



## Abba Hillel Silver Collection Digitization Project

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### **MS-4787: Abba Hillel Silver Papers, 1902-1989.**

Series II: Harold P. Manson File (Zionism Files), 1940-1949, undated.

Sub-series A: Main Manson File, 1940-1949.

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British policy on Palestine, 1942-1943.

BRITISH EMBASSY

Washington, D.C.

March 4th, 1943.

Dear Dr. Weizmann:

As Lord Halifax is indisposed, I am replying to your letter to him of February 16th on the subject of the possible transfer of the 70,000 Roumanian Jews.

We have heard from the Foreign Office that His Majesty's Government have no evidence to show whether the Roumanian proposal was meant to be taken seriously. But if it was, it was clearly a piece of blackmail which if successful would open up the endless prospect on the part of Germany and her satellites in Southeastern Europe of unloading at a given price all their unwanted nationals on overseas countries. In regard to the admission of refugees into Palestine, His Majesty's Government have gone to the furthest practical limits in the arrangement announced in the House of Commons on February 3rd in regard to the admission of Jewish children and a proportion of adults into the mandated territory. The difficulties of carrying out this scheme are formidable enough, and no country would be willing to lay itself open to the form of pressure implicit in the alleged Roumanian suggestion.

His Majesty's Government in conjunction with the Governments of the United Nations will continue to give earnest study to all practical means of alleviating the refugee position which are consistent with the fullest war effort, but to admit the method of blackmail and slave purchase would be a serious prejudice to the successful prosecution of the war. As they see it, the blunt truth is that the whole complex of humanitarian problems raised by the present German domination of Europe, of which the Jewish question is an important but by no means the only aspect, can only be dealt with completely by an Allied victory, and any step calculated to prejudice this is not in the real interests of the Jews of Europe.

Mr. Eden therefore trusts that you will appreciate that His Majesty's Government must proceed along practicable lines and avoid being drawn into action dictated by an enemy government.

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) R. I. Campbell

AHS File

Re: British  
policy -  
Jewish  
refugees



SECRET

NOTE OF CONVERSATION WITH Mr. J. M. MARTIN

*(Churchill's  
Secretary)*

June 24th at the White House

I had come to know Mr. Martin at the time when he had been a member of the Palestine division of the Colonial Office. In 1936-7 he was secretary to the Palestine Royal Commission; since the latter part of 1940 he has been principal private secretary to the Prime Minister.

After a few remarks of a personal character I said that the latest developments in the military situation in Africa were naturally causing us the greatest anxiety. We were convinced that the Allies would win the war but before that happened Palestine might be occupied by the Axis and that might mean not only destruction of the National Home but the actual physical extermination of the Jews in Palestine. What had happened now made more pressing than ever our claim that a Jewish force be organized in Palestine. I went on to say that Mr. Martin would know that in September 1940 the Prime Minister had given a clear direction in favor of the establishment of a Jewish force. Subsequently various things happened -- the then Colonial Secretary had died, there was opposition from various quarters, and the matter had first been held up and finally abandoned. I asked if Mr. Martin could give me any indication as to whether the matter had come actively before the Prime Minister of late. Mr. M. did not reply directly to this question, but said that it was some months since he (Martin) had been posted on developments with regard to the matter of Jewish self-defense in Palestine. He was under the impression that while there was no Jewish army, -- a good deal had been done both by way of a Home Guard and in other directions to enable the Jews to defend themselves. I explained that the Home Guard was akin rather to a police unit which might be of value in maintaining security internally under certain circumstances, but as at present organized was of little value as a military factor in the campaign for the Near East. On the other hand, the 13,000 Jews enrolled in the army and



June 24, 1942

RAF were for the most part functioning in various auxiliary formations -- engineers, aircraft-groundsmen, etc., and in the case of combatant units, were scattered about in unrelated companies. A Jewish division, or two or three divisions, would be a very different story. 30,000 or 40,000 additional men were not a large number, as modern armies went; but it was conceivable that in a crucial battle in the Near East they might provide just that additional weight to turn the scale. Valuable time had of course been lost. A couple of divisions of Palestinian Jews might have had two years experience in desert warfare by now and would have been a valuable asset. /He suggested however that so far as the fighting for themselves.

present crisis was concerned it would be too late to organize a force that could make any effective contribution. I said that we could only hope that the present attack would be held, but that no time should be lost in preparing for the future. Mr. Martin went on to say that he had heard that the army matter was being pressed in this country by people who he gathered were not associated with the Zionist Organization. I said that our own action might be somewhat less strident in tone, but that Jews everywhere felt very strongly about the justice of the claim of Palestine Jewry to defend itself as an organized unit.

Mr. M. said the question was whether the establishment of such a force would be helpful to the High Command or not; that there were, as I no doubt realized, political reasons for not going ahead. I said yes, I knew that certain fears with regard to possible Arab reactions were the explanation for not establishing a Jewish force; however the non-establishment of such a force did not prevent rebellion in Iraq nor the equivocal attitude of the Arabs of Egypt or of Syria, and the establishment or non-establishment of a Jewish force would not be a determining factor in Arab reactions to the war, which would be dependent on their estimate as to which side was likely to come out on top.



June 24, 1942

I asked Mr. M. whether it would not be possible to have the matter brought before the P. M. again; just as he had been a decisive factor in 1940 in reaching a favorable decision, -- though that decision had not been acted upon-- so today we felt again that only Mr. Churchill could give a definite direction. I asked whether we could not submit a note to Martin for submission to the Prime Minister. M. said that if Dr. Weizmann were to let him have such a note it would certainly be passed on. I mentioned that a telegram had been sent to Lord Halifax for transmission to the Prime Minister. It was clear from Mr. Martin's reaction he had no information as yet of such a telegram.

In the course of the talk Mr. M. said that with regard to the military crisis it would be rash for him to attempt to prophecy, but there was some reason for believing that the British forces had recovered themselves and would hold against the renewed drive.

Before leaving I mentioned that a different question which troubled us from time to time concerned reports of negotiations of the Arab leaders with regard to the future of Palestine and the Arab world. Mr. M. said that Mr. Churchill was definite in his view that any discussions on future arrangements were premature at this time. There might be representations to the Minister at Jeddah, and so forth which would be transmitted in the ordinary way, but certainly no commitments were being made.

As I was leaving, Mr. Martin said that Dr. Weizmann had tried on two or three occasions to see Mr. Churchill and he hoped that he was not resentful of the fact that circumstances had made it impossible for him to arrange an appointment. He added that their present stay was a very short one and that as may be imagined, the Prime Minister was heavily overburdened.

The interview lasted a half hour.



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THE CITADEL

QUEBEC

August 17, 1943

My dear Lourie,

Thank you for your letter, further explaining the views you expressed in our conversation here today and also enclosing an aide memoire on the request for a message from Mr. Churchill for the American Jewish Conference.

I shall lay the matter before the Prime Minister at a convenient opportunity.

It was very nice to meet you again and see you looking so fit. I shall report to your friends in Bloomsbury!

Yours sincerely,

J. M. Martin

Mr. Arthur Lourie  
41 East 42nd,  
New York,  
N.Y.



C  
O  
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Y

Letter from Mr. Arthur Lourie to Mr. J. M. Martin

Quebec,

August 17, 1943

Dear Martin:

You were kind enough to suggest that I let you have a note on the American Jewish Conference and I attach a brief aide-memoire.

I must apologize for not giving it to you in typewritten form but I have no secretary available here.

May I take this opportunity to add a few words on the other subject which I mentioned to you, that of the proposed joint statement by the British and American governments the intention of which is to put a stop, for the time being, to public discussion on the future of Palestine.

As I suggested when I spoke to you, I reflect much more than Zionist opinion when I say that the effect of such a statement would be altogether lamentable, and that it would produce a result ~~at~~ contrary to that intended. In America it would certainly be deemed, not only by Jews but by wise circles of liberal opinion, as an unjustified attempt to stifle public discussion of a vital post-war issue; this at a time when the Jews are still being massacred by the tens and hundreds of thousands; at a time, too, when the Arab leaders are meeting freely in Cairo to deal with questions of intimate concern to the future of Palestine.

It is certain that in the United States such a statement, far from silencing discussion, would provoke a considerable outcry. In Palestine where the Jewish community feels the noose of the White Paper policy drawing every tighter, the implications to the public mind of such a statement would inevitably be that the United States too had at this crucial time thrown its aid behind that policy. Far from quieting the situation it would arouse a feeling of alarm akin to desperation. Put bluntly, the Jews would feel that Churchill and Roosevelt, whom they still deem their friends, had also deserted them.

I can only express the fervent hope that these considerations have been drawn to the attention of the Prime Minister and the President, and that the proposed statement will not be made.

Again my grateful thanks to you personally for arranging to see me in the midst of what must be a rather hectically busy time.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur Lourie



SECRET

Note of conversation between Mr. J. M. Martin (principal private secretary to Mr. Churchill) and Mr. Arthur Lourie at the Citadel, Quebec, on Tuesday, August 17, 1943 at 11:00 a.m.

I thanked Mr. Martin for arranging to see me at a time when he must be extremely busy. I referred to the last occasion on which I had seen him in Washington; it was just after the fall of Tobruk and although the Nazis seemed to be on the point of entering the Nile valley, he had assured me that the situation had "reestablished itself." Mr. Martin said: "Well, you see I was right."

I asked if he had been with the Prime Minister in North Africa and he told me that he had and that he had flown with him over part of Palestine when he had seen Tel Aviv from the air for the first time. (Mr. Martin had been in Palestine as secretary to the Palestine Royal Commission). He went on to say that the war had moved away from Palestine for good.

He then asked me about the economic situation in Palestine, saying that he understood that things were going pretty well there, from that point of view. I said that while Malcolm McDonald at the beginning of the war had done his best to prevent the development of a base of supplies in Palestine, military necessities had made that development inevitable and Jewish Palestine had made a valuable contribution to the war effort.

Our immediate concern, however, was not with the military situation but with political questions. I did not know if he was aware of the proposal for the issuance of a statement on Palestine jointly by the British and American Governments the main object of which would be to stop discussion of the Palestine question at this time. We were deeply concerned about the implications of such a statement. Among the originators of this statement were apparently a Colonel Hoskins, formerly with the Office of Strategic Services, who was the son of an American missionary in Beirut - an environment not very favorable to us - and Mr. Wallace Murray of the State Department.

Mr. Martin indicated that he had heard of Colonel Hoskins. He said that as he understood it there was no intention of making any decision with regard to policy in such a statement but merely to defer matters for the time being. When the Prime Minister had been in Cairo he had been concerned with military rather than with political questions but he had heard that tension was increasing in Palestine. Naturally any trouble there would be "inconvenient" at this time.

I said that I was unable to say from here whether these reports were exaggerated or not. It must be remembered that the Jews of Palestine feel around their throats the noose of the White Paper which was drawing ever tighter, but that in any case the effects of the contemplated statement would be extremely bad. Deep concern had been aroused not only in Zionist but also in other Jewish circles of all kinds. Among others Judge Rosenman and Mr. Morgenthau had taken an interest in the matter. I also referred to Dr. Wise's interview with the President. As a result of these efforts for the time being a postponement had been achieved. The effect of the statement would be just contrary to that desired. It would produce an outcry not only on the part of the Jews but on the part of liberal opinion generally in this country which would regard it as an intolerable interference with rights of free speech. It would also



be seized on and made good use of by the enemies of the President of whom, heaven knew, there were enough.

Mr. Martin said that he had heard on the other hand that in Cairo Arab leaders were meeting to discuss Palestine as well as other matters. I agreed and said that while Nahas and Nuri were free to say and do what they liked we were to be required to be silent. I went on to say that in Palestine the effects of the statement would certainly be very bad. It could only be interpreted as meaning that the United States had come down on the side of the White Paper. It would serve to accentuate the bitterness which the White Paper policy had produced. The reaction would undoubtedly be a very bad one. Mr. Martin said; "You feel then that it would not achieve what is intended but just the opposite." He went on to ask me if Justice Rosenman was a Zionist. I said that originally he would probably have been classed as an anti-Zionist but that like many others the tragedy in Europe had made him feel that something must be done, and a change had undoubtedly come about in his approach to the Palestine question. He was not a Zionist in the orthodox sense but one could nevertheless say that today he was with us. Mr. Martin nodded at this point.

Mr. Martin asked me if it was my impression that the State Department was opposed to us. I said that we thought that there were different views within the Department. That the Near East Division and particularly its head, Mr. Wallace Murray, were unfriendly to the Zionist cause. We had reason to hope that that was not the case with Mr. Welles or with the President himself. In reply to a further question about Mr. Murray, I said one reason for his hostility seemed to be that he had a phobia about communism and was infected with the idea that a Jewish Palestine would be a Communist Palestine.

Mr. Martin said he had seen Dr. Weizmann in London after his return. Dr. Weizmann had wanted to see the Prime Minister but that had not been possible. He could not tell him at the time that the reason was that the Prime Minister was just then making his preparations to go to the United States. He had thought that Dr. Weizmann was not looking well and seemed rather depressed. I told Mr. Martin of Dr. Weizmann's illness while here and added that while Dr. Weizmann had borne well the heavy blow of the loss of his son, that, combined with problems both internal and external was a contributory factor. Mr. Martin told me that Dr. Weizmann had shown him a copy of his interview with the President which he thought interesting and which he had placed before the Prime Minister.

I then went on to deal with the second matter which I wished to take up and told him of the impending American Jewish Conference. I indicated that the Conference was the first really representative gathering of American Jewry to take place since the last war and that it would be concerned with questions of the post-war rehabilitation of European Jewry as well as with questions of Palestine. A message to this Conference from the Prime Minister would be deeply appreciated and in view of the specially significant character of the Conference was much to be desired. Mr. Martin's immediate reaction was that he doubted particularly in view of the situation in Palestine whether the Prime Minister would feel that a message should be sent at this time. I said that on the other hand the Jewish point of view must also be considered. Jews had suffered as no other people had suffered at the hands of the Nazis. Our latest information was that the numbers of those massacred by the Nazis greatly exceeded the two millions reported a few months ago. In the face of this calamity very little had been done. Surely the Jewish position was



entitled to some measure of recognition. I mentioned also by way of precedent that about a year ago Mr. Churchill had sent a message to the Madison Square Garden meeting organized by the American Jewish Congress. Mr. Martin at first thought that I referred to the private telegram which the Prime Minister had sent to Dr. Weizmann on the occasion of the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. I explained to him that the Madison Square Garden message was a public message which among other things indicated appreciation of the contribution of Palestine Jewry to the war effort.

Mr. Martin asked who would be chairman of the Conference. I said that that would be decided by the Conference itself. The acting chairman to date had been Mr. Henry Monsky, head of the large B'nai B'rith organization. It might be that at the Conference Dr. Wise would be nominated.

Mr. Martin asked whether it would be sufficient to express sympathy with Jewish sufferings if such a message were approved. I suggested that it should also give some indication of hope for the future. Mr. Martin repeated that it was very doubtful if the Prime Minister would feel himself at liberty to send such a message and particularly since he might still be in this country at the time when the Conference took place. He suggested, however, that I should let him have a note on the subject and he would follow the matter through.

Before I left Mr. Martin said that he had heard that the Jewish position here was not easy and that there had been a great increase in anti-semitism in the States. I said that anti-semitism was an intangible and difficult to measure, but no doubt there was something to the report. If so it was undoubtedly part of a reactionary tendency which was manifesting itself in various directions here.

A.L.



AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS  
41 EAST 42nd STREET, NEW YORK

*British Policy  
on Palestine*

## MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

Date August 27, 1943

From Arthur Lourie

For your private information I enclose a copy of a minute of my conversation with Mr. J. M. Martin and of our interchange of correspondence.



SECRET

(TRANSLATION FROM THE HEBREW)  
MS. LETTER FROM MR. SHERTOK.

British  
Policy

Jerusalem, 13.9.43

Dear Berl:

The bearer of this letter is leaving early tomorrow morning, and I have only just heard that he will be able to take a letter; all I can manage, however, is this short note.

In the centre of our problems today stands the gun-running trial. It is no ordinary trial, and the fate of the accused is not the important thing about it (one of them, by the way, is entirely innocent.) But the trial is really a political conspiracy aimed at defaming the Yishuv, the Jewish people, the Agency, the Histadruth, and the Jewish recruiting effort. It is also intended to incite public opinion in Britain and America against us - as well as the Arabs. It is an additional link in the chain of attempts to create the impression that Palestine (and because of Palestine the whole Middle East) stands on the verge of an abyss of rioting and civil war, due, of course, to our violence in the midst of a world war. To this end are directed the reports sent out from the British Intelligence, the incessant "guidance" given to the press (from Ronald Storrs to Emeny), and to this end the present trials have been staged.

The purpose of these indirect plottings is apparently to force America to agree to the White Paper, or failing that, at least to bring her to a more "anti-Zionist" point of view. Since they have found it impossible to influence America with political arguments - in view of the American distrust of all British political actions dating from the "appeasement" period, and the reluctance of President Roosevelt to come out against Zionism anyway on the eve of the Elections - they are trying to put their evil intentions across on purely military grounds.

I have already told you - but I would like to repeat here - that we have come to know that the necessity for a joint Anglo-American statement on the problem of Palestine was based by the English on the imminent danger of the Middle East becoming a scene of violence and bloodshed, and thus preventing the transfer of troops from the Middle to the Far East (thus touching the Americans in their tenderest spot,) and even obliging the diversion of military forces from the battle-fronts to put down "disturbances." The U.S. War Office - we are informed - stated that it was not convinced of the existence of these dangers in reality, and thus no joint statement was issued. But apparently the British Foreign Office has not yet given up hope; according to our information, they are trying to influence Winant to support with his Government the need for publishing such a statement in order to "quiet" the Arabs. The English are said to be very angry with certain American Jews (they mention Morgenthau and Baruch) who prevented them from obtaining the American Government's consent to the above-mentioned statement.

This evil plot is, according to our view, based on the assumption that the White Paper policy is tottering, and that con-



sciousness of its utter failure is spreading; it is therefore urgently necessary to take prompt action to prop it up, or at least to ensure that if it is the fate of this White Paper to be superseded by some new policy, that new policy shall be little better from our point of view.

It is not excluded that there may also be at work some idea of providing in advance justification for the continuation of British rule in Palestine, since British rule alone is represented as standing as a barrier against the great calamity which may at any moment plunge Palestine in a stream of blood. There may also be some intention of frightening the United States, and so deterring Americans from poking their noses into this unsavory and dangerous business - thereby leaving England as the only ruler in Palestine.

Immediately after the trials are over, we propose calling a meeting of the Asefat Hanivcharim, at which we shall give our public answer to all these calumnies and aspersions cast by the Military Prosecutor on Jewish institutions and personalities, and on the Jewish recruiting effort - things which had no judicial relevance to the case. Let us hope that at least a short summary of our remarks will reach the general press. The Government specially invited American journalists to be present at the gun-running trials. One hopes that the same journalists will not suppress our replies. By the way, in response to an invitation from Reuters we sent them a statement for publication in connection with Emeny's cri de coeur, but we do not know whether it has seen the light of day or not!

The conviction that the Yishuv will in no circumstances submit to the White Paper policy, and may even revolt against any further attempt to implement it, has clearly counted for much in the process of the moral and political disintegration of that policy. But in the meantime, the same conviction gives our enemies some ground for fixing on us the libel that it is we who intend to create a revolt, or incite the Arabs to riot, in the middle of a world war, and this false accusation is used as a battering-ram to destroy our hopes of overthrowing the White Paper by public political action.

We find ourselves, therefore, in a complex and dangerous situation, but are fortified by the consciousness that this situation itself stems from the fact that we appear as a strong and influential factor on the political front. The plot hatched and hatching against us itself bears witness to the success of our political attack on this hostile policy.

On my last visit to Cairo, Lord Moyne and Sir Arthur Rucker both spoke on the clear assumption that the White Paper would not survive the war. I had also a conversation with Nuri Said, and he, too, made no reference to the White Paper. When I told Moyne about this conversation with N.S., he said: "It seems that he has come to realize that, with all this opposition, and with developments in general, the policy may have to be re-examined." These are his own



words. Well, "for the moment, they are speaking only Yiddish; they are still far - very far - from speaking Hebrew." ~~None~~ speaks quite openly of partition as a solution. He said Huri Said was also thinking about it. Rucker suggested a choice between partition and a bi-national State (whatever that may mean). I replied ~~th~~ with a definite and emphatic negative to the partition suggestion, saying that we had come a long way since 1937. Today, we stood at a historic turning-point. A rapid, large-scale solution was essential. Without freedom of action in the whole of Palestine, we could not carry out any great constructive enterprise; without control of the waters in the North and the land in the South, and the Jordan Valley, any great settlement scheme would be impossible. Without a Yishuv firmly and quickly rooted in Palestine, and secured by political order, we would not be able to fulfill the important and worth-while task of assisting in the development of the whole Middle East.

I am wondering whether some similar suggestions may not have been reaching you?

It seems to me that if we once say "yes" to partition, we shall be turning the whole of Zionist policy upside down, and shall be venturing on to the top of a very slippery slope on which we shall not be able to keep our footing, and shall end by falling....who knows where? There is no doubt that the boldness shown at Biltmore has fulfilled a very important part in all these thoughts of repentances on the other side. The moment we budge from our standpoint, that advance will be checked - and then must begin a retreat. It is interesting that in one of my conversations with Arabs in Palestine, one of them used the following expression: "We will yield on the White Paper, and you will yield on the Biltmore Resolution." It is therefore clear that there are Arabs who fear that perhaps the slogan of a Jewish State may be accepted by the powers-that-be, and who, just because of that, are ready to make concessions.

Rutenberg brought me your good message about the cancellation of the joint statement. But, as I have said, we are getting information here that efforts to obtain American consent are still continuing, and we can therefore not lay down our arms, but must do all in our power to expose the plot being hatched against us and to scotch it completely.

Besides this negative duty we have before us the great positive task of again bringing up the question of our participation in the war through a Jewish Fighting Force. Recent turns in war developments have made it possible, and indeed obligatory, to make a new political attack on this front. The appearance of a Jewish Fighting Force in Europe would be free from all the dangers and doubts aroused by the idea of such a Force in Palestine or the Middle East. On the other side, our participation in the campaigns for the conquest of the Jewish "Valley of Slaughter" and for the saving of the remnants of the oppressed is a holy task in which it would be difficult to deny us our part. Today it is the destiny of some of our technical units to parti-



icipate in these campaigns, but they are all dispersed and nameless. The Jewish infantry units are mostly still in Palestine; some are in North Africa - also on guard duties. The infantry battalion which was sent out of Palestine recently has created a terrible depression here; they did not want to leave Palestine, but they would have seen some compensation for it if they had been sent to the actual battle-front. But to be "expelled" - as they say - from Palestine, and be pushed into a corner again abroad to fulfill a task of no particular importance - and this at a time when the attacks on Europe are beginning - depresses and degrades everyone.

We have to get a maximum concentration of our units in one Jewish bloc for active participation in the battle. I have sent this request verbally via Orde. Have you done anything? I begged him to explain to you that there is no point in putting this matter up to James Grigg, as he is only an official. All he can do - if he does anything - will be to get into touch with the High Command in Cairo, and from there he will get the usual answer; the existing units are needed where they are, and to do the jobs they are doing. And that will be the end of it. This is a politico-moral question, and not a military technical one. We have got to bring it before the highest authorities as a moral obligation of the democratic world to the stricken Jew.

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Are you making preparations to come out to us? I mean first of all you and Chaim. According to our information there is now a possibility of a journey by sea through the Mediterranean taking perhaps 10-12 days.

Round me there is now a perfect devil's dance in the Right Wing Press - all because of the stupidity of some of our comrades in publishing - to no purpose at all and without my permission - the fact that I made a political address at the Executive of the Party which was held just before the session of the Zionist Council. But it doesn't really amount to much. Though I must admit that life and work do seem sometimes too difficult to carry.

M.S.

Translation  
London  
12.10.43



*Brit. Policy*

BRITISH EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

September 22nd, 1943.

Ref. 2454/16/43

Dear Rabbi Wise,

I write to thank you for your letter of September 16th enclosing the aide-mémoire on the subject of the Palestine trials. As you will realise there are several statements in the aide-mémoire which I am not able to accept. I hold myself ready to discuss these questions with you at any time that you think fit.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd) R. I. Campbell

H. M. Charge d'Affaires

Rabbi Stephen S. Wise  
American Emergency for  
Committee for Zionist Affairs  
41 East 42nd Street, Room 1121,  
New York, N.Y.



November 10, 1943

B.H. Policy

Stanley midstatement Commons today announced White Paper 1939 provided proadmission Palestine 75,000 Jewish immigrants mid five year period ending March 31, 1944 subject criterion economic absorptive capacity

Annual quota 10,000 contemplated additionally quacontribution solution Jewish refugee problem admission 25,000 soon as adequate provisions maintenance assured.

War prevented fulfillment program. Number Jews entered Palestine legally or illegally up to September 30, 1943 43,922 against total 75,000 admissible subexisting quota. Thus 31,078 assumably reached Palestine before March, 1944. But pro exigencies war "Government considering position reached conclusion would be inequitable close doors Palestine those persons account time sector, no effort be lacking part Government facilitate their arrival subject requirements economic, absorptive capacity.

Earl Winterton asked Colonial Secretary to make clear great shipping difficulty which are not becoming less next few months. Stanley said he was glad question raised; could not guarantee these people be able to reach Palestine. All he did was remove legal obstacle. Sir Percy Harris asked if the Government do best remove other obstacles. Stanley answered that chief obstacle presently Hitler's domination Europe. Locker-Lampson said "Don't you think this connection Jew come first." Rathbone asked: "Does Government intend to remove restriction number adults able enter Palestine without children since this great obstacle." Stanley said: "That's different question."

Pickthorn asked whether declaration settling question principle rations immigration be kept from year to year and accumulated.

Stanley unsettled question principle but merely one exequity something which would happened subWhite Paper but prowar been righted. Pickthorn doubted distinction twixt principle equity fair did it settle whether when maximum quota immigration reached proyear any number unreached carried over next year indefinitely. Stanley said that quota system ending March 1944 therefore unquestion succeeding years.

All statement decided is those who unget in March 31st because war unkept out that reason.

Mack having regard expected military improvements Balkans elsewhere and greater number saveable will Government create greater facilities soon as practicable. Stanley said shall do what can but cannot forecast future events. ✓ Mack asked whether postdischarge obligation 32,000 others allowed enter. Stanley answered: that's different question. Hemmersley asked did statement indicate additional shipping facilities pro 32,000 made available. Stanley said: chief difficulty present not shipping but unfortunate people not allowed leave Europe. Rathbone asked Colonial Secretary for attention question adults entering without children which Stanley promised discuss with her.



*British Policy*

MR. M. SHERTOK'S CONVERSATION WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER REGARDING THE  
ARMS SEARCH AT RAMATH HAKOVESH ON NOVEMBER 17, 1943

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I called on the High Commissioner at 5:30 P. M. and remained with him for an hour - until 6:30. The conversation was, on the whole, quite friendly, without any nervousness or sharp reactions. I said that I came to him stirred to the depths by what had occurred at one of our settlements, Ramath Hakovesh, on the previous day. What had taken place there was a search for arms; a search that had been attended by acts of violence on both sides. Many people in the settlement had been injured, some of them seriously.

The H.C. asked: Where is this place? I gave him a brief description. He asked about the size of the settlement. I explained that it was a Kibbutz whose adult inhabitants numbered about 250. He said: Then it is a small place. I replied: As a settlement it is small, but as a Kibbutz it is not one of the smallest. I added that special importance attaches to that settlement, but that I would deal with them later.

I went on to describe what had occurred. I said that a large police force, from 300 to 400 strong, with 40 lorries and quite a large military force had surrounded the settlement, entered it and began to hunt for the male settlers. A miniature concentration camp was set up in the heart of the colony. Wire had been brought and an area cordoned off to form an enclosure into which the settlers were pushed after being dragged along from whatever place they happened to be in - the courtyard, the vineyards and other working places. The settlers tried to resist forcibly, but were overpowered by superior forces.

I said: The impression was at first created that it was intended to search for Polish deserters. The H.C. at once interrupted me to ask: Why do you say "the impression was at first created." Was it not actually the case? I said: You will see from the rest of my story, that the impression was correct. Although it was said that it was intended to carry out an identification of the settlers with that object in view, and the identification was actually begun, yet it was carried out in such a casual manner, that it very soon became obvious that the search was not for Polish deserters. Even the Poles who were there carried out their investigation in a half-hearted manner. The H.C. said: Were there also Poles? I said: There were some Polish military officials; I don't quite recollect how many. Two identification tables were brought. The Poles sat at one table, but they very soon gave up the business, which they seemed to regard as a mere farce. At any rate, in less than an hour it became evident from the conduct of the military that they were not looking for Poles, nor, in fact, for any people at all, but for other objects, for they started digging up the ground at several points, to pull up floors and an attempt was even made to break the walls of the dining-room. A magnetic mine detector was used.

A struggle began between the police and the settlers. As nearly all the men were imprisoned in the enclosure, it fell to the lot of the women to take up the struggle. When the attempt was made to break the walls of the dining-room, the women intervened and resisted with force. The police had to give up the attempt.

The search went on until it was announced at last that something had been found. What did they find? Not weapons; not firearms but - dummy hand-grenades which are used when practising. The police officer in charge of the search then announced that he wanted 20 men to be handed over to him. Thereupon the police began to catch whomever they could get hold of and arrest them. This incident marked the turning point in the affair and a general melee ensued. The imprisoned settlers overcame the police, broke out of the enclosure and joined in the affray. The women also joined in. Everywhere one could see people streaming with blood being dragged along forcibly and thrown into lorries. I was told by the settlers that several police officers and men showed great self-restraint and patience and tried to prevent others from hitting the settlers, nor did they retaliate for blows they themselves received from the settlers. But there were many members of the police who were extremely cruel and committed acts of great violence which exceeded all limits. There were cases where the police beat people with the butt ends of their rifles with such violence that they split their heads open. I was told of one instance where an injured man, streaming with blood, was brought to the first-aid station by a woman, who was struck by a policeman with the butt end of his rifle with such force that the man's leg was broken. There were many cases of destruction in addition to the injuries inflicted on settlers.



An agricultural workers' camp was stationed at the settlement at the time. The High Commissioner asked what that meant, and what the people were doing there. I said: Those people were sent to the settlement in accordance with the mobilisation method adopted by the Yishuv, i.e., people of a certain age who are not mobilised for the Army or for any specific tasks, are sent to help with the agricultural work of the settlements. The H.C. asked: And do they go from place to place? I replied: That depends on the season and on the labour requirements of the settlement; sometimes they do not stay long and move on to some other place, and at other times they remain for a longer period - a year or more. When they remain longer, some of them are sworn-in as special constables for the defence of the place. I have seen this camp and have also beheld the ruin and devastation caused during the search, which are indescribable. All the tents have been overthrown, the floors pulled up, the furniture broken and the people's belongings scattered around in utter confusion. Incidentally, all the watches and fountain pens disappeared during the search. One policeman approached a woman and asked, jokingly: Where is your gun? The woman replied: You'd better tell me, where is my fountain pen? - i.e. while you are looking for a gun which is non-existent, kindly return my fountain pen which did exist but has now disappeared. The H.C. asked, laughingly: And did she get her pen? I replied: Of course not, nor do I know whether that particular policeman knew anything about the pens which had disappeared. The H.C. continued: Apparently she merely asked a rhetorical question.

During the struggle the police caught 35 settlers, threw them into lorries and then began their retreat, to use a military term. Among the arrested people, some were wounded. Many people were wounded. There are some injured settlers at the Beilinson Hospital. I saw some injured people who had received medical treatment and had been discharged, and who were walking about with their arms in plaster. There are also wounded - I am told - detained in the Government Hospital at Nablus. I added that there was one man at the Beilinson Hospital whose head had been cut open by blows from the butt end of a rifle.

When the search party was withdrawing, the following happened. The settlers followed the police booing and shouting angrily, throwing stones at them. But on the whole it seemed that the situation was calming down, when suddenly without any special reason, a shot was fired. My informant told me that at the time, they thought the shot had been fired in the air. But it soon became evident that a man fell, wounded in the leg. Immediately after a second shot rang out and another man fell, also wounded in the leg. The shots were fired by a police officer who was in charge of the whole affair. His name is Caferatta. I went on: Mr. Caferatta is a police officer with long experience in Palestine and a chequered record. It is not my intention to settle any accounts with him here and now. Nor do I seek to make a personal attack on him. I am only relating to what has actually taken place. I feel very, very strongly on this point. For a man to fire upon people without warning, apparently just because he lost his temper is an act calculated to bring in its wake most unfortunate consequences. If his example should be followed by other officers and men, and be resorted to whenever a situation looked threatening - where would it lead to? I suggest in all seriousness that a special inquiry should be instituted in order to find out whether the shootings had been justifiable. Conclusions should be drawn from the findings of such an enquiry. The matter must not be allowed to rest. I added that this was the first time that firearms had been used and that before that the police had used the butt end of their rifles and committed acts of violence. The settlers had not used any sort of arms, neither live weapons nor cold steel, unless sticks, stones and kitchen utensils could be called arms.

Here the High Commissioner interrupted me and said: Perhaps your hot-headed young men have fired at Morton, the Police Officer. I replied: I only learned about the Morton affair from police sources after I returned to Jerusalem. While I was on the scene I heard nothing about it. I can say with full responsibility that nobody belonging to the settlement or its neighbourhood could have committed that act. I asked: Where did it take place? He replied: Apparently on the return journey to Nablus. I asked: In a Jewish district? He replied: No, far from the settlement, in an Arab district. How could a Jew have got there? I asked. He said: I know that Morton was not too popular. I said: I, too, know that there are people in the country who have an account to settle with him. He said: The Stern Group? I said: Please do not construe my remarks to mean that and imagine that the Stern Group could have penetrated into the hills and fired. He said: I too, find it difficult to understand how the people could have known that he was in the car. Perhaps it was the work of one of the wandering Arab bands. It may have been an accident. (I have since read in the "Palestine Post" that Morton was fired on while on his way to Nablus from Jerusalem, and not on the way to Nablus from Ramath Hakovesh. This is an entirely different district.<sup>x</sup>)

<sup>x</sup> According to later information, Morton was injured by a bullet accidentally fired from a rifle in the possession of a policeman who was in the car behind.



I said: Apart from the question of shooting in the settlement, into which I ask for a special inquiry, I want it to be understood that it is not the question of blows inflicted and havoc wrought in the settlement that is the object of my present visit. If a search is made at all, and the search is for arms, and carried out under certain conditions, it is perhaps unavoidable for a certain measure of force to be used. We are much more infuriated by the search itself than by the manner in which it was carried out. Our arms are intended to be used for defence, and any attempt to take them from us will touch the Yishuv to the quick. The H.C. interrupted me and said: I know your standpoint quite well, and I have no objection to your stating it. But you must also appreciate our point of view, which is, that the Government cannot allow the possession of illegal arms. On the whole we have not carried out many searches of late, but we cannot overlook the matter entirely. In this respect, as well as in many other respects, it is doubtful whether we shall ever reach a mutual understanding. We are moving on parallel lines and it is doubtful whether they will ever meet.

I said: This is the object of my visit: There is a matter on which the Yishuv is as sensitive as on a search for arms. It makes their blood boil. I then went on to describe the settlement, and said: This settlement forms the tip of a Jewish settlement zone which is wedged in an Arab locality. It may be said that the rear of the settlement is defended to some extent, but its front and two flanks are vulnerable to attack. It is surrounded on three sides by an Arab neighbourhood. During the disturbances the settlement was under ceaseless fire by night and day. 15 people were killed there alone besides the people who fell in the neighbouring colonies. In addition there were 25 people injured, but who have since recovered. There were also innumerable cases of incendiarism, uprooting of trees and other kinds of attacks. The settlement stood its ground under abnormal strain, without being able to have any sleep at nights. Nevertheless, there was not a single attack on Arabs in the neighbourhood, nor a single act of vengeance on an Arab village or Arab passer-by. What does that show? It shows that if these people possess arms, besides the official arms -- Here the H.C. interrupted and asked: Then you have got Government arms. But even if they do possess arms in addition to the legal arms, they were only used -- if they were ever used at all -- in self-defence, and never for purposes of attack, as can be established by fact. The H.C. said: But you said that no weapons had been found in the settlement; do you mean to say that they have arms there which the search failed to reveal? I replied: It is possible, I don't know. My intention had been to describe the feelings of the settlers when the police arrived to search for arms which they suspected to be hidden there. The settlers, greatly distressed, say to themselves: The police know that even if we have arms, they are to be used for defence only, so that they have come for the purpose of robbing us of the means needed to defend our lives. This is why our people react with such vehemence. This is not typical of Ramath Hakovesh alone; it touches the whole Yishuv to the quick. The entire community is placed in such circumstances as a result of the lesson it has learnt from attacks over scores of years, that it could not surrender its arms. There is, therefore, great tension throughout the whole Yishuv, and I have called to draw your attention to the serious consequences that may follow from these searches. In the first place there is the responsibility for the safety of the Yishuv. Every attempt to deprive the Yishuv of its weapons means exposing it to extreme dangers in the future. We do not know what is going to happen to Palestine, and what riots we may still have to face. We have learnt from the bitter experience of scores of years that it is most important for us in this country to have arms with which to defend ourselves. Whoever attempts to take these weapons from us, takes on a very serious responsibility.

But this is not merely a question of our safety in the future; there is also the question of the immediate repercussions and the disasters that may follow as a result. You have seen the results of this search -- how the insult in itself was enough to infuriate the settlers even though no arms were discovered. You have seen where it has led to -- to bloodshed. Luckily, there has so far been no loss of life, but shots have already been fired. You must realise that our people in general, and the settlers in particular, and in this respect there is no difference between the generation and type of settler, are made of a stuff that will not yield up its arms without a struggle. This has even entered their blood, they have stuck to their arms and will not give them up of their own volition. They are quiet, balanced people; people of the soil, who work hard. But when it comes to arms, they are capable of extreme acts. I tremble to think of what might follow as a result of these searches. And in such cases there is no knowing where it might lead to. I know perfectly well that I am speaking grave words, but I feel it my duty to tell you this. The H.C. said: In fact, what you say amounts to a threat. I replied: On my way here, I considered what I was to say to you. I thought the matter over and said to myself: His Excellency might take it as a threat, and I said to myself: The fact that he might regard my observations in the nature of a threat does not absolve me from the duty of telling him in what light I view the position, or of drawing his attention to the serious consequences that might follow. I said to myself: Every search might not end the same way as the search at Ramath Hakovesh ended. There might be a lot of bloodshed. There may be victims on both sides.



I added: Consider also the resentment this is causing, the animosity it is fostering. Who wants that? Is it necessary? Try to imagine the feelings of a child who sees the father being dragged along by British police to a pen fenced off with wire right in the heart of his village. What sort of impression becomes engraved in the soul of such a tender child and stored up for the future? I am asking you to save us from such horrors. The weapons in the settlements have never been used for attack. Let them be. "Let sleeping dogs lie."

The High Commissioner replied: You cannot say that we carried out a "witch hunt." We did not organise a general hunt. We did not follow the procedure used in respect of the Arabs during the disturbances, when we used to comb whole districts. But when we receive information about a certain matter, we cannot overlook it. I said: It is good to know that the area of friction between us is more limited than it might have been. But I am referring to the point still outstanding. I have come to propose in all seriousness that you should not carry out any searches. If you should catch a man armed with a weapon then I understand that you must act in accordance with the law. But do not come for the purpose of making a search. Even if you should receive information and you have good reason for making a search -- don't do it. Stop searching for arms in the Jewish settlements, at any rate until you have proof that the arms in question are used for attack. If these searches continue they might result in very grave consequences.

I added: Permit me to tell you another thing, and I say this without any hesitation: Things have been happening in the Lebanon about which we have read in the official news as well as in the British press and in the "Times" articles. It has been stated both openly and in between the lines that the French have made a mess of things; that they were tactless, that they showed an inability to handle the situation and that if they had been wise they might have averted the crisis and the publicity given to the fact that matters had led to an open conflict in one of the Allied countries. Does anyone wish to see Palestine in the news as a country of strife and bloodshed?

The High Commissioner laughed heartily and said: You mean to say, why should I be a second Helleu? I replied: Indeed, why should you? But I must confess that we are more concerned about our own flesh and blood. We do not want our people killed by British police anymore than we want British police killed by our people. I shudder when I think of what might follow.

He said: You are, in fact, giving me here and now, quite officially, a very grave warning. I understand. I admit you have put your view in very moderate terms.

He then added: I should like to revert to the subject you mentioned earlier. All this time you have been telling me that the search for Polish deserters was merely a pretext, a kind of camouflage.

I said: Is it necessary to employ a magnetic mine detector in the search for Polish deserters?

He replied: That is perfectly true. I added: Is it necessary for that purpose to dig up the ground and break down walls? He said: That, too, is absolutely true, though it does not mean to say that there was not any intention to look for Polish deserters at the same time. Perhaps it had been our intention to combine both these operations. The question of the deserters is very serious. I have seen General Anders. He recently visited me together with General Sosznkowski, but I want to refer to an earlier visit, which took place some months ago. He told me on that occasion that he was very worried about the Jews who were deserting from the Polish Army. He explained the disastrous effect it was having on his Army. Naturally, he cannot be expected to remain indifferent to a process which was liable to deplete his forces of half their strength.

I said: Do you believe, then, that there are so many Jews in the Polish Army? He said: At any rate, it might weaken the Polish Army. General Anders told me how it was done: Polish troops arrive in Palestine. They include Jews. They meet Palestine Jews, people belonging to your settlements, who tell them: Why should you remain with the Polish Army, which is a foreign army; who knows where they may send you, perhaps to Europe, and what will become of you there? Come to us, this is a land flowing with milk and honey, stay here and work with us. These Jewish soldiers are carried away by these persuasive words. General Anders said that something had to be done and asked for help. I naturally told him that if we could do anything to help him, we would do so. If people desert the Allied Armies, it is all the same whether they are Jews or non-Jews, it is our duty to help to recapture them.

I said: I entirely disagree with the explanation given you by General Anders. He has missed the point. The truth of the matter happens to be quite the reverse.



Not only did the Jews of Palestine not induce Jewish soldiers to desert from the Polish Army, but they used every means in their power to prevent them from taking such a step. For a long period our settlers used to say to them; Don't desert. It is your duty to remain with the Army. No persuasive words were used to encourage them to escape. The desertions were due to quite a different reason. What forced Jews to escape from the Polish Army was the appalling anti-Semitism prevailing in that Army, which has created an atmosphere in which the Jews felt stifled, an atmosphere in which the Jews could not breathe. Every effort to induce the Jews to remain with the Polish Forces was in vain. They began to desert and the Jews in the settlements were faced with a fait accompli. The Poles said: Here we are, are you going to send us back to our persecutors? The movement became so strong that it was impossible to stand up against it. And it was due entirely to one and the same factor. What was it that General Anders said to you, that the settlers frightened the Polish Jewish soldiers by telling them that they would be sent to Europe? These Polish soldiers are not inferior to the Jews of Palestine who joined the Forces. Are the Palestinian Jews afraid of being sent to Europe? On the contrary, many of them are anxious to be sent out there. You have no doubt heard about the Jewish unit which was sent overseas. It gave rise to a lot of excitement. There were soldiers who thought of refusing to go. But they finally obeyed the order and not one man considered desertion as a way out. The unit went as one man, without a single absentee. And when our units were sent to Italy - did they desert?

Here I told him about a Jewish unit which was sent overseas, and whose ship was torpedoed, and 140 men lost their lives. The H.C. said that he had heard about the matter. I told him how the remainder of that unit were sent back to Palestine, where they were regrouped and sent back to Europe. Did a single soldier escape when the unit was about to embark? And what about our other units in Europe? Do they know when they will return, or if they will ever return at all? Do they know what might befall them between now and the end of the war?

The H.C. said: This is all very very fine. But where is the connection?

I replied: I am trying to show you how Jewish soldiers behave when they are soldiers and not the victims of persecution. The atmosphere in the Polish Army is unlike that of any other Army. There are symptoms of anti-Semitism in the British Army, too, but it does not amount to a regime which renders the lives of Jewish soldiers a veritable hell. It would be well for General Anders to know that.

The H.C. said that in his conversation with Anders he had not detected any anti-Semitism. He went on: But why do you say that the search for Polish deserters was merely a blind? I said: It was the unmistakable impression of our settlers that the so-called search for Poles was a pretext to deceive the settlers and to break their resistance from the outset. When the police are well within the settlement they drop their mask and immediately begin a search for arms. In the meantime our people have missed the possibility of offering resistance from the start.

He said: I cannot agree that this was the case. It is possible that the two searches - for arms as well as for Poles - were carried out simultaneously.

I then reverted to the main subject, and summed up. Both of us reiterated what had already been said.

Earlier in the conversation I said: Do you know Norman Bentwich? He replied: Yes. I went on: He has left the country. Before leaving he called on me. It was on a Saturday morning. He was most distressed about the prevailing relations between the Jews and the English. I, too, am distressed about these relations. But Bentwich was very anxious as to what might happen today or tomorrow. I said to him: Don't worry, nothing will happen unless we are attacked. Here we are, sitting here this morning - and the morning was wonderfully beautiful and peaceful; it seems to us always that there is a special peacefulness and beauty about Saturday mornings, and indeed, a great calmness and stillness pervaded the air. I said to Bentwich: The peace of this room and of the whole of Rehavia reigns also throughout all our towns and villages, and so it will continue if we are left alone. But if not, - it will be bad indeed. But everything depends upon the Government, and not on us.

The conversation then turned once more on the points already described, and then I rose to go. He accompanied me to the door, and just before leaving, I said: Sir, what am I going away with? He was somewhat taken aback, and said: You are putting a very difficult question. You have called to protest against a certain action, and you have framed your protest in reasonable and moderate language. I appreciate your feelings and your point of view on this matter. I have noted what you have told me.

I said to the H.C.: I trust you realise how much has been suppressed by my moderation. But it is quite <sup>true</sup> that I have expressed myself in extremely moderate terms when compared with the feelings prevailing throughout the Yishuv. We then parted.



*Brit. Policy*

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver  
Dr. Stephen S. Wise

November 23, 1943.

Arthur Lourie

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

I have received a letter from the London office dated November 1st which, interpreted, I understand to read as follows:

"Weizmann has had some interesting talks. One was with Smuts, who was very nice indeed, but told him frankly that he found him (Ch.W.) much changed in the eleven years since their last meeting; and a second was with W.S.C, who is as ever a sure stronghold but concerned to choose the right time for what he is fully determined to do as the old man's heir. (I infer this to mean Balfour).

"We are proposing to send Harry Sacher out to Palestine, unless the delegation can materialize quickly (which does not seem too likely)".

*A.L.*





THE following conversation was held at a meeting at the office of the British Consulate General, on Monday, 20th of December, 1943, at the invitation of the British Consulate General, Sir Godfrey Haggard. The occasion for this interview with Sir Godfrey was my application, about three weeks ago, for an appointment in order to inquire about the possibilities of hastening my return to Palestine. At that time Sir Godfrey was ill in hospital, but on the 18th, his secretary Miss. Taylor, called and in my absence left a message about the appointment. I arrived duly at the appointed time, but instead of Sir Godfrey, Mr. Rendell received me, explaining that Sir Godfrey was still occupied at an uptown meeting and would return shortly. ( Sir Ronald Storrs is the uncle of Mr. Randell).

Mr. Randell ; What have you heard recently from Palestine ? I replied with another question in order to clarify his question. Then he asked point blank:

Mr. Randell: What do you think of the arms trials ?

Mordecai Newman: They display bad taste, and I can not see the reason for them. The British know that we have never denied the fact that we have arms, and they know as well that we will never give them up, because they are needed for our protection. The British know that we have never misused these arms; we have never attacked anyone. The British know, further, that during the disturbances there was a time when our boys were called upon to protect the High Commissioners Palace when an attack was feared. The first trial smelt very bad, specifically, because it was a bad design for a frame-up.

Mr. Randell: ( with impatience) What do you mean by frame-up ?

Newman: Look, Mr. Randell, we are grown-up people and we can talk with utter frankness and honesty. You know as well as I do that Prime Minister Churchill is bound to call in for consultation some high officers of the Intelligence Service; but you do not imagine that Prime Minister Churchill would leave No.10 Downing Street to go to Liverpool to confer with two people who work for the Intelligence Service for six pounds per month. This is the exact story of the first trial. The court tried to frame Mr. Ben-Gurion, who is chairman of the Jewish Agency ( Or Prime Minister of the miniature Jewish Government) which is recognized by the League of Nations and by the British Government as representing the Jewish people in the Palestine problem. Does it make sense to accuse Mr. Ben-Gurion of leaving his office in Jerusalem to go to a Haifa slum cafe to meet two Yorkshire yokels who earn six pounds per month?

Mr. Randell: I can see your point. ( He then offered me a cigarette, and continued) Mr. Newman, what is your opinion of the Arabic Federation ? Do you think the Jewish people would agree to be part of it?

Newman: I am not authorized to speak in behalf of the Jewish People nor of the World Zionist Organization, nor for the Jewish Agency, I speak for myself. I disliked living as a minority under European civil government. I shouldn't like to be a minority under a half-feudal and half-medieval people of the Middle East. I furthermore do not believe in the possibility of building a white isle within the shadowed desert. ( At that moment Sir Godfrey came in and Mr. Randell very cleverly conveyed to him the entire conversation).

Sir Godfrey : What would be your solution ?

Newman: Again I underline the fact that I have no power to make public statements for any political party. As for my self I would like to have a link with Western civilization.



Mr. Randell : Would you please make you rself clearer?

Newman : I would like the Jews in Palestine to have a link and to be <sup>out</sup> the ~~forwards~~ post of the British commonwealth in the Middle East, and in my belief the British need this Jewish post no less than the Jews need it, because it is not only the Germans who have dreamed of Drang Nach Osten. The Russians too have always dreamed of a harbor of their own in warm waters. They will temporarily have to relinquish their dream of the Dardanelles, but they will still insist and try by every ~~the~~ means to have a port of their own in the Mediterranean. The Jerusalem Mufty, before serving Nazism, had connections with Russia. The British should have learned their lesson during the years 1939 to 1942, from their closeness to Egypt when a big part of the Egyptian government, including King Farouk so easily were ready to accept Facism. So the British should remember how little they can depend on Iraq and Iran.

Mr. Randell : How would you visualize a Jewish Palestine in connection with the British Commonwealth ?

Newman : The White Paper must be abolished and the doors open for Jewish immigration.

Sir Godfrey : ( Impatiently ) But the Arabs are a majority there.

Newman : If it was possible to transfer two million men from America to England within three months, so two million Jews from Eastern Europe and the Balkans could be transferred to palestine in less than ~~two~~ months.

Mr. Randell : Let's get back to our subject, Mr. Newman.

Newman : We will have to take over the economic development of the ~~own~~ country.

Sir Godfrey : What do you mean?

Newman : We have been sold out to all kinds of dumping without the dumping governments being requested to buy even \$1.00 of goods from us. The whole import and Export policy would have to be in our hands, and the government domain will have to be made available for Jewish settlement.

Mr. Randell : What do you mean by " government domain "? Isn't it a rule ~~in~~ under the the White Paper that Jews are not allowed to buy land in certain sections?

Newman : First of all, the Jews have never recognized the White Paper. As far as we are concerned that document does not exist. In the second place I am talking about government domain. As Chairman of the Palestinian Ex-Servicemen of His Majesty's forces, I have the written promise of the Palestine government signed by the previous High Commissioner, General Wauchope, providing for the government to put up a commission of three government officers and three members of my organization to survey all the government land in Palestine and to select those suitable for settlement, with the view in mind, that that land will be made available for members of my organization. In my opinion this land can be made available right now, to prepare it for the settlement of the demobilized Jewish men and women who are now serving under the British flag in the Near East.

Sir Godfrey : But we are bound by the White Paper.

Newman : The White Paper does not prohibit the Palestine Government from granting land to the War Veterans. I hope that when I get home I will be able to take up this matter with the proper ~~and~~ authorities.

Sir Godfrey : I don't think American Jewry is so much interested in going to Palestine.

Newman : You may be surprised to learn that there are <sup>about</sup> ~~from~~ 10-15000 American citizens in Palestine. Furthermore, I want you to



know that there are three or four specific settlements of American youth in Palestine. Only lately an American youth group formed a new colony known as the Leon Blum colony, which was only a few weeks ago described at length in the New York Times.

Sir Godfrey: But what about the Arab question?

Newman: In 1914 you wouldn't have asked me about an Arab question. There was no such question, because all the Arabic countries were under the Turkish regime. They were freed and became independent only as a result of the Allied victory in the first World War. The Allies kept their promise to the Arabic world. The Arabs got their independence and vast stretches of land. Why shouldn't the British government keep its promise to the Jews?

Sir Godfrey: But what about the Palestine Arabs? They have been there for over a thousand years.

Newman: What have they done with the country for those thousand years? They ~~kept~~ have allowed it to remain a desert. We, in the last 20 years have done to Palestine in proportion to what the American people did to Manhattan island after they took it from the Indians. (There was a telephone call and Sir Godfrey was asked to leave the room. He apologized and asked Mr. Randell to continue the conversation. On his way out he said:)

Sir Godfrey: I cannot accept your approach to the Arab problem.

Mr. Randell: Can you explain why the Jews do not attack the British Government more vigorously in connection with the White Paper?

Newman: Our leadership is inclined to be favorable to the British. We would not feel at all at ease under present circumstances -- the war and the international situation -- in bitterly attacking the British government with whom we will have to live in the future, on friendly terms.

Mr. Randell: I must admit to you, Mr. Newman, that to the extent that I have been able to form an opinion on the feelings of the American Jewish people towards this question, I believe that the whole Jewish community opposes the White Paper, while there are divisions on the problem of Jewish State or Jewish Commonwealth, this information was reaffirmed to me by Mr. Rothschild of the American Jewish Committee, he ~~also~~ believes that there is no question that the whole Jewish community opposes the White Paper. Would you as friend of the British, recommend that the White Paper be abolished before March, 1944?

Newman: As much as I am convinced that the White Paper cannot survive, I would like, as a friend of the British who once wore a British uniform, to see the British government make this gesture before Jewish and non-Jewish public opinion compels them to do it.

Here we parted. Mr. Randell walked out to the hall with me, thanking me for the informative conversation, and reassured me that my name tops the priority list for returning to Palestine. He wished me success in obtaining government domain for settlement of ex-servicemen, and expressed the hope that the High Commissioner would respect his predecessor's commitment.