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American Zionist Emergency council vs. Jewish Agency Bureau,
1945.

Memorandum

July 20, 1945

To decide on an intelligent division of work in Washington between the Jewish Agency and the Emergency Council, it is necessary to visualize clearly the tasks facing us in Washington and the atmosphere in which these tasks would have to be performed.

The principal tasks are as follows:

1. - Negotiations with high Executive officials regarding political steps calculated to bring about the Jewish State.
2. - Negotiations with government officials concerning economic and technical measures of value to Jewish Palestine (trade and currency arrangements, shipping facilities, visas and travel priorities, communication facilities, etc.).
3. - Creating and maintaining a friendly attitude in the circles of Executive officials and their entourage, and dispelling hostile influences in these quarters, as a condition of successful negotiations.
4. - Creating and maintaining a friendly attitude in Congressional circles (both Democratic and Republican) and dispelling hostile influences in these quarters.
5. - Obtaining active Congressional support for our efforts, both through formal action of the Houses of Congress and through informal (either public or discreet) action by members of Congress acting individually or in groups.
6. - Creating and maintaining a friendly attitude in circles of leading authors, editorial writers, columnists, commentators, leaders of various civic organizations and other persons who congregate in Washington and who play an important part in

moulding the public opinion of the country, and dispelling hostile influences in these quarters.

7. - Creating and maintaining a friendly attitude in foreign press circles in Washington.

8. - Creating and maintaining a friendly attitude in circles of foreign government representatives in Washington.

9. - If necessary, - utilizing foreign circles in Washington as channels for negotiations with foreign governments.

The essential purpose of all these activities should be to have the full weight of American influence pulled in favor of a Jewish Palestine. This is not now the case. At present, the American Government does not sufficiently - if at all - attempt to persuade the British Government of the need to reconstitute Palestine as a Jewish State or even of the need to renounce the White Paper policy. On the contrary, a great many U. S. Government officials seem to doubt the wisdom, if not the justice, of a Jewish Palestine. These doubts have been strengthened by misconceptions regarding the **REGARDING** intrinsic merits of a Pan-Arab bloc and American interests in connection with the oil resources and the strategic position of the Middle East -- misconceptions which are being constantly fed by information from British sources, from Arab quarters, and from individual Americans closely linked to the Arabs by background and various ties. This situation is reflected in the attitude of American representatives in the field. It creates the impression among Arab and British officials with whom they come in contact that American policy

is not at all pro-Zionist, and thus encourages a further stiffening of British and Arab attitudes. In addition, there are serious grounds to believe that American acquiescence in British arrangements is figuring as a quid pro quo in certain understandings with Britain regarding British acquiescence in American policies in other regions.

Lately, doubts concerning the wisdom of American support for Zionism have begun to penetrate Congressional and press circles as well.

To counterbalance these hostile tendencies, to which ought to be added anti-Zionist propaganda from certain Jewish quarters and from some oil companies, it is necessary to strengthen and activate pro-Zionist influences in all appropriate quarters. To a large extent, this means constant and sustained contact with friendly circles, instead of the sporadic contact which we have cultivated hitherto. But to a much larger extent, this means the use of appropriate arguments, sufficient to convince the circles in question. These arguments are partly moral, partly legal, and partly political and economic in character. Special attention should be given to political and economic arguments stressing that the self-interest of the United States is not opposed to, but in many ways served by a Jewish Palestine, since it is considerations of alleged American self-interest that weigh most heavily when marshalled against us in Washington.

A particular place is to be given, of course, to pressure of voters vitally interested in the furtherance of a Jewish Palestine on their elected representatives, candidates, and political party organizations.

It is not clearly visualized in Zionist circles to what extent our contacts in governmental circles ought to be diffused. Influences and views in the higher and middle brackets of American officialdom go in personal circles and are not necessarily determined by the job occupied by the particular official. An assistant attorney general who has nothing to do with foreign affairs may be the best channel to an important official in Foreign Economic Administration or in the Department of State. Because of this, we must broaden the scope of our contacts among Executive officials. It should also be understood that certain members of Washington society and of the top-flight journalists are very close to important Executive officials, thus providing us with another potential channel. In addition, it should be realized that the agencies directly concerned with our problems are much more numerous than this would appear at the first glance. These agencies include the Department of State, the Treasury, the War Department, the Navy Department, the Department of Commerce, the Petroleum Administration, the Foreign Economic Administration, Office of Censorship, Office of Strategic Services, Maritime Commission, Shipping Administration, as well as international organizations such as the UNNRA, etc.

This memorandum does not propose to go into the question to what extent the policy is to be decided by the Agency abroad, by the Council in America, or by a suitable body that would give adequate representation to both groups. It

is assumed, however, that a coordinated procedure for the framing of policies will be devised.

On this assumption, the following arrangement in Washington would appear most reasonable:

Negotiations with the American Government on a high political level can be best conducted by the recognized leaders of Zionism. Whether these men come on behalf of American Zionists or on behalf of the Agency is less important than that they be of a caliber sufficient for the purpose and possess the necessary qualifications. Other things being equal, access to the top-figures in Government can be more frequently secured by prominent American Jews than by men from abroad.

Negotiations on an economic and technical level can be best conducted by people having a thorough knowledge of Washington and familiar with its officialdom and procedures. They would have to be, practically speaking, Americans, but it would often be useful to have experts from Palestine participate in these negotiations. The Agency would appear in many (though not in all) cases as the negotiating party, but the road should be paved by American Zionists.

Social contacts and a flow of information in official and unofficial circles in Washington (except Congress) can be maintained either under the aegis of the Agency, or under that of the Council. The important thing is that it be directed by people with a thorough knowledge of the American scene. Use of Palestinians and Europeans, who would be able to inject "local color" and a detailed knowledge of special topics, would be most valuable, however.

Congressional contacts must be maintained on a purely American level, with only occasional use of guests from Palestine and other countries as interesting persons who could convey interesting information.

Political pressure work must go on on a strictly American level, without any interference by any non-American bodies or personalities.

Contacts with foreign government representatives and the foreign press can be made either by Agency representatives or by those of the Council. As a matter of fact, there is some advantage in impressing foreigners in Washington with the attitude of American Jewry on Palestine. Nevertheless, a lot of some contacts can be handled more easily by Agency people, and most of the negotiations with foreign governments through Washington channels ought to be an Agency function.

This arrangement could be carried out with a few variations:

Variant A - (Council directs Washington work; Agency is introduced as negotiator in specific cases; Agency personnel is used for contacts, when this is opportune).

Office of the Agency:

Representative of Agency in U.S.A.

1 - 3 personable staff members, of use as experts and for contacts (foreigners, preferably Palestinians).

Office of the Council:

Chairman of Executive Committee (non-resident)

Director (resident)

Assistant in charge of Democratic contacts

Assistant in charge of Republican contacts

2 Assistants in charge of Executive contacts

2 Assistants in charge of press and civic
groups' contacts.

(The assignments should not be too strictly
defined. After all, contacts have to be made
with people, and Washington society does not
move in water-tight circles).

Consultant (one or more).

Variant B - (Agency directs Washington work; Council is
used for such tasks as may not be accomplished
by foreign body).

Office of the Agency:

Representative of Agency in U.S.A.

Director (resident)

1 - 3 Palestinian assistants

1 - 3 American Assistants

Office of the Council:

Chairman of Executive Committee (non-resident)

2 staff members in charge of Congressional relations

1 liaison man with executive agencies

Consultant (L. Sack)

Variant C - (Division of work between Agency and Council offices,
each headed by a resident director and given certain
jurisdiction independent of one another).

It can be done on paper, but I doubt its feasibility in practice. It will lead to jurisdictional disputes that will spread to New York and Jerusalem, and energy will be dissipated from political work to internal squabbles.

