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Bloom, Congressman Sol, 1944.

AHS File

February 19, 1944

Re: Pal. Res

The Honorable Sol Bloom
House of Representatives of the United States
Washington, D.C.

My dear Congressman Bloom:

I have just returned home and I regard it as my first pleasant duty to write to you and to tell you how grateful I and my friends are to you for the superb manner in which you conducted the historic hearings on the Palestine Resolution. No one who attended those hearings could fail to be impressed by your unfailing fairness, courtesy and good humor. I know that some of the opinions which were expressed by some of the witnesses were distinctly distasteful to you, nevertheless you gave each one his day in court. Friend and foe alike of the Resolution departed with a sense of having been given a square deal at your hands. You brought high honor to your distinguished office and you reflected credit upon your people.

The eyes of the Jewish world are anxiously waiting for the outcome. The passage of the Resolution will send a thrill to the hearts of American Jewry, but more especially to the hearts of the brave Jewish pioneers in Palestine and of our martyred people on the continent of Europe whose last hope of salvation is Palestine. Our enemies are busily at work to defeat the Resolution. Knowing the overwhelming sentiment for it in the House, and that if it is ever brought for a vote it will be carried almost unanimously, they are maneuvering to defeat it by the intervention of the War Department. I am persuaded that the War Department is being used by some of our enemies in the State Department who have not themselves the courage to come out openly against the Resolution. Not so long ago the War Department was unfortunately used in a similar role to keep the Jews of Algeria disfranchised after our armies marched into that country. The same argument of military necessity and the threat of an Arab uprising was used to keep anti-Jewish laws in force under the shadow of the stars and stripes. The War Department's fears proved groundless then. The Jews

February 19, 1944

of Algeria were restored to their citizenship and there was no Arab uprising.

The Jews of America will not fail to hold the Administration responsible for the intervention of the War Department to defeat a piece of legislation calculated to help our people in a tragic hour. If action on the Resolution is postponed, it will be regarded as a defeat, and there will be bitter resentment throughout the country.

I think that you should make the matter very clear to the Chief Executive. In my judgment this should be done before the next meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK



CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum to: Dr. Silver

Dated: February 22, 1944

From: Elihu D. Stone

Yesterday afternoon Dr. Feuer and I visited Congressman Bloom at his office. We spent about two hours with him in a discussion of the situation.

We conveyed to him the point of view of our Committee in clear and unmistakable language. We asserted that unless the Resolution is reported out of the Committee in its entirety, it will not be acceptable to us. Moreover that the basic element of the Resolution is its last clause which refers to "the reconstitution of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth". It is the heart and soul of the measure. This was in response to Mr. Bloom's suggestion that if this clause be eliminated or modified it was his conviction that the balance of the Resolution will be acted upon favorably.

Dr. Feuer and myself have taken great pains to convey to him that with reference to the question of eliminating or modifying the "Commonwealth" provision, there can be no compromise.

I am persuaded that the reasons advanced by us for this attitude were understood by Mr. Bloom.

It was his judgment, however, that this uncompromising attitude may serve to jeopardize the entire Resolution. He read to us a copy of a letter to Senator Connally by the Secretary of War Stimson. He also read to us a copy of a letter from the Secretary of State, relative to the attitude of the Department towards the resolution. The substance of the letter is that in view of the attitude of the

War Department, the Secretary of State, without passing on the merits of the resolution, must identify himself with the War Department.

Mr. Bloom did not solicit any of these communications. It was Congressman Luther A. Johnson of Texas -- the ranking Democratic member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs who solicited the communication without Mr. Bloom's knowledge.

It was the considered judgment of Mr. Bloom that unless some kind of a modification is permitted with reference to the last clause of the Resolution, the views of the War Department will be upheld by the majority of the Committee.

With reference to the Executive Session of the Committee at which two military men representing the War Department will appear, Mr. Bloom stated that it is his understanding that it was Congressman James W. Wadsworth of New York who approached Mr. Stimson and requested him to send representatives of his Department in order to present the views of the military leaders to the Committee.

Mr. Bloom said that at the coming Executive Session of the Committee this Thursday anything could happen. In reply to a suggestion that no final action be taken at the Thursday Session with reference to the Resolution; that the Session be devoted exclusively to the testimony of the representatives of the War Department, Mr. Bloom said that once the Session of the Committee is in progress he would not be able to control the situation; that the Committee then has full freedom of action.

Mr. Bloom said it was possible that someone might suggest an amendment which would mutilate the resolution and be adopted. The Committee may even decide to take negative action on the entire Resolution.

He took pains to point out that even the friendly members of the Committee which could be expected to vote favorably on the merits of the measure, throughout the public hearing -- solicited the obtaining of the views of both the War Department and State Department.

As a result of his observations of the conduct of the individual members of the Committee and by reasons of contacts with them, he felt that the uncompromising position taken by us will endanger the resolution in its entirety. Moreover even the postponement of final action by the Committee may be frustrated, in spite of himself.

It must be stated that Mr. Bloom took great pains to make his own position clear to us that he is ready and willing to go along with us; that he will comply with our wishes. However, Mr. Bloom stated emphatically that he could not assume any responsibility personally for the developments; that in view of the stubborn determination of the Zionist Emergency Committee to have the Resolution pass in its entirety as it is, and without any modification, the Zionist leadership would have to assume complete responsibility for the consequences.

Mr. Bloom pleaded by saying: "Give me something which would serve to accomplish the entire purpose of the Resolution including the last provision and yet would constitute such a modification of the form of the last clause that would make it palatable to the Committee."

In response to a question that in view of the objections of the War Department to the entire resolution by what process of reasoning does Mr. Bloom propose to overcome the objections of the War Department merely by an amendment to the last clause, Mr. Bloom stated that this

problem should be left to himself; that he would assume the responsibility for it and with confidence of success.

A discussion with reference to the kind of change he had in mind took place. The discussion was entirely academic as neither Dr. Feuer nor myself could speak with authority with reference to the modifications. On the contrary we made it very clear that in the line of Dr. Silver's view which he conveyed to Congressman Bloom, the provision with reference to the Commonwealth is the basic substance of the Resolution that no tampering with it will be countenanced, and that without the "commonwealth" provision as it is now, the resolution is valueless.

However, it was the judgment of Mr. Bloom that if the Zionist Emergency Committee could see its way clear to agree to a change of FORM in the last clause he would undertake to carry it through successfully. The amendment would read (in substance) as follows:

"* * * * * SO THAT WHEN THE JEWISH PEOPLE SHALL ATTAIN A MAJORITY IN PALESTINE THEY SHALL RECONSTITUTE PALESTINE AS A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC COMMONWEALTH," or words to that effect.

Mr. Bloom believed that this change in the wording or a similar wording satisfactory to the Zionists would be acceptable to the House Committee; that the resolution then in its entirety would be reported out favorably, the objections of the War Department notwithstanding.

Pressed for an explanation as to how one could reconcile such an action with the negative attitude of the Secretary of War as expressed in his communication wherein he objects to any favorable action on the Resolution as a whole, Mr. Bloom repeatedly insisted to please

leave that matter to him; that he is convinced that with this change in the wording he could persuade the judgment of the members of the Committee of Foreign Affairs in our favor.

It seems to the writer that the aforesaid change (or amendment) does not in any way destroy the original intent. It eliminates the term, "ULTIMATE". It clearly asserts that the establishment of a free and democratic Commonwealth in Palestine is predicated on the attainment of a JEWISH majority of the population in Palestine as a condition precedent and that the words, "MAY RECONSTITUTE," is substituted by the words, "SHALL RECONSTITUTE." "SHALL" is more positive and leaves no room for more than one interpretation.

The writer is skeptical however as to the ability of Mr. Bloom to cause the other members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to coincide with his views.

It must be assumed that the other members of the Committee who now entertain unfavorable views with reference to the "Commonwealth" clause are not guided in their attitude merely by a whim or caprice. Hence the mere changing of the form without affecting the substance of the last provision may not be sufficient to bring about a reversal of views in harmony with Mr. Bloom's judgment and yet Mr. Bloom may be correct.

All this requires great consideration and cautious judgment.

There will be no other opportunity for us to present our case before the U. S. Congress; the destiny of the Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine is being decided N O W.

E. D. S.

LOUIS LIPSKY
386 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

AHS File

May 4, 1944

re: Bloom's tale

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
E. 105th St. and Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio

My dear Rabbi Silver:

I am sending you herewith a copy
of the letter I have prepared to be sent to Bloom.

If there is anything in it that
you think should be corrected, please let me know by
return mail. I shall not mail the letter to Mr. Bloom
until I hear from you.

I have tried to make the letter
as gracious as possible in order to elicit some affirma-
tive action on Bloom's part.

Very cordially yours,

Louis Lipsky
Louis Lipsky *AL*

LL:FS
Enc.

PERSONAL

May 4, 1944

Hon. Sol Bloom
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

My dear Sol:

I think I owe it to you (as a friend) to give you my estimate of how matters stand among Zionists and Jews generally with regard to the Palestine Resolution, which now sleeps in Committee. It is very important that you give the conclusions I arrive at your immediate personal attention.

As to your personal connection with the Resolution:

At first and more particularly during the hearings, the stand you took was admirable and evoked general Jewish approval. But since the putting away of the Resolution, there has been a growing resentment, especially as people are becoming aware of the fact that the action to defer was tantamount to killing the Resolution. Your own position has deteriorated.

The general impression now being circulated is that while you seemed to favor the Resolution, you were in fact working all the while for its defeat. It is being said that while you made sure to have everybody believe that you were a great friend of the cause, you actually tried to force an amended resolution to the original one right from the very beginning, although the amended resolution would have practically nullified the original Resolution; and that you hastened a vote in Committee, which you had promised would not take place, because you were afraid that the Republicans would themselves bring the Resolution on the floor of the House. Your voting against the motion to defer in Committee was merely a formal gesture. In fact, you lent yourself throughout those difficult days to the crafty maneuvers of the forces who were determined to kill the Resolution. Because of these impressions, a number of leading Zionists feel that you have misled them into a major defeat; and this feeling is shared by the rank and file.

I know it as a fact that a public attack on you would have been made at the Madison Square Garden meeting last month had it not been for the restraining influence of Dr. Silver, who held your critics in check.

May 4, 1944

Page Two.

Hon. Sol Bloom:

Now, Dr. Silver feels very strongly about the situation. He feels that your action in having a vote in Committee was particularly damaging, coming, as it did, only a few days after he and Dr. Wise had succeeded in obtaining a satisfactory statement from the President, which went a long way toward neutralizing the intervention of the military. But the unexpected vote in Committee, coming a few days after that statement and before we Zionists had a chance to capitalize on it politically in London and in Jerusalem, almost nullified the great value of the President's utterance.

As matters now stand, the President's attitude on Palestine is more uncertain and beclouded than ever before, especially in view of the statement he made to the press a few weeks following the first utterance, when he commented on Palestine in such a way as to endorse the position of the military.

Naturally, the Zionist leadership cannot be expected to take a position of resignation in this situation. It cannot acquiesce in a situation which impairs every advantage we have gained in the past six months. Especially in view of the fact that the Administration is determined to give us merely gestures instead of action, and that the State Department is consistently playing the game of the British Colonial Office, and, more alarming, that the President himself seems to be unwilling to say anything definite, anything comforting, anything reassuring, on a matter which is so vital to our future. Looking at the situation objectively, I am personally convinced that there will break out a veritable storm of criticism and indignation against the Administration, which, you can readily understand, both you and I would regard as being highly undesirable in the critical months ahead.

The Republicans know what is going on very well. They are preparing to use the issue to the utmost. They can afford to make liberal promises and they are going to make them. Their most likely Presidential candidate has already issued two forthright pro-Zionist statements. There will be others. They will be used extensively among the Jews in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Cleveland, and elsewhere during the election campaign.

These developments have put Dr. Silver in a very difficult position. The President had won him over almost completely. For the first time in years, Dr. Silver issued a public statement sympathetic to and laudatory of the President. But he is being

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Page Three.

Hon. Sol Bloom:

forced to the conclusion that as matters now stand, the probabilities are that the present Administration will do absolutely nothing to help the Jewish people achieve their just rights in Palestine, except to send what he calls Rosh Hashonah greetings to Jews from time to time; and nothing more. You know that Dr. Silver's voice is listened to by vast sections of our people. He is known to be a non-partisan in politics. In fact, he has never intervened in American political affairs. If he is persuaded definitely that our cause is being sacrificed in Washington, he will not hesitate to speak out on the matter.

I call your attention to the fact that an important conference is to be held in Washington on May 23-24. It is to be attended by the leaders of 300 American Jewish communities, who are engaged in the emergency work of the Zionist movement. Their last meeting was held just before the Palestine Resolution was introduced. They will now have to be given a report of what has happened since and what is now the attitude of our Government. As Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council, Dr. Silver will be called upon to give that report. I am deeply concerned as to what he is going to say and what action may follow if conditions remain as they are.

In my judgment, it is urgent that you persuade those in authority that some action be taken before the conference on May 23-24. The President gave assurances to Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver that he would issue a statement in his own name after consulting with Mr. Churchill. The President's friends should persuade him to make such a statement -- clear and definitive as to the rights of the Jewish people under the Mandate, as to the relation of the American Government toward the promise that was made, as to the Jewish Commonwealth, free immigration, and so forth. When he shall have made such a statement, the green light could then be given to have the Resolution brought out from the Committee to the floor of the House, where it should be voted on. The American people have a right to express themselves on this subject. They are eager to speak and place themselves on record. No one has been taken in by the military argument. Nobody has been persuaded that the intervention of the military was justified in any way. To delay this action until after June would be fatal to all good relations between American Jews and the present Administration of Government.

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May 4, 1944

Page Four.

Hon. Sol Bloom:

I submit these impressions knowing that you will take them as coming from a friend -- of yourself and of the Roosevelt Administration -- and sincerely urge you to give serious thought to the suggestions I have made.

With warmest greetings, I am,

Very cordially yours,

Louis Lipsky

LL:FS



- (1) You feel that as a friend of his you should write him and tell him the feeling of our people with reference to the action of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Palestine Resolution and his (Bloom's) part in it.
- (2) There has been growing resentment, especially as people are getting the impression that the action to defer was tantamount to killing the Resolution.
- (3) It is being bruted about that you, Mr. Bloom, rushed through a vote of the Committee because you were afraid that the Republicans would get ahead of you and bring the Resolution onto the floor of the House where it would have, undoubtedly been approved. You lent yourself to those forces who were determined to kill the Resolution.
- (4) The impression is being circulated that while, ostensibly, you favored the Resolution, you were all the time working for its defeat. You tried to force an amended resolution in its place, right from the very beginning, which ^{would have} practically nullified the original Resolution. You made sure that everybody would think that you are a great friend of the cause. The Zionists eagerly welcomed what they believed was your cooperation, only to be sadly disillusioned in the end. You made sure that you would not be attacked by voting against deferment of the Resolution but ~~that you~~ ^{that you} were not taken in by that manoeuver.
- (5) You kept on saying all the time "Leave it to Papa". The Zionists now feel that they have been misled by you and that you have led them into a major defeat.
- (6) It was upon the insistence of Rabbi Silver that a public attack on you was not made at the great Madison Square Garden meeting last month. He has, so far, held your critics and enemies in check. He is, himself, very much put out about your action, but he is a fair-minded man and moves slowly. He feels that your action was particularly damaging, coming as it did a few days after he and after Dr. Wise ^{had} succeeded in obtaining a satisfactory statement from the President, which went a long way in neutralizing the intervention of the military in the matter of the Resolution and all the Arab protests which had been made. The action of the Foreign Affairs Committee, coming a few days after the President's statement and before even the Zionists had a chance to capitalize on it, politically, in London and in Jerusalem, almost nullified the value of the Presidential utterance.
- (7) From London and Jerusalem we have heard that the enemies of Zionism rejoiced at the action taken in Washington and that our movement has received a serious set-back.

- (8) The situation, as the Zionists see it, is that the Resolution has been buried in Committee and the President's attitude on Palestine is more uncertain and beclouded than ever. At a press conference a few weeks following the statement which he issued through Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver, ~~he~~^{the President} replied to a question on Palestine in such a way as to endorse the position of the military. II
- (9) The Jews will, of course, not take this situation with resignation nor will Zionist leadership, nor can they. If the impression which now prevails, generally, that the Administration has given the Zionists and the Jews of America the "run around" on Palestine, that our State Department is really playing the game of the British Colonial Office and that the President is playing along - in other words, that the Jewish National Home is being sold down the river - I believe that there will break forth before very long a veritable storm of criticism and indignation ~~against~~^{against} the Administration, which you can readily understand will be highly undesirable in the critical months ahead.
- (10) The Republicans know it very well. They are going to woo the Zionists. Their most likely presidential candidate has already issued two very forthright pro-Zionist statements. I am sure that there will be others and that they will be used very extensively among the Jews in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland and elsewhere before the election.
- (11) Rabbi Silver, who was very favorably impressed with the President when he saw him at the White House and came out, for the first time in years in a public commendation of President Roosevelt, is now again being forced to the conviction which he has maintained right along, that the present Administration will do nothing to help the Jews achieve their just rights in Palestine - that the President will keep on sending them what he calls "Rosh Hashonah greetings" and will do nothing more. Rabbi Silver is very popular among the Jews of America. He is known as a non-partisan and his voice is listened to by vast sections of our people. If he is persuaded that our cause is being sacrificed in Washington, he will not hesitate to say so.
- (12) An important conference will be held in Washington on May 23rd and 24th to which the leaders of 300 Jewish communities will come. They are the Community Contact Chairmen of the Zionist movement. They met last, just before the Palestine Resolutions were introduced. They will now have to be given a report of what happened to these Resolutions and why, and what the real attitude of our government is. Rabbi Silver, as Chairman of the Executive of the Zionist Emergency Council, will give that report. I am deeply concerned as to what he will say.

(13) In my humble judgment, some action should be taken before very long. The President, who had indicated when he met with Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver, that he would issue a statement in his own name after consulting with Mr. Churchill, should be urged to make such a statement in the very near future - clear and definitive as to the rights of the Jewish people in Palestine under the terms of the Mandate - the Jewish Commonwealth, etc. The "green light" should ~~then~~ be given ~~at once~~ to have the Resolution brought out from the Committee onto the floor of the House, where it could be voted on. The American people has a right to express itself on this subject. The military argument has made no impression whatsoever. Nobody is persuaded that the intervention of the military was in any way justified. Rather, everyone is persuaded that someone has "used" the War Department to do what ~~they, themselves~~, did not have the courage to do openly.

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C O P Y

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 10, 1944

Mr. Louis Lipsky
386 Fourth Avenue,
New York City

My dear Louis:

Needless to say, I have read your letter of the 8th with the most willing and conscientious care. I need hardly assure you (as a friend) that I am just as sympathetic to the cause of which you are so ardent a supporter, as are you and your associates.

Similarly, it goes without saying that I stand ready in any way within my power, to serve and to be helpful. Just how far I or anyone, for that matter, can give you an assurance of ability to procure a statement from the President -- "clear and definitive" as you phrase it, on the rights of the Jewish people under the Mandate -- I am unable to say.

The willingness to help is mine. The outcome rests elsewhere.

Sincerely yours,

SOL BLOOM

SB:Cv

C O P Y

May 17, 1944

Hon. Sol Bloom
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

My dear Sol:

I am replying to your letter of May 10th.

I do hope that you will appreciate the importance of your personal intervention in this matter.

The President makes his own decisions, but as you know, his decisions are the result of advices that are submitted to him. No one knows whether the President is prepared to speak, but it is important that he be asked from a number of directions by persons he has confidence in to make such a statement. Could you not see the President and urge him to issue a statement as promised?

Further, your readiness to help and your great sympathy with the cause should prompt you to press for action on the resolution. Unless the resolution is given consideration before July 1, 1944, the position is compromised beyond recall.

Therefore, we are interested to know, when do you think the resolution can be brought up for action?

I am deeply grateful for your sympathetic reception of my previous letter, and would respectfully urge action on your part in accord with your sentiments.

With warmest greetings, I am,

Very cordially yours,

Louis Lipsky

LL:FS

LOUIS LIPSKY
386 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

May 25, 1944


Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
% The Temple
E. 105th St. at Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio

My dear Dr. Silver:

I had a telegraphic reply to my second letter from Sol Bloom and arranged to meet him in New York. I saw him on Sunday evening and urged him to tell me when he thought the resolution could be brought up out of Committee.

He said that he was willing to do anything we asked of him. The subject could be raised again in his Committee and probably could be reported out, but he was not prepared to take the responsibility for what would happen later. It was his impression that if the resolution is brought up at any time before the invasion, or during the sharpest period of the invasion, it would not pass through. But whatever we asked him to do, that he would do. What he said was not encouraging at all.

Very cordially yours,



Louis Lipsky

LL:FS

LOUIS LIPSKY
386 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

June 8, 1944

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
East 105th St. at Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio

My dear Dr. Silver:

I had a talk with a friend of Sol Bloom yesterday and told him that it was up to Mr. Bloom to make a statement very soon that it was his intention to bring up for consideration the Palestine Resolution in his Committee, and that he intended to see the thing through. I suggested to this friend that it would be very important for Sol Bloom to make a definite statement as to the date, which should be some time in August.

In view of the fact that a dinner is being given to Sol Bloom on Wednesday, June 28th, I suggested that it would be most important that he make that statement not later than June 28th.

I do not think it advisable to write this in a letter. My impression is that Bloom will find it advisable to act in accordance with my suggestion.

Very cordially yours,

Louis Lipsky

Louis Lipsky

LL:FS

Maye 2, 1944

Mr. Louis Lipsky
386 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Lipsky:

Following up our conversation with reference to Sol Bloom I would suggest that you take the first opportunity to suggest to him that it is our intention to bring up the Resolution some time in August, as soon as the crest of the invasion is reached and that we will then count upon him warmly and aggressively to push for the passage of the Resolution in the Foreign Affairs Committee and in Congress. We shall of course be prepared to assume the responsibility, but that does not absolve him of the moral responsibility to do his utmost to insure the success of its passage.

Please keep him on the anxious seat. Make him realize that there is a determined group of voters in his district who are very suspicious and resentful of his attitude and who in the months before election will be watching very carefully his conduct in relation to the Resolution; furthermore, that your own attitude towards him and his re-election will be determined by such conduct. Bloom should not come to feel, as unfortunately most democratic candidates have been made to feel, that they have the Jewish and Zionist votes in their vest-pocket.

I should be very happy to see a copy of the letter which you will send him.

I am following up the matter of the Morning Journal.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK

AHS File

June 9, 1944

Re: Bloom's
Tale

Dr. Israel Goldstein
270 West 89th St.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Dr. Goldstein:

Sol Bloom is concerned about his re-election. He has been rallying his friends and supporters and he is making an especial effort to get the Zionists to be his active supporters. I know that a dinner is being given to him on Wednesday, June 28, and certain Zionist figures have been invited to deliver speeches. I know of small parlor meetings which have been held to the same effect.

Sol Bloom has not played fair with us in the matter of the Palestine Resolution. If let alone, he would be most happy to see the Resolution die in the Foreign Affairs Committee. He has had the report of the hearings printed and has included in the book testimonials to himself which were sent to him by many of us at a time when he seemed to be playing ball with us. He will undoubtedly use these testimonials as proof that he has been with us right along. Actually, as you know, he has sought to emasculate the Resolution by suggesting amendments and without consulting us, rushed through the action of deferment in the Foreign Affairs Committee when he had given us the clear promise that no action would be taken.

Mr. Bloom must be made to feel that the Zionists of New York are suspicious of his attitude, and many of them very resentful. They are waiting to see him take aggressive action in favor of the Resolution in his Committee. He is still the key man in the entire situation. It is up to Mr. Bloom to make a clear statement of his intentions to bring up the Palestine Resolution for consideration sometime in August or early September. The Zionists of his district should not give him any blanket endorsement. Quite the contrary. They should tell him that they are making their endorsement conditional upon his piloting the Resolution through the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Bloom has high regard for you, or to put it differently, he is afraid of your opposition. You are in his District and I know that you could handle the matter very effectively. Please

Dr. Goldstein

-2-

June 9, 1944

pass the word down among the Zionist lines as the proper attitude to take with reference to Mr. Bloom's candidacy.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK



COPY

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
1720 16th St. N. W.
Washington, D. C.

AHS File
copy to Dr. Silver

re. Bloom

June 12, 1944

Dr. Abba H. Silver
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York City

Dear Dr. Silver:

This is to acknowledge your letter of June 9 regarding Mr. Bloom. I wish I had been apprised about this before. I did not know that there was any exception taken by anybody to Mr. Bloom's conduct of affairs in connection with the Resolution.

I had occasion to meet Mr. Bloom only a few days ago and we exchanged cordial amenities. Not having been informed of Mr. Bloom's action during my absence in England, I assumed that his fine attitude at the beginning of the hearings continued, and complimented him accordingly.

In the course of the conversation, however, he expressed an opinion to the effect that it might be advisable, if the Resolution is to come up again, to leave out the last part. In response to that, I told him that at this stage it would be the worse possible thing to do and that the Resolution without the Jewish Commonwealth part in it would be a waste of time and that under no circumstance must he lend himself to any such tactics, because such tactics will be deeply resented by the Jews of America. I repeated this caution several times in the course of the conversation and I have reason to believe that it sank in.

Mr. Bloom parted with me by assuring me that he has only one ambition and that is to serve his people and that he is ready to take my guidance with regard to what we want him to do. When the proper time arrives, I may be helpful in securing his cooperation along the proper lines.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

/s/

Dr. Israel Goldstein

MN
6-15-44

MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Date June 22, 1944

From Arthur Lourie

1. Dr. Goldstein rang me to say that Congressman Bloom had telephoned him this morning following the receipt of the telegram to him from Dr. Wise, Dr. Goldstein, Rabbi Gold and Mrs. Epstein. Mr. Bloom had asked Dr. Goldstein what was the reason for the telegram and when the matter was explained to him he emphasized repeatedly that whatever his own opinion might be he would be guided with regard to action on the Resolution by ourselves, though naturally he must be given the right first to express to us his own opinion. Bloom added that he was ready to meet with the signatories of the telegram either Sunday or Monday in New York; or, at some earlier time if they could come down to Washington.

After consulting Dr. Wise, I spoke to Mr. Bloom and it was arranged that he should come to this office on Monday at 2:00 o'clock.

2. I have given Mr. Shapiro a draft statement for circulation amongst Chairmen of the Emergency Councils with regard to the status of the "Hebrew Committee for National Liberation", and the letter received in this connection from the State Department. I am also communicating with representatives of the Jewish press.

3. An appointment has been arranged with Mr. Wallace Murray for Wednesday at 3:00 P.M. It is doubtful, however, if Neumann will be available at that time as he plans to leave town early next week. If Neumann cannot go, I shall ask Lipsky to accompany Shulman, unless you have some other suggestion.

4. A letter of congratulation has gone to Simon Marks on behalf of the Emergency Council.

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AHS File

Brief note of Conversation with
Congressman Bloom.

June 26, 1944.

Bloom

Present: Congressman Bloom;
Dr. Wise, Dr. Goldstein, Rabbi Gold, Mrs. Epstein,
Mr. Lourie.

Dr. Wise in greeting Mr. Bloom told him that all those present were members of his own constituency and that they were glad to have the opportunity of a talk with their Congressman.

In the course of some discussion of the concluding days of the Legislative Session, Mr. Bloom mentioned the Resolutions of the Foreign Affairs Committee with regard to Hungary and Turkey. One of these Resolutions had originally come up in Executive Session and he had found determined opposition on the part of a few people, including Mundt, Voorhees of Ohio, Johnkman, and Luther Johnson. He had then decided to adjourn the session and continue the discussion in open session the following day. In open session these members kept their opposition to themselves and the Resolution went through.

Coming to the Palestine Resolution, Congressman Bloom was asked in very direct terms by Dr. Wise what he proposed to do and whether he would undertake to push the Resolution through without any change of any kind. Congressman Bloom said that he would bring up the Resolution again at any time that we wished. The Resolution had not been tabled; it had merely been postponed and could be taken up again whenever desired. He referred to the letter from Stimson to the Committee on the basis of which further discussion had been postponed, and said that this replaced a far stronger and from our point of view much worse letter, and that he, Bloom, had been responsible for the modified wording contained in the second letter which had insured the postponement and not the rejection of the Resolution. The Congressman was asked whether it would be desirable before introducing the Resolution to consult the Military. He replied that if we asked the Military, we were sure to get a negative reply. On the other hand, the war situation had already changed the picture a good deal and we should be in a position to go ahead without fearing what the Military would do. Even on the previous occasion, had it not been for the wholly uncalled for action of Senator Connolly in making inquiry first from the State Department and then from the War Department, there would have been no interference from those bodies and the Resolution would have gone through without difficulty.

Congressman Bloom was asked who in his opinion had been responsible for this initiative on Connolly's part, and Rabbi Gold suggested that it was Colonel Hoskins. This suggestion was ridiculed by the Congressman who said that the man responsible was Luther Johnson on his own Committee. Luther Johnson is a fellow legislator with Connolly, from Texas and a close friend of his. Mr. Bloom said that before bring-

2-Conversation with Congressman Bloom,
June 26, 1944

ing up the Resolution again this time he would have a talk with Connolly and he believed that that would prevent a recurrence of the previous intervention. Mr. Bloom stressed that after all this was merely an expression of opinion on the part of Congress and that there was no justification for the interference of the Departments.

Mr. Bloom was asked what were the prospects of the passage of the Resolution as it stands and whether he would undertake that it should not be modified by the exclusion of the clause referring to the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth. Mr. Bloom said that he did not think that that part of the Resolution was going to cause great difficulty. The one phrase in the Resolution which he did think might produce opposition was that which referred to "free immigration". There were ways of achieving the same thing by the use of different words and people here were very sensitive to a phrase like "free immigration". He had had the same experience in connection with the resolution dealing with the so-called "free ports". Had another phrase instead of "free ports" been used such as "safety camps", or something else along those lines, he believes that there would have been no difficulty in obtaining authorization for many more than a thousand refugees under the President's order.

Mr. Bloom, in answer to further questions, said that he would definitely push the Resolution as it stood and would vote for it unamended. He added, however, that ever since Pearl Harbor every Resolution from the Foreign Affairs Committee had been voted out unanimously and that if amendments were adopted in the Committee by a majority against him, he would have to join in support of the Resolution as it was voted out. He reiterated that he did not foresee any difficulty so far as the Jewish Commonwealth clause was concerned. He remarked at one stage, however, that "I wish that you could get rid of Voorhees and Mundt for me". There was a reference to Mr. Eaton on the Committee. Mr. Bloom thought that he was not unfriendly, but that the approach to him by Mr. Stone had not been a very satisfactory one. Dr. Goldstein then went on to refer to the dinner to be given in Mr. Bloom's honor the following evening. He said that 98% of his constituents were anxious to hear a clear and unequivocal statement from Bloom in favor of the Jewish Commonwealth and Dr. Wise suggested the wording of a sentence which should be incorporated in his speech. Mr. Bloom said that they would have to leave that to him. He would word it in his own way and what he felt about Palestine would appear clearly enough from what he would have to say. He never wrote out a speech in advance. He did not know what he was going to say before he spoke, nor sometimes, what he had said after he had sat down, but he would speak as he felt. His love for Palestine dated back to his childhood and he was going to link up the thought of this grove which was to be planted in his name with the 2,000 years of Jewish longing for Palestine.

3-Conversation with Congressman Bloom,
June 26, 1944

Dr. Wise and Dr. Goldstein stressed repeatedly and with some urgency the importance of a clear and definite statement by Mr. Bloom in his speech, to the Jewish Commonwealth, and reference was made to the unequivocal remarks of Senator Brewster in this connection in a recent speech. The Congressman said that there was a difference between what he could do and what the Senator could do. He felt sure that we would be satisfied with what he would have to say.

After some further talk on the same lines, but without anything decisive emerging on this point, the conversation which had lasted about an hour terminated.



AL:CK

Dr. Gold - 1/17/44

AHS File

June 30, 1944

Bloom

Rabbi Wolf Gold
Mizrachi
1133 Broadway
New York, N.Y.

My dear Rabbi Gold:

I am interested to know whether Congressman Bloom made any definite statement with reference to his position on the Palestine Resolution pending in Congress at the Testimonial which was given to him. I understand that he had promised our Committee to make such a statement.

I read that Wise and Monsky took violent exception at the meeting to the Palestine plank of the Republican Platform because the latter condemned the failure of the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate. (How many and how often have we Zionists been known to utter similar condemnation!) It would have been far wiser to let the Democratic Party answer the criticism. After all, the platform is that of the Republican Party and not of the Zionist Emergency Council. For the first time our Movement finds itself in the fortunate position where both major political parties are competing for its approval. Why not let us go on until we have achieved a satisfactory pro-Palestine plank also in the Democratic Platform and until both parties in their eagerness to show their good will towards us, pass the Palestine Resolution in August?

Very cordially yours,

AHS:EK

Copies to
Lipsky
Weinstein
E. Neumann