheme for the carrying through of our program; the primary problem is to achieve a decision on the part of the great powers, chiefly Great Britain and the United States, to accept the essence of our program.

He said he believed the achievement of such a decision did not depend on the working out of a detailed scheme; on the contrary, premature negotiations on points of detail may wreck the chances of success on the major issue. Discussion of details, before the acceptance by the Governments of our main point would give them the opportunity to turn the tables on us. Our interest was to be on the offensive and keep the powers concerned under the pressure of the responsibility to solve the Jewish question. We should beware of finding ourselves on the defensive by having to answer all sorts of thorny questions as to the practicability of this or that part in our program. We would, in any case, be asked difficult questions; let us not provoke them unnecessarily by putting forward points of detail on our own part at this preliminary stage.

The chief point today was whether the will is there. If it is, we should be able to obtain a definite commitment. Once there is a commitment on the major issue, it would be much easier to come to an agreement on points of detail in the course of subsequent negotiations. In practice, this meant that what we should aim at today is the recognition of two basic points:

(a) that Palestine is to be assigned to the Jews, and (b) that the country can and should take in a very large number of people.

Before these points are conceded, it would make the negotiations unnecessarily difficult to raise at this stage the question of Jewish control of immigration.

This is so far as our negotiations with outside factors were concerned. In our own minds, a certain amount of clarification was perhaps necessary as to how we are envisaging the actual establishment of the Commonwealth. In this regard he wished to point out that since he was a representative of the Executive in Jerusalem, whatever he said might assume the character of a definition of the Executive's attitude. He therefore wanted to make it clear that he was not in a position to commit the Executive on these points.

There had been a great deal of discussion in the Executive and in the Actions Committee on the Biltmore program. Finally a resolution was adopted by the Actions Committee which was known to the Emergency Committee. That resolution had since been endorsed by a number of Zionist parties in Palestine. One of the points in the resolution was an undertaking to supplement it with another resolution to define our attitude to the Arabs. He assumed that some work had been done on this in Jerusalem. He had seen references in the press indicating that such a resolution had been prepared but he had left Jerusalem before these discussions started and had no indication what the Executive's attitude actually was.

In view of these facts, Mr. Shertok said he preferred to hear the opinion of the members of the Emergency Committee so that he could transmit them to Palestine, thus giving the Emergency Committee an opportunity to contribute to the consideration of the problem in Jerusalem. With all these reservations, Mr. Shertok said he would like to make a few observations on the questions raised at the meeting of January 7.

(A) The cardinal point in our program was to his mind an immediate and substantial increase of the Jewish population after the war. In the last analysis, the implementation of our program hinged, not on the enunciation of new formulae, but on the creation of new facts. Mistakes were made in this regard after the last war when we relied quite unduly on the Balfour Declaration and the San Remo decision. These mistakes may have been unavoidable; they were, nevertheless, mistakes.

In view of the determined, perhaps fierce, Arab opposition to our program; in view of the opposition in British and American circles, which would not die down even if we achieved a decision in our favor, it is of the most crucial importance that facts be created immediately, which will simply knock the bottom out of all hostile theories. For this reason the immediate bringing in of a large number of Jews was, perhaps, more important than a formal agreement that Palestine be a Jewish Commonwealth. He regarded even half a million additional Jews in Palestine as a more tangible guarantee than a mere formal agreement. It must therefore be an integral part of the agreement -- a direct corollary of the acceptance of the main principle -- that a certain large number of Jews (say half a million) should be brought in by the Jewish Agency in the shortest period possible, with the active assistance of the great powers. Needless to say this half a million would be only the first instalment in the large-scale program of immigration.



This was based on a certain set of assumptions:

1. that a large number of European Jews will survive this war.
2. that these Jews will not be able to remain where they are at the end of the war but will in any case have to be transferred elsewhere.
3. that funds for such transfer and the feeding of these people will have to be forthcoming and that these funds could be diverted to Palestine.
4. that these people, after having faced terrible privations and the constant threat of death, could be expected to put up with very difficult conditions in Palestine for a number of years by living in camps and being employed on public works; that even if there be no full employment and they have to be maintained to some extent, it would be preferable to maintain them in Palestine than anywhere else.

The inclusion of this immediate immigration program in an agreement between us and the great powers, Mr. Shertok said, may obviate a great many difficulties of a legal character, which would be bound to arise from the immediate consideration of our claim for the control of immigration.

(B) What should be the international status of the Commonwealth?

Mr. Shertok said that once our position was firmly established, then if the choice lay between east and west his preference would be definitely for the east. We cannot legislate Palestine off the map of Asia. It is part of Asia. We shall always have to trade with the neighboring countries. Our dependence upon the west is a result of our weakness, and we should not give up our claim to western assistance, so long as we are weak. However, once firmly established, we should be interested in the greatest possible strengthening of our relations with the neighbors around us. He said he did not entirely rule out the inclusion of Palestine into the system of the British Commonwealth of Nations, but even such an arrangement did not preclude the establishment of a very close relationship between Palestine and the neighboring countries.

(C) Status of Permanent Neutrality: This proposal Mr. Shertok regarded as purely illusory. He simply did not believe it would work. Palestine is next to the Suez Canal; it is an important naval base; it is a vital link in the chain of air communications; it is the terminus of the Iraq petroleum pipe line. What, Mr. Shertok continued, is the real value of a permanent neutrality status? Will it prevent an army from coming in? If there is danger of invasion, will Palestine be expected to rely on its neutrality status for protection?

(D) International Control: On this question Mr. Shertok said he had reached no final conclusion. We must remember that in the best possible case we do not stand a chance that Palestine will be handed over to us completely at the end of the war. International control, in the world at large, will increase rather than decrease. Absolute sovereignty will become much more a relative concept than it has been. The crux of the problem is: who should represent that international control in regard to Palestine. Mr. Shertok said that he himself was in favor of joint Anglo-American control; i.e. he was in favor of America being definitely brought into the picture. It is important to have American participation in the guaranteeing and watching over the implementation of the policy laid down, together with Great Britain.

(E) Arabs: With regard to the Arabs our case should be that the assignment of Palestine to the Jews should form part of a comprehensive deal between the great powers of the Arab world. It is quite clear that we shall not be able to get Palestine removed from the context of the Arab world, at least in the discussion. In discussions between Iraq and England and America, for example,

Palestine will surely figure on the agenda. If we want England and America to adopt our policy we must visualize them as defending this policy vis-a-vis the Arabs. Our stand must therefore be that the acceptance of our claim to Palestine should be set off by the powers against the guaranteeing of the independence of the Arab states and the grant to them of assistance in reconstruction schemes.

England and American should tell the Arabs that in return for such considerations they are expected to write off Palestine as an Arab country. We believe that the salvation of Arab independence from an Axis domination, the freeing of Libya, the guarantee of their independence in the future and assistance for development is ample compensation for their writing off of Palestine. Coupled with this may come the question of our assistance to the Arab countries. But it should be made clear that we shall be able to assist only if we ourselves are firmly established.

DR. GOLDMANN

Dr. Goldmann said he agreed with the position taken by Mr. Shertok except on one point.

1. He agreed that the primary necessity was to direct our negotiations with a view to securing immigration for the Jews who survive in Europe to Palestine immediately after the war. He believed it would be almost impossible, or certainly enormously difficult, to secure a formal decision on a Jewish Commonwealth at this stage of the negotiations. He recalled that Dr. Weizmann had said that we could not be so naive as to suppose that the United Nations would agree to such immigration as we want without understanding its implications. However, it is quite a different matter for the United Nations to agree to immigration, understanding its implications, than to commit themselves to a status the conditions for which have not yet been reached.

He formulated his position as follows: In our negotiations with governments, we should try to secure an agreement that all European Jews, after the war, who are ready to go to Palestine and fit for immigration, should be transferred to Palestine with appropriate arrangements for financing, our participation, etc. etc. Such a formula was he believed, more readily attainable than the theoretical, legal formula demanding Jewish control over immigration. We should not drop this demand, but we should first secure consent to the primary question of immigration. As a matter of fact, the Biltmore program has already been submitted to the State Department, so that our program is officially on record.

2. In connection with Mr. Shertok's preference for a tie-up with the east rather than the west, if such a choice must be made, Dr. Goldmann repeated his point of view previously expressed on this subject and entirely agreed with Mr. Shertok. (See minutes of December 25, 1942)

The point on which Dr. Goldmann disagreed with Mr. Shertok was that of a status of permanent neutrality for Palestine. Dr. Goldmann believed that such a status would be both practicable and desirable.

The Jews are the classic neutral people of the world because they are everywhere. Palestine will represent the Jewish people all over the world, certainly in a spiritual and moral sense. From a practical point of view, too, it is not so impossible that we should discard it. It may, of course, happen that in the postwar world there will be no neutral states. But if there are, Palestine's nearness to the Suez Canal, etc. is not an argument against such status, since there will have to be international guarantees for the protection

of such points in the cases of other neutral countries, if there will be any, and the same regulations would apply to Palestine, were it to have neutral status. On the matter of self-defense, Switzerland is a case in point: despite its neutrality, it has always maintained a very strong self-defense. It may be that we will ultimately have to discard the neutrality idea, but we should not drop it from our agenda at this point.

Dr. Goldmann enumerated his order of preference for the future status of Palestine as follows:

- (1) A status of permanent neutrality, internationally guaranteed.
- (2) A tie-up with the East.
- (3) A tie-up with a western power — the British Empire.

Dr. Goldmann requested that Mr. Shertok be asked his views on the relationship between the concept of a Jewish Commonwealth and the principle of non-domination about which many misunderstandings appeared to have arisen. There were those who thought that a Jewish Commonwealth contradicted the principle of non-domination. In his opinion it is erroneous to consider them incompatible. In his opinion it was clear that a Jewish Commonwealth does not mean that only Jews are citizens of Palestine. The Arabs in a Jewish Commonwealth would have exactly the same rights as the Jews; they can become ministers, an Arab might be President, etc. etc. To assume that a Jewish Commonwealth means a Palestine composed only of Jews is entirely untenable. A Jewish Commonwealth means only the fact that Jews shall be in the majority. The name itself would more likely be the Commonwealth of Judaea, or Eretz Israel, rather than Jewish Commonwealth.

Mr. Shertok said, Dr. Goldmann continued, that Palestine will have to be part of the general settlement of the Near East problem and of a deal with the Arabs. Dr. Goldmann agreed that in his opinion no American or British government would discuss Palestine outside the framework of a settlement of the entire problem of the Middle East. Moreover, it is not to our interest to remove Palestine from the context of the Near East settlement, inasmuch as it must be used as a bargaining factor in dealing with them. We must get the United Nations to accept our demands for Palestine and to include them in their dealings with the Middle East.

A discussion followed in which the following points of view were presented.

Mrs. Pool said that the immediate problem on the agenda was the American Jewish Assembly. If it was thought that the Assembly must result in agreement on the Biltmore program, she foresaw a withdrawal on the part of the non-Zionists. On the other hand, she continued, if the line proposed by Mr. Shertok which she characterized as a retreat from the Biltmore program, were followed, she believed that unanimity could be secured.

Judge Rothenberg cautioned against making any demands on the great powers which might be construed as making the recognition of Palestine as Jewish dependent on the granting of sovereignty to the Arabs in other Arab states.

Mr. Neumann said it had always been his view that unless the governments of the major powers agreed a priori that Palestine is to be a Jewish Commonwealth they could not follow the Zionist line on immigration of half a million Jews immediately after the war. In answer to Judge Rothenberg,



Mr. Neumann pointed out that Mr. Shertok's presentation did not make the recognition of Palestine as Jewish, dependent on granting sovereignty to Arab states, but, rather, that in effecting any settlement of the Near East, the great powers should exact from the Arabs the renunciation of their claims to Palestine, on a quid pro quo basis.

Mr. Neumann said if he were faced with a choice between securing agreement to large scale immigration and a political promise without immigration, he would choose immigration. However, he would add that even an agreement for bringing in a large number of Jews will be of very little value unless together with it comes the granting of governmental powers so that the proposal can be implemented. The granting of governmental powers to carry through the immigration must be part of the deal.

Mr. Shulman said that a brief should be drawn up in support of the demand for a large immigration. He had no doubt that it would meet with a sympathetic response on the part of the American people if properly presented. Mr. Shulman further believed that the American Jewish Committee would support a program for the immediate immigration after the war, of half a million Jews into Palestine. But the issue of a Jewish Commonwealth has to be faced. An Arab Federation is on the agenda for consideration by the great powers and we must, therefore, take this opportunity to talk in terms of a Jewish Commonwealth.

In this connection, Mr. Shulman believed it imperative to consider the contemplated Assembly. He doubted if it would lead to unanimous endorsement of the Biltmore program, and again suggested that two reports might be submitted by the Assembly. (a) On postwar plans for European Jews, which would be unanimously agreed upon and (b) a majority report on the Biltmore Resolution, and a minority report.

Mr. Gellman urged that Zionists make only two demands, namely, free immigration to Palestine and a Jewish Commonwealth as outlined in the Biltmore program.

Mr. Publick said that in his opinion another political document to replace the Balfour Declaration was necessary after this war. He did not see any value to the Assembly if two reports were presented. He would prefer that there be withdrawals on the basis of the Biltmore resolution, than to have a minority report.

Mr. Shertok made the following statement in response to the characterization of his position as a retreat from the Biltmore program: He said that he had been astounded to hear such a construction put on his introductory remarks. He had not believed it necessary to state formally that all his remarks had taken for granted the full acceptance of the Biltmore program; that he had thought it impossible to proceed on any other basis. What he had tried to do was to make a contribution to the procedure and technique of negotiations with the governments. His remarks had been meant to supplement, certainly not to replace, the Biltmore program. He had not retreated one jot from the principle of Jewish immigration under Jewish control, but stressed the idea that the formal acceptance of this principle was not enough. Governments must help and share in the responsibility for such immigration and that is why he had said that the first instalment of, say half a million Jews, must be an integral part of the basic agreement that Palestine is to become Jewish.

He had said that it would not be wise to start negotiating on details, but the Commonwealth was not a detail, nor was immigration under Jewish control, and Arab opposition, which lay at the root of the problem, was certainly not a detail. Mr. Neumann's memorandum raised pertinent questions. But in Mr. Shertok's

opinion these questions should not form the subject matter of discussions or negotiations with governments at this preliminary stage. We must beware of giving the opposite side an opportunity of side-tracking the issue before an agreement had been reached with the governments on the fundamental question. Once it is agreed that Palestine should become a Jewish country and that is accepted as the one big solution to the Jewish question, then negotiations will proceed in a different spirit.

On the question of the Assembly, Mr. Shertok said he was inclined to agree with the view expressed by Mr. Shulman. The Biltmore program must not be whittled down, but this does not mean that its phraseology is sacrosanct.

On the principle of non-domination, Mr. Shertok said he agreed with Dr. Goldmann's understanding of the situation. He said that the Agency stood by the principle of non-domination, which had been variously interpreted in various circumstances, as a distinction had to be made between the principle and its application. When there was a Mandate, with its Zionist content, the principle of non-domination could take the form of parity. Although there were the dangers of a permanent deadlock, or of negative decisions, with a third party bound by definite international obligations which were not then repudiated, these dangers were considerably mitigated. But the situation is different today. The Royal Commission found the Mandate unworkable. The White Paper repudiated the Zionist elements of the Mandate. Parity today would result in a permanent deadlock. Moreover, an Arab federation was on the agenda which in itself raised the question of the status of Palestine. If Zionists did not now lay the claim to Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth, it would mean that they acquiesced in its becoming a mere constituent part of an Arab federation. The Royal Commission had laid down the principle of a Jewish state. It is true that it coupled it with partition and partition today was utterly unacceptable. The Zionist attitude must be that the solution of partition had already been applied with the giving over of Trans-Jordan.

The Zionist program must be a Jewish majority. The Arabs will enjoy complete equality of rights as individuals; moreover, insofar as they have things in common, they shall have complete autonomy; e.g. in regard to education, social welfare, religion, holy places. Then if the Jews use their majority powers to bring in more Jews, it is the country, not the people, that will be dominated. The principle of non-domination remains, but its application has changed.

At the conclusion of Mr. Shertok's remarks there was an intermission for lunch.

A.L.

Note: Minutes of the afternoon session of this meeting will be circulated in the very near future.

MINUTES OF AFTERNOON SESSION OF  
SPECIAL MEETING OF OFFICE COMMITTEE  
HOTEL ST. REGIS, MARCH 21, 1943

Part II  
#11

RESUMPTION OF DISCUSSION AT 2:00 P.M.

Mrs. Pool asked how far, in Mr. Shertok's opinion, one could go in rephrasing the Biltmore program with a view to its acceptance at the Assembly.

ZIONIST POSITION IN AMERICAN JEWISH ASSEMBLY

Mr. Lipsky said that it was clear to him that many members of the Committee had interpreted Mr. Shertok's remarks as enabling them to reach a modus vivendi with the American Jewish Committee in the Assembly. He pointed out that it was not the phraseology of the Biltmore program which would cause disagreement, but the spirit and essence and the intention of the demands of the Biltmore program. The American Jewish Committee does not want to see a self-governing Jewish community in Palestine, no matter how the demand for it is phrased.

Judge Levinthal asked Mr. Lipsky whether he would be satisfied if the American Jewish Committee agreed to unite on the following three points:

1. Jewish immigration into Palestine as of right.
2. As large a Jewish influx as possible with the explicit purpose of establishing a majority.
3. When the Jews constitute a majority, self-government shall be guaranteed.

Mr. Lipsky said that he would not be satisfied with this, since there was lacking any intent to create the conditions set forth.

Dr. Goldmann said he thought no useful purpose could be gained by the continuance of this discussion.

Responding to Judge Levinthal's hypothetical question, Dr. Goldmann emphasized that "as many Jews as possible" was too vague a phrase for acceptance; it must be made clear that the needs of the Jewish people must be the criterion for immigration. Moreover, in his opinion, it was bad tactics to make concessions of any kind now. Before the Assembly there will be elections; at the Assembly changes can be made in phraseology with a view to securing unanimity if that becomes necessary. However, Dr. Goldmann pointed out, the whole conception that there will be a peace conference at which Zionists will be able to present a united program is, in his opinion, erroneous. As he sees it, there will be a long Armistice period during which the world will be rebuilt and fait accompli created. It is to this period that Zionists must direct their attention, and it is important to bear this in mind.

Mr. Szold asked Dr. Goldmann whom he had in mind as having the actual governmental authority in Palestine during the Armistice period, if the present

Colonial Government persists in the White Paper policy.

Dr. Goldmann said that, under such circumstances, he hoped for Anglo-American control.

Dr. Goldstein brought up the discussion of the American Jewish Assembly. In his opinion, it would be unwise to have ideological discussions before the elections of delegates to the Assembly, which might crystallize the position of opponents of the Biltmore program. The American Jewish Committee is not a homogeneous unit. They are apprehensive on the following scores: (1) diaspora nationalism; (2) if Jewish control of immigration, what will be the instrument of control? In Dr. Goldstein's opinion, the AJC was not so much opposed to Jewish control of immigration, as it was opposed to control by the present Jewish Agency in which it had no confidence. If his assumptions were correct, that these two factors are the chief obstacles in the way of unity with the Committee, then the problem of their opposition would easily be solved by:

- (1) Assuring them that the whole problem of diaspora nationalism does not enter into the discussion at all.
- (2) If it were possible to come to an advance agreement with the Committee, they might be willing to accept immigration under Jewish control. The words "self-governing Commonwealth" following creation of a Jewish majority might, for example, be substituted for "Jewish Commonwealth." Every effort should be made to come to an agreement before the elections.

Mr. Shulman thought it would be a mistake to attempt at this meeting to formulate a possible basis of compromise. His position was that we are part of the World Zionist movement and work with the World Zionist Executive; it is impossible for us to take one position vis-a-vis Zionists and another at the Assembly. If we find, as a result of preliminary discussions, that there is no difference in substance between what they are willing to accept and our program, then we might change the language. But if there are fundamental differences, then we must have a clear idea of what we expect to accomplish at the Assembly. We should know that if faced with a question of compromises on substance, then we will rather insist on a majority and a minority resolution.

He emphasized that we must not whittle down the Zionist program, but this should not prevent us from seeking to ascertain to what extent we could get the Committee to go along with them. It must be remembered that the American Jewish Committee is an important political factor in Washington and it would be well to remove as many obstacles as possible from the path of political action.

Mr. Wertheim disagreed with Mr. Shulman's point of view. In his opinion trying to get the Committee to come into the Assembly, knowing that they will not agree to the Zionist program, would strengthen, rather than weaken, our political position in Washington.

Mrs. Epstein said that agreement on a formula was more or less meaningless, since all formulae were open to various interpretations. She disagreed with Dr. Goldstein's suggestion that no attempt should be made to crystallize a point of view before elections; on the contrary, we should, like all people under similar circumstances, make clear our position.



## POST-WAR PLANS

Mr. Szold reviewed the tenor of discussions which the Office Committee had held on post-war plans. A distinction had been made between details and substance; between procedures and ultimate aims. These distinctions must be kept in mind as the discussion proceeds.

Thus far the point had been made that, so far as procedure in dealing with governments is concerned, it is unwise to go into details. This is correct. What constitutes a detail is, of course, a question of judgment. No one can tell what the position will be as to what is properly a "detail" when a decision must be made. If we proceed with a certain assumption, we may find that the facts are otherwise. But we must discuss all problems on the basis of the Biltmore resolution.

In previous discussions, serious consideration was given to the interstitial period. There was general agreement on Commonwealth, on Jewish majority, and on unrestricted immigration. There was discussion on the interim period before the Commonwealth is actually established. Various plans were considered in connection with trusteeship: Great Britain, joint trusteeship with the United States, the United Nations, or, possibly a small nation to be delegated as the administrative body.

Mr. Szold said he was much concerned by this discussion; that we ourselves were in danger of losing sight of our goal the Commonwealth, by bearing down so heavily on the interim period. What was to be avoided was this period of trusteeship. A long trusteeship, however well intentioned, may lose us the Commonwealth. He recalled that after the last war there was a clear directive. This, however, led to the White Paper of 1939 in 20 years. He believed that similar results would be likely under any trusteeship. However clear the directive, in the process of trusteeship another White Paper of 1939 will be the result. One way to avoid this is to have a Jewish State immediately; another way is a Jewish provisional government at once. There may be other ways if the primary point that Palestine must become a Jewish country is agreed to, and if there is the will to have it - but without delay.

If, for instance, the war ends and the anti-pathetic British Colonial Administration is still in Palestine, how will immigration take place? Perhaps one possibility would be in case the movement of the armies permitted a military government to have possession of Palestine, with clear directives from the victorious powers that Jews must come in numbers.

Mr. Szold said that he was clear about one matter: whatever the course of negotiations as to details, one thing must continually be kept in mind; that a long trusteeship, however benevolent and however well intentioned, may ultimately defeat the objective of the goal of the Commonwealth, and should be avoided.

He repeated news expressed at previous meetings with reference to the Jewish minority position in an Arab political federation.

## UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATION

The discussion then led to a consideration of the proposal that the Jewish Agency seek representation among the United Nations.

Dr. Goldmann said that the matter was a very complex one -- various pro-

posals, such as a Jewish Government-in-Exile, were being sponsored by the Revisionists. This represented an extreme form of galuth nationalism, to which he would be definitely opposed. The only possible course would be to seek a unique status, without precedent, among the United Nations; namely that the Jewish Agency should be recognized by the United Nations as having some official status in relation to the problem of Palestine. This had many difficulties, but was worth considering.

In discussing this, Mr. Shulman pointed out it must be borne in mind that the non-Zionists are entitled to 50% of the representation on the Agency, and would certainly claim a voice in such a major decision.

Mr. Neumann recalled a speech of Senator Pepper's in which he suggested that the United Nations be viewed as the successors to the League of Nations and therefore assumed its obligations.

Judge Levinthal believed that if it were the right course to seek some special representation among the United Nations, the difficulties should not deter us. The Mandate for Palestine had been recognized by 52 nations of the world; Jewish Palestine is an ally of the United Nations and did offer military help to Great Britain on behalf of the Jewish Agency. A very good case could be made out for the right of the Jewish Agency for some representation among the United Nations with respect to the consideration of Palestine.

Mr. Shertok said this was the kind of question which was legal in form, but political in substance, and is organically connected with the whole question of the political orientation of the great powers towards Palestine. If they do not adopt our main policy, legal excuses can be found to exclude us. If we score politically, the legal aspect will take care of itself. As regards the participation of non-Zionists, Mr. Shertok said he would not risk losing the good will and position that the Jewish Agency had by virtue of its recognition in the Mandate.

Mr. Lipsky said that the claim of 600,000 Jews in Palestine for consideration was one which could not be ignored. The right of these people to be represented by an agent does not involve a political decision, but merely the right to plead a case.

Dr. Goldmann agreed with Mr. Shertok that the crux of the matter was political. If the United Nations did not recognize our claim to a Commonwealth, they would surely not give us representation.

There was no action, but it was generally agreed that the problem of representation in the United Nations merited further consideration within the political program.

Mr. Neumann brought the discussion back to the question of the transition period. He asked Mr. Shertok how he envisaged introducing American participation: (a) Would the British have any interest in introducing the United States as a factor, and (b) would the United States have an interest in entering. At present the British stand by the White Paper and have given no indication of a retreat from it.

Mr. Shertok answered that the whole question should be put against a wider background, namely, that of Anglo-American collaboration in the world. If the United States and England should find themselves at variance on cardinal lines of policy, they will not be likely to single out Palestine for collaboration. But if they agree to act jointly on some matters, they may single out Palestine as one

such sphere. With regard to Britain's willingness to welcome the collaboration of the United States, Mr. Shertok said that some of his British interlocutors of their own initiative proposed Anglo-American collaboration. For the British this might be a "face-saver" vis-a-vis the Arabs.

On the question of military control during the interim period, Mr. Shertok said that it was not a simple matter. Palestine was conquered 25 years ago. It is now under an emergency regime and all power is vested with the High Commissioner. There is no power which the British Government can exercise in the United Kingdom that the High Commissioner cannot exercise in Palestine. Military control is not the crucial point -- what is crucial is a regime which shall be purely temporary and not sensitive to outside pressure. It is urgent that the President of the United States be informed of our demands, so that in the event of Anglo-American collaboration on Palestine, we may have his sympathy.

#### JEWISH ARMY COMMITTEE

Mr. Shertok was asked his advice on the question of dealing with the Jewish Army Committee.

He said that in Jerusalem the line has been consistently and unanimously against any form of cooperation with any Revisionist organization under conditions of equality. The Revisionists have been invited to come back to the World Zionist Organization, but they have not yet replied. They were, however, invited to join the Joint Emergency Committee in Palestine to deal with the European Jewish situation and accepted.

The meeting was adjourned at 4:30.

SPECIAL MEETING  
of  
AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

HOTEL COMMODORE, APRIL 29, 1943, 3:30 P.M.

**PRESENT:** Dr. Wise (presiding), members of the full Emergency Committee; representatives of the governing boards of Hadassah; Zionist Organization of America; Poale Zion; Mizrachi.

AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE:

Miss Benjamin outlined the rules of election for the American Jewish Conference as formulated by the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Conference.

After some discussion on procedure, it was agreed that the meeting devote itself to a consideration of a united Zionist action in regard to the Conference, and how Zionist efforts might be coordinated to secure as large a majority as possible in the elections.

Mr. Frisch offered a motion calling on all Zionist bodies to elect candidates on the basis of the Biltmore Resolution.

Discussion followed the motion:

Mr. Weisgal stated that Zionist members of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Conference exhibited no unity of action with regard to important problems arising in connection with the Conference which might vitally affect the character of the Conference. It was essential that<sup>a</sup> result of this meeting Zionists should unite on a program of action.

Mr. Wertheim said there were two distinct problems: Zionist action with regard to Palestine and Zionist action with regard to other problems which will be on the agenda of the Conference.

As far as the Zionist program was concerned, Mr. Wertheim thought no concessions should be made -- concessions will not satisfy extremists on either side. He believed that all Zionists should be bound by the Biltmore program.

Judge Levinthal said that no Zionist, whether of the ZOA or any other body had made any statement or at any time expressed any view which would lead any reasonable person to believe that he was not behind every plank in the Biltmore program. One of the ZOA spokesmen had said that all Zionists are united in support of the Biltmore program, but we might want to secure unanimity, rather than a majority, in which case it might be necessary in addition to the Biltmore Resolution to offer another resolution which would be unanimously carried. Such a tactic might be bad judgment, but it certainly in no way implies lack of support of the Biltmore program.

Mr. Segal said that the Biltmore program was a good one, but even that program might be bettered from the Zionist point of view; e.g. the Resolution of the Labor Zionists adopted at the Pennsylvania Hotel might conceivably be considered a better Zionist program.

He was not at all convinced that the Conference was a good idea. It



seemed to him as plans developed that the American Jewish Committee was putting Zionists on the defensive and in a defeatist mood. He accused many of the Zionist organizations of being more concerned with their own prestige than with the program. If Zionist interests are not protected, the Conference will be a disservice, rather than a service, to the Zionist movement. The American Jewish Committee must be convinced that public sentiment is so passionately concerned that it will not tolerate any program other than the Biltmore.

Rabbi Gellman said that there was no defeatist attitude. On the contrary, opposition to the Conference came from Zionists who wanted no compromises. He expressed a lack of confidence in the current leadership of the Zionist movement in America. Mizrahi would not join the Conference unless it were given the absolute assurance that the whole Biltmore program would be brought to the Conference.

Dr. Goldmann said that the whole question was one of an approach to the Assembly in terms of effectiveness. Zionists should not be characterized as "good" or "bad" Zionists because that made fruitful discussion impossible. He believed it would be impossible to achieve a unanimous decision at the Conference on the basis of the Biltmore program. But he could, for example, imagine a program demanding a Jewish majority in Palestine, Jewish control of immigration and a Commonwealth, which would be unanimously accepted and which would also be acceptable to Zionists. If the Conference were conceived in terms of securing unanimity, then we might have to consider a compromise in the phrasing of the Biltmore Resolution. But this does not imply a lack of loyalty to Zionism. The problem is one of judgment and tactics and in Dr. Goldmann's opinion it would be bad judgment and bad tactics to make any compromises whatsoever at this point. Zionists must elect delegates to the Assembly on the basis of adherence to the full Biltmore program. If Poale Zion and Mizrahi want additional planks representing their special interests they are entitled to it.

He offered the following motion as a substitute for Mr. Frisch's, which was accepted by Mr. Frisch and unanimously passed:

It is resolved that the Biltmore Hotel Platform is binding upon all Zionist groups as their program in the elections to the American Jewish Conference, as far as our demands for Palestine are concerned; a committee on coordination, composed of two representatives of all organizations constituting the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs (named by the organizations) shall work out a program for the maximum coordination of Zionist forces in the elections, and submit their proposals to a second meeting of this body to be called next week.

Mr. Furmansky said that whether one did or did not accept the Biltmore program, it was the official program of the Zionist movement and, therefore, binding. Whatever the function of the Conference, Zionists must protect their basic demands for Palestine as expressed in the Biltmore program. He was therefore opposed to any further negotiations with the American Jewish Committee before the Conference, and recommended that Zionists go to the Conference with a united political front to protect the right of Jews to Palestine. If any changes are to be made in the Biltmore program that is an internal Zionist problem and not part of the agenda of the Conference.

Judge Rothenberg took exception to the lack of confidence in American Zionist leadership expressed by Mr. Gellman. He said that the ZOA leadership had actually initiated the Biltmore program and pointed to its activities in connection with the 93 rabbis, the Ichud, the American Jewish Committee, etc. as indicating vigorous and whole-hearted adherence to the Biltmore program.

On the specific issue of Zionist unity at the Conference, Judge Rothenberg agreed that it would be harmful to enter into any negotiations which would tend to weaken or compromise the Zionist program. As a matter of fact, the executive at Pittsburgh had certainly made it clear that no negotiations were to be entered into with the American Jewish Committee separately. He deplored the fact that, despite the strictures, negotiations, even though informal in character, had been entered into.

He offered the following motion which was unanimously passed:

The members of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Conference representing any constituent organization of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs shall make no commitments within the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Conference, nor undertake any negotiations looking to the modification of the Pittsburgh platform, or the Biltmore Resolution without securing the approval of the Emergency Committee.

During the course of the discussion, the question of Zionists, as individuals, or as groups, retaining membership in the American Jewish Committee, was brought up. The suggestion was made that such membership was a disservice to Zionism. Mrs. Pool took the position that the membership of Zionists, individuals and organizations, on the American Jewish Committee was a real service to Zionism. Frequently they could interpret the Zionist point of view and influence, to some extent, the character of the thinking and action of the Committee.

Mrs. Halperin asked Dr. Goldmann whether his motion applied only to the elections, or was to be considered as binding within the Conference, where the question of changing the phraseology of the Biltmore Resolution might be brought up. She believed it important to clarify this.

Mrs. Pool said that she understood that Zionist delegates to the Conference were to be elected on the basis of the Biltmore program. She, too, asked whether individuals would then be bound by this at the Conference. She recalled that, according to the constitution of the World Zionist Congress, members could not be bound in their voting. She said that she would feel bound by the decision of the National Board of Hadassah, but could not be bound by any other action.

Dr. Goldmann said that this was not a valid question. The situation was as follows: All Zionist delegates to the Conference are to be elected on the basis of the Biltmore program. The question of tactics at the Conference cannot be discussed at this meeting.

The only problem confronting the meeting was coordinating the Zionist position in respect of the elections. How to proceed at the meeting was a question to be taken up by the Pittsburgh executive committee and at the Conference.

Addendum: In the minutes of the meeting of the Office Committee of March 30th, Dr. Goldstein's name was inadvertently omitted from the list of those present.

Mr. Arthur Lourie  
Amer. Emergency Com. for Zionist Affairs  
New York City

31 W. Moshulu Parkway  
New York, May 8, 1943

Dear Mr. Lourie:

I have your letter of May 6th, inviting me to a meeting of the Office Committee on May 10th. I shall not attend the meeting, and should appreciate it if you would kindly read this note to the Committee.

In addition to a heavy load of teaching, research and writing, I devote a maximum of my limited time and energy to Zionism and to other Jewish and general liberal causes. I can be particularly useful to the Zionist cause through the field of scholarship, and have given lavishly of my time to efforts connected with research, analysis and clarification. I feel, therefore, that friends and co-workers ought to be more considerate of my time, and ought not trouble me with fruitless political negotiations. The protracted negotiations about the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee I consider fruitless.

The issue appears to be perfectly clear. The terms of reference drafted by the Emergency Committee were vague. Since shadow-boxing would do no one any good, I took sufficient time to draft a comprehensive "Plan of Work". In the introduction to the "Plan", I say specifically that the plan is "far too comprehensive for the limited facilities of the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee." Furthermore, I say that we need not "of necessity undertake an examination of every aspect of the Arab-Jewish problem...I am of opinion, however, that our Committee should envisage the problem in comprehensive terms, and that any question or questions selected for research or analysis should be recognized and treated as part of the total issue of Arab-Jewish relations."

If the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee were a public body concerned with political negotiation, or if it issued public statements, there might be legitimate grounds for apprehension. But since our work is private, if not confidential, and since our function is to submit findings to the parent Zionist political bodies, why has there been so persistent an attempt to hamper the work of the Committee? Can it be that the political leaders resent the examination of certain issues even in camera?

Judge Levinthal was present at the last meeting of the Committee, and he saw how the work is conducted. An excellent paper was presented on the subject of immigration. Dr. Tartakover examined all phases of the problem -- the past, the present and the probable future under a Commonwealth, during the "transition", even under bi-nationalism. Everyone present was pleased with the discussion, and no one suggested artificial limits. Why then the anxiety?

I am forced to the conclusion that the anxiety centers in persons, not in principles. If that is so, the Office Committee would do a service to all of us by speaking plainly. I for one have no desire to force my "Plan" or myself upon anyone. If my contribution is not desired or not required, I would readily withdraw and devote my time to my own research which may yet prove of considerable value to the Jewish cause. It is not so important who does the investigating of basic questions in Zionism. But it is imperative that the questions be examined with competence and detachment.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) OSCAR I. JANOWSKY

C  
O  
P  
Y

CABLEGRAM

(Despatched May 9, 1943)

NLT RABBI STEPHEN WISE 41 EAST 42 STREET NEW YORK

JERUSALEM

RE ARRANGEMENTS FOR EDUCATION POLISH CHILD REFUGEES FROM TEHERAN CONSIDER  
IT DUTY INFORM YOU THAT SO FAR ONLY 716 BOYS GIRLS ARRIVED PALESTINE  
FROM TEHERAN AND NOT 1000 AS RUMOURMONGERS ASSERT STOP OF THESE 72 PLACED  
IN BABY HOMES WITH RELATIVES AND IN HOSPITALS STOP OF REMAINING 644  
ARRANGED 346 IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF WHICH 278 IN  
MIZRACHI SETTLEMENTS INSTITUTIONS 32 IN AGUDAH ISRAEL INSTITUTIONS  
36 IN AHAVA AND BETH YEHOCHUA STOP 298 SENT TO GENERAL AND LABOUR  
INSTITUTIONS AND SETTLEMENTS OF THESE 203 ABOVE AGE 14 WHO THEMSELVES  
INSISTED BE SENT THESE PLACES STOP OF REMAINING 95 BELOW AGE 14 GREAT  
MAJORITY FROM UNRELIGIOUS HOMES OR HAVE OLDER BROTHERS AND SISTERS WHO  
HAVE GONE TO LABOUR AND GENERAL SETTLEMENTS AND WHO NOT WISH TO BE  
SEPARATED FROM THEM STOP IN ONLY SOME 30 OF THESE 95 CASES HAVE ANY  
COMPLAINTS BEEN MADE FROM INTERESTED BODIES AND THESE COMPLAINTS NOW  
BEING INVESTIGATED YOUTH ALIYAH OFFICE STOP AGUDAH DISSEMINATING  
EXAGGERATED FALSE STATEMENT RE TEHERAN CHILDREN WITH AIM DAMAGING  
ZIONIST INTEREST STOP KINDLY INFORM EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

(SIGNED) RABBI JUDA LEIB FISHMAN



MINUTES OF OFFICE COMMITTEE MEETING  
AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

May 10, 1943

A meeting of the Office Committee of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Monday, May 10, 1943, at 8 P.M., at 41 E. 42nd St.

PRESENT: Judge Levinthal (presiding), Messrs: Cruso, Gold, Goldstein, Neumann, Rothenberg, Shulman, Szold, Wertheim; Mesdames: Halprin, Jacobs, Pool.

Messrs. Goldmann, Levavy, Lourie, Shetzer, Weisgal.

By invitation: Dr. Halkin.

DELEGATION OF RUSSIAN JEWRY:

Dr. Goldmann reported that a delegation of two delegates representing Russian Jewry was at present in Teheran en route to the United States. The State Department has issued visas and will establish priorities for the two delegates, one of whom is both a Yiddish poet and a Colonel in the Russian Army. The Jewish Artists Committee for Russian War Relief, who have arranged for the visit, proposed that the Zionists might want to sponsor the reception. Such sponsorship on the part of the Zionists would mean that all meetings in connection with the reception of the delegates would have some Zionist connotation; i.e. resolutions which were passed would have a Zionist character character, etc. It is also contemplated that a delegation of American Jews might pay a return visit to Russia.

Dr. Goldmann said that in his opinion this was a great opportunity for Zionists to make a friendly gesture and do whatever is possible to win the sympathy of Russia for the Zionist cause. He had discussed the matter with Dr. Weizmann who agreed that Zionists should join in sponsoring the visit. Russia will play a large part in the post-war settlement of the Near and Middle East problems, and her friendly interest and support would be of inestimable political value to us. Our sponsorship of this delegation would probably assure Zionist representation in any delegation going to Russia. Perhaps the Emergency Committee would not want to undertake to sponsor the reception officially, but leading Zionists should certainly be part of the reception committee. But in that case they must be in a position to do so without being sniped at by fellow-Zionists. It was important to decide, at least in principle, our attitude toward the proposal, since the delegation would be here shortly and if the Zionists did not participate in sponsoring their trip, the Communists and those groups which go along with them, certainly would.

Moreover, the delegation obviously has the consent of the State Department, which has issued visas. Although we must bear in mind the pitfalls and dangers, the opportunity for attempting to make contact with Russia and Russian Jewry, which has been shut off from communication with world Jewry for 20 years, should be utilized for the benefit of the Zionist cause.

A discussion followed Dr. Goldmann's report.

Mr. Szold asked his opinion of the danger of Zionists becoming, through participation on the reception committee for the Russian delegation, identified in the public eye with Communism.

Dr. Goldmann said that the Reception Committee should be composed not only of Zionists, but of other representatives of the American Jewish community, also like ourselves non-Communist in character. There was certainly a danger of being deliberately misunderstood in some quarters, but this could, he thought, be met and should not outweigh the possible benefit of a direct and friendly contact with Russia.

Mr. Cruso said that the Executive Committee of the Poale Zion had not yet made a decision. In the course of their discussion on the subject, the view had been expressed that the matter did not come within the jurisdiction of the Office Committee. The delegation is coming to make contact with all American Jewry and not only the Zionists; it raised issues which were the concern of the World Zionist Executive also perhaps of the American Jewish Congress. There was general recognition of the value of establishing friendly relations, if possible, with Russian Jewry and with Russia, but there is no assurance that that will be achieved in that way, or that there will be a return Jewish delegation to Russia with Zionist representation, or even that it will be officially received by the Russian government. The risks involved are greater than the dubious benefits which might result.

Mrs. Pool said that in her opinion establishing contact with Russian Jewry was so important that it was worth taking a great many risks. Dr. Weizmann approves the idea. It might be advisable to consult Jerusalem and London, but certainly the matter was within the purview of the Office Committee. She urged that the matter be regarded from a positive point of view.

Mr. Weisgal also took issue with Mr. Cruso and considered this a matter within the jurisdiction of the Office Committee. He said that Zionists were prone to take the same position with regard to Communists as they had been taking for the past twenty years, without regard to the war and all the changes that it had brought. It is clear that the Zionists are not pro-Communist, nor will this action imply that they are. This action should be viewed only as it is a service to the Zionist cause. Of course, there are no guarantees that a return delegation will be received, or that there will be Zionist representation on it. But, if the Zionists do not participate in the reception committee, it is certain that they will not be represented on any delegation to Russia.

On the question of referring the matter to the Executive, Palestine has made its attitude clear — they have made every effort to be friendly with Russian Jewry and with the Russian government.

Judge Rothenberg agreed that Zionists should try to benefit from the situation, but pointed out the many dangers and risks. American Jewry is in quite a different position from the Yishuv. American Jewry must bear in mind not only the relationship to Russia, but the relationship to the United States, which is vastly more important. It must be borne in mind that there is a tremendous amount of hostility to Communism in this country. He deplored the fact that the first delegation from Russia to the United States should have been an all-Jewish one, but that was the fact and there was nothing to be done about it. He proposed that the sponsorship might properly be turned over to the Joint Committee for European Jewish Affairs, on which Zionists were represented. This would allow for Zionist sponsorship and, at the same time, not give the impression that it was sponsored only by Zionists.

Rabbi Gold expressed his agreement with the position taken by Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Weisgal.

Dr. Goldstein said he had always advocated the policy toward Russia which would best serve Zionism. The Zionist political situation is very bad and it is

regrettable that up to now they have not sought Russia's friendship. It should be made clear that Zionists in America feel toward Soviet Russia just as does the Yishuv. In his opinion, Zionist participation in the welcoming of the Russian delegation should be a leading one and should not be as a small part of a larger committee. The opinion of five million American Jews must have some weight with Russia.

Mr. Shulman said we must guard against becoming involved in a committee sponsored and directed by Communists. The co-sponsorship of the American Jewish Committee should be obtained, also others who could not possibly be suspected of communist leanings or sympathies. He believed that the matter might properly be turned over to the Joint Committee for European Jewish Affairs, which was composed of all Jewish organizations and which would be equipped to handle the matter. This would minimize the dangers.

Mr. Wertheim deplored the fact that a matter of major policy such as this, should have to be decided so quickly. He urged that the organizations be permitted to discuss it among themselves before the Office Committee reached any conclusion. Not only were Zionist considerations involved, but the entire attitude of America to Russia, and the whole ideology of socialism with which his party identified. Moreover, the country would never understand such a sudden reversal of policy reached without serious consideration.

Mr. Oruso pointed out that it was not as "labor" that the People Zionists opposed the Communists, but as Zionists. It may be that there should be a change of policy, but he urged that the Zionists not sell their friendship "cheaply". They should abide by their moral convictions and exact some commitments. Besides, as he understood it, the delegation is coming as an anti-fascist delegation, and not as a Jewish delegation. It would be naive to suppose that the attitude of Russia toward Zionism would be affected by whether or not Zionists sponsor a reception to the delegation. There is no parallel between the situation here and that of the Yishuv.

Mrs. Halprin said it was a Galuth question, peculiarly American in character. She suspected that the delegation might be coming to counteract the bad impression resulting from the Ehrlich-Alter murders, which would make it very undesirable for us to intervene. It was, however, worth taking the risk if two conditions would be met, namely, that the base of Jewish representation be wide and that the Ehrlich-Alter murders are not the issue. Our sponsorship should be given only if the reception assumes the character of support for the war effort of the Russian people. She proposed that Dr. Goldmann explore the matter further.

Judge Levinthal said that he understood the purpose of the delegation to be twofold: to help overcome the impression created by the Ehrlich-Alter murders and to raise money from American Jewry for Russian war relief. He urged that it be borne in mind that the antagonism of the trade unions and their leaders to Communism might affect the relationship of the latter to Zionists, if Zionist participation were misrepresented. He urged, too, that the situation be further explored and that the character and purpose of the delegation be ascertained.

Mr. Neumann said that the danger of misrepresentation of Zionist participation was very real and would not be lessened by the fact that the United States government is also trying to establish friendly relations with Russia. However, if Zionists do decide to go into the reception committee, despite its risks, and he believed that they should, he did not agree that they should play a minor role. On the contrary, he urged that they assume a leading role and thus provide the maximum of safeguards and control against the dangers. Zionists, in his opinion, were less likely than any other group to be tarred with the brush of Communism.



Dr. Goldmann replied to the various points of view expressed as follows:

1. He opposed the matter being turned over to the Joint Emergency Committee. It is an ad hoc Committee and the matter is quite outside their terms of reference.
2. It was absurd to talk of not selling our friendship to the Russians "cheap". Zionism is in a worse political situation today than at any time in its history. Russia will play a leading role in determining the future of the world; she has no axe to grind in the Near East and is entirely disinterested. Her friendship is of the greatest importance to the movement. We must take all possible steps to secure that friendship.
3. The Jewish masses in America would be deeply stirred by the first delegation of Russian Jewry. It is a cause for great elation, not only from the Zionist, but from the general Jewish point of view. He was glad that the first delegation to come from the Soviet Union should be Jewish and thus give American Jews an opportunity to re-establish contact with Russian Jewry.

Dr. Goldmann recognized the dangers, but thought they could be safeguarded against. He proposed specifically: (a) that the reception committee should not be composed only of Zionists, but that Zionists should play the leading role; (b) that it should be made clear that the Alter-Ehrlich matter should not figure on the agenda. In his opinion that was not a Jewish issue at all, but an issue between Poles and Russians, or between Socialists and Communists; (c) a small sub-committee should be appointed to discuss the character of the reception; the type of resolutions which would be passed at the meetings; the personnel of the reception committee and the personnel of the return delegation to Russia, if there is one. Perhaps the Emergency Committee as such should not participate in the committee, but leading Zionists should. It should be clearly understood, however, that they are acting in accordance with Zionist principles if they do; those Zionists who do not wish to participate, as a matter of principle, are free to stay out.

Mrs. Pool moved that Dr. Goldmann's proposals be accepted. Rabbi Gold seconded the motion. An amendment offered by Mr. Cruso referring the entire matter to the full Emergency Committee was defeated, and Mrs. Pool's motion was carried.

It was understood that nothing in the motion implies any fundamental change of Zionist policy with regard to Communism. In the meantime, Dr. Goldmann was asked to explore the matter further.

#### ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Mr. Lurie reported that the experts of the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee had been invited to attend this meeting where the discussion of April 15 would be resumed. He had received the attached communication from Dr. Janowsky.

Mr. Seld said that the letter called for comment. There had never been any idea of objecting to any person on the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee, least of all to Dr. Janowsky. Nor had there been any attempt to hamper the work of the Committee. The matter was one of jurisdiction as between the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee and the political committee of the Emergency Committee, which is, in fact, the Office Committee for the present. Arab-Jewish relations should be studied by the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee and political problems must be considered by the Office Committee.

Dr. Goldstein said that he did not agree with Mr. Seld that the problem was one of scope, but of organization. The set-up, whereby the Emergency Committee



assumed joint and equal partnership with one of its constituent bodies, was wrong. If there should be a committee for Arab-Jewish relations in this country, of which he was not entirely convinced, then it should be under the sole jurisdiction of the Emergency Committee.

Mrs. Halprin said she regretted the tone of Dr. Janowsky's letter. Nevertheless, she urged that the discussion be not along the lines of Dr. Goldstein's notion. Such a discussion might have been logical and timely a year and a half ago, but in view of the fact that there is a functioning committee, and in the light of the history behind it, she believed the discussion should address itself to personnel and the terms of reference. She thought it would be most unfortunate if the Committee, as at present constituted, were not to continue.

Judge Levinthal reported that he had attended the last meeting of the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee and had been impressed by the paper on Immigration read by Dr. Tartakower. At that meeting, Dr. Janowsky said he would welcome suggestions from the Office Committee on how, in its opinion, his plan exceeded the terms of reference and in what order the subjects should be studied. It had been Judge Levinthal's impression that Dr. Janowsky would have wanted to be present at the meeting tonight to discuss the matter freely and frankly.

Mr. Shulman made the point that the various experts on the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee, whose contribution was greatly appreciated by everyone, might have been able to make more effective contributions had each of them worked separately on a particular project. Dr. Janowsky's proposed plan of work was, in his own estimation, too comprehensive for the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee to undertake. The problem became, then, one of selecting and one of the questions was who would do the selecting. The Office Committee had no intention of turning over its whole political program to the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee for study. The terms of reference either were not clear, or were not understood. The crux of the matter was the disposition of the material and the findings of the Committee. If it were to be decided solely by the Emergency Committee, then the objections to the jurisdictional conflicts might be met. He urged that Hadassah clarify its attitude with regard to the disposition of the findings of the Committee. He believed that the Committee was doing valuable work and should not be disbanded, but that its scope should be re-defined and it should be clearly understood that the results of its findings and the disposition thereof should be solely in the hands of the Office Committee.

Dr. Halkin said that though he was not speaking on behalf of his colleague on the Committee, he believed he expressed their attitude. He agreed with Mr. Shulman that it might have been wiser and more effective had individual tasks been assigned, rather than a Committee set up; it would have met the needs and had the support of everyone. However, the set-up of the Committee exists, and its function is to study the problem of Arab-Jewish relations within the framework of the Jewish Commonwealth. The terms of reference are quite clear. However, it became immediately evident that a definition and clear understanding of the term "Commonwealth" was indispensable to intelligible research on the subject. This in turn involved consideration of a variety of associated problems. There was no intention to encroach on the territory of the Emergency Committee. The comprehensiveness of Dr. Janowsky's plan stems from the fact that the consideration of certain problems could not be eliminated if the studies were to be conducted in scholarly fashion.

On behalf of the Committee, Mrs. Jacobs said it would welcome any special assignment and that it was perfectly clear that the Committee was precluded from making public any of its findings.

On behalf of Hadassah, Mrs. Pool said that it welcomed the participation of the Emergency Committee. If Hadassah were convinced that the Emergency Committee would continue the work, it would be ready after a year of work, to relinquish the Committee to the Emergency Committee, but in view of all the circumstances and history of the Committee, it was not yet ready to do that.

Judge Rothenberg said he did not understand why the work of the Committee should be hampered or why it should be dissolved. It was conducting a valuable piece of research under the direction of a group of eminent and able scholars and Zionists should welcome it.

Dr. Goldstein said that the matter was one of form and he had learned that if the form is wrong the substance is also wrong. He said he did not know with what a priori convictions many of the members of the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee were approaching the problem. Under the existing form it is quite unfair to ask the Emergency Committee to assume joint responsibility in sponsoring the work of the Committee.

He urged that his motion to dissolve the committee as at present constituted be considered now. (see minutes of April 15).

Mr. Wertheim said that though he had not agreed to the organizational set-up, since the Committee was functioning, he could not understand why it should be dissolved now, since it was doing a useful research work.

Judge Rothenberg moved, and Mrs. Pool seconded, to table Dr. Goldstein's motion.

The motion to table was carried, by a vote of 5 to 3. Dr. Goldstein, Mr. Szold and Rabbi Gold voting against it.

The matter of the circularization of minutes and material of the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee was then discussed. Mrs. Jacobs made clear that, as chairman of the Committee, she served it only and assumed no responsibility for material circulated to anyone on the Hadassah Board or on the Emergency Committee.

It was agreed that decisions as to who should receive the material of the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee, outside of the Committee itself, must be made by the Office Committee.

Mrs. Pool said she would bring Mr. Shusterman's proposal that the Emergency Committee should be the sole judge of the disposition to be made of the findings of the Arab-Jewish Committee before the National Board of Hadassah for discussion at its next meeting.

#### MIZRACHI-YOUTH ALIYA:

In accordance with a request from Rabbi Berlin, discussion on this matter was postponed for a further meeting.

A. L.

MINUTES OF MEETING  
AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

A meeting of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Monday, May 17, 1943, at 3:30 P.M., at 41 East 42nd Street.

PRESENT: Mrs. Halprin (presiding); Miss Benjanin, Mr. Bublick, Mr. Cruso, Mr. Furnansky, Mr. Goldmann (left P.Z.); Mr. Greenberg, Mrs. Jacobs, Leib Jaffe, Miss Leibel, Mr. Lipsky, Rabbi Levinthal, Mr. Neumann, Mr. Naiditch, Mrs. Pool, Miss Rothbard, Mr. Segal, Mr. Shulman, Mrs. Shulman, Mr. Szold, Mr. Wertheim.

Dr. Goldmann; Mr. Lourie, Mr. Weisgal.

DELEGATION FROM RUSSIA:

Dr. Goldmann reported that a delegation of two Jews was coming to the United States from Russia, on behalf of Russian Jewry. The Embassy requested and was granted priorities and visas. The Jewish Artists and Writers Committee for Russian War Relief, who arranged for the visit, proposed that the Zionists take a leading part in the reception arrangements. The Office Committee, at its meeting on May 10, had agreed to the following suggestions: (a) Zionists should be represented on the reception committee in their individual capacities, together with leaders of other Jewish organizations, as individuals. (b) The Alter-Ehrlich murders should not be on the agenda of any meetings; (c) All meetings shall have a pro-Palestine connotation; (d) If a return delegation goes to Russia, there shall be a Zionist representative included.

Subsequent to the meeting of the Office Committee, Dr. Goldmann had discussed the matter informally with an official of the State Department who had thought the decisions wise.

Mr. Greenberg said that in his opinion the decision of the Office Committee was ill-advised. The delegation that was coming from Russia was not representative of Russian Jewry, but was being sent by a committee from Kubyshov which represents no organized group in Russia, where, as a matter of fact, there are no organized groups except congregations. This group from Kubyshov is self-appointed and, like the American Jewish Committee here, is quite unrepresentative. They have had no connection with Jewish life for a decade, but have been identified with the Jewish section of the Communist party either officially or unofficially. Nor do they represent the government or the Army. The Committee at Kubyshov was established for the purposes of making Communist propaganda among Jews abroad. Since they cannot speak for the government and do not represent the Jews, there appears to be no justification for receiving them. The two delegates are coming after the Alter-Ehrlich executions and the rift between the Russian and Polish governments. They are doubtless coming to counteract the impression created by these two events. One of the delegates Mr. Pfeffer, a Yiddish poet, has ridiculed everything in Jewish life in his writings. There are still hundreds of labor Zionists and Hebrew writers exiled in Siberia by the Russian government. Moreover, it is "morally unbearable" for Zionists to associate themselves in a reception on the initiative of the Jewish Writers and Artists Committee, which is boycotted by nine-tenths of the Jewish writers and authors, and members of which have publicly condoned the Alter-Ehrlich executions. It is premature to capitalize on the visit

of these two delegates under the present circumstances.

In reply to Mr. Greenberg, Dr. Goldmann said that the problem was not one of Communism, but of foreign policy. Nearly all the arguments advanced by Mr. Greenberg had been made at the Office Committee meeting, but the matter is not an internal Jewish problem. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, for example, have recognized that the issue of Russian friendship, from the point of view of foreign policy, is not one of Communism, but of politics. The Yishuv apparently has taken the same line and they certainly have more accounts to settle with the Communists than the Jews or Zionists of America. When Mr. Shertok was here, he said that the Yishuv would be very happy to welcome a delegation of Jews from Russia.

The Zionist political situation is very bad. Russia will surely be one of the three great powers after this war; she has no self-interest in Palestine, or in being either pro- or anti-Zionist. Her anti-Zionist position after the last war, was a direct result of the fact that Jewish Palestine appeared to be within the British orbit of imperialism and Russia was anti-British. Today the situation is different. Russia is certainly not an anti-British power. It may be that Russia will take a sympathetic attitude toward Zionism and it is worth taking every possible step to bring this about.

As to the character of the Kubyshev body, it is important to point out that Palestine is in constant touch with that very group. The delegation is coming with the consent of the State Department; obviously, they must be coming with the knowledge and consent of the Russian government or they couldn't come at all.

If the Zionists refuse to participate in the welcoming committee it is a definite break and an insult to Russia and there will be no chance that, if there is a return delegation to Russia, Zionists will be represented on it. In Dr. Goldmann's opinion, it would be a political blunder of the first magnitude were Zionists to exclude themselves from the reception committee. Unquestionably the reception committee will include prominent American Jews identified with the American Jewish Committee, the B'nai Brith, etc. Zionists who want to join should be given freedom of action, as individuals. If Zionists are on the committee, they can assure a Zionist connotation to the reception program. If they are not, they will forego an opportunity which may not come again.

Mr. Naiditch said that the anti-Communist sentiment in America was very powerful and he believed that more harm than good would result from Zionist participation on the reception committee. Even the Russian War Relief Committee, on whose behalf the delegation is coming, does not want them. He urged that Zionists refrain from participating on the reception committee.

Mr. Segal said that if the delegation were being sponsored by the Russian Embassy, the situation would be quite different and he would be prepared to welcome it. But the delegation is being sponsored by a committee, some of whose members have publicly endorsed the Arab terrorist acts against the Jews in Palestine. Under the circumstances, Dr. Goldmann's proposal is nothing more than a political gamble, the results of which are unknown. But there are certain facts which, in Mr. Segal's opinion, are known. The "man on the street" will be completely confused by the situation and the effect on Zionist morale will be very bad. The American Federation of Labor and the CIO will suspect Zionist sincerity — Zionists are dependent on their good will and such an act would be considered as a reversal of the Zionist position on the Communist question. Zionists will not gain the



sympathy of Russia, but will lose it from every decent public source in the United States. It is irrelevant whether Zionists participate as individuals, or officially; prominent Zionist personalities cannot be dissociated from their official positions. The action proposed by Dr. Goldmann is a dangerous political gamble and Mr. Segal urged that Zionists do not take it.

Mr. Jaffe said he recognized the importance of winning over the Soviet Government, but did not believe this was the way to do it. This delegation is coming for purposes of Communist propaganda and the Communists in America will make great capital of their visit. It will be practically impossible to evade the question of Alter and Ehrlich and it will also be very difficult to make it clear that Zionists are against communism and Stalinism, but for the Russian people and the Russian army. In addition, it will have a strongly adverse effect on Jewry in Latin America, where communists are trying to destroy Jewish unity. The Zionist communities in Latin America are both weak and naive and this would utterly confuse and demoralize them. Zionists now, and after the war, have more to lose than to gain, by the misunderstandings which would be bound to result from participating on this reception committee.

Mr. Lipsky said he came to this meeting because he regretted the decision taken by the Office Committee. He agreed with Dr. Goldmann that a way should be found to secure, if possible, the official sympathy of the Russian government. Dr. Goldmann had tried to do it, but failed. The idea that participation in this reception committee would effect it, is fantastic. The two delegates will establish contact with the Jewish communists here and the whole Zionist movement will become identified with the Communists. The door of Russia will not be opened and the doors of both England and America will be closed. It is dangerous from the Jewish as well as from the Zionist point of view. The whole Jewish labor movement in the United States is organized against Communism. He could not understand why the Soviet government should be offended, if Zionists do not welcome two delegates who are not persona grata to anyone in the United States except communists. If Zionists do participate in their reception it will put them in the position of doing something foolish for the sake of a dubious advantage. Wherever Russia, as Russia, is concerned the Jews are doing everything possible to help the war effort, but there is no advantage to their greeting these two delegates who are coming only as Communist propagandists.

Mr. Furmansky took the position that neither the Alter-Ehrlich murders, nor Communism, was our problem. The problem was one of world Jewish unity. The two delegates are Jews from Russia who want to meet with American Jewry; whatever criticism can be levelled against them personally, or the group which they represent, can be levelled against Stalin himself. The problem we face is how shall we react to a gesture of unity and reprochement between Russian Jewry and American Jewry — we have no right to turn down such an opportunity. As to Mr. Segal's argument that the man on the street would be confused, Mr. Furmansky pointed out that the man on the street would never differentiate between a delegation officially sponsored by the Russian Embassy or otherwise. We know that any one coming from Russia must be coming with government consent. He, too, thought it would be a major political blunder if Zionists did not join the reception committee.

Mrs. Pool said she considered the gifts of the Yishuv to Russia a political act. She herself had no special knowledge of the matter, but was inclined to think that an attempt to reestablish contact with Russian Jewry was worth many sacrifices. Moreover, Dr. Weizmann, the political head of the movement, agreed that Zionists should join the reception committee. Perhaps it might

be well for a committee of the four organizations to meet with Dr. Weizmann and discuss the matter again. She said she could not see any line of demarcation between participating in Russian War Relief activities and in welcoming the delegation. She recalled that Mr. Ussishkin had addressed the Russians over the radio before his death and, apparently, the entire Yishuv was eager to indicate its friendship for Russia, and her inclination was to follow their line.

Mr. Weisgal reported, for the information of the committee, that Dr. Weizmann had not been enthusiastic about the idea. But he recognized that nothing should be done which might possibly worsen our relations with Russia. Although recognizing all the dangers, Dr. Weizmann had suggested that individual Zionists should be given freedom of action to join the reception committee, so that it should not appear that Zionists are withholding themselves from participation. Speaking for himself, Mr. Weisgal agreed with the position as stated by Dr. Goldmann. He pointed out that the Writers and Artists Committee was prepared to give up the sponsorship of the delegates if we assumed it. As far as the communists taking capital of it is concerned, Mr. Weisgal believed they would make more capital of non-participation. He said he had been informed that the first reception to the delegation would be given by the Russian Embassy and that all invitations would go out from the Russian Consul-General's office in New York, thus answering Mr. Segal's objection.

It should be known, too, that in accordance with the authorization of the Office Committee, Dr. Goldmann had already got in touch with the Jewish Writers and Artists Committee, informing them of the conditions under which individual Zionists would participate and names of those who had already offered their cooperation were submitted. If the action were reversed, Dr. Goldmann would then have to inform the Writers Committee that the Zionists had reversed themselves.

At this point, Mr. Lipsky and Mr. Segal raised the constitutional question as to whether in a matter of such major policy the Office Committee was within its rights in taking action without referring the matter to the full committee.

The chairman pointed out that inasmuch as the Office Committee had full authority to conduct business between full Committee meetings, it was within its purview to proceed on this matter. She proposed, in any case, that the organization aspect of the question should be postponed to a meeting at which both the chairman of the Emergency Committee and the Office Committee were present.

Mrs. Halprin added that the decision of the Office Committee had been reached with great reluctance and many misgivings had been expressed. When the action was reported to the National Board grave misgivings were also expressed there and it had been proposed that the matter be discussed again with Dr. Weizmann.

Mr. Segal offered the following motion:

The Emergency Committee does not approve of any Zionist

body affiliated with the Emergency Committee joining the reception committee, or any individual member of the Emergency Committee lending his or her name to the reception committee.

Mr. Lipsky offered a substitute motion accepted by Mr. Segal:

Not being inclined to approve of the action of the Office Committee in this matter, this meeting has come to the conclusion that all further action should be suspended until a further meeting of the full Emergency Committee.

Mr. Segal seconded the motion.

Mr. Lipsky's motion was carried by a vote of nine to three.

A.L.



MINUTES OF MEETING  
AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS  
May 24, 1943

A meeting of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Monday evening, May 24, 1943, at 8:30 at 41 East 42nd Street, New York.

PRESENT: Dr. Wise (presiding); Miss Benjamin, Mr. Boukstein, Mr. Bublick, Mr. Cruso, Mr. Furmansky, Dr. Goldstein, Mr. Greenberg, Mrs. Halprin, Mr. Itzkowitz, Mrs. Jacobs, Rabbi Gold, Miss Leibel, Mr. Naiditch, Mr. Neumann, Mrs. Pool, Mrs. Schoolman, Mr. Segal, Mr. Shulman, Mrs. Shulman.

Rabbi Berlin, Dr. Goldmann, Rabbi Perlzweig, Mr. Lourie, Mr. Weisgal.

DR. GOLDMANN'S REPORT:

Dr. Goldmann reported on interviews he and Dr. Weizmann had had in Washington during the past ten days.

They had seen Dr. Benes, Mr. Welles, General Donovan; Dr. Weizmann had seen Col. Hoskins of the Office of Strategic Services, Lord Halifax and Mr. HM.

Minutes of the discussions are on file in the office.

Though he cautioned against any undue optimism, there was undoubtedly in some quarters sympathetic interest and understanding of the problem of Jewish homelessness and the Zionist solution to it.

TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

Rabbi Berlin urged that some steps be taken to bring to the attention of Mr. Churchill the vital interest of American Jews in opening the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigration. There would be great disappointment in Palestine if Mr. Churchill were to leave America without some serious attempt being made to impress upon him what American Jewry is thinking.

Rabbi Perlzweig proposed that a telegram be sent to Mr. Churchill, since any attempt at a personal interview was impossible in view of his program.

Rabbi Perlzweig's suggestion was accepted and a drafting committee composed of Mr. Shulman, Rabbi Perlzweig, Rabbi Gold and Mr. Lourie was asked to prepare an appropriate telegram. The attached telegram was sent to Mr. Churchill.

RUSSIAN DELEGATION:

Dr. Goldmann reported the action of the Office Committee and the Emergency Committee as recorded in the minutes of May 17.

Dr. Goldmann regretted the action of the Emergency Committee and repeated



the arguments he had made at previous meetings in favor of individual Zionists being free to participate on the reception committee for the Russian delegates. He urged that the decision of the Office Committee to this effect be endorsed.

In this connection, Mrs. Pool reported that on rereading the minutes of the National Board of Hadassah where the matter had been discussed, she found that the Board had a positive reaction to the idea, but aware of all the difficulties had proposed that the matter be discussed with Dr. Weizmann.

Dr. Goldmann said that when the suggestion had first been brought to his attention, Dr. Weizmann was reluctant to accept it. But having weighed the arguments for and against, he agreed that it would be wise for Zionists to be free to serve. He authorized Dr. Goldmann to state on his behalf that it would be harmful to withdraw at this point.

Mr. Segal said that participation in the reception committee had nothing to do with relations with the Russian government. If Dr. Goldmann's recommendation was accepted, it would bring us into contact, not with the Russian government, but with people in this country who are our bitterest enemies. He repeated the points he had made at the last meeting, namely that this action was a dangerous political gamble; that it would alienate the entire trade union movement, undermine Zionist morale, and would lay the movement open to the charge of insincerity and lack of conviction, etc. (see minutes of May 17).

Dr. Goldstein said that he had not yet come to a decision. The Zionist case is far from lost and the chances for victory are at least even, but it may be that in order to sway the scales it might be necessary to take the proposed step as a possible by-path toward winning the support of Russia. If this were so, he would be prepared to take it, recognizing the situation as dynamic, rather than static. If he were convinced this step was such a by-path he would be prepared to disregard old scores with the Communists.

Mr. Boukstein asked whether further facts were not ascertainable.

Dr. Goldmann said the understanding was that the Reception Committee would not be formed until we submitted a list of the personnel. The invitations are to be sent out in the name of Shalom Asch. One of the conditions is that individuals from other organizations should also be included: B'nai Brith, American Jewish Committee, Landsmannschaften, etc. If they do not participate, then the Zionists should certainly withdraw.

Mr. Boukstein did not see why Zionists should assume the burden of initiating negotiations with the others. Moreover, he did not understand how any action could have been taken since the facts were still so unclear. The burden of proof lies with those who advocate this step because they believe it will help our relations with Russia and bring about a better understanding on the part of the Russian government.

Mr. Naiditch said that the political situation had been pictured as so bad that it was necessary to do everything possible to win over Russia. He thought that the political situation as it appeared from tonight's report was such that Zionist efforts should be concentrated on England and the United States. He agreed with Mr. Segal that if the invitation had come from the Russian Embassy the whole situation would be different. Under the circumstances he urged that we do not participate in the reception.

Dr. Goldmann said that most of the arguments made against Zionist participation on the reception committee could have been used by the British Empire. The whole matter is one of political expediency. It must be remembered that any delegation from Russia will be composed of people whose principles we dislike. Generally, it is better tactics to control a situation than to remain outside of it; e.g. when the Pro-Communists in Palestine created a Victory League for Russia the Histadrut took it over. When a dangerous element cannot be stopped the thing to do is to step in.

Regarding the personnel of the delegation, the choice was not up to us.

It certainly seemed wiser to try to make the reception pro-Zionist if possible. Although there was no reason to despair of the political situation in the United States and England, it was still tremendously important to secure, if possible, the friendly interest of Russia.

Specifically, he proposed that all action be suspended until he ascertained the following:

- a) the possibility of adding one other delegate more acceptable and more representative of the Jewish community of Russia.
- b) The chances of a return delegation to Russia and assurances of Zionist representation if there should be such a delegation.

Mr. Shulman proposed that the following suggestions be also explored:

1. The possibility that invitations should be issued by officials of the Russian War Relief, who would invite other prominent Jews.
2. To invite those who could not possibly be accused of being Communists to participate in the reception committee. It is not necessary to have more than two or three Zionists participating.
3. To ascertain whether or not there will be a reception by the Consul General in New York and the Embassy in Washington.
4. To find out whether it might be possible that certain Jewish labor leaders might join the Committee. He said it was his understanding that this might be done.
5. To convert the reception committee from an entirely Jewish, to a mixed committee; perhaps there might be co-sponsorship between this and the Russian War Relief.

Mr. Weisgal deplored the unrealistic approach to the problem. He was certain that the committee would be composed of reliable persons and expressed the fear that continued delay in action might preclude Zionist participation. He had been officially informed, and he thought reliably, that there would definitely be a reception by the Russian Embassy, and the Consulate in New York.

Mr. Furnansky said he wanted to make clear his opposition to any attempt to change the character of the reception committee. If Zionists who are bearers of the idea of world Jewish unity should come and say they want to make the committee an affair for Russian War Relief it would not be in consonance with this idea. Zionists are interested from two aspects:

1. To initiate a relationship with Russian Jewry. Whoever comes from Russia will either be a Communist or will have to adhere to the line laid down by Russia. Are Zionists ready to postpone contact with Russian Jewry until they become like us?
2. To make a contact with Russia. Tonight the report on the political situation was encouraging, but still we need the support of Russia if we can win it. The problem must be viewed in dynamic, rather than static terms. Further postponement in this matter would be definitely against Zionist interests.

Dr. Goldmann believed Mr. Shulman's suggestions to be unrealistic. Russian War Relief has taken the position that it does not invite delegations from Russia. Jewish labor leaders definitely will not join the reception committee. It would be highly unwise to approach other Jewish groups now. To speak of a mixed committee is completely unrealistic. The delegation is coming as Jews. Moreover, if Zionists do participate, they should certainly reap the benefit of being in a controlling position. He urged that he be authorized to discuss the matter with the Russian Embassy along the lines outlined by him and that no further action be taken until he reported back. He would make no commitments.

This recommendation was accepted.

#### AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE :

Mrs. Schoolman asked for clarification on the intent of the resolution passed at the meeting of April 29.

It was made clear that the first resolution binding all Zionist groups to the Biltmore Program referred only to elections; i.e. in naming delegates to the Conference, Zionists should vote only for those candidates who accept the Biltmore Program.

The third resolution concerning Zionist commitments within the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Conference was intended to deny the right to any of the Zionist members of the Executive Committee of the Conference to negotiate in advance of the conference for any deviation from the Biltmore program.

In this connection, Mrs. Halprin urged that a sub-committee should be appointed to discuss the Zionist program at the Conference.

It was agreed that such a committee should not be named until after the elections.

A.L.

CORRECTION TO MINUTES OF APRIL 29 MEETING :

The following correction to the minutes of the meeting of the Emergency Committee held on April 29, 1943, at the Hotel Commodore, was inserted at the request of Mr. Moshe Furmansky:

"Mr. Furmansky said that the Hashomer Hatzair, as was known, is opposed to the Biltmore Resolution; however, the majority of the Actions Committee in Palestine accepted it as the present program for the Zionist organization; therefore it is binding, without denying the right to the minority opposition to continue its ideological fight against it.

The historian of the future will condemn those responsible who pushed the Zionist movement into the discussion of "ultimate aims" just in the time of war. For a number of decades, Zionism avoided this discussion which the Revisionists tried to bring in. However, the Biltmore resolution and the "Jewish Commonwealth" decision is a fact and we can not take it out of the books.

The Zionist groups can not go to the elections of the American Jewish Conference but under their own program; this is the Biltmore program. However since there is no Zionist bloc, the minority has the right to appear with its own Zionist political program as well. The main problem which we have to face is the distinction between the policy during the election to the conference, and the policy at the conference proper.

If the Zionists were interested in the creation of a mass basis of followers for the Biltmore Program as such, they should have pursued the suggestion of the Mizrahi to limit the initiators of the conference to the Zionist Emergency Committee and to the American Jewish Congress and there would be no reason then to negotiate with the Labor Committee as well as with the American Jewish Committee.

However, as I understand it, the purpose for this conference is different; this conference has to create a united front of American Jewry behind our basic demands on Palestine and the reconstruction of European Jewry. We want to get behind these basic demands all American Jews including the American Jewish Committee, the Labor Committee, etc. I doubt very much that at the future Peace Conference, the problem of a Jewish State or Commonwealth will be discussed (it may, it may not). However, I am sure that the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine, Jewish colonization and the political freedom of the growing Jewish community in Palestine will definitely be on the agenda of the Peace Conference. I understand that the purpose of this conference is to get the expression of a united Jewry through a unanimous vote of the conference for the basic demands (immigration, colonization, etc.) rather than to get a majority vote (with a minority vote against or abstaining) on the Biltmore Program. We have, once and for all, to nullify the argument of those officials in the State Department, Colonial Office, who point out that "not all Jews are with you in your claims on Palestine."

To summarize: in the period of elections, these Zionist groups who accepted the Biltmore Program have to carry on their struggle on the basis of the Biltmore Program; during the Conference proper and in view of the results of the elections the Zionists will have to decide which is more important for them - a united vote of the whole conference concerning the basic demands of Jewry on Palestine (colonization, immigration, political freedom), or a majority vote for the Biltmore resolution proper. My choice, I explained before. (Then I began to speak against the American Jewish Committee as far as its policies in the American Jewish community were concerned and Dr. Wise stopped me, saying that this was out of order.)"



May 25, 1943

To Prime Minister Winston Churchill  
British Embassy  
Washington, D.C.

"We address ourselves to you, Mr. Prime Minister, at a time when the sacrifices and the efforts of the United Nations have at last brought nearer the prospect of victory over the forces of a ruthless and terrible barbarism, and when on the other hand the agony of the Jewish people of Europe approaches a tragic climax unexampled in Jewish history. To the Jews of Europe, tortured and facing yet unimaginable horrors, Palestine still offers the one hope of immediate rescue and of ultimate survival as a people.

"We appeal to you in behalf of those no longer in a position to appeal for themselves for that word of reassurance which will make that hope a reality. We cannot accept and do not believe that a policy conceived in wholly different circumstances as part of a program of appeasement, now discredited and discarded, can prevail in the face of the compelling necessities of the unprecedented situation which now confronts the Jewish people. We cannot accept and do not believe that Britain's great Prime Minister who has led his own people through the valley of the shadow, and who has in the past so valiantly and truly expressed the conscience of Britain in insisting on the full discharge of its solemn obligations to the Jewish people, will fail in this grave hour to utter the word which will restore hope to millions now in despair.

"We ask you, Mr. Prime Minister, to say that Great Britain, true to its obligations, will be true to its promise to the Jewish people and in the light of that promise will reexamine its present policy in Palestine, so that the victory of the United Nations will insure also the reestablishment of the Jews as a nation in their ancient homeland.

American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs  
Composed of: Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization of America  
Mizrachi Organization of America  
Poale Zion-Zeire Zion of America  
Zionist Organization of America

Stephen S. Wise, Chairman

MINUTES OF OFFICE COMMITTEE MEETINGAMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

A regular meeting of the Office Committee of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Monday, June 14th, at 4:30 o'clock, at the Hotel St. Regis.

Present: Judge Levinthal (presiding), Mr. Publick, Rabbi Gold, Rabbi Goldstein, Mrs. Halprin, Mrs. Jacobs, Mr. Lipsky, Mr. Neumann, Judge Rothenberg, Mr. Shulman, Mr. Szold, Mr. Wertheim.

Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Lourie, Mr. Weisgal.

Dr. and Mrs. Weizmann, Rabbi Ferlin, Rabbi Irving Miller, Mr. Edmund I. Kaufmann.

AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE:

Mr. Shulman made the following report on the American Jewish Conference:

1. The date has been set for some time near the end of August.
2. The New Zionist Organization is to be admitted, but its candidates are to be designated "Revisionists".
3. A praesidium composed of Dr. Wise, Mr. Monsky and Judge Proskauer was elected.
4. Communists are not to be admitted.

The following matters are still under discussion:

1. The question of parity -- an equal number of delegates from all organizations.
2. The question of a joint slate for Zionists.

In connection with the report on the Conference, Mr. Shulman urged that all matters affecting Zionist interests should be on the agenda of the Office Committee for discussion. He deplored the fact that there was no unity of action among Zionists at the meetings of the Executive Committee of the Conference. It was agreed that issues affecting Zionist interests at the Conference should be on the Office Committee agenda prior to meetings of the Executive Committee.

UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS: DECLARATION

Judge Levinthal reported the adoption of a resolution by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations on principles for post-war European Jewry and Palestine. It was a compromise declaration, unanimously passed. Among the signatories are Dr. Heller and Dr. Brickner.

It was agreed that Dr. Heller and Dr. Brickner be invited to a meeting

of the Emergency Committee to explain the circumstances which led them to vote for such a declaration.

DR. WEIZMANN:

Dr. Weizmann reported an interview with President Roosevelt. (Minute on file in the office). Mr. Welles had accompanied Dr. Weizmann.

Dr. Weizmann warned that there would be many setbacks, but taken in conjunction with other facts, (the statement of Brenden Bracken in England, for instance), he felt that the situation was certainly changing and that there was some reason for hope. There was still a hard struggle ahead. The Jewish Commonwealth will not come overnight, but come it will, and he believed that so far as the leaders of the American and British Governments were concerned, there was a sincere intention to see that some justice is done to the Jews.

Referring to his remarks at the last meeting of the Office Committee, he again emphasized that hard days must be expected. There was no use in going "witch-hunting". The time element for the fulfillment of the Zionist program does not rest with the Zionists. It will come in God's time -- perhaps sooner, perhaps later. It was for us to do our best to see that it was sooner. He felt, however, that the situation was passing the "dead point."

Mr. Kaufmann urged that every effort be made to reinforce our contacts in Washington. He particularly urged that the friendship of Congressman Bloom be won for the Zionist cause.

Mr. Szold said he found Dr. Weizmann's report very interesting. After referring to certain specific aspects of that report, Mr. Szold said he was particularly impressed with Dr. Weizmann's mood, which he believed to be of the utmost importance. It was important that Dr. Weizmann should have indicated his mood at the last meeting, but it is also important that Dr. Weizmann be told the mood of some of the Zionists in America. He hoped that Dr. Weizmann would carry back his unshakable conviction that there is a considerable body of American Zionists who feel that the movement is "not licked" and not going to be licked. This was not an answer to anything which was said, but since Dr. Weizmann was going away, Mr. Szold was eager for him to carry away the knowledge that such a "mood" existed here. It is not enough, Mr. Szold continued, to open up the matter of the White Paper; it is not enough to secure a minor victory. There is a major thing that must be done now and can be done now. The question of mood is all important.

He thought Dr. Weizmann made a wise observation when he said the Arabs will revolt anyhow. There is no way of being realistic and satisfying the Arabs.

Dr. Weizmann said he was very grateful to Mr. Szold for having spoken. He was not a person who readily changed moods. What depressed him more than the Arabs, or any of the other problems was that Zionists expect to get a great deal and the effort is not commensurate with the expectations. If he could believe that everyone was "jumping out of his skin" to get a Jewish Commonwealth he would believe we would get it. But actually we do very little and expect very much. If that is the situation here in the largest Zionist organization, what can be expected from England.

Dr. Weizmann added that he felt:

1. That the situation is "opening up." It is up to us to try to direct it one way or another. Hitherto the White Paper had been the Bible of the Palestine policy. We must not wait; now is the time to work.

2. All our eggs must not be placed in one basket. But it would be a fatal mistake to play off Washington against England -- a tunnel must be dug from both sides. Palestine is an instance where Anglo-American cooperation can solve a very thorny problem. The tactless policy of the Jewish Army Committee, for example, has caused a great deal of harm. To think that either Washington alone or London alone will solve everything is a mistake -- the two great democracies must solve the problem together.

In answer to certain points made by Mrs. Halprin in connection with the interview, Dr. Weizmann said he agreed entirely and that in a letter he was planning to send to Mr. Welles these points would be incorporated.

Rabbi Gold said that in his opinion one of the greatest problems lies in the fact that Zionist policy is always under the influence of events and there is no fixed policy from which there can be no deviation under any circumstances. There is no fixed "endziel." The Arabs have made their position clear and thereby have an advantage. Had Zionists made it clear that their aim was a Jewish Commonwealth and that there is no bargaining on that score, the position would have been better. No circumstances should affect our major program.

Rabbi Irving Miller, who had recently returned from London on behalf of the World Jewish Congress, reported on his impressions and on various interviews he had had there with leaders of the labor party and others. Among other points he stated:

1. That he had been warned against any effort to lay claim to Palestine on the basis of the loss of Jewish rights in European countries. This would not only cause the position of the Jews to deteriorate, but was an insult to the war aims of the United Nations.

2. Policy in Palestine cannot be fixed in Washington. The British are eager for American collaboration in shouldering the burden of the Near and Middle East. They do not want to be told what to do by Washington, but they would welcome assistance.

3. The Prime Minister appears to be definitely opposed to the White Paper policy.

4. There are tangible assets and tangible liabilities and Dr. Weizmann is sorely needed in London where his influence is of tremendous importance.

The chairman thanked Rabbi Miller for an illuminating and helpful report.

Mr. Kaufmann outlined various activities which he believed must be pursued in Washington.

It was agreed that Mr. Kaufmann's suggestions were exceedingly helpful and that they should be given further consideration.

The meeting was adjourned at 7:30.

A.L.



MINUTES OF OFFICE COMMITTEE MEETINGAMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

A regular meeting of the Office Committee of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Monday, June 21, 1943, at 4:30 P.M.

Present: Judge Levinthal (presiding), Mr. Bublick, Mrs. Epstein, Rabbi Gold, Rabbi Goldstein, Mrs. Halperin, Mrs. Jacobs, Mr. Lipsky, Mr. Newmann, Mrs. Pool, Mr. Shulman, Mr. Szold, Mr. Wertheim, Dr. Wise,

Dr. Goldmann, Rabbi Berlin, Mr. Lourie, Mr. Weisgal.

By invitation: Rabbi Heller.

WHITE PAPER SUB-COMMITTEE:

Dr. Goldmann reported on the recommendations of the sub-committee appointed to discuss action against the White Paper:

1. No mass-meeting campaign to be started against the White Paper at present.
2. Literature should be prepared now:
  - (a) A brochure containing statements made in Parliament by British spokesmen opposed to the White Paper;
  - (b) A brochure giving the Zionist views and arguments against the White Paper;
  - (c) Other appropriate educational material.

Dr. Weismann had asked the cooperation of Dr. Josef Cohn in preparing one of the brochures. Another was to be prepared by Miss Syrkin.

Rabbi Gold thought that the publication of the Ibn Saud article in "Life" altered the situation. He now believed that mass action against the White Paper was called for.

The whole matter was referred to the panel for further consideration. The panel is to report back to the Office Committee.

UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS RESOLUTION:

Judge Levinthal pointed out that the resolution adopted by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and signed by Rabbis Brickner and Heller represented a diminution of the Biltmore program. He questioned the propriety of Zionists signing such a resolution.

Rabbi Heller said that the resolution referred to was formulated by an organization which was not a Zionist organization and represented a compromise of various points of view considering the membership of that organization. In its

final form it actually represented a surprising Zionist victory. Its intent was to serve as tentative instructions to the representatives of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations to the American Jewish Conference, who are at liberty to negotiate or alter their point of view if they find it wise to do so.

Rabbi Heller further pointed out that a careful reading of the resolution would make it clear that no Commonwealth in Palestine was demanded until after the Jews were a majority there.

Regarding his own signature to the resolution Rabbi Heller said (a) he believed it good policy to win over organizations little by little to the Zionist point of view, and (b) it was perfectly clear to his colleagues on the committee which drafted the resolution that it did not represent his point of view as a Zionist, (c) it was the best resolution that could be secured from that Organization.

Mrs. Halprin pointed out that the resolution, as reported in the press, had been unanimously passed. She questioned the advisability of having the names of prominent Zionists appear as signatories to compromise documents.

Dr. Goldmann agreed with Mrs. Halprin and pointed out that many attempts will be made before the Conference to reach agreement on a compromise resolution to be unanimously acceptable. If outstanding Zionist leaders appear to endorse compromise resolutions in other bodies, the non-Zionist may consider this a precedent for action at the Conference. He urged against considering the resolution of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations as a basis for any compromise resolution at the Conference.

Judge Levinthal reported that at the last meeting of the Executive committee of the ZOA a resolution was passed that in the future no member of the ZOA Executive should subscribe to any program less than the Biltmore resolution.

It was agreed that no member of the Emergency Committee sign any compromise resolution for publication, without previous consultation with the Emergency Committee.

#### PUBLICATION RELATIONS COMMITTEE:

PERSONNEL: Mr. Shulman reported that steps were being taken for the release of Miss Marie Syrkin from the Board of Education, and there was every hope that it would be secured. In the meantime, she has started to work with the public relations committee.

Mr. Shulman and Mr. Szold were authorized to complete negotiations for securing of the services of Mr. Kennan for the public relations committee.

In this connection Judge Levinthal suggested that the committee get in touch with Mr. Schainmark, who had been highly recommended as a publicity man.

#### ARAB JEWISH RELATIONS COMMITTEE:

Mrs. Pool said she was anxious for a final decision on the joint sponsorship of the work of the Arab-Jewish Relations committee. The Committee welcomed the guidance of the Emergency Committee and the National Board of Hadassah, it being clearly understood that it was in no way precluded from pursuing accepted scientific techniques and proceeding in a spirit of free inquiry.

Mrs. Jacobs, as chairman of the committee, reported that the work had been proceeding.

1. Bulletins are being prepared by Dr. Perlman;

2. Several special papers had been presented to the Committee: (a) One on immigration by Dr. Tartakower; (b) on the Commonwealth by Dr. Laserson; (c) a study of special aspects of the Commonwealth were being prepared by Dr. Baron.

Mrs. Jacobs did not believe the committee was effectively organized. For instance, the question of fitting in the material of the committee with the material of other groups had not yet been solved. An Institute for Zionist Affairs was, in her opinion, necessary. If the material of the American Economic Committee, Mr. Sieff's Institute, Dr. Berkson's research project, etc. were coordinated, an Institute of Zionist Affairs virtually existed. There would then be the problem of keeping the material current and available. Until such an Institute were actually organized, she assumed that the work of the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee would continue.

In connection with questions as to the political nature of the studies, Mrs. Jacobs made it clear that a study of Arab-Jewish relations could not be divorced from political issues. In general, she said, Zionists should welcome the cooperation and research work of all persons willing to contribute their professional skills.

It was pointed out that a decision had been taken at a previous meeting whereby the Emergency Committee agreed to continue joint sponsorship with Hadassah of the Arab Jewish Relations Committee. There being no motion to reconsider this the status quo remained. It was again emphasized that the findings of the Arab-Jewish Relations Committee are not to be publicized and are to be turned over for disposition to the Emergency Committee.

#### HADASSAH MEMBERSHIP ON PANEL.

Mrs. Pool stated that the entire National Board of Hadassah had voted to demand an additional Hadassah representative on the panel. The way in which Hadassah functioned made it imperative that both the chairman of the political committee and the President of Hadassah, who carry responsibility for political activity, should be members of the panel.

Following a statement by Mr. Worthheim who recalled the history of the political committee and foresaw a similar development if once steps were taken to enlarge the panel the chairman pointed out: (a) that the motion approving the panel as a sub-committee of the Emergency Committee, had been unanimously passed, with no protest from Mrs. Pool; (b) that it had been the practice to assume that the membership of working sub-committees should not be based on party representation, and (c) that since the matter had already been passed on parliamentary procedure would demand a motion to reconsider the question before it could be properly taken up.

A motion to reconsider the constitution of the panel was defeated by a vote of 5 to 4.

In this connection Rabbi Heller reported that at a meeting of the Administrative Council of the ZOA objection had been taken to the setting up of a political bureau of the Agency in Washington which it was believed might destroy the relationship of the Zionist organizations in America to the political work.

DISCUSSION

1. It was agreed to allocate the sum of \$500.- toward the sum necessary for rescuing Alexander Licht, a leader of the Zionist movement and Jewish community of Yugoslavia, from a concentration camp in Italy.
2. It was agreed to allocate the sum of \$35.00 monthly for six months to the family of the late Ittamar Ben-Avi, provided like amounts were forthcoming from the JNF, Hadassah and the Order Sons of Zion.

MIZRACHI CABLE TO PALESTINE

Dr. Wise read the attached exchange of correspondence: (Letter of Mr. Gellman to Dr. Wise and Dr. Wise's reply).

Mrs. Halprin said she was very grateful for the tone of Dr. Wise's letter. She thought the movement had a right to request its President to discuss problems frankly and honestly. Mr. Gellman's letter served no useful purpose at this point. She expressed strong criticism of the terms of the Mizrachi letter. On the other hand Dr. Weizmann's statement was, she thought, unclear and the leaders of the movement were left in doubt as to what was in his mind. She urged that a subsequent meeting be held with Dr. Weizmann before he leaves the country so that he could tell the leadership precisely what his views were as to the policy of the movement. No action whatsoever could be taken until after such a meeting.

Mrs. Pool said that if Dr. Weizmann were pessimistic, it was the duty of the movement to strengthen his conviction. It must be taken for granted that the President will carry forward the policy agreed to by the Executives of all governing bodies in Zionist life.

Dr. Goldmann said that Mr. Gellman's letter was wrongly directed to the Emergency Committee, which could not control the activities of either Dr. Weizmann or himself, who were directly responsible to the Executive.

Moreover, it was impossible to have full, free and frank discussion on confidential matters if the statements made at such meetings were to be cabled to Palestine. Rabbi Berlin had cabled to Palestine his interpretation of Dr. Weizmann's and his own (Dr. Goldmann's) remarks at the meeting of June 1st. At that meeting, another meeting for further clarification had been arranged. Nothing conclusive had been said by Dr. Weizmann; certainly nothing to indicate that either he or Dr. Weizmann had said indicated a retreat from the Biltmore resolution. Nevertheless Rabbi Berlin had cabled to Palestine reporting that both he and Dr. Weizmann wanted to abandon the Biltmore Resolution. In addition to the breach of confidence, there was the matter of transmitting such information through the British and United States censors which could be only harmful. Already as a result of the Mizrachi cable much agitation had been aroused in Palestine and an interchange of numerous cables no doubt very edifying to the British and American authorities, had taken place. If such actions were to be permitted to any members of the Emergency Committee any possibility of frank discussion would be precluded.



Dr. Goldmann associated himself with Mrs. Halprin's suggestion that another meeting with Dr. Weizmann be asked for.

Rabbi Berlin answered Dr. Goldmann as follows: For the Yishuv the whole matter was one of life and death. He believed it his duty to report to his colleagues in Palestine the developments of the situation here. He thought that Dr. Weizmann's statement was perfectly clear and that it was opposed to the Biltmore resolution. As to the matter of the censor, he believed his cable was worded in such a way that no damage could have been done.

Mrs. Halprin said she too thought the matter one of life and death. But she could not agree with Rabbi Berlin's position. If there was any value in the Emergency Committee it was that they could discuss and act as a body. If every statement made in confidence were to be reported the body would be destroyed. It is up to the Emergency Committee itself to decide what should be reported to Palestine. The meeting of Dr. Weizmann of June 1st had been considered so confidential that even the boards of the constituent organization had received no report.

Judge Levinthal said that it had been certainly made clear that the meeting of June 1st was to be kept in strict confidence. Moreover, it was assumed that all the meetings of the Emergency Committee were in executive session and strictly confidential.

Mr. Wertheim pointed out that the matter as cabled by the Mizrahi had already been publicized in the press in Palestine and he had received cables on the matter.

Mr. Shulman pointed out the political damage which was bound to result from having cables of such a nature pass through the hands of the British censor.

After some further discussion it was generally agreed that all meetings of the Emergency Committee are strictly confidential and that no report of them should go to Palestine without consulting the Committee.

It was further agreed that if possible a further meeting should be held with Dr. Weizmann before his departure, though it was reported that this was unlikely, since the physicians had for the time being categorically forbidden Dr. Weizmann to speak at any meetings.

Rabbi Gold said he did not agree that nothing conclusive had been said at the first meeting with Dr. Weizmann, nor that it had been clearly understood that a second meeting was scheduled for the purposes of clarification. He said the question of the cable passing through the hands of the censors was quite a different one from the propriety of informing Palestine. He did not believe any breach of confidence was involved. Mizrahi had, in fact, invited all the members of the Office Committee to participate at a meeting to discuss the matter, but they had refused to come.

Mr. Neumann deplored the fact that any lack of confidence should be expressed about Dr. Goldmann's adherence to the Biltmore program, especially just as he was about to open a political office in Washington. Dr. Goldmann had reported his negotiations in Washington fully and with the utmost frankness and had consistently indicated his adherence to the Biltmore program. Nothing that he said could be interpreted as a retreat from this position and he was entitled to the fullest confidence of the Committee.

Mr. Szold said he understood that the motion with reference to the confidential character of the meetings of the Emergency Committee had not been put since that is already the rule of the Committee. He moved the following resolution:

"Whereas it has been disclosed at this meeting that cables went to Palestine after a first meeting with Dr. Weizmann, and before the continuance of that meeting which was definitely scheduled, this committee records its disapproval of the cables sent by Mizrahi."

The motion was carried.

It was agreed that the Executive be informed of the motion.

A. L.



MINUTES OF MEETINGAMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

July 13, 1943

A special meeting of the members of the Office Committee of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs and the Zionist members of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Conference took place on Tuesday, July 13, 1943 at 8:00 p.m. at the Astor Hotel, New York City.

PRESENT:

Dr. Wise (presiding), Mr. Boukstein, Mr. Bressler, Mr. Bablick, Mrs. Epstein, Rabbi Gold, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Mrs. Sam Goldstein, Mr. Greenberg, Mrs. Falprin, Mrs. Jacobs, Mr. Kenen, Mr. Leichtman, Judge Levinthal, Mr. Lipky, Mr. Magida, Dr. Margoshes, Rabbi Miller, Mr. Neumann, Mr. Nirenstein, Mrs. Pool, Mr. Quittman, Miss Rothbard, Judge Rothenberg, Mr. Segal, Judge Sherman, Mr. Shetzer, Mr. and Mrs. Shulman, Miss Shultz, Mr. Sonnenreich, Mr. Stanton, Mr. Stern, Mr. Tennenbaum, Mr. Weisgal, Mr. Weisman, Mrs. Wise.

Dr. Wise called the meeting to order and said that the meeting had been called in order to determine what should, in the opinion of those present, be done to assure that the American Jewish Conference would act in accordance with Zionist aims and demands.

Dr. Goldstein pointed out that everyone should be made aware of the fact that any definite action taken at the Conference would be binding later.

Mr. Weisgal said that the danger was not what the Executive will do but what we will do. We should bear in mind tonight when we make any decisions that they are very consequential. It is imperative that we form a united front tonight. Questions of vital importance that will be on tomorrow's agenda of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Conference include the program for the Conference, election or appointment of a steering committee, a report of the Preliminary Studies Committee, and preparations for the Conference.

It was pointed out that the first problem which will arise tomorrow would be the program of the Conference. As decided in Pittsburgh, the Executive Committee stops functioning at this point. It is concerned only with the organization of the Conference now and with arranging for the opening session on August 29th. After that the Conference must proceed according to recognized parliamentary procedure.

Mr. Lipky said that what is involved is the launching of a parliament of Jews. The election returns reveal that the overwhelming majority of Jewish public opinion in this country has sustained the Zionist cause. A vacuum now exists between the elections and the Conference. The Executive Committee of the Conference will attempt to fill this vacuum until the Conference organizes itself. The setting up of the Preliminary Studies Committee on the part of the Executive is an example. Something to take the place of the Executive Committee must come into existence before August 29th. We are the representatives of the Zionists. We must prepare ourselves and we must prepare a program. It is imperative that the Conference be organized on the basis of ideological groups. It must be clearly

understood that the Executive Committee ceases to function after the preliminary arrangements have been made. We must make certain that the Executive Committee does nothing beyond making the necessary physical arrangements and organizing the procedure at the opening session on August 29th. We must take over from there on. If a standing committee is not organized before the Conference we shall lose a great deal of time. Mr. Lipsky cited as a model standing committee the Permanenz Ausschuss of the World Zionist Congress.

Judge Levinthal said that he agreed with most of Mr. Lipsky's remarks, but he felt that the affiliated organizations would resent it if we took it for granted that we were their leaders. We know that the vast majority of the elected delegates are Zionists but they would nevertheless resent it if we would assume leadership. He suggested that a committee on committees should be elected through a mail canvas among the 500 delegates prior to the Conference.

Upon enquiry as to procedure, Judge Levinthal said that we should send each delegate a list of the names of the other delegates and ask them to elect 25 names from that list. Those with the greatest number of votes would serve on the committee on committees. In the meantime the ZOA and other organizations can canvas their delegates and suggest names for election.

The question was raised as to who would approach the non-organized delegates. Judge Levinthal felt that we could recommend to them whom they should elect. That would be different from assuming leadership. This committee on committees would have to take upon itself the election of a praesidium.

Mrs. Pool said that we know just what our strength is. She believed that the Preliminary Studies Committee has a real purpose. The Executive Committee should not be demobilized or pared down immediately. It has shown good judgment so far.

It was pointed out that the division of power in the Executive is about fifty fifty while the election returns show a preponderance of Zionists.

Dr. Goldstein said that even though he might appear to be contradicting himself, he wished to make the following suggestion: We should think of the Conference in long range terms. What impression will it make on the Jewish public mind if at the first session of the Conference it is discovered that the Zionists have already organized themselves and have, so to speak, taken over the Conference and are running it? Therefore, even if the first session takes place starting August 29th it should be a purely formal session. Otherwise the minorities in the Conference will be discouraged. There is a possibility that certain people might walk out and we should postpone such a walkout as long as possible. In Dr. Goldstein's opinion the chances of such a walk-out would be minimized in direct proportion to the length of the Conference. If it presents an opportunity for the various factions to talk over and clarify the issues involved it might bring about a spirit of understanding. If we follow this process we will impose an obligation on the minorities to adhere to the Conference. We should postpone any possibility of cleavage as long as possible. Therefore, Dr. Goldstein submitted for the consideration of those present whether it might not be advisable that the opening session of the Conference be devoted entirely to speeches and addresses. Certain groups within the majority will have to be nurtured. For all these reasons we should not take definite action at the first session from August 29th to September 2nd. It might be very unwise to force the issue of strength so early. Such tests had better be left for future meetings of the delegates.



Mr. Segal and Dr. Margoshes pointed out that if Dr. Goldstein's suggestions were followed, there would be great disappointment among the public at large; what is more, there never will be any further session of the Conference under such circumstances, for people would feel that the whole Conference is futile.

Dr. Margoshes added that he believed that Dr. Goldstein was making a grave error if he thought that in a five day Conference consisting of speeches and "getting acquainted" we can persuade certain people to our point of view. He felt that the time had come for a showdown, and if we were not going to write the Conference resolutions our opponents would. We met this evening to organize and not to adopt delaying tactics.

Mrs. Epstein, while agreeing partially with Mr. Segal and Dr. Margoshes, said that she realized that Dr. Goldstein was not altogether wrong, as the minds and reactions of our opponents must be taken into consideration. She felt that we should act according to Mr. Lipsky's suggestion but with more subtlety. Probably 85% of the delegates are Zionists but whether or not they will act as such is not at all assured. She felt that we should organize and influence the delegates behind the scenes, so to speak, so as not to create the impression of having taken over the Conference and still achieve our aims.

Mr. Shulman said that the first session, the very first time the Conference delegates got together, might well be devoted to addresses and the like but that it was impossible to believe that one could continue such procedure for five days. The Conference must formulate a program. The Executive Committee might set the stage but we must know in what direction the program is to go on. The question of organization will come to the floor at the meeting tomorrow and we should agree now on urging the organization of a standing committee. Mr. Shulman said that he was not in favor of Judge Levinthal's suggestion for mail canvas. We must, however, work out a formula for controlling the proposed standing committee. If we are to act effectively we must act as a unit.

Rabbi Miller said that the question of tactics at the Conference is one of major importance. First of all, the Executive may resolve itself into a program committee to outline the program for calling the Conference or it may appoint a sub-committee for that purpose. We must challenge the Executive on that. It has no right to plan beyond the opening session. Secondly, the question arises who shall be on the Praesidium of the Conference. The Executive might constitute itself into a nominating committee. This, too, we should challenge. Thirdly, the Executive may constitute itself into a committee on committees and we must challenge that. What is going to be the agency to do all these things in the place of the Executive? Our opponents will always realize what we are trying to do. Rabbi Miller felt that a standing committee such as Mr. Lipsky suggested would not represent organizations or ideologies but delegates. He proposed that the standing committee be organized on the basis of one member for every ten delegates. For instance, there are 22 delegates from Philadelphia, therefore they are entitled to elect two of their number as members of the standing committee.

It was pointed out that this proposal was most unfair because the minorities would be completely wiped out.

Judge Rothenberg agreed with Dr. Goldstein to some extent but said that we should realize that our actions in every respect have a great deal of consequence. He considered it advisable that at the first session we should seek points of agreement rather than to emphasize differences. We should try to involve the non-

Zionist members of the Conference into all the phases of the Conference. We should try to give an impression of permanency. What comes out of the Conference must represent the opinion of American Jewry. This American Jewish Conference will be functioning not merely for the first gathering but for the duration of the war and therefore we should elect a Praesidium, using the Zionist Congress procedure as an example. Everyone will recognize that we should have a majority on the standing committee but we should not antagonize our opponents before it is necessary. When the time comes for us to assert our full strength, we should do so.

He suggested that we should make the White Paper issue one of the main ones of the first gathering of the Conference and thus create the impression that American Jewry is united on this matter.

Mr. Shulman said that he felt that we were in substantial agreement that the forming of an actual committee be postponed until the first session of the Conference itself but that we must do all preliminary work in advance and appoint a small committee for this task.

Dr. Wise was in agreement with this.

Dr. Goldstein pointed out that he only wanted the spirit of his remarks considered and not the details. He would not compromise on Zionist principles. He simply meant that we should be patient and not rush our victory at the Conference. He felt that because we are strong we can afford to be patient.

Mr. Weisgal expressed his opinion that if we do not make preparations now the cleavages will come out at the Conference itself. The people on the other side know fully well what the Zionists want and that they are going to ask for the utmost. If we are going to be generous, they should know the source of the generosity. If those factions that are indifferent will realize that we are strong and determined they will follow us. Nobody ever wants to be on the "losing team". He proposed the following: At the Executive Committee meeting the next day we should propose that the Executive Committee should appoint a committee for the organization of the Conference, based on some reflection of the groupings of the delegates. This can be done without arousing any animosity. If we do not take such a stand we will never have a Conference. If we make it possible for the unaffiliated groups to be on the committees, they will look to us for leadership.

Mr. Neumann enquired how we can assure that the reflection is fair. Mr. Weisgal said that we know more or less who the delegates are, or else we can see to it that the committee is organized by groups. He added that this is an ad hoc body and that we must plan for it. Zionist Congresses, World Jewish Congresses and similar gatherings are continuing bodies and preparations are made long in advance. This American Jewish Conference is not of the same nature.

Mr. Stanton wished to make three points. First, he did not think that the Conference should be postponed, as the public would think that we were afraid of the outcome. Secondly, he did not believe in any future sessions, as something definite is expected from this session. Third, if we have unity among ourselves we will have a strong majority, otherwise we will be overpowered.

Miss Shultz moved that the Executive Committee should be informed tomorrow that in accordance with the Pittsburgh agreement it goes out of existence

with the opening of the Conference and that thereafter the conference should organize itself on the basis of the groupings of the delegates.

Dr. Wise considered the motion obvious but said that we should get it out of the way. It was carried unanimously.

After considerable further discussion it was unanimously decided that Dr. Wise and Judge Levinthal be authorized to appoint a committee to work out a slate representing Zionist groups for the proposed Conference Standing Committee, such slate to be subject to the approval of the groups which met this evening.

Previously in the evening Dr. Wise had reported that he had been approached on the question of postponing the Conference. The person who had discussed the matter with Dr. Wise felt that in view of the invasion of Europe and the large number of casualties that seemed inevitable as a result it would be considered un-American if the Jews of America at that particular time met to concern themselves with their own problems only.

Mrs. Epstein, Mr. Bublick and others felt that it was impossible to foresee what the military situation was going to be later in the fall or at any other time. American Jewry had been keyed up to this Conference and it would be a serious let down if it were postponed now.

It was agreed that the Conference should not be postponed.

The meeting adjourned at 11:30 p.m.

A.S.M.

MINUTES OF MEETINGAMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

July 20, 1943

A meeting of the Office Committee of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Tuesday, July 20, 1943 at 5:30 p.m. at 41 East 42nd Street.

PRESENT:

Dr. Goldstein (presiding), Mr. Bublick, Mr. Cruso, Mrs. Epstein, Rabbi Gold, Mr. Greenberg, Mr. Lipsky, Mr. Neumann, Mrs. Pool, Judge Rothenberg, Mr. Shulman, Mr. Szold.

Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Kenen, Mr. Magida, Mr. Weisgal.

Mr. Daniel Frisch (by invitation).

Dr. Goldstein called the meeting to order and welcomed Mr. Daniel Frisch.

CABLES FROM PALESTINE REGARDING EMERGENCY CONFERENCE:

The attached cable from the Executive in Jerusalem was read. Dr. Goldmann reported that it had been taken up at the Executive Committee meeting of the ZOA and that the consensus of opinion had been that such a meeting would be highly desirable provided that the necessary travel arrangements could be made. He also mentioned that in his opinion it is now relatively safe to go as far as Casablanca by convoy and from there it would be a one day trip to Palestine. He personally doubted whether the Palestine Administration would allow such a meeting to take place in Palestine; he was afraid that the High Commissioner would regard a gathering of this nature as a provocation to the Arabs. He also pointed out that if we wanted to secure priorities for the American delegation the one and only person to approach in this respect was Mr. Sumner Welles who, in turn, would advise us against such a meeting and would immediately ask the British. In other words, to talk to Mr. Welles was tantamount to talking to the British.

Dr. Goldmann also mentioned that a cable had been sent to Dr. Weizmann to ascertain whether he expected to attend if the Conference could be arranged.

It was felt by all present, however, that the Executive in Jerusalem must have been aware of these difficulties when the cable was sent.

Mr. Shulman raised the question whether it would not be more advisable and practicable from the point of view of transportation as well as from the political viewpoint if the meeting were to be held in London rather than in Palestine or, as had also been suggested, in America.

It was suggested that a cable be sent to Palestine to the effect that the Emergency Committee was in principle in favor of such a meeting being called and that we would investigate further whether it was feasible. It was pointed out, however, that in that case the Executive might proceed in calling the meeting and that, in the event that the difficulties in our way were unsurmountable, the



meeting would in fact take place without an American delegation. This was to be avoided and after some further discussion it was unanimously agreed to send a cable to Palestine to the effect that we realized the importance and desirability of such a meeting and that we would communicate with them further in a week to ten days.

It was further agreed that none of the constituent organizations would in the meantime send a cable on their own behalf but that they would take it up with their respective National Boards or Executive Committees.

#### AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE:

It was reported that the only Hotel available for the Conference in New York was the Waldorf Astoria and that it had therefore been considered to hold the Conference in Atlantic City. It was the consensus of opinion, however, that the Conference should take place at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel.

It was further reported by Dr. Goldmann that at the meeting of the Office Committee and the Zionist members of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Conference at the Hotel Astor it had been unanimously decided that Dr. Wise and Judge Levinthal be authorized to appoint a committee to work out a slate representing Zionist groups for the proposed Conference standing committee. In the meantime this had been discussed at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the ZOA and that it had been decided that this joint action on the matter of the slate for the standing committee should be deferred until Zionist forces had been united. Judge Levinthal had appointed a committee within the ZOA which was headed by Mr. Daniel Frisch to organize the Zionist delegates. This committee in turn was to contact other Zionist groups and organize a coalition of the Zionist delegates.

There was considerable discussion on the preparations for the Conference and on the position that should be taken by the Zionists.

Some of those present felt that the first session of the Conference might be an ~~inopportune~~ moment to elect the delegates to the Peace Conference or to have a definitive Zionist program adopted. They felt that since such resolutions could not be implemented at the time they might lose their effectiveness over a period of time.

On the other hand it was felt that if the American Jewish Conference, which aroused the highest expectations in American Jewish public opinion, would adjourn without having taken satisfactory action on this vital question, there would be great disappointment and no further session could successfully be organized.

It was further pointed out that it was highly important that it be made clear to the Allied Governments that American Jewry stands solidly behind the Biltmore program and the Zionist demands. If no action is taken at the first session it may well be assumed by London and Washington that the Palestine issue is a matter of little importance to American Jewry and that Zionism is a small and insignificant movement without any real importance.

Mr. Lipsky said that we could rush into the Conference and have the Biltmore Resolution adopted by the Conference by an 80% to 85% majority but that this would be an empty victory. Mr. Lipsky suggested that in order to achieve

something tangible, the Conference should issue a clear statement of principle now but not necessarily definite instructions to the delegates to the Peace Conference who may be elected at the Conference. It might also be advisable to elect such delegates at a subsequent session of the Conference in the light of developments in the international situation rather than at the first session.

He suggested further that the Office Committee appoint a sub-committee to formulate a program to be submitted to the Conference.

In this connection Judge Rothenberg pointed out that a change of the wording but not the substance of the Biltmore program might be a matter of strategy.

Mr. Greenberg moved that it be the consensus of opinion that the question of Palestine be definitely disposed of at the first session of the American Jewish Conference. In his opinion any other action would be regarded as an indication of the willingness on the part of the Zionists to yield.

Dr. Goldmann expressed his view that it would definitely be a serious set back to our cause from the foreign political standpoint if the first session of the Conference were to adjourn without a clear statement of principle. He said that in weighing the above considerations against the internal difficulties he reached the conclusion that some expression should come out of the first session. He felt that this expression need not necessarily have the exact wording of the Biltmore program. In addition he endorsed Mr. Lipsky's point of view with respect to the appointment of a sub-committee.

He therefore formally moved that the Office Committee appoint a committee to formulate a program to be submitted to the Conference.

In the ensuing discussion of the two motions by Mr. Greenberg and Dr. Goldmann the wording of Mr. Greenberg's motion that the Palestine question should be "definitely disposed of" was corrected to read as follows: It is the consensus of opinion that we should attempt at the first session of the American Jewish Conference to secure the adoption of the basic Zionist program but not necessarily definitive instructions to the delegates.

Dr. Goldstein stated that while at the meeting at the Hotel Astor he had expressed the view that perhaps it might not be advisable to rush the Conference into the adoption of the full Zionist program, he had since been convinced that it would be an error to avoid if necessary having the Conference adopt the basic Zionist program. Consequently he agreed with the motions made by Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Greenberg.

After some discussion Dr. Goldmann's and Mr. Greenberg's motions were unanimously carried.

It was also suggested that the delegates should be informed that there would be a minimum of two sessions.

After further discussion an agreement was also reached on Mr. Shulman's suggestion that a meeting of all Zionist delegates be definitely called the day prior to the convening of the Conference and at that time to present the Zionist program.

LETTER FROM DR. WEIZMANN TO DR. WISE:

The discussion of Dr. Weizmann's letter of June 25 to Dr. Wise was postponed until the next meeting of the Office Committee when it should be the first item on the agenda.

In the meantime copies of the letter should not be distributed by the constituent organizations.

The meeting adjourned at 7:45 p.m.

A.S.M.



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Received July 16, 1943

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NLT PALESTINE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE  
41 EAST 42 NEWYORK (PA)

AFTER SERIOUS CONSIDERATION EXECUTIVE REACHED UNANIMOUS CONCLUSION  
THAT ORDERLY CONDUCT ZIONIST AFFAIRS AND EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION POLICY  
RENDER EARLIEST CONVOCAION PALESTINE SESSION GREATER ACTIONS COMMITTEE  
ABSOLUTELY IMPERATIVE STOP ATTENDANCE AT LEAST PART MEMBERS ACTIONS  
COMMITTEE RESIDENT AMERICA ENGLAND TOGETHER WITH SPECIAL DELEGATES  
ZIONIST ORGANISATIONS ABOVE COUNTRIES AND SOUTHAFRICA IS INDISPENSABLE  
STOP ARE URGING WEIZMANN OTHER MEMBERS AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES  
EXECUTIVE ABROAD GIVE IMMEDIATELY THEIR CONSENT ATTEND SESSION STOP  
FEEL CONFIDENT ALL CONCERNED WILL REALISE TOGETHER WITH US VITAL  
NECESSITY REGULARISE POSITION GENERATE NEW DRIVE COHESION WITHIN MOVEMENT  
AFTER FOUR YEARS SEPARATION AND UNCOORDINATED ACTIVITY STOP FULLY REALISE  
DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED BUT IN HIGHEST INTERESTS ZIONISM PRESENT UNPRECE-  
DENTED EMERGENCY MUST APPEAL FOR SUPREME EFFORTS VIEW ENSURING REPRESENTA-  
TIVE SESSION AUTHORITATIVE ORG.N MOVEMENT IF NECESSARY BY UNDERTAKING  
SEA VOYAGE STOP PROPOSE HOLDING SESSION OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER CABLE NAMES  
MEMBERS AMERICA ACTIONS COMMITTEE DELEGATE ORGANISATIONS AND HEADS FUNDS  
WHO PREPARED COME

EXECUTIVE JEWISH AGENCY