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Reel
104

Box
36

Folder
239

American Zionist Policy Committee, Dr. Israel Goldstein, 1945?.

I have been requested to comment on the statements issued by Dr. Israel Goldstein which purport to give the facts connected with the controversy which developed in the American Zionist Emergency Council. Dr. Goldstein's facts suffer from deft distortions, twists and significant omissions, which give a false and misleading account of what actually transpired.

1) Dr. Goldstein states that at a meeting of the Emergency Council on October 30, it was unanimously decided not to press for the resolutions unless and until the preliminary approval of the Executive branch of the Government shall have been secured. No such decision was taken by the Emergency Council on October 30. In fact no decisions whatsoever were taken at that meeting. The minutes of the meeting quote me as saying: "We will not go ahead with the resolution without fully canvassing the situation. If the answer from the State Department is at all vague, I would not recommend proceeding with it." This precaution was suggested not out of a desire not to offend the State Department or the President, but in order to protect ourselves against the kind of surprise which was jumped on us last Spring. The Council wanted to make doubly sure before it moved; but no one really expected any opposition in view of all that had transpired in the preceding months.

At that same meeting I reported (and I quote from the minutes of the meeting) "that in anticipation of the reconsideration of the resolution when Congress reconvenes, the Emergency Council has been engaged in stimulating afresh the interest of the members of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. The local emergency committees in communities in which these members resided had been asked to approach them again and to bring them up to date on recent developments and to suggest that early action on the resolution, when Congress reconvenes, would be

desirable. The results so far are gratifying."

Thus the Council, on October 30, was fully informed that continued activities in behalf of our resolution were going on and would continue in Washington and all over the country. It is false to suggest even by implication that the Emergency Council at its meeting on October 30 ordered all of our activities in behalf of the resolution to be discontinued. It merely directed that we explore the mind of the State Department on our resolution, and there was a consensus of opinion that if the State Department attitude was found to be negative, we would then not proceed with the resolutions. Until such time however activities in behalf of the resolution were not to be discontinued nor was word to go out that we were even considering a possible postponement.

Inquiries were accordingly made at the State Department, and at the meeting on November 21 Dr. Wise reported "that Mr. Stettinius had telephoned him and informed him that he had seen the President who urged that nothing be done about the bill at this time and that the matter be left in his hands a little while longer."

This, however, did not satisfy the members of the Emergency Council. *Many* ~~They~~ felt that they had made a mistake in ~~making~~ ^{deciding to make} inquiries at the State Department in the first place. ~~They should~~ ^{WE might} have assumed that the withdrawal of the military objections, the party platforms which included Palestine planks and the statement of the President himself on October 15 were sufficient "green light" to go ahead.

At this meeting, and here again I quote from the minutes, "there followed a lengthy discussion, and it was finally decided that efforts be made once more to obtain clearance from the President through Senator Wagner, and perhaps others. It was agreed to leave it to Dr. Wise, Dr. Silver and Mr. Shulman to take the necessary action with regard to an approach to the President." There was no other action taken at this meeting.

In other words, the Emergency Council, upon second thought, was

They were not content to let it go at that.

not satisfied to have the resolution shelved just because the State Department and the President had indicated their objection to the resolution. They wanted persuasive influence to be brought to bear upon ^{the Administration} ~~them~~ to change ~~their~~ ^{its} minds.

Dr. Wise strenuously objected to this line of procedure. He did not want the President ^{"annoyed"} ~~irritated~~ by our insistence and our persuasion. He reluctantly yielded to the pressure of the Council and thereafter, far from using his energies vigorously to persuade the Secretary of State and the President, he seriously interfered with me in carrying out the clear mandate of the Council.

2) Dr. Goldstein forgets to mention the fact which I made known to the Council that the day following the November 21 meeting, I wired Dr. Wise urging him to get in touch with Congressman Bloom to see the President. Dr. Wise never replied to this telegram.

3) No one interested in the passage of the bill ever saw the President on the resolution at that time or since. He was out of Washington. All our information has come through Mr. Stettinius. The first and the only personal contact with Mr. Stettinius to carry out the wishes of the Council could not be made before December 4. It was made by Senator Wagner and myself. Senator Wagner was not in Washington before the preceding Tuesday and our appointment could not be made before the following Monday.

4) But by December 4 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had already met and had considered our resolution. In fact, at the request of Senator Taft, our Palestine Resolution was to have been considered by the Committee on November 22, but out of courtesy to Senator Wagner who was out of the city, the consideration of our resolution by the committee was postponed to November 29. I reported at the meeting of our Council on November 21 that such meeting of the Senate Committee had been scheduled for the next day, but had been postponed to the 29th.

Senator Taft requested consideration of the resolution on his own initiative. He was neither requested nor urged by me. Already on November 11 (please note the date) Senator Taft wrote me: "I have had to delay my return to Washington until Thursday, but I hope we can proceed with the Palestine Resolution immediately." He was one of the co-sponsors of the resolution. He had resented the postponement of the resolution last Spring. ^{It was he who had} kept after the military until he obtained the letter from Secretary of War Stimson withdrawing their objections. As soon as Congress reconvened, he began pressing for his resolution, just as we all did, including the delegates at the Convention of the ZOA at Atlantic City.

5) Dr. Goldstein suggests that if I had not brought pressure on Congressman Bloom to take the matter up with his committee no action whatsoever would have been taken in Congress. I did not arrive in Washington until November 27. By that time a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as I indicated above, had already been set for November 29, and the Senate Committee was prepared to act favorably on our resolution at that meeting. It has been suggested that I should have asked the committee to defer action. Why? This was certainly not my mission nor mandate in Washington. I was there to see whether I could persuade the State Department and the President to withdraw their objections to the passage of the resolution. Failing in that, the Council would then have to decide what to do, since the first report of the President's disapproval did not close the matter as far as the Council was concerned. I had not yet had the opportunity to contact either the State Department or the President. I was not to see Mr. Stettinius until December 4. Until I had had the chance to persuade them and failed, I could not go, nor did the Council obligate me to go, to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and ask them, many of whom had been critical of the State Department's intervention and of the President's action last Spring.

to postpone action on our Palestine Resolution for which the Jews of America had so persistently pressed up to the very last. We were not pressing for the resolution. The pressure came from the Senate Committee itself which was so much interested in the Palestine Resolution that it met on our successive occasions to consider it and it insisted time and again on approving our resolution in spite of two personal appearances before it made by the Secretary of State and in spite of other pressure brought by the Administration against it. Even when the resolution was finally postponed as a result of the persistent pressure from the State Department and the President, two-thirds of the members of the Senate Committee signed a round robin in which they stated that they would have voted for the resolution were it not for this insistence of the State Department and the President.

Congressman Bloom had publicly announced right after the President's statement of October 15 that he would summon a meeting of his committee the day after Congress reconvened. *(I called upon him for the purpose of getting him to contact the President and State Department.)* He was eager to move forward. He did not feel that the State Department had to be consulted about it. It was none of its business, he stated. Prior to my arrival in Washington, and in anticipation of the meeting of his committee, he had had printed as a House document, the Palestine endorsements made by the four hundred congressmen and senators which appeared in the volume, "America and Palestine," recently published by the Emergency Council. It was Congressman Bloom's own idea and all credit is due him for it. Congressman Bloom was somewhat concerned with the fact that he might be blamed if he moved forward and the resolution failed of passage in his committee. He wanted us to share in the responsibility for moving ahead. I re-assured him on that score, and at his request, I wrote him a letter following our interview in which I backed him up. Congressman Bloom convoked his committee on November 29, the very day on which the Senate Committee met to consider our resolution. Bloom was undoubtedly encouraged to move forward

rapidly by the fact that the Senate Committee had scheduled a meeting on November 29 and was expected to act favorably on the resolution.

6) When we finally got to Stettinius on December 4 -- and here Dr. Goldstein's memory again conveniently fails him -- we were shown, right at the outset, that fatal telegram of Dr. Wise which was dispatched without the knowledge of either Senator Wagner or myself and without any authorization from the Council on the very eve of our interview, ^{a telegram} ~~and~~ which was calculated to nullify the effectiveness of our mission to the Secretary of State. This telegram which in so many words told the Secretary of State, and through him the President, that Dr. Wise and many of his associates would readily and without protest accept their decision with reference to the resolution, broke the back of the entire effort which the Council had resolved to make in order to change the mind of the State Department and of the President. Our only hope lay in persuading Mr. Stettinius, and through him, the President, that the entire Zionist Movement and the entire Jewish people of America were solidly united in demanding action on the resolution which had been hanging fire for over ten months, and that their hopes, which had been raised so high by all that had transpired during the year, would be dashed to the ground if it became known that the President insisted on a second deferment. Dr. Wise's telegram which was sent from Pittsburgh at the time of the sessions of the American Jewish Conference, and presumably with the knowledge of Dr. Goldstein, deliberately ^{wrecked} ~~ruined~~ this effort *and torpedoed the resolution.*

7) Dr. Goldstein has another serious lapse of memory. On December 5, he sent the following telegram to every member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "We earnestly urge you report our favorably Palestine Resolution for adoption by present Congress ... Your Committee's favorable action would be deeply appreciated as fulfillment President's magnificent message the Zionist Organization of America and overwhelming American opinion as expressed recently in both party platforms."

Why did Dr. Goldstein violate the "unanimous decision" of the Emergency Council in urging Senators to act on the resolution when he knew full well that no "green light" had been given? If Dr. Silver is guilty of a breach of discipline, what about Dr. Goldstein? But the gentleman was playing safe! If the resolution passed he would share in the credit. If it failed - why he would see to it that the failure would all be blamed on Dr. Silver.

And having sent this telegram, why did he appear in Washington forty-eight hours later to urge the same Senators not to pass the resolution?

And having come to Washington to persuade the Senators not to pass the resolution, why did he permit himself to be persuaded by me not to carry out his mission? Instead, he and the other members of the committee went to Stettinius to tell him that the Zionists were not pressing for the resolution but that the pressure came from the Senate Committee itself (which, of course, was the truth). Is Dr. Goldstein unwilling ever to assume responsibility for what he does, or says, or writes? Is the fault always that of someone else?

8) Dr. Goldstein again has a convenient lapse of memory when he fails to mention that at the Executive of the Emergency Council which met in Washington on Monday morning, December 11 (and which by the way was the only authorized meeting of the Emergency Council since the meeting on November 21 -- the other meetings of December 7 and 9 being rump meetings called by Dr. Wise in countervention of the clear provisions of the constitution) it was agreed that nothing be done to interfere with the passage of the resolution on which the Foreign Affairs Committee was to act that every afternoon, but instead Mr. Stettinius should be asked to issue a statement that his appearance before the Senate Committee did not indicate a change of attitude on the part of the President. Nothing was to be said to Mr. Stettinius about deferring the Palestine Resolution. Dr. Wise and Dr. Goldstein concurred on this, and joined in the delegation to Mr. Stettinius with that understanding.