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Akzin, Benjamin, 1946.

January 14, 1946

Dr. Benjamin Akzin
American Zionist Emergency Council
1706 G Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

My dear Dr. Akzin:

With reference to Mr. Sayre, I do not know why you should not try to contact him and cultivate him.

I am interested to know whether you have seen Henderson.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:GR

February 7, 1946

Dr. Akzin
Zionist Organization of America
1720 - 16th St., N.W.
Washington 9, D. C.

My dear Dr. Akzin:

I received your letter of February 6, but the
draft of the answer to Mr. Gordon was not
included in it.

Please send it to me.

Most cordially yours,

AHS:GR

February 14, 1946

Dr. Benjamin Akzin
Zionist Organization of America
1720 - 16th Street, N.W.
Washington 9, D. C.

My dear Dr. Akzin:

In reply to your letter of February 6 with reference to the location of our Washington Office after the ZOA moves back to New York, taking everything into consideration I believe that it would be advisable to sell the building, and for the Emergency Council to rent suitable office space elsewhere. I would suggest that you look around in Washington for such quarters. The data which you will obtain will then be presented to the Emergency Council for action.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:GR

March 15, 1946

Dr. Benjamin Akzin
Zionist Organization of America
41 East 42nd Street
New York, N. Y.

My dear Dr. Akzin:

In the March 12 issue of the "Congressional Record" there appeared the round-table discussion broadcast of February 23, 1946 from the studios of WOR on the subject "Palestine or Mass Suicide" under the auspices of the American League for a Free Palestine. Among those who participated was Senator Magnuson.

Senator Magnuson was made to repeat the old libel which Bergson and Gillette have been spreading through the country, in spite of repeated representations made to them and their disavowals. Senator Magnuson states in this broadcast "We have heard of demands for a Jewish state and a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. Americans cannot go along with such demands because they imply a theocracy, or they will lead to domination of one section of the population by another." This, of course, is outrageous. I am quite sure that the Senator did not know what he was saying, or against whom his statement was directed. Senator Magnuson has been speaking recently under the auspices of various official Zionist bodies who are committed to the program of the Jewish State.

I would suggest that you make an appointment with the Senator and explain to him the damage which such false and groundless statements cause. Explain to him what the Jewish Agency and the Zionists of the world understand by the Jewish State. Show him the official declaration of the Jewish Agency on the subject, as well as all other relevant official statements on the subject. Tell him that these false charges are being made to justify the separatist activities of the League for a Free Palestine.

I would suggest that you also send a letter to Mr. Louis Bromfield, who took part in this broadcast, as well as Miss Ruth Chatterton. I do not know that there is any point in raising this question again with Mr. Gillette, as Mr. Lurie of our office had considerable correspondence with him on the subject — to no effect.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:GR

American Zionist Emergency Council

CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS:

Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization of America
Mizrachi Organization of America
Poale Zion-Zeire Zion of America
Zionist Organization of America

WASHINGTON BUREAU

1720 Sixteenth Street, Northwest
Michigan 4480

ZONE 9

June 24, 1946

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
19810 Shaker Boulevard
Shaker Heights
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver

Confirming our telephone conversation of June 22nd, I wish to inform you of the meetings which Colonel Bernard Bernstein had with Messrs. Grady and Dorr on the one hand, and Mr. Foley on the other. Mr. Foley is a close friend of the Colonel, and I had asked him to speak to Foley in an attempt to persuade him to accept appointment as one of the alternates to the Cabinet Committee. Mr. Bernstein's meeting with Grady and Dorr was, as far as I know, on his own initiative.

Mr. Bernstein informed me that Grady and Dorr did not seem at all convinced in their own minds, nor did they seem to have received any instructions, that they should try to speed up the immigration of the 100,000 irrespective of the delays involved in the consideration of the other recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee Report. They emphasized to him, just as they did to me a few days earlier, that their task is to consider the Report as a whole and that in doing so, they must view the problem in the light of American Near Eastern policy. Since their conversation with Bernstein took place after Grady's meeting with President Truman, their continued reiteration of this point of view shows that nothing was said to Grady by the President which would lead the Commissioners to think that the President wants them to speed action on the 100,000.

Another point made by the Commissioners to Bernstein was that they don't want to be pressurized and would resent any attempts to do so. They also would not like to be bothered by too many people coming to see them, but would prefer to have one channel through which American Zionists would assist them by giving them any information which the Zionists want to submit to them or which the Commissioners may desire. In this connection, the Commissioners indicated to Bernstein that they liked Dr. Goldmann's approach to them, since he merely expressed a readiness to give them important technical information; whereas Rabbi Newman's and my visit to them was viewed as an attempt to pressure them and was rather resented by them.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

June 24, 1946

Mr. Foley confirmed to Mr. Bernstein his extreme reluctance to accept a position as alternate on the Cabinet Committee. While he did not say that the acceptance of the position by him is excluded, he said that it is extremely unlikely. Foley is trying to get Mr. Lawrence Morris appointed as the Treasury representative instead of himself. Mr. Morris is a former law partner of Foley, the son of the former American Ambassador to Belgium, and, according to Mr. Bernstein, a nice but uninformed and weak man who would not ~~count~~ *weigh much* with his fellow Commissioners even if he were to take a friendly attitude.

In addition to this information obtained from Colonel Bernstein, I was told today from another source that even Bernstein's visit to the Commissioners was resented by them as an attempt to pressurize them and that, therefore, he would not be the right man either to serve as channel between us and the Commissioners.

In analyzing the above information, it would seem to me that the Commissioners' attitude in resenting pressure and in not wanting to be bothered by many visitors is only natural. I see no point in irritating them by continuing to ask various people to go and see them, and I do think that they are entitled to have all our desires reach them through one person in addition to Dr. Goldmann, whom they regard as representative of Palestine Jewry rather than as a representative of American Zionists. After getting Colonel Bernstein's report, I was inclined to think that perhaps I should withdraw from further conferences with them and that he should be asked to serve as intermediary. But in view of the additional information obtained today which indicates that they resented him, too, I begin to wonder whether we should not overlook their reported personal reactions and whether I should not continue to supply them with material and, if necessary, see them personally. Indeed, in talking *to* Mr. Bernstein, the Commissioners complained especially of the attempts to impress them with the plight of the D. P.'s in Europe. This was the line taken by Rabbi Newman, whereas I confined myself to bringing up the alleged political obstacles from the point of view of American Near Eastern policy to a pro-Zionist solution in Palestine. Since they themselves admit that this is the main point, I do not see how *we* can afford to avoid giving them information regarding this matter.

At the risk of increasing my personal unpopularity with them, it may, therefore, perhaps be necessary for me to continue doing this work.

On the other hand, if you think that we should pay attention to their reported dissatisfaction with me, I would recommend that we should ask Arthur Lourie to undertake the job. He is one of the very few people who combine a thorough knowledge of all the political arguments involved with a sweetness of manner such that it might overcome the unwillingness of the Commissioners to be pressured. In addition, he is one of the few people connected with the Emergency Council who would be persona grata to the Jewish Agency in London. Therefore, after having started his work in this country, he might be asked to accompany the Commissioners when they go to London. As against this, there is the fact that he is a British subject and as such would strike a somewhat false note in talking to American Commissioners on behalf of an American movement and in

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

June 24, 1946

explaining to them the villainy of the British Government. But I think that the advantages outweigh this disadvantage, and that we will have to choose either him or me for permanent contact with the Commissioners.

Since it is essential to renew the contact soon by way of sending material to the Commissioners, I would ask you to instruct us at your earliest convenience as to who should undertake the job.

Irrespective of this, it becomes increasingly clear that whatever real pressure is to be exercised should be undertaken on a much higher level with the President and the three members of the Cabinet. The letter of the nine Senators to the President (incidentally, it will be released today by Wagner's office) and the proposed visits by you and Dr. Wise, and by the New York Congressional Delegation to the President will, I hope, accomplish some results in this connection.

I was very unhappy to hear about Foley's reluctance to accept the job. It seems that Morris would be a most inadequate substitute. We are still doing here what we can in order to get Foley or another strong and friendly man appointed from the Treasury. It is important, of course, not to alienate Morris by any indication of our attitude.

An important problem is that of the Cabinet Committee's staff. Certain steps are being undertaken to see to it that it should be composed of intelligent and unbiased people rather than of State Department stooges. In this connection, as in many other connections, I want to commend most highly the good work and cooperative attitude of Mr. Wahl, the representative of the American Jewish Conference in Washington.

In view of Colonel Bernstein's emphasis on the need to avoid more people seeing the Commissioners, I have suggested to Harry Shapiro that he ask Professor Handler to abstain for the moment from coming to Washington to meet with the Commissioners. *I hear, however, that he is already here.*

Sincerely yours,

Bakzin

Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw

July 2, 1946

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Shapiro:

Enclosed please find copy of the memorandum which I have prepared for Colonel Bernstein. The memorandum is being handed today to the Cabinet Committee. As I wrote you, I have consulted Eliahu Epstein about the text and he has suggested certain changes in my first draft. We had planned another meeting together with Gass to work out the exact text, but because of the events of the last few days, no such meeting could have been held, so that the responsibility for the final text is mine. I have tried, though, to incorporate Epstein's suggestions.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin

BA:ow
Encl.

MEMORANDUM

On the protection of the small landholder in Palestine

This memorandum, prepared in reply to a question by a staff member of the Cabinet Committee on Palestine, represents but the personal opinion of a private person who had given some thought to the problem. Lacking the knowledge of details, he would suggest that for fuller data the Cabinet Committee consult the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which body has made a full study of the matter.

The principles which, in the opinion of the author, are involved in any attempt of a fair solution of the problem of the small landholders in Palestine, are as follows:

I

The general approach to the problem should be positive rather than negative. The interests of the small landholders should be protected mainly by measures designed to raise their standards, not by draconian restrictions on the freedom of occupation of Palestine's residents or on the orderly transfer of private property.

II

Care should be taken lest the attempts to protect the interests of the small landholders in Palestine serve as means to introduce the evils of racial and religious discrimination. Any prohibitions and restrictions designed to prevent the sale of land to, and its purchase or cultivation by, members of a specific racial or religious group open the door to such abuses and should not be resorted to.

III

If the Land Law Act of 1940, with its provisions based on discrimination between Jews and Arabs, is repealed, the interests of the small individual land owner could be best taken care of by legislation which would ensure that such small land owners, irrespective of religion or race, could obtain cheap credit from public sources to help them to increase production or get over emergencies. This would make it possible for them to solve their momentary difficulties without being reduced to the necessity of selling their holdings.

On the other hand, care should be taken to avoid creating a class of compulsory small land owners who would be prohibited from selling their lands and moving into the cities in line with the general trend in countries which undergo a process of modernization. There is also nothing to be gained by making it impossible for a peasant who, because of personal circumstances, cannot operate a farm profitably, to dispose of his holdings and engage in some urban occupation more suitable to him. Provision of cheap credit by government owned or supervised credit institutions is the fairest means of enabling peasants to remain on the land without putting them into a strait jacket.

Insofar as tenants are concerned, an additional measure that would redound to their benefit would consist of a special provision for cheap credit for such tenants so as to enable them to buy small lots from the land owners. If possible, the credit rate for such loans should be even cheaper than the credit rates for ordinary agricultural loans.

While Arabs rather than Jews may be expected to be the main beneficiaries of these measures, it would seem most unreasonable and unjust to make any provision limiting the scope of such credit operations to non-Jews only.

IV

Special provisions may have to be considered that would protect a small landholder against forcible alienation of a minimum homestead area necessary for his and his immediate family's livelihood. Such protection should be afforded to tenants as well as to owners. The size of the homestead lot should be calculated differently in non-irrigable areas and in areas which are or can be irrigated.

These provisions should apply to small landholders whatever their racial or religious group.

V

The device used by the Jewish National Fund of leasing its holdings rather than selling them must be viewed in the light of that Fund's aspiration to assist in settling Jews on the land either in cooperative settlements or as individual farmers, and in reducing the evils of speculative selling and of large absentee estates. To enable settlement by people without means, it leases land to them at particularly advantageous credit terms. By refusing to sell its holdings to anyone (the refusal to sell extends to Jews as well as to non-Jews), it ensures that these holdings should not be used for speculation or other purposes, but should remain at the disposal of small settlers, in keeping with the charitable purpose of the contributors to the Fund.

There is nothing objectionable in the accumulation of such holdings, as long as the Fund in question remains a benevolent trust managed in the interest of the farmers. Analogous provisions prohibiting the sale or specifying the use of lands are a well known feature in the United States, in connection with land grants of the Federal Government and of the States, in the case of Indian lands, and in privately acquired lands of educational and other benevolent institutions.

Inalienability of land holdings marks also certain forms of land ownership by the Moslem Waqf foundation, and a movement is currently reported on foot to acquire inalienable holdings in the name of an Arab Land Fund. Provided that these funds are managed in conformity with their ostensible religious or charitable purposes, there is no reason why exception should be taken to the principle of the inalienability of their holdings. But there seems to be considerable evidence that their management permits excessive exploitation of the--as it happens--Arab tenants and other abuses. In the circumstances, an investigation with a view to remedial measures would seem appropriate.

VI

The policy of the J. N. F. and of the reported Arab land fund to restrict the lease of their holdings to members of the respective groups only, might in the long run be open to question. But the time to take up this problem would come later, when the relationship between the two sections of the population will have improved sufficiently to make mixed agricultural settlement practicable.

VII

There is a tendency in some circles to view the land problem in Palestine in the light of an alleged need to prevent "too much land falling into Jewish hands". This seems to be the principal rationale of the land laws now in force in Palestine, which appear far more interested in damaging the Jews than in bringing actual benefits to Arab farmers. There is no justification in thinking of the problem in these terms. The present inhabitants of Palestine should have equal rights to pursue agricultural as well as any other activities. Such additional Jewish immigrants as may come in should also enjoy these rights on the basis of full equality. An attitude

that seeks deliberately to prevent expansion of Jewish agriculture is conceived in bias and can only result in harm.

What is important is to consider economic facts and trends. According to Robert Nathan's study (page 195), 67% of the non-Jewish population of Palestine is rural. In modern conditions, this is a ratio which is most unlikely to increase. On the contrary, there is every likelihood that a growing part of the Arab population will move into the cities in line with modern trends. Therefore, the Arab farmer, by and large, is not faced with landlessness. His two major troubles are: too primitive a method of operation, and indebtedness to the landowner. Accordingly, the major avenues for bettering his position lie not in the direction of giving him a priority or exclusive rights with reference to available land reserves, but in the direction of enabling him to adopt more modern methods, and of enabling him to own the land which he now cultivates.

On the other hand, the proportion of Jews on the land is much smaller, about 15-18%. This is due mainly to artificial restrictions which bar Jewish would-be farmers from acquiring either private or public lands over most of Palestine. Were such restrictions lifted, a much larger part of the Jewish population of Palestine, many of whom ardently desire to cultivate the soil, would turn to agriculture.

In addition, there is the major problem of land for many among the would-be Jewish immigrants to Palestine.

VIII

Instead of trying to balance Arab against Jewish land holdings by open or surreptitious discriminatory devices, a fair solution would consist in increasing the total area of land available to small farmers on a cooperative or individual basis. This can be done best by three measures:

(1) by getting the government to put public lands at the disposal of such candidates;

(2) by enacting a tax structure which would induce owners of large tracts of uncultivated lands to dispose of them to would-be small farmers; and

(3) by increasing the yield and therefore reducing the size of the area required to provide livelihood for a single family, through introduction of modern farming methods, especially through irrigation.

The presently cultivated area of Palestine is estimated at 7.8 million dunums. The potentially cultivable area amounts, according to government estimates, to 8,734,000 dunums, according to Jewish estimates to 10,519,000 dunums. There is, therefore, a land reserve of 1 to 3 million dunums. It is out of this land reserve, and through increased irrigation, and not by juggling transfer restrictions of land already cultivated, that a way to solve the agricultural problem of Palestine should be sought.

There is one distinction that, in all fairness, might be advocated as between Arabs and Jews: the difference between the government and the Jewish estimates of cultivable lands amounts to about 1.8 million dunums. This difference springs from the fact that the government calculates cultivability on the basis of primitive Arab farming methods, whereas the Jews assume the adoption of more modern methods. It would, therefore, be fair that in distributing its public lands, the government would adopt a policy of giving preference to Arab candidates in respect of lands cultivable under any conditions, and to Jews in respect of lands which the Jews think they could render cultivable.

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WESTERN UNION

R. B. WHITE
PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NM = Night Message

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Ship Radiogram

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination.

Received at

WASHINGTON, D. C., JULY 6, 1946

DR. A. L. SILVER

UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO CONTACT YOU SINCE YESTERDAY. JEWISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON ARRANGING IMPORTANT MASS MEETING MAYFLOWER HOTEL THURSDAY JULY ELEVEN EIGHT P.M. INVITING CABINET, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, SPEAKERS INCLUDE YOURSELF, ONE REPUBLICAN AND ONE DEMOCRAT FROM CONGRESS. CONSIDER ESSENTIAL YOUR PARTICIPATION. PLEASE WIRE CONFIRMATION.

AKZIN

6000 THIRTEENTH STREET, N. W.

CLASS OF SERVICE

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WESTERN UNION

A. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

1201

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(25)

1946 JUL 31

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NBJ178 71= WASHINGTON DC 31 609P

DR A H SILVER=

COMMODORE HOTEL=

LEO SAW DAVID WHO SAID THERE IS ONE WEEK TO MAKE UP MIND
ABOUT SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING PLAN LEO CABLED
PARIS ASKING SPEEDY RETURN OF MEMBERS INCLUDING KAPLAN
ESSENTIAL YOU HELP FRAME DECISIONS CONCERNING REJECTION
OR MODIFICATION OF PLAN ALSO SUGGEST THAT YOU GIVE
PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BOTH WASHINGTON OFFICES HOW TO
EXPRESS OUR REACTION TO PLAN AND ISSUE ORDER GUARANTEEING
AGAINST DISREGARD OF INSTRUCTIONS BY UNILATERAL DEMARCHES
BY AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES= AKZIN.

BENJAMIN AKZIN
1720 Sixteenth Street, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

July 17, 1946

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
Mooselookmegantic House
Mooselookmegantic, Maine


Dear Dr. Silver:

I had a talk with Congressman Celler, who feels rather bitter about the defection of his Jewish colleagues and of some of the Zionist leaders in connection with the British loan. But he continues to be firmly convinced that the position which he and you took was the right one.

In the circumstances, he is more interested than ever to make use of his place on the Z. O. A. ticket of delegates to the Zionist Congress, and would like nothing better than to go to the Congress if and when it is held. He asked me to find out whether his place on the ticket is sufficiently high to have assured his election as a delegate.

I am sending a copy to Dr. Neumann, and, if I may add a personal hope of mine, I think a way ought to be found to place him on the list of the delegates elected. Please let me know what answer I can give to his inquiry.

Sincerely yours,



Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw

July 24, 1946

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Shapiro:

I have just spoken to Senator Myers, who related to me his talk with Acheson regarding Transjordan. Acheson told him that no action will be taken for some time but could not give him any assurances as to the length of the postponement.

In the circumstances, and since there is no immediate danger, Senator Myers does not see any point in an immediate Senatorial delegation regarding this matter. On the other hand, he wants to write a letter to Mr. Acheson asking for an assurance that before anything is done about Transjordan, the Senator be informed and an opportunity be given to the Senators to visit Acheson to discuss the matter with him. This procedure would ensure us against sudden action on Transjordan during the adjournment of Congress. The Senator asked me to prepare a draft of the letter, to which I naturally agreed.

I took this opportunity to tell the Senator about the plight of the 100,000 and asked whether he would be willing to join Wagner and Mead in visiting Secretary Byrnes. He agreed to do so and I have informed both Senators accordingly.

Sincerely,

Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw

July 24, 1946

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Shapiro:

Epstein and Arazi phoned me to say that the news from London is bad and that the British are preparing to adjourn the admission of the 100,000 until after consultations with the Jews and Arabs in the fall, this question to be treated together with the long term issues. In addition, there are indications that the British think of taking the distribution of the certificates into their own hands and to admit only old and sick people. In connection with the emergency, Epstein wired Dr. Silver asking him to come to Washington. In the meantime, Epstein had discussed the question with various people in Washington including Niles and Wagner. Niles advised him that new instructions had gone out to the American delegates in London not to agree to the postponement of the admission of the 100,000.

I have asked Epstein whether there is some concrete step which he would like me to take in this connection, and he asked me to see Senator Mead. I did so this afternoon. The Senator told me that he and Wagner spoke to the President about the matter just a few days ago and were assured by him that he will try to get the 100,000 in without further delay. The Senator said that he and Wagner believe that Byrnes rather than the President constitutes the weak spot at the moment. Accordingly, he and Wagner are trying now to see him in a day or two, i.e., before the Secretary's trip to Paris.

While on the Hill, I bumped into Senator Brewster who stopped to tell me that he would like to have material giving a few parallels from the American Revolution to show that no revolution, however just, remains unaccompanied by excesses, and that this is no reason for denying support to an essentially just cause. He told me that he has already discussed the matter in this light with a few Senators, but that he would like to have more material so as to make a speech about it.

The Senator brought us greetings from the Zionists in Shanghai, whom he found to be very energetic and very devoted to the cause.....

Sincerely yours,

BA:ow

Benjamin Akzin

Benjamin Akzin

July 24, 1946

Harry L. Shapiro

Enclosed please find copy of an editorial from today's Washington Post relating to the bombing of the King David hotel.

pp. encl.

cc: Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
Rabbi Stephen S. Wise
Mr. Emanuel Neumann
Mrs. Rose Halprin



OUTRAGE IN JERUSALEM

In a statement made in the House of Commons yesterday, Prime Minister Attlee declared that in seeking a solution of the Palestine problem the British government will not allow itself to be prejudiced by acts of terrorism. This is a praiseworthy and statesmanlike stand. It is also wholly realistic. The bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem by fanatical members of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, underground Jewish organization, which resulted in a great loss of life, was from every point of view an execrable act. It must be condemned in the strongest terms, as it has been condemned not only by Englishmen but also by the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

Yet, if the British government makes this manifestation of blind violence an excuse to go back on its duties and obligations under the mandate or as the occasion to carry out a far-reaching program of repression, it will have compounded a crime. A tragic fact stands out of a tragic situation. That is that the recent wave of violence in Palestine, where for years the Jewish inhabitants have demonstrated exemplary patience and restraint, is the grim sequel to the dilatory, evasive and bankrupt policy which Great Britain has itself pursued. The delay in carrying out the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry regarding the immediate entry of 100,000 refugee Jews into Palestine has, in particular, exacerbated feelings that, in some cases, had already reached a fanatical pitch of anger and frustration. The latest outrage in Palestine is a reminder of the imperative need of early and constructive action.

Immediate reach

July 24, 1946

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Shapiro:

Further concerning the threatened closing of the border of the American zone, Wahl informs me that he is doing his utmost to get the idea to the White House that the border should remain open until after the November elections at any rate. He has spoken to Secretary Wallace who has promised his support. He has spoken to David Niles who also promised to do something about it. He has approached Senator Wagner and is trying to get the support of Senator Kilgore, who might accomplish a great deal in view of his close relations with the President. Both Wahl and I think that the Democrats rather than the Republicans should be approached in this connection.

I will ask Dr. Silver's advice tonight as to whether I should request Senators Wagner and Mead, if and when they see Secretary Byrnes in connection with the 100,000, to raise also the question of the closing of the border.

In accordance with the suggestion made during our telephone conversation of today, I am enclosing a rough draft of a letter which, I think, ought to be addressed to the President by the leaders of the groups which were invited to the Department of State, i.e., the Emergency Council, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Conference, the American Jewish Committee, and the J. D. C. I think such a letter, to be signed by Dr. Silver, Dr. Wise or his substitute in the Congress, Mr. Monsky, Mr. Proskauer, and Mr. Baerwald, is the next logical step to be undertaken. I will show the draft of the letter to Dr. Silver tonight and will give you his reactions tomorrow morning over the telephone.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw

July 1946

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of our respective organizations and, we are certain, of all Jewish citizens of America, we should like to appeal to you to keep open the borders of the American occupation zone in Germany and Austria for Jewish refugees from persecution in Eastern and Central Europe.

At a meeting to which representatives of our organizations were recently invited, the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of State and General Hildring explained to us the gravity of the problems which the continued and accelerated influx of Jewish refugees causes to our military authorities in Europe and which have caused General McNarney to recommend the closing of the border at the time when the number of Jews in D. P. camps in the American zone in Germany will have reached 110,000.

We have the utmost appreciation for these difficulties and we would like, at this point, to express our profound gratitude for the kindness with which the Secretaries have called us into consultation on this matter.

Since we understand that the final decision in this matter will not be made without your authorization, we feel impelled to address this appeal to you.

Our appeal is based entirely on the humanitarian considerations involved. The Jews who are fleeing to the American zone come mainly from Poland where they are in daily danger of life. Closing the only avenue of escape open to them would be tantamount to condemning them

pressure on those elements in Poland who embarked on a course of persecuting and killing Jews to desist, ^{from this course} in speeding up the admission of growing numbers of Jewish refugees into Palestine and other countries, and in obtaining the agreement of the British, French, and Soviet Governments to give temporary refuge to Jewish refugees in their zones as well. We would be happy if either or all of these efforts would reduce the need for Jews to flee into the American zone or die. But as long as this need exists, we beg you in the name of the entire Jewish community of America and in the name of humanity not to close the border of the American zone to these refugees.



July 31, 1946

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Shapiro:

Professor Sheldon was here yesterday. He wanted again to try to get a Resolution introduced in the Senate to have a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee investigate the Arab activities in this country. He also wanted Senators Wagner and Mead to do something about it, and asked for my cooperation. I explained that Senators Wagner and Mead are fully taken up with other matters of immediate and urgent interest to us, and that since I did not see any hope for the appointment of a subcommittee, I could not well give him any help.

On the other hand, I fully agreed that the proposal included in the British plan that America should bribe the Arabs to the tune of \$300,000,000 makes it especially timely to inquire ~~as~~ ~~to~~ who are those Arabs who are going to profit by this money, and whether the money will not be spent in propaganda within the United States. We agreed that he should try to get Senators Murray of Montana and Myers of Pennsylvania to make speeches along these lines, and that he may tell them that we are fully backing this request.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin

BA: cw

P
Y

UNITED STATES SENATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

HANDWRITTEN

8/2/46

Dear Mr. Akzin:

I talked with the President as I suggested. I am convinced that he is losing patience with the British but of course I cannot and do not quote him.

Anyway I presented the matter to the best of my ability.

Sincerely,

/s/ E. C. Johnson



Thanks for the material and suggestions.

/s/ E. C. J.

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August 2, 1946

Honorable Edwin C. Johnson
Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator:

In accordance with your request, I enclose a few notes on recent developments in Palestine. There is no need for me to go into the over-all picture since it could not possibly be covered better than in your speeches. Permit me to refer you, for example, to your Madison Square Garden speech, published in the Congressional Record of June 13, 1946, p. A3640. The first historical part of that speech of yours is probably familiar to your St. Louis audience, but the second part of the speech is one of the most masterly analyses of recent developments in Palestine that I am aware of. Together with the enclosed notes, I think it contains all the material which you might possibly want for your St. Louis speech.

We were very happy to hear of the President's announcement postponing a decision on the British plan pending further deliberations. We only hope that during these deliberations the President will give sufficient attention to the merits of our case and to the reasons which we have for opposing the British project. I am particularly hopeful that you will be able to impress the President in this sense, at the time of the visit which, as you told me, you are going to pay at the White House before leaving town.

Respectfully yours,

Benjamin Akzin
Director, Washington Office

BA:ow

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN PALESTINE

The most important development which occurred in Palestine in the last few months is the change in the temper and attitude of the Jewish population of that country. Provoked beyond the limits of endurance by British policy, the Jews in Palestine have engaged in several acts of violence which must be regarded as indicating that the Jews are nearing the point of open insurrection against British rule. Violence is abhorrent to all law-abiding citizens, but it must be borne in mind that again and again, whenever freedom-loving people have found themselves confronted with stubborn and tyrannical rulers, with a cruel and lawless regime, they have resorted to insurrection. Far be it from me to say anything which would encourage the resort to violence on the part of the Jews of Palestine, but I will admit that had the same treatment which was meted out to them been meted out to any other civilized nation, whether they be Irishmen or Swedes, Americans or Englishmen, they would have reached the boiling point of insurrection much earlier. Certainly we, the descendants of the American colonists who revolted against England on much smaller provocation, cannot afford to cast a stone at the Jews of Palestine today.

I admire the leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine for keeping their followers peaceful so long. I admire most of the Jewish youth of Palestine who, even when reaching the point of insurrection, have known how to moderate their actions to the point of avoiding any loss of blood. And I deeply regret that a small minority among the Jews in Palestine have been carried away by their emotions to the point of indulging in acts of terror which have cost the lives of many innocent people in Jerusalem.

But I think that the main lesson to be gained from all these events is the lesson that the endurance of even the Jewish community, probably the most

peaceful-minded of all communities, has reached a breaking point. And that, therefore, that British policy which is responsible for this development stands in urgent need of being scrapped and replaced by an entirely different policy.

The British, on the surface at least, have shown no inclination of doing so. On the contrary, the British have tried to suppress the Jewish resistance by draconic measures. Leaders of the Jewish community, including the members of the internationally recognized Jewish Agency For Palestine, have been imprisoned. Thousands of people have been thrown into concentration camps without the slightest attempt to justify their incarceration. Jewish villages have been raided, crops destroyed, trees uprooted, men and women tortured. The Jewish city of Tel Aviv and the Jewish parts of Jerusalem and Haifa have been subjected to curfews which amount to placing hundreds of thousands of people under house arrest.

It is natural that a tyrannical regime which begins to meet with serious resistance, before agreeing to mend its ways, tries to suppress it by sheer might. Tyrannical governments in all countries and at all times did that, and the spectacle is again repeated before our eyes in Palestine. But whatever the things you can do with bayonets, you cannot sit on them, and in the long run police action never prevails if there is no essential justice behind it. I don't think that by its measures of government terror in Palestine the British Government will make an unsatisfactory situation satisfactory. It will not change the will of the Jewish community in Palestine. It will not convince the American people of their rectitude. I don't even think that it will convince the British people.

There appear already on the horizon the first signs that Britain would like to terminate the conflict. Naturally, being good bargainers, the British Cabinet tries to terminate the conflict on the best terms possible. They know of the impatience with which the Jews of Europe wait to be permitted to enter Palestine, of the impatience with which the Jews of America wait for this to happen. They

know how all of us, including the President of the United States, want to have at least the first 100,000 of European Jews admitted to Palestine in the immediate future. And taking advantage of this impatience, the British Government is now trying to sell to the Government of the United States, to sell to the Jewish people, and to sell to the world a very unsatisfactory plan for the future of Palestine, declaring that only at the price of this plan will the 100,000 Jews be admitted to Palestine.

This British plan is a fraud. It speaks about a "federal" Palestine, but if you will look at it closer, you see no federation: you see a British High Commissioner who appoints officials to administer the Jews and Arabs, who reserves to himself the right to legislate in all really important matters, and who keeps the right to veto even those insignificant measures which the Jews and the Arabs are permitted to pass. This would not be a federation. This would just be a British colony with a little decentralization. The plan talks glibly about the further growth of the Jewish National Home, but its first action is to reduce the size of that Jewish National Home from the 44,000 square miles which it had in 1920, from the 10,000 square miles which it has today, to 1500 square miles. Even within those 1500 square miles, Jews could not immigrate freely. They could "recommend" further immigration, but the last word would be to the British High Commissioner.

A particularly characteristic feature of the plan is its treatment of the Negev, that large and empty triangle in the south of Palestine. The plan explains that according to British opinion the Negev cannot be made an inhabited area, though the Jews think otherwise. The British admit that it would have been possible, of course, to give the Negev to the Jews and let them see what they could do with it, but with touching concern for Jewish feelings, the British state that it would have been unfair to the Jews to give them a piece of land which would

prove uninhabitable. This is why they propose to keep the Negev for themselves. Nowhere in the plan will you see that the real reason why the British want to keep the Negev for themselves is because they are installing there huge military bases, because they think of digging there another canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and because in all probability the Negev contains oil. But though the British pass in silence over these facts, we know them, and it is this sort of thing which makes us realize that the entire British plan, oozing with piety and good will, is nothing but a mask for a policy of utter and cruel selfishness.

As a matter of fact, the British do mention that at a later time they will send experts to explore the Negev, and if they find that it can be made inhabitable, they might lease land in the Negev to a Jewish company, taking good care that the oil concessions of the British companies should remain unimpaired; and that should the experts find that the Negev is uninhabitable, the British will either keep it for themselves or incorporate it into the Arab province. One might ask why one should put any trust in the findings of those "experts" whom the British would pick out. Haven't we read enough statements by so-called British experts to the effect that no Jews want to go to Palestine, that there is no room in Palestine for any Jews, that Arabs would massacre all the Jews if it were not for the protection which Jews receive from British soldiers? And after this splendid record of British expert opinion on Palestine, how can anyone in London expect that anyone outside of England would take seriously the findings of the same experts on the question of the Negev?

As a matter of fact, how can one on the one hand mention the fact that there are oil concessions in the Negev, and therefore opportunities for industrial development, and on the other hand that the Negev cannot support any population? And why, if the Negev is good should it only be leased to the Jews,

while if it is bad, it should be given to the Arabs? And what will the Arabs do with the Negev if it is uninhabitable? Why not give it to the Jews, who have much less land and many more people?

There is no logical answer to these questions, and I ask them only to show to what extent the British plan is illogical and represents only a device to evade its responsibilities. Similar questions could be asked regarding other parts of the English plan, but these examples will suffice.

But there is no need to get disheartened. The British are trying to retain control of Palestine on their own terms, and to get, in addition, a \$300,000,000 bribe from the United States, a bribe which will be ostensibly given to the Arabs but the expenditure of which would be controlled by and in the interest of the British Government. And only at this scandalous price are the British prepared, as of last week, to admit 100,000 Jews.

I do not think that the British have a single leg to stand on. I do not think that the Jews ought to accept this plan as a basis for negotiation, nor do I think that the United States should accept it. And if we stand firm, you will see how the British terms will start going down. And if we still persist, the British will have to do in the near future what they should have done long ago; one, to admit the first 100,000 refugees to Palestine without strings and conditions attached, and, two, agree to a final solution in Palestine which would conform to international law, to their own obligations, to the stand traditionally maintained by the United States, to humanity and to justice.

[August 2, 1946?]

Statements reported to have been made in London in recent days call for some analysis.

These statements, made by spokesmen for the British Foreign Office and by various speakers in the British House of Commons, hint that if the United States Government does not agree to the British plan on Palestine, Britain would turn over the Mandate to the United Nations and withdraw from that country.

It should be said in this connection that the retention of Palestine as a strategic base under sole control of Britain is notoriously the principal aim of the British government in that country. In controlling Haifa, Britain also possesses the oil pipeline outlet to the Mediterranean. These are the main reasons why Britain looks with disfavor on any proposal that would weaken its hold over the country or would result in having to share control over it with other co-trustees. These are also the reason why the recent British plan of a "federal" Palestine gives to Britain all really important functions of government. It is known that Southern Palestine is rapidly becoming the principal British base in the Middle East in place of Egypt, and recent reports indicate the forthcoming transfer of British headquarters from Egypt to Palestine. Many millions of pounds are currently being invested by the British in the construction of permanent military, naval, and air establishments in Palestine.

In the circumstances, the impression sought to be created by the London statements that Britain's control is a burden of which she would like to be relieved rather than an anxiously guarded privilege is obviously incorrect. The talk about turning Palestine over to the United Nations is a meaningless bluff. Under the Charter, the future of Palestine will have to be decided by the United Nations in any case. But the provisions of the Charter are such that no decision can be arrived at by the United Nations without the consent of Britain which holds a double veto power -- as the present Mandatory and as one of the Big Five. Pending decision by the United Nations, Britain can continue doing in Palestine what she pleases, and no decision can ever be reached unless it satisfies Britain. Therefore the gesture of resigning the Mandate or turning over Palestine to the United Nations, for all its appearance of unselfish withdrawal, merely ensures the continuation of the status quo for an indefinite period.

August 2, 1946

Honorable H. Alexander Smith
Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator:

Mr. Schein and the other members of the delegation of Lakewood Zionists who visited you yesterday told me of your request that we prepare for you a brief memorandum explaining our objections to the latest British plan on Palestine.

Accordingly, it gives me great pleasure to transmit to you the enclosed memorandum.

I was particularly happy to hear that you may have an opportunity to discuss the matter with the President and to draw his attention to the merits of our grievance. Please be assured of our deep gratitude for your invaluable help at this critical time.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw

MEMORANDUM

August 2, 1946

1. The British proposal does not provide for the immediate transference of 100,000 Jews to Palestine, but makes such transference dependent on the outcome of further consultations with Arab States and on the acceptance of a general plan concerning the political status of Palestine. In doing this, the proposal clearly violates the repeatedly announced policy of the President to have the 100,000 Jews transferred to Palestine immediately and without waiting for the settlement of Palestine's future status.
2. The plan speaks of a "federal" or "cantonal" solution. Viewed closely, it is neither. The rulers of all districts in Palestine would be appointed and removed by the British High Commissioner. All major questions would be reserved to him. And even in those matters which are reserved to the "self-governing" districts, the British would have a right of veto. In fact, the regime would be that of British Crown Colonies where native chieftains selected by a British administrator and removable by him preside over "districts" or "provinces" which are nominally "self-governing" and are nothing but puppets.
3. Though the plan ostensibly aims at permitting further Jewish immigration, it is clearly designed so as to make it impossible. In former years, British "experts" declared that even all of Palestine was too small to absorb further Jewish immigrants. Now, the British propose to limit Jewish immigration (except by Arab-British consent) to an area of less than 1500 square miles which represent the most densely populated parts of the country. The empty 4,500 square miles of the Negev are excluded from the Jewish zone on the weak pretext that the Jews might feel deceived, if they were given a territory which is no good. The plan further suggests that if the Negev is found inhabitable, it may be "leased" to a Jewish company, while -- if it is found uninhabitable -- it may be given to the Arabs. Why the difference in treatment? And what will the Arabs do with uninhabitable territory? And, in view of the record, can one trust these "experts" whom the British will invite to decide the point?
4. But the main point is that even as regards further Jewish immigration into the Jewish zone, the ultimate decision will lie in British hands. In this, as in other respects, the language of the plan conveys the general impression of opportunities for Jewish development. But somewhere in the text there is always a proviso which will permit the British, if they wish, to stop such development. In view of the past record, a plan which does not strictly define and limit British opportunities for obstructing Jewish development in Palestine must be construed in effect as a plan which sanctions such obstruction.
5. The plan amounts, therefore, to a continuation of the present unlawful regime of the 1939 White Paper, violates the Palestine Mandate and the Anglo-American Palestine Treaty of 1924, and is utterly inconsistent both with

American policy on Palestine as formulated in the Congressional Resolutions of December 1945 and with the will of the American people as expressed by both major political parties in their National Conventions in 1944.

6. For these reasons it would appear inadvisable for the United States Government to accept the British plan. A much sounder position for our Government would be to take the view that:

(a) 100,000 Jews be admitted to Palestine without further delay and without reference to a final solution; and

(b) only such final solution for Palestine could be concurred in by the United States which offers reasonable guarantees of the further development of the Jewish National Home.



Benjamin Akzin

August 5, 1946

Harry Shapiro

Enclosed are copies of the following items:

1. An editorial which appeared in the WASHINGTON POST on August 2, 1946.
dated August 2
2. Letter to Senator Smith/with Memo to be used as background material
for his interview with the President.
dated August 2
3. Letter to Senator Johnson/with notes for a speech he is to make.
Letter portion of notes, dealing with partition plan, were also to be used as
background material for his interview with the President. A copy of his reply,
written after his interview with the President, is also enclosed.
4. Memo dealing with British threat to turn Palestine Mandate over to
UN and withdraw from Palestine which was sent today to various local newspaper
correspondents.

BA:cw
Encls.

Dr. Silver: I understand you have already
been sent a copy of the Washington Post
editorial.

C. W.

WRHS



American Zionist Emergency Council

CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS:

Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization of America
Mizrachi Organization of America
Poale Zion-Ze'ira Zion of America
Zionist Organization of America

WASHINGTON BUREAU

1720 Sixteenth Street, Northwest
Michigan 4480

ZONE 9

August 2, 1946

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
Hotel Mayflower
Plymouth, Massachusetts


Dear Dr. Silver:

1. Mr. Acheson is reported to have said today that Grady, Dorr and Gaston have been instructed to report to the Cabinet Committee, i.e., Byrnes, Patterson and Snyder, before meeting with the President. This ought to be considered as a favorable development, since the Cabinet members will probably approach the scheme in a more critical spirit than the President would have done.

2. There are rumors in Washington that the British plan has been considered today at a meeting of the Cabinet and that the reaction of the members of the Cabinet was a negative one, principally on the grounds that the territory allotted to the Jews is too small and the guarantees of Jewish immigration insufficient.

3. I understand that the permanent officials of the Department of State are very downhearted since they have been given to understand that the President has about decided to reject the British plan and since these officials were very much in favor of that plan.

Sincerely yours,



Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw

Benjamin Akzin

August 2, 1946

Harry Shapiro

Enclosed please find copy of a letter received today from the Department of State.

I think I ought to answer it, and I want your instructions as to whether I should simply thank him for the information, say that we will try to assist in limiting the number of refugees, or state the number of refugees depends on conditions in the countries from which they flee. My recommendation is that we should simply thank him for the information.



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

July 31, 1946

Dear Dr. Akzin:

You will be interested to know that the Commanding General in the European Theater has been authorized to close the U. S. zone borders against the infiltration of displaced persons and former persecutees from the British zone of Germany and the French zone of Germany and Austria, if and when he believes it to be necessary or wise.

On the other hand, he has been instructed not otherwise for the present to alter existing regulations and practices with respect to admittance and care of persecutees in the U. S. zone.

In view of the mounting difficulties which the displaced person problem is causing the U. S. Army, I sincerely hope that we may count on you and your organization to assist in limiting to the very minimum the number of persecutees who seek refuge in our zone.

Sincerely,

/s/ J. H. Hilldring

J. H. HILLDRING
Assistant Secretary

Dr. Benjamin Akzin, Director,
Emergency Zionist Council,
1720 16th Street, NW,
Washington, D. C.

American Zionist Emergency Council

CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS:

Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization of America
Mizrachi Organization of America
Poale Zion-Zeire Zion of America
Zionist Organization of America

WASHINGTON BUREAU

1720 Sixteenth Street, Northwest
Michigan 4480

ZONE 9

August 3, 1946

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
Hotel Mayflower
Plymouth, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Silver:

From a reliable source I got the following two items of information:

1. In his talk with Byrnes, Attlee said that if America will agree to the British plan on Palestine, Britain will agree to the American plan concerning the unification of the occupation zones in Germany. Byrnes, without realizing that the German unification plan is as much in the British interest as in the American interest and would get British concurrence anyhow, was swayed by this offer.
2. In talking to Byrnes, Attlee presumably said that if America consents to the British plan, Britain would agree to start to move the 100,000 to Palestine on September 1st. --If this is true, some consideration may be given to asking the President to refer to this statement by Attlee and suggest that the 100,000 start moving on September 1 pending consideration of other plans. I am certain, though, that any attempt to do so would meet with a denial on the part of the British that they have ever made any such statement. Most probably, if Attlee ever said anything of the kind, he put it so vaguely that we could not get far trying to pin him down.

Sincerely yours,

Bakzin

Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw

[Enclosed letters
follow]

August 6, 1946

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue,
New York 17, New York

Dear Shapiro:

The following is a report of my conversation of yesterday's date with Herschel V. Johnson, the American delegate to the Security Council. You will recall that this conversation came about as a result of the visit which Handler, Tulin and I paid Charles Fahy, and at the latter's suggestion. Tulin said that he is going on a vacation, and Handler said that he is going to be very busy. They suggested, therefore, that I should see Johnson. I subsequently mentioned the matter to you over the telephone and you okayed the idea.

I enclose for your information the exchange of letters between Johnson and me leading up to the interview.

Johnson was very cordial in a personal way, but didn't promise anything with regard to the Transjordan issue. After reminiscences about our personal contacts, I told him that the legal grounds on which, we believe, Transjordan's application for membership should be rejected or postponed have been explained by us to the State Department orally and in two memoranda, and that Mr. Gelber for the Jewish Agency had submitted a memorandum and discussed the matter with Johnson's assistant, Mr. Noyes. In view of the existence of these sound legal reasons, the main question is one of policy -- whether or not the United States wishes to postpone this question. I explained why a postponement of the admission, on the assumption that some day Transjordan would be severed from Western Palestine and would be admitted to the United Nations (an assumption which I expressly refrained from identifying myself with), would be advisable: the United States Government favors the National Home (though not to the extent desired by us). The British and the Arabs want Transjordan's admission at once. If we grant them what they want, they will not remember past favors. The British will go on being stubborn on the question of Western Palestine, and the Arabs will indulge in uninhibited squawks against the United States. If we wait with granting their desire until a satisfactory solution is reached with regard to Western Palestine, it will be much easier to get British consent to such a solution, and Arab opposition will of necessity be somewhat toned down.

Mr. Harry Shapiro

August 6, 1946

Johnson emphatically agreed that the political rather than the legal aspects are the most important. He said that admissions to membership are treated as matters of national policy, and his vote on such questions is governed by instructions from the President or the Secretary of State. As yet he has received no such instructions with regard to Transjordan, but the question will not be left to his judgment. He mentioned that the admission of various countries to membership are treated as an interconnected matter, but that Transjordan is the most complicated of all these cases.

To make him feel better about the whole matter, I said that he does not have to fear to remain alone if he suggests postponement of the Transjordan application, but that he would find representatives of several states supporting his stand. This seemed to interest him very much. He asked me what other countries would support such a move. I didn't specify the countries but reiterated that if America takes the initiative, various other representatives would support the move.

Toward the end, we spent a little time discussing the general topic of Palestine. He said he wasn't impressed by the British threat to withdraw from Palestine and to submit the question to the United Nations. He thought that in view of British military interests they wouldn't think of getting out of Palestine, and fully realized that Britain can block any decision on the Mandate which she doesn't like, while retaining control over the country in the interval, however long that interval may be. He was concerned about Russia's attitude if Palestine comes before the United Nations. In case anybody else speaks to Johnson, I would advise their keeping in mind that he does not like the Russians at all.

Prior to seeing Johnson, I telephoned Mr. Gelber, of the New York Agency office, who had been in touch with Noyes on the Transjordan problem. After my interview, I had a long talk with Gelber and Dr. Kahani, who are the two men who handle United Nations relations under Dr. Goldmann. We dealt mainly with the Transjordan problem. I advised Gelber to contact Abe Feller, the General Counsel of the United Nations, offering to introduce him, if he wants me to.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin

BAW

JULY 25, 1946

HONORABLE HERSHEL V. JOHNSON
c/o AMERICAN DELEGATION, SECURITY COUNCIL
HENRY HUDSON HOTEL
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITH UNDER-SECRETARY ACHESON AND
MESSRS. FAHY AND HENDERSON REGARDING FORTHCOMING CONSIDERA-
TION OF TRANSJORDAN MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION AND ON ADVICE
OF MR. FAHY RESPECTFULLY REQUEST OPPORTUNITY FOR BRIEF
MEETING TO SUBMIT TO YOU AMERICAN ZIONISTS' VIEWS ON THE
MATTER STOP WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL GRANT US SUCH OPPORTUNITY
AT YOUR EARLY CONVENIENCE AND BEFORE AMERICAN DELEGATION TO
SECURITY COUNCIL HAS DECIDED ON ITS ATTITUDE. KINDLY INFORM
WHEN AND WHERE YOU CAN RECEIVE ME.

BENJAMIN AKZIN FOR AMERICAN
ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
1720 - 16th STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CHARGE TO ACCOUNT OF:
AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL

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UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

250 West 57th Street
New York 19, New York
July 26, 1946

Dear Mr. Akzin:

I have received today your telegram expressing your wish to meet with me to discuss the matter of the Trans-Jordan application for membership in the United Nations.

While I would be glad to see you personally at any time, I must state frankly that I do not consider that as a member of the Security Council it would be proper for me to discuss with anyone a pending application for membership. The policy of the United States on these questions is determined in Washington and the views of any interested organization or individual should be presented there.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Herschel V. Johnson

Herschel V. Johnson

Mr. Benjamin Akzin
American Zionist Emergency Council
1720 16th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

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July 30, 1946

Honorable Herschel V. Johnson
United States Representative
to the United Nations
250 West 57th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Mr. Johnson:

I am very grateful to you for your kind note of July 26th and take note of your explanation that as a member of the Security Council it would not be proper for you to discuss with anyone a pending application for membership. It was only because Mr. Charles Fahy suggested that you might be interested in our views regarding the Transjordan application that I made this specific request of you in the first place.

It is kind of you to state that you would be glad to see me personally at any time. I would like to take advantage of your kindness and suggest that I visit you on Friday, August 2nd, Monday, August 5th, or any other day of next week beginning Wednesday, August 7th. This would give me an opportunity to renew the pleasant contacts which, though you may not remember them, I enjoyed with you in 1937 when you were Counselor and Charge d'Affaires in London.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin

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UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

250 West 57th Street
New York 19, New York
July 31, 1946

Dear Mr. Akzin:

Just a line to acknowledge and thank you for your letter of July 30, and to say that I will be glad to see you next week. I suggest Monday morning, August 5 at 10:30.

I remember very well our meetings in London and look forward to seeing you again.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Herschel V. Johnson)

Herschel V. Johnson

Mr. Benjamin Akzin
American Zionist Emergency Council
1720 16th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

August 6, 1946

Honorable Sumner Welles
Bar Harbor, Maine

Dear Mr. Welles:

I am very grateful for your letter of
August 1.

What you have to say on the subject of
partition and the United Nations seems to me to
be so important that I am communicating your views
immediately to the leaders of the Zionist Movement.

In the meantime, I am very happy to hear
that you have already written an article on the
partition proposal and will be waiting impatiently
for its appearance in the press.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw

Benjamin Akzin

August 6, 1946

Harry Shapiro

Enclosed please find copy of a letter just received from Mr. Welles. This is in reply to a note which I sent him together with my one-page analysis of the British plan. Prior to that, I had urged him in various letters to write a column and to devote a broadcast to the Palestine issue.

I am answering Mr. Welles thanking him for the announcement of his forthcoming article and for the expression of his views, and telling him that I am communicating his views to the leaders of our Movement.

It might be worthwhile to have somebody go up to Bar Harbor to discuss with Mr. Welles what help he can give us in enlisting the support of the smaller countries in the United Nations. You will recall that Welles still enjoys tremendous personal popularity with the diplomatic representatives of Latin America and other countries. I would only recommend that, if this suggestion is adopted, Mr. Welles be visited either by a representative of the Council, or by a representative of the Agency, or by representatives of the two organizations coming together, but not by a Council representative and an Agency representative visiting him separately and talking each in a different vein. You will realize, of course, that a copy of this memorandum goes to the Jewish Agency office in pursuance of my old agreement with Epstein.

BA:cw
Encl.

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SUMNER WELLES

Bar Harbor, Maine
August 1, 1946.

My dear Dr. Akzin:

Thank you for your letter of July 29 and for the enclosure, which I have read with interest.

Before the receipt of your letter I had already written an article upon the present partition proposal and this article will be published next week.

The partition proposal as contained in the official reports is, in my judgment, shocking by reason of its nature as well as by reason of the implications contained in it. I deeply deplore the fact that my own Government should have been involved in the formulation of such a proposal and that it should have had even a measure of moral responsibility for the proposal made. I am frank to confess that the outlook seems to me exceedingly dark, and in view of the circumstances of the recent past and of the present moment, I can see no hope for any fundamental improvement until or unless the matter is taken up for open ventilation and for final canalization by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Arab States have, in my opinion, every right to debate the problem of Palestine in the meeting of the Assembly. I hope this will be done, for I have the conviction that if this is done the force of moral opinion will be so overwhelmingly for that kind of a just and permanent solution of the Palestine question for which I have long stood that I believe a substantial majority of the votes in the Assembly will be cast for the submission of the final decision to the Trusteeship Council, for the immediate constitution of the Trusteeship Council, and for the termination of the present administration within Palestine. I am sure that your associates have not lost sight, in the agitation of the present moment, of the need to make every effort to get the support of the smaller countries in the United Nations for that kind of a solution.

Believe me

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Sumner Welles

Dr. Benjamin Akzin,
American Zionist Emergency Council,
1720 16th St. N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

August 9, 1946

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Shapiro:

Following my talk with Johnson and his statement that instructions from Washington regarding Transjordan had not yet been issued, I visited Henderson yesterday. Henderson confirmed that on this question Johnson will be bound by instructions and that the instructions have not yet been worked out. He said that there are, of course, good reasons on which to base a demand to postpone the Transjordan application, but the main question is whether we want to have it postponed. At one point he said that "no one around here would like to postpone it". Somewhat later, he said that he himself would like to see it postponed, but that there are so many reasons against postponement that he cannot bring himself to recommend such a course. He said that he will bring up my reasons for postponement in the coming consultations, and that in view of the complexity of the problem he does not think that any definitive decision will be adopted until the very last moment.

Epstein has heard from what he states to be an absolutely unimpeachable source that instructions have already been sent to Johnson to vote for the immediate admission of Transjordan. Nevertheless, since both Johnson and Henderson expressly and formally stated that this is not the case, I am telephoning Handler today asking him to come down and talk the matter over with Acheson, as was tentatively agreed between them at the time of our previous visit to the Department of State. Dr. Silver approves of this course, and Epstein also believes that it should be done.

Incidentally, when I saw Henderson, he was just coming out of the final session of the meeting of the Committee of Nine under Acheson's chairmanship. We spoke a little about the situation created by the Grady plan. Henderson admitted that some of the criticism made against the Grady plan is justified, but resented vehemently the attacks made against Grady. He justified the sending to London of people who knew nothing about the problem on the ground that all those who do know about it take a partisan viewpoint. He outlined the various alternatives open to the President at the present time, and it was very clear from his presentation that his influence is being exercised to get the President to say that while he cannot agree to the Grady plan, he would not oppose it, so

Mr. Harry Shapiro

August 9, 1946

that the British would be left free to proceed with the planned Arab-Jewish consultations. I had a definite impression that, having failed in their first objective--to get the President to agree to the plan--the State Department clique is now trying to sell him this idea as the next best one. Henderson also referred to the "known fact" that the more moderate Zionists are willing to accept a solution along lines of partition, and added that if the extreme Zionists, who do not want to agree to any reasonable solution, will prevail, he thinks that this Government had better withdraw from further interest in the Palestine problem.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw



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P
Y

AUGUST 13, 1946

ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN
HOTEL ROYAL MONCEAU
PARIS, FRANCE

SUGGEST ALL GOVERNMENTS REQUESTED BY BRITAIN TO ASSIST PREVENTING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION BE URGENTLY ASKED TO ANSWER THAT SINCE ILLEGALITY DEBATABLE UNDER MANDATE SAID GOVERNMENT AS FORMER LEAGUE MEMBER SUGGESTS THAT QUESTION BE BROUGHT BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURT UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF MANDATE AND CHAPTER 14 OF CHARTER STOP OBVIOUSLY BRITAIN WOULD REJECT DEMAND BUT THIS ANSWER IS MOST EFFECTIVE ARGUMENT FOR PUBLIC OPINION AND JUSTIFIES GOVERNMENTS IN IGNORING BRITISH REQUEST STOP HAVE GIVEN THIS SUGGESTION TO KOHN WHO PROMISED INFORM KAPLAN BUT AT SHAPIRO'S REQUEST AM CABLING YOU TO ENSURE SPEEDIEST ACTION

AKZIN

STRAIGHT CABLE

Dr. Silver,

August 15, 1946

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Shapiro:

I have been requested to transmit to you the minutes of the meeting of the Washington Emergency Council held August 13th, and to draw the attention of the National Emergency Council to the recommendations for national action made at that meeting. The members of the local Emergency Council earnestly request that urgent and serious attention be given to their recommendations by the officers of the National Emergency Council.

As you will recall, I have given the essence of these recommendations over the telephone to you and to Manson yesterday morning.

Sincerely,

Benjamin Akzin

BA:es

ACTION TAKEN AT MEETING OF WASHINGTON
EMERGENCY COUNCIL, AUGUST 13, 1946

Meeting voted to be a legal meeting of the Emergency Council.

Mrs. Safer elected chairman of the meeting and Mrs. Shalowitz secretary.

Reports given on latest news.

Following suggestions of action to be taken made:

Boycott of British goods
Street demonstration
Street demonstration on national scale
Giving material to radio commentators and press
Aid to Hagana
Youth action
Arousing Christian sympathy
Hunger strike
Closing of business
Recommendations for action to National Emergency Council
Petitions to British Ambassador, initiated through clergy of all faiths.
Demonstration in front of the British Embassy

A Resolutions Committee was appointed with Rabbi Penner as chairman.

A motion was made by Dr. Projector that a demonstration be held in front of the British Embassy on Thursday at 3:00 P. M. regardless of consequences. Following discussion, the motion was passed with a vote of 14 to 4, with all persons present ~~making~~ being allowed to vote.

Rabbi Penner made a motion that the Council should ask Dr. Akzin ~~an~~ to petition the National Emergency Council on their behalf to seriously give thought to sending national figures to Washington to participate in the demonstration. The motion was unanimously passed.

Rabbi Penner made a motion that an "American Protest" day should be set aside for local demonstrations throughout the country for a date as early as possible. The motion was unanimously passed.

Rabbi Metz made a motion that advertisements be placed in the local papers following the demonstration on Thursday to explain the reasons for the demonstration. The motion was unanimously passed.

Rabbi Metz suggested that an attempt be made to synchronize the demonstration with protests by local officials.

Mr. Levine moved that protest statements be ~~x~~ sent to local radio commentators on behalf of the Emergency Council. The motion was passed.

Mr. Levine moved that a Washington demonstration, to be held simultaneously with similar demonstrations all over the country, be held to organize, separate from all other Zionist organizations, an organization of Friends of the Hagana. The motion was passed as a recommendation to the National Emergency Council.

The meeting adjourned at 12:40 A. M.



Secret

August 15, 1946

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Shapiro:

Judge Herold called up this morning from Shreveport to ask about latest developments. He told me he was going to telephone Hutcheson to suggest that he send a wire to the President emphasizing the need for the immediate admission of the 100,000.

I inquired from Crum as to the advisability of this step. Crum advised against it, since the President had told him last night that he was very emphatic in his reply to the British that the 100,000 must be immediately admitted. Therefore, he did not believe any intervention from Hutcheson necessary on this point.

I phoned Judge Herold to give him this information. The Judge said that he had already talked to Hutcheson who revealed to him that when he had last seen the President, the President said that he is going to make the immediate admission of the 100,000 a preliminary condition in connection with any reply which he will give the British. Because of that, Hutcheson did not think it correct for him to send a wire to the President about the same matter, without being asked by the President to do so. As you see, Hutcheson and Crum's views coincided on this issue.

Incidentally, Crum has already told Dr. Silver over the telephone about last night's conversation. You will later get a detailed account of what happened last night, for your confidential information.

Sincerely,

Benjamin Akzin

BA:es

American Zionist Emergency Council

CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS:

Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization of America
Mizrachi Organization of America
Poale Zion-Zeire Zion of America
Zionist Organization of America

WASHINGTON BUREAU

1720 Sixteenth Street, Northwest
Michigan 4480

ZONE 9


August 29, 1946

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
19810 Shaker Boulevard
Shaker Heights
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

In a lighter vein and as a contrast to all your troubles, you might welcome reading the enclosed letter addressed at once to a Zionist leader and to a grand Rabbi. The sender did not seem to be quite clear to whom she is writing, and I think it is not unreasonable to assume that you are the intended addressee.

Sincerely yours,



Benjamin Akzin

BA:es
Enc.

November 4, 1946

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Shapiro:

Mr. Hart is now staying in Washington. He has been in touch with me and told me about his talk with Dr. Silver regarding his establishment as a Washington correspondent of his newspaper. Naturally, he was very much disappointed upon receiving Dr. Silver's negative reply transmitted through you. It seems that he had in mind a budget of about \$24,000 to \$30,000 a year.

I can well understand Dr. Silver's negative attitude to that. If all questions regarding Mr. Hart were satisfactorily answered, even then the set-up suggested by him would make no sense. It seems to me that a much more reasonable approach to the problem would be to commission him to write some articles for our publications at a very substantial fee, so as to supplement the meager income which he would make as correspondent for his paper. But, of course, a very clear answer would have to be received from London to the questions which have arisen in our minds. I wonder whether Lourie has heard from London and whether he is now completely satisfied.

Hart wanted me to have him introduced to Governor Dewey, the introduction not to come directly from us or anyone associated with us. His idea was that he ought to be able to convey his ideas about the Middle Eastern situation to the Governor as the most likely candidate for the Presidency in 1948. -- I could do it through some friends of mine, though you and Tuvim would probably be able to handle it even more directly. I should like to know, though, whether you want to give him any assistance in this respect. Pending the receipt of your reply, I did not promise him anything.

Incidentally, if you believe it useful, he might also be introduced to people like Senator Brewster and Mr. Dulles. The question is, do you want this to be done.

For the time being, Hart thinks of establishing himself in Washington as a representative of one or two important British commercial firms. Working in this field, he would have but little time to help us, but he is ready to continue giving us whatever help he can even in this position. He intends to go

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director

November 4, 1946

to England on November 29 and to return to this country in January. He spoke to a few gatherings of the Foreign Policy Association, including one in Austin, Texas, and another in Springfield, Massachusetts. He says that upon his return to this country he will have many more speaking engagements lined up for branches of the Foreign Policy Association.

It occurs to me that it might be a good idea to inquire from Joe Goldberg in Springfield and from some of our friends in Austin how he handled himself at these meetings and what impression he made on all concerned.

If you believe that one should continue keeping in touch with him, even though we would not be linked organizationally, I would suggest a quiet little meeting between Neumann, Lourie, Hart and myself. Such a meeting, in addition to whatever information we get from London, ought to give us a clear picture regarding the manner, if any, in which we ought to continue cooperating. Please let me know what you think of the suggestion.

If, on the other hand, you have come to feel that one should drop the entire subject altogether, please let me know, so that I will be able to disengage myself from him without causing hard feelings.



Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin

BA:ow

November 7, 1946

Dr. Benjamin Akzin
American Zionist Emergency Council
1720 - 16th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.

My dear Dr. Akzin:

I think you ought to drop the matter of Mr. Hart completely. All my information seems to point to the fact that the gentleman should be left severely alone.

I read your article in The Day on Truman's reply to Ibn Saud. It is, in my judgment, a correct analysis. For the first time I have come to feel that there is a determination on the part of our government to see this thing through -- at least as far as moving the refugees is concerned. I suspect too that the British will do something about it in the near future.

I think that you might have spent a little more time in your article, and in all articles which you are likely to write in the near future -- and I believe that you should write some on the eve of the World Congress -- on pointing up the fact that this change has come about as a result of the consistent and determined political pressure of the American Zionist Emergency Council which culminated around the time of the elections. So much effort is being exerted now on the part of our "opposition" to suggest that what took place is the achievement of "others".... It is important that the record be kept straight and that the Jews of America know what the record is.

I believe that the political results of Tuesday will greatly strengthen our position in Washington.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK

American Zionist Emergency Council

CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS:

Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization of America
Mizrachi Organization of America
Poale Zion-Zeire Zion of America
Zionist Organization of America

WASHINGTON BUREAU

1706 G
1720 Shaker Street, Northwest
Washington 4480
Executive 1060

ZONE 9

November 7, 1946


Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
19810 Shaker Boulevard
Shaker Heights
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

Mr. Schulson and I had a lengthy luncheon conference with Oscar Cox today. We went over the entire situation, but concentrated mainly on the desirability for Mr. Cox to discuss the Palestine situation with Secretary of Commerce Harriman, a close personal friend of Cox. Mr. Cox agreed that this would be very useful. Accordingly, he will try to find out from Harriman what is the real situation and the real obstacles facing us in London. If he finds Mr. Harriman somewhat taken in by the British arguments, he will do his best to enlighten him. Mr. Cox will also try to enlist Harriman's support in connection with future policy by this Administration. As the only member of the Cabinet beside Byrnes who has a knowledge of foreign affairs, ~~Harriman~~ *Cox* also pointed out that should Byrnes for any reason leave the Cabinet, Harriman is the most likely man to become Secretary of State, in which case his importance is still further enhanced. We also suggested to Cox that it would be well to arrange for you to meet Mr. Harriman before you leave for Switzerland. Mr. Cox agreed that this would be good but suggested that the contact be made directly rather than through him. I would suggest that we wait a week or so, until Cox has his first talk with Harriman on this problem, and then try to get you an appointment to meet Mr. Harriman. Please let us know whether you want us to do so.

Cox has very interesting ideas about the possibility that the Administration may have been chastened by the result of the elections and may be therefore in a receptive mood for all sorts of ideas regarding the necessity of taking an intelligent stand on a large number of important issues, among them the issue of Palestine. It is my impression that Cox intends to undertake something of a crusade in this direction.

Sincerely yours,



Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw

Dear Dr. Silver,

I think you
will be interested
in the enclosures.

Cordially,

B. G.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 6000 - 13th Street, N. W.

November 19, 1946

Mrs. Tamar de Sola Pool
c/o Hadassah
1819 Broadway
New York 23, N. Y.

My dear Mrs. de Sola Pool:

To say that I was shocked at the way in which the article requested by you and written by me as an objective summary of the political problems facing Zionism, to follow a similar summary by Miss Syrksia in the previous issue, was used as a vehicle for a vehement outburst of polemics by Mrs. Halprin, is to put it rather mildly. If a debate is what was wanted, I should have been informed accordingly, and you may rest assured that I would have given you a full exposition of one point of view. But this was not done.

My shock is somewhat diminished by the fact that Mrs. Halprin's attack on me is so obviously labored, her would-be realistic approach so blatantly far from realism, and her frantic attempt to defend the Jewish Agency against an accusation which my article does not contain so clear a case of qui s'accuse s'accuse, that to any discriminating reader, her article will have achieved the very opposite effect from the one she must have had in mind. Nevertheless, the editorial handling of this matter was grossly unfair, and though I am certain that this unfairness was not of your doing, I must register my protest with you.

You will also permit me to take exception to the wholly incorrect description of my article in the editorial subhead: The assertions in the subhead notwithstanding, my article neither "viewed with alarm," nor did it go into the discussion of the merits of the Jewish Agency proposal, nor ~~did~~ it contain any "plea for an undeviating position on Zionist objectives." Whoever wrote this subhead must have described what she expected me to write rather than what I actually did write.

I hope you will understand if after this experience with editorial fairness as practiced by the Hadassah News Letter, I will forego the pleasure of further contributions to your magazine.

Kindly let me have your check for the honorarium due for the article you ordered for your October issue.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin.

BA:ME