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Reel
103

Box
36

Folder
210

Adelson, Dorothy, 1946.

June 12, 1946

DR. N. GOLDMANN

D. ADELSON

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH DR. JOAO ALBERTO LINS DE BARROS, BRAZILIAN MINISTER, AT THE
BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TRADE BUREAU, 551 FIFTH AVENUE.

This conversation disclosed that the Brazilian Government is negotiating with the U.S. State Department for the admission of 100,000 displaced persons from Europe as immigrants to Brazil.

While I was waiting to see the Minister, I was greeted by Olintho Pinto Machado, a member of the Brazilian delegation to the U.N., whom I had met through Mrs. Yarden (World Committee for Palestine). He beckoned me aside and said that, if I was going to see Lins de Barros, it might be useful for me to know that Lins de Barros was a high Brazilian immigration official, and that his mission here was connected with the immigration of displaced persons from Europe. After all, Palestine looks pretty hopeless, said Pinto Machado (who has always heretofore been a strong Zionist); the Jews cannot win against the machinations of British imperialism, and Brazil is a good place for them, as there is no racial or religious discrimination there.

The Minister received my expression of appreciation (for legalizing Zionism in Brazil) graciously, but said nothing about Jewish immigration. On my inquiring whether it was true that Brazil was contemplating a considerable immigration from Europe, he said yes, that he had been having conversations with the State Department, and was leaving at the end of June for Europe to look over the situation; would probably return in the middle of August. I asked whether any specific number of immigrants had been mentioned in the discussion; he said yes, about 100,000. I asked whether these would be exclusive of the 100,000 Jews who wanted to go to Palestine. He gave an evasive answer, said that many displaced persons were non-Jews, and terminated the interview.

At the beginning of our conversation, the Minister said he would be glad to see Dr. Goldmann next Monday. The appointment is scheduled tentatively for three in the afternoon.

Comment: Possibly the State Department would welcome an offer from Brazil, timed just before the September meeting of the General Assembly, to take in 100,000 displaced persons, including Jews. This would ease the State Department's position on the Palestine question.

June 12, 1946

DR. N. GOLDMANN

D. ADELSON

SUBJECT: STATUS OF THE JEWISH AGENCY IN THE UNITED NATIONS; CONVERSATION WITH ANDREW CORDIER, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO TRYGVE LIE.

I presented the problem of our interim status to Mr. Cordier with some trepidation, since, according to Dr. Robinson's analysis, we are not legally entitled, just now, even to a ticket; tickets are accorded so far only to national organizations, and we, as an international organization, would have to pioneer, and this it is advisable to leave to international organizations with fewer other headaches.

My question to Mr. Cordier was this: pending our formal application later on, probably when the Trusteeship Council is formed, what courtesies might we obtain from the United Nations on an informal basis, without committing ourselves in writing?

Mr. Cordier was sympathetic. Discussing the matter generally, he expressed the opinion that the whole question of "observers" and "consultants" would have to be taken up again by the Assembly in September, because of the developments in the WFFU matter. Now, to cases. He said that courtesies are being extended to two governments, Austria and Italy. Of course, we are not a government, but he recognizes that we have a stake in and connections with the U.N. He suggested that I write him a letter; I said immediately that we preferred not to put anything in writing at this juncture. He said that Italy had felt the same way, and that therefore all arrangements with Italy had been made orally, and that he would handle our case the same way. He promised to take up the matter with Trygve Lie and will let me know.

The courtesies extended consist of the following: right to receive documents, etc., and right to attend sessions. He said that he would try to see what other courtesies they might extend.

In a few words in the course of the interview, Mr. Cordier expressed his sympathy and hope that we would reach a speedy solution. He told me that before working with the State Department, he had been interested in the problem of refugees, and had been instrumental in bringing a number of European Jewish professors and scholars over to this country. I should say that we are fortunate in that he is favorably disposed.

P.A. Personal

June 18, 1946

MR. H. GOLDMANN

D. ADLSON

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH MR. OLE COLBJORNSEN OF NORWAY

NOTE: Mr. Colbjornsen, Commercial Counsellor of the Norwegian Embassy in Washington, is the acting head of the Norwegian Delegation to the Economic and Social Council.

Mr. Erik Brofos, Minister of Finance, Norway's permanent representative is not attending this session.

On hearing that I was with the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Mr. Colbjornsen launched into a petulant tirade against the Jewish position in Palestine. He mentioned the very real possibility of civil war, the 1500-year residents of the Arabs in the country, and the good faith of the British Labor Government, which was now getting out of India and was indeed reluctant to stay in Palestine. Mr. Noel-Baker is a good friend of his, he said, and the American newspapers are most unfair in attacking such good democratic laborites as Bevin and Noel-Baker. He commented that the Jewish claim to have been the original inhabitants was very weak indeed, because on that basis, the Americans would have to give this country back to the Indians, and the Norwegians themselves would have to leave the country. He knew many Norwegians who had visited Palestine and had reported that the Arabs were implacably hostile to the Jews. Besides, 80% of the European Jews wanted to come to the United States or other havens of refuge, but not to Palestine. He wanted to know why the Jews did not go to ^{an} ex-Italian colony, or to a place where they would not displace people who considered the land as their own.

I observed that the Jews did not need a new place to go since Palestine was perfectly suitable; it had been promised to them by international agreement and the reported Arab-Jewish antagonism was largely a propaganda figment. I also permitted myself to observe that some of his statistics were not correct; for example, a recent census revealed that more than 85% of the European Jews wanted to go to Palestine. I compared the Jewish contribution to the allied war effort with the Norwegian resistance, and elaborated on the nature of this Jewish contribution. I also remarked that I hoped some day the Jews will be able to fight and die like men in a country of their own as the Norwegians had done, instead of being killed like dogs, because they had no status in the world of nations. I had always thought of Norway as a model for the Jewish state in its dignity and self-respect. Mr. Colbjornsen seemed particularly struck with these idealistic considerations.

Commenting that all the British did not agree with the present policy of the Labor Government, I asked Mr. Colbjornsen whether I might send him 2 recent articles by an editor of the New Statesman and Nation (Crookman's articles,) which contain a criticism of present British policy by a liberal British journalist. He said he would be very glad to read them.

COMMENT: Clearly Mr. Colbjornsen has been worked on recently by Mr. Noel-Baker and his colleagues.

D. A. Personal

June 19, 1946

DR. N. GOLDMANN

D. ADELSON

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH DR. FELIPE PAZOS OF CUBA

NOTE: Dr. Pazos is Commercial Counsellor of the Cuban Embassy in Washington and second man in the Cuban Delegation to the Economic and Social Council.

When I spoke with him at a private cocktail party in honor of the Colombian President-elect, last Friday, he intimated that the Jewish Agency would face difficulty with the Latin Americans because of Arab influences. The following conversation continues this discussion:

Dr. Pazos said that he would not go so far as to say that a log-rolling agreement existed between the Latin American and Arab delegates. However, he warned me that there was a spontaneous tendency for the Arabs and the Latin Americans to vote together, for several reasons:

- 1—The Arab delegates stressed the argument that the Arabs and Latin Americans had mutual interest in the economic development of backward countries.
- 2—The Arabs also emphasized mutual interest in questions of raw materials, etc.
- 3—Latin Americans and Arabs share a certain resentment against the consciously white countries.

When I objected that strong democratic movements existed in most of the Latin American countries, Dr. Pazos said that first, ^{some} Latin American countries were almost as backward and feudal as the Arab countries, and second, that on the whole, Latin American diplomats, like others, were recruited from the privileged classes. He advised that we must guard against Arab-Latin American rapprochement when the Palestine question came up.

According to Dr. Pazos, probably 90% of the Latin American delegates will come to the United Nations without specific instructions on the Palestine issue. On the whole, they will be unprejudiced, although anti-Semitism, previously minimal, has grown in Latin America through Nazi influence. Although in general diplomats are cautious about committing themselves, Dr. Pazos remarked that Latin Americans tend to be obliging and will, more readily than others, agree to vote as asked by a fellow delegate. Also, he said, once Latin Americans give their word, they will keep it. Therefore, we of the Agency must try to win their support, first, before they make promises to the Arab delegates.

Dr. Pazos advised me always to go to the heads of the delegations. Of course, we must also see all subordinates.

I asked Dr. Pazos whether he did not think that knowledge of the facts would be the most cogent argument in our favor. He answered that logical arguments were effective, but he thought, in cold fact and without wishing to be gallant, that my personality would be more effective than any logical argument.

I remarked that Cuba had always been friendly to the idea of a Jewish State, and cited Dr. Gustavo Gutierrez. Dr. Pazos commented that it would be unwise to assume that Dr. Belt (Dr. Guillermo Belt, Cuban Ambassador in Washington) had the same opinions as Dr. Gutierrez. He was not implying the opposite, but he advised me to be careful. He also advised me that Guy Cisneris, one of the Cuban delegates at San Francisco, was pro Arab.

COMMENT:

Dr. Pazos' remark about Dr. Belt assumes that the Ambassador in Washington will represent his country at the General Assembly in September. This is not unlikely, as the Washington Ambassadors have frequently represented their countries at international conferences. In view of the consideration that we must get the jump on the Arabs before the General Assembly meeting, and since we have one unofficial to their five official delegates, it might be wise to pay a preliminary visit to the Latin American Ambassadors in Washington sometime before the September meeting.



da;fg

June 20, 1946

DR. N. GOLDMANN

D. ADELSON

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH MR. JEAN NEWMAN OF THE REFUGEES DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT.

NOTE: Mr. Newman is a Jew.

I met Mr. Newman at the United Nations Cafeteria immediately after the morning meeting of the Commission on Refugees (described in the attached New York Times clipping of Thursday, June 20th.) Expressing amazement at the absence of Jewish organizations and of the Jewish press at that critical session, Mr. Newman described it to me in detail. Since much of what he told me is contained in the New York Times account, I am noting here additional memoranda.

I cannot avoid repeating Mr. Newman's observation that the most significant feature of the session was the positive indication that the Russian bloc was flirting with the Arab League.

Commenting that support for the Jews came first from the U.S., Mr. Newman related Warren's arguments. In addition to those reported in the Times, Mr. Warren asked, since when do we make a distinction between "people" and governments". He excepted situations where Governments do not express the will of the people. This comment, Newman said, changed the opinion of Argyropoulos of Greece, who had first voted with Lebanon -- probably because of the Moslems in Greece. Argyropoulos now said, yes, if we admit this distinction, then "peoples" will begin to elect separate representatives from their governments. Undoubtedly he was thinking of the situation in Greece. Don't thank him for his vote, remarked Newman; he may not be pleased to know he has done the Zionists a favor -- because of those same Moslems.

The 4 Latin Americans, among them Dr. Pages of Cuba, with whom I spoke the other day, spoke strongly against the Lebanese proposal and in support of the U.S. One reason was given him by Dr. Zuleta Angel, acting as delegate from Colombia. He said, I wrote a note to Chile, Cuba and Peru, that the Lebanese motion was an attempt to inject the Palestine matter into the Refugee Commission where it had no business. Said Dr. Zuleta Angel, if Palestine is to be discussed, it must be discussed openly. I objected to this kind of indirect political manipulations.

According to the Times, Ukraine, Russia, Yugoslavia and India voted for the Lebanese proposal. One of the United Nations press attaches told me that Norway also voted for the proposal, but I have not been able to check this.

It is significant that the Czech vote did not go with the Russian bloc. Newman spoke previously to Jiri Stolz, the Czech delegate, and possibly this had some influence.

da:fg

June 20, 1946

DR. N. GOLDMANN

D. ADELSON

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH DR. EDUARDO ZULETA ANGEL OF COLOMBIA

NOTE: Dr. Zuleta Angel is in the party of Colombia President-Elect Ospina Perez. He will almost certainly be the next Foreign Minister of Colombia. Dr. Zuleta is important for us because of his influence in the United Nations. He was unanimously elected Chairman of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations in London, serves as Chairman of the U.N. Headquarters Commission, and tells me that he led the Latin American bloc of 20 votes in London. He plans to be here in September for the Assembly and says that Colombia will probably succeed Mexico on the Security Council in the fall. If so, he himself, as foreign Minister, will take an active part in Security Council proceedings.

Saying that he was quite unacquainted with the Palestine situation, Dr. Zuleta gave me the opportunity to present our case in full. He said he was glad to hear this presentation, and would be glad to read any material on the Palestine question that I would send him, inasmuch as he will now proceed to study the matter thoroughly.

da:fg

June 24, 1946

Dr. Nahum Goldmann

Dorothy Adelson

Subject: Further actions in re: Commission on Refugees by Lebanese delegate to Economic and Social Council.

At the final meeting of the Economic and Social Council, Friday evening, June 21, Malik of Lebanon insisted on a change in the wording of the American amendment to the report (adopted several days before, instead of the anti-Zionist amendment he had proposed.) Instead of the statement that the Council should not take any action that was not in consonance with the "principles of the Charter", he proposed "principles and purpose of the Charter". His amendment was adopted. I do not know for what reason Malik made this change, but he has been acting all along as a strong exponent of Arab League intentions.

With regard to the matter of refugees, Malik also went on record as saying that the Government of Lebanon reserved the right to present amendments at any time in the future.

DA:mk

June 25, 1946

Dr. Nahum Goldmann

Dorothy Adelson

Subject: Conversation with Olintho Pinto Machado, Member of the Brazilian Delegation to the United Nations.

Because of his close friendship with a Jewish man in Brazil (Aron Neumann), Mr. Pinto Machado is a good friend of ours. When I asked him to guide me in my approach to Dr. Leao Velloso, Brazilian delegate to the Security Council, he spoke frankly and confidentially. He said "It is because I promised Mr. Neumann that I would do all I could for the Zionist cause here at the United Nations." About Leao Velloso, Machado was pessimistic. "If you want to know how Leao Velloso will vote", he said, "ask the State Department".

Because Brazil needs United States economic help, she will not vote against the State Department wishes in any matter where she is not directly concerned. Moreover, Leao Velloso falls in easily with this policy, for he is a reactionary at heart, pro-Franco, and a typical old-school diplomat who has been in the service for years, has lived well and never known trouble. In the tradition of old diplomacy he is oriental, inscrutable, and will certainly not give us a promise of any kind. However, Pinto Machado felt that I should try to clarify the Jewish position in Leao Velloso's mind, that is, inform him clearly. For, in the event that the State Department leaves a loophole for freedom of action by the Latin American countries, then Brazil may follow her usual liberal tradition in foreign affairs. Because of Brazil's position in Latin America, Pinto Machado said that most of the Latin American countries would follow her lead, whether she voted for or against us.

Pinto Machado was similarly pessimistic about Mexico, which also needs the United States and will not dare to oppose United States directives if they are given positively and firmly. "I know," he said "that Truman is being pressed by public opinion but his State Department is standing solidly by Britain, which is at the root of all the trouble in Spain, Greece and Palestine."

Machado also spoke at length to me about the possibilities of immigration into Brazil. He spoke on the premise that we Zionists favor Jewish immigration to Brazil; I did not commit myself on the point. Although he likes Jews and has found them clever and honest, he told me that the Jews who came to Brazil during the war do not have a good reputation. Incidentally, most of these Jews paid bribes to Brazilian Foreign Office officials, in order to enter the country; at that time Leao Velloso was second man in the Foreign Office. These rich Jews have indulged in

June 25, 1946

sharp business practices and do not want the immigration of any more Jews, because they think it will jeopardize their position. However, although the Fascist Integralistas still hold key positions in the Government, Pinto Machado thinks that now is a good time for Jews to press for Jewish immigration. He was present at some talks between Brazilian officials and the State Department recently. He tells me very confidentially that the United States wants Brazil not to take in Eastern European Jews, but to take in 300,000 Anti-Soviet Poles whom the United States is maintaining in England at a cost of \$4,000,000 a day. But Pinto Machado tells me that Brazil also has room for Jewish immigrants if the United States will provide machinery and equipment so that Brazil can put the immigrants to work.



June 26, 1946

Dr. Nahum Goldmann

Dorothy Adelson

Subject: Conversation with Eugene Jasinski, Secretary and right-hand man of Polish Ambassador Oskar Lange.

Jasinski dropped a hint to me that Lange was thinking of bringing up the Palestine question before the Security Council, because of current developments in ~~that~~ country. Following the policy line which you indicated, I said that we did not wish to have the Palestine situation come up before the Security Council at this time, because it would mean a delay in the admission of the 100,000 Jews. Jasinski said he understood very well; we must give humanitarian reasons, the saving of lives, priority. He added, however, that Lange had thought the Palestine question would be a good stick to beat the British with.



DA:mk

[June 7, 1946]

Dr. Jacob Robinson, World Jewish Congress, 1946

Dorothy Adelson

Subject: Status of Non-States in the U.N.

You might be interested in having a record of various tentatives made to include non self-governing territories in the membership of various U.N. bodies, even when the tentatives fail. Yesterday, in the Committee on Legal Questions of the International Health Assembly, China proposed an amendment -- which failed -- as follows:

"Territories under the trusteeship of the United Nations, protectorates, colonies and other dependencies ineligible to separate membership in the United Nations, whose areas and populations are large enough, whose health problems are of world concern, and which have indigenous health administrations so as to make special representation in the World Health Organization desirable, may be admitted as Associate Members by the World Health Assembly. Associate Members ~~which~~ enjoy all the rights and privileges, and share all duties and responsibilities of full membership, except voting and holding office in the organization."

The U.S. delegation attitude was that it was premature to take action on this question of membership.

DA:mk

July 2, 1946

DR. NAHUM GOLDMANN

DOROTHY ADELSON

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH RAOUL AGLION

NOTE: Mr. Aglion, as you know, is an experienced French delegate of Jewish origin who now has a high ranking official position in the United Nations Secretariat.

Half jokingly and half in earnest, Aglion remarked that the Jewish Agency could learn much from the lobbying methods of the N.A.M., which the events of the day had proved so successful. He said that he never had realized how things were done in Washington, until, in the matter of the French loan, money had to be used. The Zionists are naive, he said; they think that people are honest.

Aglion expressed amazement that two days had passed since the arrests of the Jewish leaders in Palestine, and the Zionists had not emphasized in the press the fact that the British did not own Palestine and had no right to take this drastic unilateral action in regard to the Agency. He said that the best way to influence the State Department was through American public opinion as he had found while he was director of the French Resistance in New York. When the French occupied St. Pierre and Michelon, he himself went to all the newspapers and explained the French side of the case to them. The State Department threatened to close his office, but public opinion proved strong, and he went his point.

Since Aglion is a good friend of ours, I discussed with him our difficulties in obtaining courtesy privileges from Trygve Lie. What he said about Trygve Lie unfortunately corroborates what Ambassador S. Llanena of Bolivia told me, namely, that Trygve Lie is both stubborn and stupid. He said that the only way to influence Trygve Lie was through American pressure, and he suggested getting at him through Winant, since Winant has liberal views. Moreover, he said that a member of Winant's staff, named Penrose, had been a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. He also suggested working on Senator Austin, the new United States member of the Security Council.

Aglion also suggested that we try to win over some of the Middle European countries, such as Czechoslovakia. At least through Czechoslovakia we might be able to get to the Russians, he said.

Aglion was very pessimistic about the status that the Jewish Agency would achieve under the Trusteeship Council. He feels that the British, their dominions and satellites will minimize our position as much as possible. He thinks we must begin working intensively now to counteract this possibility.

July 3, 1946

DR. NAHUM GOLDMANN

DOROTHY ADELSON

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR PEDRO LEAO VELLOSO, BRAZILIAN PERMANENT DELEGATE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I spoke with Dr. Leao Velloso for a little over an hour. In stating our case, I emphasized particularly Britain's violations of international law, since Latin American countries place great stress on juridical correctness. I also made the point about the Lebanese (Catholic) Maronites, since Dr. Leao Velloso has spoken out in the Security Council as a representative of a Catholic country.

Dr. Leao Velloso expressed himself as glad to have a bird's eye view of this "obscure question", and asked several questions, such as:

- 1--What is the present Jewish population of Palestine?
- 2--Isn't there any other territory where the Jews could settle?
- 3--Do I think the question of Palestine will come up before the Assembly or the Security Council?

He made a characteristically cautious observation, that the question was a complicated one. His final comment was that our great problem was in winning over the Arabs. Like the Bolivian Ambassador Salamanca, he seems deeply impressed with the Arab point of view on this subject, as probably expressed to him by the Arab delegates at San Francisco. For example, he repeated to me the Arab argument that the Arabs fear the incursion of the Western-trained Jew into their area, and feel that they cannot cope or compete with superior Jewish training.

Dr. Leao Velloso mentioned having spoken with Dr. Goldmann both here and in San Francisco, and remarked that he was an interesting man.

July 5, 1946

DR. NAHUM GOLDMANN

DOROTHY ADELSON and LIONEL GILBER

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH DR. VINCENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO

Dr. Lombardo told us that he did not present the Palestine question to the Russian Government directly, since he is not an official of the Jewish people.

He did not discuss Palestine with Soviet workers' representatives, since they have no opinion on this matter.

He discussed the Palestine question at length with high-ranking Soviet officials. In answer to Mr. Gilber's question, he said that some of them belonged to the Foreign Office. He told the Russians that the organization he represents is sympathetic to the idea of a Jewish National Homeland in Palestine, (without prejudice to its sympathy for the Arab workers in the Near East.) He described to them the uneasiness of the Jewish people with regard to Russia's abstention from the Palestine question, since the Jews regard this as an international problem, not confined to the sphere of interest of a few countries.

The Russian officials said that they were not opposed to the idea of a Jewish National Homeland in Palestine, nor were they hostile to the Arabs. They said that two forces were opposed, namely, certain elements of the British Government and certain elements in the United States Government. They said that these forces were not supporting the Jewish case in Palestine, but were using the Jewish question as a tool to further oil rivalries and their own imperialistic designs in the Near East. They said that this should be stopped, and that Jewish and Arab workers should unite against these imperialistic powers in the Near East.

Dr. Lombardo now discussed a second matter. He held a long conversation with one Mustafa al-Aris of Beirut, a member of the Executive of the W.F.T.U. who represents the workers of the Arab countries. El-Aris told Dr. Lombardo that he was personally not opposed to the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. However, he said that certain matters had to be discussed by the Arabs and the Jewish community. El-Aris' substitute (alternate?) on the Executive of the W.F.T.U. is Mr. Berl Locker. The Executive decided that el-Aris and Mr. Locker together should undertake the education of the Arab and Jewish workers in the Near East to a sense of their common interests and to joint action against British imperialism. The Executive also decided that el-Aris and Mr. Locker together should investigate the situation in Iran. Dr. Lombardo said to us, you can tell Dr. Goldmann that now a basis for real accomplishment in winning the Arab workers in the Near East has been established.

Dr. Lombardo also told us that in the Moscow meeting of the W.F.T.U. it was made clear by Arab delegates that the anti-British feeling in their countries among workers was very strong. Dr. Lombardo explained that this was because the workers realized that Brit. in's maneuvers were all directed to keeping the Arab countries in a colonial status, even when they had nominal independence. The Arab workers realize that the Arab League is a British instrument, and consequently they are hostile to the Arab leaders within the Arab League. At the W.F.T.U. Conference, the British representatives, Sir Walter Citrine and others, had nothing to say in answer to these charges, except that they would try to bring pressure on their Government to improve the situation.

Dr. Lombardo now took up a third matter. He told us that the International Labour Office, with headquarters in Montreal, has planned a conference of Near Eastern countries, to be called in the near future. Although the main subject of discussion will be workers' problems, Dr. Lombardo warned us that political implications were likely to crop up, and that Bevin now had the controlling influence in the I.L.O. For example, the British might try to keep the Histadrut from having representation, through maneuvers in the Credentials Committee. More important, the British might bring up the subject of Palestine for discussion in this Near Eastern conference, and the assembled delegates might adopt an unfavorable stand. Lombardo promised that he would try to keep an eye on developments, and advised us also to be forewarned.

When questioned on the possibility of making direct contact with the Russian Government, Dr. Lombardo said that it was ~~possible~~ and that we must persevere in our attempts to see Russian officials. The best method, in his opinion, was to try to have a friendly government, such as Czechoslovakia, make an appointment for us to have a discussion with Gromyko, for example. He suggested September, during the U.N. meeting, as a likely time. He also will assist us in making contact with the Russians. The W.F.T.U. will be in session in Washington in September, because it wants to be nearby to continue its fight for participation in the Economic and Social Council. He himself will attend, and can be at our disposal.

On his return to Mexico now, Dr. Lombardo told us that he will make a report to the workers of Latin America and include in it a special section on Palestine and on British action there, which he characterized as exactly like Hitler's, saying that he had received a shocking report from Mr. Earl Locker. The Latin American Workers Confederation, he said, would continue to be sympathetic to the cause of a Jewish National Home in Palestine; this stand is unwavering, he said, since it is based on deep conviction.

July 5, 1946

DR. NAHUM GOLDMANN

DOROTHY ADELSON

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH DR. LUIS PADILLA NERVO, MEXICAN PERMANENT DELEGATE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

Padilla Nervo was the first diplomat who talked in terms of active and practical help that he could give us.

Padilla Nervo mentioned Toff in Washington and also Alberto Gerschunoff, Argentine writer and editor of La Nacion, who wrote to him about Dr. Goldmann. Padilla Nervo said that he had been waiting to meet Dr. Goldmann, as Toff had promised, and would be very glad to see him next week. An appointment can be arranged by calling him directly at the Hotel Warwick.

In London, after Bevin's speech, in which he promised to fulfill the obligations of the mandate towards Transjordan, Padilla Nervo said that he was approached by Jewish groups, who asked him to protest. The Jews claimed that it was irregular to give statehood to one part of a mandate and not to another. However, Padilla Nervo could not help them; the subject of Palestine was not under discussion, and it was not in order for him to attack a statement made by Bevin in the course of an address.

After I had spoken with Padilla Nervo at length on the background of the Palestine issue, he began to think aloud on ways and means of helping us practically within the framework of the United Nations. Supposing, he said, that a friendly member brought up the Palestine question in the United Nations. They would have to prove that Britain's conduct of the mandate was a threat to the peace, as in the Spanish issue. This would be very difficult and roundabout. Padilla Nervo does not think that Palestine will come up before the Security Council or Assembly. The Arabs will not bring it up, he said, because Britain directs the international policy of the Arab League, and Britain would not like the question aired at this moment.

If the Jews want the question aired, he said, then the most likely method is to have an unfriendly country, such as Transjordan, once it is admitted, to say that the Jews in Palestine constitute a threat to the peace. Then, if we are sure that we have a majority of countries on our side, and the question comes to a vote, we will have the opportunity of winning a public vindication. However, this will be only a moral victory, indicating that the Jews in Palestine are not a threat to the peace, and it might not be worth our while to risk it. We have lined up against us 5 Arab states and possibly 6, plus Great Britain and her satellites, and

possibly others, and perhaps it would be better for us not to have the question brought up.

I suggested that the Palestine question would probably come up when the Trusteeship Council would be organized. Padilla Nervo warned that we might face long delay before the Trusteeship Council was organized. He has not heard yet of any Trust agreements being concluded. Besides, when Rabin mentioned the territories that Britain was willing to place under Trusteeship, he did not include the Palestine Mandate. Besides, there is another consideration. The terms of the Trusteeship Agreement will be decided between the mandatory and the Council members. Suppose Britain asks for a status quo for Palestine for a number of years? Perhaps it would be better for us to try to stay out of the Trusteeship Council.

Continuing to think aloud, Padilla Nervo then said: What did I think of the possibility of some country's bringing up the Palestine question in one of the introductory speeches made at the opening of the Assembly? On second thought, however, he said that such a statement would do little good if the issue was not on the floor.

We discussed the possibility of Britain being brought to court for violations of the mandate. Padilla Nervo was pessimistic. The League of Nations was dissolved, he said, and there is no supervisory body now in existence to control the mandatory. Without the existence of a supervisory body, it was difficult for any one country to criticize the mandatory. If a supervisory body took action, then countries could rally to its support.

Padilla Nervo said finally that the question was bound to come up some day and that our job was to keep it alive.

Because of our interior difficulties, I ventured to ask Padilla Nervo whether the Mexican delegation would extend us the courtesy of including us on its guest list for official functions. He said he did not see why not, as it was not unusual for organizations to receive invitations and that he would take the matter up with the Minister.

Padilla Nervo closed the interview by repeating that he would be very glad to see Dr. Goldmann any time next week.

July 5, 1946

Dr. Nahum Goldmann

Dorothy Agelson

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH DR. FRANCISCO CASTILLO NAJERA, MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

Dr. Castillo Najera greeted me amiably and said that he had read my article about him and had "recognized himself." He had visited Palestine 15 years ago, he told me, and saw clashes between Jews and Arabs in the streets of Jerusalem. He had not visited the colonies, but had read a great deal about them. In his usual brusque manner, he said to me, what are you going to do about the Arabs? I tried to explain the Arab-Jewish conflict was an artificial one. After some further discussion, on whether or not Jews wanted to go to Palestine, etc., Castillo Najera said to me, now what is your plan (meaning the Jewish Agency's plan of action for the future). He told me that when Dr. Wise was in Mexico, he had told Castillo Najera that we expected to get France to bring up our situation before the Security Council. France is not so willing to do so, I think, said Castillo Najera.

Castillo Najera then asked me again, what do you plan to do? It seemed to me that he was ready to offer concrete help, and I was troubled by the feeling that we might be losing an opportunity by not having a clear-cut plan of action to present. However, my latest instructions were that the Jewish Agency Executive had not yet decided what it was going to ask for. Still, Castillo Najera were told that, we we did not have a definite plan of action, he might think us remiss or incompetent, and lose interest. What I said was the following:

Our present plan of action is defensive; we do not wish the Palestine question brought up before the Security Council at this moment because it will delay the admission of the 100,000 Jews. Since our present status is undefined, because of the dissolution of the League of Nations, we do not plan any offensive action until we acquire status under the Trusteeship Council. In the matter of the Trusteeship Council, we shall probably need the help of our friends, because, judging by Britain's recent action, we may have to fight hard for proper recognition. Castillo Najera asked when the Trusteeship Council would probably meet, and answered the question himself, saying, probably directly after the Assembly meeting in September.

Castillo Najera intimated that the ^{attitude} idea of Great Britain and the United States in the Near East was conditioned by considerations of oil.

He asked me, how do the Russians feel about us?

I said we did not know. I mentioned the fact that the USSR Russia and the Ukraine had voted with the Lebanon last week on the refugee question.

How does France stand, was his next question.

I said that France had a very large Moslem population in her colonies.

You can count on the Latin American Countries, he said. They are not self-interested in this matter, he said. We will see what can be done.

I said that we were rather anxious because the Arab countries had 5 votes within the United Nations, while we had no representation, and that therefore, the Latin American countries might be influenced by the Arab delegates.

Don't worry about that, he said. I myself will be here in September, he said.

COMMENTS:

My conversations with the Mexican permanent delegate, Padilla Harvo and Dr. Castillo Najera, Foreign Minister, have made me acutely aware of the necessity of our having a specific plan of action or perhaps several alternative plans, with regard to the United Nations, as soon as possible. It is not too early to begin mobilizing our friends for active and specific help.

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