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American Zionist Emergency Council, resignation, booklets and
statements, 1944.

DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER'S RESIGNATION

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A MEMORANDUM

The appalling and long festering situation within the American Zionist Emergency Council which led to the resignation of Dr. Abba Hillel Silver as co-chairman of the Council and as chairman of its Executive Committee is known to very few. Those of us who had been in daily contact with the political work of our movement but who could not in conscience continue after Dr. Silver and his program were ruthlessly sacrificed, have resolved that you shall have the facts. You who have done such a magnificent job during the past year, are entitled to the truth.

In a memorandum dated December 12th, you were informed of much that had transpired in Washington in connection with the Palestine resolutions. That memorandum avoided any reference to the shocking conditions which obtained in official Zionist circles during this period. But after all that has taken place, and with wild rumors agitating our people throughout the country, we regard it as a solemn duty to pass on as many of the important facts as can be encompassed within the space of this memorandum.

At a meeting of the American Zionist Emergency Council on October 30th and at a subsequent meeting, it was agreed that the "green light" should be obtained from the State Department and the President before we pressed for action on the resolution. This was done, not out of a desire to avoid offending the State Department or the President, but to protect ourselves against the kind of opposition which we encountered last Spring. No one anticipated any serious difficulty in view of Secretary Stimson's letter lifting the military ban, the President's own statement of October 15th, etc. Accordingly, Dr. Silver, Dr. Wise and Dr. Nahum Goldmann called on Mr. Stettinius on November 9th to get the "green light."

Mr. Stettinius had no opinion of his own, but said that he would consult with the President. It is altogether false to suggest, as has been suggested, that Dr. Silver or the other members of the delegation which called on Mr. Stettinius gave any promise, expressed or implied, that we would give up the resolution if the State Department or the President registered objections. If anyone gave such a promise, it was done before or after the interview with Mr. Stettinius - and not by Dr. Silver.

At a meeting of the Emergency Council on November 21st, Dr. Wise reported that on November 15th Mr. Stettinius had telephoned to him and had said that the President thought we should not proceed with action on the resolution and that the matter should be left with him for a little while longer. In the discussion that followed, it was clear that the Council was not satisfied that Mr. Stettinius' reply definitely closed the matter. On the contrary, it was felt by quite a few that a mistake had been made in going to Mr. Stettinius in the first place, that we should have assumed that the "green light" had, in fact, been given by President Roosevelt in his statement of October 15th. Dr. Silver urged that a strong effort should be made to induce the President to change his mind, but Dr. Wise argued against such action, declaring that the President was leaving the country almost immediately. Dr. Wise emphasized further that Congress would adjourn in a few days and that he had been assured that our resolution could not possibly be acted upon in the closing days of this Congress. Dr. Wise was badly misinformed in both of these matters.

The Council agreed that a strong effort should be made to reach President Roosevelt. It was clear from Dr. Wise's attitude that if the matter were left to

him, no earnest effort would be made to urge the President to change his mind. As far as he was concerned, the resolution might just as well die.

The President was not in Washington and could not be reached. It was not until December 2nd, 11 days after the meeting of the Council, that Senator Wagner, who was deeply committed to the resolution, wrote a personal letter to the President, in which he explained the situation as he saw it and appealed to the President to withdraw his objections. Meanwhile, important events had already taken place -- without any pressure on Dr. Silver's part. For many months your committee, along with the other local Emergency Councils, had been interviewing your Senators and Representatives, Congressmen-elect and other public officials, and obtaining pledges from them to vote for our resolution. All members of Congress received our book, "America and Palestine" which contained the printed opinions of nearly 400 members of the 78th Congress. Senator Wagner informed the Convention of the Zionist Organization of America that the President's statement clears the way for Congressional action on the Palestine resolutions. Secretary Stimson had lifted the military ban. The ZOA Convention called for speedy action on the Palestine resolution. Congressman Bloom had announced that he would summon a meeting of his Committee to consider the Palestine resolution on November 15th. In short, the Congress, which all of us had been cultivating for a full year, was set for action and the sponsors of the resolutions insisted upon discharging their obligations to the Jewish people.

Dr. Silver had wired Dr. Wise on November 22nd, the day after the Council's meeting, to this effect: "Because of strike here (in Cleveland) could not reach you by telephone. Strongly urge you to contact Bloom immediately and urge him to see the Chief and persuade him to give clearance to resolutions... Please inform me by telegram or telephone results of conversation with Bloom."

Dr. Wise never replied to this telegram.

On the very day that Dr. Silver arrived in Washington (Nov. 27) he went to see Congressman Bloom to urge him to get in touch with the President. Congressman Bloom, a staunch supporter of President Roosevelt, declared that he did not need any new "green light." He had already made his own soundings. He stated that he was going forward with the resolution. Congressman Bloom requested that Dr. Silver write him a letter indicating approval of the course he was following. Dr. Silver complied with Mr. Bloom's request in order that the resolution be kept alive pending negotiations with the Administration. As you know, favorable action was taken in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday, November 29th.

When Dr. Silver met with Senator Wagner on Tuesday, November 28th, the Senator had no plans to see the President to persuade him to remove his objections, despite the fact that Dr. Wise and Mr. Shulman had seen Senator Wagner in Atlantic City on November 26th. But Senator Wagner was, nevertheless, determined to go into the meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the next morning and have his resolution considered. On that same Tuesday, Mr. Shulman telephoned Senator Wagner's secretary in Washington and gave him many reasons as to why the Senator should use his efforts to postpone consideration of the resolution by the Senate Committee. This was not Mr. Shulman's mission. Three men -- Dr. Silver, Dr. Wise and Mr. Shulman -- had been authorized and directed to try to persuade the Administration to change its mind, not to urge Senators and Congressmen to desist from working for the passage of the resolution.

As on earlier occasions, our leaders were working at cross purposes. Dr. Wise and Mr. Shulman were pressing Senator Wagner to have his resolution shelved, and

Dr. Silver, following the clear line indicated by the Council, was urging the Senator to get in touch with the President. Senator Wagner found himself the victim of two opposing forces pulling in different directions. He was telephoned a score of times from New York by people, all of whom spoke in the name of the Emergency Council or of Zionists. Senator Wagner was baffled and confused -- and understandably so.

On Saturday evening, December 2nd, when Dr. Silver arrived in Pittsburgh to attend the American Jewish Conference, the situation was the following: the resolution in the Senate was hanging fire, pending word from Mr. Stettinius and a reply from President Roosevelt to Senator Wagner's letter. Senator Wagner and Dr. Silver were awaiting an appointment with Mr. Stettinius scheduled for noon on Monday. There was little doubt that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was determined to act -- without being prodded or pressed. The House Foreign Affairs Committee had already acted favorably and its action had been warmly hailed by the Jewish press, by the Jewish public and by most of the leaders of the Zionist parties.

When he arrived in Pittsburgh, Dr. Silver planned to call together the members of the Interim Committee, consisting of the co-chairmen of the Council and the representatives of the Jewish Agency, which, the Council had ruled, was to consult on urgent political affairs between meetings of the Emergency Council. To his amazement he discovered, upon his arrival, that Dr. Israel Goldstein had during the day called a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Z. O. A. to discuss the Palestine Resolutions, despite the fact that neither the Interim Committee nor the Council had as yet discussed the matter, and that Dr. Silver, who was closest to the whole situation, was not present to supply accurate information. The halls of the William Penn Hotel in Pittsburgh were buzzing with rumors, fragments of information and misinformation. What Zionist purpose Dr. Goldstein intended to serve by calling this meeting, at such a time and place, where hundreds of delegates including non-Zionists were gathered not for a Zionist convention but for the American Jewish Conference, is incomprehensible. Nothing but mischief could result from such hasty and ill-considered opinions expressed on insufficient and largely inadequate data. Here was the start of a campaign to "run down" the resolution passed by the House Committee and to discredit Dr. Silver, whose name had been so closely identified with the resolution.

Dr. Wise declined to attend the meeting of the Interim Committee which Dr. Silver had called in Pittsburgh. The other members of this Committee who did attend received all the essential facts from Dr. Silver.

Dr. Wise called an unauthorized meeting of the Emergency Council in Pittsburgh for Sunday evening, December 3 (the Council's Constitution clearly provides that no special meeting of the Council can be called without three days' notice.) This meeting resulted in nothing except a request that Dr. Silver meet with the heads of the four parties represented in the Council to consider what should be done in case the President persisted in his objection. Dr. Silver had to leave for Washington immediately after his report to the American Jewish Conference, and rushed from the platform to the train.

On Monday, December 4, Dr. Silver, together with Senator Wagner, had an interview with Mr. Stettinius. Both were shocked and amazed when they were shown a telegram sent by Dr. Wise from Pittsburgh to Mr. Stettinius, which in so many words stated that while Dr. Wise wished the resolution passed, he was prepared to acquiesce in its deferment if the Administration so desired. This, in effect, told the Administration that the Jews of America would quickly reconcile themselves to the deferment of the resolution, and that Dr. Wise, co-chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council, could be counted upon to defend the Administration's stand.

When considered in retrospect, it becomes quite clear that Dr. Wise's unauthorized telegram, sent without the prior knowledge of the Council or of Dr. Silver, sealed the fate of the Palestine resolution.

Mr. Stettinius told Senator Wagner and Dr. Silver that he would immediately transmit to the President the case as presented to him by them. (He characterized the case presented by Dr. Silver as "unanswerable.")

It must be borne in mind that every member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee received telegrams from the President of the ZOA, urging favorable action on the Palestine resolution. Similar telegrams were sent by the heads of the other parties. The telegram sent by Dr. Israel Goldstein on December 5th opened with the statement: "We earnestly urge you to report favorably the Palestine resolution for adoption by the present Congress." As of Tuesday, December 5th then, the presidents of the Zionist parties in the United States -- including Dr. Goldstein -- were officially urging the Senate Committee to act, not to defer action! If there was a decision against taking such steps and if the decision was binding and unalterable, then clearly the sending of such telegrams by the Zionist leaders was either a violation of these decisions or a reversal of earlier decisions. It is as clear as a pikestaff that if the resolution had been approved, all the Zionist leaders would have eagerly shared the credit for that achievement. Now that it has been deferred, the situation is, of course, quite different ...

What happened in the meetings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, you have learned from our earlier memorandum. It was quite clear to the State Department that the Committee was intent upon reporting favorably on the resolution. The State Department then adopted another method to achieve its end, the deferment of action on the resolution. They tried to get the Zionists themselves to withdraw the resolution. The Zionists were to assume the role of lobbyists against their own measure. Someone got in touch with Dr. Wise, presumably on Wednesday, December 6th or early Thursday morning, December 7th, for by Thursday noon Senator Connally was informing Senator Taft that the resolution would not pass the Committee, because Dr. Wise and the Zionists of New York would soon be heard from. On the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Stettinius telephoned Senator Wagner and asked him whether he had already heard from Dr. Wise and the Zionists of New York about withdrawing the resolution.

Dr. Wise lost no time in complying with the request made of him. He called two meetings, again in violation of constitutional principles, and at these meetings it was decided to send a delegation representing the 4 parties in the Council to Washington to arrange for the deferment of the resolutions. The Mizrahi Organization voted against this proposal and refused to participate in the delegation. The delegation, headed by Dr. Israel Goldstein, arrived in Washington on Friday morning, December 8th. It had been instructed to see Dr. Silver before going to the Capitol and that nothing was to be done until they had spoken with Dr. Silver. But by 8:30 A. M., Dr. Wise had already telephoned Senator Wagner, again urging him to ask for deferment.

The delegation was advised by Dr. Silver that it should not make the Zionist movement ridiculous in Washington by requesting the shelving of a resolution which all of us had been urging upon Congress for almost a year. Dr. Silver pointed out that the Senate Committee was pressing for it, that it was not the duty of Zionist leaders to press for deferment, that it was enough to indicate to the State Department that the Zionist leaders were not pressing the resolution but that the matter was in the hands of the Senate Committee, which was bent on action.

The delegation saw Mr. Stettinius, Senator Wagner and Senator Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and discussed various compromise proposals which had been considered in the discussion with Dr. Silver. The delegation made it clear to Mr. Stettinius that the Zionist leaders were not pressing for action. While the Secretary of State thought well of a compromise whereby the resolution would be voted out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with the understanding that it would not come to the floor of the Senate for final action at that session of Congress, this proposal was turned down by Senator Connally. The anti-Zionist elements in Washington who were anxious to see the resolution shelved, felt very confident -- the very presence of the delegation of Zionist leaders outside the doors of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicated that the plan to get the Zionists to disown their own measure was succeeding. Members of the Senate Committee saw what was happening. The Jews themselves were divided and did not know what they wanted after they had conducted an intensive campaign in behalf of the Palestine resolutions for almost a year -- and all this was happening only 48 hours after the very same Zionist leaders had sent telegrams to every member of the Senate Committee urging favorable action on the resolution!

The delegation of Zionists was actually invited by Senator Connally to come in and address the meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Fortunately, they refused this invitation.

What took place at the last two meetings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee you have learned from the earlier memorandum. You know that the State Department has assumed full responsibility for the deferment of action. You have seen the statement issued by the State Department. You know, too, the attitude of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as indicated by the statement which twelve of its members -- seven Democrats and five Republicans, constituting two-thirds of the Committee members who considered the resolution -- made: "... we wish to record our own personal approval of the Resolution."

When Dr. Silver presented a complete report of what had transpired in connection with the resolutions to the Emergency Council on December 20th, he made a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the present situation and submitted a program of action which he urged the Council to consider. He also urged that a sub-committee be appointed to make a careful study of the Council's organizational structure with an eye to the greater efficiency and the smoother functioning of the Council and the avoidance of such tragic pulling at cross purposes in the future.

Dr. Silver's statement and an account of what transpired at the last two meetings of the Council cannot be covered adequately in this memorandum. Suffice it to say that the small group which had been quietly opposing Dr. Silver and frustrating some of his most important efforts almost from the very moment he was named to lead American Zionist political work, refused to deal with questions of policy. They were out to "get" Dr. Silver. This clique, composed chiefly of the representatives of the Zionist Organization of America on the Council, created an "issue" -- Dr. Silver had "contravened" the Council's decisions. They could not wait to settle their score with him immediately. A motion to censure Dr. Silver was squarely rejected. However, a motion calling for the resignation of "all officers" of the Council was made, following which another motion to table this last proposal was defeated. Dr. Silver then resigned.

The ludicrousness of the trumped up charges against Dr. Silver becomes obvious after one surveys the account of what really took place in Washington. It should be added that there have been occasions when there was contravention of the Council's decisions, when Zionist leaders had acted independently and broken

discipline, and when such actions had damaging effects on our work -- but the gentlemen of the Z. O. A. in the Council not only refrained from censuring such acts, but condoned them, actually gave them moral support and encouragement. Dr. Silver was not one of the leaders whose actions were under fire. But that is a story requiring a chapter of its own.

Here, then, is an important part of this tragic story. We have dealt with first things first, and have given you an account of some important happenings in connection with the Palestine resolutions. Other important aspects of this critical situation, as well as a discussion of the basic and vital question of policy involved here (which is really the core of the problem) must be dealt with separately. This basic question of policy should be fairly clear to you from this memorandum and from Dr. Silver's statement of resignation: "I shall continue to advocate ... a policy in which timidity, appeasement and backstairs 'diplomacy' will have no place."

Harry L. Shapiro

Formerly Executive Director,
American Zionist Emergency Council

Harold P. Manson

Formerly Director of Information,
American Zionist Emergency Council

STATEMENT BY DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER

I have been requested to comment on the statements issued by Dr. Israel Goldstein which purport to give the facts connected with the controversy which developed in the American Zionist Emergency Council. Dr. Goldstein's facts suffer from deft distortions, twists and significant omissions, which give a false and misleading account of what actually transpired.

1) Dr. Goldstein states that at a meeting of the Emergency Council on October 30, it was unanimously decided not to press for the resolutions unless and until the preliminary approval of the Executive branch of the Government shall have been secured. No such decision was taken by the Emergency Council on October 30. In fact no decisions whatsoever were taken at that meeting. The minutes of the meeting quote me as saying: "We will not go ahead with the resolution without fully canvassing the situation. If the answer from the State Department is at all vague, I would not recommend proceeding with it." This precaution was suggested, not out of a desire not to offend the State Department or the President, but in order to protect ourselves against the kind of surprise which was jumped on us last Spring. The Council wanted to make doubly sure before it moved; but no one really expected any opposition in view of all that had transpired in the preceding months.

At that same meeting I reported (and I quote from the minutes of the meeting) "that in anticipation of the reconsideration of the resolution when Congress reconvenes, the Emergency Council has been engaged in stimulating afresh the interest of the members of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. The local emergency committees in communities in which these members resided had been asked to approach them again and to bring them up to date on recent developments and to suggest that early action on the resolution, when Congress reconvenes, would be desirable. The results so far are gratifying."

Thus the Council, on October 30, was fully informed that continued activities in behalf of our resolution were going on and would continue in Washington and all over the country. It is false to suggest even by implication that the Emergency Council at its meeting on October 30 ordered all of our activities in behalf of the resolution to be discontinued. It merely directed that we explore the mind of the State Department on our resolution, and there was a consensus of opinion that if the State Department attitude was found to be negative, we would then not proceed with the resolutions. Until such time, however, activities in behalf of the resolution were not to be discontinued, nor was word to go out that we were even considering a possible postponement.

Inquiries were accordingly made at the State Department, and at the meeting on November 21, Dr. Wise reported "that Mr. Stettinius had telephoned him and informed him that he had seen the President who urged that nothing be done about the bill at this time and that the matter be left in his hands a little while longer."

This, however, did not satisfy the members of the Emergency Council. Many felt that they had made a mistake in deciding to make inquiries at the State Department in the first place. We might have assumed that the withdrawal of the military objections, the party platforms which included Palestine planks and the statement of the President himself on October 15 were sufficient "green light" to go ahead.

At this meeting, and here again I quote from the minutes, "there followed a lengthy discussion, and it was finally decided that efforts be made once more to obtain clearance from the President through Senator Wagner, and perhaps others. It was

agreed to leave it to Dr. Wise, Dr. Silver and Mr. Shulman to take the necessary action with regard to an approach to the President." There was no other action taken at this meeting.

In other words, the Emergency Council, upon second thought, was not satisfied to have the resolution shelved just because the State Department and the President had indicated their objection to the resolution. They were not content to let it go at that. They wanted persuasive influence to be brought to bear upon the Administration to change its mind.

Dr. Wise strenuously objected to this line of procedure. He did not want the President "annoyed" by our insistence and our persuasion. He reluctantly yielded to the pressure of the Council and thereafter, far from using his energies vigorously to persuade the Secretary of State and the President, he seriously interfered with me in carrying out the clear mandate of the Council.

2) Dr. Goldstein forgets to mention the fact which I made known to the Council that the day following the November 21 meeting, I wired Dr. Wise urging him to get in touch with Congressman Bloom to see the President. Dr. Wise never replied to this telegram.

3) No one interested in the passage of the bill ever saw the President on the resolution at that time or since. He was out of Washington. All our information has come through Mr. Stettinius. The first and the only personal contact with Mr. Stettinius to carry out the wishes of the Council could not be made before December 4. It was made by Senator Wagner and myself. Senator Wagner was not in Washington before the preceding Tuesday and our appointment could not be made before the following Monday.

4) But by December 4 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had already met and had considered our resolution. In fact, at the request of Senator Taft, our Palestine Resolution was to have been considered by the Committee on November 22, but out of courtesy to Senator Wagner who was out of the city, the consideration of our resolution by the committee was postponed to November 29. I reported at the meeting of our Council on November 21 that such a meeting of the Senate Committee had been scheduled for the next day, but had been postponed to the 29th.

Senator Taft requested consideration of the resolution on his own initiative. He was neither requested nor urged by me. Already on November 11 (please note the date) Senator Taft wrote me: "I have had to delay my return to Washington until Thursday, but I hope we can proceed with the Palestine Resolution immediately." He was one of the co-sponsors of the resolution. He had resented the postponement of the resolution last Spring. It was he who had kept after the military until he obtained the letter from Secretary of War Stimson withdrawing their objections. As soon as Congress reconvened, he began pressing for his resolution, just as we all did, including the delegates at the Convention of the ZOA at Atlantic City.

5) Dr. Goldstein suggests that if I had not brought pressure on Congressman Bloom to take the matter up with his committee, no action whatsoever would have been taken in Congress. I did not arrive in Washington until November 27. By that time a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as I indicated above, had already been set for November 29, and the Senate Committee was prepared to act favorably on our resolution at that meeting.

It has been suggested that I should have asked the committee to defer action. Why? This was certainly not my mission nor mandate in Washington. I was there to see

whether I could persuade the State Department and the President to withdraw their objections to the passage of the resolution. Failing in that, the Council would then have to decide what to do, since the first report of the President's disapproval did not close the matter as far as the Council was concerned. I had not yet had the opportunity to contact either the State Department or the President. I was not to see Mr. Stettinius until December 4. Until I had had the chance to persuade them and failed, I could not go, nor did the Council obligate me to go, to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and ask them, many of whom had been critical of the State Department's intervention and of the President's action last Spring, to postpone action on our Palestine Resolution for which the Jews of America had so persistently pressed up to the very last. We were not pressing for the resolution. The pressure came from the Senate Committee itself which was so much interested in the Palestine Resolution that it met on four successive occasions to consider it and it insisted time and again on approving our resolution in spite of two personal appearances before it made by the Secretary of State and in spite of other pressure brought by the Administration against it. Even when the resolution was finally postponed as a result of the persistent pressure from the State Department and the President, two-thirds of the members of the Senate Committee signed a round robin in which they stated that they would have voted for the resolution were it not for this insistence of the State Department and the President.

Congressman Bloom had publicly announced right after the President's statement of October 15 that he would summon a meeting of his committee the day after Congress reconvened. He was eager to move forward. I called on him for the purpose of getting him to contact the President and State Department. He did not feel that the State Department had to be consulted about it. It was none of its business, he stated. Prior to my arrival in Washington, and in anticipation of the meeting of his committee, he had had printed as a House document, the Palestine endorsements made by the four hundred congressmen and senators which appeared in the volume, "America and Palestine," recently published by the Emergency Council. It was Congressman Bloom's own idea and all credit is due him for it. Congressman Bloom was somewhat concerned with the fact that he might be blamed if he moved forward and the resolution failed of passage in his committee. He wanted us to share in the responsibility for moving ahead. I reassured him on that score, and at his request, I wrote him a letter following our interview in which I backed him up. Congressman Bloom convoked his committee on November 29, the very day on which the Senate Committee met to consider our resolution. Bloom was undoubtedly encouraged to move forward rapidly by the fact that the Senate Committee had scheduled a meeting on November 29 and was expected to act favorably on the resolution.

6) When we finally got to Mr. Stettinius on December 4--and here Dr. Goldstein's memory again conveniently fails him--we were shown, right at the outset, that fatal telegram of Dr. Wise which was dispatched without the knowledge of either Senator Wagner or myself and without any authorization from the Council on the very eve of our interview, a telegram which was calculated to nullify the effectiveness of our mission to the Secretary of State. This telegram which in so many words told the Secretary of State, and through him the President, that Dr. Wise and many of his associates would readily and without protest accept their decision with reference to the resolution, broke the back of the entire effort which the Council had resolved to make in order to change the mind of the State Department and of the President. Our only hope lay in persuading Mr. Stettinius, and through him, the President, that the entire Zionist Movement and the entire Jewish people of America were solidly united in demanding action on the resolution which had been hanging fire for over ten months, and that their hopes, which had been raised so high by all that had transpired during the year, would be dashed to the ground if it became known that the President insisted on a second deferment. Dr. Wise's telegram which was sent

from Pittsburgh at the time of the sessions of the American Jewish Conference, and presumably with the knowledge of Dr. Goldstein, deliberately wrecked this effort and torpedoed the resolution.

7) Dr. Goldstein has another serious lapse of memory. On December 5, he sent the following telegram to every member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "We earnestly urge you report out favorably Palestine Resolution for adoption by present Congress ... Your Committee's favorable action would be deeply appreciated as fulfillment President's magnificent message to last Zionist Organization Convention and overwhelming American opinion as expressed recently in both party platforms."

Why did Dr. Goldstein violate the "unanimous decision" of the Emergency Council in urging Senators to act on the resolution when he knew full well that no "green light" had been given? If Dr. Silver is guilty of a breach of discipline, what about Dr. Goldstein? But the gentleman was playing safe! If the resolution passed he would share in the credit. If it failed - why he would see to it that the failure would all be blamed on Dr. Silver.

And having sent this telegram, why did he appear in Washington forty-eight hours later to urge the same Senators not to pass the resolution?

And having come to Washington to persuade the Senators not to pass the resolution, why did he permit himself to be persuaded by me not to carry out his mission? Instead, he and the other members of the committee went to Mr. Stettinius to tell him that the Zionists were not pressing for the resolution but that the pressure came from the Senate Committee itself (which, of course, was the truth). Is Dr. Goldstein unwilling ever to assume responsibility for what he does, or says, or writes? Is the fault always that of someone else?

8) Dr. Goldstein again has a convenient lapse of memory when he fails to mention that at the Executive of the Emergency Council which met in Washington on Monday morning, December 11 (and which by the way was the only authorized meeting of the Emergency Council since the meeting on November 21 -- the other meetings of December 7 and 9 being rump meetings called by Dr. Wise in contravention of the clear provisions of the constitution) it was agreed that nothing be done to interfere with the passage of the resolution on which the Foreign Affairs Committee was to act that very afternoon, but instead Mr. Stettinius should be asked to issue a statement that his appearance before the Senate Committee did not indicate a change of attitude on the part of the President. Nothing was to be said to Mr. Stettinius about deferring the Palestine Resolution. Dr. Wise and Dr. Goldstein concurred on this, and I joined in the delegation to Mr. Stettinius with that understanding and only on that basis.

9) Dr. Goldstein stated that the resolution which was approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee was regarded by many Zionists here and especially in Palestine as a "watered-down" resolution because the word "Jewish" was omitted before "Commonwealth" and the word "ultimately" was retained. How, then, is one to account for the fact that the presidents of Hadassah, Mizrachi and the Poale Zion, as well as Mr. Lipsky of the Jewish Agency Executive, hailed the resolution in public statements? Dr. Wise told Congressman Bloom and me on the very day that it was voted that it was "a very good resolution." The Jewish press likewise welcomed it heartily, and the American Jewish Conference, meeting in Pittsburgh, acclaimed it.

It might be in point here to recall that at the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs - on February 8 - Dr. Goldstein was asked by Congressman Schiffler: "You do not propose immediately to have a Commonwealth?" To which Dr. Goldstein

replied: "No; we could not propose it as an immediate step, because we realize there would have to be a Jewish majority in the land before we could act for the implementation of a commonwealth, and the achievement of a Jewish majority will undoubtedly take some time." (See p. 119 of the Hearings.)

10) Dr. Goldstein is guilty of a distortion when he states that at the final meeting of the Emergency Council, where I announced my resignation, I asked to be made the sole leader in the Zionist movement in America with absolute unconditional power. "When this condition was not agreed on," states Dr. Goldstein, I "handed in my resignation." There is not a scintilla of truth in all this. I stated at the meeting that the present set-up of dual or multiple leadership in the Council has led to serious conflicts in the past and had culminated in the present crisis. I advised a re-organization of the Emergency Council with an eye towards the elimination of conflicting leadership and the centralization of authority. In connection with that, I read at great length a letter which I wrote to Dr. Wise in 1943 at the time when he and Dr. Weizmann asked me to take over the leadership of the political work of our movement. In that letter I stated that if Dr. Wise wished to continue as the active political leader of the movement, no one was thinking of supplanting him. I assumed that he wished to be relieved of it. "If now you feel that you wish to retain that office, not in an honorary but in an active capacity, I wish you would let me know definitely and in making my reply I will say that Dr. Wise is head of the political work of the Emergency Council and there is no need for drafting me or anyone else."

Dr. Wise knew exactly under what conditions I assumed the office at his and Dr. Weizmann's urging. The purpose was to eliminate the very unfortunate overlapping and cross-purposes in our political work which brought the Emergency Council to bankruptcy two years ago.

My resignation, as everyone knows, was not prompted, as Dr. Goldstein asserts, by the refusal of the Emergency Council to accept my suggestions for re-organization. These suggestions were not even considered at the meeting and have not yet been acted upon. It was a motion to request all the officers of the Emergency Council to resign, a motion which the Council refused to table, which called forth my resignation.

THE FOLLOWING SECTION (#11) IS CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

11) Dr. Goldstein refers to a memorandum which Dr. Nahum Goldmann sent me purporting to be a report of what the Secretary of State had told him and Dr. Wise in reply to the request of the Council to issue the statement which is referred to above. I was a member of the committee which called upon Mr. Stettinius to request that statement. The reply of Mr. Stettinius was not given in writing to the Council, but orally to Dr. Goldmann and Dr. Wise who happened to be calling on the Secretary of State on another mission. Dr. Goldmann sent me the following memorandum a few days later:

"Mr. Stettinius called Dr. Wise and me into his room before meeting with the delegation. He told us that he had been in touch with the President about the statement which we had suggested he should issue. He said that the President was in a very bad mood because we had gone ahead with the Resolution and instead of acquiescing in his request to hold the matter up for the time being, had sought to bring pressure to bear through the Senate. He felt that the Zionists had lost confidence in him, and Mr. Stettinius said that in the circumstances it was difficult to discuss such questions with him at this time. It would not be possible for him (Mr. S.) to issue the letter suggested."

I was surprised and disturbed by this report, for in my two previous contacts with Mr. Stettinius there was no indication whatsoever given that the President was in a very bad mood or that he felt that the Zionists had lost confidence in him.

Dr. Goldmann did not treat that "information" as confidential. He conveyed this "information" to newspapermen in New York. A panic mood was being fostered among Zionists with the design -- as later events showed -- to bring about my resignation.

In preparation for my official report to the Emergency Council, which was to be given on December 20, and in order not to do any injustice either to the Secretary of State or to the President, I made inquiries as to whether this memorandum of Dr. Goldmann correctly represented what Mr. Stettinius had said, and whether perhaps he had been misquoted, or misunderstood.

I received a reply to the effect that Dr. Goldmann's memorandum "was not quite in accordance with the Secretary's record. The Secretary told Dr. Wise that he had been in touch with the President as he had offered to do regarding the statement which Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver had requested him to make. The reaction that Mr. Stettinius obtained was that the President felt that this group should have confidence in his handling of the matter and that it would not be appropriate for Mr. Stettinius to issue the statement. Mr. Stettinius asked Dr. Wise if he would be good enough to give this information to Dr. Silver."

This, of course, is a radically different version from that of Dr. Goldmann's. There is nothing here about the President being in a very bad mood, or feeling that the Zionists had lost confidence in him. But Rabbi Goldstein, far from being shocked at Dr. Goldmann's amazing misquotation of a most critical report and far from regarding it as something "scandalous," denounces rather my fact-finding inquiry as something "scandalous"...

12) There are many other things which this Rabbi chooses to forget. Already at the Zionist Convention in Atlantic City he and his little cabal were preparing the way for my elimination. The Resolutions Committee of the Convention had prepared a resolution which wholeheartedly endorsed my administration and called for a continuation of the dynamic and successful program of the Emergency Council "under the present leadership." At a subsequent meeting, Dr. Goldstein demanded the elimination of the words "under the present leadership." He made that request, he said, in the name of Dr. Wise with whom he had spoken by telephone in New York. I stated, of course, that as far as I was concerned, I intended to hold my office not a single day longer than the Emergency Council wished me to, and that, of course, I would agree to the elimination of the words "under the present leadership."

The ZOA Administration had a difficult time at the plenary session of the Convention to put through the resolution without the words "under the present leadership." I personally had to step forward and beg the delegates to agree to the omission of those words. But my friends and I knew all along what was in the mind of Dr. Goldstein and his clique.

13) Many will recall the fight which raged at the ZOA Convention in Atlantic City about my annual report which the administration was determined to schedule at the very end of the Convention when most of the delegates would have gone home, in order to make small change of it. Dr. Goldstein had to yield to the pressure from the delegates but the whole miserable affair was another result of the embittered and envenomed policy of undermining, belittling and discrediting which Dr. Goldstein and his friends had been carrying on throughout the year.

14) The Rabbi has since carried out a successful purge of Silver adherents on the Executive of the ZOA and among the representatives of the ZOA on the Emergency Council. His efficiency in perfecting his political machine should be the envy of Tammany Hall.

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