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Yalta Conference, 1945, 1955.

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Refers to Feb. 1945

OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 16—*Following is what the State Department describes as a "substantially correct" record of the Yalta Conference of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Marshal Joseph Stalin in 1945. It is included in an official State Department book entitled "The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945." This book is divided into two parts. The first includes United States background and briefing documents prepared in advance of the Yalta meeting. The second part is printed here.*

CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

Washington, 17 July 1944

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Number 28. Top Secret and Personal From the President for Marshal Stalin.

Things are moving so fast and so successfully that I feel there should be a meeting between you and Mr. Churchill and me in the reasonably near future. The Prime Minister is in hearty accord with this thought. I am now on a trip in the Far West and must be in Washington for several weeks on my return. It would, therefore, be best for me if to have a meeting between the tenth and fifteenth of September. The most central point for you and me would be the north of Scotland. I could fly by ship and you could come either by ship or by plane. Your Army is doing so magnificently that the trip would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago. I hope you can let me have your thoughts. Secrecy and security can be maintained either aboard ship or on shore.

ROOSEVELT.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

Moscow, 8 July 1944

TOP SECRET

Sent by the United States NAVAL ATTACHÉ, Moscow, by Navy communications.

Personal and Top Secret for the President From Harriman.

I recommend that you consider sending from your message to Marshal Stalin your No. 27, the following sentence: "Your Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago." The implication of this sentence is that Marshal Stalin should fly over enemy occupied territory. Because of the dangers inherent in such a flight I feel there may be remembrance on the part of Stalin's principal advisers which might jeopardize the prospects of the meeting. Until disclosure of the real reason, I have of such a solution by the Soviets I have taken the liberty of holding delivery of your message awaiting your reply.

The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman).

Sent to the United States NAVAL ATTACHÉ, Moscow, via Navy channels.

(Washington), 18 July 1944

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Number 29. Personal and Top Secret From the President for Ambassador Harriman.

Replying to your message of July 18, you are authorized to delete before delivery the following sentence:

"Your Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago."

ROOSEVELT.

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

Apparently transmitted by Soviet Embassy, Washington.

Secret and Personal From Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. D. ROOSEVELT.

I share your thought about the desirability of meeting between you, Mr. Churchill and myself.

However I must say that now, when the Soviet Armies are involved in battles on such a wide front, it would be impossible for me to leave the country and depart for a certain period of time from the conducting of front matters. All my colleagues consider it absolutely impossible

July 22, 1944.

Telegram

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Washington, 27 July 1944

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Number 32. Top Secret and Personal for Marshal Stalin From the President.

I can fully understand the difficulty of your coming to a conference with the Prime Minister and me in view of the rapid military progress now being made. But I hope you can keep such a conference very much in mind and that we can meet as early as possible. Such a meeting would help me considerably and we are approaching the time for further strategical decisions.

ROOSEVELT.

(Roosevelt Papers: Telegram)

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

(Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels).

Moscow, 24 September 1944

TOP SECRET

Personal and top secret for the eyes of the President only. From Harriman.

This evening I explained to Marshal Stalin that you had asked General Hurley to call on him to explain your concern over China and to give him personally a message regarding a future meeting. Stalin interrupted to say that he had been ill with the grippe when Hurley was in Moscow, that in the past he had been able to shake it in a few days but this time he had been ill for several weeks. He looked more worn out than I have ever seen him and not as yet fully recovered. I obtained that you had in mind a meeting in the latter part of November and that as it was too late for Alaska the Mediterranean might provide a suitable place. He said that a meeting was very desirable but that he was afraid his doctors would not allow him to travel. It had taken him two weeks to get over an ear attack he had had from his flight from Teheran and his recent illness had been due to a trip to the front. I suggested that the warm weather in the Mediterranean would do him good but he said his doctors considered any change of climate would have a bad effect.

Molotov claimed that his associates felt Stalin must protect his health and that traveling was not good for him. Stalin then said that Molotov was giving good vigorous and that as his deputy, a man in whom he had great confidence, he could meet you and the Prime Minister any time you wished. I assured Stalin that you liked Molotov and were always glad to see him but suggested that his doctors might give us both a different view of the desirability of a warm climate, particularly if the trip would be made by air. Jokingly I suggested also the possibility of his having some new doctors by that time. He agreed that might be a good idea but gave no further encouragement. I am satisfied that Stalin is anxious to meet you but he is definitely worried about his health. Although Stalin showed the effects of his grippe I do not feel that you could have any concern over the possibility of serious illness.

The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

(Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.)

Washington, 4 October 1944

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Number 78. Top Secret and Personal from the President for Ambassador Harriman.

Your NUMBER [Telegram of October 2] received this morning.

Will you please deliver the following message to Marshal Stalin at once:

"While I had hoped that the first meeting could have been between you, Churchill and myself, I appreciate that the Prime Minister wishes to have an early conference with you.

"You naturally understand that in this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of us can find the solution to the still unresolved questions. In this sense, while appreciating the Prime Minister's desire for the meeting I prefer to regard your forthcoming talks with Churchill as preliminary to meeting of the three of us which, so far as I am concerned, can take place any time after the elections have been held.

"In the circumstances, I am suggesting, if you and Mr. Churchill approve, that our Ambassador in Moscow be present at your coming conference as an observer for me (Robert E. Sherwood in "Roosevelt and Hopkins" (p. 852) indicates that Hopkins skipped the Quebec conference of a previous visit of this telegram which would in effect have "let Churchill work for the United States as well as for Great Britain.") Admittedly Mr. Harriman would not be in a position to commit the Government relative to the important matters which you and the Prime Minister will very naturally discuss.

"You will by this time have received from General Deane the statement of our Combined Chiefs of Staff position relative to the war against Japan. (The President evidently was referring to the Joint Chiefs of Staff position alluded to) and I want in reference to your now completely I accept the assurances which you have given us on this point. Our three countries are making a successful war against Germany and we can surely join together with no less success in routing a nation (but I am sure in my heart is as great an enemy of Russia as she is of ours."

"The above message will indicate to you that I wish you to participate as an observer."

I can tell you quite frankly but for you only and not to be communicated under any circumstances to the British or the Russians that I would have very much preferred to have the real conference between the three of us for the very reasons that I have stated to the Marshal. I also hope that Uncle Joe and I have an opportunity to see each other before the end of the year. I should hope that the bilateral conference to which more than a preliminary exploration by the British and the Russians leading up to a full-dress meeting between the three of us. You, therefore, should bear in mind that there are no subjects of discussion that I can anticipate between the Prime Minister and Stalin in which I will not be directly interested. It is of importance, therefore, that this conference is over Mr. Hull and I have complete freedom of action.

I will expect you to come home immediately when the conference are over and, naturally, you will keep Mr. Hull and me fully and currently advised during the talks.

ROOSEVELT.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy Channels.

Washington, 1 October, 1944

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Number 626. 1 October 1944. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

I can well understand the reasons why you feel that an immediate meeting between yourself and Uncle Joe is necessary before the three of us can get together. The questions which you will discuss then are ones which are, of course, of real interest to the United States, as I know you will agree. I have therefore instructed Harriman to be present at and to participate as observer, if agreeable to you and Uncle Joe, and I have so informed Stalin. While naturally Averell [Harriman] will not be in a position to commit the United States—I should not [illegible] unless he were fully informed and I had him to return and report to me as soon as the conference is over.

I am only sorry that I cannot be with you myself but I am prepared for a meeting of the three of us any time after the election. Stalin knows this and I have complete freedom of action.

Let me hear from you frankly about this. Best of luck and warmest personal regards.

ROOSEVELT.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Washington, 4 October 1944

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Number 629. For the Prime Minister from the President.

I am very much disappointed that you feel that it is necessary to postpone our meeting after all so immediately about this question which is definitely related to public opinion in the United States and in all the Nations.

I am asking our representative in Moscow to make it clear to you our Joint Chiefs of Staff position.

You carry my best wishes with you and I will [illegible] word of how it goes.

ROOSEVELT.

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

4 October 1944

FROM: Marshal Stalin
TO: The President.

(Apparently transmitted by Soviet Embassy, Washington.)

Your message of October 4th received just now. I am sorry that you postpone the meeting. I think that the meeting of the three of us could be arranged in the near future.

I am sorry that I cannot be with you myself but I am prepared for a meeting of the three of us any time after the election. Stalin knows this and I have complete freedom of action.

I will expect you to come home immediately when the conferences are over and, naturally, you will keep Mr. Hull and me fully and currently advised during the talks.

ROOSEVELT.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Washington, 11 October 1944

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Number 633. Top Secret and Personal from the President for Prime Minister.

I am very much disappointed that you feel that it is necessary to postpone our meeting after all so immediately about this question which is definitely related to public opinion in the United States and in all the Nations.

I am asking our representative in Moscow to make it clear to you our Joint Chiefs of Staff position.

You carry my best wishes with you and I will [illegible] word of how it goes.

ROOSEVELT.

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

(Apparently transmitted by Soviet Embassy, Washington.)

Your message of October 4th received just now. I am sorry that you postpone the meeting. I think that the meeting of the three of us could be arranged in the near future.

I am sorry that I cannot be with you myself but I am prepared for a meeting of the three of us any time after the election. Stalin knows this and I have complete freedom of action.

I will expect you to come home immediately when the conferences are over and, naturally, you will keep Mr. Hull and me fully and currently advised during the talks.

ROOSEVELT.

The Commanding General United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(Excerpt)

Moscow, 11 October 1944.

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY
EYES ONLY
N 21412

Stalin then said that Mr. Hopkins, with the approval of the President, had talked with [illegible] Gromyko and he had understood that the President was anxious to meet with Marshal Stalin and unequivocally that he would be delighted to meet the President and was prepared to do so during the end of November.

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

(Apparently transmitted by Soviet Embassy, Washington.)

Your message of October 11th received just now. I am sorry that you postpone the meeting. I think that the meeting of the three of us could be arranged in the near future.

I am sorry that I cannot be with you myself but I am prepared for a meeting of the three of us any time after the election. Stalin knows this and I have complete freedom of action.

I will expect you to come home immediately when the conferences are over and, naturally, you will keep Mr. Hull and me fully and currently advised during the talks.

ROOSEVELT.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Washington, 14 October 1944

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Number 635. Personal and Top Secret from the President for Prime Minister.

Referring to your NUMBER [illegible] I have received a report from U. J. which is not very helpful on the question of a place for our meeting. He states that meeting on the Soviet Black Sea coast appears to be acceptable for you. I would consider it extremely desirable to realize this plan. The conditions for a meeting there are absolutely favorable. I hope that by that time it will be also possible to provide a safe crossing of your vessel into the Black Sea. Since the Germans do not recommend to undertake any trips at the present time, there to give consideration to that.

October 29, 1944.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Washington, Nov. 2, 1944.

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

(Sent to the United States naval attaché, London, via Navy channels.)

Number 8132 personal and secret from the President for Prime Minister.

Referring [illegible] 635 I have received a report from U. J. which is not very helpful on the question of a place for our meeting. He states that meeting on the Soviet Black Sea coast appears to be acceptable for you. I would consider it extremely desirable to realize this plan. The conditions for a meeting there are absolutely favorable. I hope that by that time it will be also possible to provide a safe crossing of your vessel into the Black Sea. Since the Germans do not recommend to undertake any trips at the present time, there to give consideration to that.

I have been thinking about the practicability of Malta, Athens, or Cyprus if [illegible] putting into the Black Sea on ship should be unfavorable or too difficult. I prefer travelling and living on a ship.

We know that the living conditions and security in Malta and Cyprus (In the message as reported to Churchill, Athens was substituted for "Cyprus" at this point) are satisfactory.

I am looking forward with much pleasure to seeing you again.

Please let me have your suggestions and advice.

ROOSEVELT.

(Roosevelt Papers)

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

Apparently transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

(Translation)

Secret and personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. D. Roosevelt.

I have received your message of Oct. 25.

If the idea that was expressed earlier about the possibility of meeting on the Soviet Black Sea coast appears to be acceptable for you I would consider it extremely desirable to realize this plan. The conditions for a meeting there are absolutely favorable. I hopethat by that time it will be also possible to provide a safe crossing of your vessel into the Black Sea. Since the Germans do not recommend to undertake any trips at the present time, there to give consideration to that.

October 29, 1944.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

(Excerpt)

London, 27 October 1944

TOP SECRET

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret. Number 881.

Para 2. U. J.'s duties do not like him flying and I suppose there would be the same difficulties in Russian warships running out of the Black Sea as of American and British warships coming in. One way would be for Turkey to denude Wal, which I expect she would be very willing to do. But I am not at all sure that the Russians would welcome this at the present juncture in view of what I told you about their wish for revision of the Treaty of Montreux. Alternatively we could ask Turkey to waive the Montreux Treaty for the passage either way of the said ships. Thus I expect the Russians would like. But I am not so sure about the Turks. From what I say of the Crimea it never much shattered and I expect all other Black Sea ports are in a similar state. We should therefore in all probability have to live on board our ships. I am inquiring about Athens from Eden who will be there in a day or two. Personally I should think it a splendid setting and often again we should have our ships handy. Cyprus is of course available where absolute secrecy, silence and security can be guaranteed together with plain comfortable accommodation for all principals. Will you telegram to U. J. on the subject or shall I? Or, better still, shall we send a joint message?

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels repeated to Churchill as Roosevelt's No. 635 same date.

[Washington 31 October 1944]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[illegible] Churchill [illegible]

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

(Excerpt)

London, 31 October 1944

TOP SECRET

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret. Number 891.

Para 2. I am delighted to hear from U. J. that you had suggested a trifle meeting toward the end of November at a Black Sea port. I think this a very fine idea and hope you will let me know about it in due course. I will come anywhere you may desire.

(Roosevelt Papers: Telegram)

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

(Excerpt)

(WASHINGTON) 31 October 1944.

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

Number 637. Personal and Top Secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.

The solution of a Black Sea port for our next meeting seems

BIG THREE AT YALTA: Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin seated in front of U. S., Soviet and British officers.

Purpose and Method of Assembling Documents

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 16—*Following are the foreword and introduction to the State Department's book of documents dealing with the World War II conferences of Yalta and Malta in 1945. This section of the book explains the purpose and method of assembling the documents.*

FOREWORD

It has long been the custom for the American Government to release to the public, after a certain lapse of time, selected papers dealing with important events in our country's history. This custom, established early in our history, was crystallized by President Lincoln and Secretary of State Seward through the publication of the series of volumes entitled "Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers" (hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations).

The publication of the Foreign Relations volumes was intended to fill increasingly far behind the period which they cover. During the past two decades this lag has usually been eighteen years. This lag is now being gradually reduced, thanks to the cooperation of the appropriation committees of the two Houses of Congress and efforts will continue to reduce it. Due consideration being given to the necessity of avoiding any harm to our current negotiations with other countries or to our national security interests.

This volume of documents on the conference at Malta and Yalta is the first to appear in a special series of foreign relations volumes on World War II conferences attended by President Roosevelt or President Truman along with Prime Minister Churchill or Marshal Stalin, or both of the latter. The series is part of a special foreign relations publication program prepared by the Department of State, in cooperation with the Executive Office of the President, to present the essential documentation on the major international conferences and decisions of World War II.

INTRODUCTION

In February 1945, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin met in the Crimea, at Yalta on the Black Sea. Before these three statesmen were then classic problems of world politics. It was perhaps inevitable that the decisions reached at these conferences, the first wartime conferences of the three leaders, would be subjected to close scrutiny by the Alexandria discussion. A great deal of the comment was critical, and it was not always well informed. Many of the criticisms were based on the assumption that the conferences were held in secret and that no documents were published. As a matter of fact, the general nature of the Yalta decisions was announced at the time, and documentary records of the conferences were published in fact to the conference.

The Malta Conference began on January 30 and lasted through February 2. It was a series of discussions between American and British military leaders, which were preceded to confer with the Russians at Yalta.

Scope of Coverage

The editors have aimed to present in this volume a definitive and comprehensive coverage of the Malta and Yalta conferences as could be made at the present time. To achieve this purpose it was necessary to obtain many documents that had never been in the files of the Department of State. Initially, the Department had collected in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York, its files relating to the conferences. The director of that library, with the approval of the Archivist of the United States, set up a special project to assemble all documents pertaining to these conferences from the Roosevelt and Hopkins papers in the custody of the library.

Since the files of the Department of State contained very few papers on the military staff talks at Malta and Yalta, the Department of State also obtained the assistance of the Department of Defense in locating and releasing documents from the military records of these conferences. This type of material consists of papers documenting the official position or advice of the War and Navy Departments on political-military subjects discussed at the international level, as presented by the British leaders at these conferences and by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, together with

Continued on Following Page

Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin Exchanges on the Selection of a Meeting Place

he must give consideration, do not wish him to make any "big trips."

He gave me no information as to location of the meeting, accessibility, living conditions, etc., except to express a hope that it will be possible to provide a safe entrance for my ship into the Black Sea. He will be glad to see me as soon as I find it possible to make the trip.

I do not wish to go to the Black Sea if it can be avoided, first because the Congress will be in session at that time which makes it imperative that I be at all times within rapid mail communication with Washington by air mail, and second because of sanitary conditions.

Dr. McIntire tells me that health conditions in Black Sea ports such as Odessa are very bad, and we must think of the health of our staff and our ship crews as well as ourselves.

What do you think of the possibility of our inducing U. J. to meet with us in Piraeus, Salonica or Constantinople? Any of these would not be a "big trip" for him.

Please give me your advice as to the best date for the meeting from your point of view, together with any information you may have in regard to a suitable place for the meeting, danger from enemy action, living conditions, etc. I will take a ship to wherever we may go.

I fear that Uncle Joe will insist on the Black Sea. I do think it important that we three should meet in the near future.

All advice and assistance that you can contribute to the solution of this problem will be appreciated.

ROOSEVELT

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TOP SECRET

London, 5 November, 1944

[Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.]

Personal and top secret from the Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 814.

1. Your Number 644. I send you in my immediately following the report which I called for from the First Sea Lord (not printed). The whole matter has been carefully studied by the Admiralty and, as you will see, every port is reported on separately. Our sailors have pretty good knowledge of these ports. On all this I consider the Black Sea out of the question and the Piraeus very little better.

2. I am somewhat attracted by the suggestion of Jerusalem. Here there are first-class hotels, government houses, etc., and every means can be taken to ensure security. The [illegible] by special [illegible] of [illegible] in [illegible] I am having the times of the journeys studied

and will telegraph to you about them.

3. I think we ought to put the proposition to U. J. and throw on him the onus of refusing. After all, we are respectable people too.

4. In the event of his not coming, I earnestly hope you will pay your long-promised and deferred visit to Great Britain and then visit your armies in France. The right thing would be to have the conference between us in Britain. I have reached my often on your hospitality. We could no doubt get Molotov to deputize for Stalin. He counts for a lot.

7. Perhaps you would send me a draft of the telegram we should send to Stalin after considering the information I am now sending you.

PRIME

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London via Navy channels.

Washington, 18 November 1944

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

Number 648, top secret and personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

The more I think it over the more I get convinced that a meeting of the three of us just now may be a little less valuable than it would be after I am inaugurated on the twentieth of January. The location of a meeting now is very difficult. All my people advise strongly against the Black Sea. I do not think there is a chance that U. J. would agree to Jerusalem, Egypt or Malta.

But there is a real chance that by the end of January or early February he could get rail transportation to head of the Adriatic. He might be willing to come to Rome or the Riviera. I would of course dip in England going or returning. I do not think he wants to fly or take a very difficult and long rail journey to Malta.

Incidentally it would be far easier for me as I am undergoing the throes of the old session and preparing for the new session on January third.

What do you think of postponement? It appeals to me greatly by best to you on your Parisian trip. Don't turn up in French clothes.

ROOSEVELT

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

London, 18 November 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and top secret, number 825.

2. Your most [illegible] I am very sorry that you are [illegible] able to make further efforts to procure a triple meeting in December, and I will send you a separate telegram making

ARRIVAL IN CRIMEA: President Roosevelt is greeted by Soviet officer on arrival at airport in Crimea on Feb. 3. At left is Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov.

Associated Press

some further suggestions about this.

PRIME

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

(Washington) 18 November 1944

Number 124, personal and top secret, from the President for Marshal Stalin.

All three of us are of one mind — that we should meet very soon, but problems chiefly geographical do not make this easy. At this moment I can, under difficulties, arrange to go somewhere now in order to get back here by Christmas, but, quite frankly, it will be far more convenient if I could postpone it until after the inauguration, which is on January twentieth.

My Navy people recommend strongly against the Black Sea. They do not want to risk a capital ship through the Aegean or the Dardanelles, as it would involve a very large escort, much needed elsewhere. Churchill has suggested Jerusalem or Alexandria, and there is a possibility of Athens, though this is not yet sure.

Furthermore, I have at this time a great many problems at home with Congress to finish its final day, with the probability of its not adjourning finally until December fifteenth. Also, I have to be here under the Constitution, to send the annual

message to the new Congress which meets here in early January.

What I am suggesting is that we should all meet about the twenty-eighth or thirtieth of January, and I hope that by that time you will have rail travel to some port on the Adriatic and that we should meet you there or that you could come across in a few hours on one of our ships to Bari and then motor to Rome, or that you should take the same ship a little further and that we should all meet in a place like Taormina, in eastern Sicily, which should provide a fairly good climate at this time.

Almost any place in the Mediterranean is accessible to me so that I can be within easy air distance of Washington in order to carry out action on legislation — a subject with which you are familiar. I must be able to get bills or resolutions sent from here and returned within ten days.

I hope that your January military operations will not prevent you from coming at that time, and I do not think that we should delay the meeting longer than the end of January or the beginning of February. [illegible] A [illegible]

I wish you would let me know your thoughts on this.

I hope to talk over many things with you. We understand each other's problems and, as you know, I like to keep these discussions informal, and I have no reason for formal agenda.

My Ambassador in China, General Hurley, is doing his best to iron out the problems between the Generalissimo and the forces in North China. He is making some progress but nothing has been signed yet.

My warmest regards to you.

ROOSEVELT

[Roosevelt Papers: Telegram]

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

(Washington) 18 November, 1944

Number 649, personal and top secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

822. I am sending you [illegible] [illegible] the French [illegible] Government [illegible] The [illegible] you raise in regard to [illegible] France after the [illegible] a nation and the further

problems of helping to build up a strong France.

I shall be glad to have your views about the time and place of our next meeting.

ROOSEVELT

[Roosevelt Papers: Telegram]

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

TOP SECRET

London, 19 November 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and top secret, number 825.

1. Naturally I am very sorry to receive your numbers 649 and 650.

2. Your message to U. J. will, of course, make it certain that he will not come anywhere before the end of January. Also you yourself give independently the important reasons which make it difficult for you to come earlier.

3. These reasons, I fear, destroy the hope which we had cherished that you would now pay your long-promised visit to Great Britain and that we two could meet here in December and ask U. J. to send Molotov, who would be an adequate deputy. It is a great disappointment to me that this prospect should be indefinitely postponed.

4. There is, in my opinion, much doubt whether U. J. would be willing or able to come to an Adriatic port by January 30th, or that he would be willing to come on a non-Russian vessel through this extremely heavily mined sea. However if he accepts, we shall, of course, be there. I note you do not wish the French to be present. I had thought they might come in toward the end in view of their vital interests in the arrangements made for policing Germany, as well as in all questions affecting the Rhine frontiers.

5. Even if a meeting can be arranged by the end of January, the two and a half intervening months will be a serious hiatus. There are many important matters awaiting settlement — for example, the treatment of Germany and the future world organization, relations with France, the position in the Balkans, as well as the Polish question, which ought not to be left to moulder.

PRIME

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

It is greatly regretted that your naval organs doubt the expedience of your initial supposition, that the Soviet coast of the Black Sea should be chosen as the meeting place for the three of us. The suggested by you date of the meeting at the end of January or beginning of February has no objection on my part, but at the same time I have in mind that we shall succeed in choosing as a meeting place one of the Soviet port cities. I still have to take into consideration the advice of the doctors about the danger of long trips.

I still hope, however, that we shall succeed, if not right now

then somewhat later, to agree finally upon an acceptable for all of us meeting place.

I am sending you my very best wishes.

November 23, 1944.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

(Washington) 26 November 1944

Number 656. Top secret and personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 825. Uncle Joe has now replied to my message in regard to the tripartite meeting forwarded to you in my 650.

He expresses regret that my naval advisors doubt the expediency of meeting on the shore of the Black Sea. He does not object to a meeting at the end of January or the beginning of February, but he has in mind that we shall choose as a meeting place one of the Soviet port cities. He must consider the opinion of his doctors that a long trip would be a danger to him.

He hopes that we will now or soon finally agree upon a meeting place that will be acceptable to all of us.

I have a feeling that we will not succeed in getting Uncle Joe to travel beyond the Black Sea unless the Germans should have surrendered by that time.

ROOSEVELT

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

TOP SECRET

London, 27 November, 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and top secret, Number 834.

2. Your 656. I agree with your conclusion that Uncle Joe will not travel beyond the Black Sea but I am sure the ports will be unfit for us until the winter has passed.

PRIME

A handwritten notation in the margin by Leahy reads: "No reply necessary."

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

[Excerpts]

Washington, 9 December, 1944

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Number 672. Top secret and personal from the President, for the Prime Minister.

I think I can leave after inauguration day. I had hoped that Uncle Joe could come to Rome or Malta or Taormina or Egypt but if he will not—and insists on the Black Sea—I could do it even at great difficulty on account of Congress. Harriman suggests Batum which has an excellent climate. You and I could fly there from Malta or Athens, sending ahead one of my

transport flagships on which to live. Yalta is also intact, though the roadstead is open and we should probably have to live ashore.

ROOSEVELT

[Roosevelt Papers: Telegram]

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 14 December, 1944.

(Received 15 December.)

Personal and top secret for the President from Harriman.

I talked with Marshal Stalin this evening about the proposed meeting and explained that you wished the meeting to take place somewhere in the Mediterranean. He said he knew that and had answered you that he could not go to the Mediterranean. He suggested Odessa where he was already having prepared suitable facilities ashore. He said if you preferred to go to the Crimea or the eastern port of the Black Sea where it was warmer anywhere down to Batum he would be agreeable. I explained the many reasons why you were insisting on the Mediterranean and the difficulties of the Black Sea, emphasizing particularly that you wished to be on a naval vessel and not to fly. He said eventually that he would consult his doctors as to whether they would allow him to fly to the Mediterranean. He said that he would see me again in about a week to give me some info on certain military matters and I hope to have another chance to discuss the matter.

Stalin appeared well.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

SECRET

Moscow, 15 December 1944.

(Received 16 December.)

Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

Supplementing my telegram of December 14: sent last night reporting on my talk with Stalin about the place of the proposed meeting, although Stalin definitely left the door open for consideration of the Mediterranean I do not feel too optimistic that he will finally agree to go there. It was my definite impression however, that he wanted to accede to your request and he spoke rather regretfully when he said he would have to consult his doctors again.

He brought the subject of the meeting up himself and indicated that he was anxious to have it take place promptly after the inauguration.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

(Washington) 23 December 1944

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

Number 676, personal and top

Foreword and Introduction: Plan and Method of Assembling Documents

Continued From Preceding Page

ference papers of Edward R. Stettinius Jr., who was present as Secretary of State. It may be doubted, however, that any of these would change significantly the basic record of United States policy here presented.

Organization of the Volume

The volume is divided into three major segments. Part I contains pre-conference background material; Part II presents the records of the conference at Malta; Part III consists of the records of the Yalta conference.

The inclusion of the background material comprising Part I (Chapters 1-4) was necessitated by the fact that the annual foreign relations volumes for the years of World War II have not yet been published. Accordingly, the editors felt obliged to include in this volume a considerable quantity of pre-conference material in order to indicate at least the general outlines of the historical setting in which the conferences at Malta and Yalta took place. Chapter 1 of this pre-conference documentation shows how the arrangements were made for holding the conferences. Chapter 2 contains correspondence, memoranda, and briefing book papers showing the pre-conference status of United States policy on the principal subjects discussed at Malta and Yalta. For most of these subjects, the documentation presented herein goes back no farther than the autumn of 1944.

Ultimately a full historical coverage of these subjects will have to await the appearance of the foreign relations volumes for the years 1941-1945. Chapter 3 comprises excerpts pertinent to these conference subjects from the so-called record (official diary) of Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr., for the period from December 1, 1944, the day on which he took the oath of office as Secretary, to January 22, 1945, the day before he left Washington for the trip to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. (His records for the conferences themselves are not available.) Chapter 4 contains two high-level reports surveying the broad lines of Soviet policy on the eve of the conference.

The records of the conferences themselves (Parts II and III) are organized as follows: (1) At the beginning of each conference (Chapters 5 and 7) there are presented those portions of President Roosevelt's log which pertain to the days of each conference. This furnishes an overall calendar of events for the day on which the President was in attendance at Malta and

for all eight days of the conference at Yalta.

(2) Following the excerpts from the log for each conference, there appear the minutes and related documents of Malta and Yalta respectively, arranged by meetings in chronological order (Chapters 6 and 8). The documents, regardless of their respective dates and subjects, have been placed after the minutes of the meeting in which they refer, or at which they were first discussed.

(3) For the Yalta Conference there are three additional chapters containing documents of a type not found for Malta. Chapter 9, entitled "other conference documents," contains Yalta documents which bear no reference to any specific conference discussion and which could not therefore be included with the minutes in Chapter 8. Chapter 10 presents [illegible] prints of the English texts of the agreements signed at Yalta. Chapter 11 consists of three hitherto unpublished documents which were prepared by conference participants after the conference, describing factually certain of the proceedings at Yalta. Although other post-conference documents of this type may exist, only three were found in the files of the Department of State in the course of research for this volume.

Categories of Conference Records

The records of the conferences themselves fall into three major categories: (1) minutes of international discussions in which American representatives participated with either the British or the Russians or both; (2) documents which figured in the international negotiations at the conferences; (3) intradelegation documentation relating to conference subjects; the scope of coverage in each of these categories is as follows:

(1) Minutes of international meetings — even with the addition of documents from the White House, the Department of Defense, and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the official American record of the international discussions at these conferences contains some gaps. For Malta, there are minutes (reproduced herein) of all the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but on the political side there are minutes for only one of the several meetings of the foreign secretaries and no American minutes of the Roosevelt-Churchill talks. With respect to the Yalta Conference there are minutes of all international military meetings in which the United States Chiefs of Staff participated, and these are included in this volume. No rec-

ords were found, however, of the private Roosevelt-Churchill meetings. There are minutes or notes on most of the other political discussions but these are not as complete or definitive as might be desired. On this point the late Secretary of State Stettinius wrote as follows:

"It would * * * have been better at Yalta to have had a stenographic record made of the discussions. The record then could have been distributed to and approved by each delegation and become the official record of the proceedings. There was, however, no single official record of the meetings, nor was there any stenotyped recording every word. Instead, each delegation kept its own minutes. Bohlen, for instance, took notes of shorthand for the British, while Bohlen had the double task of interpreting and note taking for the United States. In addition, some members of the American delegation, at least, kept their own personal notes. Every noon at the Foreign Ministers' meetings to discuss problems assigned by the three leaders, Edward Page of the American Embassy in Moscow served as interpreter and note taker for the American delegation. * * * The military followed a different practice in keeping a record of their discussions. Although each of the three nations had its own representative making notes, these three individuals cleared their versions with each other and with all the participants. In the case of the diplomatic discussions, this practice was unfortunately not followed."

In view of this situation the editors decided to include in this volume all available minutes or notes on the international political discussions at Yalta, even though they are, at times, somewhat repetitious. Thus for a majority of the political meetings at Yalta there will be found in this volume two or more accounts, generally in the form of minutes prepared by Charles E. Bohlen, Edward Page, or H. Freeman Matthews, or rough notes in abbreviated long-hand taken by Matthews or Alger Hiss.

(2) Conference documents—This category comprises proposals, memoranda, and correspondence, of American, British, or Russian origin that were actually submitted or exchanged as part of the international negotiations at the conferences. It also includes, of course, the international documents signed at Yalta. For both Malta and Yalta, documents of this type have been included for military, as well as political subjects.

(3) Intradelegation documentation—This type of documentation includes minutes or notes on discussions within the United States delegation bearing directly on the subjects under negotiation at the conferences with either the British or the Russians or both. I also [illegible] memoranda and correspondence [illegible] on such subjects within the United States delegation or between the delegation and other officers of the United States Government. At Malta and Yalta there were frequent meetings of top civilian advisers with the Secretary of State or the President to discuss political questions under negotiation at the conferences but apparently no minutes of these discussions have been included, together with all significant intradelegation memoranda dealing with international conference subjects.

On the military side, Bohlen were regularly kept of the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Malta and Yalta. Those portions of these minutes which relate to subjects under international negotiation at the conferences are included in this volume, together with such related documents as are not otherwise summarized in the minutes themselves.

Unpublished Sources

Only a small proportion of the total documentation published in this volume was found in the indexed central files of the Department of State. Documents which came from these files are indicated by a file number, in the usual style of foreign relations. The great majority of documents in this volume came either from unindexed files or special collections within the Department of State. These sources are indicated by brief headings above each document. The files and collections as indicated are described in the following paragraphs.

A. INSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. Bohlen collection—This collection consists of the Yalta minutes and documents collected by Charles E. Bohlen, then assistant to the Secretary of State, who served as interpreter for the President at Yalta. It contains all the minutes of the plenary meetings at Yalta which were prepared by Bohlen. It also includes one memorandum of conversation dictated by Averell Harriman and the minutes of the meetings of the foreign ministers at Yalta which were taken by Edward Page, Jr., then second secretary of the American Embassy at Moscow, who served as interpreter for Secretary Stettinius. Also in the collection are copies of the more important conference documents and one paper of British origin dating from Malta. The Bohlen collection, while by no means [illegible] has been regarded by the Department and the White House as the most important and official American record of the Yalta conference.

2. Hiss collection—This collection consists of the notes and documents pertaining to Malta and Yalta, which were collected by Alger Hiss, then deputy director of the Office of Special Political Affairs. The Hiss collection, which comprises only one file folder, contains the original penciled notes taken by Hiss at a number of meetings at Yalta, together with roughly chronological assortment of conference papers and United States delegation working memoranda and notes prepared by Hiss and others at Malta and Yalta. The collection also contains a few Yalta papers of British origin and several papers prepared in June 1945, at the San Francisco conference which pertain to subjects discussed at Yalta. The original Hiss notes on the Yalta meetings have been printed in this publication as nearly facsimile as feasible.

3. Matthews files—The files accumulated in the office of H. Freeman Matthews, then director of the Office of European Affairs. These voluminous files contain a number of Yalta papers not in other collections. They also contain the original penciled notes taken by Matthews at six plenary meetings and four foreign ministers' meetings at Yalta. The Matthews notes on the plenary meetings have been transcribed into Matthews into smooth minutes and these have been reproduced in this volume. The rough notes on foreign ministers' meetings, Matthews had not transcribed, are reproduced in this volume as nearly facsimile as feasible.

4. Executive secretariat files—These files provide the only [illegible] could be found in the Department of State of the Yalta book.

5. [illegible] files—The files of the legal adviser for treaty affairs. These files contain the [illegible] of the agreements signed at Yalta and sent by the White House to the Department of State in February, 1946.

6. [illegible] A. files—The files of the [illegible] (office) of the United Nations Affairs (now the Bureau of International Organization Affairs).

7. [illegible] files—The files of the [illegible] of Eastern European Affairs.

8. [illegible] files—The files of the [illegible] (office) of European Affairs.

9. Moscow Embassy files—The [illegible] files of the American Embassy at Moscow, which are now in the Department on State.

10. A. C. files—The files of the [illegible] Affairs Committee, now in the Department of State.

11. F. E. C. files—The files of the Far Eastern Commission, now in the Department of State.

B. OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. White House files—From these files there was obtained a copy of the booklet containing the log of the President's trip to Malta and Yalta.

2. J. C. S. files—The files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These files provided not only Joint Chiefs of Staff material but also Combined Chiefs of Staff documentation. The approval of the British Chiefs of Staff, along with that of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, was obtained for the declassification of Combined Chiefs of Staff documentation.

3. Defense files—The files of the War and Navy Departments. The files of the secretaries and assistant secretaries of war and navy and other relevant files were surveyed for documents pertinent to the international discussions at both conferences.

4. Roosevelt papers—the papers of President Roosevelt in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York. The Roosevelt papers were found to contain very little unique material on the conferences themselves but many papers of importance in the pre-conference period not found in other files.

5. Hopkins papers—The papers of Harry L. Hopkins, located in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York. A few notes written by Hopkins to the President at Yalta were found. There were no other Yalta papers of a unique nature and no papers at all on Malta.

Published Sources

In addition to the Department of State Bulletin, the two official publications listed below were found to be the most convenient sources for citations to previously published documents referred to in this volume.

Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945. Department of State Publication 3580 (Washington: Government Printing Office 1949). Hereafter cited as "Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation." A Decade of American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1941-49.

Senate Document No. 123 81st Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), hereafter cited as "Decade."

The most authoritative unofficial publications containing basic data on the conference at Malta and Yalta are the following books, which were written by conference participants or from the papers of participants.

JAMES F. BYRNES, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947); hereafter referred to as "Byrnes."

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), Volume VI of the series The Second World War hereafter referred to as "Churchill."

JOHN R. DEANE, The Strange Alliance: the story of our efforts at wartime cooperation with Russia (New York: The Viking Press, 1947); hereafter referred to as "Deane."

ERNEST J. KING AND WALTER MUIR WHITEHILL, Fleet Admiral King: A naval record (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1952); hereafter referred to as "King."

WILLIAM D. LEAHY, I Was There: the personal history of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, based on his notes and diaries made at the time (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950). Hereafter referred to as "Leahy."

ROBERT E. SHERWOOD, Roosevelt and Hopkins, an intimate history (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948); hereafter referred to as "Sherwood."

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR. Roosevelt and the Russians: the Yalta conference (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1949); hereafter referred to as "Stettinius."

While much information is contained in these books that is not in the official record, it would be neither feasible nor appropriate to reproduce such material in this volume. Citations have been made to these books, however, for factual assertions which are specifically supplementary to, or at variance with, the official record as presented herein. A few other unofficial but authoritative books touch on aspects of the pre-conference negotiations have also been cited, at appropriate points in this volume.

Testimony given in Congressional hearings by participants in the Malta and Yalta conferences has also been studied for factual additions to the record, and citations to such statements have been made at appropriate points in the volume.

Editorial Treatment

In the documents presented in this volume the editors have corrected only obvious typographic error. All permissible variations in spelling, punctuation, and capitalization have been retained as in the original text. The data appearing on the headings and sub-scriptions of the original documents (place, date, addressee, method of transmission, and classification) have been harmonized by the editors into a more

nearly standard pattern in the headings as printed herein. Any substantive titles appearing on the original documents have been retained.

The classification of the document (top secret, secret, confidential, restricted) is included in the printing heading if such information appears on the document itself. It should be noted, however, that in 1944 and 1945 many documents were not given any formal classification, although they were handled as if classified and were in some instances so marked subsequently. The editors have endeavored to reproduce in this volume the original classification of the document, if any, disregarding subsequent modifications thereof. In instances in which the classification was stamped rather than typed on the text copy, it is possible that this classification was applied subsequently and did not appear on the document as originally prepared.

Most of the minutes and notes presented in this volume contained lists of participants for each meeting reported on. In order to avoid the useless repetition of such lists and to harmonize differences in spelling, the editors have compiled a single list of names of participants for each meeting of each conference. A complete list of persons mentioned in the volume (is included) with indications as to whether they attended the Malta Conference, the Yalta Conference or both.

All telegraphic instructions of the Department of State are issued over the name of the Secretary or Acting Secretary, although many of them are actually signed by an appropriate official of lower rank who subscribes his own initials. In the telegrams printed in this volume, such initials have been retained as a part of the signature, with a bracketed indication in each case of the identity of the signing officer.

In accordance with the customary practice in the foreign relations series, a limited number of omissions are made in order (1) to avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals, (2) to protect defense information, in accordance with Executive Order 10501, and (3) to condense the record as by eliminating items that are merely repetitious, or not germane. All deletions have been indicated by dots, at the appropriate points in the documents as printed.

A consolidated list of abbreviations, symbols, and code names [and] a list of papers [are included].

It is anticipated that an index volume for the entire series on World War II conferences will be issued when the series has been completed.

Argonaut Proposed and Accepted as the Designation for the Operation

Personalities Who Are Mentioned in Record of the Big Three Conference

MILITARY CHIEFS: **General of the Army** George **C. Marshall**, left, Admiral William **D. Leahy**, left rear, **and Field Marshal** Sir Alan **Brooke, Chief of the** Imperial General Staff, chat at the **British headquarters** during **the three-power conference** at Yalta.

secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

I am today sending to Harriman the following message in regard to our projected three-party meeting with U. J.

"Please let me have your opinion as to the possibilities of this plan from your point of view.

"If Stalin cannot manage to meet us in the Mediterranean I am prepared to go to the Crimea and have the meeting at Yalta, which appears to be the best place available in the Black Sea, having the best accommodations ashore and the most promising flying conditions.

"He would arrive by plane from some Mediterranean port and would send in advance a naval vessel to Sevastopol to provide necessary service and living accommodations. It would be necessary for me to go on board ship.

"I would plan to leave Africa very soon after the inauguration, on a naval vessel. You will be informed later of a date of arrival that will be satisfactory to Churchill and to me. My party will be numerically equal to that which was present at Teheran, about 25 total.

"I still hope the military situation will permit Marshal Stalin to meet us half way."

ROOSEVELT.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 28 December, 1944

Personal and top secret for the President from Harriman:

In a talk with Minister this afternoon I again asked for an appointment with Marshal Stalin to discuss the place of the meeting. Minister said that this could be arranged but that he knew the position of Marshal Stalin and could tell me as the decision unfortunately was not dependent upon the Marshal alone. Stalin had again consulted his doctors who maintained their position that he should not make a long journey at the present time. He therefore could not go to the Mediterranean. He would, however, gladly come to any place on the Soviet coast of the Black Sea and if you could not come there it had been decided that Minister as his first deputy could go to meet you and the Prime Minister wherever you wished. I imagined whether full consideration has been given to your suggestion of traveling by rail. He maintained categorically that the decision was based on consideration of the length of the journey as well as the mode of travel. From my previous discussion with Stalin and this one with Minister I am now convinced that Stalin will not go to the Mediterranean for this meeting. I said in conclusion that I knew you were most anxious to meet Marshal Stalin, that I would communicate with you and see him again in the next day or two with your final answer. I am seeing him tomorrow on another matter and will then discuss arrangements for the meeting in the Crimea in accordance with your telegram of December 23.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

Sent via United States Army radio.

(Moscow), 29 December, 1944

TOP SECRET

To the President from Harriman:

I told Minister this afternoon that I had received word from you that if Marshal Stalin could not come to the Mediterranean you were prepared to come to the Black Sea. I emphasized the difficulties that this decision made for you but that in consideration of Marshal Stalin's health you were prepared to face them. We discussed in detail the arrangements for the holding of the meeting at Yalta with your ship at Sevastopol. Minister said he would discuss the questions with Marshal Stalin and get in touch with me tomorrow.

It was agreed that I and appropriate members of the military mission should go to the place of the meeting after preliminary arrangements have been made. It would be helpful if I could be informed of the names of the principal members of your party and the number and character of the balance of the party so that suitable arrangements can be made for their accommodation. As hotels and sanatoria were stripped of their furniture the Russians will have to make extensive preparations. If you are to be accompanied by the Chiefs of Staff would you wish me to discuss with Marshal Stalin his bringing the opposite numbers of the Russian staff? I feel this would be helpful in the establishment of relationships useful in future discussions. In addition I have found that Marshal Stalin has sometimes given his agreement on military proposals which he has not fully studied and subsequently reversed them after consulting his staff.

The presence of members of his staff would I believe therefore contribute to definite decisions. Minister asked for the approximate date when you expected to arrive in the Crimea. I explained that the Prime Minister had agreed to go wherever you decided and therefore I suggested that the Marshal not communicate with Mr. Churchill until you had had a chance to do so, after which I presumed Marshal Stalin would wish to extend him an invitation. I did this as I do not know how far you have kept the Prime Minister informed of the recent development. I would appreciate advice on this point. In order that we can make arrangements at Sevastopol, it would be helpful to have advice as to the character and number of naval vessels for which provision should be made. Also the approximate number of airplanes which will bring your party. In addition, the character of the naval planes and from where they would fly.

Referring to this message, Harriman telegraphed the president on December 28, 1944: "I have a message from Molotov today stating that Marshal Stalin has agreed to your suggestions regarding the meeting which I presented yesterday."

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

London, 29 December 1944

TOP SECRET

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 802.

Your 474. I send you in my immediately following the Admiralty report on Yalta. If this plate is chosen, it would be well to have a few destroyers on which we can live if necessary. There would be no difficulty in flying from the great air base and weather center at Chanaka. I, myself, landed in at York at Rinderwood. Dare say, however, Stalin will make good arrangements ashore. Our party will be kept to the smallest dimensions. I think we should aim at the end of January. I shall have to bring Anthony [Eden] and [Lord] Leathers.

PRIME.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Washington, 30 December 1944

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

Number 682. Top secret and personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 801 and 802. I am preparing to leave the U. S. as soon as possible after inauguration and from there by airplane for Yalta. But have not yet informed Stalin.

I will give you accurate dating as soon as details are worked out.

My thought now is to send a naval ex-passenger ship to the Black Sea to provide servicing and living accommodations if necessary. This ship could be in Sevastopol in advance because of weather.

Information from [illegible] indicates that suitable [illegible] and staff meeting [illegible] made available at Yalta. The city was not damaged during the German occupation.

It is my intention [illegible] the above 35 persons [illegible] joint staff, per [illegible] service, servants [illegible] the staff [illegible] President, as [illegible] number. The [illegible] I will [illegible]

[illegible] information in the near future.

ROOSEVELT.

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

London, 31 December 1944

TOP SECRET

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 803.

Your 682:

I will certainly meet you at Yalta. We are preparing to send a small signal ship to Sebastopol, also a cruiser has accommodation if later information indicates that this is necessary to supplement quarters on shore. It will be necessary for me to take with me about the same number of persons as attended the last Quebec conference. This includes the provision for a round-the-clock signal service, but any answers by yer those who can be conveniently put up on shore will save aboard. Pending further news from you I am taking January 28th as target date for arrival of ships. I shall fly direct via Canada in the C-54 which General Arnold gave me and which is a wonder. Have you a name for this operation? If not I suggest "Argonaut" which has a local but not deducible association.

PRIME.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Washington, 31 December 1944

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Number 683, personal and top secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Referring to your 681, in regard to taking off by plane from Canada, my advisers, medical and otherwise, consider it inadvisable to fly in high altitudes over the mountains between Italy and destination.

Admiral Hewitt has recommended going by naval vessel from here to Malta and flying from Malta to destination, which can be done without reaching any high altitude. The same applying to Alexandria or Suez, but would necessitate my spending more time on the ship.

Is there any reason why I should not transfer from ship to plane at Malta which might involve remaining overnight?

We are working on the details and hope to give you full information in the early future.

ROOSEVELT.

The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

Sent to the United States Military Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Washington, 31 December 1944

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

Number 153. Personal and top secret from the President to Ambassador Harriman.

Replying to your telegrams of December 28, 27 and 28.

I am now preparing to leave the U. S. by warship as soon as possible after the inauguration and by airplane from the Mediterranean to Yalta. I have an informal Churchill who is agreeable and I will at a later day give you accurate dates of departure and arrival Yalta.

My party for which suitable arrangements should be made will be as follows:

Fleet Admiral Leahy, General of the Army Marshall, Fleet Admiral King, General of the Army Arnold, Lieutenant General Somervell, Vice Admiral Cooke, Major General Watson, Major General Wood, Rear Admiral McCormick, Rear Admiral Duncan, Brigadier General Lindsay, Colonel Lincoln, Brigadier General Bessell and Evatar, Commodore Borrough, aides to the Chiefs of Staff, Colonel McCarthy, Captain McCall, Commander Dennis and Commander Clark, fifteen members, officers and clerks of the secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Bohlen, interpreter.

My personal group will be Vice Admiral McIntire and Brown, Major General Watson, Mr. Matt Henlein, six White House chief officers, sixteen Secret Service officers and eight servants.

I may be able to bring Harriman and Jimmy Byrnes.

The total number from here will be about seventy.

About a week before our arrival at Quebec I is my present intention to send a total complement, not a combatant unit of war, to anchor off Yalta or in Sevastopol if necessary to provide services, etc. She will act as supply ship and communication center. She can provide some furniture from ration to make up for any deficiencies and also certain standard food supplies.

We will arrive in four or five airplanes of the C-54 type. There should be a daily mail plane from Cairo of the Army C-54 or similar type.

Churchill suggests that he will want to bring some British destroyers.

ROOSEVELT.

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TOP SECRET

London, 1 January 1945

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and top secret, Number 871.

We shall be delighted if you will come to Malta. I shall be waiting on the quay. You will also see the navigation of your noble message to Malta of a year ago. Everything can be arranged to your convenience. No more let us falter. From Malta to Yalta, I am [illegible]

Churchill

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Washington, 1 January 1945

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

Number 688. Top Secret and personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 871. We plan to arrive by ship at Malta early forenoon 3 February and hope to proceed at once to Yalta without delaying. It will be grand to meet you on the quay.

ROOSEVELT.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Washington, 1 January 1945

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

Number 690. Personal and top secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 869. I have informed Harriman that I will arrive Yalta February 3rd or second by airplane from Malta and that Chiefs of Staff will arrive at same time, possibly from Egypt.

I have also informed Harriman that we are sending a naval auxiliary non-combatant vessel to Sevastopol to arrive three or four days in advance of my arrival.

Your suggestion of "Argonaut" is welcomed. You and I are direct descendants.

In considering itinerary of visit to Black Sea, it has developed much to my regret that because of my extended absence from Washington it is necessary for me to postpone my projected visit to the United Kingdom until a later date.

I will make every effort to arrange to visit the U. K. in May or June.

ROOSEVELT.

(Roosevelt Papers)

The President's Naval Aide (Brown) to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet (Cooke)

Washington, 2 January 1945

TOP SECRET

Memorandum for Vice Admiral Cooke:

Subject: Detailed White House arrangements for Argonaut.

1. The Prime Minister and Ambassador Harriman have been informed that the President expects to arrive at Malta on board a USS-of-War on the early forenoon of 3 February and to proceed at once by plane to Saki.

2. The State Department has been informed that the Colonies will leave Naples on 22 January for Sevastopol and that the passage of the Dardanelles will be made about 24-25 January.

Continued on Following Page

Preparations Quickened as the Date for Session in the Crimea Approached

has been described as a naval auxiliary anti-combatant vessel. The State Department has been directed to inform the President of Turkey of our intention and to arrange for the Catoctin's passage of the Dardanelles and of the Bosporus.

3. It is requested that appropriate instructions be issued to the Catoctin to carry out the above and that appropriate instructions also be issued for her to communicate as necessary with Mr. Harriman and to do whatever may be necessary to assist in providing communications furniture (if desired), provisions and supplies for the mission. I suggest that her instructions might authorize the commanding officer to use his judgment as to whether she should remain at Sevastopol or sail to Yalta.

4. It might be well for her to transport some Army jeeps for use of the mission.

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U. S. N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

TOP SECRET

London, Jan. 5, 1945.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 874.

Your 850. In some of your telegrams about Argonaut have you mentioned whether U. J. likes this place and agrees to it and what kind of accommodation he can provide. I am looking forward to receiving this. It has occurred to some of us that he might come back and say, "Why don't you come on the other four boats and let me entertain you in Moscow?" However, I am preparing for Yalta and an assembling a larger fleet which will cover all our troubles.

Would it not be possible for you to spend two or three nights at Malta and let the staffs have a talk together unostentatiously? Alex, Eisenhower and Alexander could both be available there. We think it very important that there should be some conversation on matters which do not affect the Russians, e.g., Japan, and also about future use of the Italian armies. You have but to say the word and we can arrange everything.

We are very sorry indeed you will not come to our shores on this journey. We should feel it very much and a very dismal impression would be made if you were to visit France before you came to Britain. In fact, it would be regarded as a slight on your closest ally. I gather, however, that you will only go to the Mediterranean and Black Sea, in which case it is merely a repetition of Teheran.

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

[illegible], 9 January 1945.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and top secret, Number 875.

Argonaut. Please see my Number 874.

If you do not wish to spend more than one night at Malta, it could surely be arranged that both our Chiefs of Staff's should arrive there say a couple of days before us and have their preliminary discussions. We would then all proceed by air to Argonaut. This is the way proposing the journey of the two combined chiefs to Sebastopol. Our Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions would of course also proceed at Sebastopol at periods when military officers were not required for the general meetings. The British Chiefs of Staff are pressing this to the United States Chiefs of Staff and suggesting an agenda.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

(Washington), 6 January 1945.

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Number 852. Personal and top secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.

Your 874 and 875. I am informed by Harriman that U. J. will meet us at Yalta February first or second.

Preparations are being made to take care of us and our staff in undamaged houses in Yalta. I will send my ship to Sevastopol to arrive three or four days in advance of my arrival.

There is a chance that weather might permit of the ship's anchoring off the place of meeting.

With favorable weather at sea I can arrive Malta February second, and it is necessary to proceed by air the same day in order to keep the date with U. J.

That is why I regret that, in view of the time available to me for the journey it will not be possible for us to meet your suggestion and have a British-American staff meeting at Malta before proceeding to Argonaut. I do not think that by not having a meeting at Malta any time will be lost at Argonaut.

I am anxious of your visits to the great incentive which are great to me by company.

ROOSEVELT.

The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

TOP SECRET

(Washington), 6 January 1945.

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy Channels.

Number 851. Personal and top secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.

Your 874 and 875. I am informed by Harriman that U. J. will meet us at Yalta February first or second.

Preparations are being made to take care of us and our staff in undamaged houses in Yalta. I will send my ship to Sevastopol to arrive three or four days in advance of my arrival.

There is a chance that weather might permit of the ship's anchoring off the place of meeting.

With favorable weather at sea I can arrive Malta February second, and it is necessary to proceed by air the same day in order to keep the date with U. J.

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I am anxious of your visits to the great incentive which are great to me by company.

ROOSEVELT.

The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

TOP SECRET

(Washington), 6 January 1945.

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy Channels.

Number 852. Personal and top secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.

Your 874 and 875. I am informed by Harriman that U. J. will meet us at Yalta February first or second.

Preparations are being made to take care of us and our staff in undamaged houses in Yalta. I will send my ship to Sevastopol to arrive three or four days in advance of my arrival.

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I am anxious of your visits to the great incentive which are great to me by company.

ROOSEVELT.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President

Moscow, 6 January 1945.

TOP SECRET

Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Personal and top secret for the President from Harriman.

I have communicated to Marshal Stalin through Minister the date you have selected for the meeting, suggesting rendering an invitation to Mr. Prime Minister, and submitted the code name you proposed. The above refers to White House cables NR 159 and 160 January 6 and 7. I have arranged to bring down several Russian-speaking American officers to act as interpreters and to assist in dealing with the details of talks with the Russians. I have already informed Minister that there would be about 100 in my party, which would take into account those coming from Moscow, including General Deane, Admiral Olsen, General Hill, and the special Weapons planning staff, General Roberts, Captain Staples, U.S.N., and Colonel Bryant. With Minister's cordial approval I am planning to go to the Crimea, the end of the week just as soon as the Hungarian armistice is concluded and will have to be able to advise you in detail regarding the housing arrangements. The Russians will in doubt provide a first class car for your personal use equipped with bullet-proof glass such as is used by Soviet high officials.

[Roosevelt Papers: Telegram]

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TOP SECRET

London, 8 January 1945

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and top secret, No. 880.

1. I am still looking it of high importance that our military men should get together for a few days before we arrive at Argonaut. There will be double opportunity for them to come together at Sebastopol on days when we are engaged in talks and do not require technical advice. At the same time are a tremendous lot of questions which should be looked at beforehand, and our agenda ought really to be considered.

2. Even further to this I would add that there would be great advantage in a preliminary conference of about a week's duration between the Foreign Ministers. If these could be gathered at the juncture of Alexandria, above which arrangements are very easy, and could join us at Argonaut, an immense amount of preliminary work would be done. I do not know whether you are bringing Stettinius with you, or whether you would bring Eden for such a conference. If so, I should greatly welcome it, also the moment that such a decision has been taken, we would invite Molotov to come to the rendezvous. You will remember what advantages were gained last time by the discussions which took place in Moscow before retreat at Teheran. Pray let me know whether this appeals to you at all.

3. What are your ideas of the length of our stay at Argonaut? This may well be a fateful conference, coming at a moment when the great Allies are so divided and the shadow of the war lengthens out before us. At the present time I think the end of this war may well prove to be more disappointing than was the last.

[Roosevelt Papers: Telegram]

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TOP SECRET

London, 8 January, 1945.

Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

No. 881. Prime Minister to President. Personal and top secret.

1. Please see paragraph one of my No. 880. In spite of your No. 852, our staffs consider it of the highest importance that they meet with yours before we go on to Argonaut. I understand that your staffs, at start are flying separately from you. Why then can they not reach Malta say on January 30th and meet our people there? We think this very important and we do not see how the agenda can be covered unless there is this preliminary talk. I hope you will consider this. Eden only arrive in time to welcome you on February 2nd.

2. We assume all what the flying will be from Malta onward and you may easily have to wait an extra day in Malta. However if our staffs have covered most of the ground, we can spend this day discussing with them. Could Joe may if the weather is bad have to put up with a delay. But we may comfort himself with the reflection that he has left us some 6,000 miles behind him, which in all the circumstances we are wise to do.

MILITARY MINDS: Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Admiral William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt, General of the Army George C. Marshall and Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, seated during a shipboard conference on Feb. 2, 1945.

Figures Mentioned in Record of the Conference

Continued From Preceding Page

MORGENTHAU, Henry Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.

MORRIS, Leland B., U. S. Ambassador to Iran.

MOSELY, Philip E., chief, Division of Territorial Studies, Department of State.

MOUNTBATTEN, Acting Admiral Lord Louis, R. N., Supreme Commander Southeast Asia Theater.

MOWRER, Edgar A., newspaper columnist and radio commentator.

MURPHY, Robert D., U. S. political adviser on German affairs with the personal rank of Ambassador; formerly Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

MYKOLAJCZYK, Stanislaw, Polish Prime Minister, 1943-1944.

MYERS, Lieut. Col. Henry C., U. S. A., special assistant to the Commanding General, Air Transport Command, and a special missions pilot; pilot of President Roosevelt's plane to and from the Crimea.

N

NAHAS, Mustafa, leader of the Egyptian Wafd party.

NELSON, Donald M., Chairman, War Production Board, February, 1942-October, 1944.

NEMEC, Frantisek, Czechoslovak Minister of Liberated Territories, September, 1941-April, 1945.

NOVIKOV, Nikolai Vasilievich, U. S. S. R. delegate.

NEWTON, Wilson, associate special counsel to the Under Secretary of State.

NICHOLAS II, Tsar of Russia, 1894-1917.

NICOLSON, Maj. Gen. Harold George, Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, Baron Carnalea of the Kingdom of Ireland, Order of the Bath.

NIMITZ, Fleet Admiral Chester W., U. S. N., Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean areas.

NORSTAD, Brig. Gen. Lauris, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Headquarters, Army Air Forces and Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Air Force.

NOTTER, Harley A., adviser, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State.

NOVIKOV, Col. Gen. Nikolai Alexandrovich, Commanding General of the Soviet Army Air Force.

NOVIKOV, Nikolai Vasilievich, member of the Delegation of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and Chief of the United European Division.

O

O'DRISCOLL, Daniel J., United States Secret Service.

OLIVER, Senior Officer Afloat (Deputy Mission's Assistant Air Force Member of Prime Minister Churchill).

OLSEN, Rear Admiral Clarence E., U. S. N., Chief of the Naval Section of the United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.

OLSZEWSKI, Edward, Polish Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lublin Provisional Polish Government.

P

PAGE, Edward Jr., second secretary and consul, United States Embassy, Moscow; secretary and interpreter at the Yalta Conference.

PARR, Col. Richard Jr., U. S. A., personal military aide to President Roosevelt.

PASYUKEVICH, Lieut. General Vasili Ivanovich, Deputy to the Secretary of State, 1939-47; also Executive Director, Committee on Foreign Relations, 1945.

PATTERSON, Richard C. Jr., United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

PAULUS, Field Marshal Friedrich, German prisoner of war in the Soviet Union.

PAVLOV, Vladimir Nikolayevich, personal secretary and interpreter to Marshal Stalin.

PEARSON, Lester Bowles, Canadian Ambassador to the United States.

PECK, Col. Clarence P., U. S. A., executive secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

PERLE, John W., assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury and Executive Director of the War Refugee Board.

PELLA, Herbert C., United States member, United Nations War Crimes Commission.

PETER II, King of Yugoslavia.

PETERSON, Elmer A., United States Secret Service.

PETROV, Army General Ivan E., Commander of the Fourth Ukrainian Front.

PIERLOT, Hubert, Belgian Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

PILSUDSKI, Michal Kazimierz, son of the late Polish Marshal Pilsudski.

POPIEL, Karol, Polish Ambassador to the United States.

POTSDAM, Mikhail Nikolayevich, adviser of the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

POTOCKI, Count, Polish ambassador and observer mission to the Soviet Union.

PRATT, Rear Adm. William V., U. S. N., member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

PRITCHARD, Lieut. Col. Earl E., U. S. A., Air Force member of the Combined Secretariat.

PUTNAM, Maj. Henry W., U. S. A., member of the President's party.

R

RACZKIEWICZ, Wladislaw, Premier of the Polish Government in London.

RATNOR, G. Hayden, special counsel to the secretary of State.

REILLY, Michael F., Chief Secret Service.

REPIN, Col. Gen. Alexander Pavlovich, Chief Engineer and Chief of the Aviation Engineering Service of the Soviet Army Air Force.

REYNAUD, Paul, French Premier, 1940.

RICHMOND, Maj. Elton C., U. S. A., attaché to the Army Air Forces Mission in Moscow.

RICHARDS-WEBSTER, Sir Gerald, British Minister to Portugal.

ROBERTS, Maj. Gen. Frank N., U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Forces, European Theater.

ROBERTSON, Walter S., assistant to the Secretary of State.

ROBINSON, Edwin W., United States Minister to Bulgaria, with the personal rank of Minister.

ROCHEFORT, Robert R., United States Consular Officer at Yalta.

ROCKEFELLER, Nelson A., United States Representative to the American Republics.

ROGERS, Edith Nourse, United States Representative from Massachusetts.

ROMANIUK, Col. Gen. Stanislaw, Chief of the Polish General Staff.

ROOSEVELT, Brig. Gen. Elliott, U. S. A., Commanding General, Photographic Wing, Army Air Forces.

ROOSEVELT, Mrs. Eleanor, wife of President Roosevelt.

ROOSEVELT, Brig. Gen. James, U. S. A., Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, Calif.

ROOSEVELT, Lieut. Col. John A., U. S. A., Air Force member of the Combined Secretariat.

ROOSEVELT, Lieut. Col. Kermit, U. S. A., Air Force member of the Combined Secretariat.

ROOSEVELT, Lieut. Col. Mrs. Romelle, U. S. A., Air Force member of the Combined Secretariat.

ROOSEVELT, Lieut. Col. Mrs. Sara, U. S. A., Air Force member of the Combined Secretariat.

ROOSEVELT, Lieut. Col. Mrs. Sarah

Roosevelt Log Describes Trip to Yalta and Formal Opening of the Talks

sonal agreement communique or to the Prime Minister's statement.

I am sending a similar telegram to U. J.

FRANK.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

(Washington), 31 Jan. 1945.

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Number 708, personal and top secret, for the Prime Minister from the President.

I am in full agreement with the suggestion regarding press representatives and photographers made in your 891.

ROOSEVELT.

(Churchill replied, in his telegram No. 897, "Please tell U. J.")

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

(Washington) 31 January 1945

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Number 178, top secret and personal from the President to Marshal Stalin.

I have decided to not have any press representatives at Argonaut, and to permit only a small group of uniformed service photographers from the American Navy to take the pictures that we will want.

Prime Minister Churchill agrees.

ROOSEVELT.

(Stalin's reply, dated January 23, as received by the President in translation, included the statements, "I do not have any objections against your proposal" and "The same reply I will

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

London, January 28, 1945.

TOP SECRET

Sent to the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and top secret, Number 891.

It would be a great pity if Eisenhower and Alexander only came to Yalta and if we did not have them with us at Magneto.

(Alexander was present at both Malta and Yalta, but Eisenhower was not. The latter's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, was, however, in attendance at Malta.)

This will really make it impossible for the heads of government to enter fully into the military problems. I hope therefore they may be instructed as originally proposed to come to Magneto as well as Crichel and if they have to be absent from either it should be Crichel.

The above of course is subject to battle exigencies.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

(Washington) 28 January 1945

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

Number 706, personal and top secret from the President to the Prime Minister.

Thank you for your 891 and 892. The approaches to Argonaut appear to be much more difficult than at first reported. I will have my advance party make recommendations as to how I shall travel from Baza.

I agree that we must notify U. J. as soon as we can fix our schedule in the light of present information.

ROOSEVELT.

The Yalta Conference

February 4-11, 1945

The President's Log at Yalta

LOG OF THE TRIP

Saturday, February 3rd:

1210: The President's plane, escorted by five fighters, arrived at Saki (in the Crimea). The fighters had joined the flight at Athens. A sixth P-38 had to turn back to Athens because of engine trouble.

At the airport to meet the President were the Honorable V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Secretary of State Stettinius and Ambassador Harriman. It was explained that Marshal Stalin had not yet arrived in the Crimea.

The President did not leave his plane at once but, remained discussing until the Prime Minister arrived from Malta some twenty minutes later.

Distance traveled Malta to Saki, 1,370 miles.

We were met at Saki by Agnita Rowley, Peterson, Deckard, Compton, Savage and Gridley, members of our advance party.

1250: The Prime Minister and his party arrived at Saki in his special aircraft escorted by six fighters. The Prime Minister disembarked and came over to the President's plane. The President then left his plane and entered a jeep. As the President and the Prime Minister approached the guard of honor, honors were rendered for them. The honors consisted of the guard presenting arms and the band playing The Star-Spangled Banner, God Save the King, and the Tsing Hai Hsiang. Then, while in the jeep, the President drove down the ranks of the guard and made an inspection of them. Afterwards the guard of honor passed in review before the President and the Prime Minister. The President took the review while seated in the jeep.

1300: The motorcade at the airport over, the President and members of his party left Saki by automobile for Livadia Palace, near Yalta, some 40 miles distant. Mrs. Boettiger rode with the President. All automobiles used in our convoy were furnished by the Soviet Government and were operated by Russian drivers.

The first stretch of our drive, from Saki to Simferopol, was over rolling, snow-covered country somewhat like that of our Middle-West. We saw few, if any trees and many reminders of the recent fighting there—earth-covered-out buildings, burned out tanks and destroyed German railroad rolling stock that had been abandoned and burned by them in their flight.

From Simferopol, the capital city of the Crimea, we went on to Alushta, a small town on the east coast of the Crimean Peninsula. From Alushta we followed the "Route Romanoff" to Yalta. This is a high and very winding road that passes around the southside of the Roman Kosh (the highest mountain in the Crimea—5,805 feet) and ascends to the Red Crag (1,780 feet). The entire distance from Saki to Yalta was guarded by Soviet troops. It was noted that a considerable number of them were young girls.

1720: We passed through the city of Yalta.

1800: We arrived at Livadia Palace, two miles south of Yalta. This was our headquarters during the Crimea Conference. Miss Kathleen Harriman (daughter of Ambassador Harriman) was at Livadia to greet the President and Mrs. Boettiger.

We were all very tired, as it was a case of talking, dining and to bed for us this evening.

The Prime Minister's party traveled separately from the President's and went from Saki to Vorontsov Villa (located about 12.5 miles south of Livadia), where they made their headquarters during the conference.

Commander Tyree, Major Putnam and Mr. Considine had arrived at Livadia several hours before us and had our suitcases and communications center set up and in operation when the President arrived. Commander Smith had been at Livadia for several days. He had come to the Crimea in the Catoctin.

2100: Lieutenant Rogers who had remained behind at Malta to handle any last minute communications for our party and had left Malta on one of the last planes of our fight, arrived at Livadia, completing the arrival of our party.

The U. S. newspaper Pittsburgh and Jupiter were moored in the harbor at Yalta. The naval auxiliary Catoctin, the Liberty ship William Moore and the minesweepers Incessant and Invincible were moored in the harbor at Sevastopol, 35 miles to the southwest. The Soviet Republics had failed to permit the Catoctin, or the William Moore to continue on to Yalta because of the presence of mines in that area of the Black Sea. This task group had been called from the Mediterranean area some 500 days previously in order to be on hand to furnish miscellaneous services to the American delegation at Yalta. These ships were the first Allied vessels to pass through the Dardanelles since the beginning of the present war and they opened communications with Sevastopol and Yalta.

Because the Catoctin could not come to Yalta, or closer than Sevastopol, it was necessary for us to communicate by landline (teletype) with the Catoctin, which vessel served as communications relay ship for our party during the conference. For the first few days we experienced "wire trouble" between Livadia and Sevastopol. Our communications engineers eventually laid an entirely new line from Livadia to Sevastopol and thereafter no further wire trouble was experienced.

YALTA

Yalta before the war was the center of the health resorts on the south coast of the Crimea. In 1939 it had a normal population of 29,000. It is picturesquely situated in the valley at the River Uchan-Su and is surrounded on three sides by mountains. The mountain range to the north thwarts the cold North winds and, together with the Black Sea, gives Yalta a mild climate. The summers are hot but it was not at all uncomfortable.

LIVADIA PALACE

The buildings used by the American Delegation during the Crimea Conference are the former summer palaces of the Czars. The main building is called the Livadia and the two auxiliary buildings the Feliski Korpus.

After the Revolution Livadia was used by the Soviet Government as a rest home for tuberculosis patients. During the German occupation of the Crimea it was used by their high command, who did a very thorough job of looting when they were forced to leave. The buildings were left in complete disrepair and the grounds in equally bad condition. The only original furnishings in the building (Livadia) all the time we resided there were the two pictures in the President's bedroom.

The Soviet Government had performed an amazing job, however, in completely renovating the place during the three weeks period immediately preceding the conference, assisting because of the critical shortage of materials and the very limited time available. This was because it was not until about 15 January that it was definitely decided to hold the conference at Yalta. Hotel staffs were brought in from Moscow and furniture and furnishings were obtained from Moscow and other Soviet cities or from local sanitoria and rest homes. It should be added here that in addition to everything that the Soviets did, Lieutenant Commander L. H. Barkus, MC-V(S), U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant T. W. Sullivan, MC-V(S), U. S. N. R. (both from the U. S. S. Catoctin), did an outstanding job in transforming Livadia, an isolated building since the German occupation and pillage, to a place that was completely habitable and comfortable, and prevented what might have been a most serious threat to the health of the entire party.

The New Palace (Livadia) was built from white limestone in 1911, in the style of the Italian renaissance, being

MISSION IN MALTA: Anthony Eden, left, the British Foreign Secretary, greets Averell Harriman, U. S. Ambassador to Russia, at airport for discussions prior to Yalta conference.

Abbreviations, Symbols, Code Names

WASHINGTON, March 16—The State Department's account of the Malta and Yalta conferences includes this list of abbreviations, symbols and code names:

ACC—Allied Control Commission.

A-D—Assistant Secretary of State, James C. Dunn.

ADDED—Addressed.

AEF—Allied Expeditionary Force.

AFHQ—Allied Force Headquarters.

AGWAR—Adjutant General War Department.

ALLATIVE HORSERADISH—A phrase used between Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. and his aides, the Horseshoe, indicating that all was going well.

AMG—Allied Military Government.

AOC—Air Officer Commanding.

ARGONAUT—Code name for the Yalta Conference, also used to refer to military discussions at Malta as well as at Yalta.

ARSIC—Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee (World War I); also any type of underwater supersonic echo-ranging equipment of vessels.

ART—Airborne Search Radar.

AUXOJ—See AVNOJ.

AUS—Army of the United States.

AVNOJ—Anti-fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Yugoslavia.

BMA—British Military Authority.

BMOT—British Ministry of War Transport.

BROADSWORD—Code name for the operation to liberate Dalmatia and open the Straits of Malacca.

CAC—Country and Area Committee, Department of State.

CC—Carbon copy.

CCAC—Combined (American and British) Civil Affairs Committee.

CCS—Combined (American and British) Chiefs of Staff.

CM-IN—Classified message—Incoming.

CMTC—Combined Military Transportation Committee.

C of S—Chief of Staff.

COMNAVGIB—Commander, Naval Group.

CONG—Congress.

CRICKET—Code name for Malta as a geographical location.

D-DAY—The term used to designate the unnamed day on which an operation commences or is to commence, sometimes used with specific reference to the day of the Allied cross-Channel assault (June 6, 1944).

DUKW—Amphibious truck.

EAC—European Advisory Commission.

ER—Office of Eastern Europe Affairs.

EUR—Office (bureau) of European Affairs, Department of State.

EW—European War.

FAN—Military Communications indicator on classified messages.

FEA—Foreign Economic Administration.

FEC—Far Eastern Commission.

FM—Foreign Ministers(s).

FRANTIC—Code name for England-to-Russia air-shuttle bombing operations.

FX—Military communications indicator.

G-1—Army general staff section dealing with personnel at the divisional or higher level.

G-3—Army general staff section dealing with operations and training at the divisional or higher level.

GESTAPO—German secret state police.

GRENADE—Code name for the attack by the Ninth Army across the Roer River in the Rhine near Duesseldorf.

HC—Hospital Carpenter.

HMG—His (Britannic) Majesty's Government.

HMS—His (Britannic) Majesty's ship.

IBC—International Labor Organization.

JCS—Joint United States Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff.

JG—Junior grade.

JIC—Joint Intelligence Committee.

JPS—Joint staff planners.

JSSC—Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

LE—Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State.

LOYALIST—Code name for the operation to liberate Burma.

L/T—Assistant (assistant legal adviser) for Treaty Affairs, Department of State.

LVT—Landing vehicle, tracked.

M—Communications Indicator.

MAGNETO—Code name for Yalta as a geographical location.

MANHATTAN DISTRICT—Code name for the atomic-bomb development project.

MC—Medical Corps.

MC-V(S)—Medical Corps, volunteer (specialist).

MR—Division of Middle Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

MILEPOST—Code name referring to stockpiling of supplies in eastern Siberia for the use of Soviet forces in the war against Japan.

MR—Map room at the White House or at the conference. Served as communications center for the President.

MWT—Ministry of War Transport (British).

NAF—Military communications indicator.

NCR—Communications indicator.

NEA—Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State.

NIACT—A communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night.

NKVD—People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Soviet Union).

OCTAGON—Code name for the second Quebec conference—Sept. 11-16, 1944.

OFD—Operations Division, War Department General Staff.

PARA—Paragraph.

PM—Prime Minister.

RAF—Royal Air Force (British).

RANKIN—"C"—Code name for a plan that provided for Allied action in case of German

[illegible] down from Moscow by rail to a point in the Crimea and then driven to Koreiz Villa, about six miles south of Livadia, where they made their headquarters during the Crimea Conference.

11:40: The President conferred with Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Harriman, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Somervell, Mr. Hiss (Agnes Hiss, special assistant to the Secretary of State) and Mr. Bohlen (Charles E. Bohlen, special assistant to the Secretary of State). The conference was held in the grand ballroom of Livadia.

1025: Marshall Stalin and Mr. Molotov called on Livadia and conferred with the President in his study. Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov were also present.

1450: The President conferred with Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Matthews and Mr. Bohlen in his study.

1710: The first formal meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballrooms of Livadia. Present were:

FOR THE U. S.
THE PRESIDENT
MR. STETTINIUS
ADMIRAL LEAHY
GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING
MR. HARRIMAN
GENERAL DEANE
GENERAL SUTER
GENERAL McFARLAND

FOR GREAT BRITAIN
THE PRIME MINISTER
MR. EDEN
FIELD MARSHAL BROOKE
AIR MARSHAL PORTAL
FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER
ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM
GENERAL ISMAY
MAJOR BIRSE

FOR THE U.S.S.R.
MARSHAL STALIN
COMMISSAR MOLOTOV
ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV
GEN. GENERAL ANTONOV
AIR MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV
MR. VYSHINSKI
MR. MAISKY
MR. GROMYKO
MR. PAVLOV

This meeting adjourned at 1950.

2030: The President was host at dinner at Livadia to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Clark Kerr, Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Vyshinsky, Justice Byrnes, Major Birse, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov. The menu included cold fish platter, bread, butter, mayonnaise, sturgeon with onions, beef and macaroni, sweet cake, tea, coffee and fruit.

Sunday, February 5th:

0730: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived at Livadia with White House mail. This mail had been dispatched from Washington on January 31st.

0930: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed Livadia with mail for the White House.

1000: The President had lunch in Livadia with the members of his staff.

1420: The President conferred with Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Matthews and Mr. Bohlen in his study.

1500: The conference listed until

Rhymster Churchill: 'From Malta to Yalta'

WASHINGTON, March 16—Prime Minister Churchill's right-handed approach to understanding world problems took a rhyming turn on one occasion.

He asked President Roosevelt to meet him at Malta before proceeding to the Black Sea conference with Marshal Stalin. He concluded with this:

"No time to lose, so follow
From Malta to Yalta. Let Stalinsay else."

made a minor trip to Sevastopol today.

0001: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived from Washington with White House mail.

0030: Dinner at Livadia—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Flynn.

Tuesday, February 7th:

0001: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed Livadia with mail for Washington.

1200: Lunch at Livadia—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Harriman, Major General John R. Deane, Major General Kuter, Lieutenant General Ismay, Admiral Cunningham, Mr. Eden, Major Birse, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Pavlov.

1530: The President and Mrs. Boettiger and lunch in his study from a tray.

1700: The President signed an executive order authorizing the Secretary of War to take over and operate the plants and assets of the Detroit Edison Company of Detroit, Michigan.

1745: Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov conferred with the President in the President's study.

1815: The fifth formal meeting of the Crimea conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present were:

FOR THE U. S.
THE PRESIDENT
MR. STETTINIUS
ADMIRAL LEAHY
MR. HOPKINS
JUSTICE BYRNES
MR. HARRIMAN
MR. MATTHEWS
MR. BOHLEN
MR. HISS

FOR GREAT BRITAIN
THE PRIME MINISTER
MR. EDEN
MR. CADOGAN
MR. CLARK KERR
MR. JEBB
MR. BRIDGES
MR. WILSON
MR. DIXON
MAJOR BIRSE

FOR THE U.S.S.R.
MARSHAL STALIN
MR. MOLOTOV
MR. VYSHINSKI
MR. MAISKY
MR. GOUSEV
MR. GROMYKO
MR. PAVLOV

The meeting adjourned at 2000.

2030: Dinner at Livadia—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy and Mr. Stettinius.

Thursday, February 8th:

1200: The President conferred with Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Harriman, Justice Byrnes, and Mr. Bohlen. The conference was held in the President's study.

The British and American combined chiefs of staff met in the grand ballroom at Livadia.

Neither the President nor the Prime Minister attended this meeting.

1330: The President and Mrs. Boettiger and lunch in his study from a tray.

1500: The President signed an executive order authorizing the Secretary of War to take over and operate the plants and assets of the Detroit Edison Company of Detroit, Michigan.

1545: Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov conferred with the President in the President's study.

1615: The fifth formal meeting of the Crimea conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present were:

FOR THE U. S.
THE PRESIDENT
MR. STETTINIUS
ADMIRAL LEAHY
MR. HOPKINS
JUSTICE BYRNES
MR. HARRIMAN
MR. MATTHEWS
MR. BOHLEN
MR. HISS

FOR GREAT BRITAIN
THE PRIME MINISTER
MR. EDEN
MR. CADOGAN
MR. CLARK KERR
MR. JEBB
MR. BRIDGES
MR. WILSON
MR. DIXON
MAJOR BIRSE

FOR THE U.S.S.R.
MARSHAL STALIN
MR. MOLOTOV
MR. VYSHINSKI
MR. MAISKY
MR. GOUSEV
MR. GROMYKO
MR. PAVLOV

The meeting adjourned at 1940.

2030: The President and certain members of his party left Livadia by motor for Koreiz Villa to dine as guests of Marshal Stalin. The complete guest list was:

MARSHAL STALIN
MR. MOLOTOV
MR. VYSHINSKI
MR. BERIA
ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV
GENERAL ANTONOV
AIR MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV
MR. GOUSEV
MR. GROMYKO
MR. MAISKY
MR. PAVLOV

THE PRESIDENT
MR. STETTINIUS
ADMIRAL LEAHY
MR. HOPKINS
JUSTICE BYRNES
MR. HARRIMAN
MR. FLYNN
MRS. BOETTIGER
MISS HARRIMAN
MR. BOHLEN

THE PRIME MINISTER
MR. EDEN
FIELD MARSHAL BROOKE
AIR MARSHAL PORTAL
ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM
MR. CADOGAN
FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER
MR. CLARK KERR
GENERAL ISMAY
MRS. OLIVER
MAJOR BIRSE

Friday, February 9th:

1200: The President attended a plenary meeting of the combined Chiefs of Staff at Livadia. Present were:

FOR THE U. S.
THE PRESIDENT
MR. STETTINIUS
ADMIRAL LEAHY
MR. HOPKINS
MR. HARRIMAN
MR. MATTHEWS
MR. BOHLEN
MR. HISS

FOR GREAT BRITAIN
THE PRIME MINISTER
MR. EDEN
MR. CADOGAN
MR. CLARK KERR
MR. JEBB
MR. BRIDGES
MR. WILSON
MAJOR BIRSE

FOR THE U.S.S.R.
MARSHAL STALIN
MR. MOLOTOV
MR. VYSHINSKI
MR. MAISKY
MR. GOUSEV
MR. GROMYKO
MR. PAVLOV

The meeting adjourned at 1750.

1900: The President, accompanied by Mrs. Boettiger, took a jeep ride through the grounds and gardens of Livadia. Before he returned to his quarters he also inspected the United States naval armed guard crew and drank up enough cold juice to last the time.

1930: The eighth formal meeting of the Crimea conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present were:

FOR THE U.S.
THE PRESIDENT
MR. STETTINIUS
ADMIRAL LEAHY
MR. HOPKINS
MR. HARRIMAN
MR. MATTHEWS
MR. BOHLEN
MR. HISS
MR. FOOTE

FOR GREAT BRITAIN
THE PRIME MINISTER
MR. EDEN
MR. CADOGAN
MR. CLARK KERR
MR. JEBB
MR. BRIDGES
MR. WILSON
MAJOR BIRSE
MR. DIXON

FOR THE U.S.S.R.
MARSHAL STALIN
MR. MOLOTOV
MR. VYSHINSKI
MR. MAISKY
MR. GOUSEV
MR. GROMYKO
MR. PAVLOV

The meeting adjourned at 2000.

2030: The President, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Bohlen left Livadia for the British headquarters (Vorontsov Villa) where they dined with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Major Birse, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Pavlov as the guests of the Prime Minister.

Sunday, Feb. 11:

1130: The President, accompanied by Mrs. Boettiger, took a jeep ride through the grounds and gardens of Livadia. Before he returned to his quarters he also inspected the United States naval armed guard crew and drank up enough cold juice to last the time.

1200: The eighth formal meeting of the Crimea conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present were:

FOR THE U.S.
THE PRESIDENT
MR. STETTINIUS
ADMIRAL LEAHY
MR. HOPKINS
MR. HARRIMAN
MR. MATTHEWS
MR. BOHLEN
MR. HISS

FOR GREAT BRITAIN
THE PRIME MINISTER
MR. EDEN
MR. CADOGAN
MR. CLARK KERR
MR. JEBB
MR. BRIDGES
MR. WILSON
MAJOR BIRSE
MR. DIXON

FOR THE U.S.S.R.
MARSHAL STALIN
MR. MOLOTOV
MR. VYSHINSKI
MR. MAISKY
MR. GOUSEV
MR. GROMYKO
MR. PAVLOV

The meeting opened at 1230.

1300: The President was host

Military Situation in General Canvassed by the President and Soviet Leader

at luncheon at Livadia to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Clark Kerr, Mr. Cadogan, Major Birse, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov.

Conference discussions continued at the fifth table under 1345, at which time the Crimea conference formally adjourned.

1555: Marshal Stalin after having bade the President and members of his party goodbye, left Livadia by motor for Kazach Ville. Before the Marshal left Livadia the President presented to him for further delivery the following decorations that had been awarded by the United States to officers of the Soviet forces:

Legion of Merit (degree of chief commander) for Marshal Vasilevsky, Chief of Staff of the Red Army.

Legion of Merit (degree of chief commander) for Marshal Novikov, Commanding General of the Red Air Force.

Legion of Merit (degree of commander) for Colonel General Kuzma.

Legion of Merit (degree of commander) for Lieutenant General Gromadin.

Legion of Merit (degree of commander) for Lieutenant General Kruknikoun.

Legion of Merit (degree of commander) for Major General Lvvandovich.

Legion of Merit (degree of commander) for Major General Slavin; and

Legion of Merit (degree of commander) for Colonel Byas.

As we were leaving Livadia the President was presented numerous gift packages by the Soviet authorities at the palace, as also were various other members of the party. These packages contained vodka, several kinds of wine, champagne, caviar, butter, and langerines.

GENERAL COMMENT

The weather at Livadia was most pleasant during our visit. The average temperature was 40. The Russians accredited the good weather to the President and called it "Roosevelt weather." For several days preceding our arrival the weather had been anything but favorable. At exactly the "right time," however, it cleared and remained as generally throughout our stay at Yalta.

During the period 4-11 February, daily meetings of the three foreign secretaries were held in addition to their attendance at the major conference. Livadia, Yeniatare and Koreiz shared these foreign secretary meetings.

Our mail was brought to Yalta by Joint Chief of Staff couriers who used the regular air transport command facilities from Washington to Cairo and the shuttle service from Cairo to Saki. The average time employed for the journey from Washington to conference headquarters was four days.

The British party had daily [illegible] mail was [illegible] London to [illegible] aircraft, [illegible] a direct [illegible] two points [illegible] served.

Our radio communications were handled by a two-way high speed circuit set up between radio Washington and the Catoctin (at Sevastopol), using Navy radio Oran as an intermediate relay station. The messages were broadcast over the Washington "fox" schedules and where necessary relayed, by radio Oran. Communication between the Catoctin and Livadia was by a land line or by telephone.

A number of U. S. naval personnel who spoke Russian were assembled by Admiral Hewitt and sent to Yalta in the Catoctin. This team proved most helpful in working with the Soviets to complete the preparations for our visit and they were also very helpful to us in interpreters during our eight days at Livadia. They were:

Lieut. George Scherbatoff, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. Dimitri P. Kousnetff, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. C. Norris Houghton, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. Michael Kimack, U. S. N. R.
Lt. (jg) John Cheplick, U. S. N. R.
Lt. (jg) John P. Romanov, U. S. N.

Andrew M. Rachs, Chief Typist was ever rolling country.

Minutes and Related Documents

Sunday, February 4, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 4, 1945, 10 A. M.

Livadia Palace
PRESENT

Fleet Admiral Leahy	Brigadier General Lindsay
General of the Army Marshall	Brigadier General Russell
Fleet Admiral King	Brigadier General Everest
Major General Mulor	Commodore Burrough
Lieutenant General Somervell	Colonel Peck
Vice Admiral Cooke	Colonel Riddle
Major General Lemon	Colonel Lincoln
Major General Hull	Colonel Ohly
Major General Wood	Captain Stroop
Rear Admiral Duncan	Captain McDill
Rear Admiral McCormick	Lieutenant Colonel McKee
Rear Admiral Olsen	Commander Clark
Brigadier General Roberts	**Secretariat**
Brigadier General Loutzenhiser	Brigadier General McFarland
	Captain Graves

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes (187th Meeting)

TOP SECRET

1. AGENDA FOR TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS AT ARGONAUT (J.C.S. 1176/9, J.C.S. 1207/3, M AND J.C.S. INFO. MEMO 338)

Admiral Leahy said that there had not been time to study the papers before the meeting and asked for a summary.

Admiral Cooke explained that the joint staff planners and the members of the U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, had met to bring up to date all matters pending with negotiations with the Russians. These discussions had resulted in the circulation of J.C.S. 1176/9 and J.C.S. 1207/3. He said that the two major items to be considered were:

(1) Conversations with the Russians in the matter of operations in the field;

(2) Negotiations with the Russians concerning Far Eastern matters.

The first item involved British, U. S. and Russian negotiations. This matter has been under discussion for a considerable length of time and little progress has been made. The second item involved only discussions between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. This matter has been the subject of negotiation by the special U. S. mission now in Russia. There are certain phases of the problem which are not progressing very well.

The papers before the chiefs were presented by the planners with the view to formulating for the President a form of approach in the forthcoming discussions. It was felt that the President should be thoroughly familiar with matters which will be the basis of the tripartite discussions.

The agenda items listed in Appendix "A" to J.C.S. 1207/3 have been presented to the Russians by the British. The only answer has been nothing from the Russians.

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Deane explained the situation that the British people would like to see the Russians participate in the Japanese war. The British military staff would be obliged to attend a meeting and bring it already received the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff on agenda items. They would be prepared to discuss them.

General Marshall said it is important to keep the conclusions of military planners alive during the conference while political talks were taking place on higher levels.

Admiral King felt that the President should be advised to ask Premier Stalin to discuss the matters set out in the agenda.

Admiral Cooke said that the views of the Russian military staff would probably not be discussed freely unless Premier Stalin had previously given his approval. The President should tell Premier Stalin to give his staff officers a free hand in the preliminary discussions with the British and U. S. staffs. Further it was felt by the planners that the President should get the consent of the Prime Minister to set up direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U. S. and British military missions in Moscow. This, it was felt, was the proper approach to the desired arrangement.

General Marshall felt that the first and important step should be to inform the Russians of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite session. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should put before the President the agenda as outlined in Appendix "A" and "B" of J.C.S. 1207/3.

Admiral Leahy said that he would undertake to do this.

Admiral King emphasized the necessity for clearing up the matter of direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U. S. and British missions in Moscow and endorsed the suggestion of having the President speak to the Prime Minister on this subject.

Admiral Leahy said that he would attempt to have military matters presented first at the meeting with the President this morning. This would enable the President to be acting on the subjects which are now under discussion prior to his talks on political matters.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took note that Admiral Leahy would inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite session.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army (Antonov)

(Yalta.) February 9, 1945.

TOP SECRET

Memorandum for General Antonov.

It is the desire of the American staff to discuss with the Soviet staff details of possible participation in the war against Japan. Can you obtain approval of this suggestion?

Meeting of the President With His Advisers, Feb. 4, 1945

10:50 AM, LIVADIA PALACE
PRESENT

The President
Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Secretary Stettinius

DISCUSSION AT YALTA: Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. engages in a brief conference with President Roosevelt on the patio of the Livadia Palace. Seated is President Roosevelt is Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin.

Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss
secretary
Brigadier General McFarland

Joint Chief of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

Admiral Leahy said that since the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered it unable to have a tripartite meeting scheduled for this morning, the President would be obligated to attend a meeting and taking already received the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff on agenda items. They would be prepared to discuss them.

General Marshall said it is important to keep the conclusions of military planners alive during the conference while political talks were taking place on higher levels.

Admiral King felt that the President should be advised to ask Premier Stalin to discuss the matters set out in the agenda.

Admiral Cooke said that the views of the Russian military staff would probably not be discussed freely unless Premier Stalin had previously given his approval. The President should tell Premier Stalin to give his staff officers a free hand in the preliminary discussions with the British and U. S. staffs. Further it was felt by the planners that the President should get the consent of the Prime Minister to set up direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U. S. and British military missions in Moscow. This, it was felt, was the proper approach to the desired arrangement.

General Marshall felt that the first and important step should be to inform the Russians of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite session. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should put before the President the agenda as outlined in Appendix "A" and "B" of J. C. S. 1207/3.

Admiral Leahy said that he would undertake to do this.

Admiral King emphasized the necessity for clearing up the matter of direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U. S. and British missions in Moscow and endorsed the suggestion of having the President speak to the Prime Minister on this subject.

Admiral Leahy said that he would attempt to have military matters presented first at the meeting with the President this morning. This would enable the President to be acting on the subjects which are now under discussion prior to his talks on political matters.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took note that Admiral Leahy would inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite session.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army (Antonov)

(Yalta.) February 9, 1945.

TOP SECRET

Memorandum for General Antonov.

It is the desire of the American staff to discuss with the Soviet staff details of possible participation in the war against Japan. Can you obtain approval of this suggestion?

Meeting of the President With His Advisers, Feb. 4, 1945

10:50 AM, LIVADIA PALACE
PRESENT

The President
Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Secretary Stettinius

(Copies of text of United States proposal and analysis thereof are available if you wish to hand them to Churchill and Stalin.)

ARGUMENTATION: Our proposal safeguards unity of the Big Three as far as possible. Mr. Molotov's objections will require abstentions with respect to decisions with a party to a dispute can be able to veto Latin American and other small powers will be disinterested if decisions can be vetoed.

NOTE: If the voting issue is settled, additional points would have to be agreed in before a United Nations conference could be called: Occupational treatment of Germany, Poland, Italy, Finland, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

Our representatives must be assured of (A) freedom of movement, and (B) consultation before decisions are made by the control commissions.

4. Iran.

We should seek Soviet agreement not to press for an extension in Iran until termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops.

5. China.

We should seek Soviet and British support for our efforts to bring about Kuomintang-Communist agreement.

ARGUMENTATION: Conversation between the two groups with tentative conclusions of the war in the Far East and prevent possible internal conflict and foreign intervention in China.

(Malta.) February 2 1945.

Informal Discussion in the United States Delegation

February 4, 1945

Hiss notes (transcribed for this volume from longhand notes in pencil).

Jebb joined us.

Jebb said. Have paper on dependent areas—which Sir has been cleared thru dominions and is now being considered by War Cabinet. He then read aloud a paper containing following points:

(A. Instance at this point states "Only Byrnes and Jebb of the British delegation are identified for any country.

ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING, Feb. 4, 1945, 4 P. M.

Livadia Palace
PRESENT

United States
President Roosevelt
Mr. Bohlen

Soviet Union
Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

BOHLEN COLLECTION

Bohlen Minutes

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: GENERAL DISCUSSION.

After an exchange of amenities, in which the President thanked Marshal Stalin for all the successful efforts that had been made for his comfort and convenience, the President said that the military situation was considerably improved since they had last met.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was certainly true. He felt that the Soviet armies were moving very successfully onto the line of the Oder.

The President replied that he had made a number of bets on board the cruiser coming over as to whether the Russians would get to Berlin before the Americans would get to Manila.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he was certain the Americans would get to Manila before the Russians got to Berlin, since there was at present very hard fighting going on the Oder line.

There followed a conversation about the Crimea and characteristics of the Crimea.

The President said that he had been very much struck by the extent of German destruction in the Crimea and therefore he will raise Hitchcock in regard to the Germans that he had been a real SOB. And he hoped that Marshal Stalin would again provide a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German Army.

Marshal Stalin replied that because of the honest, good sled in fighting the Germans, everyone was more bloodthirsty than one was three months ago. Nevertheless, if they had been a year ago, adding that the destruction in the Crimea is nothing compared to that which occurred in the Ukraine. He said in the Crimea the Germans had been surprised and had had little time to carry out planned destruction, whereas in the Ukraine they had done it with method and calculation. He said the Germans were savages and seemed to take within definite hatred the creative work of human beings.

The President agreed with this.

The President replied that General Marshall, at the 5 o'clock meeting, would give a detailed outline of the situation and plans, but he could say now that there was an offensive planned for the 8th of February and another on the 12th, but that the main blow of the Anglo-American armies on the Western front would take place in March.

Marshal Stalin expressed gratification at the news, and said that General Antonov of the Soviet General Staff would give a detailed review of the situation on the Eastern front at the 5 o'clock meeting. He added that if it were possible to capture the Ruhr and Saar regions, the Germans would be deprived of all sources of coal, since the Russians had already captured the Silesia Basin.

The President said to tell that the armies were getting close enough to have contact between, and he hoped General Eisenhower could communicate directly with the Soviet staff rather than through the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington as in the past.

Marshal Stalin agreed and thought it was very important and promised that the staffs while here would work out the details of this suggestion. He added that if the Germans were deprived of all their coal, since they were already short of bread, there was a possibility that the Germans' [illegible] would come before absolute disaster defeat.

The President inquired whether or the Soviet bridgeheads across the Oder were sufficient for further offensive action.

Marshal Stalin replied that in regard to these bridgeheads, of which there were five or six, these battles were in progress on the Eastern front.

The President said that one of the difficulties on the Western front was that we had no secure bridgeheads and that on the upper Rhine the current was so strong with floating ice that it made it very difficult for pontoon operations, but that General Eisenhower felt sure he reached the Rhine he would be able to cross it, but he did not expect this before March. He added that the British had wanted to make a major crossing of the Rhine on the northern plains in Holland, but since we had four times the number of men in France that the British had we felt we were entitled to have an alternative, which would be either through Holland or in the region of Metz.

The President then inquired how Marshal Stalin had gotten along with General de Gaulle.

Marshal Stalin replied that he had not found de Gaulle a very complicated person, but he felt he was unrealistic in the sense that France had not done very much fighting in the war and de Gaulle demanded full rights with the Americans, British and Russians, who had done the bulk of the fighting.

The President then described the conversation with de Gaulle in Casablanca two years ago when de Gaulle compared himself with Joan of Arc as the spiritual leader of France and with Clemenceau as the political leader.

Marshal Stalin replied that de Gaulle does not seem to understand the situation in France, and that in actual fact the French contribution at the present time to military operations on the Western front was very small and that in 1940 they had not fought at all.

The President replied that he recently decided to arm eight new French divisions composed of Frenchmen who had had previous military training.

Marshal Stalin said that was good in so far as it would help the American armies, but at present he felt the de Gaulle army was very weak.

The President said he had recently heard that the French Government did not plan to annex outright any German territory, but they are willing to have it placed under international control.

Marshal Stalin replied that he was not the story de Gaulle told in Moscow—there to annex the Rhine was the natural boundary of France and he wished to have French troops placed there permanently.

The President said he would now call the marshal meeting to order, and, since he would like to say it in front of Prime Minister Churchill, namely of the British for two years now and the task of gradually building up France into a strong power which would have 200,000 troops on the eastern border of France to hold the line for the period required to assemble a strong British Army. He felt the British were a peculiar people and wished to have [illegible] and as a.

The President then said he understood the French zones in regard to occupation if Germany were already agreed upon, to which Marshal Stalin appeared to agree, but he went on to say that one outstanding question was that of a French zone of occupation. The President said he had had a good deal of trouble with the British in regard to zones of occupation. He said that he would of course prefer to have the northwest area, which would be adjacent to [illegible] France, but the British would

Death Kept Roosevelt From Visiting London

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 16—President Roosevelt told planned to visit Britain in 1945.

In one of his messages to Prime Minister Churchill before the Yalta Conference this year, he said the itinerary for that trip would keep him out of Washington so long that "it is necessary for me to postpone my proposed visit to the United Kingdom until a later date."

"I will make every effort to arrange to visit the U. K. [United Kingdom] in May or June," he added.

Mr. Roosevelt died on April 12 1945.

The Secretary of State to the President

(This paper is a copy of the memorandum which Stettinius said he presented to the President at the President's meeting with his advisers on February 4. . . .)

The paper was prepared at Malta and reflects certain agreements reached there by Stettinius and Eden.)

Memorandum of Suggested Action Items for the President.

1. International Organization.

We should seek adoption of United States proposal for voting formula and agreement to convene immediately calling of general United Nations conference.

German Problems Debated by Big Three Chiefs at First Plenary Session

to think that the Americans should restore order in France and then return political control to the British.

Marshal Stalin inquired where the President thought France should have a zone of occupation, and for what reason.

The President said he thought it was not a bad idea, but he added that it was only out of kindness.

Both Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov spoke up vigorously and said that would be the only reason to give France a zone.

Marshal Stalin said that question would have to be reconsidered further here at Yalta.

As it was then four minutes to 5, the President suggested that they proceed to the conference room, where the military staffs were gathered.

(The log indicates that the President met with Hopkins, Matthews and Bohlen at 4:30 P.M. on February 4. No record of such a meeting has been found, and there is no other evidence to indicate that such a meeting actually took place.)

AMBASSADOR GREETS PREMIER: Averell Harriman, former Ambassador to Russia, now Governor of New York, with Premier Stalin at Big Three conference in Yalta palace.

United Press

FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Feb. 4, 1945, 5 P. M.

Livadia Palace

PRESENT

United States

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
SECRETARY STETTINIUS
FLEET ADMIRAL LEAHY
GENERAL OF THE ARMY MARSHALL
FLEET ADMIRAL KING
MAJOR GENERAL KUTER
MAJOR GENERAL DEANE
BRIGADIER GENERAL McFARLAND
MR. HARRIMAN
MR. BOHLEN

United Kingdom

PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
FOREIGN SECRETARY EDEN
FIELD MARSHAL BROOKE
MARSHAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE PORTAL
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET CUNNINGHAM
FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER
GENERAL ISMAY
MAJOR BIRSE

Soviet Union

MARSHAL STALIN
FOREIGN COMMISSAR MOLOTOV
GENERAL OF THE ARMY ANTONOV
MARSHAL OF AVIATION KHUDYAKOV
FLEET ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV
MR. VYSHINSKY
MR. GROMYKO
MR. GUSEV
MR. MAISKY
MR. PAVLOV

Bohlen Minutes

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: THE MILITARY SITUATION

Marshal Stalin said he hoped the President would again consent to opening the meeting.

The President replied that his opening of this meeting, as had been the case in Teheran, was not based on any law or historic tradition but merely by chance. He said that he was honored to open this great conference and he wished first of all to express on behalf of the American guests here their deep appreciation for the hospitality and splendid arrangements made by Marshal Stalin and his assistants for their comfort and convenience.

He said that he knew that all the people he represented wished peace above all and the war to be over as soon as possible. He said that he felt that we understood each other much better now than we had in the past and that month by month our understanding was growing. For this reason, he felt safe in proposing that the talks be conducted in an informal manner in which each would speak his mind frankly and freely, since he had discovered through experience that the best way to conduct business expeditiously was through frank and free speaking.

He said he knew that while they were here in Yalta they would cover the map of the world, but today he thought that military questions, particularly those on the most important front of all, the Eastern front, should be the subject of discussion. He said he wished to add that when the Red Armies advanced into Germany twenty-five kilometers, it was doubtful whether the Soviet people were more thrilled than those of the United States and those of Great Britain. Here, he thought it would be most appropriate if the marshal would ask one of his staff officers to give a detailed report on the Eastern front.

General Antonov then read a prepared paper giving in great detail the background development of the Soviet offensive of early January, the estimate of enemy probabilities and the results of the offensive. He concluded with the statement of Soviet desires with regard to the actions of their allies.

In regard to the part of the Soviet report where General Antonov referred to the number of divisions which were being moved to the East, the Prime Minister asked if he could go into more detail as to where they were coming from.

General Antonov stated that they anticipated that there would be five German divisions from Norway, twelve from the Western front, eight from Italy and eight from the interior of Germany which would be moved to the Eastern front to reinforce the Germans.

The President then inquired whether in the advance into Germany the Russians had altered the gauge of the railroads from the customary European gauge to the wide Russian gauge.

General Antonov replied that the majority of the locomotives and wagons which they had captured from the Germans had been so badly damaged that they had been useless and it was, therefore, necessary to widen the gauge on a few important lines of the railroads in order to accommodate Russian rolling stock to supply the troops.

The President said that as our armies are now approaching each other in Germany, it was important that the staffs should discuss this problem so that there would be a definite place in Germany where the different gauges would meet.

Marshal Stalin answered at this point that the greater part of the German railroad lines would remain of their customary gauge and that it was not for pleasure but for absolute necessity that any at all had been changed, since the Soviet Union did not have adequate resources to adopt this expedient to a greater extent than was absolutely necessary.

The Prime Minister then said that he had a number of questions in regard to General Antonov's report, that he felt that the Anglo-American and Russian staffs which were here gathered for the first time should discuss these technical military matters between themselves. He added, for example, that it was important to find out how long it would take the enemy to move these divisions from Italy and the Western front to the Eastern front and whether the Allies could be of more help by reinforcing the Western front or by leaving the divisions in Italy, or by moving across the Adriatic into the Balkans. He suggested that General Marshall, with the President's approval, present a picture of the operations on the Western front.

General Marshall then gave the following general summary of the situation on the Western front:

The Ardennes bulge had now been eliminated and in certain places the Allied armies were further to the east than they had been when the German offensive began.

In the last week General Eisenhower has been regrouping his divisions for future offensive action and was engaged in eliminating enemy pockets on the southern sector of the line north of Switzerland. He was exerting pressure on the base of the Ardennes bulge for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Germans were in sufficient force to successfully oppose a movement northeast in the direction of Bonn or whether such an operation would require special preparation. He had ascertained that the German resistance was too strong and four days ago had ceased operations in this area and begun to transfer divisions to the north. North of Switzerland operations were being directed toward the elimination of German positions around Mulhausen and Colmar. Colmar had been taken but the First French Army was advancing very slowly north of Mulhausen.

Small German bridgeheads to the north of Strasbourg were being eliminated. When our forces have reached the Rhine a number of divisions will be released through the shortening of the line.

Field Marshal Montgomery in command of the 21st British Army Group and the United States Ninth Army is preparing offensive action in a southeast direction north of Dusseldorf. A supporting operation is planned by the Ninth Army in a northeast direction towards the same objective. The first of these operations is expected to commence on February 8 and the second approximately a week later. These two operations are designed to drive the Germans east of the Rhine and to cross the river north of the Ruhr. This operation will be the main blow of the Anglo-American armies. Airborne divisions will be used in large numbers to land east of the Rhine.

The passage of the Rhine is considered possible after the first of March. Although a crossing would be attempted if the Rhine were reached before that date it would be a hazardous operation because of ice conditions and the strength of the current. There are three good crossings in this sector and a fourth may be attempted. Only five divisions could be accommodated on the actual front of the assault.

In the south the left wing of the United States First Army was endeavoring to carry out the capture of two dams on the Roer River. Despite air action these dams remained intact and there was a danger of imperiling our positions in that area if the Germans were to open the dams.

Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the area of Frankfurt as an alternative if the main operation in the north suffers a check.

Operations on the Western front had been limited by the shortage of supplies due to inadequacy of shipping. The opening of the port of Antwerp has remedied this situation and the armies are now receiving adequate supplies. The utilization of the port of Rouen has facilitated the movement of supplies. It is now possible to bring in 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo and 12,000 to 15,000 tons of wet cargo a day. The Germans were endeavoring to disrupt the use of the port of Antwerp by robot bombs and rockets and sporadic air attack. The day before yesterday sixty robot bombs and six rockets fell on the city of Antwerp. One ship had been destroyed and one oil dump blown up. The chief danger was that a lucky hit might destroy the Antwerp lock gates. When weather permitted the American Air Forces had been extremely active in destroying German transport, railroad lines and troop convoys, particularly in the direction of Cologne.

Marshal Stalin then inquired if there was any definite estimate of the actual destruction done by the tactical air force.

General Marshall replied that he did not have the exact estimates but the destruction had been very heavy. According to present data the German oil production had been reduced to about 20 per cent of its former capacity as a result of Allied heavy bombing. They had also struck at tank factories, motor transport factories, rail communications and assembly yards. In these operations were included the heavy bombers from Italy which, when the weather did not permit a strike on Germany, operated in the valley of the Po and against railroad lines leading from Italy into Germany.

In reply to a question General Marshall stated that there were approximately 32 enemy divisions on the Italian front, 27 German and 5 Italian, facing an approximately equal number of Allied divisions. The Allied forces have superiority in fighter aircraft in this theater.

General Marshall mentioned briefly the submarine danger which was more threatening at the moment than it had been in the past, due largely to improvements in German technical methods. At the time of the African landings there had been 100 enemy submarines operating in the Atlantic. At the present time there were between 30 and 35 in the Atlantic and the threat was potential rather than actual. He said difficulty had been encountered in attacking submarines in the shallow waters around the British Isles because the tide made it difficult for ASDIC to locate them. The Allied heavy bomber force has been striking heavily at submarine pens and construction yards but first priority was still being given to oil production and refining centers.

General Marshall concluded by saying that Field Marshal Brooke might have something to add to his report on the military situation.

The Prime Minister said he hoped that Field Marshal Brooke would have some news, but he certainly hoped that Admiral Cunningham would be able to speak on the help the Soviet armies could give in the U-boat war since Danzig was the principal point of construction of U-boats.

Marshal Stalin asked what were the other points.

Admiral Cunningham replied, Kiel and Hamburg.

The Prime Minister said that we had had great experience with the United States forces in working out the crossing of oceans for landing operations but that we hoped to benefit by the Russian experience in crossing rivers. There was an officer here especially charged with that duty and he hoped to be able to get into contact with the Russian staff on this subject.

Marshal Stalin then asked a number of questions particularly relating to the potentials which the Anglo-Americans would have in the northern area and those designated for the attacks on February 8 and February 15. He said that on the central front in Poland the Soviet Army had enjoyed a superiority of 100 divisions over the Germans as well as overwhelming artillery supremacy. He added that they had had 9,000 planes on a relatively narrow front in Eastern Poland. He said that the Red Army had had 9,000 tanks on the break-through sector on its central front.

General Marshall said that approximately one in three allied divisions was armored comprising 300-500 units. There was some discussion as to the relative strength of the German and Allied divisions in which General Marshall said that a German Panzer division which they had encountered on the Western front had had a complement of 12,000 men, at which Marshal Stalin expressed surprise.

The Prime Minister said that he understood that the British division was composed of 18,000 men and the American 14,000 with tank divisions of approximately 10,000 men.

Sir Charles Portal, in reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, said that we would have 4,000 to 5,000 aircraft on the section of the Western front designated for the attack, of which 4,000 would be Anglo-American heavy bombers capable of carrying 4 tons of bombs each.

The Prime Minister said in reply to Marshal Stalin's observations that they had 150 Soviet divisions against 80 German divisions on the front in Poland, that the Anglo-American armies had never had a superiority in manpower but that their superiority has rested in air power and armor.

General Marshall stated that ten days ago there had been 79 German divisions on the Western front opposing 78 Anglo-American divisions.

Marshal Stalin then said that in the present offensive the Soviet armies had enjoyed artillery supremacy of four to one and gave a brief description of the manner in which the special Soviet artillery break-through divisions had been organized. He said that these artillery divisions had from 200 to 400 guns and in addition to offensive operations the corps artillery was added during the attack. For example, on a front from 25 to 45 kilometers, Marshal Konev had had six artillery break-through divisions and the corps artillery, which meant that for every kilometer there were some 230 guns of heavy caliber. The result was after a two-hour bombardment a gap was opened in the front through which the Soviet forces advanced fifteen kilometers the first day. The German losses in killed and wounded were very heavy and the survivors were stunned and [illegible] Stalin then [illegible] and explained their [illegible] their allies, but they [illegible] learned from the [illegible] ready undertaking [illegible] they had already [illegible] required what were [illegible] of the Allies in regard [illegible] Red Army.

The Prime Minister [illegible] of all that he wished to [illegible] the gratitude of England [illegible] he was sure of America [illegible] massive power and [illegible] the Soviet offensive.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was not a desire. [illegible] Stalin then said that the Soviet Union was not bound by any agreement at Teheran to conduct a winter offensive [illegible] decide what some people [illegible] thought, no demand or request had been received from the [illegible] or the Prime Minister in regard to such an offensive. The President had asked him to receive a representative, Air Marshal Tedder, from General Eisenhower's staff to discuss the situation and he had, of course, immediately agreed. He said that he mentioned this only to emphasize the spirit of the Soviet leaders who not only fulfilled formal obligations but went farther and acted on what they conceived to be their moral duty to their allies. He [illegible] Air Marshal Tedder had [illegible] plained the desire, which [illegible] seemed was that of the [illegible] don and the Prime Minister, that the Soviet Army continue their offensive operations until the end of March. Marshal Stalin said that they would do so if the weather and road conditions permitted.

The President said that he thoroughly agreed with Marshal Stalin's statement made at the Teheran Conference: it had been freely agreed that each partner would move as quickly and as far as possible against the common enemy. He said at that time he personally was feeling at ease, and that it had been impossible to make detailed plans for the future. Also at that time our armies were separated by many miles. Now, however, the President said, with our forces approaching each other it should be possible to coordinate the already close operations.

The Prime Minister remarked that [illegible] the complete [illegible] the President [illegible] the Marshal, the [illegible] asked that [illegible] Air Marshal Tedder [illegible] had been in Moscow [illegible] it was of the highest [illegible] that the three plans [illegible] here [illegible] would really work [illegible] detailed plans for the [illegible] tion of the joint blows against Germany, so that if the Soviet offensive came to a halt because of the weather or road conditions the Allied armies would move. The best of all would be for both armies to attack simultaneously from the east and west.

Marshal Stalin agreed with the Prime Minister but stated that they had to take into account what had occurred, that when the Anglo-American armies were in the offensive in the West the Soviet armies were not ready and conversely. He felt that it would be most useful for the staffs to discuss the question of a summer offensive against Germany because he was not so sure that the war would be over before summer.

Mr. Churchill replied that he thoroughly shared the view of the Marshal and that we should take full advantage of this gathering.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MINUTES

[illegible] Stalin for all that he had found time to do in this regard in the midst of the prosecution of the war. He said that the United States, British and Russian delegations would understand each other better and better as we go along. We could therefore proceed informally to discuss frankly and freely amongst ourselves the matters necessary to the successful prosecution of the common cause in which we all are engaged. There was much that required discussion, the whole map in Europe in fact. Today however the conversations by common agreement would be concerned with Germany. In this connection he felt sure that the British and American people were viewing with a satisfaction as deep as must be that of the Soviet people themselves the successful advances of the Soviet Armies against the common enemy.

Marshal Stalin said that Colonel General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, would outline the situation existing on the Eastern front.

General Antonov made the following statement:

Soviet forces from the 12th to the 15th of January went into attack on the front from the Nieman River to the Carpathians, a [illegible] of 700 kilometers. Forces of General Chernyakhovsky advanced [illegible] Koenigsberg, forces of [illegible] Rokossovsky along the [illegible] bank of the Vistula cutting off East Prussia from Central Germany. Forces of Marshal Zhukov [illegible] of the Vistula [illegible] forces of Marshal Konev [illegible] Czenstochowa-Breslau [illegible] General Petrov [illegible] the area of the Carpathians against Novy Targ. The greatest blow was delivered by the [illegible] groups of Rokossovsky, Zhukov and Konev [illegible] Ostrolenka-Crakow front, 300 kilometers.

Because of the unfavorable weather conditions, this operation was to commence at the end of January, when weather conditions were expected to improve. Since the operation was planned and prepared as an operation in full strength, it was hoped to carry it out under the most favorable conditions possible. Nevertheless, in view of the difficult circumstances on the Western front in connection with the German attack in the Ardennes, the high command of the Soviet Army gave an order to commence the attack not later than the middle of January, not waiting for improvement in weather.

The enemy grouping, after the Soviet forces reached the Narev and Vistula rivers, was the most concentrated on the central sector of the front, since striking from this sector led our troops out along the shortest route to the vital centers of Germany. In order to create for ourselves more advantageous conditions for attack, the Supreme Soviet Command decided to extend it to the central group of the enemy. For this purpose this operation was conducted as a subsidiary against East Prussia and the advance in Hungary toward Budapest was continued. Both of these attacks were for the Germans very painful, and they quickly reacted to our attack by a rapid transfer of power onto the flank at the expense of the central sector of our front. Thus out of twenty-four tank divisions on our front, representing the principal German striking power, eleven tank divisions were drawn in to the Budapest sector, six tank divisions on the East Prussian (three tank divisions were located in Courland) and thus on the central part of the front there remained only four tank divisions. The aim of the High Command was accomplished.

On the front from Ostrolenka to Crakow, that is, in the area of our greatest attack, the enemy had up to eighty divisions. We set up a grouping calculated as having a superiority over the enemy in infantry more than double, in artillery, tanks and aviation, a decided superiority.

The massing of artillery on the sectors of the breakthrough amounted to 220-250 guns (from 76 mm. and above) on one kilometer of the front.

The advance was begun under extremely unfavorable weather conditions, low visibility and fog, which completely ruled out the possibility of air operations and limited artillery observation to several hundred meters.

Due to good preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy positions and a powerful artillery attack, the fire power of the enemy was overwhelmed and his fortifications destroyed. This situation permitted our troops during the first day of the advance to move forward ten to fifteen kilometers, that is to completely break through the entire tactical depth of the enemy defense.

The following results were achieved:

A. During the eighteen days of the advance, the Soviet troops moved forward up to 500 kilometers in the direction of the main offensive. Thus the average speed of forward movement was 25-30 kilometers per day.

B. The Soviet troops came out onto the Oder River on the sector from Breslau (north of Frankfurt) and south and seized the Silesian industrial area.

C. They cut across the main roads and cut off enemy groups in East Prussia from Central Germany. Now, in addition to the Courland group (twenty-six divisions), isolated twenty-seven divisions of the enemy group, a series of divisional groupings were surrounded and annihilated in the region of Lodz, Torun, Poznan, Schneidemuhl and others, an approximate total of up to fifteen divisions.

D. Breakthroughs in force of long duration of German defensive positions in East Prussia in the Koenigsberg and Latvian directions.

E. Destroyed forty-five German divisions which sustained the following losses:

Prisoners about 100,000 men
Casualties about 300,000 men
Total approximately 400,000 men

Probable enemy action:

A. The Germans will defend Berlin, for which they will try to hold up the movement of the Soviet troops in the area of the Oder River, setting up the defense here at the expense of withdrawn troops and at the expense of reserves being moved over from Germany, Western Europe and Italy.

For the defense of Pomerania they will try to use their Courland grouping, moving it over by sea beyond the Vistula.

B. The Germans will probably cover the direction leading to Vienna more strongly, strengthening this sector at the expense of troops now in action in Italy.

The shifting of enemy troops:

A. On our front there have already appeared
From the central regions of Germany 9 divisions
From the Western European front 6 divisions
From Italy 1 division
Total 16 divisions

B. In the process of being shifted
4 tank divisions
1 motorized division
Total 5 divisions

C. It is probable that there will yet be shifted up to 30-35 divisions at the expense of the Western European front, Norway, Italy and reserves located in Germany. In this manner there can appear on our front an additional thirty-five to forty divisions.

Our wishes are:

A. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western front, for which the present situation is very favorable.

(1) To defeat the Germans on the Eastern front.

(2) To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into the Ardennes.

(3) The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East.

It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February.

B. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western front, from Norway and from Italy.

In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.

C. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy.

The President asked whether the Russians proposed to change the gauge of the railroad rolling stock captured from the Germans or to widen the gauge of the lines.

General Antonov replied that much of the equipment was unfit for use. At present the Russians are widening the gauge of those lines that are most vital to supply. These lines were being widened only as a matter of necessity as, manifestly, the available resources are not sufficient to widen all the railroads in Germany. The greater part of the German lines will remain intact.

The Prime Minister stated that the British delegation would have a number of questions to address to the Russians. As these were of a technical and military nature he thought it would be more advantageous if they could be brought up between the military staffs. The Prime Minister then suggested that General Marshall explain to Marshal Stalin the impending operations on the Western front. The President pointed out the increasing necessity for coordinating the operations of the three allies now that the British and American armies are getting so close to the Russians. By reason of the short distance separating the Western and Eastern fronts the Germans are now able to transfer their reserves quickly from one front to the other.

General Marshall then gave a resume of the operations planned for the Western front. He said that the German bulge in the Ardennes had now been eliminated and the Allied forces have advanced in some areas beyond the line originally held. During the past week General Eisenhower has been regrouping his forces and conducting operations designed to eliminate enemy pockets in the southern part of the line north of Switzerland. At the same time he has been maintaining pressure in the Ardennes area in order to determine whether the Germans were present in sufficient forces to resist a movement northeast toward Bonn. Because of the resistance encountered it was decided four days ago to cease operations and to transfer divisions further north. In the southern end of the line, operations were being directed toward the elimination of the German positions in the vicinity of Mulhausen and Colmar. Colmar has now been occupied but the advance of the First French Army north of Mulhausen has been very slow.

North of Strasbourg the small German bridgeheads across the Rhine are being eliminated. As soon as the Rhine is reached it will be possible to reduce the number of divisions in the front line and release them for other employments. Some released divisions are even now moving north in preparation for the larger operations.

Field Marshal Montgomery, in command of the 21st Army Group and Ninth United States Army, is preparing an operation designed to strike toward the southeast in order to reach the line of Rhine from Dusseldorf north. A complementary operation has been planned in a northeast direction toward the same objective, which it is hoped can be launched about a week later than the first operation. By means of these two operations it is hoped to drive the Germans east of the Rhine north of Dusseldorf and then to cross the river north of the Ruhr. This crossing will constitute the main effort of the British and American armies and into it will be put all of the divisions which it is logistically possible to support. In addition airborne troops in large numbers will land east of the Rhine.

From the standpoint of weather, the passage of the Rhine is considered possible after 1 March. A crossing will be attempted as soon as the river is reached, but it is recognized that ice will make hazardous any crossing prior to 1 March. Three good crossing sites are available for the operation and a fourth may be attempted. However, the front of the assault will accommodate initially only five divisions.

Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the vicinity of Frankfurt which can be expanded if the main effort in the north should fail to go through. The troops composing the left of the American First Army are now conducting an operation designed to capture the two dams controlling the water in the Roer River. As long as these dams are in the hands of the Germans there is a danger that the bridges established for the river crossing may be swept away by the release of the impounded water.

The opening of the port of Antwerp has relieved the limitation on operations on the Western front imposed by a lack of supplies. It is now possible to bring in from 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo a day. The Germans have realized the importance of Antwerp in the Allied supply scheme and have made a continuous effort to interfere with the operations of that port through the use of robot bombs and rockets. This constitutes a danger as there is, of course, always a chance of a lucky hit being made against the Antwerp lock gates. Only scattered attacks have been made by air.

United States and British fighters and light bombers supporting the ground troops have destroyed a great deal of German transport. Considerable effort has been directed against trains operating in the vicinity of Cologne and on the east bank of the Rhine. Although definite final reports have not yet been received, there is every indication of severe damage having been done to Panzer divisions withdrawing from the Ardennes.

The heavy bombers have been employed primarily against German oil supplies in order to reduce the German supply of fuel for airplanes and motor transport. Present data indicate that these operations have resulted in a reduction of German oil production to 20 per cent of the former capacity. The heavy bombers have also been used against German rail communications and assembly yards and a continuous effort has been maintained to destroy German fighter forces. These planes have also struck heavily at tank factories. The air forces in these operations include United States heavy bombers operating from the Italian front. When weather prevents profitable operations in the Po Valley, they are directed against communications leading into Germany.

There are now about 32 enemy divisions on the Italian front, 27 German and 5 Italian. The number of Allied divisions is approximately equal. The Allied forces have great superiority in fighter airplanes and these, in good weather, are able to ravage the Po Valley. The destruction of rail lines and rolling stock has been heavy.

Indications point to a serious resumption of the German submarine war as the result of technical developments which are making the detection of the submarines increasingly difficult. The submarines have developed considerable skill in operating in shallow waters where the tide makes it difficult for ASDIC to locate them. In order to counter this submarine resurgence, heavy bombers are being employed to strike at submarine assembly points whenever these operations do not interfere with the bombing of the German oil supplies.

In concluding, General Marshall said he would be glad to have Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke amplify his remarks in any way he thought desirable.

The Prime Minister stated he would be very glad for Field Marshal Brooke to do this and stated [illegible]

The Prime Minister [illegible] of the submarines [illegible] expressed satisfaction in the thought that the city is now not far from the Russian front lines, which are daily drawing closer.

In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister said that other submarine assembling points were Kiel and Hamburg.

Field Marshal Brooke said that General Marshall had fully covered the situation now existing on the western front and the operations which are contemplated for the future. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in full accord with the plan for the future operations which General Marshall had outlined.

The Prime Minister stated that both the British and Americans have amphibious branches in their services. The officer commanding the British amphibious branch is at present in Argonaut and he, the Prime Minister, would like very much to have him meet with the Russian amphibious experts and obtain from them any information which the Russians would be kind enough to provide.

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, General Marshall explained that the front of the main effort in the impending operations covered three crossings over a distance of 25 or 30 miles and afforded room for not more than five divisions. The front eventually would extend all along the Rhine down as far as Dusseldorf, a total of some 50 or 60 miles. He pointed out that, as was the case in Normandy, it will be necessary to assault initially on a narrow front but this front would be expanded as rapidly as possible. He said that the Ruhr was very heavily fortified and for that reason would be by-passed. However, troops attacking on this front would soon get into good tank country.

In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, General Marshall said the reserves available for the proposed attack were believed to be ample.

Marshal Stalin said that he asked the question because in the Russian central campaign 9,000 tanks were used up. He would like to know how many tanks the Allies expected to employ.

General Marshall said that roughly one in every three divisions employed would be a tank division. He said that on March 1st General Eisenhower will have eighty-nine divisions at his disposal to cover the front from the Mediterranean to Holland, not including Italy; nine of these were French and all the remainder were either British or American.

Through answers to his questions it was made clear to Marshal Stalin that there are nearly 10,000 Allied tanks in the European theatre. The British divisions number 18,000 men, the American divisions 14,000 and armored divisions [illegible] 10,000. There will be available 4,000 heavy bombers, each car-

U. S. Guest Roster Grew, Taxing Soviet Hospitality

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 16—The Russians had to revise some of their hospitality preparations for the Yalta Conference because of some poor estimating at the United States' end.

President Roosevelt originally estimated he would take a staff of thirty-five persons with him. A day later he made it seventy. Actually the party was ten times the original estimate. The British had about the same number.

Smaller Powers' Role in Postwar Peace Organization Discussed by the Leaders

WHILE SOVIET ANTHEM PLAYED: President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. doff hats, Prime Minister Churchill salutes and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov stands at attention at airfield in Crimea after arrival of the President for the conference of the Big Three.

rying up to 3,000 pounds of bombs.

Marshal Stalin explained that in their attack on the central German position, the Russians employed 180 divisions, which was twenty more than the Germans had. He was interested in the preponderance that the British and Americans would have over the Germans.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the British and American forces had overwhelming preponderance in airplanes and armored troops but not great preponderance in infantry. He stressed the necessity of exploiting to the full such superiority in strength as existed.

Marshal Stalin said that the British and Americans had asked the Russians to express their wishes. He would like to know now what the wishes of the British and Americans were.

The Prime Minister said that his greatest wish was to express profound gratitude and admiration as he witnessed the marvelous advance of the Russian troops. He said the British and Americans recognized the hard and difficult task lying before them in their impending operations but had full confidence in their power to execute it. All they could ask from the Russians was that the Russians continue to do as they are doing now.

Marshal Stalin said there had been no demand from the British and Americans for the Russian winter offensive and no pressure was exerted by them to bring it about.

The President had asked that information of the offensive be given to General Eisenhower in order to assist him in his planning and Air Marshal Tedder who came to Moscow as General Eisenhower's representative had requested that the Russian offensive continue to the end of March but this was understood to be a request from the military leaders.

Marshal Stalin said they had staged their winter offensive because they felt it to be their duty as allies to do it. They greatly appreciated the attitude manifested by both the President and the Prime Minister in this matter.

The Prime Minister said the reason that neither the British nor Americans had made any attempt to bargain with Marshal Stalin was because of their faith in him and in the Russian people and the realization that they could be depended on to do the right thing. It was his opinion that regardless of the documents which had been held with Air Marshal Tedder, matters should be fully discussed now by the three staffs in order to determine what is the best course to pursue with respect to the coordinating of the action on the Western and Eastern fronts. It was imperative that the two offensives should be integrated so as to get the best results.

TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING
Feb. 5, 1945, 10 A. M.

Marshal Stalin agreed that the offensives had not been fully synchronized at first and that action should be taken to do this now. He thought it would be well also to consider a summer offensive as he was not at all certain that the war would be over by that time.

Admiral Cunningham said that he would like to add something to General Marshall's statement on the submarine warfare. He said while the submarine threat was potentially great it was not very serious at the moment. The point is, however, that the Germans are building large numbers [illegible] U-boats. As [illegible] underwater [illegible] all the latest [illegible] it will be very difficult for the Allied air and surface craft to deal with them. In Bremen, Hamburg and Danzig the new submarines were being built by prefabrication methods. His greatest wish as a naval man was for the Russians to take Danzig as quickly as possible for in that city about 30 per cent of the U-boats were being constructed.

In answer to a question by the President, Marshal Stalin stated that Danzig was not yet within artillery range of the Russian guns but it was hoped that it soon would be.

Discussion then turned upon the time and place of the next meeting. After discussion, it was agreed that the staffs of the three nations would meet at 1200 on Monday, 5 February at the headquarters of the Russian delegation.

LIVADIA PALACE
PRESENT
United States
President Roosevelt
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Bohlen
United Kingdom
Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Major Birse
Soviet Union
Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vishinsky
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

TOP SECRET
SUBJECT: Voice of Smaller Powers in Postwar Peace Organization.

Before dinner and during the greater part of the dinner the conversation was general and personal in character. Marshal Stalin, the President and the Prime Minister appeared to be in very good humor throughout the dinner. No political or military subjects of any importance were discussed until the last half hour of the dinner when indirectly the subject of the responsibility and rights of the big powers as against those of the small powers came up.

Marshal Stalin made it quite plain on a number of occasions that he felt that the three great powers which had borne the brunt of the war and had liberated from German domination the small powers should have the unanimous right to preserve the peace of the world. He said that he could serve no other interest than that of the Soviet state and people but that in the international arena the Soviet Union was prepared to pay its share in the preservation of peace. He said that it was ridiculous to believe that Albania would have an equal voice with the three great powers who had won the war and were present at this dinner. He said some of the liberated countries seemed to believe that the great powers had been forced to shed their blood in order to liberate them and that they were now scolding these great powers for failure to take into consideration the rights of these small powers.

Marshal Stalin said that he was prepared in concert with the United States and Great Britain to protect the rights of the small powers but that he would never agree to having any action of any of the great powers submitted to the judgment of the small powers. The President said he agreed that the great powers bore the greater responsibility and that the peace should be written by the three powers represented at this table.

The Prime Minister said that there was no question of the small powers dictating to the big powers but that the great nations of the world should discharge their moral responsibility and leadership and should exercise their power with moderation and great respect for the rights of the smaller nations. (Mr. Vishinsky said to Mr. Bohlen that they would never agree to the right of the small powers to judge the acts of the great powers, and in reply to an observation by Mr. Bohlen concerning the opinion of American people he replied that the American people should learn to obey their leaders. Mr. Bohlen said that if Mr. Vishinsky would visit the United States he would like to see him undertake to tell that to the American people. Mr. Vishinsky replied that he would be glad to do so.)

Following a toast by the Prime Minister to the proletariat masses of the world, there was considerable discussion about the rights of people to govern themselves in relation to their leaders.

The Prime Minister said that although he was constantly being "beaten up" as a reactionary, he was the only representative present who could be thrown out at any time by the universal suffrage of his own people and that personally he gloried in that danger.

Marshal Stalin ironically remarked that the Prime Minister seemed to fear these elections, to which the Prime Minister replied that he not only did not fear them but that he was proud of the right of the British people to change their government at any time they saw fit. He added that he felt that the three nations represented here were moving toward the same goal by different methods.

The Prime Minister referring to the rights of the small nations gave a quotation which said: "The eagle should permit the small birds to sing and care not wherefor they sang."

After Marshal Stalin and the President had departed, the Prime Minister discussed with Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius further the voting question in the Security Council. The Prime Minister said that he was inclined to the Russian view on voting procedure because he felt that everything depended on the unity of the three great powers and that without that the world would be subjected to inestimable catastrophe; anything that deserved (preserved?) that unity would have his vote. Mr. Eden took vigorous exception to the Prime Minister and pointed out that there would be no attraction or reason and that he personally believed it would find no support among the English public. The Prime Minister said that he did not agree in the slightest with Mr. Eden because he was thinking of the realities of the international situation.

In reply to an inquiry of the Prime Minister in regard to the American proposal to the solution of the voting question, Mr. Bohlen remarked that the American proposal reminded him of the story of the Southern planter who had given a bottle of whiskey to a Negro as a present. The next day he asked the Negro how he had liked the whiskey, to which the Negro replied that it was perfect. The planter asked what he meant, and the Negro said if it had been any better it would not have been given to him, and if it had been any worse he could not have drunk it.

Soon thereafter the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden took their departure, obviously in disagreement on the voting procedure on the Security Council of the Dumbarton Oaks Organization.

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Feb. 4, 1945, 8:30 P. M.

Livadia Palace
PRESENT
Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Bull
Major General Deane
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull
Major General Wood
Major General Hill
Rear Admiral McCormick
Rear Admiral Duncan
Brigadier General Roberts
Brigadier General Bessell
Brigadier General Everest
Brigadier General Lindsay
Commodore Burrough
Colonel Peck
Colonel Lincoln
Captain Stroop
Captain McDill
Commander Clark
(Secretariat)
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. Approval of the minutes, 185th meeting of C. C. S.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the minutes of the 185th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

2. British proposal to abandon the plan to return to Cricket.

Admiral Leahy said that this was a memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff which proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff complete all of their unfinished business at Magneto and abandon the plan to return to Malta. The suggestion was open to discussion.

General Marshall said that the proposal was agreeable to him as the next best thing to do. He preferred to have the United States shipping representatives sent to Magneto to complete their studies and, if necessary, to detach the necessary number from this place to provide space.

General Somervell explained that the point at issue was the agreement on a planning date for the end of the war with Germany. The dates of 1 April, 1 July and 1 November had already been considered, but it was necessary to settle on one date. He suggested that an agreement be reached with the British on the date of 1 July for planning purposes. The only possible complication in such an arrangement would be the introduction of some other operation which would change planning.

Admiral King said that Russian concurrence should be obtained on the planning date.

General Marshall suggested that the course of action should be as follows:

A. Obtain Russian concurrence to a planning date of 1 July 1945 for the end of the war with Germany, and

B. Detach a suitable number of personnel from Magneto to make room for the shipping personnel ordered from Cricket to complete the shipping studies at this place.

After further discussion,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff

A. Agreed to seek Russian concurrence on the date of 1 July 1945 as the date of the collapse of Germany.

B. Agreed to accept the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff contained in their memorandum of 4 February 1945 and directed the secretaries to take necessary action.

3. Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany.

Admiral Leahy said that this subject has been under consideration by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. J.C.S. 577/6 was the report of the Joint Logistics Committee on its own initiative, recommending the acceptance of the British proposal subject to certain amendments set forth in Appendix A of this paper.

General Marshall explained that J.C.S. 577/26 is the last of a long series of papers pertaining to the controversy with the British concerning the Bremen-Bremerhaven area. General Macready wrote a letter to Mr. McCloy on 29 January offering an agreement which is on Page 223. Mr. McCloy wrote a letter back saying that this agreement was acceptable providing its meaning was in accordance with specifications which he named.

The Joint Logistics Committee in this paper has proposed a [illegible]-page memorandum to the British in which the [illegible] essential understanding and [illegible] poses an agreement which [illegible] conform to [illegible] General Macready's letter [illegible] and attached to the paper.

Failure to reach agreement [illegible] this paper [illegible]

[illegible] General Marshall, their [illegible] to be [illegible] posed by the Joint Logistics Committee.

After further discussion, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to present to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the memorandum proposed by General Marshall, with the draft agreement proposed by the Joint Logistics Committee and General Macready's letter to Mr. McCloy attached thereto.

4. Russian participation in the war against Japan (J.C.S. 1176/10, J.C.S. 1176/11).

Admiral Leahy [illegible] the papers under consideration [illegible] Joint Staff planners [illegible] memoranda bearing on the war against Japan to be presented to the Soviet General Staff. He questioned whether the Russians would understand the memoranda when they received them.

Admiral Duncan [illegible] that the memorandum [illegible] in J.C.S. 1176/11 had to do with a special U.S. planning [illegible] Moscow and would be [illegible] by the Russians.

General Deane explained [illegible] that the planning group had already had one meeting with the Russian staff in Moscow previous to this [illegible] and this memorandum was intended to facilitate the work of the planning group. There has been delay in the work of the reconnaissance party [illegible] due to the fact that [illegible] Johnson had been allowed to remain in Kamchatka. [illegible] they have been [illegible] American planning staff [illegible] be permitting to travel in [illegible] territory. He suggested that [illegible] memorandum be [illegible] handed to the Russians at a [illegible] bilateral meeting which [illegible] was necessary. He recommended further that the President should be asked to request from Marshal Stalin the Soviet answers to two questions of paramount importance. The basic question is whether the Russians will [illegible] a Pacific supply line. The next question concerns [illegible] agreement to establish [illegible] United States air forces in the [illegible] area Siberia. These questions should be put to the Russians and definite answers requested.

General Marshall agreed [illegible] recommended approval of the memorandum for transmission to the Russians, preliminary to a meeting with them. He recommended further that a memorandum be prepared for the President to present to Marshal Stalin as follows:

The following are two basic military questions to which the United States Chiefs of Staff would appreciate an early answer at this conference:

A. Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential to you that a Pacific [illegible] ice be kept open across the Pacific to eastern Siberia?

B. Will you assure us that United States air forces will be permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk or some more suitable area providing developments show that these air forces can be operated and supported without jeopardizing Russian operations?

In reply to a question by General Marshall, General Crane said that the memorandum he had proposed was entirely satisfactory. He thought that after discussion of the two basic questions with the Russian staff we should outline the main points and request the President to ask Marshal Stalin for a flat approval or disapproval of them. The Russian staff has already approved a U. S. [illegible] and he felt that this would not change this decision without a direct approval of the highest level.

After further discussion, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: A. Agreed [illegible] the Joint Staff planners [illegible] (1176/10 and 1176/11). B. Agreed to send to the President [illegible] General Marshall with a view [illegible] to be presented to Marshal Stalin.

[illegible]

PRESENT
United States
Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Deane
Major General Bull
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull
United Kingdom
Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Alexander
General Ismay
Rear Admiral Archer
Soviet Union
General of the Army Antonov
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Lieutenant General Grysler
Vice Admiral Kucherov
Commander Kostrinsky
(Secretariat)
Brigadier General McFarland
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Captain Graves
Commander Coleridge
(Interpreters)
Captain Long
Captain Ware
Lieutenant Chase
Mr. Potrubach

TOP SECRET

At the suggestion of General Antonov, Field Marshal Brooke agreed to take the chair.

Coordination of offensive operations.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the meeting should begin by considering the coordination of the Russian and U. S.-British offensives. At the plenary meeting on the previous day, General Antonov had put forward certain Russian requirements. He had asked, first, that during the month of February the Allied armies in the West should carry out offensives. As General Marshall had explained, the Allied offensive in the West would start in the north on the eighth of February and some eight days later the Ninth U. S. Army would also start an offensive. These operations would be carried out during most of February. In addition to these operations in the north, operations were now being carried out by United States and French armies to push the Germans back across the Rhine in the Colmar area.

It was therefore clear that the immediate coordination of Allied and Russian offensives was already being carried out. It was necessary, however, to look ahead to the matter of coordination of offensives in the spring and summer months. As far as operations in the West were concerned, these would be more or less continuous throughout the spring. There were, of course, bound to be intervals between operations, though such intervals would not be long duration. For instance, after clearing the western bank of the Rhine on the northern part of the front, operations would have to be undertaken for the final crossing of the Rhine. From a study of conditions of the river it was hoped to start a crossing during the first half of March. After crossing it would have to be widened and improved before the final advance into the heart of Germany could be undertaken.

Should operations in the north aimed at the Ruhr be held up, it was the intention to carry out further operations in the south. It was safe to say, therefore, that during the months of February, March and April, active operations would be in progress during almost the entire time.

The actual crossing of the Rhine presented the greatest difficulties and it was during the period of this crossing that the Allies were anxious to prevent a concentration of German forces against the armies in the West. It was therefore hoped that during March operations on the Eastern front would be able to continue. Sir Alan Brooke said he appreciated the difficulties in March and early April due to the thaw and mud, which would interfere with communications. He also realized that after their present great advance the Russian armies would want to improve their communications. He would much like to hear General Antonov's views on what operations could be undertaken by the Soviet Armies during March and April.

General Marshall said that during the tripartite plenary meeting on the previous day, the number of divisions, the amount of artillery and the number of tanks on the Eastern front had been enumerated. In considering the Western front, it was important to bear in mind that operations must be conducted to meet the special conditions existing. In the West there was no superiority in ground forces. There were definite lines of communications, particularly in the [illegible].

The Allies, however, did enjoy a preponderance of air power, but in this connection the weather was an important consideration. If the Allies were unable to take full advantage of their air superiority, they did not have sufficient superiority on the ground to overcome enemy opposition. Operations must therefore be conducted on this basis. Another restriction arose from the fact that there were only a small number of favorable locations for crossing the Rhine. It was therefore most important to insure that the enemy would not concentrate strongly at the point of attack.

The enemy were now operating behind the Rhine and the Siegfried Line and therefore had great freedom of maneuver. We must, therefore arrange to occupy the Germans as much as possible to prevent them from concentrating against us on the very narrow bridgehead area available to us.

With regard to air forces, on the Western front some 3,000 to 4,000 fighter-bomber sorties could be undertaken each day. There was about one-third of this strength on the Italian front. This did not include the power of the great four-engine bombers with their escorting fighters.

General Antonov said that, as Marshal Stalin had pointed out, the Russians would continue the offensive in the East as long as the weather permitted. There might be interruptions during the offensive and as Sir Alan Brooke had said, there was the need to re-establish Russian communications. The Soviet Army would, however, take measures to make such interruptions as short as possible and would continue the offensive to the limit of their capacity.

In connection with the Western offensive in February, it was not believed that the Germans could transfer forces from the Eastern front to the West in large numbers. The Soviet Staff, however, was also interested in the Italian front, from where the Germans had the opportunity of transferring troops to the Eastern front. In view of this, the Soviet General Staff would like to know the potentialities of the Allied armies now fighting the Germans in Italy.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the situation on the Italian Front was being carefully examined as it developed. Kesselring's forces had now been driven into northern Italy, where the country was very well suited for defense on the systematic retirement. There was a series of rivers which could be used for rearguard actions while withdrawing his forces gradually. The enemy would have to retreat through the Ljubljana Gap or the passes of the Alps. The coast in the Bay of Venice was not suitable for amphibious operations, and therefore outflanking operations on the Adriatic did not appear fruitful. So far there had been continuous offensive operations which had driven the enemy out of the Apennine line and into the Valley of the Po. Winter weather and floods had, however, brought these offensive operations almost to a standstill.

At present our troops were preparing for further offensive action when the weather improved. It had, however, been decided that it would be better to transfer some of the forces now in Italy to the Western front, where at present we did not have sufficient superiority in ground forces. Five divisions were therefore now to be transferred from Italy to France and certain air forces would accompany them. The forces remaining in Italy had been instructed to carry out offensive operations and to seize every opportunity to inflict heavy blows on the enemy. Their object was to retain as many of Kesselring's forces as possible by offensive action. However, owing to the topography of the country, it was believed that Kesselring could carry out a partial withdrawal without the Allies being able to stop it. The rate of withdrawal was estimated at some one and one-half divisions per week. Thus any withdrawal which he did undertake could only be gradual.

To sum up it was proposed to take what action was possible to stop the German withdrawal in Italy, though it was not thought that this could be entirely prevented. For this reason, it had been decided to withdraw certain forces from Italy to the vital front in northwest Europe.

General Marshall said that he agreed with Sir Alan Brooke's summary of the position but felt that a reference should be made to the value of our air power in Italy.

General Antonov asked the number of German troops believed to be in Italy.

Field Marshal Alexander said that at present the German forces in Italy consisted of twenty-seven German divisions and five Italian divisions.

Sir Alan Brooke said that all these forces could not be held down in Italy by offensive action. If the Germans decided to retire to the line of the Adige, it was estimated that they would be able to withdraw some ten divisions from Italy.

Sir Charles Portal said that on the Western and Italian fronts together the United States and British Air Forces consisted of some 14,000 aircraft. This figure did not include the reserve behind the front line. Should the land campaign have to halt, the war in the air would continue, as far as weather permitted, even more strongly than before. Everything possible would be done, as General Marshall had stated, to bring the greatest possible air assistance to the vital points of attack in the land offensive. Such air assistance included the operations of a number of airborne divisions, for which the necessary transport was available.

So far as the requirements of the land battle permitted, it was the intention to concentrate the strategic bomber forces on the enemy's oil supply. Evidence was available almost daily that the destruction of his oil production capacity was imposing limitations on the enemy's operations. It was believed that the destruction of enemy oil was the best contribution which the air forces could make. Both to the offensive on land and in the air. Much had been done and would continue to be done to disorganize the enemy's rail communications, but it was our experience that an attempt to cut all railways in the middle of Germany to stop troop movements would produce disappointing results in view of the relative ease with which the enemy could repair such destruction.

It was known that the Germans intended to assemble a strong force of jet-propelled fighters during the course of the present year. It had therefore been decided that, in order to maintain our air superiority into the summer, a proportion of our air effort must be devoted to attacks on the German jet-propelled fighter manufacturing plants. Nevertheless, it was [an] agreed principle that when the land offensive began, everything in the air that could contribute to its success should be so used.

Before the advance of the Soviet Armies, Allied air power had been brought to bear as far afield as Koenigsberg, Danzig, Posen and Warsaw. The great range of our strategic air forces made it most necessary that Allied air operations should be coordinated with the advance of the Soviet armies both to prevent accidents and to obtain the best value from our bomber effort.

General Marshall invited Field Marshal Alexander to comment on the capability of air forces in Italy to prevent a German withdrawal.

Field Marshal Alexander said that it had been his experience in Italy that our greatly superior air forces were a most powerful weapon while the enemy was withdrawing, if it was possible to force the pace of his withdrawal. If, however, he was in a position to withdraw at his own pace, the air forces were less effective since the withdrawal could be undertaken mostly under cover of darkness.

In the valley of the Po there was a series of extremely strong holding positions and it would therefore be difficult to force the enemy to withdraw faster than he planned. Nevertheless, when the weather improved from May onwards, considerable damage could be done to the withdrawing German forces and to their lines of communication. However, in February, March and April the weather was bad with low clouds, which hindered the air effort to a great extent. Further, the Germans had destroyed nearly all the bridges over the River Po and had replaced them with some thirty to forty pontoon bridges which were not kept in position during the day but were hidden along the banks. The destruction of these bridges was therefore extremely difficult.

To sum up, the better the weather the more damage could be done to the enemy by air action, but however successful the air action, he did not believe that it would be possible entirely to prevent a German withdrawal by this means.

General Marshall said that at the tripartite plenary meeting on the previous day, the desire had been expressed that every effort should be made to stop the movement of German forces from West to East by air action and, in particular, to paralyze the vital rail junctions of Berlin and Leipzig. In this connection a report he had received that day concerning Allied air operations in the last few days was of interest. On Friday, the second of February, the Royal Air Force had flown 2,400 sorties, concentrating on rail and road targets in [illegible] and Coblenz. The latter in particular, was of vital importance in the transfer of German forces to the east. Similar destruction of rail targets had taken place east of Aachen. On the same night a thousand of our bombers had attacked Wiesbaden, Karlsruhe and synthetic oil plants elsewhere. On the following day, Saturday, the third of February, four-engined United States bombers had attacked the Nuremberg railway yards and the R. A. F. bombers had attacked targets in the same area.

In relation to the destruction of communications and the interference with enemy movements, the following data had been received relating to the effect of air attacks carried out on the twenty-second and twenty-third of January. On those two days alone, 2,000 motor cars and trucks had been destroyed and 1,500 damaged, a thousand railway cars had been destroyed and 700 damaged, ninety-three tanks and self-propelled guns had been destroyed and a further ninety-three damaged, twenty-five locomotives had been destroyed and four damaged, fifty horse-drawn vehicles had been destroyed and eighty-eight damaged. In addition, sixty-two known gun positions had been wiped out and twenty-one marshaling yards damaged. These very large results had been obtained on the two days he had referred to, but similar attacks were carried out on almost every fine day by the Allied air forces. He had received on the previous day [illegible] the three thousand-bomber attack on Berlin carried out on the third of February. There was also ready a plan to carry out a similar attack on Leipzig.

Marshal Khudyakov said that, as Marshal Stalin had pointed out, more than 8,000 Soviet planes were being used in the main thrust. In spite of weather conditions, between the twelfth of January and the first of February, [illegible] sorties had been flown in support of the Russian advance. More than a thousand enemy planes had been captured on airfields which had been overrun by the Russian troops. These aircraft had been prevented from flying away by bad weather. In addition, 560 planes had been shot down in air combat. If better weather prevailed, air operations could be stepped up and the objectives farther in the enemy rear, but fog at this time of year rendered such deep operations to the west of Berlin almost impossible. He agreed with Sir Charles Portal that there were too many railroads in Germany to destroy all of them. He hoped that Field Marshal Alexander's operations could be aimed at hampering the movement of German divisions from Italy to the Eastern front.

Field Marshal Alexander said that this effort was contained in his directive.

Marshal Khudyakov said that he was glad to hear of this. In Italy there were fewer railways to assist the enemy withdrawal.

Field Marshal Alexander explained that the Germans in Italy largely used roads for their withdrawals.

General Antonov said that in addition to the Soviet offensives in the north, offensives would also continue in the direction of Vienna and west of Lake Balaton. It was for this reason that Allied action in Italy was of importance to the Soviets. It seemed to him expedient that Allied land offensives should be directed toward the Ljubljana Gap and Graz. He now understood that this was not possible.

Sir Alan Brooke said that it must be remembered that the Allies had no great superiority in land forces. They had come to the conclusion that in conjunction with the vital death blows being dealt by the Soviet armies in the East, the correct place for the Western death blow was in northwestern Europe. For this reason it had been decided to transfer divisions from Italy to the Western front and to limit operations in Italy to holding as many German forces in that theatre as possible. In the event of a German withdrawal from Northern Italy, we had forces strong enough to take advantage of such a withdrawal, and possibly at a later date to be able to operate through the Ljubljana Gap. Such action, however, must remain dependent on the withdrawal of a proportion of the German forces at present in the north of Italy.

3. Movement of German Forces From Norway.

General Antonov said that the Germans were transferring forces from Norway to Denmark. He asked if there was any way in which such a movement could be stopped.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said as far as was known, these movements were being carried out by rail and road to Oslo and then by sea. The troops were then being moved across the short sea passage to Denmark. It was not possible in view of heavy mining to operate surface forces in the Skagerrak and thus prevent the enemy making this short sea passage.

Sir Charles Portal said that the action of the air forces in the

Terms of the Surrender for Germany Taken Up by Chiefs of 3 Powers

connection could be divided into two parts. Firstly, by such attacks as could be made on shipping in the Kattegat, and with four-engined bombers operated on almost every fine night in an endeavor to bomb enemy ships. Several ships had recently been set on fire in this area. The second form of air action was by mine-laying aircraft. Approximately 1,000 mines were being laid by this method each month. Each aircraft carried some 4S mines. Sir Andrew Cunningham had just told him that possibly these mines had sunk or damaged four enemy transports. German minesweepers did evidence of course to sweep our mines but it was now planned to increase the number of air attacks made on these minesweepers. However, there were so many varying tasks for the air forces to carry out that all could not be undertaken equally well.

Sir Alan Brooke said an examination had also been made of the possibility of stopping the movement of German forces from Norway by land action in Norway itself. There were, however, insufficient forces to undertake this without weakening our main effort on the Western front.

5. Use of Artillery and Air in Future Operations.

General Antonov said he felt it would be interesting to exchange information with regard to the method of carrying out operations in the autumn, winter and spring when, by reason of weather, it was not always possible to make use of air power. On these occasions the role of artillery became one of particular importance. As Marshal Stalin had said, on the previous day, the Russians were establishing special artillery divisions of some 300 to 400 guns each, which were used for breaking through the enemy line. This method enabled a mass of artillery of some 250 guns of 76 millimeters and upwards to be concentrated on a front of one kilometer. He would be very glad to know what degree of artillery density would be used on the Western front when the February offensive commenced.

General Bull said that the Northern Army group, which would take part in the main offensive, possessed some 1,500 guns of 105 millimeters and upwards, and the United States Army group which would also take part in the offensive, had some 3,000 guns of similar calibers.

The army commanders concerned, by concentrating their artillery power on a narrow front, would be able to use some 200 guns to the mile in the area of the break-through. To this offensive power should be added the power of the air forces. In the three days preceding the attack on the eighth of February, it could be expected that some 1,600 heavy bombers would be used, capable of delivering a 500 tons of bombs on the first day. For the remaining two days before the offensive, a slightly less weight of bombs could be dropped, but closer to the point of attack. Not only would communications behind the enemy be knocked, but also positions known to be strongly held.

On the day of the attack itself, "carpet bombing" would be used, and some 4,000 tons could be dropped on an area two miles square. He felt the effort of the air attack and the artillery concentration should produce a break-through, thus allowing our armor to operate in the enemy's rear. A similar pattern of attack had been used on previous occasions with great success.

Marshal Khudyakov asked what action would be taken if it was found that weather prohibited the air from operating on the day of attack.

General Bull explained that the attack was normally timed for a day on which it was predicted that the weather would enable "carpet bombing" to be carried out. During the actual attack the bombing was carried out some 2,000 yards ahead of our own front line, but earlier bombing on targets further behind the line could be undertaken through overcast.

Marshal Khudyakov explained that all Russian operations in winter were plotted on the supposition that bad weather would exist, and so air operations would be possible. He felt that the Allies should bear this point in mind in planning their own operations.

General Marshall said that he had endeavored to explain that the Allies did not possess the same superiority in ground forces as did the Russians. The Allies did not have 200 divisions nor was it possible to produce them. It was therefore essential to make full use of our air superiority. He would like to point out, the advance across France had, in fact, been accomplished with the same number of divisions as the enemy himself had. This was made possible by a combination of ground and air power.

General Antonov said that he now had a very clear picture of Allied offensive intentions. Were there any questions which the British or United States Chiefs of Staff would like to ask?

4. Liaison Arrangements.

Admiral Leahy said that in view of the very frank discussions of plans which was taking place, he would like to bring up the question of liaison between the Eastern and Western fronts. The distance between the two armies was now so short that direct liaison was a matter of great importance. He had been directed by the President to bring up this question of liaison before the British, Russian and United States Chiefs of Staff. It was the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff, who had not yet discussed it with their British colleagues, that arrangements should be made for the Allied armies in the West to communicate rapidly with Soviet commanders on the Eastern front through the military missions now in Moscow. He would be glad to take back to the President the views of the Soviet and British Chiefs of Staffs on this matter.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were equally anxious to have the necessary liaison in beneficial place could be concerted. They felt that such liaison required organizing on a sound basis. Military missions were already established in Moscow, and these should, he felt, act as a link on high level between the United States, British and Soviet Chiefs of Staffs. In addition to this, closer liaison was required between the commanders of Allied theatres with the commanders of the Second Russian armies. For example, on the Italian front, Field Marshal Alexander required direct liaison with the Russian commander concerned.

In the case of the Supreme Commander on the Western front, he would require direct liaison with the commanders of the Russian armies in the East. Thus there would be coordination between the high commands dealing with future action and in addition direct coordination between the Allied and Soviet Armies, who were closely in contact on such matters as the employment of air forces and the coordination of day-to-day action.

General Antonov said that the question of liaison between the General Staffs was very important and, as had already been mentioned, could be undertaken through the missions in Moscow. In the present state of the offensive, this should be perfectly satisfactory until the forces came closer into contact with each other. Also, as operations advanced, the question of liaison between army commanders could be reviewed and adjusted. The proposals would be reported to Marshal Stalin.

General Marshall said that he had not entirely understood the necessity for limiting liaison.

General Antonov explained that his proposal was to limit liaison to that through the General Staff in Moscow and the U.S. and British missions. Such arrangements, however, could be reviewed and adjusted later in case changed conditions.

General Marshall pointed out that difficulties and setbacks in air operations from Italy over the Balkans. Such operations were directed from day to day and even from hour to hour, depending on weather and other conditions. If contact had to be maintained between Cairo armies concerned through Moscow, difficulties would be certain to arise.

If this roundabout method of communications through many busy people had to be adopted, there was a risk that our powerful air weapon could not be properly used.

General Antonov said that the accident to which General Marshall referred had occurred not because of lack of liaison but due to the plans concerned being changed. They had, in fact, made a navigational mistake with regard to the correct point.

General Marshall said that he recognized this. However, the bombline at that time included roads crowded with retreating Germans who could not be bombed by the Allied forces without an approach being made through Moscow. As powerful air force was available and good weather existed, but the Allied air force was unable to act and the Germans profited thereby.

Sir Alan Brooke said he entirely agreed with General Marshall that, through lack of liaison, we are losing fruitful days of the air power at our disposal.

General Antonov said that at the present time no liaison or coordination was required between Allied and Russian ground forces. We should, he believed, aim at planning the strategic requirements of our air forces. The use of all Soviet air forces was dictated by the Soviet General Staff in Moscow. I was for this reason that the coordination of the air effort should, in his view, be carried out through the Soviet General Staff in Moscow, who alone could reconcile problems. It was possible to agree on the objective for strategic bombing irrespective of a bombline.

Sir Charles Portal said that in the British view there were two distinct problems outstanding to discuss. The first was to decide on the form of liaison referred to by General Antonov, i.e., the coordination of the Allied long-range bomber effort over eastern Germany and its relation to the advance of the Red Army. The Allied long-range strategic bomber force was not controlled by the Supreme Commander in the West except when it was undertaking work in close cooperation with the ground forces but was controlled by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff. It was right, therefore, that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff or their representatives should deal direct with Moscow on this matter.

The second problem was in respect to the constant air operations out from Italy in relation to Russian operations in the Balkans and Hungary in that theatre liaison was required, but not so much on policy as on an interchange of information. The British Chiefs of Staff entirely agreed with the United States view that it was sufficient for liaison between Field Marshal Alexander and the Russian commanders to be effected through Moscow. It was, therefore, essential that some machinery should be set up to deal with day-to-day liaison between General Alexander and the Russian headquarters which controlled the southern front. Without such direct liaison it was impossible to take advantage of the many opportunities presented to hit the Germans from behind.

Marshal Khudyakov said that concerning Air action on Germany itself this could be done through the General Staff in Moscow as suggested by Sir Charles Portal, using as U. S. and British military missions. The liaison on policy was one which took time to arrange and was not a matter for great speed. With regard to direct liaison between Field Marshal Alexander and the Russian left wing, he felt this was a matter which should be reported to Marshal Stalin.

General Antonov added it should not be agreed that a bombline should be established running from Berlin to Dresden, Vienna and Zagreb, all these places being allotted to the Allied air forces. Such a line could, of course, be changed as the front changed.

Admiral Leahy said Sir Alan Brooke asked that this matter be deferred one day for consideration.

3. Naval operations in support of the land offensive.

Admiral Kuznetsov asked if plans had been made for any naval operations in direct assistance to the land attack which was shortly to be carried out. He referred not so much to the normal operations in the defense of communications and day-to-day operations of the fleet to control the seas but rather to direct operations in support of a land offensive.

Sir Andrew Cunningham explained that projected operations were not far enough to be directly affected by any operations which could be carried out by the fleet except the routine operations of keeping open communications. He asked if Admiral Kuznetsov had any particular operations in mind.

Admiral Kuznetsov said he had no particular operation in mind but rather the possibility of some operation in the neighborhood of Denmark that would not have any direct tactical connections with the army operations but would have a strategic connection.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that possible operations to outflank the Rhine had been studied. However, lifting on the dikes of Holland would prove extremely difficult and the necessary land forces unobtainable.

Sir Alan Brooke said that owing to the difficulty of forcing a crossing of the Rhine when that river was in flood, a very detailed examination had been carried out of the coastline from Scheldt to the Danish coast, but operations in this area had not been found practicable since, firstly, large areas of Holland would be flooded and, secondly, operations further to the north would be too far detached from the main front to be of value.

Admiral King asked if General Kuznetsov would outline for us courses which the Soviet Fleet had been able to obtain in amphibious operations or operations to interfere with the transport of troops from the Baltic states to Germany.

Admiral Kuznetsov said that operations of the Soviet Fleet to cut German communications in the Baltic had been undertaken by submarines and naval aircraft. When the area of Memel was reached, it became possible to transfer torpedo boats to augment Russian naval activity in that area. However, all operations were at present hampered by ice conditions and, whether the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga were heavily mined by the enemy, and mine clearance was hampered by weather conditions and ice.

Admiral King said that he appreciated that ice conditions were now limiting operations but had asked this question a view of earlier Soviet accomplishments mentioning the damage or destruction of German shipping.

Admiral Kuznetsov said that the actual destruction of German shipping had been carried out by naval air forces and submarines.

4. Date of the End of the War With Germany.

Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were engaged in making detailed plans for that phase of the war following the collapse of Germany. It had been suggested that such plans should now be based on a probable date of the first of July for the ending of possible collapse of Germany. He was desiring on such a date as he was wishing to have the views of the Soviet staff on the matter.

General Antonov said that operations in the Eastern and Western theatres developed in a different way and impossible to predict the date of the collapse of Germany.

Admiral Leahy said he appreciated the uncertainty of the matter but the planning staffs required that for the purpose of the earliest date of withdrawal.

General Antonov said that he could only say that the Soviet Government had given instructions that all preparations for the defeat of Germany should be completed by the first half of May. Whether the war would be finished by that date he could not say.

General Marshall said that a year ago it had been necessary to assume a date for the defeat of Germany on which basic calculations on such items as production and the provision of shipping were necessary to revise the plans from time to time, particularly in connection with the build-up of shipping throughout the world. It had been proposed to use later dates, one the end of December and one the latest date for the defeat of Germany. Both dates were now under examination between the United States and British Chiefs of Staff and it was in agreement that the date of July was the earliest, but that dates to be offered by two months that the future of mankind depended upon this step.

LUNCHEON MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
February 5, 1945, 1:30 P. M.

Yusupoff Palace
PRESENT
United States
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Page
United Kingdom
Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Major Tweedsmuir
Soviet Union
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vishinsky
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Pavlov

PAGE MINUTES

TOP SECRET

SUBJECTS 1. Toasts.
2. Name of Conference.
3. Treatment of Germany.
4. Economic matters relating to Germany.

1. Toasts.

Mr. Molotov opened the luncheon by proposing a toast to the health of the three statesmen. Upon being informed by Mr. Harriman that Mardi had been captured, Mr. Molotov immediately proposed a toast to the victory of the Allied armies.

After a brief toast by Mr. Eden to Mr. Molotov as Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and chairman of the 1943 Moscow Conference, Mr. Stettinius also proposed a toast to Mr. Molotov. He said that he regretted that he would be able to carry on the fine work of his predecessor, Secretary Hull. He asked that Mr. Hull, who was now in a hospital but was recovering, be remembered to Mr. Molotov. He concluded by saying that he looked forward to the day when he, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden would have frequent meetings.

Mr. Molotov immediately responded and proposed a toast to the recovery of Secretary Hull. He requested Mr. Stettinius to convey to Mr. Hull the sympathy and best wishes of all those present at the luncheon. He then proposed a toast to the British Ambassador, who reciprocated by proposing the "Marshal Commander" and his continued success. This was followed by toasts on the part of Mr. Stettinius to the Dumbarton Oaks colleagues, Monnet, Gromyko and Cadogan; to the health and success of his wife, Mr. Harriman, by Mr. Molotov, and a toast to the distinguished head of the drafting committee who assisted and assisted over the "Moscow Conversation," Mr. Vishinsky, by Mr. Harriman.

Mr. Justice Byrnes then proposed that the guests drink to the great armies of the Soviet Union and Ambassador Gromyko thanked Mr. Byrnes as a great American who had served in the three most important branches of the American government.

Mr. Vishinsky suggested that Messrs. Byrnes and Winant, the co-workers on the European Advisory Commission, be the subject of a toast.

Mr. Stettinius then raised his glass to Ambassador Gromyko whom he described as an able and effective representative of the Soviet Union in Washington who had won the respect and admiration of the American people.

Mr. Molotov remarked that there had been enough toasts to the diplomats. He wished to raise his glass to Mr. Byrnes, who held one of the most important positions in the United States Government. He said that it was hard for the average person to imagine just how important Mr. Byrnes was.

Mr. Eden then toasted the men who were fighting the war.

After a toast to the success of the present conference, Mr. Maisky was requested to make a few remarks. He raised his glass to the closest possible unity between the peoples, Governments and chiefs of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union and remarked

SECOND PLENARY SESSION
Feb. 5, 1945, 4-8 P. M.

Livadia Palace

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
SECRETARY STETTINIUS
FLEET ADMIRAL LEAHY
MR. HOPKINS
MR. BYRNES
MR. HARRIMAN
MR. MATTHEWS
MR. BOHLEN
UNITED KINGDOM
PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
FOREIGN SECRETARY EDEN
SIR ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR

BOHLEN COLLECTION
BOHLEN MINUTES

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Treatment of Germany.

The President opened the meeting by saying that it was his understanding that political matters affecting Germany would be discussed today. He said that they would not cover the map of the world and discuss Dairen or Indochina, but confine themselves to the political aspects of the future treatment of Germany. He said that the first question was that of the zones of occupation, which he understood had been agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission. He said there was one question still open and that was the desire of France to have a zone of occupation and French participation in the control machinery for Germany. He emphasized that the question of zones do not relate to the permanent dismemberment of Germany.

The President then handed a map of the agreed tripartite zones to Marshal Stalin, pointing out that, although these had been agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission, they had not yet been signed by the three Governments.

Marshal Stalin said that in the discussion of Germany he would like to include the following points:

(1) The question of dismemberment of Germany. He said that at Tehran they had exchanged views on this subject and later at Moscow he had talked this subject over with the Prime Minister. From these informal exchanges of views, he had gathered that all were in favor of dismemberment, but nothing had been decided as to the manner of dismemberment. He said he wished to know first as to whether the President or Prime Minister were adhering to the principle of dismemberment.

(2) Marshal Stalin inquired whether the three Governments proposed to set up a German government or not and if there was a desire expressed on the part of the three Governments to set up such a government or not, the Soviet Government would not oppose the setting up of such governments by the various parts of Germany.

(3) Marshal Stalin inquired as to how the principle of unconditional surrender would operate in regard to Germany. Would the German people, or their armies, after surrender, be subjected to unconditional annihilation? How would we deal with his Government?

(4) Marshal Stalin said he had not just dealt with the question of reparations.

The President replied that as he understood it, the permanent treatment of Germany might grow out of the question of the zones of occupation, although the two were not directly connected.

Marshal Stalin replied that he wished to find out here whether or not it was the intention to dismember Germany or not. He said that at present the question had arisen in the press of dismemberment.

Mr. Molotov favored this idea.

Mr. Eden continued with the suggestion that the Prime Minister, the President and Marshal Stalin discuss the treatment of Germany in three zones at the dinner's meeting, that they refer the question to the three Foreign Ministers for further study and that they instruct them to report back to the Big Three in one or three days with definite proposals.

Mr. Molotov welcomed his approval of this proposal.

2. Economic matters relating to Germany.

Mr. Stettinius stated in an earlier remark to Mr. Molotov that the United States Government would be interested in reaching certain economic considerations with respect to Germany.

Mr. Molotov indicated that the Soviet Government expected to receive reparations from Germany in kind and hoped that the United States would furnish the Soviet Union with long-term credits.

Mr. Stettinius stated that his Government had studied this question and that he personally was ready to discuss it at any time with Mr. Molotov. This time with Mr. Molotov. This could be done here as well as later either in Moscow or in Washington.

Mr. Molotov indicated that now that the end of the war was in sight, it was most important to reach an agreement on these economic questions.

Meeting of the President With Certain of His Advisers
February 5, 1945, 7:30 P. M.

Livadia Palace
PRESENT
President Roosevelt
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Bohlen

ECONOMIC NOTE

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the log, which states that the discussions continued until 4 P. M. on August 13, 1954. Matthews's note of the meeting is as follows: "I do not recall the subject but most such meetings were to inform the President of the results of our morning Foreign Ministers meeting and to prepare him for the afternoon session."

CAVIAR ON THE TABLE: Premier Stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill dine at Yalta.

added that the question of the Ruhr Valley and the industrial areas of the Ruhr and their capacity of producing armaments had not yet been decided: should they go to one country, or should they be independent, or part of Germany, or should they come under the trusteeship of the world organization which would designate certain large powers to see to it that these areas were not used to threaten the peace of the world? At this, the Prime Minister said, required careful study, and the British Government had not yet any fixed views on the subject. Five territories, he said, no decision had been reached on the question as to whether France, after being isolated from the rest of Germany, should be further dismembered internally. He said that the right act on machinery which would examine the best method of studying the question. Such a body could report to the three Governments before any final decision is reached. He said we are well prepared for the immediate future, both as to thought and plans concerning the surrender of Germany. All that was required was a final agreement on zones of occupation and the question of a zone for France.

Marshal Stalin replied that it wasn't clear to him as to the surrender. Suppose, for example, a German group had declared that they had overthrown Hitler and accepted unconditional surrender. Would the three Governments then deal with such a group as with Badoglio in Italy?

The Prime Minister replied that in that case he would presume the terms of surrender, but if Hitler or Himmler should refuse to surrender any circumstances with any war criminals and that the war would go on. He added it was more probable they would be killed or in hiding, but another group of Germans might publicize their willingness to accept unconditional surrender. In both a case the three Allies would immediately consult together as to whether they could deal with this group, and if in terms of unconditional surrender would immediately be submitted. If not, the war would continue and we would occupy the entire country under a [illegible]

Marshal Stalin [illegible] of the three Governments [illegible] the suppression of the Nazis [illegible] Germany [illegible] view to what a change in the terms saying that Germany would be dismembered, without going into details.

The Prime Minister said he did not feel there was any need to discuss with any German any question about their future—that unconditional surrender gave us the right to determine the future of Germany which could perhaps best be done at the second stage when unconditional surrender. He said he could not see any reason why the Germans should not be told that they were being talked about the same thing and what Marshal Stalin had said was absolutely right in principle here and now on the principle of dismemberment of Germany. He said personally, as stated by him at Tehran, that he was in favor of dismemberment of Germany. He recalled that forty years ago, when he had been in Germany, the center of the Reichstag not really been known there and any community dealt with the provincial government. For example, if in Bavaria you dealt with the Bavarian Government and if in Hesse-Darmstadt you dealt with that Government. In the last twenty years, however, everything has become centralized in Berlin. He added that he still thought the division of Germany into five states or seven states was a good idea.

The Prime Minister interrupted to say "no-less," to which the President agreed.

The Prime Minister remarked that there was no need, in his opinion, to inform the Germans of our future policy—that they must surrender unconditionally and then await our decision. He said we are dealing with the case of 80,000,000 people and that required more than eighty minutes to consider. He said it might not be very determined until a month or so after our troops occupy Germany.

The President said he thought the Prime Minister was talking about the question of dismemberment. In his view he said he thought it would be a great mistake to have any public discussion of the dismemberment of Germany as he would certainly receive as many plots as there had been German plots in the past. He suggested that the conference ask the three

Question of Dismembering Enemy After the War Spurs Leaders' Debate

Foreign Ministers to submit a recommendation as to the best method for the study of plans to dismember Germany and to report within twenty-four hours.

The Prime Minister said the British Government was prepared to accept now the principle of dismemberment of Germany and to set up suitable machinery to determine the best method to carry this out, but he couldn't agree to any specific method here.

Marshal Stalin said he wished to put a question in order to ascertain exactly what the intentions of the three governments are. He said events in Germany were moving toward catastrophe for the German people and that German defeats would increase in magnitude since the allies of the Soviet Union intend to launch an important offensive very soon on the western front. In addition, he said that Germany was threatened with internal collapse because of the lack of bread and coal with the loss of Silesia and the potential destruction of the Ruhr. He said that such rapid developments made it imperative that the three governments not fall behind events but be ready to deal with the question when the German collapse occurred. He said he fully understood the Prime Minister's difficulties in setting out a detailed plan, and he felt therefore that the President's suggestion might be acceptable, namely: (1) agreement in principle that Germany should be dismembered; (2) to charge a commission of the foreign ministers to work out the details; (3) to add to the surrender terms a clause stating that Germany would be dismembered without giving any details. He said he thought this latter point was important as it would definitely inform the group in power who would accept surrender unconditionally, whether generals or others, that the intention of the Allies is to dismember Germany. The group by their signature would then bind the German people to this clause. He said he thought it was very risky to follow the plan of the Prime Minister and say nothing to the German people about dismemberment by the Allies. The advantage of saying it in advance would facilitate acceptance by the whole German people of what was in store for them.

The Prime Minister then read the text of Article 12 of the surrender terms agreed on by the European Advisory Commission, in which he pointed out that the Allied governments have full power and authority over the future of Germany.

The President said that he shared Marshal Stalin's idea of the advisability of informing the German people at the time of surrender of what was in store for them.

The Prime Minister said that the psychological effect on the Germans might stiffen their re- [illegible] ident and Marshal [illegible] there was no [illegible] making the decision public, and Marshal Stalin added that as far as he knew the surrender terms which Italy had accepted had not yet been made public.

The Prime Minister said he would find it difficult to go further than to give the assent of the British to the principle of dismemberment and the setting up of machinery to study the best method of putting it into effect.

It was agreed that the three Foreign Ministers should consider Article 12 of the surrender terms instrument in order to examine the best method of bringing in a reference to the intention to dismember Germany.

The President then said that the question of the French zone remained to be decided. He said that he had understood from Marshal Stalin that the French definitely did not wish to annex outright the German territory up to the Rhine.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was not the case, since during the visit of General de Gaulle the French had made it quite plain that they intended to annex permanently the territory up to the Rhine.

The Prime Minister said that he did not feel it possible to discuss possible frontiers as they were considering only the zones of temporary military occupation. He added that he was for giving the French a definite zone which could come out of the British and possibly the American zones and that all he sought here was that the Soviet Government would agree that the British and American Governments should have the right to work out with the French a zone of occupation. He added that this zone would not in any way affect the proposed Soviet zone.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether or not the granting of a zone to France would not serve as a precedent to other states.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the occupation of Germany might be a long one and that the British Government was not sure that it could bear the burden alone for an extended period and that the French might be able to be of real assistance in this matter.

Marshal Stalin said that if the French were given a zone, would not that change the tripartite control of Germany to a four-nation control.

The Prime Minister replied that the British Government expected that if France were given a zone they would of course participate in the control machinery, and that in regard to other nations that might assist in the occupation such as Belgium or Holland, there would be no question of a specific zone and thus no part in the participation of the control machinery.

Marshal Stalin stated that he thought it would bring up many complications if we should have four nations instead of three participating in the determination of German matters. He thought that some method might be evolved whereby England might let the French, Belgians and Dutch assist in the occupation but without the right to participate in the three-power decisions for Germany. He said that if this was accepted the Soviet Government might desire to ask other states to help in the occupation of the Soviet zone without any right to participate in the decisions of the control commission.

The Prime Minister replied that he felt that this brought up the whole question of the future role of France in Europe and that he personally felt that France should play a very important role. He pointed out that France had had a long experience in dealing with the Germans, that they were the largest naval power, and could be of great help in the administration of Germany. He went on to say that Great Britain did not wish to bear the whole weight of an attack by Germany in the future and for this reason they would like to see France strong and in possession of a large army. He said it was problematical how long the United States forces would be able to stay in Europe and therefore it was essential that France be relied upon to assist in the long-term control of Germany.

The President replied that he did not believe that American troops would stay in Europe much more than two years. He went on to say that he felt that he could obtain support in Congress and throughout the country for any reasonable measure designed to safeguard the future peace, but he did not believe that this would extend to the maintenance of an appreciable American force in Europe.

The Prime Minister said that he felt that France should have a large army since it was the only ally that Great Britain had in the West, whereas the Soviet Union in addition to their own powerful military establishment could count on the support of the Poles.

Marshal Stalin said he fully appreciated the necessity of a strong France, which had recently signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union. He added that he had discussed this matter with Daladier before the war and recently in Moscow with General de Gaulle.

The President then remarked that he felt that France should be given a zone but that he personally felt that it would be a mistake to bring other nations into the general question of the control of Germany.

Marshal Stalin observed that if France was given the right to participate in the control machinery for Germany, it would be difficult to refuse other nations. He repeated that he wished to see France a strong power but that he could not deny the truth which was that France had contributed little to this war and had opened the gates to the enemy. In his opinion, he said the control commission for Germany should be run by those who have stood firmly against Germany and have made the greatest sacrifices in bringing victory. He did not believe that France should belong on the list of such powers. But, that it should be limited to the three nations represented here.

The Prime Minister replied that every nation had had their difficulties in the beginning of the war and had made mistakes. He said that France had gone down before the attacks of the new German tank and, while it was true that France had not been much help in the war, she still remained the nearest neighbor of Germany and of great importance to Great Britain. He agreed that it would be inconvenient to add France to the present group of major allies. But he felt that British public opinion would not understand why France was being excluded from a problem which was of such direct concern to her. He observed that the destiny of great nations was not decided by the temporary state of their technical apparatus. He concluded, however, that he had been against the participation of France in the present conference, which as he understood was the opinion of the President and had gathered here was also that of Marshal Stalin. He concluded by saying that we must provide for France in the future to stand guard on the left hand of Germany, otherwise Great Britain might again be confronted with the specter of Germany at the channel ports.

Marshal Stalin repeated that he would not like to see France as a participant in the control machinery for Germany, although he had no objection to their being given a zone within the British and American zones.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the control commission will be an extraordinary body under the order of the Governments concerned and that there was no reason to fear that basic policy in regard to Germany would be made by this commission.

The President pointed out at this point that France was in fact a full member of the European Advisory Commission which was the only Allied body apart from this conference which was considering the German problem.

The President said that he favored the acceptance of the French request for a zone, but that he agreed with Marshal Stalin that France should not take part in the control machinery, otherwise other nations would demand participation. He went on to say, for example, that as a result of the deliberate German destruction of the dikes that large sections of Dutch farm land had been inundated by salt water and that it would be necessary to give the Dutch farmers compensation for a temporary period from German territory. He said that he understood that it would take at least five years before the flooded lands would be suitable for cultivation. If this was done, and he personally felt that it should be done, the Dutch might well claim a voice in the control machinery for Germany.

Mr. Eden then pointed out that there was no question of any zone for any other power except France, but that France would not accept a zone of occupation within the British and American zones without participation in the control commission.

FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BIG THREE: From left, Vyacheslav M. Molotov of Soviet, Anthony Eden of Britain and Edward R. Stettinius Jr. of U. S. photographed at Yalta.

The New York Times

Marshal Stalin remarked that Great Britain could speak for France in the control commission.

The Prime Minister supported Mr. Eden's theories and said that if France got a zone they must be representation in the control commission, otherwise the question of the administration of the French zone and its relation to the other zones would be impossible of solution. He again pointed out that the control commission would be a subordinate body but would be actively engaged every day in the administration of Germany. He added that he felt French participation would serve as a precedent for others.

The Prime Minister then suggested that the three Foreign Ministers be asked to study the question in relation to the French zone to the control commission.

Mr. Molotov said that the European Advisory Commission had already worked out a definite agreement on a tripartite administration of Germany.

Mr. Eden replied that there was no intention of reversing that decision but that he felt as a practical matter the question of the relationship of the French zone to that of the control commission should be considered.

In reply to a question from Mr. Molotov, the Prime Minister repeated that there was no intention of giving the Belgians or Dutch a zone.

Mr. Eden repeated that the case of France was different and that they would not accept a zone subordinate to British control.

Marshal Stalin then said that he felt that there was agreement on the fact that France should be given a zone but should not be given participation in the control commission. The three Foreign Ministers should study the question of the relationship of the French zone to that of the commission.

Marshal Stalin then said that he would like to discuss the question of German reparations.

The President said that in regard to reparations there was first of all the question of the desires and needs of principal allies and the subsequently that of the smaller countries, such as Belgium, Holland, Norway, etc. He said he would like to bring up the question of Russian desires in regard to the utilization of German manpower.

Marshal Stalin replied that they had a plan for reparations in kind but were not ready yet to present any plan in regard to German manpower. He then said that Mr. Maisky would present the Soviet plan.

Mr. Maisky then outlined the Soviet plan for reparations for Germany. He said that the Soviet plan for reparations in kind envisaged two categories: (1) The removal from the national wealth of Germany of plants, machine tools, rolling stock, etc., to be completed within a period of two years after the end of hostilities; (2) yearly payments in kind of [illegible] for ten years. He said that in order to restore the Soviet economy, which had suffered so much from German aggression and to safeguard the future security of Europe, it would be necessary to reduce German heavy industry by 80 per cent. By heavy industry he meant iron and steel, electrical power and chemical industries. Specialized industry useful only for military purposes should be 100 per cent removed. In this category would fall all aviation factories, synthetic oil refineries, etc. He said that the Soviet Government felt that with 20 per cent of her heavy industry Germany would be in position to cover the economic needs of the country. He said the list of goods to be delivered during the ten-year period would be definitely fixed later on. He further proposed that in the interests of the orderly execution of the reparations plan and for the security of Europe there should be an Anglo-Soviet-American control over German economy which would last beyond the period of the reparations payment. All German enterprises which could be utilized for war purposes should be placed under international control, with representatives of the three powers sitting on the boards of such enterprises.

Mr. Maisky went on to say that in the calculation of losses as a result of German aggression, the figures had been so astronomical that a selection and the establishment of a system of priorities for compensation had been necessary. He said that even direct material losses, such as public and private property, factories, plants, railroads, houses, institutions, confiscation of materials, etc., had been so large that no reparations could cover their loss. For this reason priorities had been established according to indices: (1) The proportional contribution of any nation to the winning of the war; (2) The material losses. [illegible] made the highest contribution to the war and had suffered the highest material losses would come into the first category and all others would fall into the second. Mr. Maisky proposed that there should be set up a special reparations committee of the three Governments to sit in Moscow. He concluded the the total reparations shown in withdrawals and yearly payments which the Soviet required would reach a total of $10,000,000,000.

The Prime Minister [illegible] the [illegible] been [illegible] that [illegible] the Allies [illegible] that [illegible] have [illegible] States [illegible] He said [illegible] had taken [illegible] credit to [illegible] ships. He [illegible] suffering [illegible] the Soviet Union had [illegible] war had been [illegible] other power [illegible] Soviet Union [illegible] near the [illegible] had [illegible] He said that at the end of the last war the Allies [illegible] figures of reparations [illegible] these [illegible] turned [illegible] worth. He said that [illegible] Eden [illegible] war and that the British [illegible] bulk of [illegible] He said that the British had to export goods in order to import food [illegible] dependent on [illegible] of their food [illegible] there would be [illegible] country so [illegible] and that, therefore, if he could see any benefit [illegible] in large reparations from Germany he would favor them, of course. But he very much doubted whether this was possible. He added that other countries, such as Belgium, Holland and Norway also [illegible] against Germany. He said he was haunted by the specter of a starving Germany which would present a serious problem for the Allies since we would either say, "It serves them right" or endeavor to help them. In the latter case, who would pay for the help. The Prime Minister concluded that if one wished a horse to pull a wagon, that you would at least have to give it fodder.

Marshal Stalin observed that that was right, but care should be taken to see that the horse did not turn around and kick you.

The President remarked that he had also been through the last war and that he remembered very vividly that the United States had lost a great deal of money. He said that we had lent over $10,000,000,000 to Germany and that this time we would not repeat our past mistakes. He said that in the United States after the last war the German property that had been sequestered during the war had been turned back to the German owners, but that this time he would seek the necessary legislation to retain for the United States all German property in America. He said that the Germans had no capital, factories or other equipment that the United States needed, but that he did not wish to have to contemplate the necessity of helping the Germans to keep from starving. He said, however, that he would willingly support any claims for Soviet reparations since he felt that the German standard of living should not be higher than that of the Soviet Union. He added that just as we expected to help Great Britain expand her export trade, we would also help the Soviet Union obtain the reparations in kind which she required, as well as German manpower to reconstruct the devasted regions, but he felt that the Germans should be allowed to live in order that they might not become a burden on the world. The President concluded, however, that despite his desire to see the devasted areas of all countries, in the Soviet Union, in Great Britain, in Poland and elsewhere, restored [illegible] reparations could [illegible] he was in favor of [illegible] the maximum [illegible] from Germany but [illegible] the extent that the people [illegible]

[illegible] Maisky then stated that [illegible] appreciated the Prime Minister's points concerning the [illegible] after the last war [illegible] of reparations [illegible] failure [illegible] from the [illegible] the reparations had [illegible] Germany [illegible] which was the [illegible] the reparations policy [illegible]. He said that [illegible] that the financial policy of the United States and Great Britain contributed to the German refusal to pay. He said the Germans had never paid more than one-quarter of the reparations figure and had received a great deal more in credits and loans. Mr. Maisky stated that the purpose of reparations in kind was to avoid the problem of transfer. He pointed out that the amount desired by the Soviet Union was equal only to 10 per cent of the present United States budget and equal to about six months of the British expenditures in the war. The Soviet demands for German reparations equaled about one and one-half times the United States budget in peace and about two times the British budget. He said, of course, there was no intention to bring Germany into starvation but he pointed out that he did not feel that the Germans had a right to a higher standard of living than that of Central Europe. He said Germany can develop her light industry and agriculture and that since the Germans would have no military expenditures there was no reason why Germany would not have a modest but decent standard of living for her people.

The Prime Minister said that the question of reparations should be examined by a subcommission [that] should consider the claims of other countries who were the victims of Nazi aggression as well.

The President said that in his opinion the commission should be confined to the representatives of the three powers, to which Stalin agreed.

The Prime Minister said that he was in agreement, that in the first instance the representatives of the three major powers should consider the question.

Marshal Stalin said he felt that the commission could accomplish nothing unless it was given general directives from the conference. He said he felt that the commission composed of the representatives of the principal Allies must work on the basis that those powers which contributed most to the common victory and should be given priority in the matter of reparations. He said that although the United States did not need machinery or such, she might well need raw materials which she could obtain from Germany. He mentioned that the United States would take over German property in the United States as a part of her share.

The President expressed agreement with this view.

Marshal Stalin confirmed that in deflating Germany's capabilities, Germany's post-war requirements should be also taken into consideration. These all determine terms would work not for war but for peace. He remarked that the three powers that had made the most sacrifices and had been the organizers of victory should have first claim to reparations. He stated that he did not include France among these powers since she had suffered less than Belgium, Yugoslavia or Poland.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the Allies had done a great deal of the damage in France.

Marshal Stalin replied that France could not expect to get reparations from the Allies. He said that he respected France but that he could not ignore the truth and that at the present moment France only had eight divisions in the war, Yugoslavia twelve and the Lublin Government of the Poles thirteen.

It was then agreed that the question of the basic directives to a commission on reparations which would sit in Moscow would be referred to the Foreign Ministers who would report back to the conference. It was agreed that the next meeting would be 4:00 P. M. tomorrow, February 6, and that the questions of Dumbarton Oaks and Poland would be considered.

The President opened the meeting and said that he thought they should talk about the general aims of peace rather than about Dakar and China. There were many things to discuss. He said that one of the first questions to dispose of immediate importance was that of zones of occupation of Germany now that the situation seemed to be coming to a head. He meant not the permanent solution of Germany but just that of occupation. It was a question of the French, who want a zone. Occupation also involves control machinery. He showed a map to those at the table and said that it what he and Prime Minister Churchill discussed about at Quebec. He amended this statement when it was explained to him privately that the map had its origin in the protocol on the zones of occupation and the European Advisory Commission.

STALIN: I should also like to discuss the following questions: (1) The Dismemberment of Germany. There was an exchange of views at Teheran and when Churchill came to Moscow it was further discussed [but] there were no decisions. I understand that we are all in favor of dismemberment, but I would like to know definitely, do we agree and if so, what form of dismemberment? (2) Do we admit the setting up of any government in Germany or not? Or should we confine ourselves merely to establishing their administration? If we divide Germany, will each part have its own government or will each part have its own administration? (3) Unconditional surrender. We are agreed on that, but if Hitler surrenders unconditionally are we to preserve his Government? We have already had experience with that in Italy. [illegible] work out the definite terms of unconditional surrender? (4) Reparations and the amount. All these questions are in addition to those raised by the President. (It appeared that Stalin was not familiar with the E. A. C.-approved protocol on unconditional surrender.)

PRESIDENT: All these other questions are pertinent and grow out of the zones of occupation.

EDEN: (Nodding) That's right.

STALIN: That we shall find out. If Germany is to be partitioned, then in what parts? It is well known that we twice exchanged views. First at Teheran, when the President then suggested partition into five parts. The Prime Minister hesitated but said he also favored partition. I associated myself with the President, but that was only an exchange of views. The second time I exchanged views with the Prime Minister in Moscow. He talked of partition in two parts; one of Prussia and one of Bavaria. He suggested that the Ruhr and Westphalia be put under international control. I replied that might be appropriate but would make no decision because the President was not there. Hasn't the time come for decision? If you think so, let us make one.

PRIME MINISTER: In principle I think we are all agreed on dismemberment, but the actual method, the tracing of lines, is much too complicated a matter to settle here in five or six days. It requires very searching examination of geography, history and economic facts and is deserving of prolonged consideration by subcommittees or committees to be set up to go into the question. The two conversations mentioned by Marshal Stalin have approached the topic in a very general way only. If asked today, "How would you divide Germany?" I would not be prepared to answer. I might make some personal suggestion but would feel free to change my views. One has in mind, first the might of Prussia, then the [illegible] of Austria. One can see that Prussia separating from other German states would have her power greatly reduced, and I personally myself thought establishment of another German state in the south—possibly with its capital at Vienna—would be a line of great division between Prussia and the rest. The population would be half and half. There are other questions in principle decided, which here present themselves for consideration: (1) We are agreed Germany should lose certain territories largely conquered by Russian arms or needed in connection with Polish settlement. (2) Also there is the question of the Rhine Valley—the Ruhr and the Saar—potent munitions areas. Should they be handed to a country like France? Or made independent under Germany? Or placed under some world organization for a long period of time? This necessary requires very searching study and consideration. I have no fixed ideas. (3) Finally, there is the question whether Prussia, herself having been isolated, should be subjected to internal division. I have no fixed opinion. I would like the matter explored and possibly settled in agreement with our two great allies. The French must of course be consulted. At Teheran there was some talk of an examination being made of these complex matters. We should do this quickly, mainly set up machinery for examination.

Churchill Had Doubts On Roosevelt Estimate

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 16—President Roosevelt thought the Yalta Conference should finish its work in five or six days. Prime Minister Churchill had doubts.

To meet such a schedule, the British leader suggested that top staff officers meet in advance to review the agenda.

"I do not see any other way," he said in a message to Mr. Roosevelt, "of realizing our hopes about world organization in five or six days. Even the Almighty took seven. Pray forgive my pertinacity."

We are not ill-prepared for the immediate effect of German surrender. All details have been worked out and are well known to the three governments. There remains only formal agreement on zones of occupation and control machinery. If Germany surrenders in a few weeks or a month unconditionally we have only to march in and occupy by processes already agreed upon.

STALIN: This is not clear. How can it be carried out in practice? Suppose a group declares it has thrown out Hitler? Shall we be prepared to deal with them?

EDEN: We would set the terms agreed upon before this regime.

(Eden left the room at this point to get a copy of the surrender terms and missed the next few minutes.)

PRIME MINISTER: In that case we must make up our mind whether the group is worth dealing with. If so, we must make them sign the agreed terms. If they are not worth dealing with we should continue the war and occupy the whole country.

STALIN: When shall we bring up the question of dismemberment to these new people if there is no provision for dismemberment on the surrender terms? Shall we not add a provision in the terms of surrender for dismemberment?

PRIME MINISTER: If they sign we do not discuss with them any question about the future. There is no need to raise the question. We reserve all rights over their land, their liberty and their lives.

STALIN: This is not an additional question but it is most important.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree. But it is not necessary to discuss it with the Germans.

STALIN: No, simply to demand from them.

PRIME MINISTER: I do not think it possible to discuss the exact form of dismemberment. That would come at the peace conference.

PRESIDENT: We have not decided what the Marshal proposed. Are we going to dismember or not?" He wants the matter settled in principle but not as to details. The Prime Minister says he is not yet ready to lay down the limit; that requires study. In effect, these are our terms and in addition we shall dismember. That is the only difference. Shall we all agree that Germany should be dismembered? As at Teheran, I am very much personally in favor of decentralization. Forty years ago when I was in Germany there was no word for the Reich and in Bavaria affairs were managed entirely locally. I do not know whether there should be more or less states than suggested before but shall we tell the Germans that we are going to dismember and do it our way."

PRIME MINISTER: I see no need to inform the Germans at that time of surrender whether we will dismember them or not. It is enough to tell them, "await our decision as to your future." We might be able to tell while our troops are marching in what is needed.

PRESIDENT: If this question is discussed all over the world there will be a hundred plans for dismemberment. Therefore, I ask that we confine it to ourselves and that the three Foreign Secretaries bring in tomorrow a plan for dismemberment.

PRIME MINISTER: You mean a plan for the study of the question of dismemberment, not a plan for dismemberment itself?

PRESIDENT: Yes, for the study of dismemberment.

PRIME MINISTER: His Majesty's Government would be prepared now to assent to the principle of dismemberment and to set on foot the best body to study the method.

STALIN: I put the question so that we may be quite agreed on what we want. Events in Germany are developing rapidly toward a catastrophe for them. Their defeats shall increase because of the Allied airforce attacks in the near future.

(I left the room to get a glass of water for the President and missed the following few minutes.)

STALIN: In view of such rapid events we should not be without preparation. Therefore, I put the questions and think they should be settled here. No details need be worked out now. I think the President's compromise proposal should be accepted. Is it agreed (1) to dismember Germany and empower a commission to elaborate concrete plans? (2) To add to the surrender terms that Germany is going to be dismembered, though not to say into how many states? I think it important that we should say this so that the group in power should know Germany is to be dismembered. I think the Prime Minister's plan not to tell the Germans is a risky one; we should say this to them in advance. I think there are advantages to have this provision in the surrender terms so that any German group should know when they sign and bear the responsibilities.

PRIME MINISTER: The terms of unconditional surrender are terms on which the fighting stops. (He reads Article 12 of surrender terms). That is what they have got to sign.

PRESIDENT: The first paragraph on disarmament does not mention dismemberment and does not make it clear enough. The Marshal's idea, which is somewhat my own, is that it will make it easier if it be in the terms and tell them.

PRIME MINISTER: But you don't want to tell them. Eisenhower doesn't want that. That would make the Germans fight all the harder. We should not make this public.

PRESIDENT: My own feeling is that the people have suffered so much that they are now beyond questions of psychological warfare.

STALIN: No, these conditions for the moment are only for us; they should not be public until the time of surrender. We can do as we have done with Italy where the surrender terms are not yet public. I want it agreed (1) to dismember and (2) to put dismemberment into the surrender terms.

PRIME MINISTER: I find it difficult to go beyond assent to the principle of dismemberment and the setting on foot of machinery as to the best method of doing it. I agree to a most rapid examination of the question of the best means of studying a method of dismemberment.

PRESIDENT: Would you put in Article 12 in addition the word "dismemberment"?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes, I would agree.

EDEN: Or some other formula to make dismemberment possible.

STALIN: I have no objection to the proposal. It is agreed.

PRESIDENT: Now to take up the next question—a zone of occupation for France. (A portion missed here.)

STALIN: The French told me in Moscow that they would want a frontier on the Rhine.

PRIME MINISTER: I can't agree. There is a question of a condominium on the Rhine. The present question is different. It applies only to zones of occupation. We are all now agreed, are we not, on the three zones? The French want a zone and I am in favor of granting it to them. I would gladly give them part of the British zone. All we want is this: It does not affect the Soviet zone. Will our Russian allies agree that the British and Americans get together on a zone to allot to the French? The line of the Moselle seems a convenient place to let them in. They are not in a position to occupy a large zone.

STALIN: Would it not be a precedent for other states? Would it not mean that the French become a fourth power in the control machinery for Germany which, so far, is only for the three of us?

PRIME MINISTER: Our answer is that France should come in and as its army grows take a larger part in the occupation.

STALIN: I think there might be complications in our work if we have a fourth member. I suggest another method—for the British to get the help of France or Holland or Belgium in occupation, but not give them rights in the control machinery. We might ask on our side to invite other states to help occupy our zone but not to sit in on control machinery.

PRIME MINISTER: The discussion is on the immediate question of France. They have had long experience in occupying Germany. They do it very well and they would not be lenient. We want to see them might grow to help keep Germany down. I do not know how long the United States will remain with us in occupation. (The President: "Two years.") Therefore the French Army should grow in strength and help to share the burden. If Russia wants some other power in her zone we should not object.

STALIN: I should like to know the President's response.

PRESIDENT: I can get the people and Congress to cooperate fully for peace but not to keep an army in Europe a long time. Two years would be the limit.

PRIME MINISTER: I hope that would be according to circumstances. At all events we shall need the French to help us.

STALIN: France is our ally. We signed a pact with her. We want her to have a large army.

PRESIDENT: I would much rather have a small member on the control machinery. I should be just as satisfied if the French are not in on the control machinery.

STALIN: I should like to repeat that if we let the French in on control machinery it would be difficult to refuse other states. I agree that the French should be great and strong, but we cannot forget that in this war France opened the gates to the enemy. This is a fact. We would not have had so many losses and destruction in this war if the French had not opened the gates to the enemy. The control and administration of Germany must be only for those powers standing firm against her from the beginning and so far France does not belong to this group.

PRIME MINISTER: We were all in difficulties early in the war and France went down before the new tank, and I admit they were not much help in this war. But the fact remains they are the neighbor of the Germans and the most important neighbor. British public opinion would not understand if decisions vital to France are being made with regard to Germany over France's head. I hope, therefore, that we shall not decide for an indefinite exclusion of France for all time. I was very much against General de Gaulle's coming here and the President's view was very much the same. Apparently Marshal Stalin feels the same. But the fact remains that France must take her place. We will need her defense against Germany. We have suffered badly from German robot guns and should Germany again get near to the Channel coast, we would suffer again. After the Americans

Liaison for the Advancing Armies Planned by the Military Authorities

have gone home I must think seriously of the future. I propose to offer the French a zone out of present British and American zones and that technical studies be made of the French position in the control machinery.

STALIN: I am still against France taking part in the control machinery.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree. (Several sentences not understood) . . . that France cannot be a member of this group but cannot we let her into control machinery.

PRESIDENT: (On the basis of a note from Mr. Hopkins) I think we have lost sight of the French position on the European Advisory Commission. I suggest that the French have a zone of occupation but that we postpone discussion on control machinery. Others might want to come in and has Holland or Austria.

STALIN: I agree.

PRESIDENT: The Netherlands are in a very serious situation. Several millions of their farmers are thrown off their land by flooding and we must set aside some land in Germany to take care of this. Their own land will not be suitable for cultivation for five years. The Netherlands might ask for a seat on the control commission.

EDEN: If the French are to have a zone, how can they be excluded from the control machinery? If they are, how can their operation of their zone be controlled?

STALIN: They could be controlled by the power from which they obtained the zone.

PRIME MINISTER and EDEN: We cannot undertake to do that and the French would never submit to it.

EDEN: The French pressed us hard on this question in Paris when we visited there. Didn't they question it at Moscow?

STALIN: We talked about it. But we said it could only be discussed by all the three powers.

PRIME MINISTER: Is it agreed that the Americans and British set aside a zone for France? I propose to leave the next step as to the future status of France when it may be approved as a whole. I propose that the three Foreign Secretaries sketch out the kind of commission for control to be set up. (After Eden has whispered to him) he (Eden) says it has all been worked out and I withdraw my question.

MAISKY: I think it is superfluous to discuss the question with the three Foreign Ministers.

MOLOTOV: The European Advisory Commission has already taken decisions and has set up for only the three powers. It is agreed that France is to have a zone and that the question of their relation to the control machinery shall be left for report by the three foreign ministers.

Reparations

PRESIDENT: The three of us are involved in this question and there is also the question of what the small powers want. First, there is the question of manpower. What does Russia want? The United States and Britain, I believe, do not want reparations in manpower.

STALIN: We have a plan for reparations in kind but we are not ready to talk about manpower.

PRIME MINISTER: Could we hear about your plan for reparations in kind?

(Stalin instructs Maisky to explain the Russian plan.)

MAISKY: Reparations in kind we think should be in two forms: (1) Withdrawals from the national wealth of Germany at the end of the war. By this is meant transfer of factories, plants, machinery, machine tools, rolling stock and investments abroad. (2) Yearly payments in kind for a period of ten years.

To restore Russian economy and for the security of Europe it is necessary to cut down German heavy industry by 80 per cent. By heavy industry is meant iron and steel, metal working, engineering, chemicals, electrical engineering, etc. All military production and aviation as well as synthetic petroleum should be prohibited 100 per cent. About 20 per cent of German heavy industry would be left and this would be enough for the real need of German economy. Reparations in kind should be for a period of ten years and the list could be settled later on. The reparations in kind should be terminated in ten years and withdrawals of plants, factories, etc., in two years. In order to make Germany pay, there must be very strict financial control over Germany. The details can be settled later on, but it must be established that the most important industries should be internationalized and members of the three great Allies should be on the boards of directors, such representation to continue for the ten-year period. In estimating reparations we have considered the kind of losses to be covered. The figures are so astronomical that we believe that only those losses under the category of direct material losses, that is, destruction of state and private property of all sorts, should be included. Even this is so large that the whole amount of reparations cannot be covered. Therefore, priorities among countries should be fixed by indices. We make two suggestions: (1) The proportion of contribution by a country to the winning of the war to the losses of material in the war. The highest should be in the first category and the others in the second category. (2) For discussion of the principles and details on reparations, we suggest that a commission with its seat in Moscow should be set up. The question now comes how much would Russia want for reparations. We would want not less than $10,000,000,000.

PRIME MINISTER: I remember well the last war and the sad experience in reparations that followed. It was with great difficulty that £1,000,000,000 was finally extracted from Germany and that was due to the fact that Germany received much larger amounts in loans from the United States. I remember we took over some old Atlantic liners which permitted Germany to build better new ones. I do not want to repeat that experience. I admit that Russian losses are much greater than those of any other country. I feel that the removal of certain plants and materials from Germany is the proper step for restitution. I am sure that we will never get out of Germany anything like £150,000,000 a year. Britain has suffered. Our houses have been destroyed. We are faced with an export problem. We must export in order to buy food, one-half of which we must import. We have incurred very heavy debts outside Lend-Lease. No victorious country will come out so burdened financially as Great Britain. If I could see any benefit in reparations I would ... suffered great devastation in France, Belgium, Norway. We must also consider the phantom of a starving Germany and who is going to pay for that. If 80,000,000 are starving, are we to say, "It serves you right," and if not, who is going to pay for feeding them?"

STALIN: There will be food for them anyway.

PRIME MINISTER: I am in favor of setting up a commission to study the question.

PRESIDENT: We lost Germany far more than we got after the last war. That cannot happen again. We want no manpower. We do not want their machine tools or their factories. Therefore, what can we get? German stock and property in the United States? This has at present been taken over by the Alien Property Custodian. After the last war it was used as an offset against our claims in Germany. I hope to get legislation this time to take it over as a trust fund.

We must think of the future of Germany. We have always been generous through our Red Cross but we can't guarantee the future of Germany. We don't want to kill the people. We want Germany to live but not to have a higher standard of living than that of the U. S. S. R. I envision a Germany that is self-sustaining but not starving. There will be no lending of money. Our objective is seeing that Germany will not starve in helping the Soviet get all it can in manpower and factories and helping the British get all they can in exports to former German markets. Therefore, the time has come to set up a reparations commission. In rebuilding we must get all we can but we can't get it all. Leave Germany enough industry and work to keep her from starving.

MAISKY: The experience of reparations has been bad but the reason was not because reparations were too heavy but because they were asked in monetary form and therefore the transfer question arose. There was also the question of Germany's refusal to pay. What is ten billion dollars? It is 10 per cent of the United States budget this year. It is six months' war expenditure of Great Britain. It is one and one quarter times the United States peacetime budget and two and one quarter times the British each year. Yes, we should prevent Germany from having a higher standard than the middle European standard. Germany will be able to live on this and she is free to develop her light industry and agriculture. The doubts of the Prime Minister are unfounded. Germany will be able to live a decent life and we must not forget that she will have no burden of military expenditures.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree on the setting up of a reparations commission but we must keep it secret.

STALIN: Yes, it should be kept secret.

PRIME MINISTER: The commission must also consider the claims of all the victims, the assets available and the priorities to be assigned. Differences arising in the commission must be referred to and settled by the three governments.

STALIN: We must take here common decisions as the guiding lines for the commission. The work must be done by the three parties to the commission. We three should have the first place on reparations claims as we bear the burden of the war. The United States should get German property in America. She doesn't want machine tools. We must take into consideration not only present German resources but her future resources when her manpower returns and goes to work. I do not include France in the first category and certainly France shall not have reparations from us. I must say in all truth, France cannot be compared to us. She takes part in the war with eight divisions and some navy. The Yugoslavs, and I am not mentioning them, have twelve divisions; Lublin Poland has ten divisions, which is more than de Gaulle has. I propose that the three foreign ministers meet and report.

PRIME MINISTER: They should settle the heads of the directives—the guiding principles—and I hope that within one month the Governments can receive their version. You must remember I have a Cabinet and Parliament. Also the point of the first index on damage sustained I think is enough. I do not think that the services in the war should be taken into consideration. Remember the saying of each according to his needs. The President agrees to the setting up of the reparations commission in Moscow; the Prime Minister agrees also.

The meeting adjourned at 8 P. M. after determining that the next meeting should be held at 4 tomorrow afternoon and that the world organization should be taken up first and Poland second.

Associated Press

SOVIET LEADERS: Vyacheslav M. Molotov, left, Soviet Foreign Minister, with Premier Stalin as they appeared while attending the conference of the Big Three at Yalta.

HOPKINS PAPERS

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President.

1. The relationship of this and of the two following notes to the second plenary meeting appears from internal evidence and from their association in the files with a paper bearing the following words in Hopkins' handwriting: "Notes given to President by me during conference with Stalin and Churchill on Feb. 5-6th."

Yalta, February 5, 1945.

1. France is on the European Advisory Committee now. That is only body considering German affairs now.
2. Promise a zone.
3. Postpone decision about control commission.

HOPKINS PAPERS

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President.

Yalta, February 5, 1945.

Could you not add that French participation on control commission might be considered later?

HOPKINS PAPERS

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President.

Yalta, February [illegible]

Could you ask [illegible]

1. Why not [illegible] Storm Troopers [illegible] criminals.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Feb. 6, 1945, 10 A. M.

Vorontsov Villa

PRESENT

United States

General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Bull
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser

United Kingdom

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
Field Marshal Alexander
General Ismay
Admiral Somerville
Major General Laycock

(Secretariat)

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves
Major General Jacob
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

C.C.S. 186th Meeting

TOP SECRET

1. Approval of minutes of the 185th meeting.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 185th meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

2. Levels of supply of petroleum products in U. K. and northwest Europe.

3. Planning date for the end of the war against Germany (C. C. S. 771).

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Agreed to accept for planning purposes the following dates for the end of the war with Germany:—

A. Earliest date, 1 July 1945.

B. Date beyond which war is unlikely to continue, 31 December 1945.

4. Provision of LVT's for the Mediterranean.

5. Alteration of Zones of Occupation in Germany (C. C. S. 320/35).

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff proposing the acceptance of an agreement regarding the Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave and the use of the railway from Bremen to the southwest zone, on the understanding that this agreement did not involve the question of command of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area.

General Marshall referred to the fact that the letter at enclosure "B" (Page 5) visualized the necessity for making a more detailed form of agreement, covering a variety of circumstances. He felt strongly that no such detailed agreement was necessary. The broad policy had been decided and the goodwill was there. Details could be left very largely to local commanders and any problems of overlapping authority which did arise could be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the time came.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then agreed to the following amendments to the [illegible] to enclosure "B" of C. C. S. 320/35:—

A. In Paragraph 1 delete the words "but will be generally administered as a subdistrict of the larger British-controlled area."

B. In the second sentence of Paragraph 1, delete the words "larger district" and substitute "British zone."

C. In the second sentence of Paragraph 2, delete the word "responsible" and substitute the word "responsive."

The Combined Chiefs of Staff—

A. Endorsed the text as proposed by General Marshall above and approved the draft to enclosure "B" of C. C. S. 320/35 as amended in discussion (subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 320/37).

B. Agreed to take no further action on the detailed recommendations included in the draft of enclosure "B" to C. C. S. 320/35.

6. Basic Undertakings (C. C. S. 775).

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff recommending a substitute for the existing Paragraph 6h in C. C. S. 680/2.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were now in a position to agree to this Subparagraph 6, as it had been amended informally in discussion at a previous C. C. S. meeting when this had been discussed.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff—

Agreed to the following revised Subparagraph 6:

"H. Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the enemy powers in the present war. Having regard to the essential undertakings of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations against Germany and/or Japan."

7. Liaison with the Soviet high command over Anglo-American strategic bombing in Eastern Germany (C. C. S. 7[illegible]).

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them [illegible] Chiefs of Staff [illegible]

8. Next meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff—

Agreed to meet again, provisionally at 1000 on Thursday, 8 February 1945 to finish off all outstanding items on the Argonaut agenda.

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

5 February 1945. C. C. S. 320/3[illegible]

TOP SECRET

Alteration of Zones of Occupation in Germany

1. With regard to the draft agreement concerning the Bremen-Bremerhaven area proposed by General Macready in the attached letter to Mr. McCloy (Enclosure "B"), the United States Chiefs of Staff prefer that the final agreement exist on one sheet of paper and recommend that the combined Chiefs of Staff approve enclosure "A."

2. As regards the numerous points proposed in General Macready's letter, it appears to the United States Chiefs of Staff that such matters which cannot be agreed to by the local commanders of the zones of occupation should be referred at that time to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision. There will be undoubtedly some problems of overlapping authority and conflicting interests which will have to be resolved under the policy of coordination and cooperation.

It has been our understanding that the draft agreement as proposed by Lord Halifax and Mr. McCloy and as modified by the British Chiefs of Staff does not involve the question of command of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area. Such command, with the full authority that is inherent in command, must rest with the American commander of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area, as subordinate of the American commander of the southwestern zone. It is intended, however, that in the normal administration of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area the American commander thereof will, in accordance with the draft agreement, conform to the general policy pursued in the administration of the British zone as qualified in the phrasing of the draft agreement.

4. If the British Chiefs of Staff prefer to retain the wording of the agreement attached to General Macready's letter it is acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff provided the British Chiefs of Staff indicate their concurrence to the above interpretation of the draft agreement.

5. The United States Chiefs of Staff urge that this matter be completed before the end of the present conference.

(ENCLOSURE "A")

(Paragraph numbers conform to the attachment to General Macready's letter.)

1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave area as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization but will be generally administered as a subdistrict of larger British controlled area. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the larger district British zone, subject always to the right of American commander to vary the administration of the enclave Bremen-Bremerhaven area in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree to permit necessary access by the British to offices, and necessary use of available installations, situated in the Bremen-Bremerhaven area, which provide services essential to British administration of the British zone of occupation.

2. 3. The United States interest in transit passage from the Bremen-Bremerhaven area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one Government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsible responsive service, each military zone commander will accept a deputy controller for United States (or British) requirements of movement and transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

3. 4. The map referred to as attached is the same as that attached to C. C. S. 320/29.

J. C. S. FILES

Agreement regarding the Bremen-Bremerhaven Enclave approved by Combined Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

C. C. S. 320/37

(Yalta), Feb. 6, 1945.

THE BREMEN ENCLAVE

1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven Enclave as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the British zone subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

2. The U. S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria so evident, that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one Government through a zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsive service, each military zone commander will accept a deputy controller for (United States) British requirements of movement and transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

3. The map referred to is that attached to C. C. S. 320/29.

SECOND TRIPARTITE MILITARY MEETING

Feb. 6, 1945, Noon

YUSUPOVSKY PALACE

PRESENT

United States

Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Deane
Major General Bull
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull

United Kingdom

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
General Ismay
Admiral Somerville
Rear Admiral Archer

Soviet Union

General of the Army Antonov
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Lieutenant General Gryzlov
Vice Admiral Kucherov
Commander Kostrinsky

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier General McFarland
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Captain Graves
Commander Coleridge

INTERPRETERS

Captain Lunghi
Lieutenant Chase
Mr. Potrubach

J. C. S. FILES

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

CHAIRMANSHIP

General Antonov requested Admiral Leahy to serve as chairman of the second tripartite meeting.

Admiral Leahy thanked General Antonov but suggested that in the interest of continuity Field Marshal Brooke continue to preside.

1. Bombline and Liaison arrangements.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the first item to be discussed should be General Antonov's proposal for bombline running from Stettin through Berlin, Vienna and Zagreb. He asked the United States Chiefs of Staff to express their views on this proposal since they were most intimately concerned with it.

General Kuter said he would like to read a statement on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff, setting out their views on this matter. This statement read as follows:

1. Our wishes are:

(A) To continue to do the greatest possible damage to the German military and economic system.

(B) To avoid interference with or danger to the Soviet forces advancing from the east.

(C) To do what is possible to assist the advance of the Soviet Army.

2. To achieve the first wish, that is, maximum damage to the Germans, it is essential to avoid as far as possible any restriction of strategic bomber action. It is now our wish to draw a line on the map which would exclude our bombers from attacking any targets which are important to the war-making power of the enemy, whether against the Soviet or the British and American forces.

3. To achieve the second wish, that is, avoidance of interference with Soviet land operations, we must rely upon the Soviet High Command to inform the British and United States missions in Moscow of the position of the Red Army from day to day. We also invite the Soviet High Command to inform the British and United States missions if there are any particular objectives, for example railway centers or centers of road communications, thus in front of their armies which they wish us not to attack. We should require at least twenty-four, and preferably forty-eight hours' notice for action upon such request.

4. A regular daily meeting between the British and United States missions in Moscow and a responsible officer of the Soviet General Staff seems to us to be essential.

5. To achieve the third wish, that is assistance to the Russian advance, we should be glad to receive through the British and American missions in Moscow any suggestions from the Soviet High Command. This suggestion would have to be considered in the light of other commitments and such factors as the distance and the weather.

6. To summarize, we suggest:

(A) That there should be no rigid division of eastern Germany into spheres of action of the Soviet and British and American strategic bombers, respectively.

(B) That day-to-day liaison should be established between a responsible officer of the Russian High Command and representatives of the British and American missions in Moscow, in order to exchange information upon which we can regulate the action of the Anglo-U. S. strategic bombers in accordance with the development of Soviet operations on land.

7. When the Soviet Air Force is ready to undertake strategic bombing deep into Germany from the east, the coordination of policy should be discussed by Soviet, American and British staff representatives in London or in Moscow. Some further machinery for the closer coordination of operations would appear to be necessary at that time.

General Kuter said that he would like to add that in addition to his objection to the principle of a fixed line on the map, there was the further objection that there were valuable strategic targets to the east of the proposed line. From among a number of such strategic targets which would be denied to Allied air power, he would mention a few. These included the oil targets at Politz, the main production center of high-octane gasoline and main source of fuel supply for the German Air Force; Ruhland, second only in importance to Politz, and one of the four major synthetic oil plants in Germany. In addition there were several other oil targets. Further, the proposed line would appear to prohibit attacks on some industrial and communication targets in the neighborhood of Berlin and Dresden. The line would also prohibit attack on three tank and self-propelled gun factories; and, lastly, and of great importance, it would prevent attacks on three jet-propelled fighter engine factories where components of the Jumo jet engines were made and the engines themselves were assembled. He would point out that the oil targets referred to required repeated attacks in view of the Germans' ability to repair them rapidly. There was one further point he would like to make. Apart from the strategic implications of the line, it was unacceptable in view of topographical considerations. A bombline must be clearly visible to a pilot in the air, both from high and low altitudes.

General Marshall said he would like to add an additional illustration of the point made by General Kuter. He had that morning received a message from the Commanding General of the United States heavy bombers operating from the United Kingdom, reporting an attack on Berlin carried out three or four days previously by a thousand heavy bombers supported by some 400 fighters. These fighters were practically over the Russian lines and in fact, destroyed a number of German aircraft taking off from an airfield east of Berlin. The Commanding General pointed out that with good liaison parties and proper radio communication, not only could valuable information be given to the Russians before such an attack but also that the most recent information with regard to enemy and Russian movements could be communicated to him.

With the speed of modern fighters, the aircraft taking part in this raid were involved in operations only five minutes flying time from the Russian ground forces. Yet it must be remembered that these aircraft were bombing a definite point which the Russian staff had requested should be attacked. Unless better methods of handling liaison were evolved, it would mean that the most powerful weapon of the war would be denied its proper use in assisting the Russians. He asked that an immediate and really practical solution should be found to this problem.

Sir Charles Portal then explained the point of view of the British Chiefs of Staff. Owing to the fact that United States bombers operated by day while the Royal Air Force bombers operated mainly by night, this problem affected the United States forces more than it did the British. Nevertheless, the problem for both air forces was almost identical. Already complete integration of control of the United States and British bomber effort from the west and from the south had been achieved. Speaking for the British air staff, he fully supported the proposals which had been put forth by General Kuter which would entirely cover British requirements.

General Antonov explained that in putting forward at the previous meeting his proposal with regard to the bombline, he had in mind the wishes expressed by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff which had been put forward by General Deane and Admiral Archer. These wishes expressed a desire that the bombline should be as near as possible to the Soviet front. The line that he now suggested was only some sixty to seventy-five kilometers in front of the Soviet lines. There was no possibility of moving the bombline further to the eastward as this would hinder the action not only of the Soviet ground forces but also the Soviet air forces. He appreciated that there were a number of important targets to the east of the proposed line which should be bombed. In connection with the bombing of such individual targets, each one could be considered separately. He would ask also that consideration should be given to the fact that the Soviets had a large number of aircraft themselves. He had mentioned on the previous day the 6,000 aircraft now being employed on the central group. All the targets [illegible] were made available to Allied air forces. [illegible] would be nothing left for the Soviet Air Force [illegible] now proposed was only a rough line drawn in the light of considerations put forward by General Deane and Admiral Archer and would have to be worked out in detail and, in particular, altered to enable Allied flyers easily to identify it. With regard to changes in the line necessitated by changes in the position of Soviet forces, full information with regard to this would be provided daily through the missions in Moscow. Through the same channel the efforts of the Soviet air forces could also be coordinated.

Sir Charles Portal said that as he understood it, General Antonov's view was that if the line which he had proposed was to be moved further to the east, there would be nothing left for the Soviet Air Force to attack. He felt there had been some misunderstanding on this point since the United States and British air staffs were entirely agreeable that any strategic target should be attacked by all three air forces. This was one of the reasons why he was opposed to drawing of any line which would divide Germany into two parts from the point of view of strategic bombing.

General Kuter said he would like to comment on two points. He was glad to learn that the Soviet wishes were similar to our own, as indicated by General Antonov's reference to constant liaison to enable coordination to be achieved. Secondly, he would like to refer to the results achieved during the advance across the western desert in this operation. As the result of excellent air-ground liaison, it was possible to place the bombline not at some specific distance ahead of the front line but at a point which it was expected that our own ground forces might be able to reach in eight hours.

General Marshall asked confirmation that General Antonov's view was that the bombline he proposed should be altered so that it could be better defined topographically and that at the same time arrangements could be made for Allied forces to bomb critical points on the Soviet side of this line.

General Antonov said the line which he had indicated was a rough guide only. He felt that the heads of the air staffs could work out the details of this line so as to insure its recognition from the air. The definition of the line could, he believed, be undertaken at the present conference. He also supported the statement made by Sir Charles Portal that there could be no line established which would effectively divide the targets of the three strategic air forces. It was for this reason that he suggested that the action of the Soviet strategic air force would be coordinated with the Allied air effort through the missions in Moscow. If it was desirable for the Allied air forces to bomb targets to the east of the line, such action could be discussed

Churchill in '45 Feared Peace Worse Than '18

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 16—As early as January, 1945, Prime Minister Churchill was taking a grave view of the post-war world.

Preparing to go to Yalta, he told President Roosevelt in a message:

"This may well be a fateful conference, coming at a moment when the great Allies are so divided and the shadow of the war lengthens out before us.

"At the present time I think the end of this war may well prove to be more disappointing than the last."

German Problem Pursued at a Meeting of the Three Foreign Ministers

in Moscow and the necessary decision taken.

Sir Alan Brooke said he regarded the bombline as a line of demarcation between the action of air forces and land forces and not as a line of demarcation between the action of strategic air forces. In Allied operations on the Western front there was no line of demarcation between the actions of the United States and British strategical air forces, but there were bomblines on the various fronts closely connected with the action of the land forces and designed to insure close cooperation between land and air forces. He asked if it were to be assumed from General Antonov's statement that the proposed bombline now being discussed was to be considered as the bombline which would ensure coordination of action between land and air forces but not designed to restrict the action of the strategic air forces, which action would be regulated through the missions in Moscow on a day-to-day basis.

Sir Charles Portal said he would like to put the question in a different way. Was it the intention of the Soviet staff that the improved liaison, which it had been suggested should take place through the missions in Moscow, would be in lieu of the line proposed and should be such as to safeguard the Soviet ground forces from the action of strategic bombers.

General Antonov said that the line he had proposed was designed to secure Soviet land forces from the possibility of accidental bombardment by the Allied air forces. Such a line would not be permanent and would be changed frequently to conform to changes in the land front. The actions of the strategic air forces, both Soviet and Allied, could not be bound by this line, however. It was drawn so close to the Soviet front that he presumed that the Allied strategic air forces would not find many targets to the east of this line though such targets might exist and in this case action against any of them could be decided upon individually, as to the Soviet strategic air force, it would appear that in most cases their attacks would take place to the west [illegible] the line.

Admiral Leahy suggested that since there appeared to be a large measure of agreement, time would be saved if the three air staffs met together and worked out the details of the proposed bombline.

Sir Charles Portal said he would like to suggest an amendment to Admiral Leahy's proposal. He felt that instead of the air staffs trying to work out the details of the line, they should work out the requirement for safeguarding the interests and security of the Soviet forces, having regard to the need for the destruction of as many important German installations as was possible. There seemed to be little difference between the various views expressed and what differences there were would, he felt sure, be settled quite easily.

[illegible] said that he [illegible] Charles Portal's [illegible] in his suggestion.

General Antonov said that he agreed with Admiral Leahy's view that the matter should be referred to the air staffs to work out a detailed line in accordance with the principles which had been discussed.

It was agreed that Marshal Khudyakov, General Kuter and Sir Charles Portal should meet together immediately to consider the matter.

Sir Alan Brooke said that there was one further related question which remained unsettled. This was the question of liaison on a lower level. General Antonov had undertaken, at the previous meeting, to seek the views of Marshal Stalin on this point.

General Antonov said he had reported on this matter to Marshal Stalin. Marshal Stalin had pointed out that there had so far been no close contact between Soviet and Allied land forces and therefore wished that liaison should take place through the staff of the Red Army and the military missions in Moscow.

4. Coordination of Offensive Operations.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the forthcoming offensives had been fully discussed at the previous meeting and coordination had been broadly settled. There remained, however, the question of the offensives during March and April. General Antonov had mentioned also a summer offensive. Could he give any further information as to the probable date of the commencement of this summer offensive and whether it would be in great strength? Further did he foresee any long periods between the end of the present offensive and the commencement of the summer offensive?

General Antonov said that Soviet offensive action had started and would continue. The Soviet forces would press forward until hampered by weather. With regard to the summer offensive, it would be difficult to give exact data with regard to the interval between the end of the winter and beginning of the summer attack. The most difficult season from the point of view of weather was the second part of March and the month of April. This was the period when roads became impassable.

General Marshall asked with regard to General Antonov's comment on the bad weather period between the winter and summer offensives, whether it was anticipated that it would be possible to carry out any important action until the summer offensive could be started.

General Antonov said that, if during this period operations in the West were carried out actively, the Soviets would take every possible action on the Eastern front wherever this could be done.

General Marshall emphasized that the interval between the winter and summer offensives would probably be the period at which the Allies would be trying to cross the Rhine. He was therefore most anxious that the enemy should not be able to concentrate forces against the Allies on the Western front at that particular time.

General Antonov said that he would assure General Marshall that the Soviets would do everything possible to prevent the transference of German forces from East to West during this period.

5. Exchange of information with regard to river crossing, technique and equipment.

Admiral Leahy said that at the first meeting between the heads of state, the British Prime Minister had raised the question of exchanging information with regard to technique and equipment employed by the Soviet forces in river crossings. At the present time, in view of the Allied proximity to the River Rhine, this was a most immediate problem for the Allied forces. There were now two officers present from General Eisenhower's headquarters and it appeared highly desirable that they should meet with the appropriate Soviet experts on the subject of the technique and equipment employed by the Red Army in major river crossings which they had undertaken. Thus the Allies, on the Western front could obtain the benefit of the experience of the Red Army in this matter. He would therefore very much appreciate it if General Antonov would indicate whether this could be done and if so would make such arrangements as were practicable for the officers from General Eisenhower's headquarters to meet with the appropriate Soviet officers.

General Antonov said that the Soviet Army was always ready to share its battle experience with its Allies. However at the moment there were no specialists in this technique available and he would like therefore time to look in this matter. He would furnish the required information later.

Admiral Leahy thanked General Antonov for this very satisfactory reply.

6. Bases for U. S. strategic bomber forces in the Vienna-Budapest area.

General Marshall said that as the Soviet advance proceeded it would be found logistically possible to move United States strategic bomber forces now in Italy, with their protecting escorting fighters, to bases in the Vienna-Budapest area. It was very desirable for such aircraft to operate from that vicinity. It was therefore the hope of the United States Chiefs of Staff that this could be arranged by having a staging area or zone of passage in that area so that it could be arranged for some 400 individual heavy-bomber sorties to be undertaken each month. This would require the support of about 1,600 fighter missions in the same period. To effect this it would be necessary to carry out certain construction work for which some 2,000 United States personnel could be provided from Italy and 500 from elsewhere. The greatest difficulty would be the transfer of the necessary supplies and equipment, twenty-two thousand tons would be required initially and a further eight thousand three hundred tons a month thereafter. The President of the United States was likely to present this project to Marshal Stalin with a request for his approval. It would involve the use of two airfields in the Budapest area and also agreements that the Soviet authorities should undertake the movement of the necessary stores to the Budapest area by road, rail or barge.

General Antonov said that the matter would probably be decided between Marshal Stalin and the President. He personally felt that it could ostensibly be undertaken and suggested that the heads of the air forces should consider the problem.

General Marshall said he would be very happy for this to be arranged.

7. PROVISION OF SOVIET AIRFIELDS FOR DAMAGED BRITISH NIGHT BOMBERS.

Sir Charles Portal said he had one request to make. It would be extremely helpful if the Soviet General Staff could designate air bases with night landing equipment at various points distributed along their front at which British night bombers, damaged in night combat over Germany, could land instead of having to fight their way back over the heavy defenses of Germany. If these aircraft were so badly damaged that they could not get back, and no such airfields were available, the crews had no alternative but to bail out and lose their aircraft. If the Soviet authorities could agree to this request, he suggested that details could be arranged through the missions in Moscow.

Marshal Khudyakov said that he regarded this as a technical question. Up to the present the Soviet forces had given Allied assistance to Allied fliers, who had always been met and taken care of. He suggested the details of Sir Charles Portal's proposal should be worked out after the conference.

8. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE.

General Antonov said that at the previous conference he had referred to the fact that the Germans would endeavor to stop the Russian offensive on the line of the Oder. Quite possibly they would not only adopt a passive defense on this line but would try to gather together counter-attack forces for a breakthrough. He would be glad to know if the Allied commander in the West had any intelligence with regard to the collection of such forces, their movements or the likely point for such an attack. He was particularly interested in the transference of the Sixth S. S. Panzer Army.

General Bull said that when he left General Eisenhower's headquarters a short time ago evidence existed that the Sixth Panzer Army was leaving the Western front and possibly another additional two divisions from north of the Vosges. General Eisenhower had taken immediate action to put the maximum possible air effort on these German movements. He was not up to date with regard to the direction of these moves, but he was certain that such information as was available at the Supreme Commander's headquarters could be sent to the Soviet General Staff. He would be glad to take this matter up with General Eisenhower immediately on his return.

General Marshall said that he had received a message on the previous day which gave definite information of the moves of certain divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army from the Western front. This message had also given the new total of enemy divisions on the Western front as sixty-nine. This morning's operational report raised this total to seventy since a newly formed parachute division had appeared on the Western front on the right of Field Marshal Montgomery's forces, in a position somewhere east of Venlo. He would get an exact statement on this matter and give it to General Antonov.

Sir Alan Brooke said that his information was very similar to that given by General Marshall. It was known that the Fifth Panzer Army had also been pulled out of the line, but there were no indications yet of its moving to the eastward. The British experts believed that this move was unlikely to take place. If General Antonov wished, a telegram could be sent asking for the latest information.

General Antonov said he was very grateful for the information given him and was particularly interested in the transfer of the Sixth Panzer Army to the eastward.

Sir Alan Brooke said, with regard to the Italian front, that as far as was known only one division was being withdrawn although there were indications of considerable movement.

General Marshall said it might be helpful, if the Soviet staff was not already aware of them, to give details of the attack in the Ardennes. This attack has been made by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. Prior to the attack, the Sixth Panzer Army had been out of the line for several months and had been located northeast of the Ruhr with five divisions. The Fifth Panzer Army had been in the front line or close to it. The Sixth Panzer Army had crossed to the west of the Rhine a month or six weeks before the offensive had taken place but had not been located until the attack was launched. The Sixth Panzer Army had been the first to be withdrawn from the attack and the Fifth Panzer Army was finally also withdrawn though it was not known if it had left the front.

Marshal Khudyakov asked if the losses in the Fifth Panzer Army were known.

General Marshall said it was difficult to differentiate between losses incurred by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. At the meeting on the previous day he had given information with regard to the destruction inflicted on one or the other of these armies in the course of two days' operations. It was believed that very heavy casualties had been inflicted on the motor vehicles and tanks of almost all the divisions of both the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies.

General Bull said the Fifth Panzer Army had attacked in the center and, of the two, made the most progress. The Sixth Panzer Army had attacked in the north in the direction of Malmedy-Liege. Both the Fifth and the Sixth Armies had suffered considerable losses in armor and two divisions of the Fifth Army in particular were known to have suffered heavily.

9. Pacific Operations.

Admiral King said that the general principles for the conduct of the war against Germany and Japan were: Firstly, the defeat of both Germany and Japan at the earliest possible date; secondly, that Germany was the principal enemy; thirdly, that continuous and unremitting pressure would be maintained against the Japanese forces. Efforts would be made to attain positions from which the final attack on Japan could be staged when the necessary forces became available from Europe. There had been no fixed schedule, but endeavor had been made to go as fast and as far as the available means permitted. At the present time our operations were hampered chiefly by lack of shipping and the shortage of service and auxiliary troops. It was worthy of note that all operations in the Pacific had, of necessity, been amphibious operations and some were carried out over great distances.

In general, the forward line now held included Attu, the Marianas and Luzon. In addition, we had control of the sea and air not only up to this line, but beyond it to China, Formosa, the Ryukyus and even to the coast of Japan itself. The present fighting was taking place on the island of Luzon, about 1,500 sea miles from Japan itself. The Japanese appeared to prefer to keep the fighting at that distance from their homeland. What was important was that it was still possible to inflict casualties on the Japanese Navy, air forces and shipping. The British Pacific Fleet was now available and had been reported to him as being available for operations about the fifteenth of March.

Regarding future operations, it was proposed to continue the liberation of the Philippines and to establish air bases in Luzon from which to interdict enemy air and shipping in the north part of the China Sea, including the China coast and the area of Formosa. On the nineteenth of February the United States forces would seize the Bonin Islands, which would be used chiefly as a base for fighters accompanying the heavy bombers on raids on Japan. About the first of April it was proposed to go into Okinawa in the Ryukyus for the purpose of establishing air bases and an advance naval base, and to intensify the sea and air blockade of Japan.

Though no decision had been taken, planning was proceeding on an operation to go into the Chusan Archipelago to broaden the base for intensifying the air and sea blockade of Japan. This would also assist interdiction of communications in the Shanghai-Hankow area, including the great water highway of the Yangtze.

In the North Pacific air operations were being conducted from the Aleutians and occasional ship bombardments of the Kurile chiefly against the islands of Paramushiro and Shimshu in the extreme north of the chain. The weather for air operations in this area was particularly bad and consequently there had been a number of forced landings by United States aircraft in Kamchatka. He would like [illegible] his deep appreciation [illegible] and assistance [illegible] rendered [illegible]

For a period [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Admiral Kuznetsov asked if the capture of an island in the Kuriles was planned for 1945.

Admiral King said that means were not available to undertake it as well as the other operations which had been planned, however, as always, it was a question of the relative importance of the various operations under consideration.

General Marshall said he would like to add that from the point of view of the Army, plans were kept up to date in great detail, particularly with regard to shipping, in order to effect the most rapid possible movement of forces from Europe to the Pacific. These plans were so arranged that the movement would start one week after the termination of the war in Europe. The total transfer would, however, take a long time. Air would move first, accompanied by the service units needed to support the air forces and to prepare bases for the other troops. The necessity for these plans was one of the reasons why an estimated date for the end of the war against Germany had been required.

General Antonov said that, as he had mentioned on the previous day, it would be more convenient to discuss questions concerning the Far East after this matter had been considered by the heads of state.

8. V.L.R. Bomber Operations Against Japan.

General Kuter said that the B-29's, the heavy long-range United States bombers, were organized into the Twentieth Air Force commanded by General Arnold. The operations of the Twentieth Air Force had been following a plan somewhat similar to that used by the strategic air forces in Europe. The Japanese aircraft industry had been selected as the first priority target.

At the present time this air force had approximately 250 operational B-29's. About a third of that number had been operating from China bases since May 1944, and the remainder had begun operating from the Marianas in July, 1944. It was expected to build up a force of approximately 1,000 operational B-29's. The latest operation carried out was on the previous Sunday when 120 B-29's had attacked Kobe. Broadly speaking, the relatively small force of B-29's which had so far been employed had exceeded the anticipated results for the number of attacks that had been carried out.

9. Operations in Burma and China.

Sir Alan Brooke said that during 1944 the Japanese had delivered a serious attack in North Burma. This attack was stopped and the Japanese were driven back by the British force in North Burma, assisted by Chinese forces under United States [illegible] which had been trained [illegible] United States officers in [illegible] land communications to [illegible] now been opened [illegible] North Burma route.

[illegible] was not good but [illegible] and guns could [illegible] by that road to [illegible] southward with [illegible] crossing [illegible] out of Burma [illegible] then provide a [illegible] for further operations [illegible] Japanese in China [illegible] as Admiral [illegible] [illegible] to operations in the Pacific [illegible] and against the [illegible] advancing on the [illegible] of Burma.

Sir Charles Portal said that [illegible] he said that the British [illegible] operating [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] almost entirely [illegible] air supply [illegible] United States and British transport aircraft.

General Marshall said that the United States maintained a considerable air force in China, consisting at the present time of some 400 planes with, since its [illegible] the sole source of supply for these forces was over the 17,000-foot mountains between Northeast Burma and Bhamo. These operations presented an extremely difficult proposition from every point of view. As Sir Alan Brooke had said, the Japanese had in the previous spring attacked toward the line of communication to China. This was the line of communication not only for the British forces in Burma but also for the Chinese forces in Burma, and the United States Air Transport Force flying supplies into China. In spite of all the difficulties, 44,000 tons of supplies had been flown over the Himalayas last month. A transport plane left airfields in Burma every two minutes of the day and night. It was necessary to provide not only gasoline for the air forces operating out of China but to provide also for the ground forces in China who had little food or equipment. United States transport aircraft had moved Chinese forces to India from where, after training, they had again been transferred by air to the seat of operations where they had joined up with their equipment. More recently the Chinese forces had been pushed back over the mountains, thus providing the only really dependable well-equipped fighting force in China. They were, however, without armored fighting vehicles or medium artillery. Now that the road was open, armored fighting vehicles, trucks and artillery could be sent to them. There had been almost a complete lack of motor transport in China and what there had was now worn out. It was under these circumstances that the United States Chiefs of Staff had asked assistance from the Soviets in order to get 100 trucks to the Chinese. He very much appreciated the efforts the Soviets had made and fully understood their difficulties. Fortunately, these vehicles could now be sent to China direct by trucks now available, his task should prove easier. As he (General Marshall) had previously mentioned, in the face of unparalleled difficulties 44,000 tons had been flown over the Himalayas last month. He mentioned this because to him it meant the accomplishment of the greatest feat in all history. In the face of such achievements, cooperation by the staffs now sealed around the table should be relatively easy.

A United States General (General Wedemeyer) was now acting as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo in an effort to coordinate the various activities of the Chinese forces. This was of particular importance in relation to United States action in the Pacific. Operations in China were of increasing importance now that the naval forces were so close to the coast of China. General Wedemeyer was endeavoring to build a very serviceable situation with armored [illegible] and

General Antonov asked if the operations in Burma were regarded as decisive operations or secondary operations.

Sir Alan Brooke said that they were decisive operations aimed at the clearing of Burma of all Japanese forces.

General Antonov asked if it was considered that there were enough troops for decisive action on the two fronts—the Far East and Europe. Would not concentration on the main front hasten the end of the war in Europe and thus hasten the end of the war against Japan by making additional forces available?

Sir Alan Brooke explained that mainly local forces were being used in Burma, the majority of them being from the Indian Army. Indian divisions had been taken from India and had been engaging Germans since the beginning of the war. However, it had been essential to protect India's eastern frontier and at the same time to open up a land route to China. Far greater forces were required in this theatre to carry out all the deserved operations. As General Marshall had mentioned, plans were ready to transfer forces as fast as possible upon the completion of the war with Germany in order to finish the war against Japan. Up to the present time Germany was regarded as the main enemy and Japan as the secondary enemy, to be taken on with full forces immediately Germany was defeated.

General Marshall explained that the policy of the United States Government played a great part in the decisions with regard to operations in Burma. The United States Government placed great importance on the maintenance of the present regime in China. From the military point of view it would be a very serious matter if all China passed into Japanese control. Only relatively small American forces had been used except for transport aircraft.

It was imperative, however, that operations should not stand still in the Pacific. This would enable the Japanese to build up a solid line in the occupied areas. In the first year of the war only small land and air forces had been available to assist the strong naval force in the Pacific. These forces had, however, pushed forward by bypassing Japanese positions. At present some 300,000 to 500,000 Japanese troops had been cut off in those by-passed positions and a comparable number could now be considered as cut off in Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and even Burma.

Admiral Kuznetsov asked for information with regard to the areas of the United States submarine operations in the Pacific.

Admiral King said that the United States submarine force had always operated where the most Japanese shipping was to be found. The main submarine force used Hawaii as its main base and worked generally north of the latitude of 20 degrees N. A further submarine force was based on Australia and was now supplemented by a considerable number of British submarines. Therefore working in the area of the East Indies. Allied submarines in the Pacific had taken a heavy toll of Japanese shipping, which was now reduced from a maximum of some seven million tons to two million tons. These Japanese losses had been inflicted by submarines, by air forces and by naval surface vessels. United States submarine losses had remained relatively constant at about two per month. The number of United States submarines operating was still increasing. It was clear that the closer operations came to Japan the tougher would be the opposition not only for submarines but also for air and naval forces and for ground troops.

Admiral Kuznetsov asked if it was intended that United States submarines should operate in the Sea of Japan.

Admiral King said that so far they had not operated in the Sea of Japan though they operated in the Yellow Sea.

Admiral Kuznetsov suggested that the Japanese were likely to shift their sea lines of communications to the Sea of Japan.

Admiral King explained that such a line of communications already existed, as did a Japanese sea line of communications to Manchuria and to the North China coast.

10. Future Business.

After a brief discussion it was agreed that all the necessary subjects had already been covered and that no further meetings were called for until such time as the heads of state might submit additional problems to the military staffs.

In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, General Antonov said that he felt that for the present no written report to the heads of state was necessary, but rather that each staff should report individually to its own Head of State. Should a written report be required, this could easily be prepared later.

In conclusion, Sir Alan Brooke said he would like to thank General Antonov for his hospitality in receiving the United States and British Chiefs of Staff in Yalta and for his cooperative attitude during the meetings.

LIGHT MOMENT: Premier Joseph Stalin smiles as Prime Minister Churchill selects cigar between Yalta talks.

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

Feb. 6, 1945, Noon

LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

United States	
Secretary Stettinius	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Harriman	Mr. Jebb
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Dixon
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Harrison
Mr. Bohlen	Major Theakstone
Mr. Foote	**Soviet Union**
Mr. Page	Foreign Commissar Molotov
United Kingdom	Mr. Vishinsky
Foreign Secretary Eden	Mr. Maisky
Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Gusev
	Mr. Novikov
	Mr. Golunsky

PAGE MINUTES

TOP SECRET

SUBJECTS: 1. Press Release

2. Procedure for studying Dismemberment of Germany

3. Reference of the question concerning the dismemberment of Germany to the E. A. C.

1. Press Release.

Mr. Stettinius stated that it had been deemed advisable to issue a preliminary communiqué on the Crimean conference. He had requested Mr. Steven Early, the assistant to the President on press matters, to make a few remarks on this subject. A copy of this release is attached hereto.

During the course of the discussion Mr. Molotov suggested that the word "common" be inserted before the word "enemy." Mr. Stettinius suggested that the words "for meeting" and "immediately" be eliminated.

Mr. Molotov agreed to these deletions. He stated that he would have to refer the release to Marshal Stalin and that he hoped to give an answer at the 4:00 o'clock meeting.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the release would be held in strict secrecy until its simultaneous issuance in London, Moscow and Washington on Thursday.

2. The Dismemberment of Germany.

Mr. Stettinius stated that this topic had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. In his opinion much research and study would be necessary before agreement could be reached, but he hoped that they could come to agreement on the general principle involved. At the present session he would like to suggest that the words "and the dismemberment" be added after the word "demilitarization" in Article 12 of the surrender instrument for Germany. He also wished that consideration be given to the assignment of this topic to the E. A. C. in London for study.

Mr. Molotov stated that Mr. Stettinius' suggestion regarding the addition of the word "dismemberment" was entirely acceptable.

Mr. Eden stated that he had worked out another formula which included the addition of the words "and measures for the dissolution of the German unitary state" which he wished included in the second paragraph of Article 12.

Mr. Molotov then suggested that the paragraph commence with the words "in order to secure the peace and security of Europe they will take measures for the dismemberment of Germany." He felt that this reading would reflect the agreement reached at yesterday's plenary session.

Mr. Eden maintained that this wording would commit the three powers to too great an extent before the question had been thoroughly studied. He stated that he would prefer merely to add the words "and the dismemberment." He felt that this proposed draft would not only cover the dismemberment of Germany but also its decentralization.

Mr. Molotov continued to press for the Soviet draft.

Mr. Eden maintained that the British delegation could go no further than the addition of the words "and the dismemberment."

Mr. Stettinius suggested as a possible alternative a phrase reading to the effect that "including dismemberment to the degree necessary to safeguard the peace and security * * *." He added, however, that his preference was his original suggestion of inserting the words "and the dismemberment."

Mr. Molotov was inclined to prefer the second draft submitted by Mr. Stettinius.

Mr. Eden strongly objected.

Mr. Molotov then suggested rephrasing the paragraph by including the words "for the future peace and security" and eliminating the words "as deemed requisite."

Mr. Eden maintained that he would be unable to accept this draft, since it was too broad. However, he would readily accept Mr. Stettinius' original proposal. The British Government could go no further.

After some discussion as to the merits of Mr. Stettinius' first and second proposals, during which Mr. Molotov mentioned that his second proposal was preferable since it was more definite and more closely reflected what Mr. Churchill had said at yesterday's plenary session, it was decided to sum up the discussion by stating that all three Foreign Secretaries desired the word "dismembered" included in Article 12 and that Mr. Eden would consult with Mr. Churchill as to whether this course was preferred by him to Mr. Stettinius' second proposal.

3. Reference of the Question Concerning the Dismemberment of Germany to the E. A. C.

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether it might not be agreed that the question concerning the dismemberment of Germany might now be referred to the E. A. C. for study.

Mr. Molotov suggested that this question be taken up at a later time. He said that since it was a specific matter it might be better to establish a special commission to study the question.

* * *

MATTHEWS NOTES

1. Communiqué—S. thinks wise to issue one.

Mol. Preliminary one suggestion. Add "common" enemy. Likes communiqué. No objection to mention Black Sea area. Mol. to be approved by Stalin.

2. S. Announces three questions before the 3 F. M. to take place.

Adding "dismemberment" to Art. 12 & refer to E. A. C. Mol. accepts addition of word.

Eden. Another formula "and measures for the dissolution of the German unitary state." Would cover abolition of centralization of Germ. Govt.

Mol. Will exercise sup "power" take measures for dismemberment of G. for peace & security of Europe necessary to dismember G.

Agreed to add "and the dismemberment" after demilitarization.

No agreement on Russian change.

1. Transcribed for this volume from longhand notes in pencil.

2. For citations to pertinent documents see the preceding minutes of this meeting.

3. Stettinius. (Throughout the Matthews notes the editors have added footnote explanations of the more unusual abbreviations and abbreviations.)

4. Of the draft instrument entitled "unconditional surrender of Germany."

5. Supreme.

6. Words appear in the source text.

BOHLEN COLLECTION

United States delegation draft of preliminary Yalta press release.

PRESS COMMUNIQUE 1

(This draft, which was attached to the Page minutes, appears to have been the one used as a basis for discussion in the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 6.)

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their Chiefs of Staff, their Foreign Secretaries and other advisers are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the enemy and for building, with their allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace.

2. Meetings are continuing day and night.

3. (The omission of this sentence, indicated in the source paper, was apparently made prior to the discussion of this draft by the Foreign Ministers on February 6.)

The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, for meeting the economic political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain the peace.

A complete communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the conference.

February 6, 1945.

Agreed Text of Preliminary Yalta Press Release

CRIMEAN CONFERENCE
PRESS RELEASE

Yalta, February 7, 1945.

Statement for the press and radio release at 4:30 o'clock P. M. Eastern war time Wednesday, February 7, 1945.

"The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their Chiefs of Staff, the three Foreign Secretaries and other advisers, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

"Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the common enemy and for building, with their allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. Meetings are proceeding continuously.

"The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

"Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain peace.

"A communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the conference."

Approved by Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt, released simultaneously in Washington, London and Moscow.

Debate Turns to a World Security Organization and a Settlement for Poland

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING

Feb. 6, 1945, 1 P. M.

Livadia Palace

PRESENT

United States

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
MR. HOPKINS
MR. BYRNES
MR. HARRIMAN

United Kingdom

PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
SIR ALEXANDER CADOGAN

EDITORIAL NOTE

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the log, which states that the discussions continued after lunch until 3 P. M.

THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Feb. 6, 1945, 4 P. M.

Livadia Palace

PRESENT

United States

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
SECRETARY STETTINIUS
FLEET ADMIRAL LEAHY
MR. HOPKINS
MR. BYRNES
MR. HARRIMAN
MR. MATTHEWS
MR. HISS
MR. BOHLEN

United Kingdom

PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
FOREIGN SECRETARY EDEN
SIR ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR
SIR ALEXANDER CADOGAN
SIR EDWARD BRIDGES
MR. JEBB
MR. WILSON
MR. DIXON
MAJOR BIRSE

Soviet Union

MARSHAL STALIN
FOREIGN COMMISSAR MOLOTOV
MR. VISHINSKY
MR. MAISKY
MR. GUSEV
MR. GROMYKO
MR. PAVLOV

BOHLEN MINUTES

TOP SECRET

SUBJECTS: 1. World Security Organization. 2. The Polish Question.

World Security Organization.

The President inquired whether the Committee of Foreign Ministers had anything to report to the conference.

Mr. Stettinius said it had been decided to insert the word "dismemberment" of Germany into Article 12 of the unconditional surrender terms, but that Mr. Molotov had had some additional phrases which he wished to see put in.

Mr. Molotov replied that he was withdrawing his proposed additional words.

Mr. Stettinius then said that they could report full agreement to insert the word "dismemberment" into Article 12 of the surrender terms, but that they would like to have some more time before reporting on reparations and the relationship of the French zone to the control commission.

The Prime Minister said that he had not had an opportunity to obtain the consent of the War Cabinet to the proposed insertion but that he was glad to accept on the behalf of the British Government the decision on this point. He went on to say that in regard to the French zone he felt that the importance of France in the future had been enhanced by the limitation which the President yesterday had placed on the length of time United States forces might stay in Europe. He said that Great Britain would not be strong enough alone to guard the western approaches to the Channel.

The President said that he had spoken on the basis of present conditions and he felt public opinion in the United States would be prepared to support an international organization along the lines of Dumbarton Oaks and that this might change their attitude in regard to the question of troops. [illegible]

[illegible]

"(B) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

"We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the council is permitted, the establishment of the world organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the council the organization, even if it could be established would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated.

"The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have ready and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which under our proposals would require unqualified unanimity and separately those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.

"3. Reasons for the American position.

"From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.

"First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world.

"Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States that there be provision for a fair hearing for all members of the organization, large and small.

[illegible]

ADMIRALS IN MALTA: Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and Admiral E. S. Land arriving at Union Club in Valletta for lunch. They are pictured during preparations for Yalta trip.

[illegible]

THE POLISH QUESTION

[illegible]

HISS NOTES

[illegible]

Division Between the Polish Factions Assessed by the Big Three Leaders

own point of view in associating themselves with prop. In the US paper and we are great advantage in the three great powers not assuming the position of rulers of all the rest without ever allowing them to state their case. In fact, we feel it would not be right to take that position of denying them the rt to state the case and we rely on III if we are not convinced by the arguments made ag. us (absent see doc)

Reference here is to Matthews.

St: If any nation raise any import Q. will raise not only Q. but will want a dec. already have rt to express opin in as Mr. Church thinks that Ch after raising Q of his would be content to express her opin. Ch. might ask for a decision.

Will demand a dec.

(Geometrical symbol for "therefore") matter is much more serious than merely to escape for each nation rt. to express its opinion.

Also it is not a matter of three powers liking to be master of world. D. O. proposals should be a brake upon such a group of powers. I don't know any great power which would have intention to master world. Perhaps I am mistaken and see not everything.

I would like to ask my friend Mr. Ch to name which power might intend domin. world. [illegible] doesn't want Domin. I'm sure U. S. hasn't opin. of this kind. U. S. S. R. hasn't. There remains only one power, China.

CHURCH: I was speaking of three great powers gathered here collectively lifting themselves so high that others would consider they're trying to domin. world. Not any one power but the three. Not one but a trinity.

(ST:) If two great powers accept prosi. which excuse them from that, one power has not yet agreed to that.

I will examine the doc and perhaps I will understand what is the matter but at present everything is not clear to me.

Think much more serious Q than RT of powers express opinion or domin world.

I fear—we are not now and will not allow that any of our gt. countries—act of agg. but in ten years time we will disappear—new generations will come which did not experience horrors of war and forget what we been thru.

Seems we would like to secure peace at least for fifty years. I have such an idea. I think we have now to build up such a form which would put as many obstacles as possible to domination of world. I think that the task is to secure our unity of three powers in future and for this purpose must elaborate such a covenant which would in certain respects (?) the greatest danger for future is possibility of conflicts among ourselves. If unity Ger. danger not very great and now we have to think how to create—that our great powers and poss. Ch. and Fr. will keep united front in future. There must be elaborated a statement which would prevent conflicts among great powers.

[illegible] apologize. I was real[illegible] matters and not [illegible] study this Q. in detail. As far as I understand what was said by Chur. today. All possible divided in two categories—

In 1st cat., as I understand belong such things as sanctions econ, pol and mil and in other cat. all those conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means without sanctions.

Also understand that in consid. of conflicts of both types contemplated free discussion of the Council.

I understand in consid. of Q's of 1st cat. perm. members being party to dispute has rt. to vote and not be asked to withdraw.

But in conflicts of 2nd cat. party in dispute not be allowed to vote.

We so being accused talking too much about how to vote. But issues are being decided by vote and we are interested in the decisions and less in discussions. Can discuss for 100 yrs and nothing settled, but I'm interested in decs.

Suppose Ch. suggests H. K. be returned or Suez Can. to Eg. I can assure Mr. Church Ch. and Eg. will be not alone. They will have some friends in add. and possibly some protectors.

CHURCH: I would say so when it came to use of long powers. Powers should not be used ag. us if we remained unconvinced.

ST: Is it so.

CHURCH: It is as I understand it.

EDEN: They could talk and complain but no dec. could be taken without our consent.

F. R. S: No econ. sanction or use of force without unan. of perm. members of Sec Coun.

MAISKY: No recommend could be made.

MAISKY: These five points will not be decisions but only discussions?

E. R. S.: Yes.

ST: I'm afraid these conflicts re HK might break our unity.

CHURCH: See force of that but whole force of diplomacy proceeds and is not prevented by world org. Members will always be discussing matters among themselves.

ST: Another picture my colleagues in Mosc. can not forget the case which occured in Dec. '39 during Rus-Fin war when Brit. and Fr. used Leag. ag. us and eventually expelled us, and isolated us and later mobilized all the powers ag. us in matter of crusade.

CHURCH: We were very angry, were all alone.

ST: How guar. such thing not occur ag.

CHURCH: We couldn't do it here.

ST: Couldn't we make more obstacles in way of it.

CHURCH: Expulsion must be unan. and gt. power could veto.

ST: First time we have.

FREE: Should emphasize action like Fin. One would be impossible as would require unan. of five.

ST: Not only expulsion but mobilization of opinion.

CHURCH: I see the case which cause anxiety to any of us agitation be worked up and lot of abuse be hurled at one of us. Might be Brit. I can only say dip. would be active.

Everything would be done to prevent anything that would mar our unity.

I'm quite sure Mr. St. wouldn't make a harsh att. on Brit Emp—verbally I mean—without talking to us first. We could get to some arrangement, many event we should be very careful not to let the unity be destroyed.

ST. I would prob. feel what of Maisky.

FREE. Let's put it another way. Whole doc. is drawn up to promote not impair unity. Will be differences—will be known—will be talked in Assembly. To permit discussion in coun. will in no sense impair unity but will promote it and will demonstrate confid. have in each other and in justice.

ST. Tomorrow continue, meanwhile study.

POLAND

Interruption Gromyko indicated he had not understood from L. P. the changes in 2nd of our proposal. I straightened him out on the scope of body, but he was still not satisfied that the effect of the reference to VIII C was clear or desirable. He also said he would have great difficulty explaining the effect to his colleagues. He said it would be much easier for the R. A. if we could drop the whole reference, and asked if the Free would agree to that. I said I thought so.

MATTHEWS FILE

MATTHEWS MINUTES

For citations to pertinent documents, are the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

TOP SECRET

(The first part of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the voting procedure for the world organization. This is covered in Mr. Hiss' notes.)

POLAND

PRESIDENT: I should like to bring up Poland. I come from a great distance and therefore have the advantage of a more distant point of view of the problem. There are six or seven million Poles in the United States. As I said in Teheran, in general I am in favor of the Curzon Line. Most Poles, like the Chinese, want to save face.

STALIN: (interrupting) Who will save face, the Poles in Poland or the emigre Poles?

PRESIDENT: The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Germany. It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet Government would give something to Poland. I raised the question of giving them Lvov at Teheran. It has now been suggested that these lands in the southward of Lvov might be given them. I am not making a definite statement, but I hope that Marshal Stalin can make a gesture in this direction.

But the most important matter is that of a permanent government for Poland. Opinion in the United States is against recognition of the Lublin Government on the ground that it represents a small portion of the Polish people. What people want is the creation of a government of national unity to settle their internal differences. A government which would represent all five major parties (names them) is what is wanted. It may interest Marshal Stalin that I do not know any of the London or of the Lublin Government. Mikolajczyk came to Washington and I was greatly impressed by him. I felt that he was an honest man.

The main suggestion I want to make is that there be created an ad interim government which will have the support of the majority of the Polish people. There are many ways of creating such a government. One of the many suggestions is the possibility of creating a presidency council made up of a small number of men who would be the controlling force ad interim and to set up a more permanent government. I make this suggestion as from the distance of 5,000 miles. Sometimes distance is an advantage. We want a Poland that will be thoroughly friendly to the Soviet for years to come. This is essential.

STALIN: (interrupting) Friendly not only to the Soviet but all three Allies.

PRESIDENT: This is my only suggestion. If we can work out some solution of this problem it will make peace much easier.

PRIME MINISTER: I have made repeated declarations in Parliament in support of the Soviet claims to the Curzon Line, that is to say, leaving Lvov with Soviet Russia. I have been much criticized and so has Mr. Eden especially by the party which I represent. But I have always considered that after all Russia has suffered in fighting Germany and after all her efforts in liberating Poland, her claim is one founded not on force but on right. In that position I abide. But of course if the mighty power, the Soviet Union, made a gesture suggested by the President, we would heartily acclaim such action.

However, I am more interested in the question of Poland's sovereign independence and freedom than in particular frontier lines. I want the Poles to have a home in Europe and to be free to live their own life there. That is an objective which I have always heard Marshal Stalin proclaim with the utmost firmness. It is because I put my trust in his declaration about the sovereign independence and freedom of Poland that the frontier question I consider not of supreme importance. This is what is dear to the hearts of the Nation of Britain. This is what we went to war against Germany for—that Poland should be free and sovereign. Everyone here knows the result it was to us unprepared as we were and that it nearly cost us our life as a Nation. Great Britain had no material interest in Poland. Her interest is only one of honor because we drew the sword for Poland against Hitler's brutal attack. Never could I be content with any solution that would not leave Poland as a free and independent state. However, I have one qualification: I do not think that the freedom of Poland could be made to

SCENE OF YALTA CONFERENCE: General view of the palace where the Big Three gathered in February of 1945

cover hostile designs by any Polish government, perhaps by intrigue with Germany, against the Soviet. I cannot conceive that the world organization would ever tolerate such action or leave it only to Soviet Russia to take proper measures. Our most earnest desire which we care about as much as our lives is that Poland be mistress in her own house and in her own soul. I earnestly hope that we shall not separate without taking a practical step with this objective. At the present time there are two governments about which we differ. I have never seen any of the present London Government. We recognize them but have not sought their company but Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski are men of good sense and we have confidence in them. We remain in informal but friendly contact with them. There will be great criticism against us all if we let them divide us when we have such great tasks and common hopes. Can we not create a government here in Poland, a provisional or interim government, as the President said, pending free elections so that we can extend recognition to it as the other United Nations [illegible] we not pave the way [illegible] future on the [illegible] and administration [illegible] If we could [illegible] leave the table [illegible] step accomplished toward future peace and the prosperity of central Europe. I am sure that [illegible] before guaranteeing [illegible] down to secure the [illegible] communications of the victorious Red Army in its battle to defeat Germany. His Majesty's Government would cordially support the President's suggestion and would [illegible] the question to our Russian allies.

(Stalin suggests a ten-minute intermission.)

STALIN: The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britain the question of Poland is a question of honor. For Russia it is not only a question of honor but also of security. It is a question of honor for Russia for we shall have to eliminate many things from the books. But it is also a question of security of the state not only because we are on Poland's frontier but also because throughout history Poland has always been a corridor for attack on Russia. It is sufficient that during the last thirty years our German enemy has passed through this corridor twice. This is because Poland was weak. It is in the Russian interest as well as that of Poland that Poland be strong and powerful and in a position in her own and in our interests to shut the corridor by her own forces. The corridor cannot be mechanically shut from outside by Russia. It could be shut from inside only by Poland. It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful. It is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet state. That is why Russia today is against the Czarist policy of abolition of Poland. We have completely changed this inhuman policy and started a policy of friendship and independence for Poland. This is the basis of our policy and we favor a strong independent Poland.

I refer now to our Allied appeal with regard to the Curzon Line. The President has suggested modification, giving Poland Lvov and Lvov Province. The Prime Minister thinks that we should make a gesture of magnanimity. But I must remind you that the Curzon Line was invented not by Russians but by foreigners. The Curzon Line of Curzon was made by Curzon, Clemenceau and the Americans in 1918-1919. Russia was not invited and did not participate. This line was accepted against the will of the Russians on the basis of ethnological data. Lenin opposed it. He did not want to give Bialystok and Bialystok Province to Poland but the Curzon Line gives them to Poland. We have retreated from Lenin's position. Some want us to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau. What will the Russians say at Moscow and the Ukrainians? They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau. I cannot take such a position and return to Moscow. I prefer that the war continue a little longer and give Poland compensation in the west at the expense of Germany. I asked Mikolajczyk what frontier he wanted. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear of a western frontier to the River Neisse. I must say that I will maintain this line and ask this conference to support it. There are two Neisse Rivers. The east and the west. I favor the west.

Now about the government. The Prime Minister has said that he wants to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue. Without the participation of Poles we can create no Polish government. They all say I am a dictator but I have enough democratic feeling not to set up a Polish government without Poles. It must be with participation of Poles. We had the opportunity in Moscow to create a Polish government with Poles. Both London and Lublin groups met in Moscow and certain points of agreement were reached. Mikolajczyk returned to London and was kicked out of the government. The present London Government of Arciszewski [illegible] a reality under the President [illegible]

[illegible]

Now as a military man I demand [illegible] First, there should be [illegible] quiet in the [illegible] The men of the [illegible] indifferent as to [illegible] government there [illegible] but they do want [illegible] maintain order be[illegible] The Lublin Warsaw [illegible] fulfills this role not [illegible] are agents of the London Government connected [illegible] called underground [illegible] called resistance forces had nothing good from them [illegible] much evil. So far their agents have killed 212 Russian soldiers. They [illegible] attacked supply bases for arms. It was announced that all wireless stations must be registered and these forces continued to break all the laws of war and complained of being arrested. If they attack the Red Army any more they will be shot. When I compare the agents of both governments I find that the Lublin ones are useful and the others the contrary. The military must have peace and quiet. The military will support such a government and I cannot do otherwise. Such is the situation.

(The President says that it is now quarter to eight and that the meeting should adjourn.)

Prime Minister: I must put on record that both the British and Soviet Governments have different sources of information in Poland and get different facts. Perhaps we are mistaken but I do not feel that the Lublin Government represents even one third of the Polish people. This is my honest opinion and I may be wrong. Still, I have felt that the underground might have collisions with the Lublin Government. I have feared bloodshed, arrests, deportation, and I fear the effect on the whole Polish question. Anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished but I cannot feel that the Lublin Government has any right to represent the Polish nation.

HISS COLLECTION

United States Delegation Memorandum 1

(Authorship not indicated. This is a carbon copy of one of the papers from which Stettinius spoke in the plenary meeting of February 6. The copy contains penciled notes by Hiss indicating the variations made by Stettinius when speaking from the paper.)

Statement on the American proposal on voting in the Council.

1. Review of status of this question.

It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

At Dumbarton Oaks, the three delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three governments.

On Dec. 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that the matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; [illegible]

[illegible]

At [illegible] time our [illegible] recognized the desirability of the permanent members [illegible] that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which [illegible] member [illegible] other than the permanent members have a right to state their case without arbitrary procedure.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the world organization which we all desire would be seriously jeopardized, if not made impossible. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from that we have contemplated. The paper which we placed before the other two governments sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unanimity and [illegible] those matters in the [illegible] discussion and peaceful [illegible] in which any party to [illegible] would abstain from voting.

[illegible] for the American [illegible]

[illegible] the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure. First there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of peace of the world to which [illegible] referred.

Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States that there be provision for justice for all members of the organization.

Our task is to reconcile these major elements. We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5 provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

[illegible] February 6, 1945.

VOTING PROCEDURE

Supplementary Arguments for Secretary

[illegible] to acceptability of [illegible] unless our proposal [illegible] Our main concern is [illegible] to establish the [illegible] public opinion and [illegible] nations, especially [illegible] American nations, and [illegible] the British Dominions [illegible] not accept an organization which they believe [illegible] would give them a just and [illegible] position.

2. Importance of the organization starting off with goodwill of all members and of world public opinion.

In the Teheran declaration, the three powers stated:

"We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command goodwill from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world * * *."

Without this goodwill on the part of all members of the organization—even if it could be established — its future would (we feel) be uncertain.

To insure this goodwill is necessary to the effective operation of the organization, we must avoid the charge (even giving the impression) of great power domination.

3. Unity of the Great Powers is one of our major aims and is promoted rather than impaired by our proposal.

If there should unfortunately be any differences between the Great Powers, the fact would become fully known to the world, whatever voting procedure is adopted.

Inclusion of differences cannot be prevented in the Assembly in any event.

To permit full and free discussion in the Council will in no sense promote disunity, but will, on the contrary, demonstrate the confidence the great powers have in each other and in the justice of their own policies.

HISS FILE

United States Delegation Memorandum

(Undated copy; authorship not indicated. This is apparently the paper copies which were distributed to the British and Soviet delegations at the plenary meeting on Feb. 6 and of which a considerable portion was read by Stettinius. A photocopy of the paper (likewise undated) from the Roosevelt papers shows variant phraseology and arrangement of items.)

Proposed formula for voting procedure in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization and analysis of the effects of that formula.

I. Proposed formula as communicated on Dec. 5, 1944, to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill (with a minor clarification of the reference to Chapter VIII in Section C).

The provisions of Section C of Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would read as follows:

"C. Voting

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII in Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:

I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

1. Admission of new members;
2. Suspension of a member;
3. Expulsion of a member;
4. Election of the secretary general.

II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;

2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;

3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;

4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:

I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council's attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the International Court of Justice;

V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.

HOPKINS PAPERS

The President's special assistant (Hopkins) to the President

Yalta, February 6, 1945

Mr. President

Why not let this wind up today when Stalin is thru—and say we will talk it over again tomorrow? It is 7:15.

Harry

(This note is undated, but the context indicates that it was passed to the President during Stalin's extended statement on the Polish question during the third plenary meeting on February 6, 1945.)

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Feb. 7, 1945, 10 A. M.

Livadia Palace

TOP SECRET

PRESENT

Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Bull
Major General Deane
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull
Major General Wood
Rear Admiral McCormick
Rear Admiral Duncan
Rear Admiral Olsen
Brigadier General Roberts
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Lindsay
Brigadier General Bessell
Brigadier General Everest
Commodore Burrough
Colonel Peck
Colonel Lincoln
Colonel Cary
Captain Stroop
Captain McDill
Lieutenant Colonel McRae
Commodore Clark (Secretariat)
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

J. C. S. FILES

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

J. C. S. 186th meeting.

1. **Approval of minutes of C. C. S. 186th meeting.**

The Joint chiefs of staff:—

Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the minutes of the 186th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

2. **Utilization of the Fifteenth Air Force in Vienna-Budapest area (J. C. S. 1241).**

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Staff planners had in this paper reviewed the problem of basing or staging U. S. strategic air forces in the Vienna-Budapest area and recommended that a memorandum be sent to the President requesting Marshal Stalin's agreement to the staging of elements of the Fifteenth Air Force through airdromes in the Budapest area. He found no objections to the paper and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve it.

General Marshall drew attention to the fact that this subject had been discussed with the Russians at the tripartite meeting on 6 February 1945, and that the President need only to hand the memorandum to Marshal Stalin without discussion.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to present to the President the memorandum in Appendix "A" of J. C. S. 1241 enclosing the draft memorandum to Marshal Stalin, prepared in English and Russian text.

3. **Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War (C. C. S. 777; J. C. S. 1266/1 (Argonaut); J. C. S. 1266/1 (Wash.).**

Admiral Leahy said that J. C. S. 1266/1 (Argonaut) was the report of an ad hoc committee which expressed agreement with the British proposal in C. C. S. 777 and recommends a memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to this effect. He pointed out that the acting Secretary of State in Washington had already agreed to a different method but that this problem appeared to be one for the State Department to solve and was not the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He found no objection to the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in J. C. S. 1266/1 (Argonaut) and recommended approval.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the memorandum in the appendix of J. C. S. 1266/1 and directed that it be presented to the combined Chiefs of Staff (subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 777/1).

4. **Supplies and Equipment Requested by the U. S. S. R. (J. C. S. 1138/2, J. C. S. info. memo. 360—Milepost summary).**

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had reviewed J. C. S. 1138/2 and brought up to date the status of availability of equipment to meet the requirements for Operation Milepost. In J. C. S. 1138/2 they recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the facts and conclusions of the report and that a copy of the paper be furnished to the executive, President's Soviet Protocol Committee. He recommended that J. C. S. 1138/2 be approved.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Took note of the facts and conclusions developed in that of J. C. S. 1138/2 and directed that a copy of the report be furnished to the executive, President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

5. **Protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and administration of "Greater Berlin" (J. C. S. 577/28).**

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had recommended as the final action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and administration of "Greater Berlin," the dispatch of the message to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy contained in the appendix to J. C. S. 577/28. He saw no objection to the paper and recommended approval.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Agreed to dispatch to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the message contained in the appendix to J. C. S. 577/28.

6. **Zone of limitation for British and U. S. air operations in advance of the Soviet armies.**

General Marshall requested General Kuter to report on the meeting of the tripartite air staffs in connection with the coordination of strategic air operations with the Soviets.

General Kuter said that the draft agreement reached had been circulated to the Chiefs of Staff informally. It had been decided not to use the term "bombline" because of the difference between the Russian, British and American definitions but to use instead the expression "zone of limitation." There were two items in the agreement which were not entirely satisfactory. The first was the 24-hour notice of Allied air operations required by the Soviet General Staff and, second, the depth of the zone, which would be deeper than the Allied command desired. However, it was the best arrangement that could be worked out. The agreement had been changed in one respect. He substituted the words "British and U. S." wherever the word "Allied" occurred. He requested the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by General Deane, General Kuter explained that the mission in Moscow would be furnished daily information of the location of the Soviet front lines, which automatically fixed the location of the zone of limitation.

General Kuter said that the matter of Allied-Russian liaison on a lower level had also been brought up at the meeting. For the necessity of such liaison the strategic air operations to the east of Berlin which had involved bombing within an extremely short distance of the Soviet lines had been used as an example. It was suggested that the Russians consider the use of VHF communication links with the Allied planes in order that their own fighter pilots might be able quickly to receive information on German movements discovered by Allied pilots and conduct their operations accordingly. He felt that the meeting, although not entirely satisfactory on all points, would lead to further discussions in Moscow. As an additional point, no decision on the advance bomber bases in the Vienna-Budapest area had been reached.

Admiral Leahy recommended that the agreement be approved as General Kuter had requested.

After further discussion,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the agreement for a zone of limitation for British and United States air operations in advance of the Soviet Armies prepared by the British-U. S.-Soviet air staffs, as amended during the discussion. (Subsequently circulated as "J. C. S. 1245.")

10. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Soviet General Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Approved the dispatch to General Antonov of a note requesting a meeting with the Soviet General Staff at Soviet headquarters, Thursday, 8 February, at 1200.

11. Report by combined shipping staffs.

General Somervell said that combined oil and shipping studies had been progressing. Eight of the ten points involved in the oil studies had been resolved and a paper would be circulated to the combined chiefs of staff as soon as possible. It had been decided to defer action on the remaining two points of difference in the oil studies.

The report of the combined shipping staffs would be completed and circulated sometime during the night and would be ready for consideration by the combined chiefs of staff at the meeting scheduled for 8 February 1945.

Several disturbing points had arisen. The Russians had demanded additional ships, and

Dumbarton Oaks and Germany Are Topics at a Meeting of Foreign Chiefs

...that was of greater concern, there was the accompanying question of cargo requirements, chiefly the item of trucks. As yet it was not known how the Russian requirements could be filled. There was also the question of a cut in British requirements. The Prime Minister was intensely concerned in this matter and was reluctant to accept any reduction in imports but would do so if necessary. It was his, General Somervell's, view that the British import program should not be considered at this conference unless directed by the President.

* * *

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

(Yalta,) 6 February 1945

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that it is necessary to obtain Marshal Stalin's approval of holding a meeting with the Soviet staff to discuss details of possible participation in the war against Japan and suggest that you speak to Marshal Stalin with the purpose of obtaining his agreement.

The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army (Antonov).

(Yalta,) 7 February 1945

TOP SECRET

My dear General Antonov: The U. S. Chiefs of Staff desire to meet with the Soviet Chiefs for a most secret discussion tomorrow, Thursday, Feb. 8, at 3 P. M. at the Russian headquarters. No one to be present but the Chiefs of Staff and one interpreter, your Russian interpreter being satisfactory for our purpose.

For the U. S. Chiefs of Staff
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
First Admiral, U. S. Navy.

The First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army (Antonov) to the Chief of Staff of the President (Leahy)

Crimea, 7 February 1945

TOP SECRET

(Translation)

Dear Admiral Leahy: In reply to your letter of the Seventh of February concerning your wish to meet with the Soviet Chiefs of Staff, I inform you that I shall be glad to meet with you on the Eighth of February at three o'clock in the afternoon at the headquarters of the Russian staff.

I hope you will be kind enough to inform me of the persons who will attend with you at this meeting.

Yours very respectfully,
ANTONOV,
Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army.

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

February 7, 1945, Noon

Yusupovsky Palace

PRESENT

United States	
Secretary Stettinius	Mr. Jebb
Mr. Harriman	Mr. Dixon
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Harrison
Mr. Hiss	Major Theakstone
Mr. Page	**Soviet Union**
United Kingdom	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Foreign Secretary Eden	Mr. Vyshinsky
Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Maisky
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Gusev
	Mr. Novikov
	Mr. Golunsky

BOHLEN COLLECTION
PAGE MINUTES
TOP SECRET
SUBJECTS:

1. Dumbarton Oaks.
2. The dismemberment of Germany.
3. Creation of a commission to study the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany.
4. The integration of France into the German control machinery on condition that France were to receive a zone of occupation.
5. Reparations.

1. Dumbarton Oaks.

Mr. Stettinius inquired at the outset whether there were any questions regarding Dumbarton Oaks which the American delegation had failed to make clear at yesterday's plenary session. He said that if so he was prepared to answer with his colleagues any questions which remained open or which needed to be expanded.

Mr. Molotov remarked that the world security organization had not been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. He continued that although he had a few questions to advance he was not prepared to go into this subject at the present time.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was always ready now or at a later date to discuss the matter. He added that he wished merely to make the offer to discuss the question; he personally had no new points to bring up.

2. The Dismemberment of Germany.

Mr. Molotov recalled that it had been agreed to limit the changes in Article 12 of the German surrender instrument to the addition of the words "and the dismemberment" after the word "demilitarization." He suggested that a subcommittee consisting of British, American and Soviet representatives be appointed to work out the exact wording of Article 12.

It was decided to authorize Messrs. Vyshinsky, Cadogan and Matthews to make a final redraft of Article 12, which would include the addition of the word "dismemberment" and to authorize a commission consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev to study the question of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany.

3. Creation of a commission to study the procedure for dismemberment of Germany.

Mr. Molotov suggested that such a commission be set up in London consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt the creation of this commission was a most important matter. If this question were not referred to the E. A. C. the prestige of that body would surely be diminished. He, therefore, thought that the question of taking away this work from the E. A. C. should be carefully considered.

Mr. Eden pointed out that if the dismemberment of Germany were included in the E. A. C. the French would participate in this work.

Mr. Stettinius stated that it was entirely agreeable to have these studies carried on in London and to appoint Mr. Winant as the American representative.

Mr. Molotov stated that the subject under discussion was the study of procedure for dismembering Germany and not the actual dismemberment or details thereof. Therefore, it could be assigned to a special committee. Later, perhaps, it might be handed over to the E. A. C.

Mr. Eden remarked that he thought that the body handling this question should go further than merely studying questions of procedure. He stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the terms of reference of that body. On the assumption that Germany was to be broken up into individual states, that body, he believed, should examine when this separation should take place; should look into boundary questions and measures needed to ensure the proper functioning and survival of the new states. What relations should be permitted between them and foreign powers should also be studied. He stated that it might be necessary to request that a report be drawn up on the practicability of the dismemberment of Germany. He also questioned whether the commission was to undertake the type of work referred to in the aforementioned terms of reference or merely to decide how this work was to be done.

Mr. Molotov stated that he did not believe that there was any need for a special commission at this stage and suggested that the question be studied through diplomatic channels in London. He expressed doubt that the Foreign Secretaries had received any directive to form an actual commission.

Mr. Eden stated that they had not; however they had the power to make recommendations.

Mr. Molotov continued that he was not insisting on a commission.

Mr. Eden stated that he felt worried about the absence of the French. They were neighbors of Germany and had certain ideas on control of the Ruhr and Rhineland. He felt that it would be a mistake to keep them out.

Mr. Molotov suggested that the question of French participation be subsequently decided by Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev in London.

Messrs. Stettinius and Eden stated that this would be agreeable.

Mr. Eden stated that in view of his many activities it might be impossible for him personally to participate in the London discussions.

Mr. Molotov stated that he, of course, had the right to deputize someone to represent him.

4. The Integration of France into the German control machinery on condition that France were to receive a zone of occupation.

Mr. Molotov submitted a statement on this matter and inquired whether it could be used for a basis of discussion.

Mr. Eden stated that since it had been agreed upon that France would receive a zone of occupation he hoped that it might also be agreed that France would participate on the Control Commission itself. He said that he foresaw all kinds of difficulties if the French were not to participate and expressed the opinion that De Gaulle in all probability would refuse to accept a zone if he did not have the same treatment on the Control Commission as the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. Even if France were to accept a zone they would always have trouble in administering it if they were not represented on the commission. He maintained that he could not see why it was any more of a departure to have France on the commission than on the E. A. C. He pointed out that the Prime Minister opposed enlarging the present three-power conferences; however, he could not see how the participation of France on the Control Commission would affect this view.

Mr. Molotov stated that he felt that at the present stage the question of France should be limited to the two proposals contained in the Soviet statement. If at a later date it were necessary to study French participation on the Control Commission it could be done. He felt that it was only proper that actual control should be in the hands of the three Commanders-in-chief.

It was decided that the three Secretaries should submit a report to the plenary session stating that: (A) It had been agreed upon to give to France a zone of occupation; and, (B) with respect to the question concerning the participation of France in the Control Commission, Messrs. Molotov and Stettinius considered it appropriate to submit this question to the consideration of the E. A. C. while Mr. Eden considered it appropriate to study the question at the present time and to assign to France a place on the Control Commission.

Mr. Eden stated that he believed that if France were admitted to the Control Commission the three Foreign Secretaries should agree that no other state should be given a zone of occupation.

Mr. Molotov suggested that there was not sufficient time to discuss that question at the present conference.

5. Reparations.

Mr. Molotov submitted a statement on this subject and summarized it in brief. He requested Mr. Maisky to explain the considerations which formed the basis of the Soviet statement.

Mr. Maisky stated that the Soviet authorities had come to the figure of twenty billion dollars (ten billion dollars of property to be removed immediately after the war and ten billion dollars of reparations to be paid in kind over a period of ten years) the following way. The national wealth of Germany at the beginning of the war amounted to 125 billion dollars. It was figured that this national wealth would be reduced by 40 per cent or less during the course of the war. Thus, the national wealth of Germany at the termination of the war would amount to seventy-five billion dollars. An analysis of the national wealths of the more highly industrialized countries had shown that the mobile part of this wealth which could be transferred abroad amounted to approximately 30 per cent or in the case of Germany to 22-23 billion dollars.

The Soviet Government proposed to remove ten billion dollars of this mobile wealth. The remainder would be left to Germany which would secure for that country living standards comparable to those prevailing in Central Europe. These were lower than in Germany but quite decent. With respect to the second item it had been figured that the national income of Germany before the war amounted to thirty billion dollars annually. The war would lower this income by 20-25 per cent and would bring it to the neighborhood of approximately 18-20 billion. The Soviet Government proposed to take one billion dollars annually, or 5-6 per cent from the German national income. This was not a large sum and could be supported by Germany.

Mr. Eden stated that there was one point in the opening paragraph of the Soviet statement on which he wished to comment. The Prime Minister had stated that the test for reparations payment should be not only the exertion of a country in the war, but also the sufferings endured at the hands of the enemy. On either basis the Soviet Union stood well. He would like to see reference made also to the sacrifices undergone by the Allies in the first paragraph of the Soviet statement. He remarked that he agreed in principle with the second paragraph of the Soviet statement. He wished, however, to give thorough study to the Soviet document before continuing discussion of it.

Mr. Molotov stated that there would be no objection to the addition in paragraph one of the words suggested by Mr. Eden.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he also wished to give a thorough study to the Soviet document. He recalled that the President at the plenary session had stated that the United States itself would not be interested in large reparations, except with respect to German foreign investments and perhaps raw materials. He expressed the hope that at this afternoon's plenary session the Foreign Secretaries would report that the reparations matter had been discussed and that it had been agreed that a commission should be established in Moscow where it would immediately commence work on the question of reparations.

Mr. Molotov stated that whenever the British and American representatives were prepared he would be ready to continue the discussions. With respect to the amount of reparations for the United States and Great Britain that was entirely the concern of those countries. However, in view of their losses especially at sea, the Soviet Government felt that it was only just to make mention in the reparations statement of compensation going to the United States and Great Britain. He favored Mr. Stettinius' proposal that the Foreign Ministers report to the plenary session that the question of reparations had been discussed, would be discussed further, and that a Reparations Commission would be set up in Moscow which would immediately commence work on this question.

Mr. Stettinius stated that it would be helpful for the American delegation to know whether the subject of labor would be discussed at the Crimean conference or at a later date.

Mr. Molotov stated that this question was very complicated, that the Soviet representatives needed time for further study on it and that they were not prepared to discuss it at the present conference. He agreed that it should be discussed by the Reparations Commission in Moscow.

Mr. Molotov's interpreter then read a second paper on the constitution of the Reparations Commission. Mr. Stettinius stated that his Government was prepared to accept the statement on the understanding that it had not yet agreed on the principles mentioned in it.

Mr. Eden inquired whether the Moscow Reparations Commission should not also be authorized to study German industry in connection with future security and control. If this were so, he suggested that this subject be dealt with in the draft terms of reference of the commission.

Mr. Molotov maintained that the commission would deal with German industry only in connection with reparations. The question of security, of course, would always be kept in mind although it was not the principal task of the commission.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that as a practical measure the German Control Commission should have the responsibility for the control of German industry for security purposes. The Reparations Commission should, of course, coordinate its work with the policy of the control machinery and should establish liaison with it.

Mr. Molotov was in agreement with this proposal.

GENERALS ARRIVE AT MALTA: General of the Army George C. Marshall, left, and Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson on arrival at Luqa Airport for a staff meeting.

* * *

MATTHEWS FILES
MATTHEWS NOTES

Dumbarton—No clarification needed.

Agenda.

1. Dismemberment, Article 12. [illegible]—commission to study.

MOL: Suggests Eden, Winant & Gusev.

EDEN: On terms of reference? [illegible]

MOL: Perhaps we [illegible]

EDEN: Worried about [illegible] of Fr. They [illegible] The three [illegible] French participation [illegible]

[illegible]

REPARATIONS

MOL: Explains paper.

MAISKY: Explains [illegible] reached [illegible] 125 [illegible] after war 75 [illegible] mobile part of wealth [illegible] 22 or 23 [illegible] This would [illegible] (Germany) Middle European level standards of living before [illegible] propose to take 1 bil annual [illegible] not big sum.

EDEN: Whether exertion in war should be a basis or would be sufferings at hands of enemy. On either basis would [illegible] well.

In general agreement as principles of Par. 2.

S. Prep. To study. As [illegible] said U.S. not interested except for invest possible raw materials. Hopes we can agree on to start instead.

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Somervell explained that the necessary military shipping would be found, but he felt that the Director of War Mobilization would require complete information and would wish to clear the matter before making any final allocation.

The joint chiefs of staff took note of General Somervell's report on the progress of cargo shipping and oil studies.

[illegible] thought it fair. Our losses [illegible] very great. Not ready to discuss at this conference. [illegible] would be studied by Moscow commis.

E. Should con. security provisions?

MOL: To extent necessary for reparations.

HISS NOTES

2-7 12:00 meeting ERS, Molotov, Eden, Amb. H., [illegible] A. H.-Cadogan, Clark Kerr, Jebb, Theakstone, Trans. [illegible] "Vishinsky, Maisky, Gusev, Golunsky, Novikov.

ERS at outset asked if there any q's re D. O. which we failed to make clear yesterday. If so I am prepared to answer with my colleagues any q's that may remain open and to expand it [illegible]

MOL: Not quite prepared to talk any q's now.

ERS merely made the offer but no desire to discuss it. No new points to bring up.

MOL: Thanks.

ERS: Ready at any time now or later.

ERS report—1p. by 4 P. M.

2-7 For Mins. Mol. claim France

Report: We are agreed that Fr. should have a zone of occupation in Ger. for occup. by Fr. forces. Mr. Mol. and ERS believe q. of particip. by Fr. in Control Com. should be studied by eac. Ed believes particip. Fr. in Con. Com. should be agreed to now (Eden). Would also be willing say 3 for. mins. agree that if Fr. is admitted to Con. Com. no other power should be given zone?

Reparations

Principles—Eden wants [illegible] referring to Para 1. Agreed by Mol. Eden in prin. agrees with par. 2.

ERS wants study means—will do so promptly and discuss it at your pleasure. Pres. at plenary session that U. S. would be interested in reparations except for investments and perhaps raw materials. Would be content if it would approach figure suggested. Perhaps Brit. would take some of what U. S. gives up.

Mol. up to U. S. and Brit.

[illegible] committee should be set [illegible] to go to work.

Mol. ready to go on when Brit. are [illegible]

[illegible]

BOHLEN COLLECTION

Soviet proposal on French Zone of Occupation in Germany circulated but not submitted by Molotov on Feb. 7, 1945:

1. [illegible] a separate zone of occupation in Germany to be allotted to France.

2. It has been found desirable to allot to France a separate zone of occupation in Germany for occupation by French forces.

2. It has been decided that the French occupational authorities shall exercise control in their zone of occupation under the general guidance of the Control Council.

* * *

BOHLEN COLLECTION

Soviet Proposal on Reparations from Germany

Basic Principles of Exactions of Reparations from Germany

1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have organized victory over the enemy.

All other countries are to receive reparations secondly.

2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labor by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

(A) Removal in a single payment at the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.). These removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

(B) Annual deliveries of commodities during 10 years after the end of the war.

3. The total of German reparations in the form of removals from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war is fixed at [illegible] billion dollars.

[illegible] shall be distributed as follows:

(A) U.S.S.R.—Ten billion dollars.

(B) United Kingdom and U.S.A.—Eight billion dollars.

(C) All other countries—Two billion dollars.

* * *

BOHLEN COLLECTION

Soviet Proposal on the Establishment of an Allied Reparation Committee

Circulated and submitted by Molotov on Feb. 7, 1945.

Regarding the organization of an Allied Reparation Committee.

1. The committee shall consist of three representatives one from U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom and U. S. A. Each representative shall be entitled to call in to assist in the work of the committee any number of experts.

2. The functions of the committee shall be to work out a detailed plan for exaction of reparations from Germany according to the principles elaborated at the Crimean conference of the three powers.

3. The Governments of U. S. S. R., U. S. A., and the United Kingdom shall (in relation to the corresponding document in the Hiss Collection indicates that the text in the Bohlen Collection is a revision of the draft initially presented by Molotov, the word "shall" having replaced the following words which were stricken from Paragraph 3 "may on recommendation of the Allied committee or on their own initiative") determine the moment when the representatives of other Allied powers will be invited to participate in the Allied committee as well as define the forms of participation of these powers in the committee.

4. The activities of the committee shall proceed in strict secrecy.

5. The Allied Reparation Committee shall be established in Moscow.

FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Feb. 7, 1945, 4 P. M.

Livadia Palace

PRESENT

United States	Sir Alexander Cadogan
President Roosevelt	Sir Edward Bridges
Secretary Stettinius	Mr. Jebb
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Mr. Wilson
Mr. Hopkins	Mr. Dixon
Mr. Byrnes	Major Birse
Mr. Harriman	**Soviet Union**
Mr. Matthews	Marshal Stalin
Mr. Hiss	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Vyshinsky
United Kingdom	Mr. Maisky
Prime Minister Churchill	Mr. Gusev
Foreign Secretary Eden	Mr. Gromyko
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Pavlov

BOHLEN COLLECTION—BOHLEN MINUTES

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT:

1. Dismemberment of Germany.
2. Poland.
3. World security organization.
4. Zone of occupation in Germany for France and French participation in the Control Commission.

The President said in regard to the Polish question he wished again to emphasize that he was less interested in the tracing of the frontier lines than he was in the problem of the Polish Government. He said that he did not attach any importance to the continuity or legality of any Polish Government since he thought in some years there had in reality been no Polish Government. He added that before proceeding with the Polish question he understood that Mr. Molotov had a report on the meeting of the Foreign Ministers today.

Mr. Molotov then read the results of the Foreign Ministers' meeting as follows:

Decisions adopted at the meeting of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden Feb. 7, 1945.

"1. Regarding the dismemberment of Germany.

(A) A. Y. Vyshinsky, Mr. Cadogan and Mr. Matthews were entrusted with the preparation of the final draft of Article 12 of the instrument "Unconditional Surrender of Germany" having in view the insertion in the text of Article 12 of the word "dismemberment."

(B) The study of the question on the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Eden, Mr. Winant and F. T. Gusev.

"2. Regarding the zone of occupation in Germany for France.

(A) The allotment to France of a zone in Germany to be occupied by French occupational forces has been agreed upon.

(B) As regards the question of the participation of France in the Control Commission, V. M. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius feel it desirable to refer the question to the E. A. C. Mr. Eden considers it necessary to discuss the question now and to give France a place on the Control Commission.

"3. Regarding the reparations to be exacted from Germany.

(A) It was agreed that in the paragraph one of the Soviet proposals mention should be made of sacrifices borne.

(B) It was decided that the residence of the reparations committee should be in the city of Moscow. It was agreed that the committee should begin its work immediately upon the approval of the principles of the exacting of the reparations.

(C) It was decided that the discussion of the two documents relating to the exaction of the reparations which have been submitted by V. M. Molotov, first, regarding the basic principles of exacting the reparations from Germany, and second, regarding the organization of an Allied Reparations Committee, should be continued at the Crimean Conference."

The President said that we are all grateful for the constructive work of the three Foreign Ministers.

The Prime Minister added that he joined the President in thanking the committee for their fruitful work, but he said that since he had only heard the report orally he would wish to study the English translation, although, except for one point, he felt that he would be in complete agreement.

The President inquired whether the document included Mr. Eden's reservation on France, to which Mr. Eden replied in the affirmative.

The Prime Minister stated that the British Government was unconvinced by the argument that it would be possible to accord a zone to the French without participation in the Control Commission. If the French were given a zone without participation they would cause endless trouble. If we were stern in our zones, they might be lenient in theirs and vice versa. He felt that it was of the utmost importance that there should be unanimity in the treatment of Germany by the three or four Allies. He repeated that he felt the Control Commission for Germany would be a subordinate instrument as was the case in Italy, although we recognized that the German Commission would have more important tasks. He said he wished to make it clear that he did not consider that French participation in the Control Commission would give them any right to attend a conference such as this one, at least for the time being. He said he must state frankly that he found the arguments of the subject somewhat [illegible] it was obvious that France would accept no zone unless they were given participation in the Control Commission and he for one thought that they were right. He felt it was no good to refer the question to the European Advisory Commission, which was a weaker body and particularly as France was represented on the commission and only a deadlock could result with the French and British on one side and the Russians and Americans on the other. He therefore was of the opinion that the matter should be settled here, but it still required further study.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether the Prime Minister meant that it should be settled now or later.

The Prime Minister answered that it should be done now, but at some later stage of this conference.

The President then observed that would it not be better to postpone it for two or three weeks instead of two or three days.

The Prime Minister answered that he felt that once they had separated after this conference it would be difficult to settle the question.

Marshal Stalin remarked that the three Governments had been able to settle a good many things by correspondence. Marshal Stalin then said that in the European Advisory Commission they would at least have the benefit of the French opinion which was not represented here.

Marshal Stalin stated that he had received the President's letter containing the suggestion that they summon here from Lublin two representatives from the Lublin Government and two representatives from other elements of Polish public opinion and that in the presence of these four Poles they should endeavor to settle the question of a new interim government for Poland which would be pledged to hold free elections when conditions permitted. He said he noted that there were three personalities from London, namely, Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, who had been mentioned by the President as possible members of this new government. He said he had received the President's letter only an hour and a half ago and he endeavored to reach the Lublin Poles by telephone but had been informed that they were away in Cracow and Lodz. He had attempted to ascertain their opinion. As to the others, he was not sure that they could be located in time for them to come to the Crimea and he mentioned in this connection especially Witos and Sapieha. The Marshal added that Mr. Molotov had worked out some proposals on the Polish question which appeared to approach the President's suggestions, but that these proposals were not typed out. He suggested, therefore, that they proceed to the consideration of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal and he would ask Mr. Molotov to state the views of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Molotov said that yesterday we have heard Mr. Stettinius give a full report and explanations of the President's proposals and that this report and explanation had been satisfactory and had made the issue clear to the Soviet delegation. He said that they had always also followed closely Mr. Churchill's remarks on the subject. He said that after hearing Mr. Stettinius' report and Mr. Churchill's remarks, which had clarified the subject, the Soviet Government felt that these proposals fully guaranteed the unity of the great powers in the matter of preservation of peace. Since this had been the main Soviet purpose at Dumbarton Oaks and they felt that the new proposals fully safeguarded this principle, he could state that they were entirely acceptable and that they had no comments to offer. He felt that there was full agreement on this subject. Mr. Molotov said that there was one question raised at Dumbarton Oaks, namely that of participation of the Soviet republics as initial members of the world organization. He said the Soviet views were known as were those of the British and American Governments. He said the Soviet views were based on the constitutional changes which had occurred in February of last year and he did not think that this conference should ignore this request.

It was not the Soviet intention to raise the question in the same form as had been done at Dumbarton Oaks but they would be satisfied with the admission of three or at least two of the Soviet republics as original members. These three republics were the Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania and he felt that three, or at any rate two, should have the right to participate as original members. He said that it was unnecessary to explain the size, population and importance of the Ukraine, White Russia or Lithuania or their importance in foreign affairs.

He said that as these three republics had borne the greatest sacrifices in the war and were the first to be invaded by the enemy, it was only fair, therefore, that these three, or at any rate two, be original members. He said that the Soviet Government put these proposals before the President and the Prime Minister and hoped that they would be accepted.

The President then inquired whether Mr. Molotov meant members of the Assembly.

Mr. Molotov replied "Yes," that they should be included among other members of that body. The dominions of the British Commonwealth have gradually and patiently achieved their place as entities in international affairs. He said he felt that it was only right that three, or at least two, of these Soviet Republics should find a worthy place among the members of the Assembly. Their sacrifices and contributions to the war earned them this place. He said in closing that he wished to repeat that he fully agreed with the President's proposals and withdrew any objections or amendments but would request that three, or at least two of the Soviet Republics mentioned above be given a chance to become equal members of the world organization.

The President said he was very happy to hear from Mr. Molotov the agreement of the Soviet Government to his proposals on voting in the Council. He felt that this was a great step forward which would be welcomed by all the peoples of the world. He said that he thought the next step was to consider the question of summoning a conference to organize the setting up of the world organization. He said he thought that this conference could take place at the end of March, although it might be physically possible to do it within the next four weeks. He added that he had been greatly interested in what Mr. Molotov had said in regard to the participation of the Soviet republics. He added that the British Empire, the U. S. S. R. and the United States were very different in structure and in tradition. The British Empire, for example, had many large units such as Canada, Australia, etc. The U. S. S. R. had a different national structure. The United States had one language and one Foreign Minister. He felt, therefore, that Mr. Molotov's suggestion should be studied, particularly in the light of the possibility that if the larger nations were given more than one vote it might prejudice the thesis of one vote for each member. He mentioned that certain countries are large in area, though small in population and referred in this connection to Brazil which he said was smaller than the U. S. S. R. but larger than the United States. On the other hand, there were

Polish Governmental Solution Sought by President in Big Three Discussions

some countries that were small in area but large in population, such as Honduras and Haiti. He also mentioned the fact that there were a number of nations associated with the United Nations, such as Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Iceland, and others, which had broken relations with Germany but which were not at war. He concluded with the statement that he felt that the important thing was to proceed with the plans for a conference to set up the world organization and that the question of the admission of countries not members of the United Nations could be considered either at that time or after the organization was in operation. He said he suggested, therefore, that the question raised by Mr. Molotov should be studied by the Foreign Ministers who might also make recommendations as to the time and place of the conference and as to what nations should be invited.

The Prime Minister said he would like to express his heartfelt thanks to Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov for this great step forward which he felt would bring joy and relief to the peoples of the world. On the question of membership of the Soviet republics, he said this had been put before us for the first time. He said he must agree with the President that the United States and the British Empire were different, that during the last twenty-five years the self-governing dominions have taken their place in world affairs and have worked for peace and, if he might say so, for the furtherance of democratic processes. The dominions had come into the war when Great Britain declared war against Germany, knowing full well the weakness of Great Britain at that time. Great Britain had had no means of forcing them into this decision and into which they knew they would not often be consulted on major matters. He said that Great Britain could not agree to any organization which would reduce the status of the dominions or exclude them from participation. That is why, Mr. President, the Prime Minister said, he had great sympathy with the Soviet request. His heart went out to mighty Russia which though bleeding was beating down the tyrants in her path. He said he could understand their point of view, as they were represented by only one voice in comparison with the British Organization which had a smaller population, if only white people were considered. He was glad, therefore, that the President had made an answer to the Soviet proposal which in no way constituted a final negation. He added, however, that he could not exceed his authority and as he had just heard this proposal he would like to discuss it with the Foreign Secretary and possibly communicate it to London and he asked Marshal Stalin to excuse him as he could not give a precise answer today.

The President remarked that his recommendations had been somewhat different. He had [illegible] meant that the Foreign Ministers should study the question as well as that of the time and place of the conference and who should be invited.

The Prime Minister said that he did not disagree with the President's suggestion but he felt that the Foreign Ministers had already had a good deal of work thrust upon them. He said he must speak frankly and say that he foresaw difficulties in attempting to hold a meeting as soon as March. The battle would be at its height and more soldiers would be involved than at any time of the war. British domestic problems would be very pressing and their ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, would be greatly occupied in Parliament. He also wondered whether the state of the world and in Europe in particular was not such as to make very difficult a meeting of all of the United Nations. He doubted whether any representatives at such conference would be able to have behind them the full thought of the vital forces of their countries.

The President observed that he had only in mind a meeting to organize the setting up of the world organization, and that the world organization itself would probably not come into being for from three to six months after the conference.

The Prime Minister said that he had in mind the fact that some nations in March would still be under the German yoke and would be represented by governments in exile whose authority in regard to their own people would be questionable. Other countries would be starving and in misery, such as Holland. France would be there with a loud voice. There would be other countries represented there who had not suffered at all in the war and who had not lost a man. He wondered how such a gathering could really undertake the immense task of the future organization of the world.

The President repeated his proposal, namely, that the Foreign Minister could consider (1) the Soviet proposal regarding membership, (2) the date and place of the conference, and (3) what nations should be invited.

The Prime Minister said he had no objection to the Foreign Ministers' discussing this point but he said he must emphasize that this was no technical question but one of great decision. With this qualification, he agreed to the President's proposal.

Marshal Stalin remarked that the Foreign Ministers will not make decisions but merely report to the conference.

There was a short intermission at this point.

The Prime Minister said that he proposed that the Foreign Ministers should consider the question of Iran and other matters of perhaps secondary importance but which should be considered.

The President and Marshal Stalin agreed.

The President then said, jokingly, that he hoped that forestry would be one of the points considered since he had not seen a tree in his visit last year to Teheran. He went on to say that he thought Iran was a good example of the type of economic problem that might confront the world if we are to bring about expansion of world trade and greater exchange of goods. He said that Persia did not have the purchasing power to buy foreign goods, and if expansion of world trade was to occur measures must be considered for helping those countries like Persia that did not have any purchasing power. He concluded that before the advent of the Turks, Persia had had plenty of timber and thus plenty of water and her people had been reasonably prosperous, but that he personally had never seen a poorer country than Persia was at the present time. He, therefore, very much hoped that the new world organization would conduct a world-wide survey with a view to extending help to countries and areas that did not have sufficient purchasing power, either in cash or in foreign exchange.

The President added that there was a parallel, he thought, in Europe in that certain countries had adequate supplies of power, such as coal and water power, and those countries had cheap and abundant electric power, whereas other countries within fifty miles had neither. He felt that this situation was wrong. He mentioned that in the Soviet Union and its various republics consideration had been given to the problem of a country as a whole and in the United States the TVA had the same idea. He mentioned that in the region of the TVA electric current was sold at the same price throughout the area. He concluded that, having said his piece, he would now defer to Mr. Molotov for his proposals in regard to the Polish question.

Mr. Molotov then read his proposals in regard to the Polish question, as follows:

1. It was agreed that the line of Curzon should be the Eastern frontier of Poland with a digression from it in some regions of 5-8 kilometers in favor of Poland.

2. It was decided that the Western frontier of Poland should be traced from the town of Stettin (Polish) and farther to the south along the River Oder and still farther along the River Neisse (western).

3. It was deemed desirable to add to the provisional Polish Government some democratic leaders from Polish emigre circles.

(The words "and from inside Poland" were added at the end of this paragraph in the subsequent discussion.)

4. It was regarded desirable that the enlarged Provisional Polish Government should be recognized by the Allied governments.

5. It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged as was mentioned above in Paragraph 3, should as soon as possible call the population of Poland to the polls for organization by general voting of permanent organs of the Polish Government.

6. V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three governments.

After reading the proposals Mr. Molotov said he would like to add that they had attempted to reach the Poles in Poland by telephone but they had been unable to do so and it was apparent that time would not permit the carrying out of the President's suggestion to summon the Poles to the Crimea. He said he felt that the proposals he had just put forward went far toward meeting the President's wishes.

The President replied that he would say he felt progress had been made in the light of Mr. Molotov's suggestions. He said there was just one word he did not like and that was "emigre." He said he did not see any necessity to go to emigres since you could find enough Poles in Poland for the purpose. He repeated what he had said yesterday, namely, that he did not know any of the Poles in the Poland Government in London and he knew only Mr. Mikolajczyk. He concluded by saying he would like to have an opportunity, with Mr. Stettinius, to study Mr. Molotov's proposals, to which Marshal Stalin agreed.

The Prime Minister said he shared the President's dislike of the word "emigre." The word had originated during the French Revolution and meant in England a person who had been driven out of a country by his own people.

He said in the case of the Poles this wasn't true, since they had left their country as a result of the brutal German attack. He, therefore, preferred in place of the word "emigre" to refer to them as "Poles temporarily abroad." He said in regard to the second point of Mr. Molotov's proposals he would always support the movement of Polish frontiers to the West since he felt they should receive compensation, but not more than they can handle. He said it would be a pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it got indigestion. He said he felt that there was a considerable body of British public opinion that would be shocked if it were proposed to move large numbers of Germans, and although he personally would not be shocked he knew that that view existed in England. He said he felt if it were confined to East Prussia, 1,000,000 Germans probably could be handled quite aside from moral grounds, but the addition of the line west of the Neisse would create quite a problem in this respect.

Marshal Stalin remarked that most Germans in those areas had already run away from the Red Army.

The Prime Minister said this, of course, simplified the problem, and in regard to the question of space in Germany for these deported persons he felt that the fact that Germany had had six to seven million casualties in this war and would probably have a million more would simplify that problem.

Marshal Stalin replied that the Germans might well have one or possibly two million more casualties.

The Prime Minister said that he wasn't afraid of the problem of transfer of populations provided that it was proportioned to the capacity of the Poles to handle it and the capability of the Germans to receive them. He felt, however, that it needs study, not only in principle but as a practical matter. He said he had one other comment. In the Soviet proposal some reference should be made to other democratic leaders from within Poland itself.

Marshal Stalin agreed and the words "and from inside Poland" were added at the end of Paragraph 3 of the Soviet statement.

The Prime Minister then concluded that he agreed with the President that it would be well to sleep on this problem and take it up tomorrow, but he did feel that some progress had been made.

At the President's suggestion the meeting was adjourned until four o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

(MATTHEWS FILES)

MATTHEWS MINUTES

TOP SECRET.

PRESIDENT: I think we should take up the Polish question. When we concluded our meeting yesterday Marshal Stalin had explained his views. I have nothing special to add to what I said yesterday. I think it is particularly important to find a solution of the governmental question. [illegible] I am concerned with frontiers. I am, however, not so concerned on the question of the continuity of the Government. There hasn't really been any Polish Government since 1939. It is entirely in the province of the three of us to help set up a government—something to last until the Polish people can choose. I discard the idea of continuity. I think we want something new and drastic—like a breath of fresh air. But before we go on with Poland I think Mr. Molotov should report to us on the meeting of the three foreign ministers.

(Molotov reads his report.)

PRIME MINISTER: I wish to thank the committee for their labor. I am in general agreement with the report with a single exception. However, I should like to see in writing what has been decided as I have only now been orally informed of what took place. On the question of giving the French a zone but not a place on the Control Commission His Majesty's Government is made quite uncomfortable.

I cannot believe that [illegible] treatment of Germany between the four Allies in Berlin with [illegible] the Allied Control Commission as a subordinate [illegible] the will of the governments. In principle it is no more [illegible] Allied Commissions [illegible] they have a [illegible] giving France a place on the control [illegible] right to the French [illegible] But all [illegible] to the Poles [illegible] French will take [illegible] they are given [illegible] the Control Council [illegible] I think [illegible] would [illegible] from" For the [illegible] that the proposal [illegible] work. Likewise, I feel that there is no use bringing [illegible] cannot [illegible] body such as the European Advisory Commission where the French are acting. So why not settle it here. I suggest that we should give the question further study and settle it here.

PRESIDENT: Shall we go on with the discussion of Poland?

STALIN: I have received the President's message. It contains a proposal to call from Poland two representatives of the Lublin Government and two from the opposite camp, so that in our presence these four would settle the question of the new Polish Government. If this is successful, the new provisional government should in the shortest possible time organize elections in Poland. The message of the President's also proposes that some more Poles from London—Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski—should also take part in the new government. I received this letter an hour and a half ago. I immediately gave instructions to find Bierut and Osubka-Morawski so that I could talk with them on the phone. The result was that at the moment they are outside Warsaw at Lodz or Cracow but they will be found and I must ask them how to find the representatives on the other side and what they think of the possibility of their coming. I can then tell how soon they will arrive. If Vincente Witos or Sapieha could come here it would facilitate a solution but I do not

SHIPBOARD CONFERENCE: Averell Harriman, Ambassador to Russia, visits President Roosevelt after Yalta talks.

know their addresses. I am afraid we have not sufficient time. Meanwhile, Molotov has prepared a draft to meet in a certain extent the President's proposal. Let us hear it when it arrives as the translation is not yet finished. Meanwhile, we might talk of Dumbarton Oaks.

(Molotov here gave his explanation of the Russian acceptance of our voting procedure and of their request for the inclusion of three representatives in the Assembly. This is being covered by Mr. Hiss's notes.)

The President made some remarks on the low purchasing power of Persians and other nations which he stated was another reason for organizing the world organization. He likewise threw out the idea of setting up a T.V.A. for Europe. Mr. Molotov's proposal then arrived.

[illegible]

Poland. Now we [illegible]

STALIN: [illegible]

PRIME MINISTER: [illegible] the Prime [illegible] word "emigre" during the [illegible] people driven [illegible] countrymen [illegible] driven out [illegible] With regard [illegible] the River Neisse [illegible] say a word [illegible] feel [illegible] Poles [illegible] should be free [illegible] but [illegible] can manage. I [illegible] stuff the Polish goose [illegible] also [illegible] school of thought [illegible] which [illegible] transferring [illegible] by force [illegible] shocked [illegible] in England [illegible] change of [illegible] a great [illegible] moved two [illegible] take East Prussia [illegible] that means [illegible] That is manageable [illegible] will be big [illegible]

STALIN: There will be no more Germans there [illegible] our troops come in the Germans run away and no Germans are left.

PRIME MINISTER: [illegible] there is the problem of how to handle them in Germany. We have killed six or seven million and probably will kill another million before the end [illegible]

STALIN: One or two.

PRIME MINISTER: [illegible] not proposing any limitation on them. So there should be room in Germany for some who [illegible] need to fill the vacancy. I am not afraid of the problem of transfer of populations so long as it is in proportion to what the Poles can manage and what can be put in the place of the dead in Germany.

I have only one other point. It is a reference in Mr. Molotov's plan to the [illegible] of some democratic leaders from "emigre" circles. Would Marshal Stalin be willing to add [illegible] some within Poland itself [illegible] was also suggested in the President's message.

STALIN: Yes, that is acceptable.

PRIME MINISTER: [illegible] in agreement with the President's suggestion that we should sleep on this till tomorrow.

STALIN: I likewise find this acceptable.

The meeting is adjourned until 4 tomorrow.

HISS COLLECTION

HISS NOTES

"CRIMEA CONF"

Plenary

Ed page—added to his notes—given to Chip (Bohlen)

D.O.

MOL: Yesterday heard [illegible] put from E. R. S. We are satisfied with this report and we got some explanations. After the report and after these explanations certain Q's became much clearer. We paid much [illegible] to what Church. said on [illegible] After report of E. S. and remarks of Church. the Q a considerably clarified for us. In the [illegible] of these explanations and [illegible] we believe it would [illegible] the unity of three powers [illegible] gen. P. and sec. after the [illegible] Our position in the Q's of D.O. essentially was to secure [illegible] unity among these gt. [illegible] Q of P. and sec after [illegible] We believe the dec. [illegible] D.O. and modifications [illegible] by Pres. will secure [illegible] nations great and [illegible] the war [illegible] "therefore" [illegible] the proposals which [illegible] accepted as acceptable to [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] importance [illegible] all well known. I don't want to go into detail in describing also impact of B-R and Lith. Also from point of view of [illegible] these [illegible] made the greatest sacrifices in this war. The peoples of U. R. and Lith. have suffered very much in this war and were [illegible] to be invaded. Would be fair if these three or at any rate two be accepted as orig. members.

The Sov Govt requests Pres. and P.M. these three or at least two be accepted among other UN NS. I would like to mention in this connection that the Domins of Brit Crown approached [illegible] gradually and showed great patience. This gives us the example and reason to withdraw our orig. proposal advanced at D.O. and propose these three or at least two be accepted as orig. members. Among members of Ass. these few Reps. certainly should find their due there. Their role and sacrifices in this war entitle.

PRES.: Much gratitude at what Mol. has said in accepting the gen. plan. That is making real progress. Next thing we have consider is timing. What is next step. Invitations will go out to all nations that have had a place in this war.

CHURCH: The Ger war.

PRES.: Yes.

PRES.: No use talking much further about UN NS. We are all agreed except it has not been set up. Next we should invite [illegible] to assemble [illegible] in U. S. be held soon as possible—end of Mar., late of [illegible]

Personally approve of UN NS [illegible] in a [illegible] 1 month. Personally I think that quicker [illegible] UN Ns meeting is developed, quicker we can take up [illegible] Mol. has said which is very interesting to me. But that [illegible] will mean the later meeting after the organ is set up. [illegible] a practical matter when we [illegible] this organizing meeting [illegible] shall we ask? Nations [illegible] war of those associated but [illegible] in the war. For instance those [illegible] Assoc. Nations [illegible] broken rels with Ger. but [illegible] declared war. Road [illegible] got to decide who we're [illegible] to invite. What we have [illegible] from Mr. Mol. gives me a [illegible] list, in matter of a [illegible] for Uk. (Ukraine) Wh. R. (White Russia) Lith. (Lithuania) [illegible] We 3 (M. St., P. M., and [illegible] different views because [illegible] are so very different. [illegible] Bra. has great pop. like [illegible] Australia) Can. S. Af. [illegible] has great masses like [illegible] Mol. mentioned, US is [illegible] no colonies, about [illegible] for 1 for each. Those things require study, require study of q of more than 1 vote for the larger nations in the world. In same way certain nations have large terra. Brazil smaller than S. U. but larger than U. S. In same way many small countries like Haiti, Honduras, and we should consider whether by giving any govt. more than 1 vote we would break down prin. of 1 vote for each. (Geometric symbol for "therefore") if we can agree on gen. idea for meeting to organ. U Na'ns can consider these q's by for mins or at the meeting of the organizers.

PRES.: For. Mins. have an successful suggest Q. of voting in ass. be referred to for. mins. also to recommend time and place of a conf.

CHURCH: I should like to express my heartfelt thanks to Mar. St. (Marshal Stalin) and sov govt for the enormous step they have taken to put forward D.O. I'm sure the agr. of the 3 gt powers such as has already been expressed around this table will give joy and relief to the thinking people around the world. On the q of membership of the ass. it has been put before us in quite a new form by our R friends and allies.

Everyone I'm sure will feel that here again a very remarkable advance to gen. agr. has been made. I must fully agree with the Pres. that the position of the US and of the Brit Em are different. We have our 4 self governing domins. that for nearly a quarter of a century have played a part in the organ of P. which broke down before the present war. All these 4 domns. have worked for P. and for democratic purposes and all without hesitation sprang into the war when we declared it though they knew how weak we were. We had no means of compelling them and no rt. to give them any summons but they came freely in a matter in which they could only be partially consulted. We could never agree to any system which excluded them from the position they have held and justified for over ¼ of a century. It is for this very reason that I could not listen to the proposal of the Sov Govt without a feeling of profound sympathy. My heart goes out to mighty Russia, bleeding from her wounds and conquering and beating down the tyrant in her path. I should feel that a nation so great with 180,000,000 people would perhaps have cause to look at our [illegible] with a questioning eye if they had but one vote when their nos. far exceed our own, speaking of whites. I was very glad that the Pres made an answer which could in no way be construed a final neg. to the consideration of this proposal. I could not however exceed my own personal auth. We have only just heard this new proposal and I should like to discuss it with the For. Sec. and possibly send a tel. to the Brit. War Cab. We only want to see done what is rt. and fair.

(Geometric symbol for "therefore") I will ask the Mar. to excuse me if I do not give precise final answer on behalf of HMG here today. I will not lose time.

PRES.: My notion was a little different. It did not call for a dec. today. Refer the study to for mins and second where it should be held and who should [illegible]

Church: Very glad—we are pulling great deal on them—very large and simple. As meeting suggested by Pres. I shouldn't think it desirable hold it so early as March. In Mar. we shall be at the very height of the battle on both the fronts, more millions of soldiers will be engaged than ever before. Our dom. problems in Eng. are very complicated with shortage of labor, housing and need of supplying fighting forces at the front. We also have a par. (Parliament) which is in active life from day to day and claims large share of the atten. of the mins. incl. for. sec.

We are now already a quarter thru F'b. I wonder also whether state of the world and Eur. particulary is such as not to make a meeting diff. of all the un na. If they are charged with the most tremendous tasks of the future will they have behind them the full thought of their people. Will they have anything left over after vital needs of the war are met. I wonder what the aspect of the ass. would wear. Could Premiers be present?

Pres: This is not a meeting of the ass (Assembly)—only of the organizing conf.

CHURCH: But they would be same people. How many of the nations there will still be in the bondage of the Gers. we do not know how they will represent their people. Another group will be starving in their frightful misery—amid the scenes of war. Holland will be there with her ghastly ruins. Fr. will be there with a loud voice. With all these agonized communities will also be joined a large No. of nations who have not suffered at all in the war. No (nations) that have not even declared war. I can not think that the meeting of such an ass. would be free from the danger of becoming chaotic. Some in will be screaming in agony and others will be calmly weighing the problems of the future. I see particular diffs. for an early meeting so far as Brit. is concerned.

CHURCH: Position in Eng. though perfectly calm and steady is governed by our own coal. We may have a gen. election impending. May have new parliament to carry with us. may have entirely new set of ministers.

Will always do our best to comply with the pres. wishes but I feel it absolutely nec. to put on record the very great diff. which I see, practically. And I should be very disappointed if the settlement of the membership of ass. was postponed till new meeting of UN. NS. can be held.

Pres. again proposes to refer to For. Mins. to study membership and date and place of meeting and who should be invited.

Stalin agreed.

Church: I said earlier no objection is it being discussed by For. Mins. but is not a technical matter but one of large and broad dec. Not at all sure matters will be advanced by the discussion.

St: 3 Mins. will meet, discuss and report.

Agreed

(Intermission)

Church proposed Iran be remitted to For. Mins.

[Pres says to see he can cable Chiang and get consent re voting immediately.

He would not consult France, merely invite Fr. to the meeting.]

While waiting for Molotov's paper on Pol.

Pres. raised q of int. economics—another reason the early creation of un. na. org.—should be some way of getting so that have no purchasing power to get some—historically Persia well wooded before Turks came—no erosion, water—today poorest place I have ever seen in the world. That is why I hope new un. na. org. will concern itself with those countries that have no money with which to get goods. While on this subject—parallel one—in Eur. some areas have coal, cheap power and light from water. Why favoritism to those who have coal and water or cheap elec. light rates when others 50 miles away have no water, no light. Sov. Govts. All the Soviets are all thinking in terms like that. We are thinking in terms like that—T. V. A.

POLAND

Mol: In E. Curzon Line, 5-8 kms digression in some regions in favor of Pol.

In W. from Stettin along Oder, then along Neisse.

Add some emigres to Pol. Govt.

Allies recog. Pol. Govt. now.

Prov. Govt. hold elections soon as possible.

Mol., Harr., Clark-Kerr to consider and report enlarging Pol. Govt.

President's proposals.

Can't reach Poles by phone in time to come here.

progress.

Pres: We are making real. Wants are study this tonight.

Knows one word he doesn't like—"emigre."

Not so. Take emigres. Like to have S. D. study it until tomorrow.

Church: Agrees with Pres. Re "emigre."

Re: Neisse—We have always qualified movement of Pol. frontier to W. that they shouldn't take much more than they wish or can take care of.

Great pity to stuff Pol. goose so full of Ger. food that he died of indigestion. Large school of opin. shocked by transferring many millions of people by force. I am not frightened to success of Gk Turk transfer after last war—but only ½ million.

It take E. Pr. and Silesia up to Oder means 6,000,000 Germ. That might be managed with modern facilities.

St. says there are no more Gers. there. Where our troops come in they find no Gers.

Church: We have killed 5 or 6 mil and prob another million before the end. There ought to be room in Ger. for people transferred. They will be needed to fill vacancies, so not afraid of prob of transferring pop as long as proportioned.

* * *

Draft of Letter from President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

(Undated carbon copy; authorship not indicated. Stettinius says that the letter as sent was prepared "by the Department and Hopkins." On August 11, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought the draft was by Bohlen.)

My dear Marshal Stalin, I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political set-up in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin Government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut and Mr. Osubka-Morawski from the Lublin Government and also any two of the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski (Zulawski), Professor Buyak (Bujak), and Professor Kutzeba (Kutrzeba). If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland, the United States Government, and I feel sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to disassociate themselves from the London Government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin (the copy in the Bohlen Collection is stamped "top secret")

(YALTA,) Feb. 6, 1945.

My Dear Marshal Stalin: I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political set-up in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin Government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut and Mr. Osubka-Morawski from the Lublin Government and also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us would recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders from abroad such as Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, the United States Government, and I feel sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to examine with you conditions in which they would dissociate themselves from the London Government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

(Hopkins Papers)

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President.

(Yalta, Feb. 7, 1945.)

Mr. President, I think you should try to get this referred to Foreign Ministers before there is trouble.

HARRY.

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President, and reply by the President.

(Yalta, Feb. 7, 1945.)

All of the below refers to Churchill's opposition to early calling of conference of United Nations.

There is something behind this talk that we do not know of its basis.

Perhaps we better to wait till later tonight what is on his mind.

All this is not local politics.

Yalta Publication Cost Difficult to Estimate

WASHINGTON, March 16 (AP)—Nobody is prepared to say just how much the publication of the Yalta papers, complete with photographs and maps, will cost the United States.

The State Department's surprise decision to release the papers made available a massive array of bound galley proofs that will must be corrected and sprinkled with some illustrations and three maps, including one map in color. They probably will sell for about $10 for the two-volume set.

The State Department spent more than the usual amount in preparing the Yalta papers because of the great length to which it had gone to keep them secret.

The papers were obtained from various sources. The principal collections on which the papers are based is that prepared by Charles E. Bohlen. Mr. Bohlen, now Ambassador to Moscow, was then an Assistant Secretary of State and interpreter for President Roosevelt.

Military Representatives Study Problems of Supply and Troop Movement

(The relationship of these notes to the plenary meeting appears from internal evidence and from Sherwood, pp. 862-866.)

(This line is in Roosevelt's handwriting:)

I am quite sure now he is thinking about the next election in Britain.

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Feb. 8, 1945, 10 A. M.

Livadia Palace

PRESENT

Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Bull
Major General Deane
Major General Anderson
Major General Hull
Major General Wood
Major General Hill
Rear Admiral Smith
Rear Admiral McCormick
Rear Admiral Carter
Rear Admiral Duncan
SECRETARIAT
Rear Admiral Olsen

Brigadier General Roberts
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Cabell
Brigadier General Lindsay
Brigadier General Bessell
Brigadier General Everest
Commodore Burrough
Colonel Peck
Colonel Lincoln
Colonel Dean
Colonel Bogart
Colonel Cary
Captain Stroop
Captain McDill
Commander Clark
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves
(J. C. S. FILES)

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

J. C. S. 186th Meeting.

1. Levels of supply of all petroleum products in all theatres.

2. Over-all review of cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945.

Admiral Leahy said that although the paper was an agreed report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board it appeared to him that the essence of the report was an agreement to re-examine the position when a need for further study arose.

General Somervell said that the necessity for a revision had already arisen, particularly with reference to redeployment plans. On the other hand, he felt that the paper in its present form was entirely satisfactory. Referring to Paragraph 4B (Q) (D) of the paper, he said that during the committee negotiations the British had insisted upon the submission of the report referred to therein on 1 June.

General Marshall said that if the war ended by 1 April 1945 the combined redeployment plan and the related combined report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and shipping authorities would be too late if submitted on 30 April 1945, as required in the paper.

General Somervell felt that the date for the submission of the report might well be moved up to 1 April.

Admiral King pointed out that the reports could be submitted at any time prior to 30 April. The requirement as stated in the paper was that they should be ready not later than 30 April.

Colonel Lincoln said that as far as the United States was concerned the planners already had a redeployment paper under way and that they could make this plan available by 1 April.

Admiral Leahy said that a change of the date to 1 April might not be acceptable to the British.

Admiral Smith said that the British members of the Combined Committees appeared to have no objection to a 1 April date. The date of 30 April had been selected to afford the U. S. planners ample time to produce their redeployment plan.

General Somervell thought there might be some objection on the part of the British to moving the date up to 1 April. He understood that the British plans for redeployment had not progressed as far as the United States plans.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Agreed to recommend approval of C. C. S. 746/11 subject to the change of the date in the third line on Page 4 from 30 April to 1 April.

3. Employment of war weary United States bombers against large industrial target areas in Germany.

(J. C. S. 1150/1)

Admiral Leahy said that in this paper the representative of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, proposed that the question of the employment of war-weary bombers be reopened by recommending that the President address a memorandum on the subject to the Prime Minister. He understood the Prime Minister had instructed the British Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their previous concurrence in the employment of this type of weapon and felt that to request the President to ask the Prime Minister to reverse his stand would be undesirable.

General Anderson explained that there was no intention of launching uncontrolled aircraft indiscriminately against the German countryside. He believed that there had been a misunderstanding on the part of the British as to the employment of this weapon. Recent developments had proved that explosive-laden aircraft could be directed against military targets with considerable accuracy and therefore had a definite military value when used against heavily protected underground installations.

General Marshall said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of Staff have no military objection to the project but that certain Cabinet members had opposed it. He doubted the propriety of having the President press the Prime Minister to urge those Cabinet members to reverse their position, for heretofore these same members had supported the British Chiefs of Staff in war measures advocated by the United States.

In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why this project should not be restricted entirely to France, General Anderson said that while the launchings were to be made in France all of the developments so far had taken place in base installations set up in England and to move these base installations to France would be a waste of effort.

General Kuter pointed out that further development of this project was highly important in view of the prospects of a very profitable employment of this type of weapon against Japanese targets.

Admiral Leahy said the discussion had given him an entirely different conception of the weapon. When this matter first came up, he understood that the aircraft would be launched in the general direction of Germany and that the explosive-laden planes would fall aimlessly when the fuel was exhausted. This he considered an inhuman and barbarous type of warfare with which the United States should not be associated; but now, since it appeared that the missiles could be controlled with a considerable degree of accuracy, he agreed that they could be usefully employed. He inquired why, since the planes employed were American and would be operated under American command, it was necessary to collaborate with the British in their use.

General Kuter said that, in view of the instructions already received on this subject by the British Chiefs of Staff and since the matter had heretofore been dealt with on a combined basis, it would be undesirable for the United States now to employ this weapon unilaterally. Moreover, the bases where the project was being developed were located in England.

Admiral Duncan felt that it would be entirely proper for the United States Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their original proposal to use uncontrolled missiles and present the project as a development of a controlled missile.

General Kuter said that the development of the control of this type of aircraft had progressed very rapidly, and it was essential that this development continue.

In view of the foregoing, Admiral Leahy said that he felt an approach should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for reconsideration at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to bring up for discussion at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to follow the question of the employment of radio-controlled explosive-laden bombers.

(The conference record contains no further mention of this subject.)

4. Subjects for first U.S.-U.S.S.R. staff meeting.

Admiral Leahy said that in J. C. S. 1227/4 the Joint Staff planners suggest certain subjects which the United States Chiefs of Staff should discuss with the Soviet General Staff. In J. C. S. 1227/5 General Deane recommends a series of questions as the basis of the discussions. The planners' paper appears to go into considerable detail and to contain items not covered in the questions suggested by General Deane.

Admiral Leahy said that he entertained little hope of engaging in extended conversations with the Soviet General Staff.

General Marshall observed that our success in arranging a meeting with the Soviet Army staff was a good omen as to the Soviets' willingness to discuss the matters in which we are interested.

Admiral King said that he favored the approach to the Soviets advanced by the planners.

General Deane said that he found no fault with the planners' paper except that he would not recommend that the status of the Milepost project be discussed by the United States Chiefs of Staff unless the Soviets first brought up the matter. Moreover, he proposed that the United States Chiefs of Staff refrain from suggesting a Russian strategic air force, inasmuch as it appeared that the aircraft necessary to constitute such a force could not be provided.

General Evans felt that it would be a mistake to bring up the matter of the exchange of weather information in view of the satisfactory progress that had been made so far. The Soviets had met every United States request for the exchange of this information.

General Kuter said that the weather information received so far did not meet the full requirements of the Twentieth Air Force in dealing with Japanese targets and suggested that there should be an increase in the number of weather stations in Siberia.

Admiral Olsen said that the Soviets had encountered considerable difficulty in setting up weather stations in Siberia because of the lack of transportation and communication facilities. They prefer to use their own personnel and equipment and therefore, if it were suggested that more stations be installed, the request should indicate willingness to make United States equipment available. He confirmed General Deane's view that it would be a mistake to insist on a further exchange of weather information on a high level, since negotiations in most cases had been satisfactory. United States requirements could be satisfactorily handled by the



SOVIET GUARD OF HONOR: President Roosevelt's jeep passes a Soviet guard of honor at an airfield in Crimea.

United States Mission in Moscow.

General Deane said he had arranged his list of questions with a view to permitting the Soviets to do the talking. The questions were designed to draw out Soviet views. Whether or not the questions were proper ones is a matter for decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to an inquiry by Admiral Leahy, General Deane said that the operations referred to in Question 7 in J C S 1227/5 were those to be initially undertaken by the Soviets if they entered the war against Japan. General Deane felt that the Soviet answer to the first question in his paper would undoubtedly lead to several contributory questions which would cover the points made by the planners in their paper.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Agreed to use both J C S 1227/4 and 1227/5 in their conference with the Soviet General Staff.

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

Feb. 8, 1945, Noon

PRESENT

United States
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss
Mr. Page
(Blank)
(Blank)

United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Jebb
Major Theakstone
(Blank)

Soviet Union
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vishinsky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Golunsky

(BOHLEN COLLECTION): PAGE MINUTES

SUBJECTS:

1. World security organization.
2. Yugoslavian frontiers.
3. Control commission in Bulgaria and Hungary.
4. Reparations.

TOP SECRET

1. World security organization.

Mr. Eden, who presided, stated that the Foreign Secretaries had been requested to consider two points vis-a-vis the world security organization: first, the question of membership which included that concerning the admission of two or three of the Soviet republics, and, second, the question of the time and place of the meeting.

Mr. Stettinius interjected that there was also the question of exactly which nations should be invited to the initial conference.

Mr. Eden inquired whether anyone desired to initiate the discussion on this general question.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he wished to start at the bottom. He said that he would be delighted to invite the Great Allies to confer in the United States. He hoped that the President had not shocked the Foreign Secretaries yesterday by mentioning the month of March as the time for the opening of the conference, and he continued that he felt sure that the time could be arranged to fit in with the convenience of Mr Molotov and Mr. Eden. However, he was anxious to open the conference at the earliest possible date. Personally, he hoped that it could be held no later than the latter part of April. With respect to the question concerning who would be invited, he recalled that at Dumbarton Oaks there had been considerable talk of inviting the associated nations as well as the United Nations. He stated that he had come to the conclusion that it would probably be most satisfactory to limit the invitations to those who had signed the United Nations declaration and declared war on the common enemy. With respect to Mr Molotov's references to multiple membership for the Soviet Union, it was his feeling, from the standpoint of geographical area and population, that this question should be given sympathetic consideration at the opening conference. He continued that he had thus far been unable in his own mind to decide just how inclusion of these entities could be arranged. In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals there was a provision to the effect that each sovereign state had one vote. He had not thus far been able to see clearly how the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. He concluded that he wished again to refer the matter to the President who had said that the subject was most interesting and deserved sympathetic consideration.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had expressed his views on the inclusion of two or three Soviet republics in the world organization at the last plenary meeting. He requested Mr. Eden to state his ideas on the other subjects on the world security agenda.

WORLD SECURITY AGENDA

Mr. Eden stated that he would be glad to accept [illegible] of the United [illegible] wished to enter [illegible] remarked that Mr. Winant, Mr. Gusev, and himself [illegible] a little jealous [illegible] any large conference [illegible] If Mr. Molotov and he [illegible] go to the United States [illegible] conference, he hoped that there would be an early meeting of the Foreign Secretaries [illegible].

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. [illegible] supported Mr. Eden's view [illegible] respect to a meeting [illegible] Foreign Secretaries in London.

Mr. Eden continued that some time would be needed to get the Chinese and possibly the French in line, and also that lawyers would need possibly [illegible] weeks before the conference opened, he would prefer to postpone the opening of the conference until the second half of April. He pointed out that he would be committed to debates in Parliament before he would be able to go to the United States. After some discussion it was agreed by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden that the conference should open on April 25.

Mr. Molotov had previously accepted the invitation to hold the conference in the United States.

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to make a few observations on the inclusion of Soviet Republics in the organization. He said that he was sympathetically inclined to the Soviet position in this respect and would be ready to agree to whatever was considered to be an appropriate number.

Mr. Molotov interjected "the sooner the better." Mr. Molotov then pointed out, in relation to the remarks made by Mr. Stettinius, that the President had indicated yesterday that according to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals each government had one vote. However, Canada and Australia had individual votes and the fact that they were component parts of the British Empire did not prevent them from being individual members of the Assembly. He said that amendments had been made in the Soviet Constitution which gave the Soviet republics the right to have contact with foreign states. The Soviet Union was a Union of states. The Constitution had now been revised to increase the rights of the republics. The development of relations between the republics and foreign states, which had already begun, was in this direction and was developing according to democratic principles. He continued that he believed that it would be superfluous to mention the political, economic and military importance of the Ukraine, White Russia and the Lithuanian republic. He urged that it would be most desirable if agreement could be reached on this question today.

Mr. Molotov then referred to Mr. Stettinius' statement that only those nations which had signed the United Nations declaration and declared war on Germany should be invited to the conference. This immediately gave rise to some questions. Which Polish Government, for example, should be invited.

Mr. Eden immediately interjected that this was a good reason for settling the Polish problem now.

Mr. Molotov continued that certain countries which did not maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would also be invited. He stated that he would like to check the exact list of states which would attend the conference.

Mr. Stettinius gave Mr. Molotov such a list and pointed out that although Ecuador had recently declared war on Germany it was not included on the list since it had not yet signed the United Nations Declaration.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that if [illegible]

Mr. Eden stated that [illegible]

[illegible]

Mr. Stettinius stated [illegible] United Nations [illegible] [illegible] meeting [illegible] range for [illegible] Soviet request before [illegible] meeting of the Assembly.

Mr. Eden suggested [illegible] procedure that [illegible] Nations might [illegible] draw up an order [illegible] which would include the question of extending foundation membership to two Soviet republics. He said that he was "ready to agree to this proposal."

Mr. Molotov suggested an amendment to Mr. Eden's proposal to the effect that the three Foreign Secretaries had agreed that it would be advisable to extend admission to the Assembly to two or three Soviet republics.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was favorably impressed with what Mr. Eden had said. He had not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the President this morning and it was, therefore, impossible for him to make any firm commitment. However, he would be glad to discuss the question with the President promptly and hoped and expected that the United States would be able to give a favorable reply before the end of the day. He stated that he would not bring up the question of Poland since he hoped that agreement would be reached on this matter at the present conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that there were a number of other details with respect to Dumbarton Oaks, such as the status of France, how China would be consulted, who would issue the invitations, etc.

Mr. Eden suggested that a sub-committee be set up to study these details and report back to the Foreign Secretaries. Messrs. Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to study these matters.

2. Yugoslavian Frontiers.

Mr. Eden stated that although he did not wish to raise the question of Yugoslavian frontiers with Austria and Italy, he would like to point out that with the occupation of Austria by the Red Army there might well be administrative questions relative to the frontiers which should be handled. For this reason, the British delegation was submitting a note to the Soviet delegation on the question.

3. Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary.

Mr. Eden stated that he also wished to discuss the question of a control commission in Bulgaria in the light of the decisions reached vis-a-vis the Hungarian Control Commission. It was agreed to confine the present meeting to those matters which had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries by the Chiefs of State for consideration.

4. Reparations.

Mr. Molotov inquired as to when the American and British delegations would be prepared to discuss the question of reparations.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he would be ready tomorrow.

Mr. Eden added that he hoped that the British side would also be ready.

5. Iran.

Mr. Eden recalled the signing of the declaration on Iran. He stated that the Allies had signed treaties with Iran in which certain privileges had been granted to them for the duration of the war. In all other respects, however, he felt that the Iranian Government should be the master in its own house and free to make its own decisions. The British Government felt that it was most important to observe this principle—otherwise the Allies might find themselves in competition in Iranian affairs. He had desired that, for this reason he hoped that the Allies refrain from interfering in internal Iranian matters. With respect to oil, Mr. Eden stated that the British Government did not dispute the Soviet need for Iranian oil and that it was not part of British policy to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining oil from northern Iran. Indeed, the Soviet Union was a natural market for this oil. The British Government did not wish to put any obstacles in the way of the Soviet Union's obtaining oil concessions at any time the Iranians were prepared to negotiate. He continued that he felt that it should be made known publicly that the Allies would not press the question of oil concessions any further until their troops had been withdrawn from Iran. The British Government was ready to consider at the Crimean Conference the advisability of making some statement which would indicate that the Allies were prepared to start to withdraw their troops earlier than was [illegible]. This withdrawal might commence as soon as the supply routes were closed. Mr. Eden believed that if agreement could be reached on this point it would have a good effect on world opinion and would show that the Allies were prepared to carry out the Teheran Declaration.

Mr. Molotov maintained that there were two different questions involved: i.e., those concerning the oil concessions and the withdrawal of Allied troops. With respect to the withdrawal of the troops, this question had never been placed before the Soviet Government until today. He maintained that this was a question of fulfilling the provisions of the treaty signed by Iran. If there were any need to amend this agreement the question should be studied. This would take some time.

With respect to the oil concessions, Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to make a few comments. The Soviet Government had asked Ambassador Ahi what the Iranian attitude would be to a request for concessions. Ahi's reply had been most favorable. Kavtaradze had then proceeded to Iran to negotiate. In his first conversation with Foreign Minister Saed, the Foreign Minister had taken a favorable position. This was only natural since the granting of concessions was not only to the interests of the Soviet Union, but also to Iran. It was also in compliance with the Declaration of Teheran, since the granting of concessions would assist Iranian economy. This was the first stage of the controversy.

During the second stage the situation changed. The Iranians then stated that it would not be appropriate to carry on the negotiations. Thereupon, the Medjlis had adopted a decision to the effect that there should be no concessions during the war. Subsequently, many Iranians had stated that this decision had been adopted in too great a hurry and that it was unwise.

Why could there not be a third stage? Since the Iranians had changed their minds in one direction the Soviets saw no reason why they could not change it back to the first stage. The Soviet Government had endeavored to persuade them to do so and Kavtaradze had returned and the strong-armed methods he had used have subsided. He said that no negotiations were being carried on at the present time and that he did not believe it advisable to pay any special attention to this question now. He suggested that the matter be left alone—that it take its own course. The situation was not acute at the present time.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the United States had no war-time treaty with the Iranian Government. American firms had carried on negotiations for oil concessions, but these had been dropped following the Medjlis decision. The firms were consequently in the same position as the Soviets. With respect to the withdrawal of troops from Iran he wished to point out that the American troops there were serving the interests of the Soviet Union in moving lend-lease supplies from the Persian Gulf. The United States Government was content to leave the question of oil negotiations until the end of the war. He wished fully to support Mr. Eden's proposals regarding the withdrawal of the Allied troops.

Mr. Eden remarked that the British Government had no opposition to the granting of oil concessions to the Soviet Government.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the United States Government took the same position.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the British had also carried on negotiations with the Iranians, even before the Soviet negotiations had started. As a result of the present attitude of the Iranian Government, all of these negotiations were now held in abeyance. He said that if some statement were released, as suggested by him, it might reassure the Iranians and facilitate the recommencement of oil negotiations. With respect to the renewal of Allied troops, there was no need to amend the Iranian treaty, which stated that Allied troops would be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of hostilities. He felt that it would be wise to withdraw these troops as soon as the supply route was no longer necessary.

Mr. Molotov stated that he believed it might be advisable to limit the matter to an exchange of views on the subject. He offered to summon Kavtaradze to the conference to make a report on the Iranian situation.

Mr. Eden stated that he would like to think over what Mr. Molotov had said and added that he might have new suggestions to make at a forthcoming meeting.

(MATTHEWS FILES: MATTHEWS NOTES

1. Austria - Yugoslav. must agree on boundary for purpose of Admin. note.

2. Bulgarian and Hungary Control Com.

3. Reparations tomorrow.

4. Iran—

Oil—no dispute on Sov. to get oil from N. Persia. No obstacle on Brit. concession if and when Pers. are prepared to negotiate. We should all make it known we will not press matters further until Allied troops withdrawn. We prepared to issue statement prepared to withdraw troops earlier, pari passu, when supply route closes. Would show world prepared to carry out Teheran decl.

MOL: Eden has 2 pts.—different 1. Oil 2. Troops. Troops question new. If necessary to change agreement must be studied and some time needed.

Oil—what was beginning? Negotiations began by asking Pers. Govt attitude on concess N. Persia. Answer was attitude would be most favorable. Dep. Com. Kav. went to Iran. Conversation with first position of Saed and Shah both favorable. Seemed not only U. S. S. R. but Persia also [illegible]. Would be econ. assistance to Pers.

Something has changed. No time for details but Govt. said would not continue discussions Persia during war. Medjlis would not discuss. Said decision was taken in a hurry. Why not now a third phase. Why can't Pers. Govt change position again. Trying to persuade them thats all. Kavtaradze has returned home and method which might seem strong has changed. No negot. now but reserve right to take. Why special attention now? Why not let things go that way. Situation not acute.

S. We have no treaty with our oil concessions also advanced stage and were in same position. Supports Eden on troop withdrawal. Willing to wait till war's end on concess.

EDEN: Reiterates no oppos to Soviet concession. Does believe some statement might reassure Pers. who were frightened at one time and make negotiations easier.

On troop withdrawal no change in treaty necessary.

Would help reassure Pers. and therefore negot.

MOL: Thinks we should limit ourselves to an exchange of views might bring in Kavtaradze—he is here in Crimea.

(HISS COLLECTION: HISS NOTES

E.R.S. [illegible] Ed. [illegible] E. Am states [illegible] for [illegible].

E.R.S. [illegible] Ed. Immediately Eden chmn.

Eden: 1st world org. Q. 2 Q's referred to us. 1) Q. of membership of two or three reps of S. U. All note to Pres. re Art VII. 2) Time and place of conference. E.R.S. and N.A. to be invited.

E.R.S.: To start at bottom of list I should like take this opportunity invite our great allies to conf. in U. S.

Hope Pres. didn't shock you yester by mentioning March. I'm sure time can be arranged to fit in with convenience of Mr. Mol and Mr. E. However we are very anxious to have the conf at earliest poss time. Pres hope could be held not later than latter part Apr.

As to matter of those to be invited you will recall at D. O. (Dumbarton Oaks) there was much talk as to the Assoc. Ns as well as the U.N. Ns. We have come to the conclusion that taking everything into consid [illegible] would seek to most satis to limit those to be invited to those who had signed U.N. Ns decl and declared war on our common enemy. As to Mr. Molotov's reference to multiple membership for S. U. from standpoint geog area and pop it is my feeling this entire Q. should be given very sympathetic consid. As to how it could be done immediately at the very first meeting I have not been able to determine in my own mind.

In D.O. proposals we wrote in the provision each state have 1 vote. I have not yet been able to see clearly how D. O. proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. I wish again to refer to the Pres. reaction yesterday to this matter when he said it was most interesting and deserved sympathetic study.

MOL.: Has expressed his ideas re last Q. as to 1st Q. Like Ed. to state his views.

ED.: As regards time and place. Glad to accept the invitation of the U. S. Govt. I only want to offer one caveat. Mr. Winant, Mr. Gusev and I getting little jealous we never have anything in Lon. If Mr. Mol and I go to Am. for this I hope for an early meeting of For Secs in Lon.

E.R.S.: Agreed.

MOL.: Quite poss.

ED.: Invitation not ultimatum.

E.R.S.: Promptly accept.

MOL.: We also.

ED.: As to time have to get Ch. into line and possibly Fr. Lawyers want ten days or so. I rather think I am committed to debates in Par. before I go. I would like myself second half April.

E.R.S.: Around about Apr. 15.

ED.: I would give it a [illegible] more [illegible] something.

MOL.: Agreed.

ERS: Latter part April?

MOL.: Agreed.

E.R.S.: Wanted calendar. Suggested week April 23.

MOL.: Agreed to both.

ED.: We mildly prefer second (date). Easter 1st. Agreed April 25.

MOL.: We accept your invitation to Wash. and the date of 25th.

Re three reps.

ED.: Definitely sympathetic to their inclusion in ass. We would be ready to say that at whatever is considered the approp. moment.

MOL.: As soon as possible.

Would like deal with this Q. relation to remarks of Mr. S. Mr. S. has reminded us Pres. spoke of docs. of D.O. and vote. Like ask one Q. Can. and Austr. part of U.K.

ED.: Of Brit. Em.

MOL.: Are members of ass.

The amends. to Sov. Const. which have been accepted Feb. last yr. give reps. rt of [illegible] touch with for. states. S.U. union of states. Const. enlarges rts. of reps. in this sense. We must develop rels. with for. states. This already begun. As to their pol. econ. mil. importance no use proving what import. have such reps. As U.— would be very desirable if could arrive at agt. now, reach dec. today.

To proposal made by ERS that only [illegible] decl. signers and decl. of war com.

Q—Which pol. should be invited.

ED.: Another reason settle Polish.

MOL.: Some ns. have no dip rels with S.U. Would like to check up exact no. of states which would take place.

ERS: Read list.

Ecuador has recently declared war but has not yet declared war [illegible].

ED.: Laughed.

MOL.: If we cannot arrive at agt. re membership must say so and move on to another subject.

ED.: All agreed except re 2 reps.

CAD.: If you call a conf. to complete D.O. work and to agree finally on the Charter don't see how you can exclude any of members of that conf. from the ass.

ERS: The UN. NS must so complete a Charter and all would be members. They could start new members before 1st meeting of the Ass. Trying find way. Sov. request can be taken before 1st meeting.

ED.: U.N. NS could meet as and last time and could agree amongst other Ns. to extend foundation members to include the 2 Sov. reps. We should be quite ready to agree to that.

MOL.: Supports amend. to ED. proposal.

We must formulate this Q. as he proposed and add we 3 have agreed it would be advisable to give the 2 or 3 Sov. reps a place in the Ass.

ERS asked ED. Q—ED. restated position.

ERS: I am favorably impressed with what Mr. Ed. has said. I did not have an opportunity of discussing this with Pres. This morn. . . . All this time imp. make any final commit. However delighted discuss with Pres. promptly and would hope and expect U. S. be able give favorable answer before end of day.

MOL.: Agreed.

ED.

MOL.: We leave now Q. of pol.—in hope we reach agt.

ED: Other items to consider.

ERS: There are a No. of details. If we could meet tomorrow.

Status of Fr., Ch. participant at D. O. and must be consulted, form of invitation, how and by whom and when invitations be issued.

ED: We might set up subcom to prepare this and report to us.

ERS: A. H. Gromyko, Jebb.

ED: Other items on agenda.

1. Yugoslav frontier—will put in a note of that.

2. Control coms. Bul. and Hung.

MOL: Doc re Hung. con com just arrived at other Q's.

3. Iran.

Agreed not try to let Q's still to come up at plenary session.

MOL: When can we go on with Q of reparations?

ERS: We'll be prepared tomorrow to discuss rep further.

ED: Hope we will.

Iran.

ED: At Teheran we signed decl. re Persia and each made treaties with Iran [illegible]. About oil—no dispute about S. U.'s need for oil. No part of our pol. to prevent S. U. from obtaining oil from N Persia. In-

Provisions for the Care of Liberated Prisoners of War Under Discussion

AT MALTA AIRPORT: Harry Hopkins, left, adviser to President Roosevelt; Secretary of State Stettinius, center, and Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, as they stepped from their plane at airfield before going on to the Yalta conference.

Approved For Release 2000/08/23 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100010001-3

United States Delegation Memorandum

(Authorship not indicated. This memorandum, with attachments, was presumably prepared for Stettinius prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on Feb. 8, 1945.)

(Yalta.) Feb. 8, 1945.

List of items referred to Foreign Ministers.

1. Inclusion of Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania among initial members of the organization. (See attached paper.)

2. Date and place of United Nations Conference.

3. Nations to be invited to United Nations Conference. Emphasis customarily should include all signatories of United Nations Declaration — not just the specific listed countries which have already signed. (See attached list.)

4. The policy toward Iran. (See attached paper.)

(ATTACHMENT 1)

(YALTA) Feb. 8, 1945.

Arguments against inclusion of any of the Soviet republics among the initial members not previously listed:

1. Soviet republics not signatories of the United Nations Declaration.

On further thought we have become impressed with the Soviet view that the initial members of the United Nations Organization should be the signatories of the United Nations Declaration. As some of the Soviet republics are signatories of this declaration, Mr. Molotov's proposal that two or three of these republics be admitted to initial membership would be contrary to that principle.

2. The question should be postponed until the organization is formed.

The President indicated in his remarks yesterday at the plenary session that this question should not come up until after the organization is formed. Mr. Molotov said yesterday at the plenary session that the Soviet Government had observed the great development of international relations of the British Dominions. In accordance with the practice followed by the signatories it would seem to be premature to take the action referred to by Mr. Molotov at this time. We should allow a longer time to elapse and have available more experience as to the international relations of the Soviet republics before we consider the question.

The question is such a novel one in international relations that the other members of the organization should have a chance to consider the question before a decision is reached.

3. The Soviet republics are not sovereign states under international practice.

The Soviet Constitution does not permit the Soviet republics to control their own foreign policy or affairs. Other aspects of central control over the republics are all inconsistent with the republics being sovereign.

(Note: India is one of the United Nations. If, too, it is not independent, the Soviet representative will probably argue that if India can be a member so should the three republics. The answer: India has for some period past been gradually developing international relations and is generally regarded as having more of the attributes of sovereignty established than the Soviet republics.)

(ATTACHMENT 2)

List of nations which were invited to the United Nations conference at Mon Springs, Atlantic City and Bretton Woods.

United Nations

Australia	Liberia
Belgium	Luxemburg
Bolivia	Mexico
Brazil	Netherlands
Canada	New Zealand
Chile	Nicaragua
Colombia	Norway
Costa Rica	Panama
Cuba	Philippine Commonwealth
Czechoslovakia	Poland
Dominican Republic	Union of South Africa
El Salvador	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Ethiopia	United Kingdom
Greece	United States
Guatemala	Uruguay
Haiti	Venezuela
Honduras	
Iran	
Iraq	

Nations Associated With the United Nations in War

Chile	Ecuador
Ecuador	Paraguay
Egypt	Peru
France—Provisional Government of the French Republic	Turkey

(Others)

French Minister at Washington, speaking as a personal opinion:

Authority not indicated. This list was not attached to the covering memorandum in the files collection, but a copy was so attached in the UNA files. The footnote on the original would indicate that the list had been prepared prior to Jan. 1, 1945. The word "Turkey" was written in longhand beside the list of associated states.

"On Jan. 1, 1945, France became a signatory of the United Nations declaration. (Footnote in the original.)

(ATTACHMENT 3

(Yalta.) February 8, 1945.

Policy on Iran.

At Malta we agreed with the British on two points:

1. We should urge the Soviet Government, in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration of Tehran of December 1, 1943, to respect the decision of the Iranian Government to postpone negotiations for oil concessions until the Government can constitutionally be reconstituted after the withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran.

(The Declaration on Iran, which was signed by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at Tehran, expressed faith in the maintenance of Iran's sovereignty and integrity.)

2. Both governments should state that when the truck route to Russia across Iran is no longer needed, we would be prepared to begin removing our troops (at a rate to be agreed upon) not later than six months after the termination of hostilities.

(ATTACHMENT 4)

Although the covering memorandum referred to only three attachments, this paper was attached to the preceding documents in both the Hiss collection and the UNA files.)

Declaration of the three powers regarding Iran.

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U. S. S. R. and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desirous to declare the mutual agreement of their three governments regarding their relations with Iran,

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will examine in making available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Government of the United States, the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independent, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

December 1, 1943.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Feb. 8, 1945, Noon

Livadia Palace

PRESENT

United States	Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Fleet Admiral Leahy	First Sea Lord Admiralty
General of the Army Marshall	First Marine Wilson
Fleet Admiral King	General Ismay
Major General Kuter	Admiral Rutherville
Lieutenant General Somerville	Major General Laycock
Vice Admiral Cooke	Major General Holmes
Rear Admiral McCormick	Lord Leathers
Major General Hull	(Secretariat)
Major General Anderson	**United States**
Major General Hull	Brigadier General McFarland
Brigadier General Lundequist	Captain Graves
	United Kingdom
United Kingdom	Major General Ismay
Field Marshal Brooke	Brigadier Cockwell-Jones
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal	Commander Coleridge
	(J. C. S. FILES)

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes 2

TOP SECRET

1. Approval of the minutes of the 180th meeting of the combined chiefs of staff.

The combined chiefs of staff—

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 180th meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

2. Levels of supply of all petroleum products in all theatres.

3. Over-all review of cargo shipping (C. C. S. 746/11) 3.

Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had examined the paper and it was acceptable to them with one modification.

They would like to change the date referred to in the first sentence of Paragraph 1B (1) (D) on Page 4 of the enclosure from 20 April to 1 April.

Lord Leathers said that this amendment would suit him perfectly very well if the staffs concerned would prepare the study in time.

Admiral Leahy said that the United States staffs believed this would be possible.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the first of April as a target date for the report concerned.

Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke suggested that Paragraph 1B (1) of the enclosure requires clarification as to the order of priority in which the tasks mentioned were to be undertaken. For instance, the timing of principles for the continuation of the war against Japan referred to in Paragraph 1B (1) (E) might well have to take place before the preparation of the combined redeployment plan or at least concurrently with it.

General Somerville explained that the tasks referred to in Paragraph 1B (1) were set out in the sequence in which they would necessarily be undertaken.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the combined chiefs of staff should decide on the agencies to undertake the preparation of a combined redeployment plan and the fixing of priority for continuance of the war against Japan. He felt that the combined administrative committee, in consultation, would be the best bodies to undertake this work. They would, of course, as set out in Paragraph 1B (1) (C) of the enclosure, be in close contact with their combined military transportation committee and the appropriate shipping agencies.

The combined chiefs of staff—

A. Approved C.C.S. 746/11, subject to the change of the date in the third line on page 4 from 20 April to 1 April, 1945.

B. Directed their combined staff planners, in collaboration with the combined administrative committee, to take the action outlined in Paragraph 1B (1).

C. Invited their combined shipping committee to take the action outlined in Paragraph 1B (2).

4. Reciprocal agreement on prisoners of war (C. C. S. 771/1) 2.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that two points the British Chiefs of Staff would like to make. With regard to Article 5 of the proposed agreement, the equipment for Allied troops in question should be limited to that which is necessary for their maintenance and not for their operations. Secondly, in Article 6 the British Chiefs of Staff would like to have it made clear that the expression "as soon as practicable" does not mean that transfers must be made immediately their presence is no longer required for operations.

Admiral Leahy replied that the United States Chiefs of Staff would be willing to make the changes suggested by Sir Alan Brooke.

General Marshall said that he was prepared to accept Paragraph 5 should be deleted.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff—

Approved C. C. S. 771/1 as amended, subject to the following:

Article 5 delete the words "and remainder the article as Article 6 (numbering paragraph accordingly) as C. C. S. 771/1 Equipment for Allied Forces (C. C. S. 180th Mtg., C. C. S. 180/1) 5 (A) 2.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the combined chiefs of staff, at their 180th meeting, 2 February 1945, it had been agreed that 500 Greek forces would be sent from London at certain times. The British Chiefs of Staff were now in a position to inform the United States Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of this decision would not result in any additional or indirect charges upon United States resources. The British Chiefs of Staff would also be prepared to agree to the transfer of the equipment for these forces from the theatre in which they were stationed to the theatre in which they were to be employed.

Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were satisfied with the British Chiefs of Staff statement.

(J. C. S. FILES)

Draft Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Feb. 8, 1945

TOP SECRET

Agreement relating to prisoners of war and civilians liberated by the Soviet armies and United States (British) armies.

PREAMBLE

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of the United States of America (the Government of His Britannic Majesty) wishing to conclude an agreement concerning the care and repatriation of Soviet citizens freed by Allied troops, and the American citizens (British subjects) freed by the Red Army, through their advanced representatives acting jointly in the territory duly to be specified in them, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

All Soviet citizens liberated by the armed forces under United States (British) command and all United States citizens (British subjects) liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command shall, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and maintained separately from persons in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or United States (British) authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities.

The United States (British) and Soviet authorities will at their disposal in the circumstances obtaining in any area and from time to time, supply liberated citizens (or subjects) of the contracting parties found by them, and will undertake to move all the persons of this agreement, Soviet and United States (British) repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens or subjects are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and act on the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the dispatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are sufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander on whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a representative who shall have the final responsibility for the execution of administration and discipline of the camps or points concerned.

The relocation of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be carried to the competent Soviet or United States (British) authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

ARTICLE 3

Except insofar as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of U. N. R. R. A. (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent United States (British) and Soviet authorities will defray from time to time, in supplying liberated citizens (or subjects) of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention, both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or United States (British) authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall be as far as possible be consistent with the normal practice relating to military rank.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party.

ARTICLE 4

Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party.

ARTICLE 5

Soviet and United States (British) military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens (and subjects of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and United States (British) authorities shall agree upon to be just.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and United States (British) Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens (or subjects) necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

ARTICLE 6

Employment of the (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps of billets in which they are housed. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and U. S. (British) authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labor shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces are housed and there are sufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander on whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a representative who shall have the final responsibility for the execution of administration and discipline of the camps or points concerned.

The relocation of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be carried to the competent Soviet or United States (British) authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

ARTICLE 7

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the information to the next of kin of their liberated citizens (and subjects). They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens (and subjects) to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens (and subjects) shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

ARTICLE 8

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

MEETING OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET CHIEFS OF STAFF

Feb. 8, 1945, 3 P. M.

Yusupoff Palace

PRESENT

United States	Soviet Union
Fleet Admiral Leahy	General of the Army Antonov
General of the Army Marshall	Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Fleet Admiral King	Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Major General Kuter	(aided by a 2-star admiral)
	(J. C. S. FILES)

KUTER MINUTES

TOP SECRET

(Note on the original: "No U. S. interpreters or secretaries were present. Three Russian secretaries or interpreters in military uniform attended meeting.")

Admiral Leahy opened the conference with the statement that we would discuss military problems in the Far East and that we required specific data on which to base the long range planning required by the great distances from the United States to the Pacific Theater. Admiral Leahy then stated that we have prepared a series of questions on which replies were desired.

General Antonov asked to have all the questions presented prior to any replies or discussion.

Admiral Leahy then read the questions set forth in the memorandum by the Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, "subjects for first U. S.-U. S. S. R. staff meeting," as stated in JCS 1222/3 (Argonaut), dated 7 Feb. 1945. These questions were read as written, with the words "or some more suitable area" interpolated in Question (3).

After brief discussion on the side with Admiral King, Admiral Leahy posed two additional questions, the first consisting of Paragraph 3 of the memorandum by the Joint Staff planners, "subjects for first U. S.-U. S. S. R. staff meetings" as set forth in JCS 1222/4 (Argonaut), 7 February, 1945. Admiral Leahy's second additional question was based on Paragraph 7 of the planners' papers and asked if arrangements could be made whereby weather information could be made available to the U. S. from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia.

General Antonov opened the period of reply and discussion with the very clear statement that he had no authority to give definite answers or promises or to make decisions on matters pertaining to the Far East. He stated that his comments represented his own personal opinion and views and further that he would refer the questions to Marshal Stalin the same day and would arrange to provide complete and authoritative answers as quickly as possible.

(The following replies to questions and discussion ensued):

A. There have been no changes in the Soviet projected plans of operations in the Far East, from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October.

B. With regard to the Soviet requirements for a Pacific supply route after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start, General Antonov opened with the statement that the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railroad "can be hampered" by the enemy. The Soviets therefore cannot rely on that rail line to support their forces. A maximum effort will be made to keep the Trans-Siberian Railroad in operation. However, the Soviets will require that air and sea routes across the Pacific coastal sea routes be kept open. They will particularly require fuel (petroleum products) and foodstuffs.

C. As to basing U. S. air forces in Siberia, no discussion could be had until Marshal Stalin's decision was obtained.

D. U. S. forces may be required to defend Kamchatka and eastern Siberia, General Antonov's words was that the Soviets "will find American help useful."

E. As to probabilities preparation including construction, reception, and storage of U. S. stock piles in Kamchatka and eastern Siberia, a rather lengthy reply was given including the following points.

The Soviets will move much larger forces to the Far East than are now there—these augmented forces will require greatly increased supplies—the Soviet problem will be great to supply their expanded forces and they cannot promise to construct and store materials for American forces. They may need American materials with which to build fuel storage for the Soviet forces. This question could be answered after detailed requirements were known and after a decision had been obtained that U. S. forces would be employed in Kamchatka and eastern Siberia.

F. Entry into Kamchatka by "an American survey party will be determined by Marshal Stalin."

G. The Soviets will occupy southern Sakhalin as quickly after the beginning of hostilities as possible and will do this with the

not American help. The Soviet Navy will deny Japanese first to the Japanese but it will be difficult to permit friendly surface movements through the Japanese Strait until a Soviet Navy base and shore artillery are established.

H. To this question "are we assured that combined planning in Moscow will be vigorously pursued" is answered (added in reply). General Antonov stated that he had planned in October to start the movement of troops in early 1945. However, all Soviet troops, including those released from Finland and Latvia are now joined in the battle in the eastern front. He stated that the planned troop movements will, therefore, be delayed until the necessary units can be disengaged from the present battle. Later in the conversation, General Marshall repeated the American requirement for firm data on which to base future plans. He explained that never any had been the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to relieve their grave concern from their great responsibilities to permit them to move to Moscow to conduct talks on the Russian-American phase of the war against Japan. He made it very clear that we must have planning basis and that we are severely concerned. General Marshall concluded with a forceful statement that conversations and conferences planned in Moscow must be pursued. General Antonov stated that he would do his best to improve the planning situation in Moscow.

I. Weather in Siberia was discussed at some length and in relation to the initiation of operations. From a ground force viewpoint the most difficult conditions would be experienced during the thaw and floods in April and May and although June is a favorable month, July and August is also undesirable. As far as the ground forces are concerned, weather would be most favorable in September, October and November. As the weather is favorable in July, August and September.

J. Authority to obtain views of Russia would be discussed with Harriman.

Admiral Kuznetsov presented his desire to take over ships from the U. S. at Dutch Harbor or Kodiak but accepted Admiral King's statement that Cold Bay was more desirable and would be used. Some discussion followed and it was concluded that Russian crews could be moved from Murmansk to the east coast of the U. S. by returning convoys and that to be moved by rail to the West Coast. However, the provision of American shipping to move them (crews to Cold Bay was not viewed with favor by Admiral King.

Except for the immediately preceding conversation, the discussion had no questions to ask.

General Marshall presented a summary of recent developments prior to General Antonov's written statement as to our views of the combat effectiveness of German divisions after the Ardennes Battle and left with the Russians our estimate of Japan's strength in the Pacific.

Air Marshal Khudyakov presented a Russian version of the agreement to create a unified zone for air operations in the Baltic Sea.

Upon adjourning General Antonov stated that he would see Marshal Stalin forthwith and would inform the U. S. Chiefs of Staff as to when we might expect the next meeting to receive official and definite replies to communications.

Invited to and transcribed by Capt. George J. Lang, General Kuter's aide and Sgt. Lang's shorthand notes have been destroyed.

L. S. Kuter,
Major General, U. S. A.

Six (6) copies prepared with distribution to the individuals indicated below:

General Marshall 3 copies
General Deane 1 copy
Admiral Hull 1 copy
General Kuter 1 copy

(J. C. S. Files)

Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations (King).

A copy of this memorandum was attached as Appendix A to the preceding Kuter minutes.

TOP SECRET

(Yalta.) 8 February 1945.

Memorandum

Subject: Questions posed by Admiral Kuznetsov at the U. S.-Russian Chiefs of Staff meeting Thursday afternoon, February 8th.

1. a) Question. What has been determined about the transfer of ships to the Rus-

Minutes of Far East Discussions by President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin

aims (presumably with reference to the subject program).

(b) ANSWER. It is difficult to be definite until we know more about the U-boats offensive in the ATLANTIC. However, it would seem practicable to work out a schedule of deliveries on a step-by-step basis in which the later deliveries may have to be delayed because of the U-boat situation in the Atlantic.

2. (a) Question. If Dutch Harbor is not a suitable place for the transfer of ships to the Russians and for the training of Russian crews, the second preference would be Kodiak. What is your view?

(b) Answer. After thorough review of all considerations, it has been decided that Cold Bay is the best place to effect the delivery of ships to the Russians and for the training of Russian crews.

NOTE: Admiral Kuzmenov was unfamiliar with Cold Bay but, when the location was pointed out to him he accepted it.

3. (a) Question. We wish to transfer crews from Murmansk by sending convoys returning from Murmansk to the United States, thence by rail across the United States to the West Coast, and thence to Cold Bay. Can you arrange this?

(b) Answer. It might seem practicable to move Russian crews as far as the West Coast of the United States in the manner you describe, but, it will be extremely difficult to move them from the West Coast to Cold Bay because of the very bad shipping situation in the Pacific. The matter will require the closest examination and the answer must be understood to be very uncertain at this time.

NOTE: Admiral Kuzmenov made no offer for the movement of the Russian crews from the West Coast to Cold Bay in Russian ships, which matter should be taken up further with the Russians.

NOTE: After the staff conference adjourned, I asked the Russian Admiral how many men, total, they wish to move from Murmansk to Cold Bay. His reply was about 3,000. I suggested if they were moved in detachments suitable to the accommodations in the ships of the convoys returning from Murmansk, it would make the problem more easy of solution—and, as well, it would facilitate their transfer by rail across the United States and, further, their transfer from the West Coast of the United States to Cold Bay. I added that such an arrangement would do as well with the proposed schedule of delivery of ships on a step-by-step basis.

A Copies of this memorandum will be given to the distribution list below. All agencies that are involved are urged to peruse this matter to an acceptable solution.

E. J. KING,
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army:
General Somervell
General Kuter
General Deane
Admiral Cook
Admiral Horne
Admiral Edwards
Admiral Cooke
Admiral Duncan
Admiral McCormick
Admiral Leahy

J. C. S. FILES

Memorandum by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)

TOP SECRET

(Special Distribution)

J. C. S. 1227/3
7 February 1945

(Argonaut).

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subjects for First U. S.-U. S. S. R. Staff Meeting

References:
A. J. C. S. 1176 series.
B. J. C. S. memo for information No. 360.

Memorandum by the commanding general, U. S. Military Mission, Moscow.

It is recommended that in your meeting with the Soviet staff you obtain their comments or opinions, as appropriate, on the following subjects:

(1) Have there been any changes in Soviet projected plans of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. HARRIMAN and General DEANE in October?

(2) Will the Soviets require a Pacific supply route after Soviet-Japanese hostilities cease?

(3) Will agreement be given for operation of U. S. Air Forces in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area?

(4) Will U. S. forces be required for defense of Kamchatka?

(5) Will the Soviets make pre-hostility preparations, including construction and reception and storage of U. S. stockpiles in Kamchatka and eastern Siberia?

(6) Can the Kamchatka survey party depart from Fairbanks by 15 Feb. 1945?

(7) Will the Soviets occupy southern Sakhalin and when? If so, Will they cover passage of Lapérouse Strait?

(8) Are we assured that combined planning in Moscow will be vigorously pursued?

J. C. S. FILES

Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners

TOP SECRET (Special Distribution)

J. C. S. 1227/7 7 February 1945.

(Argonaut).

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subjects for First U. S.-U. S. S. R. Staff Meeting

1. In the following paragraphs the joint staff planners have set forth the various subjects and questions which it is considered should be brought up at the meeting and in so doing have used the phraseology which might be suitable for presenting such subject to the Red General Staff. Most of these have been presented previously in various papers and are repeated here for convenience of the Chiefs of Staff.

2. The President asked Marshal Stalin two questions, saying he would appreciate an early reply at this conference. The first was: "Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential to you that a supply line be kept open across the Pacific to eastern Siberia?"

The second was: "Will you agree to that United States Air Forces will be permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk or some more suitable area, providing developments show that these air forces can be operated and supplied without jeopardizing Russian operations?"

If the Red Army staff gives an encouraging reply on basing the Strategic Air Forces, explain that they be asked for agreement to entry of a U. S. survey party in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area at an early date, details to be worked out with the mission.

3. On the assumption Russia can be ready to enter the war against Japan three months after the end of the German war (as indicated by Marshal Stalin in October), how would the weather and season of the year affect the beginning operations in eastern Siberia?

4. Do you estimate that you are liable to need any U. S. assistance in defending Kamchatka once war breaks out with Japan? Do you consider you will be able to develop bases in Kamchatka, particularly air bases, before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan? In connection with the foregoing, the United States Chiefs of Staff sent you a memorandum concerning the Kamchatka survey party.

We consider it most important that this survey party go under way in the very near future. Will you give us your thoughts on our memorandum? (See Appendix "A" for copy of memorandum.)

5. In connection with your plan of operations in eastern Siberia, do you intend to take the southern half of Sakhalin? If so, do you think you will be able to open the La Perouse strait to shipping?

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have sent you a Radioram (see Appendix B) in which we state our feeling as to the importance of combined planning in Moscow between your representatives and our planning group. We hope you will agree with our views and would like to hear any comments or suggestions you have.

7. In connection with our operations accurate information on weather is most important. This information will be equally necessary to your air forces as well as to ours operating over Japan. The United States views here is that it is important that they obtain weather information from more elevations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia and request that you arrange this.

8. Pending the Red staff views to discuss sub-post requirements, it is suggested that the substance of J. C. S. memorandum for information No. 360 be given the Red General Staff verbally.

9. The Joint Staff planners recommend that in the discussion of the above subjects, the United States Chiefs of Staff make clear to the Russians that:

A. Amphibious operations in the North Pacific in 1945 are remote.

B. If the Russians indicate a desire for a supply route across the North Pacific, the United States chiefs indicate they expect facilities for basing United States Strategic Air Forces in Eastern Siberia, in connection with the opening of any such route.

APPENDIX "A"

Memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff to the representatives of the Soviet General Staff:

In order that there be complete understanding on the arrangements for the entrance into Kamchatka of the United States reconnaissance party, the composition of which by name has already been furnished the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is requested that the Soviet General Staff indicate agreement to the following:

A. The reconnaissance party will have access to any part of the area.

B. Transportation in, from and within the area will be furnished by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

C. Full information and assistance will be furnished by local Soviet authorities.

D. Free and rapid communication between the party and U. S. military authorities will be permitted and arranged by the Soviets.

It is further urged that arrangements be completed in time to permit the departure of this party from Fairbanks, Alaska, not later than 15 February 1945.

APPENDIX "B"

Memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff to the representatives of the Soviet General Staff:

The United States Chiefs of Staff have noted with satisfaction the initiation of combined planning in Moscow. The work of this combined group is of the utmost importance to the planning and coordination of our operations for the defeat of Japan.

The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that special effort should be made at this time to expedite this combined planning by full free and frank exchange of information, data and views between members of the combined group, preparation of combined studies and estimates for presentation to the respective Chiefs of Staff during the earliest future meetings between them.

The United States chiefs ask for your agreement to these views and for any comments or suggestions which you may care to make.

ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING

Feb. 8, 1945, 3:30 P. M.

LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Marshal Stalin
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Commissioner Molotov
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Pavlov

BOHLEN COLLECTION
BOHLEN MINUTES

TOP SECRET

1. Air bases in the Far East

The President said that with the fall of Manila the war in the Pacific was entering into a new phase and that we hoped to establish bases on the Kuriles and on the islands near Formosa. He said the time had come to make plans for additional bombing of Japan. He hoped that it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese islands and would do so only if absolutely necessary. The Japanese had 4,000,000 troops. Their army had to be kept by sustained bombing to be able to destroy Japan and its army and thus save American lives.

Marshal Stalin said he did not object to the United States having bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikolaevsk. He said he first was on the lower Amur on the Amur River and the second at its mouth. He said that in regard to the Straits of Kamchatka he thought we would have to leave that until a later stage since the presence of the Japanese coast there makes it difficult at this time to make the necessary arrangements. At any rate, he added, the other two bases in the Maritime provinces were nearer.

Marshal Stalin added that there had been one phase in regard to "commercial routes" in the President's letter on the subject which had not been clear to him.

The President said he had in mind the importance of the supply routes across the Pacific and Eastern Siberia to the Soviet Union and he felt that since war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union it would become very important but also very difficult to get by the Japanese islands.

Marshal Stalin indicated that he recognized the importance of these supply routes and again repeated that he had no objection to the establishment of American bases in the maritime provinces.

The President handed the Marshal a paper in which it was requested that the Soviet staff be instructed to enter into planning talks with the United States staff.

Marshal Stalin indicated that he would give the necessary instructions.

II. Use of airfields and survey of bomb damage in Eastern and southeastern Europe.

* * *

Discussion of the subject began at 3:40 P. M.

The President said he had two questions of a military nature relating to Russia which he wished to take up with the Marshal. He then handed to Marshal Stalin two papers in English which were translated into Russian.

(Text of "these" papers not found).

The first was a request that the United States Air Force be allowed to use certain airfields in the vicinity of Budapest in order to carry on bombing operations against the Germans. The President said at the present time the American bombers based in Italy had to make a long and hazardous flight over the Alps in order to reach Germany.

The second paper contained a request that a group of United States experts be permitted to make surveys of the effects of bombing in the areas liberated or occupied by the Red Army in order to profit by the experience and achievements similar to the surveys that had been made at Cassel.

The paper asked that this group be permitted to proceed at once since it was important to examine the damage while the evidence was still fresh and the people who had been there during the bombing still were on the spot.

Marshal Stalin said he could grant both these requests and would immediately give the necessary orders.

Sale of ships to the Soviet Union after the war ends.

Marshal Stalin mentioned that Mr. Stettinius had told Mr. Molotov there was a possibility that the United States would have surplus shipping property after the war which might be sold to the Soviet Union.

The President said that this would require some changes in legislation which he hoped to work out as the surplus shipping after the war not needed by the United States and Great Britain could be transferred on credit without any interest. He said after the last war the mistake had been made of attempting to charge interest for the disposal of surplus property but it had not worked. His idea was to transfer the ships for a fixed sum on credits which would include the cost of the ship less the cost of depreciation, so that in twenty years the entire credit would be extinguished. He said that the British has never sold anything without commercial interest but that he has different ideas.

Marshal Stalin expressed gratification at the President's statement and said this shipping would greatly ease the task of the Soviet Union in the future.

III. The President replied that he hoped the Soviet Union would

WITH EGYPT'S KING: President Roosevelt chats with King Farouk aboard United States warship near Cairo. The President stopped there on way back from Yalta conference.

The New York Times Photo

[illegible] part in a large way in the shipping game.

Marshal Stalin said that he thought the President's idea was a very good one and also that Lend-Lease was a "remarkable invention," about which nothing would have been said before. He said that in former wars some allies had subsidized others but this had avoided the ulcer covering the subsidies and led to difficulties.

Lend-Lease, however, continues on such reciprocal, and as compared the system of ordinary contribution of Lend-Lease to the winning of the war.

The President replied that four years ago, when having a seat in his small game, he had thought the allies had to help the nations which were being overrun by the Germans, but [illegible] Lend-Lease.

(1) The subject of [illegible] Marshal Stalin, whereupon [illegible] each of the powers [illegible] armaments of the [illegible] mastering of the [illegible] has been agreed to [illegible]. The time [illegible] the beginning of the [illegible] of Tokyo [illegible] was 3:45 P. M.

IV. Far East: Russian [illegible]

Following the discussion of certain military questions involved in the Far East, Stalin said that he was [illegible] during the political [illegible] under which the U. S. would enter the war against Japan. He said he had had a conversation on the subject with Ambassador [illegible].

The President said he had received a report of this [illegible] and he felt that there would be no difficulty whatever in regard to the southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles going to Russia at the end of the war. He said that as a warm water port in the Far East for the Soviet Union the Marshal recalled that [illegible] Japan. They undertook the war against Germany which was threatening the very existence of the Soviet Union. But they could not understand why Russia would not declare war against Japan at a time when they had no great trouble. He said, however, if the Soviet political conditions were such that the people would understand the national interest involved and it would be very much helpful to explain the matter to the Supreme Soviet.

The President replied that he had not had an opportunity to talk to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek about it but that one of the difficulties in speaking to the Chinese was that anything said to them was known to the whole world immediately.

Marshal Stalin agreed and said that it was certainly necessary to keep the Chinese and the Japanese in the dark. He said that the Japanese were [illegible] Harbin and from there to Dairen and Port Arthur, as well as the line from Harbin running to Nikolsk-Ussuriski connecting there with the Khabarovsk line to Vladivostok.

The President said that [illegible] although he had not talked with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek on the subject, there were [illegible] methods of bringing this about. (1) To locate [illegible] Soviet operation; (2) Under a [illegible] composed of the Chinese and one Russian.

Marshal Stalin said that it [illegible] that if these conditions [illegible] was ready to [illegible] Soviet people who [illegible] way entering the war against Japan. They understood the war against Germany which [illegible] threatening the very existence of the Soviet Union. But they could not understand why Russia would [illegible]

Dispute Over a Regime for Poland Again Arouses Conferees in Crimea

by the other delegations. He Army would be reconciled to the said that with some slight transfer of the British Govern- amendments, if a decision in ment's support from the gov- principle was reached he was ernment with which it had dealt prepared to accept the Presi- since the beginning of the war dent's proposals which have been it would be regarded as an act under discussion. of betrayal of Poland. At Mar- shal Stalin and Mr. Molotov

Mr. Molotov said he had some knew, he had no special feeling observations to make on the for the Polish Government in President's proposals. He said London, which in its opinion had that their proposals made yes- been foolish at every stage, but terday had been based on cer- a formal act of transfer of tain realities existing in Poland. recognition would cause the very It was impossible to ignore the greatest consternation. He point- existence of the present Polish ed out that the people forming Government and he said that the Soviet Government had neither the new Provisional Government it would be useful to have dis- who only about one year old. cussions on the basis of enlarg- ing that Government with the addition of other democratic ele- The Prime Minister made it ments from within Poland and clear that, speaking only for abroad. He said that the Lub- Great Britain, it would be said lin, or Warsaw, Government that the British Government had stands at the head of the Polish given away completely on the people and enjoys great pres- frontiers, had accepted the So- tige and popularity in the coun- viet view and had championed try. The Poles would never it. To break altogether with the agree to any action which lawful Government of Poland would greatly change the Pro- which has been recognized dur- visional Government. ing all those five years of war would be an act subject to the

We might have some success most severe criticism in Eng- if we start from the basis that land. It would be said that we the present Provisional Govern- did not know what was on in ment should be enlarged. The Poland or that we could not people who now compose the even get anyone in there to find Polish Provisional Government out what was going on and that have been closely connected with we had accepted in toto the view the great events of the libera- of the Lublin Government. Great tion of Poland, but Messrs. Mi- Britain would be charged with kolajczyk, Grabski and Witos breaking the cause of Poland, have not been directly connected and we were bound to say that with these events. Therefore, if we might to achieve a practical the greatest pain. But he might result it should be done on the add most dangerous to Allied basis of the enlargement of the unity. He added that all the present Government, but how above was on the supposition many and who they should be is that they might find it possible the subject we should talk about. to agree to Mr. Molotov's pro- He said if they were to posal. He said if they were to give up the London Government it must be evident that a new start had been made on both sides from equal ems. Before such transfer of recognition His Majesty's Government would have to be certain that a new government, representative of the Polish people, had been cre- ated, pledged to an election on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot with the par- ticipation of all democratic par- ties and the right to put up their candidates. When such elections were held in Poland, he said Great Britain would salute the government which emerges with- out regard for the Polish Gov- ernment in London, which in its opinion had been foolish at every stage, but a formal act of transfer of recognition would cause the very greatest consternation. He point- ed out that the people forming the new Provisional Government who only about one year old.

The Prime Minister made it clear that, speaking only for Great Britain, it would be said that the British Government had given away completely on the frontiers, had accepted the So- viet view and had championed it. To break altogether with the lawful Government of Poland which has been recognized dur- ing all those five years of war would be an act subject to the most severe criticism in Eng- land. It would be said that we did not know what was on in Poland or that we could not even get anyone in there to find out what was going on and that we had accepted in toto the view of the Lublin Government. Great Britain would be charged with breaking the cause of Poland, and he was bound to say that the greater is Parliament would be most painful that he might add most dangerous to Allied unity. He added that all the above was on the supposition that they might find it possible to agree to Mr. Molotov's pro-

U. S. Proposal on Warsaw Accepted by Soviet for Curzon Line as Boundary

sions. Instead they cut each others throats. I notice that Tito also seems very popular in the country.

PRIME MINISTER: I invited Sir Walter Citrine to go out with five trade unionists, but I have not yet seen their report. I believe that he had a rather tough time. I thank the Marshal for his help.

STALIN: On Greece I only wanted to know for information. We have no intention of intervening there in any way.

[The meeting adjourned.

HOPKINS PAPERS

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President.

(Yalta, Feb. 8, 1945)

MR. PRESIDENT: The Joint Chiefs of Staff told Welles that it (this note is undated but is assumed to have been passed to the President at the plenary session on Feb. 8 in connection with the President's reference to Welles and the reasons why certain South American states had not declared war. The Department of Defense states that there is no evidence in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to substantiate this statement) would be difficult for us to defend their coasts against Japan. That is Welles' excuse.

HARRY.

United States Delegation Memorandum on the Foreign Ministers' Report to the Fifth Plenary Meeting

(This is a ribbon copy, undated and unsigned. Authorship not indicated. On Aug. 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought the memorandum had been drafted by Hiss [740.0029-2-2354].)

The report by the Foreign Secretaries was accepted, subject to Paragraph 2 (b) being amended to read as follows: "The United Nations as they exist on the 8th February, 1945, and such of the associated nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945, would be the only states invited to the conference on world organization. At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist republics, i. e., the Ukraine and White Russia."

* * *

(The term "associated nations" in this connection means the eight associated nations and Turkey which shall be regarded as an associated nation for the purpose [footnote in the original].)

United States Proposal on Poland

February 8, 1945

TOP SECRET

(The copy in the Bohlen collection has the entire text in quotation marks under the following caption: "Counter-proposal circulated by the United States delegation to the Soviet and British delegations on February 8, 1945." The copies in the Hiss collection, the Matthews files and the U. N. A. files carry no caption or quotation marks.

(The Hiss collection contains at this point, along with the other documents herein cited to that collection for February 8, the carbon copy of the undated paper entitled "Concrete Proposals on the Polish Question" which is printed under the Malta Conference. * * *)

The proposals submitted by Mr. Molotov in regard to the Polish question in reply to the President's letter to Marshal Stalin dated February 6, 1945, have been given careful study.

In regard to the frontier question, no objection is perceived to Point One of the Soviet proposals, namely that the eastern boundary of Poland should be the Curzon Line with modifications in favor of Poland in some areas of from five to eight kilometers.

In regard to Point Two, while agreeing that compensation should be given to Poland at the expense of Germany, including that portion of East Prussia south of the Koenigsberg Line, Upper Silesia, and up to the line of the Oder, there would appear to be little justification to the extension of the western boundary of Poland up to the western Neisse River.

In regard to the proposals of the Soviet Government concerning the future government of Poland, it is proposed that Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr be authorized on behalf of three Governments to invite to Moscow Mr. Bierut, Mr. Osobka-Morawski, Bishop Sapieha, Mr. Vincente Witos, Mr. Mikolajczyk and Mr. Grabski to form a Polish government of national unity along the following lines:

1. There will be formed a presidential committee of three, possibly consisting of Mr. Bierut, Mr. Grabski and Bishop Sapieha, to represent the presidential office of the Polish Republic.

2. This Presidential committee will undertake the formation of a government consisting of representative leaders from the present Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw from other democratic elements inside Poland and from Polish democratic leaders abroad.

3. This interim government, when formed, will pledge itself to the holding of free elections in Poland as soon as conditions permit for a constituent assembly to establish a new Polish constitution under which a permanent government would be elected.

4. When a Polish Government of national unity is formed, the three governments will then proceed to accord it recognition as the provisional government of Poland.

HISS COLLECTION

United States Delegation Memorandum

(Carbon copy authorship presumably for Stettinius.)

(Yalta) February 8, 1945

Points to take up with the President:

1. Location of conference. (See attached papers.) Not issued.

2. Consultation of France before invitations are issued.

(A) France is listed in the proposals as one of the five permanent members "in due course."

At Dumbarton Oaks "in due course" was understood to mean recognition—which has now occurred.

(B) We need France's influence among the smaller powers in "selling" the organization.

(C) To save time, the United States can consult France on behalf of Britain and Russia.

3. Consultation of China before invitations are issued.

(A) China is a full-fledged Dumbarton Oaks participant and must be one of the sponsoring powers.

(B) We can consult China on behalf of Britain and Russia. 4. Mr. Stimson is opposed to territorial trusteeships.

(A) Joint Chiefs have agreed to setting up the machinery for territorial trusteeships, without discussion of specific territories.

(B) United States public opinion has criticized Dumbarton Oaks for leaving out territorial trusteeships.

(C) New organization can't supersede League of Nations without disposing of mandates system.

(D) Chinese, Russians and Latin Americans all want territorial trusteeships. The British will agree? We can't be the one objecting power.

HISS COLLECTION

United States delegation memorandum

(Ribbon copy: authorship not indicated. This memorandum was prepared presumably for Stettinius. On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought it had been drafted by Hiss.)

(Yalta) February 8, 1945.

Items still remaining open before conference can be called

1. Status of France:

At Malta the British and we agreed that France should be a fifth sponsoring power and should be included along with China as one of the powers on whose behalf invitations will be issued.

2. Nature of consultation with France and China.

At Malta we and the British agreed that the United States should consult France and China on behalf of Britain and Russia.

Mr. Grew is all prepared to initiate this consultation promptly in Washington as soon as he gets a flash.

3. Form of invitation.

The invitations could most conveniently be issued by the United States on behalf of itself and the other four sponsoring powers.

(We have a draft invitation.)

4. International trusteeships.

We should get agreement that the subjects of international trusteeships and dependent areas will be discussed at the United Nations conference, and that provisions on these subjects will be incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations.

(We should arrange for prompt interchange of papers on these subjects after the Crimean conference in order to try to get agreed proposals drafted before the United Nations conference.)

5. Communiqué of the Crimean conference on Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

We have a drafted communiqué. (Wilder Foote is preparing an alternative draft for your consideration.)

ACROSS YALTA TABLE: President Roosevelt with press secretary, Stephen Early, and Prime Minister Churchill

TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING

February 8, 1945, 9 P. M.

Yusupovsky Palace

(Marshal Stalin acted as host.)

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

Bohlen minutes top secret subject: General conversation.

The atmosphere on the dinner was most cordial, and forty-five toasts in all were drunk. Marshal Stalin was in an excellent humor, and even in high spirits. Most of the toasts were routine—to the armed forces of the representative countries and the military leaders and the continuing friendship of the three great powers.

Marshal Stalin proposed a toast to the health to the Prime Minister, who he characterized as the bravest governmental figure in the world. He said that due in large measure to Mr. Churchill's courage and staunchness, England, when she stood alone, had divided the might of Hitlerite Germany at a time when the rest of Europe was falling flat on its face before Hitler. He said that Great Britain, under Mr. Churchill's leadership, had carried on the fight alone irrespective of existing or potential allies. The Marshal concluded that he knew of few examples in history where the courage of one man had been so important to the future history of the world.

He drank a toast to Mr. Churchill, his fighting friend and a brave man.

The Prime Minister, in his reply, toasted Marshal Stalin as the mighty leader of a mighty country, which had taken the full shock of the German war machine, had broken its back and had driven the tyrants from her soil. He said he knew that in peace no less than in war Marshal Stalin would continue to lead his people from success to success.

Marshal Stalin then proposed the health of the President of the United States. He said that he and Mr. Churchill in their respective countries had had relatively simple decisions. They had been fighting for their very existence against Hitlerite Germany but there was a third man whose country had not been seriously threatened with invasion, but who had had perhaps a broader conception of national interest and even though his country was not directly imperiled had been the chief forger of the instruments which had lead to the mobilization of the world against Hitler. He mentioned in this connection Lend-Lease as one of the President's most remarkable and vital achievements in the formation of the anti-Hitler combination and in keeping the Allies in the field against Hitler.

The President, in reply to this toast, said he felt the atmosphere at this dinner was as that of a family, and it was in these words that he liked to characterize the relations that existed between our three countries. He said that great changes had occurred in the world during the last three years, and even greater changes were to come. He said that each of the leaders represented here were working in their own way for the interests of their people. He said that fifty years ago there were vast areas of the world where people had little opportunity and no hope, but much had been accomplished, although there were still great areas where people had little opportunity and little hope, and their objectives here were to give to every man, woman and child on this earth the possibility of security and well-being.

In a subsequent toast to the alliance between the three great powers, Marshal Stalin remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which was clear to everyone. He said the difficult task came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the Allies. He said he was confident that the present alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty to see that it would, and that our relations in peacetime should be as strong as they had been in war.

The Prime Minister then said he felt we were all standing on the crest of a hill with the glories of future possibilities stretching before us. He said that in the modern world the function of leadership was to lead the people out from the forests into the broad sunlit plains of peace and happiness. He felt this prize was nearer our grasp than any time before in history and it would be a tragedy for which history would never forgive us if we let this prize slip from our grasp through inertia or carelessness.

Justice Byrnes proposed a toast to the common man all over the world. He said there had been many toasts [illegible] never forget the [illegible] of women [illegible] earth.

Miss Harriman, [illegible] the Allies [illegible] proposed a toast [illegible] had worked so hard [illegible] for our comfort [illegible] were the destruction [illegible] the Germans [illegible] noticed what had been [illegible].

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

February 9, 1945, 11 A. M.

PRESENT

United States / United Kingdom	
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Vice Admiral Cooke
Field Marshal Brooke	Admiral Somerville
General of the Army Marshall	Rear Admiral McCormick
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal	Major General Hull
Fleet Admiral King	Major General Deane
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham	Captain McDill
Major General Kuter	Commander Clark
Field Marshal Wilson	(Secretariat)
Lieutenant General Somervell	Brigadier General [illegible]
General Ismay	Major General Jacob
	Captain Graves
	Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
	Commander Coleridge
	Colonel Capel-Dunn
	J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

C. C. S. 186th Meeting

TOP SECRET

1. Approval of the minutes of the 187th meeting of C. C. S.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 187th meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

2. Draft final report to the President and Prime Minister

Following acceptance of this paper by the President and the Prime Minister at their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff later on Feb. 9, 1945, the report was recirculated as C. C. S. 776/3.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered those paragraphs of the draft final report which had been added since they had approved C. C. S. 776/1.

Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in appendix "A" of C. C. S. 776/2. He pointed out that in paragraph 4 C. of the directive it was stated that "the nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction." In order to avoid any possible delay in the movement of these forces he suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should send an instruction to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, repeated to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, on the following sense:

"Reference paragraph 4c. of the directive issued to you the move of two Canadian and three British Divisions should proceed under plans to be agreed between yourself and S. C. A. E. F. without awaiting any further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

General Marshall said that this proposal is acceptable.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

A. Approved the text of the report to the President and Prime Minister on the [illegible] Conference (C. C. S. 776/3).

B. Approved the dispatch of the [illegible] instruction proposed by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.

3. Liaison with the Soviet High Command with regard to strategic bombing in Eastern Germany.

(C. C. S. 776, C. C. S. 188th MTG., item 7, two tripartite military meetings).

Sir Charles Portal referred to the discussions which had been taking place between himself and General Kuter and Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov. At the meeting a draft agreement had been drawn up and agreed and submitted to the three high commands. It was acceptable to the British and he understood the United States Chiefs of Staff. However, on the previous evening identical letters had been received by General Kuter and himself from Marshal Khudyakov setting out a considerably revised draft agreement. This was unacceptable to himself and to General Kuter. General Kuter said he had redrafted the Russian proposals in such a way as to make them acceptable to the U. S. and British. He proposed putting this new draft to the Russians. If this were not acceptable to the Russians, it would probably be wiser to inform them that we propose to continue with the previous arrangements.

Sir Charles Portal explained the main difference between the Russian proposals and the draft, which had been agreed at the meeting of the heads of air staffs. In the agreed draft the Allied air forces could bomb a target to the east of the line, provided twenty-four hours' notice was given to the Soviet High Command and no objection was raised.

In the Russian proposal, however, it was necessary to obtain agreement for any Allied bombing east of the line twenty-four hours before the attack was to take place. It had been his understanding in conversations with Marshal Khudyakov, that the Russian staff was more interested in preventing incidents between Allied and Soviet aircraft than they were in protecting their ground forces.

General Kuter pointed out that there was one further important change in the Russian proposals. The Soviet staff had now proposed that a rigid line should exist which would be moved from time to time by the Soviet staff whereas in the original agreement the bombline was to move forward automatically at a given distance from the Russian front line. An example of the difficulties which would [illegible] Marshal Khudyakov's [illegible]

[illegible] The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the best method of handling further action with regard to the Russian proposals.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal and General Kuter should each reply separately to Marshal of the Soviet Air Force Khudyakov, making it clear that the revised agreement proposed by the Soviet High Command differed substantially from that which it was thought had been agreed between the heads of the three air forces on 8 February; that these differences made acceptance of the revised agreement impracticable; and that the British-United States High Command therefore intended to continue with the arrangements in force prior to the Crimean conference.

4. Concluding remarks.

Admiral Leahy said he would like to express on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the cooperation and assistance received from the British Chiefs of Staff during the present conference. [illegible] that progress had been [illegible] on the general plans of the war as a whole, and that much had been accomplished.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he would like to reciprocate on behalf of Britain.

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

February 9, 1945, Noon

[illegible] Palace

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Page

UNITED KINGDOM
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Dixon
Major Theakstone

SOVIET UNION
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vishinsky
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

(Bohlen Collection)

PAGE MINUTES

TOP SECRET

SUBJECTS:

1. Points still before the Foreign Ministers
   (A) Dumbarton Oaks matters.
   (B) Report by subcommittee on form of invitations and other details of arrangements for United Nations conference.
   (C) Reparations.
   (D) Poland.
   (E) Iran.
   (F) Questions relating to the Yugoslav frontiers.
2. The Polish question.
3. Reparations.
4. Dumbarton Oaks.
5. Iran.
6. Yugoslavia.

1. Points still before the Foreign Secretaries.

Mr. Stettinius, who presided, stated that he thought it might be helpful to have a general review of the unfinished items. He stated these were as follows:

(A) The report of the February 8 meeting on Dumbarton Oaks matters.

This report was modified in principle by general agreement of yesterday's plenary session.

(B) Report by the subcommittee on the form of invitations and other details of arrangements for the United Nations conference.

(C) Reparations.

The American delegation desired to submit a paper on this matter today.

(D) Poland.

The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Secretaries.

(E) Iran.

(F) Questions relating to the Yugoslav frontiers. After a brief discussion it was decided to touch upon the Polish question first.

2. The Polish Question.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he would like briefly to comment upon one important point which had not been previously raised. There had been quite a struggle in the United States on American participation in the world organization. From the standpoint of psychology and public opinion the Polish situation was of great importance at this time in the United States. He hoped with all his heart that the Polish question could be settled before the Crimean conference broke up.

Mr. Stettinius then read the following statement:

"After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov's statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

"I believe that with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative 'provisional Polish Government'—and we speak of the formation of a government of national unity. All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this Government should be composed of the present Polish Provisional Government. And in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

"The following formula might therefore be considered:

"That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative Government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed 'the Provisional Government of National Unity.' Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Government of National Unity would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

"When a Provisional Government of National Unity is satisfactorily formed the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to obtain a copy of the text of the statement in the Russian language, as he did not feel prepared to reply to the oral statement.

Mr. Eden said that he had some preliminary remarks on Mr. Stettinius' proposal. He must tell his colleagues frankly of his difficulties in this matter. Many people thought that the Poles had been harshly treated by the British readiness to acquiesce in a frontier on the Curzon Line. He himself had been troubled for some time because, quite apart from the merits of the case, it might become a cause of difficulty between the Soviet Government and the British as regards the Lublin Provisional Government. It was possible that he might be quite wrong but he thought it was a fact that hardly anyone in Great Britain believed that the Lublin Government was representative of Poland. He should have thought that that view was widely held in the rest of Europe and in the United States of America. It was for that reason that the documents which he had put forward the previous day had avoided all mention of adding to the Lublin Government and had stressed that a new start was necessary if agreement were reached here. This would involve a transfer of recognition from the London Government to the new Government. The British Government should have to abandon[ment] would be much easier for it if it were not made [illegible] of the existing Lublin Government.

The British Government had considerable Polish forces fighting with it, about 150,000 at present, and these forces would increase as more Poles were liberated or escaped from Germany. It naturally desired very much to carry them along in any settlement. The task would be easier if a fresh start were made.

He had one other comment which concerned a personality. It had been said that there was considerable opposition to Mr. Mikolajczyk in the Lublin Government. He was not convinced of that but in any case the presence of Mikolajczyk in a Polish Government would do more than anything else to add to the authority of that government, and to convince the British people of its representative character.

Mr. Molotov stated that while the American document was being translated he wishes to make some comments although he could not, of course, go further than what Marshal Stalin had said yesterday, he recalled that the President had said yesterday, he recalled that the President had stated that the Polish situation was temporary and could not last for a long time. In the Russian opinion the most important question was the holding as soon as practical of general elections in Poland.

These elections would give a life for a permanent government and do away with all the difficulties that were facing the Allies at the present time. Marshal Stalin had referred to the provisional period as lasting perhaps one month whereas the Prime Minister had mentioned two. In any event, it would be a short interval. However, at the present time it was not only a question of Poland but also the rear of the Red Army. Even for a short period, it was essential to the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to take this military situation into consideration. If there were any obstacles in the rear of the Red Army an impossible situation would arise. That was why Mr. Molotov had suggested yesterday that the reorganization of the Polish Government should be on the basis of the present Lublin Government with democratic elements from within the country added to it.

With respect to Mikolajczyk, Mr. Molotov stated that it would be a mistake to say that he was unacceptable. The Poles themselves must decide this. Conversations must be held with the Poles in and out of Poland.

Perhaps the Mikolajczyk question was not so acute as it appeared. However, it could not be cleared up in the Crimea without consulting the Poles. Furthermore reorganization of the Polish Government could not be undertaken without speaking to the Poles. The Moscow commission made up of the British and American Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov would have serious tasks to perform.

They should discuss the entire question with the Poles and make clear to them the basis reached in the Crimea on the Polish question.

Mr. Eden said he entirely agreed with Mr. Molotov in respect to his remarks on the importance of the Polish elections. However, he felt sure that British opinion would agree that if the elections were controlled by the Lublin Government they would not be free elections or represent the will of the Polish people.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he supported Mr. Eden's views in full in this respect.

After a brief interruption Mr. Molotov, on reading a translation of the American proposal, stated that he would be unable to give a final answer to the new American considerations until he had consulted Marshal Stalin. He hoped to be able to do this by four o'clock.

However, at the present time he would like to make a few preliminary comments.

Firstly, it would be inadvisable to place too much emphasis on the formula of the question of the Polish Government before consulting the Poles themselves. He still believed that the new Polish Government should be created on the basis of the Lublin Government. If the three Foreign Ministers agreed to this in principle, it would not be difficult to find a formula.

Secondly, it might be better to leave out reference to the Allied ambassadors in Warsaw since this reference would undoubtedly be offensive to the Poles as it would indicate that they, the Poles, were under the control of foreign diplomatic representatives. The ambassadors would, of course, see and report as they desired. In the last analysis the question of a formula was not important—the question of an agreement on the fundamental issues was more so.

Mr. Eden stated that the three Allied Governments considered that a new situation would be created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This would call for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which would be more broadly representative than was possible before the liberation of Poland. This government should be composed of members of the Lublin Government and other democratic leaders in Poland and abroad.

Mr. Eden felt that this government should be called the Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov continued to stress the advisability of forming the new government on the basis of the Lublin Government. Otherwise an unstable situation would be established in the rear of the Red Army. This government would include other representatives from Poland and from without the country.

Mr. Stettinius maintained that it would be preferable to start with an entirely new government and stated that unless the Foreign Ministers could get away from the words "existing Polish Government," no agreement could be reached on this question. He suggested that Mr. Molotov give consideration to a formula which would state that the Polish Government should be based upon the old and also on the democratic leaders which will be brought in.

Mr. Molotov maintained that it was very difficult to deal with the Poles and that a serious situation would arise if a period should be created in which there were no government in Poland. The authority of the present Lublin Government would be undermined. He maintained that if the American or British proposals were adopted everything would be standing in the air and a period of instability would be created in Poland.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the present Polish Government would continue until the new government was formed.

Mr. Molotov maintained that the Poles would know that negotiations were proceeding on a change in government and that the present Government would not endure. This would create a situation which might well cause difficulties for the Red Army.

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Eden's formula avoided this situation.

Mr. Molotov, however, adhered to his former position of insisting that the new Polish Government be formed on the basis of the Lublin Government. He maintained that the matter would have to be discussed with the Poles themselves before any decision could be reached.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to Mr. Molotov's reactions with respect to the name of the new Polish government.

Mr. Molotov replied that this could be taken up at a later date.

Mr. Stettinius stated that under present circumstances it would probably be best to report to the plenary session that the Foreign Ministers had discussed at length the Polish government question on the basis of the memorandum submitted by the American delegation and that although they had not yet reached an agreement on the matter they had decided to continue discussions at a later date.

Mr. Harriman asked Mr. Molotov to consider's redraft of the American formula which would contain the words "based on the old and also on other democratic elements from outside and inside Poland."

Mr. Molotov's reaction to this suggestion was negative. He appeared to prefer the wording "based on the old government and with the enlarged representatives * * *."

4. Reparations.

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Molotov had presented to him through Mr. Vishinsky and Mr. Maisky a document on the principles of exacting reparations payments from Germany. He wished now to present some counter-proposals which were fundamentally based on the Soviet principles. He then read the following statement:

"1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

"2. Putting aside for the moment the use of German labor by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

"(A) Removal in a single payment at the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located in the territory of Germany itself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

"These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

"(B) Annual deliveries of commodities during ten years after the end of the war.

"3. The total of German reparations in the form of removal from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war shall be the first subject of study by the Moscow commission. In this study the commission will take into consideration the effect of whatever common steps ought to be taken for the elimination or reduction of various important German industries from the standpoint of the total decentralization of Germany. This commission should take into consideration in its initial studies the Soviet Government's suggested total of twenty billion dollars for all forms of reparation."

Mr. Maisky pointed out that paragraphs 1 and 2 of the American proposals were acceptable. However, paragraph 3

British Proposals Offered on Future Status of Iran's Oil and Yugoslav Regime

should be more fully clarified. In order to do so he suggested that the Moscow Commission accept the total of $20,000,000,000 "as a basis" for its studies. The final figures arrived at by the commission might be a little more or less than $20,000,000,000. However, the Soviet delegation urged that this figure be accepted as the basis.

Mr. Eden stated that the Prime Minister was strongly against stating a figure in the basic principles, even as a basis.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation was thinking only of the Soviet Union. Mr. Maisky's commission had done good work—it had only one defect, that of nominalism.

Mr. Stettinius urged that the question of setting a figure be left to the commission. He continued that he, of course, could not commit the United States but that he felt that Mr. Maisky's figure was reasonable.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether it would be agreeable to mention only the reparations, in the amount of ten billion dollars which would go to the Soviet Union.

As a counter-proposal Mr. Stettinius suggested that it merely be stated that 50 per cent of the total sum of reparations collected which would be not specified would go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Molotov stated that he did not object to this suggestion; however, the exact percentage might be a little more or less than 50 per cent of the amount collected. He again stressed the importance of including a figure in the statement.

Mr. Eden said that his Government well understood the suffering and need of the Soviet Government and would not be niggardly in the apportionment of reparations. However, he would like the commission to do its work and ascertain the total amount of German reparations.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation was not endeavoring to supersede the work of the commission, but only to give it guidance.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to what price levels the Soviet Government had in mind.

Mr. Molotov replied that reparations should be based on 1938 prices since destruction had taken place in pre-war values.

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether the Soviet Government also had in mind addition of 15 per cent to 20 per cent.

Mr. Molotov said that this was likely.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the effect of the dismemberment of Germany on payment of reparations.

Mr. Maisky replied that it would not have any effect on the removal from the national wealth of Germany of German equipment located inside and outside of the country at the termination of the war. It might affect annual payments in the post-war years. However, the Soviet Government had taken this into consideration in drawing up its report.

After some discussion the Soviet and American delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (A) and (B) of the preceding paragraph should be $20,000,000,000 dollars and that 50 per cent of it should go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.

4. Dumbarton Oaks.

Mr. Stettinius presented copies of the draft invitation (see attached) to the Dumbarton Oaks (United Nations) Conference and stated that it was his understanding that the United States would consult with China and France before the invitations were issued on the Dumbarton Oaks matters which had been discussed in the Crimea.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed to this.

It was pointed out that some differences existed in the invitation submitted at the meeting and a former draft. It was suggested that the invitation be referred back to the subcommittee which would report as soon as possible to the Foreign Ministers. He explained that he had placed the draft before the meeting in order to get the Foreign Ministers' consideration of the general principles at this stage so that time could be saved. Without decisions of the Foreign Ministers the subcommittee could not complete its work.

It was also agreed that the paragraph relative to trusteeships should be omitted from the invitation and that the five Governments which would have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the conference on the subject of territorial trusteeships and independent areas. This would be done on a diplomatic level.

Mr. Stettinius explained that he did not contemplate any detailed discussions on particular islands or territories but wished to establish the right of the organization to deal with the problem of trusteeships and to set up some machinery.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden indicated agreement.

5. Iran.

Mr. Stettinius inquired whether Mr. Eden wished to bring up the subject of Iran.

Mr. Eden stated that he had submitted a paper on this question.

Mr. Stettinius remarked that the American delegation was in entire agreement with the British position, as stated by Mr. Eden yesterday.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviet delegation had not had time to give study to Mr. Eden's paper. The subject was consequently no longer discussed.

6. Yugoslavia.

Mr. Molotov referred to the unstable situation in Yugoslavia and to the Subasic-Tito agreement. He stated that he could not understand the British desire to supplement this agreement when steps had not been taken to put the original agreement into force. He proposed that the original agreement be executed and that following this subsequent questions be discussed.

Mr. Eden maintained that the amendments to the agreement which had been suggested by the British Government were reasonable in nature and provided for a more democratic Yugoslavia. He could see no harm in the application.

Mr. Molotov continued to maintain that no useful purpose would be served by the submission of supplementary agreements until the original agreement had been effected.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that representatives of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation. The British and Russian ministers agreed to this proposal. Mr. Molotov stated that it would be desirable to state that it had been agreed at the Crimean conference that the Subasic-Tito agreement should be fully executed.

(HISS COLLECTION)
(HISS NOTES)

4th Meeting

Poland

E. R. S. We have a hard fight in U. S. on particip. in U. N. Na. Org. Polish sit. is of great importance to us from psych. point of view at this time. So hope with all heart we can settle this Pol. matter before we break up in a manner which will be acceptable to the world.

1. Dropped Pres. Commission idea.

2. (a) Mol. spoke of reorg. of Pol. govt.

(b) Brit. formula suggests formation of a fully representative provisional govt.

(c) We govt. of national unity.

All of us agree Pol. Govt. should include 3 elements—Lublin, democrats in Pol. and abroad.

Proposal present Pol. govt be reorganized to include Pol. democrats in Pol. and abroad and be called Provisional Govt. of Pol. Natl. unity Pol. commission in Mos. to consult in first instance Lublin govt. and Polish leaders in Pol. and outside.

Be pledged hold free elections, universal suffrage and secret ballot as soon as practicable.

When Pol Govt. of Nat Unity is formed 3 govts recognize.

Ambs. of 3 powers in Warsaw be charged report on holding of free elections.

Reparations

E. R. S. presented proposal.

Point 1 acceptable.

Point 2 add should consider 20,000,000,000 as a basis—total figures to be arrived at by commission.

E.R.S.: We think that figure should be taken into consideration. We can accept it as a basis for discussion.

Eden not prepared to mention any figure.

Maisky wants figure for Soviet share mentioned.

E.R.S.: Can't commit F. R. to any figure but as said before personally thinks it is a reasonable figure.

MOL: Could it be mentioned as a basis for discussion was.

E.R.S.: Suggests 50% as basis for discussion.

MOL: No objection but should not insist on 50%. May be more or less, but figure would have significance. Distribution of total sum may be different.

E.R.S.: Can't go further at this time.

Maisky means 1938 prices.

EDEN: What of effect of dismemberment.

Maisky might affect annual payments—initially lower perhaps—but not total.

ERS: 15 per cent or 12 per cent variation that applied to Hung.

M. Possibly.

Agreed can mention 50 per cent applies to 20,000,000,000.

REPORTS

ERS presented draft invitation.

Understands we are agreed United States permitted to consult China and FR. before.

Agreed.

ERS agreed to subcommittee but reserved as to [illegible].

ERS: We do not contemplate any detailed discussions of particular islands or territories but do wish to establish right of org to deal with this and to set up machinery.

MOL: Agreed.

ED: Why mention it?

ERS: Agreed to eliminate it in invitation.

Understood we will take it up at conf. and meanwhile among us at dip level.

REPORT

MOL: Brit did not object at D. O.

ED: Agrees and should be in report to plenary session.

IRAN

ED: Mentioned his paper. ERS said we agree.

POLAND

ERS: Can we say U. S. S. U. agree. Mol don't.

YUG.

Committee to prepare statement.

POLAND

New draft by Brit.

MOL: Can only give prelim. Answer. Try to give final answer by 4:00. Mustn't [illegible] too. such is this formula, mustn't go into what we can't say without consulting Poles. [illegible] amend. say based on Lublin Govt. 2. Leave out reference to entire in war—offensive to Poles—indicate they are under control. Q. of formula of importance—Q. of agreement is.

Ed: The three govts. consider that a new sit has been created by the complete lib. of Pol. by the Red Army. This calls for the est. of a fully repres. provisional govt. which can now be more broadly repres. than was possible. This govt should comprise members of Lub gov etc.—should be called prov. of nat. unity.

Mol: Can't leave out statement govt. is based on present one. Propose: The present Pol govt. be reorg. into a fully repres. govt based on the present govt and and etc.

ERS: Must be entirely new. Might say based on Lub. and etc.

Mol: Will be very diff. to deal with Poles. Can't do that when no auth. or stability in Pol.



The New York Times

A SALUTE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: Prime Minister Churchill salutes from a British warship to President Roosevelt (arrow) on the bridge of American vessel as the ships sail by each other before proceeding to Yalta.

ERS: Present gov't would go on during the negt. until new govt is formed.

Mol: But Poles will know negs. are going on and will know presnt. govt. won't last long—make it weak and make negs. last long. That impossible sit. for Red Army.

Mol: Ed proposal incompatible with his own. Must discuss this proposal with Poles.

ERS: What about name of new govt.?

Mol: We can consider this. Report. We have discussed matter and will continue it later and were unable to agree on this feature.

Harriman asked reconsider based on Lub and other.

Mol: Negative.

H gave Jebb this message 2:[illegible] 12:30 P. M. during for. mins. meetings. (Notation in Hiss handwriting.)

'We must be prepared to make—state on an interview to Ecuador, Turkey, Egypt on joining world organ'

United States Delegation Memorandum

(Apparently written by Hiss for Stettinius. Stettinius [illegible] this outline in his review of outstanding items at the opening of the foreign ministers' meeting of noon on February 9, 1945.)

(Yalta), February 9, 1945

Points still before the foreign ministers.

1. Report of February 8th meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters:

The report was accepted in principle by general agreement at yesterday's plenary session. Sir Edward Bridges and Mr. Alexander Cadogan were preparing a re-draft which they will wish to submit to the foreign ministers this morning so that final text of the report can be agreed to and presented very briefly to the plenary session this afternoon.

2. Report by subcommittee on form of invitations and other details of arrangements for United Nations conference:

Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to this committee yesterday and are planning to meet this morning. Jebb was chairman when we were appointed and as a courtesy, he might be asked to report. This report may have to be oral as we have not completed our drafting.

3. Reparations:

Two papers on this subject presented by Mr. Molotov at the meeting over which he presided are still under consideration.

4. Poland:

The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the foreign ministers. The status of this is that Molotov presented a paper at the plenary session the day before yesterday, and yesterday the President presented a counter-proposal.

5. Iran:

You might ask Molotov if after thinking over the points made yesterday on Iran, he has any comments to make.

The points were:

(A) Respect for the Iranian decision not to grant oil concessions until after the war.

(B) Suggest for announcement now that the three powers would be prepared to begin to withdraw their troops from Iran pari passu, i.e. by equal steps.)

6. Points mentioned by Mr. Eden yesterday:

You may wish to ask whether Mr. Eden would like to say anything further with respect to the additional points he mentioned yesterday.

These points were:

(A) Questions relating to the Bulgarian Control Commission.

(B) Questions relating to the Yugoslav frontier.

(Bohlen Collection)

United States Proposal Regarding the Polish Government

(Authorship not indicated. This paper was attached to Bohlen's Minutes of the plenary meeting on the afternoon of Feb. 8, at which time the proposal was [illegible] discussed. On Aug. 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought Bohlen was the author (640.0025 8-1354).)

Yalta, February 9, 1945

TOP SECRET

Suggestions in regard to the Polish governmental questions.

After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov's statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative "Provisional Polish Government" and we speak of the formation of a "Government of National Unity." All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this Government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

The following formula might therefore be considered:

That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative Government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed "The Provisional Government of National Unity." [illegible] Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult [illegible] in Moscow with [illegible] present [illegible]

When a "Polish Government of National Unity" is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition.

The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.

* * *

HISS COLLECTION

The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of State.

(Ribbon copy. The authorship is not indicated but a handwritten notation on the original reads: "Note: According to Mr. Hiss this was prepared by 'Doc' Matthews" and on Aug. 13, 1954 Matthews wrote that he thought he was the author (640.0025 8-1354). The "suggested paper" referred to as attached has not been found. Presumably it was a draft of the proposal read by Stettinius at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at noon on Feb. 9, 1945. See also Stettinius' question to Molotov.)

(Yalta) February 9, 1945.

I attach a suggested paper to hand to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden on reparations. It is based on the Russian proposal of basic principles. The first two sections follow the Russian proposal literally with the additional words in the first paragraph suggested by Mr. Eden. I think you should inquire ask Mr. Molotov on what price, i.e. what year it is intended that the total reparations shall be fixed.

* * *

BOHLEN COLLECTION

United States proposal for the invitation to the United Nations conference.

(Copy also in the Hiss collection. This draft was presented by Stettinius at noon meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 9, 1945.)

INVITATION

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of ——— to send representatives to a conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter at ——— in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization which were made public last October and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

[illegible]

* * *

The brackets enclosing this paragraph were probably added at the Foreign Ministers' meeting when it was decided that this paragraph should be omitted.

(His collection).

United States delegation draft invitation to the United Nations conference.

The carbon copy, which is marked 'OK' in the upper right-hand corner, is presumably a copy of the "Premier draft" to which Stettinius referred. The conditions and insertions in italics presumably reflect the work of the subcommittee of which he was a member. The conditions and insertions indicated by Hiss were incorporated in the text as presented by Stettinius, supra.

INVITATION

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of ——— to send representatives to a conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25 or soon thereafter, at ——— in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, a copy of which was transmitted to you for your information on October 9, 1944, which were made public last October and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

[insert]

The above named governments have agreed that, in their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at the forthcoming conference to the projected charter provisions relating to territorial trusteeships and dependent areas. They hope to be able to prepare and place before the conference proposals relating to this subject.)

Further information as to the details of the conference and its arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of ——— desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating governments.

(Hiss Collection)

Draft report to the Foreign Ministers by the Subcommittee on Arrangements for the United Nations Conference.

(Undated ribbon copy; authorship not indicated, but Matthews wrote on August 13, 1954, that it was written by Hiss (640.0025 8-1354). Carbon copy also in Matthews files. The report was presumably drafted early on February 9, 1945, for possible presentation at the Foreign Ministers' meeting at noon on that day. The report was not presented.)

Report to the Foreign Ministers.

We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:

(A) The method of consultation with France and China in respect to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

(B) The text of the invitation which should be issued to all the nations which will take part in the United Nations conference.

With regard to (A) we consider that the United States on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the Provisional French Government.

With regard to (B) we attach for the approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the nations which will take part in the conference.

The draft invitation was presumably the one presented by Stettinius to the Foreign Ministers at their noon meeting on February 9, 1945. A copy of this draft is in the Hiss collection, but is not attached to this draft report of the subcommittee.

(HISS COLLECTION)

British Proposal on Iran

An undated carbon copy is in the Hiss collection, with papers relating to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 11, 1945, at which time it was decided that the proposal would be eliminated in favor of the language agreed upon for the final protocol.

DRAFT CONCLUSION ON PERSIA

The remarkable progress made in the war against Germany has enabled the American, British and Russian representatives to consider the application of Article 5 of the tripartite treaty of alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Persia regarding the withdrawal of Allied forces from Persian territory. It has been agreed that a commencement of the withdrawal of forces need not await the termination of hostilities, but should begin pari passu in stages as military considerations, including the use of the Persian supply route may allow. The stages of this gradual withdrawal, beginning with the evacuation of Teheran, will be discussed and agreed on by the respective military authorities of the three countries in Moscow. The Persian Government will be kept fully informed.

Misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with applications for rights to develop oil resources in Persia were also discussed in the course of the conversations. It was agreed that in the light of the known views of the Persian Government with whose free decision the matter rests, none of the Governments involved would favour pressing any suggestions for further oil concessions upon the Persian Government pending the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia.

(Possible addition to be held in reserve until it is seen how the discussion proceeds): After the withdrawal the whole question of the future exploitation of Persian oil resources not already covered by existing concessions should be the subject of discussions to be held within the framework of the Teheran declaration of Dec. 1, 1943, and to which the Persian Government would be a party.

* * *

Memorandum from the British delegation to the Soviet delegation regarding the Yugoslav Government. (Notation on file copy reads: "Copy of paper handed by Britain to Soviet delegation.")

When Dr. Subasic returns to Belgrade with his Government about Feb. 7, he intends to raise two outstanding points with Marshal Tito. His Majesty's Government consider it important that Marshal Tito should be in a position to give satisfactory assurances on both these points and therefore hope that Marshal Stalin will agree to advise Marshal Tito in this sense.

1. The first of these points is that AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Assembly by National Liberation of Yugoslavia) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina (the National Parliament of Yugoslavia before World War II) who have not compromised themselves, thus forging a body to be called a temporary parliament.

2. The second point is that legislative acts passed by AVNOJ should be subject to ratification by a Constituent Assembly. This could be arranged either (1) under Article 116 of the Constitution, which lays down that all measures taken in accordance therewith should be subject to ratification, or (2) by introducing a passage in the new Government's declaration agreed between Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic. The latter would be the more satisfactory course. It would also be helpful if the New Government's declaration could include a statement to the effect that the Government was only temporary, pending free expression of the will of the people.

Yalta, 6th February, 1945.

MATTHEWS FILE

British Proposal Regarding the Yugoslav Government

(Undated carbon copy. This is apparently the paper referred to by Eden in the foreign ministers' meeting at noon on Feb. 9, 1945.)

Draft for discussion with the Soviet and American delegations.

Message from the Soviet Government, His Majesty's Government and the United States Government to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic.

The heads of the three governments have met and discussed the Yugoslav question and have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic:

(A) That the Tito-Subasic agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement.

(B) That the new government as soon as formed should make a declaration that:

(I) AVNOJ will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary parliament;

(II) Legislative acts passed by AVNOJ will be subject to ratification by a Constituent Assembly;

(III) The Government is only temporary pending the free expression of the will of the people.

BOHLEN COLLECTION

Draft Report by the Foreign Ministers to Sixth Plenary Meeting

TOP SECRET

(This copy of the report was attached to the page minutes of the Foreign Ministers meeting at noon on February 9, 1945. The report was slightly modified before being delivered by Stettinius to the plenary meeting that afternoon.)

Yalta, February 9, 1945.

REPORT TO THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, FEBRUARY 9, 1945.

1. The Polish Question:

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American delegation. This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov's proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential committee.

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

2. Reparations:

The American delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations and to the type of reparations in kind Germany should pay.

The Soviet and American delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (A) and (B) of the preceding paragraph should be twenty billion dollars and that 50 per cent of it should go to the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.

The Soviet delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15 per cent on the prices of the items delivered.

TOP SECRET

3. Dumbarton Oaks:

It was agreed that the five governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the subjects of territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.

It was also agreed that these subjects should be discussed at the United Nations conference itself.

4. The subcommittee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming conference. This subject was discussed at today's meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

4. Iran:

Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question. The subject was consequently not discussed.

5. Yugoslavia:

On the proposal of the chairman, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, February 9, 1945, Noon

Livadia Palace

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
General Ismay
Admiral Somerville

SECRETARIAT
Brigadier General McFarland
Major General Jacob

(JCS File)

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

Report to the President and the Prime Minister.

The text of this report, numbered C. C. S. 776/3 after its approval by Roosevelt and Churchill, follows these minutes.

The meeting had before them the draft of the final report to the President and the Prime Minister, containing the results of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Argonaut discussions.

The report was accepted and approved by the President and the Prime Minister without amendment.

In the course of the ensuing discussion, the following matters were touched on briefly.

A. There was a discussion of possible developments after the defeat of Germany and the possible action of Russia at that time.

The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that it would be of great value if Russia could be persuaded to join with the United States, the British Empire and China in the issue of a four-power ultimatum calling upon Japan to surrender unconditionally, or else be subjected to the overwhelming weight of all the forces of the four powers. Japan might ask in these circumstances what mitigation of the full rigour of unconditional surrender would be extended to her if she accepted the ultimatum. In this event it would be for the United States to judge the matter, but there was no doubt that some mitigation would be worth while if it led to the saving of a year or a year and a half of a war in which so much blood and treasure would be poured out. Great Britain would not press for any mitigation but would be content to abide by the judgment of the United States.

Whatever the decision, Great Britain would see the matter through to the end.

The President thought that this was a matter which might well be mentioned to Marshal Stalin. He doubted whether the ultimatum would have much effect on the Japanese, who did not seem to realize what was going on in the world outside and still seemed to think they might get a satisfactory compromise. They would be unlikely to wake up to the true state of affairs until all their islands had felt the full weight of air attack.

B. The Prime Minister expressed his thanks to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the work which they had accomplished. He said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff was a wonderful institution which smoothed out so many difficulties, issued clear directions to the commanders in the field and would without doubt be held up in years to come as a model of cooperation between allies. He hoped very much that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could be kept in being for three or four years more. There would be many problems affecting the security of the two nations in this period the solution of which would be greatly facilitated if the Combined Chiefs of Staff could continue to operate.

The President agreed that there would be many matters affecting the two countries, such as the use of bases, which would have to be effectively handled.

In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, General Marshall expressed his personal opinion that the continuance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be advantageous. Its existence had certainly simplified the solution of the problems which had confronted the two nations during the war.

C. There was a short discussion upon the provision of intelligence to the Russian armies and the President and the Prime Minister were informed of certain steps which had been agreed in discussion between General Marshall and Field Marshal Brooke.

The meeting then adjourned.

J. C. S. FILE

Military Conclusions Reached by the Combined Allied Strategists in the Talks

REPORT OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

TOP SECRET

(Yalta, 9 February 1945.)

Report to the President and Prime Minister of the agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the "Argonaut" conference:

1. The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at Argonaut conference is submitted herewith.

I. Over-all objective.

2. In conjunction with Russia and other allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.

II. Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war.

3. In conjunction with Russia and other allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attacking positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of Germany, in cooperation with other Pacific powers and with Russia to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. Basic undertakings in support of over-all strategic concept.

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

A. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

B. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

C. Maintain vital overseas lines of communications.

D. Continue the disruption of enemy sea communications.

E. Continue the offensive against Germany.

F. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

H. Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist fellow-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the enemy powers in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the warmaking capacity of the United Nations against Germany and/or Japan.

I. Exercise forces from the European theatre in the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or assumable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.

J. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.

IV. Execution of the over-all strategic concept.

DEFEAT OF GERMANY

The U-Boat War.

7. We are concerned with the possibility that German U-Boats may again constitute a serious threat to our North Atlantic shipping lanes. It is too early yet to assess the extent to which such an offensive could achieve success, and we propose to review the matter again on 1 April 1945.

8. Meanwhile, we have agreed on the following counter-measures.

A. To build up as much as is practicable the strength of surface hunting groups and anti-U-boat air squadrons.

B. To maintain and, if possible, increase "marginal" bomber effort on assembly yards, concentrating as far as is practicable against Hamburg and Bremen.

C. To maintain "marginal" effort against operating bases, being ready to increase this when bases become crowded because of the capacity of concrete pens.

D. To increase by 10 per cent, if possible, the air mining effort against U-boats, including the Baltic area.

E. To mine waters beyond range of 10 above by using surface minelayers and carrier-borne aircraft.

F. To intensify operations against enemy minesweepers.

G. To maintain and intensify operations against the enemy supply used to supply U-boat bases.

Operations in Northwest Europe.

9. In the telegram, SCAF 180 as amended by SCAF 194 the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has provided his appreciation and his plan of operations for northwest Europe. His plan is as follows:

A. To carry out, immediately a series of operations north of the Moselle with a view to destroying the enemy and closing the Rhine north of Duesseldorf.

B. To direct our efforts to eliminating other enemy forces west of the Rhine, which still constitute an obstacle of a potential threat to our subsequent Rhine crossing operations.

C. To seize bridgeheads over the Rhine in the north and the south.

D. To deploy east of the Rhine and south of the Ruhr the maximum number of divisions which can be maintained (estimated at some 35 divisions). The initial task of this force, assisted by air action, will be to deny to the enemy the industries of the Ruhr.

E. To deploy east of the Rhine on the axis Frankfurt-Kassel such forces, if adequate as may be available after providing for divisions for the north and elsewhere, but actually elsewhere. The task of this force will be to draw enemy forces away from the north by capturing Frankfurt and advancing on Kassel.

10. We have taken note of SCAF 159 as approved by SCAF 194 and of the supreme commander's assurance that he will seize the Rhine crossings in the north just as soon as he is in a favorable operational and without waiting to clear the Rhine throughout its length. Further that he will advance across the Rhine in the north with maximum strength and consider destruction, immediately the situation in the south allows him to collect the necessary forces and do this without incurring unreasonable risks.

STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

11. We have reviewed our strategy in the Mediterranean in the light of the developments of the situation in Europe and of the fact that the enemy is at liberty at any time to make a voluntary withdrawal in Italy. We have agreed that our primary object in the war against Germany should be to bring to the maximum possible strength on the Western front and to such a decision in that theatre. We have, therefore, reviewed your decision and decided as follows:

GREECE

2. The current tripartite discharge of British responsibility in Greece must be your continuing aim.

The object of British pressure and especially of British air forces must be that part of Greece which is necessary for the retention of the present Greek Government.

3. This object must always be regarded as the right of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to withdraw permanent land forces from Greece for use against the Germans. You should therefore concentrate on building up a Greek force as soon as possible.

ITALY

4. In pursuance of the decision given in Paragraph 1, it is not been decided to withdraw from your theatre to the Western front up to five divisions (of which not more than two would be armored) as follows:

A. At the earliest possible date three Allied divisions drawn from the Allied armies in Italy.

B. Further complete formations as the situation in Greece are released from that country.

C. It is intended to withdraw Canadian and British divisions. The examination of ground installations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction. The programs will be agreed between you and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before any moves take place.

AIR FORCES

5. Two fighter groups of TWENTY AIR Force will be moved to France as soon. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishments of your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

6. There will be no significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces.

7. We recognize that these withdrawals will affect the scope of your operations in the Italian Theater. We, therefore, redefine your objects as follows:

A. Your first object should be to ensure that, subject to any minor adjustments you may find necessary, the front already reached in Italy is solidly held.

B. Within the limits of the forces remaining available to you after the withdrawals in Paragraph 4 above have been effected, you should do your utmost, by means of such limited offensive action as may be possible and by the skillful use of cover and deception plans, to contain the German forces now in Italy and prevent their withdrawal to other fronts.

C. You should, in any case, remain prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces.

ADRIATIC

8. Subject to the requirements of the Italian theater, you should continue to give all possible support to the "Yugoslav army of national liberation, until the territory of Yugoslavia has been completely cleared. You will carry out such minor operations on the eastern shores of the Adriatic as your resources allow.

Appendix "C"

Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia

1. Your first object is to liberate Burma at the earliest date. (To be known as Operation Laycock.)

2. Subject to the accomplishment of this object, your [illegible] will be the liberation [illegible] of Malaya and the opening of the [illegible] of Malacca. (To be known as Operation Properdent.)

3. In view of your recent [illegible] in Burma, and of the [illegible] of the date of the [illegible] of Germany, you are [illegible] your first object with the [illegible] at your disposal. [illegible] you are, provide the [illegible] further [illegible] the European theatre consistent with the possible [illegible] in the Japanese [illegible]

4. You will prepare a [illegible] of the forces required [illegible] Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. In pursuance [illegible] Chiefs of Staff [illegible] Liaison to the [illegible] reflect of the [illegible] air [illegible] Chiefs of Staff [illegible] in the [illegible] Air Forces [illegible]

FEB. 18, 1945: Prime Minister Churchill boarded U. S. warship near Cairo for talk with President Roosevelt. President also met with leaders of Egypt, Ethiopia and Arabia.

Signal Corps

Roosevelt-Churchill Conference Meeting

February 9, 1945 ... M.

Livadia Palace

(President, Prime Minister and

Staff)

PRESENT:

United States

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

MRS. BOETTIGER

MISS HARRIMAN

FLEET ADMIRAL LEAHY

MR. BYRNES

MR. HARRIMAN

United Kingdom

PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

MRS. OLIVIER

Editorial note: For the [illegible] meeting. Before [illegible] service supply "no [illegible]." The information [illegible] above regarding the [illegible] the participants is [illegible] the list. According to [illegible] 312. "The conference [illegible] would [illegible] provide [illegible] proposed assembly of the [illegible] peace organization [illegible] agreed orally to [illegible] [illegible] whereby the United [illegible] Great Britain, and [illegible] republics should have [illegible] ing power in the [illegible] solution on the five [illegible] the Plenary Meeting [illegible] afternoon [illegible] the subject was discussed."

PRESENT

United States

GENERAL OF THE ARMY [illegible]

MARSHALL

FLEET ADMIRAL [illegible]

MAJOR GENERAL [illegible]

Soviet Union

GENERAL OF THE ARMY [illegible]

ANTONOV

MARSHAL OF AVIATION [illegible]

KHUDYAKOV

FLEET ADMIRAL [illegible]

KUZNETSOV

(aided by a [illegible]

(A note on the original reads: "Except for Fleet Admiral Leahy, who was absent, the attendance and seating were exactly as [illegible] for the first meeting.") [illegible]

RUTER KUSTER

TOP SECRET

General Antonov opened the meeting with the statement that he had discussed all the points raised at the previous meeting with Marshal Stalin. Whereas his statements at the first meeting represented only his personal views, he was prepared for the second meeting to give definite and official replies to each of the points. General Antonov confirmed that he had brought brief statements on each of the questions that had been raised.

A. There is no change in the plans of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October [illegible] it had been planned to [illegible] replied that it would be "not less than three months."

General Marshall asked when the movements eastward would begin. General Antonov replied that the forces were awaiting the movements of supplies at the time and stated that "units of troops on the way can not be diverted without altering notice by the Japs."

General Marshall asked if additional equipment would provide [illegible] divisions] troops [illegible] would agree with the [illegible] Mr. Harry supplies (ammunition, food, etc.) would provide the movement of divisions.

General Marshall asked how many divisions per week would be moved from the German front to the Far East. General Antonov replied that a three-month period would be required to move the necessary forces.

General Marshall stated that Field Marshal Brooke will remain with and attend the Crimea conference from London to [illegible] plenary meetings.

The plenary meeting was adjourned with an exchange of compliments by glasses of the fine local wine, and definite arrangements [illegible] were achieved in these conferences between the Russian and American military staff.

Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov and Major General Kuter continued to discuss the air side of the Soviet-American relations for about two hours. The principal items covered in the discussion follow:

A. General Kuter gave to Marshal Khudyakov a prepared statement of our detailed requirements in expanding the weather reporting establishment in Siberia. He explained that Admiral King was equipped with the most information and that further arrangements would be made in Moscow through the military mission.

B. General Kuter gave to Marshal Khudyakov a detailed statement of our requirements to permit the U. S. Strategic Bombing Force to operate on shuttle air operations which have already been captured by the Russians and those which might be arranged in Moscow with the military mission. Marshal Khudyakov requested that Soviet experts on bomb damage assessment would be permitted to accompany our survey parties. General Kuter stated that this was entirely acceptable and furthermore our reports of the survey within the Soviet area were available if those reports were desired.

C. General Kuter stated that our basic requirement in the Kamchatka - Nikolaevsk area was for two large air bases, each to accommodate one group of very heavy bombers (B-29's) permanently. He stated the requirement for 4,500-foot runways with good approaches and strips with [illegible] construction needed for loading aircraft and dispersal parking by 150,000-pound aircraft. General detailed [illegible] on the heavy bomb [illegible] and very heavy 100-pound [illegible] requirements of B-29 [illegible] groups. Marshal Khudyakov appeared somewhat shaken by the [illegible] of the air-base requirements in Kamchatka and very heavy bombers.

He pointed the probable necessity that we provide the [illegible] to handle aviation gasoline storage and distribution [illegible] as well as plumbing, bomb trailers, air steel planking. Marshal Khudyakov stated that it might be difficult to find sufficient personnel to do the necessary construction and asked if Field personnel to do the necessary American aviation engineers could be provided if needed for this [illegible]. General Kuter replied that American aviation engineers would be available.

D. General Kuter stated that our request for air bases asked [illegible] for the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area of some more suitable area. He explained the fact that two groups of B-29's in the far north [illegible] in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area could pose far fewer bombs on Japan that would be possible if much larger numbers of heavy bombers (B-17 and B-24) were based in the Vladivostok area within range of Japanese targets. General Kuter made it clear that he would not prejudice the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk decision by citing the need of the bases in the Vladivostok area, and further that, it was appreciated that supply difficulties and the requirement to base extensive tactical air forces in the Vladivostok area would probably postpone consideration of that area until after progress had been attained in the ground battle west of Vladivostok. Air Marshal Khudyakov clearly understood the desire not to prejudice other decisions and that Vladivostok probably could not be used as strategic air base area until the Russian ground war with the Japs in Manchuria had progressed, but stated that he was anxious to have heavy bombers attacking Japan and that he would initiate action toward basing two bases on the south of Petsamo available to United States strategic air units in the Vladivostok area.

E. Marshal Khudyakov stated his requirements for C-54 type transport aircraft and acknowledged the reply that General Kuter could see no chance of procuring that type transport. Utilization of C-47's followed and it was agreed that the Army Air Force would cut down on proposed provision of C-47's to our troop carrier units in order to make additional C-47's available to the Red Air Force.

(General Deane has been informed that we can provide an additional 100 C-47's to the Russian during the first six months of 1945 and can provide 40 per month thereafter. This will more than double any scheduled flow of C-47's to the Red Air Force and in my opinion will tax their capacity to absorb transports.)

F. Marshal Khudyakov stated a requirement for four to five hundred single and twin-engine trainers, plus 1,500 200 to 300 horsepower trainer engines. The engines are for installation in Russian trainers. This was a surprise request. General Kuter replied that single engine primary trainers could be provided if shipping is available and that operational consideration would be given to the request when received in Washington.

G. The current tour of the Army Air Force Band in the Mediterranean theater, and General McNarney's suggestion that this band might be available to play in Moscow and the Balkan capitals was presented. General Kuter stated that if the Russians wished to have the band we would make it available and would request a visit to America upon the part of a Russian military band. Air Marshal Khudyakov stated his personal hope that such arrangements could be made and requested that General Deane discuss the matter in writing in Moscow. (General Deane will take this action.)

A General Kuter handed to Marshal Khudyakov a formal written statement of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff rejection of the Russian proposal to present [illegible] against our attack on targets near the Russian front. Written Soviet-American agreement that by [illegible] present the attention of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin-Forrestal meeting [illegible] been overtaken by the general situation. The matter also will be handled by the military mission in Moscow.

The meeting concluded in a friendly tone with the statement that the attack can get along all right, but whatever the [illegible] the attack cannot guarantee agreement by [illegible] staffs.

(Dictated to and transcribed by a sgt. Arthur Miller General Kuter's notes and Sergeant Miller's shorthand notes have been destroyed.)

L. S. KUTER,

Major General U. S. A.

[illegible] to the Kremlin-Nikolaevsk area [illegible] Russian [illegible] Japan [illegible] Soviet [illegible] Japan [illegible] Japan [illegible] Japan

British Attack to Siegfried Line Announced to Conferees by the Prime Minister

(Bohlen Collection)

BOHLEN MINUTES

TOP SECRET

The President said he understood the foreign ministers had another report to make, and he would ask Mr. Stettinius, who presided today, to give it.

Mr. Stettinius then reported on the results of the discussion concerning the Polish question as follows:

The foreign ministers discussed at length the Polish governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American delegation. This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov's proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a presidential committee.

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum of this question at a later date and to report that the three foreign ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

It was decided, at Mr. Churchill's request, that the Polish question would be discussed before Mr. Stettinius proceeded with the balance of his report.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet delegation accepted as a basis of discussion the proposal put forward this morning at the meeting by Mr. Stettinius. He said the Soviet delegation was very anxious to come to an agreement and he believed that this could be done with certain amendments to Mr. Stettinius' proposal. First, he offered an amendment which dealt with the first sentence of the formula. He suggested that in place of the sentence in Mr. Stettinius' draft that the following be substituted.

The present provisional government of Poland should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad and in this connection this government would be called the National Provisional Government of Poland.

He added that the next two sentences remained unchanged, but he had a slight amendment to the last sentence, namely that the words "non-Fascist and anti-Fascist" be added before the words "democratic parties." He then said that he felt the last sentence dealing with the responsibilities of the Ambassadors of the three Governments in Warsaw to observe and report on the carrying out of the free elections should be eliminated since he felt certain this would be offensive to the Poles and would needlessly complicate the discussion. He said that it was the first duty of Ambassadors anyway to observe and report, and therefore no such statement is necessary. He concluded that with these slight amendments Mr. Stettinius' proposal made this morning was acceptable.

Mr. Molotov said he had one more request, and that was that the Subasic-Tito agreement in regard to Yugoslavia would be put into effect. He said that the Prime Minister, in messages to Marshal Stalin, had urged this, that there had been a series of delays, and he felt that agreement should be reached here. He felt that agreement should be reached here at this conference to put this agreement immediately into effect irrespective of the wishes of the King.

The Prime Minister replied he thought that the Yugoslavia question was virtually settled and would take no time, but he thought it better to proceed immediately to discuss the Polish question. He said he was glad to see that an advance had been made at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and to hear Mr. Molotov's proposal on the largest, immediate and painful problem of Poland. He said he wished to make some general suggestions that he hoped would not affect the movements the President had in mind. He said that here, in a general atmosphere of agreement, we should not put our feet in the stirrups and ride off. He said that he felt it would be a great mistake to hurry this question—it is better to take a few days of latitude than to endanger bringing the ship into port. He said it was a great mistake to take hurried decisions on these grave matters. He felt he must study the Polish proposals before giving any opinion.

The President then proposed that Mr. Stettinius should finish his report on the meeting of Foreign Ministers this morning and then the conference would adjourn for half an hour in order to study Mr. Molotov's amendments to the Polish proposals.

Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister agreed.

The Prime Minister repeated that he felt that this great prize should not be imperiled by too much haste, and he certainly did not want to leave this conference without an agreement on the subject which he felt to be the most important we had before us.

Mr. Stettinius then read the following report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the results of their discussions on reparations:

The American delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points of the types of reparations in kind Germany should pay.

The Soviet and American delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph should be twenty billion dollars and that 50 per cent of it should go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden reserved his position to await instructions from his Government.

The Soviet delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15 per cent on the prices of the items delivered.

Mr. Stettinius then reported on the results of the discussion at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the matter of providing machinery in the World Organization for dealing with territorial trusteeships and dependent areas, as follows:

It was agreed that the five Governments, which will have permanent seats on the Security Council, should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.

The Prime Minister interrupted with great vigor to say that he did not agree with one single word of this report on trusteeships. He said that he had not been consulted nor had he heard of this subject up to now. He said that under no circumstances would he ever consent to forty or fifty nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life's existence of the British Empire. As long as he was Minister he would never yield one scrap of their heritage. He continued in this vein for some minutes.

Mr. Stettinius explained that the reference to the creation of machinery was not intended to refer to the British Empire, but that it had in mind particularly dependent areas which would be taken out of enemy control, for example, the Japanese islands in the Pacific. He said that it was felt that provision had to be made for machinery to handle this question of trusteeship for dependent areas taken from the enemy and he repeated that this was not intended to refer to the British Empire.

The Prime Minister accepted Mr. Stettinius' explanation but remarked it would be better to say it did not refer to the British Empire. He added that Great Britain did not desire any territorial aggrandizement but had no objection if the question of trusteeship was to be considered in relation to enemy territory. He asked how Marshal Stalin would feel if the suggestion was made that the Crimea should be internationalized for use as a summer resort.

Marshal Stalin said he would be glad to give the Crimea as a place to be used for meetings of the three powers.

Mr. Stettinius then completed reading the report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers, as follows:

TRUSTEESHIPS (continued)

It was also agreed that this subject should be discussed at the United Nations conference itself.

The subcommittee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming conference. This subject was discussed at today's meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

IRAN

Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question.

The subject was consequently not discussed.

YUGOSLAVIA

On the proposal of the chairman, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

The Prime Minister then asked if the Soviet Government had agreed to the two amendments proposed by Mr. Eden in regard to the Subasic-Tito agreement.

Mr. Molotov replied that it was a question of putting the agreement speedily into effect and that amendments might cause delays. He said that it would be better to ask Tito and Subasic concerning the amendments after the agreement had gone into effect.

The Prime Minister inquired whether it was too much to ask that legislative acts of the temporary authorities be subject to confirmation by democratic processes.

Marshal Stalin said that delays were very undesirable and that if the British proposed two more amendments the Soviet Government might propose some of their own. In the meantime, the Government of Yugoslavia was held in the balance.

The Prime Minister said you couldn't say this, as Tito was a dictator and could do what he wants.

Marshal Stalin replied that Tito is not a dictator but the head of a national committee without any clear government and this is not a good situation.

Mr. Eden replied that it was not a question of amendments before the agreement went into force but merely that this conference agreed that they be adopted. He said that Subasic was going to ask for it anyway and so Tito would agree everything would be all right.

Marshal Stalin said the first of the British amendments provided that any former members of the Skupshtina who had not collaborated with the Germans should be included in the Anti-Fascist Vetch (Communist committee of local government) and the second suggested that all legislative acts of the anti-Fascist Vetch should be confirmed by a popular elected body. He said that he agreed with these amendments and found them good, but first he would like the government to be formed and then propose the amendments to it.

Mr. Eden remarked that as

ON WAY BACK FROM CONFERENCE: President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia confer aboard U. S. warship near Cairo. President was on way back from Yalta.

The New York Times

felt if we could agree here on the amendments then we could ask Tito after the agreement was in force to adopt them.

Marshal Stalin agreed to this proposal. He added that he thought it would be a good idea to send a telegram stating the desires of the three powers to have the agreement put into effect irrespective of the King's wishes.

The Prime Minister and Mr. Eden explained that the question of the King had been settled and anyway wasn't important and Subasic was on his way to Yugoslavia, unless weather had prevented him, to put the agreement into effect. The Prime Minister added that he thought we should here agree to advise the adoption of the amendments.

Marshal Stalin said that he had already agreed and as a sign of his word he would bet go here on it.

There was then a half-hour intermission for the study of the Polish proposals.

The President said that after studying Mr. Molotov's amendment we were now very near agreement and it was only a matter of drafting. He said that for those Governments which still recognize the London Government the use of the words "Provisional Government" was somewhat difficult, and he felt that the open words of Mr. Molotov's amendment which read "The Government now operating in Poland." He said he felt it was very important for him in the United States that there be some gesture made for the 6,000,000 Poles there, indicating that the United States was in some way involved with the question of freedom of elections, and he therefore felt that the last sentence concerning the reports of the Ambassadors was important. He repeated that he felt, however, that it was only a matter of words and details and the three Foreign Ministers might meet tonight to discuss it.

The Prime Minister said he agreed with the President that progress had been made, but he felt that the draft might be tied up by the Foreign Ministers this afternoon. He said that he had two points now that he wished to emphasize. He felt it was desirable to mention in the beginning the new situation that had been created as a result of the liberation of Poland by the Red Army which called for a government more broadly based. He said this might be an ornament, but nevertheless an important ornament. He said the second question was more important and related to the last sentence of the United States draft. He said he would make an appeal to Marshal Stalin in that one of the great difficulties in the Polish situation was the lack of accurate information, and we were thus called on to make a decision of great responsibility on the basis of inadequate information. He said that we know that there are bitter feelings among the Poles and fierce language had been used by Osubka-Morawski in regard to the London Government, and that he understood the Lublin Government had declared its intention to try as traitors the members of the Polish Home Army and the underground forces. He said these reports caused great anxiety and perplexity in England, and he hoped these two points would be considered with Marshal Stalin's usual patience and kindness.

The Prime Minister continued that he personally would welcome observers of the three powers in any area where they appeared needed. He therefore felt that the last sentence of the United States draft in regard to responsibilities of the Ambassadors was very important. He said that he understood that Tito would have no objection to foreign observers when elections were to be held in Yugoslavia and the British would welcome observers from the United States and the Soviet Union when elections were held in Greece, and the same would apply to Italy. He said these were not idle requests, since, for example, he knew in Egypt that whatever government held the elections won. He recalled that King Farouk for this reason refused to permit Nahas Pasha to hold an election while the latter was Prime Minister.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he understood the Egyptian elections where he had heard that the very greatest politicians spend their time buying each other, but this could not be compared with Poland since there was a high degree of literacy in Poland. He inquired as to the literacy in Egypt, and neither the Prime Minister nor Mr. Eden had this information at hand.

The Prime Minister remarked that he did not mean to compare Poland with Egypt but he had to give the House of Commons real assurance that free elections would be held. For instance, would Mikolajczyk be allowed to take part in these elections?

Marshal Stalin remarked that Mikolajczyk was a member of the Peasant party which wasn't a Fascist party and therefore could take part in the elections.

The Prime Minister suggested this question be considered by the Foreign Ministers tonight.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought this was a matter which should be discussed in the presence of the Poles.

The Prime Minister said he thought this was a matter which … to insure the … would be held in Poland.

Marshal Stalin … [illegible] … parties."

The President said he would like to add … that the … of the whole … it was true, as Marshal Stalin said, that the Poles were quarrelsome people not only at home but also abroad. He would like to have some assurance for the six million Poles in the United States that these elections would be freely held, and he said he was sure if such assurance were present that elections would be held by the Poles there would be no doubt as to the sincerity of the agreement reached here.

Marshal Stalin then … had before him the Declaration on Liberated Europe and Mr. Molotov had one small change to propose.

He said that in the … paragraph, after the part about consulting the other United Nations, he suggested adding the following:

In this connection, support will be given to the political leaders of those countries who have taken an active part in the struggle against the German invaders.

Marshal Stalin remarked that with this slight amendment he found the declaration acceptable.

The President pointed out that the declaration would of course apply to any areas or countries where needed as well as to Poland.

The Prime Minister said he did not dissent from the President's proposed declaration as long as it was clearly understood that the reference to the Atlantic Charter did not apply to the British Empire. He said he had already made plain in the House of Commons that as far as the British Empire was concerned the principles already applied. He said he had given Mr. Willkie a copy of his statement on this subject.

The President inquired if that was what had killed Mr. Willkie.

The President said that in an earlier draft France had been included but was now absent.

Marshal Stalin remarked that three powers were better than four.

The Prime Minister said it might be possible to ask France to associate itself with the declaration.

The President suggested that this matter be considered by the three Foreign Ministers tonight.

Marshal Stalin said that the Prime Minister need have no anxiety that Mr. Molotov's amendment was designed to apply to Greece.

The Prime Minister said he was not anxious about Greece, that he merely desired that everybody should have a fair chance and do his duty.

Marshal Stalin said he thought it would have been very dangerous if he had allowed other forces than his own to go into Greece.

The Prime Minister said he would welcome a Soviet observer in Greece.

Marshal Stalin said he had complete confidence in British policy in Greece.

The Prime Minister expressed gratitude for this statement. The Prime Minister then said that they should touch on at this conference the question of war criminals—that is, those whose crimes had no geographical limitation.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether this … to the declaration …

The President replied that he thought it should be considered by the Foreign Ministers.

Marshal Stalin said that we could consider it agreed that the Tito-Subasic agreement should go into effect immediately.

The Prime Minister commented … telegram to … [illegible]

The Prime Minister said that … had drafted the … [illegible]

The Prime Minister said he … [illegible]

Marshal Stalin inquired … the Western Front … begin.

The Prime Minister said … British launched an attack yesterday morning … of about … five-mile front. He said he had been … two villages and were in contact with the defenses of the Siegfried Line. He said a second wave, of the … Army, was to start tomorrow. He added that the advance was to continue … intensity.

The meeting then adjourned until 4 o'clock tomorrow.

MATTHEWS FILES

MATTHEWS MINUTES

TOP SECRET

The President opened the meeting by calling on Mr. Stettinius for a report on the 12 o'clock meeting of the foreign ministers. Mr. Stettinius read his report. Upon the conclusion of the … on Poland Mr. Molotov … and said that he would like to make a few remarks … he was decided to hear … points on Poland prior to the reading of the rest of Mr. … report.

Molotov: We accept as a basis the proposal put forward this morning by Mr. Stettinius. We would like it to come to an agreement, giving only some amendments. The first sentence we would modify to read that the present provisional government should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic elements in Poland and from those abroad." I have a second amendment to suggest. In the sentence on the holding of elections I would revise to read, "In these elections all non-Fascist and anti-Fascist democratic parties would have the right to take part and to put forward candidates." My third amendment is the omission of the last sentence of Mr. Stettinius' draft which we feel would only offend the sensibilities of the Poles.

I have one more request to … the carrying out of the … agreement has been delayed. Since Mr. Churchill agreed … we feel that … should be carried out immediately.

Prime Minister: We can settle … in just a few minutes but … will hold up … Poland. (This was agreed …) I am glad to see that here … great advance … solution of the Polish … I should like to have more time to study the problem.

(The President suggested a half-hour intermission and this was agreed to but the Prime Minister continued.)

I mean more than that. I do not feel that we should hurry away from the Crimea leaving these vital problems unsolved or reach hasty decisions. These are among the most important ones that any of us shall live. Of course you could all go away and leave me in this delightful spot but I do urge that we stay a little bit longer to conclude our discussions satisfactorily.

(There was no comment by either the President or Marshal Stalin on this statement.)

On Yugoslavia there were only two amendments to the agreement which Marshal Stalin has now had an opportunity to study.

Stalin: I agree with both of the suggested amendments but after the unified government is formed we will be in a position to carry them out. I propose that we first proceed with the formation of this unified government of Tito and Subasic and then we can proceed with the amendments.

Eden: We agree to this if it is likewise agreed that both of us will support the adoption of these amendments.

Stalin: This must be finished before we separate. We must have a promise that the Tito-Subasic agreement be carried out immediately creating a new government, irrespective of what fantasies there may be in the head of King Peter. Has Subasic actually left for Belgrade?

Eden: We telegraphed last night to find out but have not yet heard. Any delay would be due to weather.

(Here followed the intermission during which consideration was given by the Americans and British to Molotov's amendments to Mr. Stettinius' formula.)

President: I find that it is now largely a question of etymology of finding the right words. We are nearer than we have ever been before. I believe there is a chance of real agreement to settle this question of the period before the Poles can hold their election. I have two examples of what I mean by the use of words. Mr. Molotov says that the present Polish Government should be reorganized on a wider basis. This is difficult for those recognizing the Polish Government in London. I suggest that the words be changed to, "The Polish Provisional Government now functioning in Poland." I have another example. Mr. Molotov proposes the elimination of the last sentence. (He reads it.) I suggest that some gesture be made to show that there will be an honest election. Therefore, I think that with a little more work by the three foreign ministers tonight we are sufficiently … [illegible]

Prime Minister: I agree with the President that there has been continuous progress toward a united declaration by the three principal powers. I agree with the President that the matter should be tidied up by the three foreign ministers and reported to us tomorrow.

But there are two points which I should like to emphasize now. The first is a small one. It arises out of what Marshal Stalin said yesterday. He said that Poland has been liberated and the enemy driven away. That is a great new fact. It is a good point to make before the world that the Red Army has liberated Poland. Therefore, a new situation has been created. This calls for the establishment of a new provisional Polish Government, that this now be more broad-based than before liberation. That gives a good chance for what we say to be received favorably by the world. It is ornamental but it is important to us.

The other point is much more important. That is the last sentence of the United States draft. I want to make an appeal to Marshal Stalin. We are at a great disadvantage in discussing Polish affairs for we know very little but must take great responsibilities. We know there are very bitter feelings among the Poles. Very fierce language has been used by Mr. Morawski. I am informed that the Lublin Government has openly declared its intentions to try as traitors all members of the Polish Home Army. This causes us great anxiety and distress. We are perplexed in forming our view of course. I put first the non-hampering of the operations of the Red Army against Germany. But I would ask the Marshal with patience and kindness to consider our position. We really do not know what is going on except through a few people we parachuted in and a few we brought out through the underground.

I don't like to obtain information that way. How can this be remedied without hampering the movements of the Red Army which of course are before everything else in importance? Could any facilities be granted to the British? And the United States would no doubt like to participate in order to see how the Polish quarrels are being settled? That is why the last sentence is so important for us. Might I say if elections take place in Yugoslavia, Tito will have no objection to Russian, British and American observers to assure the world that they are impartial. So far as Greece is concerned, when elections are held, which we hope will be soon, we would greatly welcome U. S., Russian and British observers to show the world. The same thing is true of Italy. There are vast changes in the Italian political situation. There must be elections to form a constitutional Assembly or Parliament. Our formula is the same. The U. S., Britain and Russia should be observers to see that they are carried out impartially. These are no idle requests. In Egypt whatever Government conducts the elections wins. Nahas wanted elections when he quarrelled with the King. The King said, "No, not while you are in office." When he turned Nahas out the King's people won.

Stalin: I do not believe much in Egyptian elections. It is all rotten corruption there. They buy each other.

Prime Minister: Anyway, we seek this formula.

Stalin: What percentage of the people read and write in Egypt? In Poland 70 per cent can read and write.

Prime Minister: I do not know the Egyptian percentage but I meant no comparison with Poland. I only wanted fair elections. This should be considered with the Poles. I do not want to go on any longer. We have agreed to think this over. But I must be able to tell Parliament that elections will be free and fair.

Stalin: Mikolajczyk is a representative of the Peasant party. The Peasant Party is not Fascist and will take part in the elections. Those candidates will be allowed to stand.

Prime Minister: Yes, specifically as a Government is formed.

Stalin: Yes, the Peasant party will be represented. This can be done in the presence of the Poles with various people present.

Prime Minister: In Parliament I must be able to say that the elections will be held in a fair way. I do not care much about Poles myself.

Stalin: There are some very good people among the Poles. They are good fighters. Of course, they fight among themselves, too. I think on both sides there are non-Fascist and anti-Fascist elements.

Prime Minister: I do not like this division, anybody can call anybody anything. We prefer the terminology democratic parties.

Stalin: I refer to the declaration on liberated areas. On the whole I approve it. I find in a certain paragraph the same expression, anti-nazism and anti-fascism.

President: This is the first example for the use of the declaration. It has the phrase to create democratic institutions of their own choice. The next paragraph contains the following: … to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people.

Stalin: We accept that paragraph three.

President: I want this election in Poland to be the first one beyond question. It should be like Caesar's wife. I did not know her but they said she was pure.

STALIN: They said that about her but in fact she had her sins.

PRESIDENT: I don't want the Poles to be able to question the Polish elections. The matter is not only one of principle but of practical politics.

MOLOTOV: We are afraid to leave this phrase in without consulting with the Poles. They will feel that it shows a lack of confidence in them. It is better to leave it to the Poles.

PRESIDENT: Why not leave this for the foreign ministers and talk about it tomorrow?

STALIN: I think in the first place in the words "present provisional Polish government" we can delete the word "present." We can say, "The Polish government which acts in Poland."

PRESIDENT: The only thing left is this declaration on liberated areas.

PRIME MINISTER: I do not dissent from this declaration, but I want to be on record that the Atlantic Charter I once interpreted as affecting the British Empire. We are pursuing the Atlantic Charter. I sent a copy of this interpretation to Wendell Willkie.

PRESIDENT: Was that what killed him? (Laughter)

PRIME MINISTER: I will furnish the conference with a copy of this record. (This part was not clear.)

EDEN: I suppose it would be left open for France to associate herself with this declaration at a later date.

STALIN: Three would be better.

MOLOTOV: I should like to add at the end of the third from last paragraph the following phrase: "and there will be secured a wide measure of support to men in those countries who have taken active part in the struggle against German occupation."

PRIME MINISTER: (This seemed irrelevant) on Greece there was no question of setting up an Allied commission, but if Marshal Stalin wants to send in military observers they can go anywhere they like.

STALIN: I have full confidence in the way things are going.

PRIME MINISTER: I should like to discuss the treatment of war criminals. I sent a paper to the conference at Moscow. This is an egg I have laid myself. (He then discusses at some length the question of having lists prepared of principal war criminals and the question of holding trials.) There is nothing, of course, that would be said in public about this because I fear retaliation on our prisoners. (The President indicates that we are not ready to discuss this question at this meeting.)

PRESIDENT: I propose adjournment.

PRIME MINISTER: I should like to announce that the British troops began an attack at dawn yesterday in the Nijmegen area. They advanced about three thousand yards (yards) and are now in contact with the Siegfried Line. They were not strongly resisted. Several hundred prisoners were taken. Tomorrow the second wave will follow and the American Ninth Army comes in. The offensive will continue without cessation.

The meeting adjourned.

(HISS COLLECTION)

HISS NOTES

Get copy of Eden's report of 2/1

Q of invitation to Poland

Plenary session
2/9 4:15 P. M.

E. R. S. read his report

Mol: After Polish part

New suggestions—

"Amendments to AM. proposal ("reorg" etc & re Ambs.

Church: Glad see advance but going say something before gossip. Refers to some private talks we have had about Lublin …

Pres—if you will forgive me. Feels this matter can't be hurried. It may be complete meeting of minds can be achieved in the time we have in view. There are only 48 hrs. left. I do not like to feel spoiling whole thing. Most say we should, if nec., take a day's latitude. If we leave here without agt. about Pol whatever else say we shall have failed one the most dangerous and fearsome matter. I haven't taken it all in fully. The foregoing is in Hiss' handwriting on a loose sheet found in the Matthews files.

(1) Get copy of Eden's report of 2/8

Plenary session 2/9
4:28 P. M.

(2) Q: of Poland as invitation to conference.

(3) Add T. T. (Trust Territories) formula to E. R. S. report; and eliminate "dependent areas."

(4) See H. H. (Harry Hopkins) re Point 2 of formula.

E. R. S. read report.

Mol. after pol. section, Mol. proposed amendments to U. S. paper of this morning.

Re terr. trusteeship part off E. R. report.

I absolutely refuse to engage myself in that without consultation with the dominions.

I will not have 1 scrap of the Brit. Empire . . . (incl.) . . . after all we have done in the war.

I will not consent to a representative of Brit. Emp. going to any conference where we will be placed in the dock and asked to defend ourselves. Never, never, never.

If you tell me we are not to go and be brought up before a vague tribunal and be told how to be good and proper I will not object.

Every scrap of terr. over which Brit. flag flies is immune.

E. R. S.: Only plan is to provide machinery for trusteeship if org. wants set it up. We have in mind Jap. mandated islands to be taken from Jap.

We have nothing in mind in relation to Brit. Empire.

Church: we desire no territory.

Say it will in no way affect integrity of Brit. Em. (in interm…) a formula was agreed to.

Decl. on Lib. Eur.

Referred Pol. Q. back to for. mins. to. night session.

Church made speech in favor of amb. watching over pol. elections.

When in discussion this Church: said we don't like word Fascist. (E. referred to decl. on lib. Eur. Par 2 1st sentence and said he liked decl.

Pres. then read Para 3 from (C) on. St: We accept that. Poles … of need of elections being above suspicion.

Pres. then brought up decl. Formally. Church: I do not dissent from this but I would like it on record that Atl. Ch. was interpreted by me on my return from Newfoundland in short para I read to H. of C. that we … pursuing these aims in Brit. Em. That is a part of our interpretation I sent it to Wendell Willkie.

Pres: Was that what killed him?

Church: I will furnish conf. with copy of this rule (?).

Ed: Might be left open to 3 powers to associate Fr. with them if they so desire.

St: Three will be better—looks better.

Ed: I don't want to chance it now.

Mol: Addition: At the end—of 3d from last comma and: give strong … will be executed wide measures of support to the men of those countries who took active part in the struggle fighting Ger. occupation.

No other suggestion.

Pres: I like the thought but for pure form of the language.

St: To Church who was about to say something "Are you worried about Gr" (laughing).

Church: I should like election in Gr.

Sol: I don't want to control Mr. Church.

CHURCH.: I don't want to control the elections. If Mar. St. wants to send in some of his resp. officers they can go where they like.

ST.: I have every conf. in the Brit. policy.

CHURCH.: Let U. N. R. R. A. come in and give food.

CHURCH.: One Q. We shall have to consider war criminals. Ops: (from …) note: After Pres. made his commitment on W. S. re Sov. repr. Justice Byrnes was very agitated and discussed it with Flynn coming home from Stalin dinner. Flynn said with apparently some confusion of thought, that the Irish in N. Y. and other cities would never agree to Britain having six votes and Russia three with U. S. only one. He said D. 15 is dead. Byrnes then began considering giving Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Alaska votes and he and Churchill and the Pres. discussed it at lunch on 2/9. I talked to Byrnes after plenary meeting on 2/9 and argued against that. I said if Pres. could get St. to release him from his commitment that would be best course. Byrnes still seemed to be worried about Brit. citing 1920 League campaign.

Byrnes was particularly worried because Pres. had made a special point with Sen. For. Rels. Com. and others of the ridiculousness of Sov. proposal re repetition.

P. M. and President, Eden and Cadogan approved on 2/9 at plenary session during intermission.

Add to E. R. S. report 2/9

Territorial trusteeship would apply only to:

(1) Existing mandates of the League of Nations.

(2) Territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of this war.

(3) Any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

* * *

It would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which

Issues Discussed at Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the Three Conference Powers

The New York Times Photo by Acme.

ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE: The scene at Yalta Palace as representatives of the United States, Russia and Britain conferred on the isle of Germany, leading clockwise from Admiral William D. Leahy, top center, are Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Secretary of State; President Roosevelt; Charles E. Bohlen, chief of the State Department's division for Eastern European affairs; James F. Byrnes; two unidentified men; Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary; Prime Minister Churchill; two unidentified men; Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Soviet; Andrei Y. Vishinsky, Soviet Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs; Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Premier Stalin, Ivan M. Maisky, Soviet Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs and Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to the U. S.

territories within the above categories would actually be placed under trusteeship. No discussions at specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations conference. Only machinery and principles of trusteeship would be formulated at the conference for inclusion in the charter.

REVISED REPORT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO THE SIXTH PLENARY MEETING (Yalta) February 9, 1945

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

Report to the Plenary Session of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting, February 9, 1945.

1. The Polish Question:

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American delegation. This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Minister's proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential committee.

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish government, Mr. Minister stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations adverted to in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

2. Reparations:

The American delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and as to the types of reparations in kind, Germany should pay.

The Soviet and American delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third clause point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider as its initial duties as a basis for discussion, the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (A) and (B) of the preceding paragraph, should be twenty billion dollars and that 50 per cent of it should go to the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden reserved his position.

The Soviet delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind an increase of 10 to 15 per cent on the prices of the items delivered.

3. Dismemberment Only:

It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult with each other prior to the United Nations conference on proposing machinery in the world charter for dealing with territorial trusteeship.

Territorial trusteeship would apply only to:

(1) Existing mandates of the League of Nations.

(2) Territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of this war.

(3) Any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

It would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the above categories would actually be placed under trusteeship. No discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations conference. Only machinery and principles of trusteeship would be formulated at the conference for inclusion in the charter.

A subcommittee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the foreign ministry. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming conference. This subject was discussed at today's meeting and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

4. Iran:

Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question. The subject was consequently not discussed.

5. Yugoslavia.

On the proposal of Mr. Stettinius, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Maisky should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Belgrade-Tito agreement.

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

United States delegation draft of declaration on liberated Europe.

(Carbon copy carries this penciled notation in Hiss' handwriting: "1st redraft after talking to Junior Byrnes; copy given 5:15 P. M. to Joe 2:5 at Yalta copies to FDR HFM, Byrnes and Hopkins 8:15 P. M." This paper was included in the Hiss collection with other drafts on this subject following the plenary meeting on February 10, 1945, when the subject was also discussed.)

(Yalta, February 5, 1945)

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert the action of their four governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The structure of the Nazi war machine and the collapse of its support regimes, under the relentless blows of the victorious armies of the United Nations, are leaving behind confusion and disorder and intolerable distress and suffering. The agony of the liberated peoples must be relieved, their first steps must be taken during the temporary period of confusion and disorder to help them in the orderly reconstruction of their daily living.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To enable the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

Text Proposed by the United States for a Declaration on Liberated Europe

(FEBRUARY 1, 1945)

(This was the draft submitted by President Roosevelt to the Plenary Meeting on February 9, 1945. Carbon copies also in the Matthews files and the Yalta collection.)

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interest of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them.

To enable the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (A) to establish conditions of internal peace; (B) to take such emergency measures for relief of distressed peoples as may be required; (C) to form governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (D) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

Tripartite Meeting on the Draft Agreement Regarding Liberated Prisoners of War and Civilians

Feb. 9, 1945, 4:30 P. M.
Executive Office

PRESENT

United States, General Deane
Mr. Pigg, Assistant.
United Kingdom: Admiral Archer.
Soviet Union: Mr. Novikov.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Examination of the draft relating to prisoners of war and civilians liberated by the Soviet and Allied armies.

Examination of the draft relating to prisoners of war and civilians liberated by the Soviet and Allied armies.

PREAMBLE

The draft under discussion was the draft approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Feb. 5, 1945 A (5056 Post).

No comment.

ARTICLE I

No comment.

ARTICLE II, Paragraph 1.

Mr. Novikov requested that the "words "undertake to follow up" be replaced by the words "at the same time take the necessary steps to implement."

ARTICLE II, Paragraph 2.

Mr. Novikov requested that the words "notifying the competent Soviet or allied authorities" be replaced by "effected as a rule by agreement or in any case only after notification to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities."

ARTICLE III

Mr. Novikov said that he would prefer the text of Article III of the Soviet draft, this reads as follows:

"1. The competent British and Soviet authorities will supply liberated Soviet citizens and British subjects with food, clothing and medical attention, both in camps or points of concentration and en route and with transport until they are handed over to the authorities of the other side at points agreed upon between the sides on the following basis.

"(A) Ex-prisoners of war shall be provided with all forms of supply (stores and food) on a basis laid down respectively for private, non-commissioned officers and officers.

"(B) Civilians will be supplied on a basis laid down for private.

"The parties will not mutually demand compensation for these or other services which their subjects may respectively supply to liberated Soviet citizens or British subjects."

It will be noticed that the Soviet draft makes no mention of U. N. R. R. A. or other related agencies and makes special provision of supplies to civilians.

In endeavoring to find a compromise the British suggested a draft omitting the first three lines of Article III (up to the parenthetical statement) and revise the last sentence of the first paragraph to read as follows:

"The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall make distinction between military rank but shall apply to liberated civilians and liberated members of the respective forces."

The Soviet delegation stated that the reference to U. N. R. R. A. was superfluous since there was nothing in the agreement which would bar U. N. R. R. A. or any other relief agency from operating. They said they would refer the British re-draft to their Government.

ARTICLE IV.

The Soviet delegation [illegible] the insertion of the words "[illegible] and with the utmost [illegible]" in the [illegible] paragraph.

ARTICLE V.

The British, [illegible] the words "should be subject to [illegible] payment of Lire 5 [illegible] shall be subject to [illegible] account of the [illegible] paragraph.

The Russian [illegible] thought this [illegible] [illegible] for the payment of Lire. [illegible] Stettinius, and [illegible] which might be the subject [illegible] discussions."

ARTICLE VI

The British pointed out that they had added a new [illegible] which had not as yet been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This sentence would be at the end of the article as follows: "Any liberated member of the respective forces [illegible] willing to perform [illegible] be exercised under [illegible] forces."

ARTICLE VII

No comment.

ARTICLE VIII

No comment.

In addition to the above amendments, it was considered advisable to include an additional heading to the article, "The agreement enters into force upon signature."

The British representative stated that his Government proposed to exchange notes with the Soviet Government concerning nationals of other countries (Belgium, Holland, Poland, etc.) in British uniform who were liberated by the Russian armies.

The question also arose as to whether a reference of bilateral agreements should be signed. The Russians stated that they were prepared to sign either document.

It was suggested that the next meeting be called tomorrow at 2:30 P. M. No objections have been found and the drafters be made to have the documents signed by that time, Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius no later than Sunday.

(ATTACHMENT)

Revised British working [illegible]

ARTICLE 4.

X. (as—) Prisoners of War (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the United and Associated Nations [illegible] repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps in which they are accommodated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort, but only in accordance with agreement to be reached between the competent Soviet and United States military authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between these authorities. It is understood that persons members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces who is unwilling to perform such work will be interned under similar supervision.

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
February 9, 1945, 10:30 P. M.
Temporary Palace

PRESENT

United States
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Bowles

United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Allen

Soviet Union
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vishinsky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

PAGE MINUTES

TOP SECRET

SUBJECTS:

1. The Polish Question.
2. Declaration on Liberated Europe.
3. Yugoslavia.
4. Reparations.
5. Communique on the Crimean conference.
6. World organization.
7. Austro-Yugoslav frontier.
8. Yugoslav-Italian frontier.
9. Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier.
10. Iran.

Mr. Eden, who presided, opened the meeting.

1. The Polish Question.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American experts as well as the President had given careful study to the Polish formula and that the American delegation was prepared to withdraw the part [illegible] which Mr. Molotov had objected to, on the understanding that the President would be free to make any statement he [illegible] necessary on Poland relative to his meeting [illegible] formation from his Ambassador on the question. Later in the conversation, Mr. Eden stated that he did not wish to indicate during the conversation on the Polish formula that he agreed with the American proposal to drop the last sentence.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he, of course, preferred the text to remain as it stands. The President would, however, be willing to accept the Polish agreement that he who was in favor of adding up the [illegible] was willing to make the necessary concessions to [illegible].

Mr. Molotov stated that he [illegible] had several amendments to the Polish formula. He proposed that "as soon as British agreed [illegible] as practicable" be changed to read "as soon as possible." He said it was necessary to have as many as possible [illegible] also proposed that the last part [illegible] of the last paragraph be deleted in its entirety.

Mr. Eden stated that he agreed that the United States of America and Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government as has been done by the Soviet Union.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he could not agree with this amendment.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that [illegible] special situation existed in Poland. The Soviet Government had accorded the Polish Government recognition, whereas, the United States and Great Britain had not.

Mr. Eden said that the government referred to in the [illegible] was a new government and that it was [illegible] that the three Allies move together in recognizing it.

Mr. Stettinius supported Mr. Eden and stated that it was vital for public opinion in the United States to adhere to the principal of the new Polish Government.

Mr. Molotov stated that the present situation was a different one and that the document would reflect this difference. He referred to the inadvisability of jeopardizing the present situation by raising difficulties in the rear of the Red Army. He suggested that the matter be given consideration and be subsequently discussed. Mr. Molotov later suggested that Mr. Eden make a full report on last night's and today's discussion on the Polish situation for submission to the Plenary Session.

2. Declaration on Liberated Europe.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he had consulted with his experts and with the President on the declaration on liberated areas and that he was obliged to say that the American Government found it impossible to accept the first amendment proposed by Mr. Molotov at the Plenary Session of February 8. To do so would cause untold difficulties in United States domestic affairs.

Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to submit a second amendment. He suggested that in the fifth paragraph the words "They will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration" be replaced by the words "they will immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultation."

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden agreed to this formula.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the status of Mr. Minister's amendment of February 8.

Mr. Stettinius agreed that it should be dropped, though he remarked that he thought it very useful in that it might prevent occurrences similar to those in Greece.

Mr. Eden inquired whether the Soviet proposal regarding Polish association were acceptable.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had not sufficient time to give full consideration to this proposal. He suggested that it be discussed at the 4 o'clock meeting.

Mr. Stettinius observed that he approved highly the British proposal and recommended that it be included in the declaration.

3. Yugoslavia.

Mr. Eden stated that he had been informed that Subasic was due to leave today on his return to Belgrade. The principal question under dispute, as he understood it, has been about the names of the regents. However, in the British view, there was no reason why this should hold up the execution of the agreement. If Mr. Molotov so desired, Mr. Eden stated that Marshal Stalin's proposal might be discussed by the officials that a telegram be sent setting forth the views of the Foreign Ministers on the Yugoslav situation.

Mr. Molotov suggested that the Soviet draft [illegible] the basis of discussion on the Yugoslav question.

Mr. Eden suggested that both courses might be advisable.

Mr. Molotov recalled that Marshal Stalin had suggested that a telegram be sent to Tito and Subasic suggesting that they consider the coming into force of the agreement.

Mr. Eden stated that he would submit a draft telegram to the foreign ministers for consideration.

4. Reparations.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was not the chair. However, he could say that the Soviet Minister did not believe that the Russians would receive anywhere near as much as they hoped for.

Mr. Maisky stated that naturally when the dismemberment of Germany had been decided in a practical form the reparations plan must be adjusted. This problem was considered from its inception. There was no contradiction. The amount of annual payments were quite possible after the contemplated recovery. If Mr. Eden had any doubts the simplest way out was to accept the formula agreed

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
February 10, 1945, Noon
Yusupov Villa

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

United States
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Page

United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Dixon
Major Thompson

Soviet Union
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vishinsky
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

PAGE MINUTES

TOP SECRET

SUBJECTS:

1. The Polish formula.
2. Declaration on Liberated Europe.
3. Yugoslavia.
4. Reparations.
5. Communique on the Crimean conference.
6. World organization.
7. Austro-Yugoslav frontier.
8. Yugoslav-Italian frontier.
9. Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier.
10. Iran.

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Mr. Eden said that the government referred to in the [illegible] was a new government and that it was [illegible] that the three Allies move together in recognizing it.

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Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the status of Mr. Minister's amendment of February 8.

Mr. Stettinius agreed that it should be dropped, though he remarked that he thought it very useful in that it might prevent occurrences similar to those in Greece.

Mr. Eden inquired whether the Soviet proposal regarding Polish association were acceptable.

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3. Yugoslavia.

Mr. Eden stated that he had been informed that Subasic was due to leave today on his return to Belgrade. The principal question under dispute, as he understood it, has been about the names of the regents. However, in the British view, there was no reason why this should hold up the execution of the agreement. If Mr. Molotov so desired, Mr. Eden stated that Marshal Stalin's proposal might be discussed by the officials that a telegram be sent setting forth the views of the Foreign Ministers on the Yugoslav situation.

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Mr. Maisky stated that naturally when the dismemberment of Germany had been decided in a practical form the reparations plan must be adjusted. This problem was considered from its inception. There was no contradiction. The amount of annual payments were quite possible after the contemplated recovery. If Mr. Eden had any doubts the simplest way out was to accept the formula agreed

British Proposal on Polish Boundaries and Government

(Yalta) February 8, 1945.

REVISED FORMULA FOR POLAND

TOP SECRET

1. It was agreed that the Curzon line should be the eastern frontier of Poland, with deviations in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favor of Poland.

2. It was decided that the territory of Poland in the west should include the free city of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia west and south of Konigsberg, the administrative district of Oppeln in Silesia, and the lands ceded by Poland to Prussia east of the line of the Oder. It was understood that the Curzon line in the mid regions should be rectified in favor of Poland, and that all Poles in Germany should as many wish be repatriated to Poland.

3. Having regard to the Provisional liberation of Western Poland by the Soviet armies it was agreed provisionally to facilitate the formation [illegible] of a fully representative provisional Polish Government based upon all the democratic and anti-Fascist forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poles abroad. This government should be reconstituted on a basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three Governments will then accord it recognition.

The one important point on which considerable discussion failed to produce agreement was with respect to the addition of a further sentence along the following lines:

"The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledges in regard to free and unfettered elections."

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden emphasized the importance of the inclusion of some such sentence if recognition is to be transferred from the London Government because of its effect on public opinion in their respective countries. Mr. Maisky intimated that this was a point that could be discussed with the Poles by the commission on the spot in Moscow but would not be inclined without such discussion as it would offend their susceptibilities. Mr. Stettinius then proposed a variation of that sentence, reading as follows:

"The three governments consulting [illegible] responsibility as a result of the present agreement for the future duty of the Polish people freely to choose the government and institutions under which they are to live, will receive reports on this subject from their ambassadors in Warsaw."

Mr. Molotov had [illegible] objections to this sentence. It was [illegible] that the question would be put up to the Big Three meeting this afternoon.

The second part discussed [illegible] Mr. Molotov's proposed addition to the draft declaration on liberated areas. He proposed that the following clause be added at the conclusion of the third from the last paragraph:

"And in this connection representatives should be given to the political leaders of those countries who took an active part in the struggle against the German invaders."

Mr. Stettinius stated that he could not accept this addition and that it did not appear applicable to the declaration. He said that he regarded the too much intervention in the affairs of these countries and involved taking decisions on who had collaborated with Germany, which should be left to the peoples of those countries themselves. Mr. Eden expressed full concurrence with these views. It was agreed therefore to refer this to the next session of the Big Three.

[illegible] FILES]
Matthews Notes
SECRET [illegible] NOT TO BE TAKEN OUT OF [illegible]

[illegible] Reports Row Over Greek Aid

ATHENS [illegible] Cable war ban tonight [illegible] opposing his last three days [illegible] and [illegible] departure [illegible] important Bevin [illegible] [illegible] assuming the title [illegible] leader of Big Two] expressing [illegible] Greek [illegible] [illegible] which Mr. Molotov had objected to, on the understanding that the President would be free to make any statement he [illegible] necessary on Poland relative to his meeting [illegible] formation from his Ambassador on the question. Later in the conversation, Mr. Eden stated that he did not wish to indicate during the conversation on the Polish formula that he agreed with the American proposal to drop the last sentence.

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3. Yugoslavia.

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Official Discussions of Soviet Union's Entry in Japanese War Are a Part of the Record

upon by the Americans and Russians yesterday as the basis for discussion and to raise the British proposals in Moscow on this basis. He stated that the question of labor would certainly come up for discussion of the plan during the commission studies of Germany. He pointed out that the formula did not commit the Allies to the exact figure. Taking into account all considerations advanced by Mr. Eden, Mr. Maisky maintained that the British could easily agree to the formula.

Mr. Eden maintained that the British wished a period shorter than ten years for the reparations payments. They preferred five years.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the ten-year period was merely mentioned as a basis for discussion. It might result that all the capital movements would be effected in seven years. He added that the Soviet Government was not committing itself to ten years or twenty billions dollars.

Mr. Eden inquired why this time limit should then be put in the formula.

Mr. Maisky replied that it was desired as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Eden stated that he would submit an alternative draft and that he hoped that the subject might be discussed at the 4:00 o'clock meeting.

3. COMMUNIQUE ON THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

Mr. Molotov inquired whether any thought had been given to the communique on the conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American delegation was drafting something for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers. He suggested that the first item on the afternoon's agenda be the question of a communique and that the drafting of a communique be assigned to the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed to this suggestion.

4. WORLD ORGANIZATION

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a report of a subcommittee.

Mr. Molotov stated that he agreed to both points contained in the report i. e. regarding the method of consulting France and China and the text of the invitation to the conference.

Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius also agreed.

5. Austro-Yugoslav Frontier.

Mr. Eden stated that this problem would surely arise and that he did not want a repetition of "Athens." He wished to submit a small paper on the question.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would wish to study this paper before discussing it.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt that paragraph (B) on page two went beyond the period of occupation and that it might be improved by redrafting.

6. Yugoslav-Italian Frontier.

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a paper on this question. He added that he did not expect to discuss it at the present meeting. A copy of this document is attached.

7. Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations

In accordance with Mr. Eden's suggestion, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav Treaty of Alliance. The British Embassy in Moscow had transmitted to the Narkomindel a note on the Balkan federation in which it was stressed that such a federation might include Turkey. This was not an urgent matter at the present time; however, there were conversations in progress between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on a treaty of friendship and alliance. The Soviet Government entertained favorable views on this treaty and had informed the British accordingly. The Bulgarians and Yugoslavs were collaborating militarily against the Germans in Yugoslavia. There should consequently be no objections to such a treaty.

Mr. Eden stated that this treaty raised the important question of principle. The British held the view that former enemy states should be debarred from entering into treaty relations with other states when they were under an occupational regime and certainly not without the permission of the Allies. Apart from this principle the British were somewhat anxious concerning the effect of the treaty on reparations which Greece should obtain from Bulgaria. He wished to submit a separate memorandum on this matter.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Foreign Office had received a note from the British to the effect that former enemies under an armistice regime should not have treaty relations with other enemy states. But now it was a question of an ex-enemy and a friendly state. He maintained that the British had stated that they had no objections to treaties between an ex-enemy and friendly states.

Mr. Eden questioned this.

Mr. Molotov continued that this principle was also implied in the British proposal concerning a Balkan federation in which former enemy and friendly states would enter.

Mr. Eden maintained that he did not believe that states under an armistice regime should be permitted to make peace treaties without the permission of the Allies. Furthermore, the British never had in mind a Balkan federation until the armistice period had terminated.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was completely in accord with Mr. Eden's views.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be preferable for the states in question to wait.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had no power to speak for them.

Mr. Eden reminded him that Bulgaria had signed an armistice and was not free to do what it wished.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that this question be discussed by the Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov in Moscow promptly.

Mr. Molotov stated that it might be preferable to postpone discussion of this matter until tomorrow and then to seek agreement.

8. Iran.

Mr. Eden inquired whether Mr. Molotov had considered the British document on Iran.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had nothing to add to what he had said several days ago on the subject.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be advisable to issue a communique on Iran.

Mr. Molotov stated that this would be inadvisable.

Mr. Stettinius urged that some reference be made that Iranian problems had been discussed and clarified during the Crimean conference.

Mr. Molotov stated that he opposed this idea.

Mr. Eden suggested that it be stated that the declaration on Iran had been reaffirmed and reexamined during the present meeting.

Mr. Molot. opposed this suggestion.

(HISS COLLECTION)
(HISS NOTES)
(From penciled notes in longhand)

For Mins. 12:00 P. M.

ERS [illegible] make statement.

We are prepared to withdraw our insistence on the final sentence in the Polish memo which Mr. Mol. objected to, with the understanding that the Pres. would be perfectly free to make any statement to the Am. people he might think he had to relative to receiving [illegible] from our Amb.

MOL.: Would like to make a small amend. to yesterday's text: One cond. as soon as possible of U. S. and Gt. Brit. will est. dip. rels with Polish Govt. as done by the Soviet Un.

ED: objected. It is to be a new Gov't.

MOL.: We can leave out "as has been done by the Soviet Un".

ED: But we would all have to recognize it.

MOL: But sit. is different from that of U. S. We have already given recog. to present Gov't.

ED: Yes, but this will be a new Gov't.

ERS: Advisable that we all move together.

MOL. Present sit. being different the doc. must reflect this diff. We quite agree on the future. Let us think about it.

ERS: [illegible] have discussed Mr. Mol's proposal. Impossible for us to consider amend. Would create difficulties for us with respect to our dom. situation.

MOL: Then I will propose another amend. 2nd para from the end. "They would [illegible] take measures for carrying out mutual consultation." Bulgaria one or other amend.

ED: An improvement.

ERS: I'm very favorably impressed.

MOL.: As to the former amend. thinks it would be very unreasonable because we don't wish [illegible] which have occurred in Athens to take place elsewhere.

ERS: Sorry, I'm not authorized to consider this amend. any further.

New amend agreed to.

Mol: Withdraws his former amend.

ED: One other point. About French situation, proposed addition of a last para.

BELGRADE

MOL: Hasn't had time to study it, perhaps at 4:00.

ERS: As stated yesterday, thinks it most desirable.

Ed: Little further inform. re Yug. Subasic due leave today or tomorrow for Belgrade. Argument, as I understand, has been about names of regents. But in our view no reason this should hold up coming into force of agt. We can send tel. setting forth our views as Mar. St. suggested.

Mol: And communique?

Ed: Can do that too.

Mol: Tel. [illegible] them to hurry up, that the agt. come into force [illegible].

Ed: Will show other 2 delegs. draft of tel.

Ed: Re pol.—I didn't mean to indicate agt. with Am. proposal to drop last sentence.

ERS: We would, of course, still prefer doc. as it exists but Pres., so anxious reach agt., he is willing to make this concession.

Mol: Thanks, Mr. [illegible], very much.

REPARATIONS

Ed: 1. Reps. should be considered in connection with dismemberment.

2. Two Russian objects—destruction Ger. war capacity and ensuring ability make large payments later—are difficult to reconcile. We are very anxious to avoid conditions making it nec. finance or feed Ger. after it [illegible] reparations.

3. Would like Fr. in Moscow Commission from start.

4. Labor should be considered too.

5. Can't name any figure for deliveries until commission had studied matter.

Mol: Any points Mr. Ed. agrees on?

Ed: Ans: These arrangements are without prejudice to restitution of looted property.

MOL: Of course.

Ed: Reserve position re prewar claims. We are in favor of com. being set up in Mos. as soon as possible.

MOL: No basis for work of com. We don't give it any directives or principles on which to work.

ED: We agree on principles: immediate withdrawal of machinery, etc.—[illegible] the better—and annual payments. Has a redraft.

MAISKY: Mr. Ed's reply is very disappointing: whole spirit of reply. Seems apparently is to take from Ger. little as poss.

ED: Never said anything of kind but can say my Prime Minister doesn't think you'll get anything like as much as you think.

Re ED's points:

1. Naturally when dismemberment decided a practical form, plan be adjusted.

2. Problem was considered from beginning. No contradiction. Acct. of annual payments quite possible after contemplated removals. If you have doubts, shortest way to accept as our formula of yesterday—to take our proposals as basis for discussion and then bring up your points. Never expected support

Nothing on 3.

Labor certainly will come in elaboration of whole plan, but as com. studies Q.

5. Our formula doesn't commit you to the figures. Taking into account all your points, you can easily agree to formula agreed on by Sov and Am delegs.

ED: We consider $20 billion equals 500,000,000 pounds a yr.

MAISKY: No, in ten yrs.

ED: We wanted a shorter period.

MOL: Let us write down 10 yrs.

ED: We prefer 5 yrs.

E. R. S.: It's all a basis of discussion. Might end up all essential movements possible in 7 yrs. Sov. govt isn't committing itself to 10 yrs or $20 billion.

MAISKY: Certainly. In end might 5 or 8.

ED: Then why put in 10 yrs?

MAISKY: As basis for discussion.

ED: Let each put in its own plan. Will give alternative draft and discuss at 4:00 P. M.

Agreed.

MOL.: Re communique.

E. R. S.: We are hard at work drafting something for your consid.

MOL.: You take initiative?

E. R. S.: There will be draft as would be glad to take initiative. I would suggest an order that this afternoon be that of drafting of commun. be assigned to for mins.

ED: All right.

World Org.—Report of Subcommittee

MOL.: I agree to both points—consultation of China and France and the invitation.

ED: We all agree then.

Austria-Yug. Frontier

ED: Presented proposal.

MOL.: Translate and study.

E. R. S.: We feel that on page 2 should be pretty carefully considered. We feel that at present this goes beyond period of occupation.

ED: That is all that is meant. Drafting may need to be made clearer.

Yug.—It. frontier

ED: Proposal to be studied.

Yug-Bul relation.

MOL.: Mentioned treaty of alliance between Yug-Bul—[illegible] recently for commentarial [illegible] note re federation might include Turkey. This is not an urgent Q.—[illegible] There are conversations between Yug. and Bul. about a treaty of friendship and alliance. Sov Govt holds a favorable view. They are collaborating militarily against Ger in Yug. There should be no objections to it.

ED: Glad to hear treaty is not actual [illegible] anxious about effect of their treaty on reparations we are anxious and all agreed Greece should receive from Bul. Has separate memo on this.

MOL.: All obligations of Bul. have been effected. No one can change them without consent of 3 powers. Bul and Rumania cannot have a treaty between them. Now is Q. of treaty between a friendly country and an ex-enemy. There was a Brit. [illegible] by Brit. Govt. [illegible]

MOL.: There were objections to treaty between 2 former enemies but not friendly and enemy.

ED: We do not think a country under armistice terms can make a treaty without consent of 3 powers. I agree that it we mind a country under armistice would come into a federation until armistice over.

E.R.S.: I'm completely in accord with Ed's views.

ED: Can't they wait?

MOL.: Has no power to speak further.

ED: Bul. has signed armistice. Isn't free to do as she wants. Although has threatened to shoot our planes coming here.

MOL.: Our planes have been shot at in Yug but was mistake and our troops shot at by Am planes.

ED: I don't know why Bul. can shoot at any planes. Can we ask this week [illegible].

Mol: Can go on with discussion.

Ers: Suggest our amss. discuss with Mol in Mos. promptly.

Mol: Would wait until tomorrow.

IRAN

Mol: Has nothing to add.

Ed: Would Mol like to put out communique.

Mol: Undesirable. Can discuss this later.

Ers: I would like some reference that Iranian problems have been discussed and clarified. Very troublesome Q.

Mol: Against that.

Ed: Say re-examined and reaffirmed Teheran decl.

Mol: Against that.

Ers: Status of Poland. Agreed Ed. to report on yesterday's and today's progress.

Reparations:

MOL.: Mention in document just two figures as basis for discussion.

Hiss collection.

United States Delegation Memorandum

(Apparently prepared for Stettinius just prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10, 1945)

Yalta, February 10, 1945.

Items still before the Foreign Ministers.

1. Poland: There is probably no reason to discuss this until the plenary meeting.

2. Declaration of liberated Europe.

Same status as Number 1.

3. Iran:

The British may propose adoption of their paper—Mr. Matthews has a copy of it.

4. Reparations:

The British have not yet agreed to Soviet-American paper. The British or Russians may want to bring this up.

5. Mr. Eden wants:

(A) To have the provisions relating to the Hungarian Control Commission apply also to Bulgaria.

(B) To get an agreement for Bulgaria reparations to Greece.

(C) To express opposition to Russian proposal favoring an alliance between Yugo and Bulgaria.

(MATTHEWS FILES)

United States Delegation Memorandum on the Polish Government

(Yalta, Feb. 10, 1945)

Text of formula on Poland as far agreed by the three Foreign Ministers.

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Provisional Polish Government more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

"When a 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three Governments will then accord it recognition." (The last seven words are crossed out and the words "Mol. Formula" are written in the margin.)

In lieu of the following sentence: "When a 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three Governments will then accord it recognition," Mr. Molotov suggests the following rewording,

"When a 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with it as has been done by the Soviet Union."

This sentence was not accepted by Mr. Stettinius or Mr. Eden.

He said he would bring it up again at the 4 o'clock meeting this afternoon.

The British still advocate inclusion of the following sentence:

"The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

(Matthews Files)

United States Delegation Memorandum on the Soviet proposal for the final paragraph of the Declaration of [illegible]

(Yalta, Feb. 10, 1945)

[illegible] Agreement [illegible] of Poland [illegible] and Great Britain [illegible] Yalta [illegible] relations [illegible] U.S.S.R." [illegible] respective [illegible] kept informed [illegible] tion in Poland.

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

British Amendment to the draft Declaration on Liberated Europe

TOP SECRET

(Yalta, February 10, 1945)

British draft of last paragraph of Declaration on Liberated Europe.

In issuing this declaration the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)
BRITISH PROPOSAL ON REPARATIONS

TOP SECRET

(Yalta, February 10, 1945)

Basic principles of exacting reparation from Germany:

1. The proportions in reparation allotted to the claimant countries shall be determined according to their respective contributions to the winning of the war and the degree of the material loss which they have suffered. Account shall be taken of deliveries made to the claimant countries by other enemy countries.

2. Reparation is to be exacted from Germany in the three following forms:

(A) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory. These removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. Subject to the fulfilment of these aims the Germany's industrial capacity will not be reduced to a point which would endanger the economic existence of Germany or the execution of such reparation as may be imposed on her.

(B) Annual deliveries from current production for a period to be considered.

(C) Use of German labor [illegible] service.

3. In fixing the amount of reparation to be exacted under paragraph 2 above account shall be taken of any arrangements made for the dismemberment of Germany, the requirements of the occupying forces and Germany's need to acquire from time to time sufficient foreign currency from her exports to pay for her current imports and the pre-war claims of the United Nations on Germany.

F V 10STH ADD

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

Report to the Foreign Ministers by the Subcommittee on Arrangements for the United Nations Conference

TOP SECRET

(Yalta, Feb. 10, 1945.)

Report to the Foreign Ministers.

We were instructed on Feb. 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:

(A) The method of consultation with France and China in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

(B) The text of the invitation which should be issued to all the nations which will take part in the United Nations conference.

With regard to (A) we consider that the United States on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the Provisional French Government.

With regard to (B) we attach for the approval of the ministers a draft invitation to all the nations which will take part in the conference.

(ATTACHMENT)
INVITATION

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of ——— to send representatives to a conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at ——— in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. Voting.

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of ——— desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating governments.

A [illegible] copy of this attachment in the Hiss collection bears the notation in pencil "O.K. F.D.R."

(Bohlen collection)

British Proposal Regarding the Austrian-Yugoslav Frontier

TOP SECRET

(Yalta, Feb. 10, 1945.)

British [illegible] on Austro-Yugoslav frontier.

If the British proposals for the allocation of zones of occupation in Austria are approved, the whole length of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier will be a British responsibility. This may involve us in difficulties with Yugoslavia because though the Yugoslav Government have not so far asked for any alteration of the prewar portion of this frontier they have advanced claims to Klagenfurt and those parts of Carinthia which they failed to obtain under the postwar settlement. Action may be required to resist Yugoslav efforts to assert these claims and to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslav partisans who in the course of operations may well advance into Austria and establish control over it. It would be inadvisable for H. M. G. to be solely responsible for such action and after our experiences in Greece we would wish to prevent British troops from becoming involved in fighting with Allied partisans. We hope, therefore that an agreement might be reached between the three powers for the maintenance of the 1937 Austro-Yugoslav frontier pending the final territorial settlement and for joint measures to ensure its acceptance and observance by all parties.

It is therefore suggested we should agree at the present conference:

(A) That pending the final peace settlement the 1937 frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia shall be restored.

(B) That the integrity of this frontier is the joint interest of the three powers, and that the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. will support any action which H. M. G. may be required to take to preserve its integrity.

(C) That the three powers should jointly inform the Yugoslav Government of decisions (A) and (B) above and request the Yugoslav Government to give an undertaking to preserve this frontier.

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

British Proposal Regarding Venezia Giulia

TOP SECRET

(Yalta, February 10, 1945.)

[illegible] for the Secretaries of [illegible] in regard to Venezia Giulia.

I should like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that the Province of Venezia Giulia in the northeast of Italy is a potential powder magazine. It is therefore likely that there will, as the war draws to a close, be clashes in this area between the Yugoslavs and the Italians and we must prevent these outbursts to the best of our ability.

We had originally intended to set up Allied Military Government over the whole province up to the 1937 frontier, but we now have doubts whether this would be a very satisfactory course for the following reasons. Tito has not yet put his views in writing but he has made it pretty clear that he will not agree to such a proposal. He certainly intends to administer himself the considerable areas which he claims for Yugoslavia and part of which are already controlled by his partisans. Even if under extreme pressure he was forced to accept Allied (British) Military Government his partisans would remain in arms throughout the district and it would be a miracle if sooner or later they did not obstruct our military administration.

We should then have to take forceful measures to assert our authority and fighting might begin. Alternatively there might be clashes between the Yugoslav Partisans and the Italian Partisans, both trying to hold as much territory as they could. In that case also we should have to intervene to keep the peace by force. I would therefore ask my colleagues to agree to establish some body for the purpose of working out a provisional line of demarcation in the Venezia Giulia between the area to be controlled by Tito and the area over which we should establish Allied Military Government. We have made an attempt ourselves to draw up such a line based for the most part of ethnic consideration. But obviously we cannot jointly agree on a line now, all we can do is agree to the principle that there should be such a line and that some body of technicians should be established for the purpose of determining it. After that it would no doubt be for His Majesty's Government to obtain Tito's acceptance of it. But if they do this His Majesty's Government would like to be able to say that both their Allies agree with the proposal.

Finally I would point out that in any case, even if the area west of any suggested provisional line is allotted to Tito, it will be necessary, in the early stages at any rate, for our supreme commander to make use of the communications from Trieste northwards, in which case he would have to have suitable measures to that end. It might later be possible for him to arrange for his communications to Austria to pass further to the west.

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

British Proposal Regarding the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria

TOP SECRET

(Yalta, Feb. 10, 1945.)

Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Bulgaria

His Majesty's Government regard it as essential (A) that their representatives in Bulgaria should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and communications, and (B) that decisions about which they have not been consulted should not be taken in their names. In the case of Hungary, (A) has been satisfactorily dealt with in the "Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary," and His Majesty's Government suggest that identical statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was delivered to Mr. Molotov on or about Dec. 11th, 1944.

His Majesty's Government also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.

During the second period, i. e. after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, His Majesty's Government wish to ensure that:

(A) The British and American representatives should take their places on the Control Commission as full members and should have the right to attend all their meetings and to participate fully in the consideration of all questions before the commission. They should also have the right of direct access to the Bulgarian authorities.

(B) Decisions of the Allied Control Commission should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the representatives of the three powers are in agreement. If the Soviet high command, being in de facto control of Bulgaria through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Government or taking action which has not been approved by both the British and American [illegible] they should act [illegible] in their own name.

(C) The [illegible] in which the British and [illegible] in the [illegible] commission [illegible] be settled [illegible]. But they must [illegible] the right to membership [illegible] any subcommission [illegible] of any organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.

(D) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet Chairman and the British and American representatives on the control commission on the spot.

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

British Proposal on Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations

(Yalta, February 10, 1945)

TOP SECRET

YUGOSLAVIA-BULGARIA RELATIONS

His Majesty's Government recently communicated to the Soviet Government an expression of their views regarding a possible Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. In replying to this communication, the Soviet Government informed His Majesty's Government that they were aware that negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for the conclusion of a pact of alliance and mutual assistance were proceeding, and added that their attitude toward this was favorable. The Soviet Government, however, considered that the question of a Balkan federation, and in particular of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation, was not of present actual and was of no practical importance.

While His Majesty's Government are glad to learn that the Soviet Government do not consider the question of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation to be actual at present and that they regard the matter as of no practical importance, they are disturbed to learn that a pact of alliance and mutual assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria is under negotiation and that the attitude of the Soviet Government toward these negotiations is favorable.

His Majesty's Government cannot but regard the pact now under negotiations as open to the same objections which they felt in regard to a possible federation. In their view an enemy state whose status is still regulated by an armistice regime must be debarred from entering into special treaty with another state, more particularly with another state with which she is still technically in a state of war except with the explicit permission of all the victorious powers with whom the armistice was concluded.

Quite apart from the important question of principle involved, His Majesty's Government are also anxious regarding the effect of the pact now under negotiation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria upon the interests of Greece which has hitherto not received from Bulgaria the full reparation to which she is entitled under the terms of the armistice. This aspect of the matter is treated in greater detail in a separate aide-memoire.

His Majesty's Government accordingly consider that a communication should be made to the Bulgarian Government by all the victorious powers with whom she recently concluded an armistice, stating that they cannot agree to her entering into special treaty relations with Yugoslavia at this stage and that full reparations must be made to Greece before there can be any question of such negotiations being resumed. His Majesty's Government consider that Marshal Tito should simultaneously be informed of the objections seen by the victorious powers to the conclusion of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact. His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn the views of the Soviet Government upon this matter as soon as possible.

BOHLEN COLLECTION

British Proposal Regarding Greek Claims on Bulgaria

TOP SECRET

(Yalta, February 10, 1945.)

Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly in regard to reparations.

His Majesty's Government are concerned regarding the position in regard to Greek claims against Bulgaria. On the occasion of the signature of the armistice with Hungary, the Soviet Government informed the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments that they might send representatives to be accredited to the Hungarian Control Commission for the purpose of dealing with all questions affecting their particular government.

On January 23, the Greek Government, with the support of His Majesty's Embassy in Moscow, approach the Soviet Government with a request for facilities in Bulgaria similar to those granted to the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments in Hungary. No reply has, however, yet been vouchsafed to this request by the Soviet Government.

The Greek people have suffered very seriously from Bulgarian depredations and are in the view of His Majesty's Government entitled to early satisfaction and to immediate reparation deliveries of which Greece stands in urgent need. The Greek Government have already presented to the Bulgarian Control Commission a list of commodities necessary to the Greek economy and due to them in virtue of the Bulgarian armistice agreement, the delivery of which to Greece in the immediate future is essential to the maintenance of Greek economy. Deliveries which are more urgently required comprise, inter alia, foodstuffs, locomotives, agricultural implements and livestock. Furthermore, in view of the decision incorporated in the Hungarian armistice terms allotting to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fixed sums payable in commodities as reparations over a period of six years, it is in the view of His Majesty's Government equitable that similar arrangements should be made to fix a lump sum due to Greece by Bulgaria to be paid similarly in commodities over a period of six years. In the view of His Majesty's Government, a corresponding sum should be allocated to Yugoslavia which has also suffered from Bulgarian occupation. In this connection His Majesty's Government desire to make it clear that, while they are in general opposed to the fixing of lump sums for reparations to be exacted from enemy countries, they consider it only equitable, in view of the fact that lump sums have been allocated to the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments under the Rumanian, Finnish and Hungarian armistices, that a similar lump sum should now be allocated to Greece and Yugoslavia under the Bulgarian armistice.

His Majesty's Government accordingly trust that the Soviet Government will accede to the proposals put to them on January 23d with the support of His Majesty's Government concerning Greek representation on the Control Commission in Bulgaria. They further trust that the Soviet Government will agree to give explicit instructions to the head of the Control Commission in Bulgaria that immediate deliveries must be made to Greece in accordance with the terms of the armistice and that the list already presented by the Greek Government to the Soviet Government is to be taken as the basis for determining the nature and amounts of commodities to be delivered.

Finally His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that immediate consideration should be given to the question of fixing the total Bulgarian reparation liability to Greece and Yugoslavia, if necessary in terms of money.

(MATTHEWS FILES)

British Memorandum on Oil Equipment in Rumania

(This paper, an undated British carbon copy, was not attached to the page minutes, nor do these minutes indicate that the subject was discussed at the Foreign Ministers meeting on February 10, 1945. A note from Eden to Molotov, however (post, [illegible]), states that this paper was circulated at the Foreign Ministers meeting of February 10.)

(Yalta, February 10, 1945.)

OIL EQUIPMENT IN ROUMANIA

His Majesty's Government have been glad to note that the Soviet authorities have now agreed to stop removing equipment from the oil fields in Roumania in which British interests are involved and have also agreed that the [illegible] plant should remain in situ. But if the large quantities of equipment which have already been removed are not to be returned, His Majesty's Government consider that these must be regarded as deliveries on account of reparations, and arrangements made for compensating the oil companies. Similarly the [illegible] plant should be restored to its previous condition and brought into production as soon as possible. As the Soviet Government have made no attempt to refute the argument advanced by His Majesty's Government, that any equipment which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and not as war booty, His Majesty's Government earnestly refer the Soviet Government to the statement of the case which has already been made. It should also be pointed out that these difficulties would never have arisen if the Soviet representatives in Roumania had discussed problems affecting the Roumanian oil industry with their British and American colleagues on the control commission instead of taking unilateral action.

CONVERSATIONS REGARDING THE ENTRY OF THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

February 10, 1945, Afternoon

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

(Harriman) memorandum of conversation

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS

TOP SECRET

1ST CONVERSATION

Date: February 10, 1945

Time: 2 P. M.

Place: Koreis

Present:

Mr. Harriman

Mr. Molotov

Mr. Pavlov

2D CONVERSATION

Date: February 10, 1945

Time: [illegible]

Place: Livadia Palace

Present:

The President

Mr. Harriman

3D CONVERSATION

Date: February 10, 1945

Time: 4:30 P. M.

Place: Livadia Palace

Present:

The President

Mr. Harriman

Marshal Stalin

Subject: The Far East—Political

At Mr. Molotov's request I called on him at Koreis (Yusupovsky Palace) at 2 P. M.

He handed me in English translation the draft of Marshal Stalin's political conditions for Russia's entry in the war against Japan as discussed with the President on February 8.

I explained to Molotov that there were three amendments I believed the President would wish to make before accepting:

2. It should indicate Stalin's readiness to accept the President's proposal that Port Arthur and [illegible] should be free ports, and

[illegible] It should cover the alternative of the railways being operated by a Chinese-Soviet commission [illegible] of which Marshal Stalin had agreed on. In addition I felt sure that the President would not wish to decide these two matters [illegible] in which China was interested without the concurrence of the Generalissimo. Mr. Molotov indicated that Marshal Stalin had agreed to the first two points but it would take some time to [illegible] the reasons for the [illegible] agreed to submit to Molotov the President's suggested [illegible].

On my return to Livadia I showed the President the proposed draft (copy attached) with the amendments covering the points mentioned (copy of amendments attached). The President approved and author-

7th Plenary Meeting Considers Issues in Formation of the Future World Organization

ned me to recommit them to Mr. Molotov, which I did.

After the formal conference meeting in the afternoon between the President, the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin and their associates, Marshal Stalin came to me to explain the further changes he had in mind for the agreement. He said that he was entirely willing to have Dairen a free port under international control, but that Port Arthur was different. It was to be a Russian naval base and therefore Russia required a lease.

I suggested to Marshal Stalin that he take the opportunity to discuss this matter at once with the President, which he thereupon did.

The President agreed to Marshal Stalin's revised proposal regarding the ports as above.

Marshal Stalin then explained that he agreed it would be more appropriate for the Manchurian railroads to be operated by a Chinese-Soviet commission. He further agreed in the need for concurrence of the Generalissimo on these matters but stated that the Generalissimo should also give his concurrence to the status quo in Outer Mongolia.

The President asked Marshal Stalin whether he [Stalin] wished to take these matters up with T. V. Soong when he came to Moscow or whether Stalin wished the President to take them up with the Generalissimo.

Marshal Stalin replied that as he was an interested party he would prefer to have the President do it.

The President then asked when the subject should be discussed with the Generalissimo, having in mind the question of secrecy.

Marshal Stalin said he would let the President know when he was prepared to have this done.

The President said that he would send an Army officer from Washington through Moscow to Chungking with a letter of instructions to Ambassador Hurley in order to insure secrecy.

At that moment the Prime Minister interrupted the discussion. I had an opportunity later, however, to ask Marshal Stalin whether he would undertake to draft the further revisions, to which he replied in the affirmative.

W. A. Harriman

(ATTACHMENT 1)

Draft of Marshal Stalin's Political Conditions for Russia's Entry in the War Against Japan

(Translation)

The leaders of the three great powers — the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain — have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has ended the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the allies on condition that:

1. Status quo in the Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's republic) should be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 should be restored, viz:

A) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to this part of Sakhalin should be returned to the Soviet Union;

B) Possession of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored;

C) Any rights possessed by Russia before the Russo-Japanese War to the operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad providing an outlet to Dairen should be restored on the understanding that China should continue to possess full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U. S. S. R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

(ATTACHMENT 2)

Mr. Harriman's suggested changes in Marshal Stalin's draft of Russia's political conditions for Russia's entry in the war against Japan.

Item 2 B): (The word "possession" is deleted. Mr. Harriman revised the Soviet draft to read as follows:)

Possession lease of the port areas of Port Arthur and Dairen release should be restored, or these areas should become free ports under international control.

Item 2 C): Add the following after the word "Manchuria" at the end of the paragraph: "or these railroads should be placed under the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet commission."

Item 3: Add final paragraph: "It is understood that the agreement concerning the ports and railways referred to above requires the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek."

The New York Times

CHURCHILL IN EGYPT: On his way back from Yalta, the Prime Minister spent five days in Egypt, where he held a series of conferences. He is shown on Feb. 17, 1945, with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia at Fayoum oasis. In background are members of King's entourage.

SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

February 10, 1945, 4 P. M.

Livadia Palace

PRESENT

United States

President Roosevelt
Secretary Stettinius
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Foote
Mr. Early

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Edward Bridges
Mr. Jebb
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Dixon
Major Birse
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Allen

Soviet Union

Marshal Stalin
Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Vishinsky
Mr. Maisky
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

(BOHLEN COLLECTION)

BOHLEN MINUTES

TOP SECRET

Subjects:
Poland
French participation in Control Commission for Germany
Yugoslavia
World security organization
Reparations from Germany
The Dardanelles

The President said he thought that Mr. Eden had a report to make on the progress achieved at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning.

Mr. Eden said that he had to report agreement on the future government of Poland, that there had been two questions involved which he would refer to later, but in the meantime he would read the new formula. He read the new formula with one correction which he admitted to have been made by Mr. Molotov. The new formula was as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The Prime Minister said that the document made no mention of frontiers. He said we were all agreed on the eastern frontier of Poland and he agreed that Poland should receive compensation in the west, up to the line of the Oder if the Poles so desired. He said that the British Government was very doubtful about going any further or mentioning any such possibility at this stage, since he did not believe that the War Cabinet would accept the line of the western Neisse. He said he felt, however, that some mention should be made of the territorial settlement otherwise the whole world would wonder what had been decided on this question. There would be some criticism, but nevertheless, it would be better than no mention at all.

The President said that the Polish Government should be consulted before any statement was made in regard to the western frontier.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought there should be some statement on the eastern frontier on which all present had agreed.

The Prime Minister concurred with this statement of Marshal Stalin and repeated the people would wish to know what we had decided on this question.

Mr. Molotov remarked that it would be a good thing if something definite could be said about the Eastern frontier, since it would clarify and quiet the whole situation in so far as the Poles were concerned. He said that it was certain that there would be criticism, but he felt it would in general be beneficial. He suggested that the matter be referred to the three Foreign Ministers to draft some elaboration on this point. He added that it was perhaps not necessary to be as specific in regard to the Western Frontier as in regard to the Eastern Frontier.

The Prime Minister said that he had already gone on record to the effect that Poland would receive a good slice of territory in the north and in the west, but that the opinion of the new Polish Government of National Unity would be sought.

The President said he had no objection in principle to such a statement, but he thought the Prime Minister should draft it.

Mr. Molotov suggested that it should form a last sentence of the Polish statement.

Mr. Eden, continuing his report, said that in regard to the (the) declaration on liberated Europe the Soviet delegation had proposed an amendment, in regard to the last sentence of the fifth paragraph to the effect that the three Governments should immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultations. Mr. Eden said that he proposed a draft that the three Governments should immediately consult together upon the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

After some discussion as to what had been agreed upon at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning, Marshal Stalin said he accepted the British suggestion.

Mr. Eden then said there was a note which he wished to attach to this declaration, namely, that the French should be invited to associate themselves with the declaration and that the note would merely state that in issuing this declaration the three heads of Governments expressed the hope that the Provisional Government of France would associate themselves in the actions and procedures envisaged therein.

The President then said that he had changed his mind in regard to the question of the French participation in the Control Commission. He now agreed with the views of the Prime Minister that it would be impossible to give France an area to administer in Germany unless they were members of the Control Commission. He said he thought it would be easier to deal with the French if they were on the commission than if they were not.

Marshal Stalin said he had no objections and that he agreed to this.

The Prime Minister suggested that there should be a joint telegram sent to De Gaulle informing him of these decisions to which there was general agreement.

Mr. Eden said the next subject was that of Yugoslavia and read the text of a telegram to be sent to Marshal Tito and Subasic suggesting that the agreement which they had reached be immediately put into effect as the basis for the formation of a unified government of Yugoslavia.

The President said he was not sure whether he would be able to join in the statement on Yugoslavia but when it had been read to him he agreed that it was satisfactory and that he could associate himself with it.

After some discussion Marshal Stalin suggested that the telegram to Marshal Tito and Subasic should say that "the heads of the three governments have agreed that the agreement between Tito and Subasic should be put immediately into effect and that as soon as a new government was formed the two amendments proposed by the British should be put into effect." He said he thought it was inconsistent to put more in the communique than there was in the telegram.

The Prime Minister said he hoped that both of the two amendments proposed by the British could be put in the communique.

Mr. Molotov said he thought it would be better to confine the telegram and reference in the communique to the entry into force of the Tito-Subasic agreement.

The Prime Minister said he thought the British people would be more reconciled to the government and it would have a better reception if the two amendments were included.

After some discussion with the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden Marshal Stalin said he thought that three points could be included in the telegram: (1) That the Tito-Subasic agreement should go immediately into force; (2) that the members of the Skupschina who had not collaborated with the Germans could be included into the Vetch, and (3) that the actions of the anti-Fascist Vetch would be subject to the confirmation by the Constituent Assembly. He added that he thought these three points could go into the communique.

Mr. Eden said that the sub-committee in regard to Dumbarton Oaks had reported on the matter of informing the French and Chinese Governments and on the form of the invitations, but he did not feel that it was necessary to bother the conference with these small matters. He went on to say that in regard to reparations the British Government still had reservations in regard to the Soviet proposals.

The Prime Minister said he had received instructions from the War Cabinet not to mention figures and that that should be left to the reparations commission to determine.

The President said that he was afraid that if reparations and especially if any figures were mentioned that the American people would believe that it involved money.

Marshal Stalin explained that the sum mentioned was only the expression of the value of the reparations in kind.

The Prime Minister asked that nothing would be published, as he understood it, in regard to reparations but that he would [illegible] agree to the [illegible].

Marshal Stalin said he wished to discuss the circumstances of the matter. He did not understand why there should be confusion in regard to [illegible] in which the Soviet Union [illegible] concluded [illegible] with Finland, Rumania [illegible] in which the [illegible] reparations in kind were stated and that there had been no confusion as far as he knew on this subject. He said the British felt that [illegible] things at all, it should [illegible] frankly. He said [illegible] had heard a great deal at the conference that the [illegible] would receive reparations in the form of [illegible] and plants but that no decision had been reached. He said he thought that two decisions might be taken by the conference: (1) That it was agreed in principle that Germany should pay reparations and (2) that the reparations commission in Moscow should fix the amount and should take into consideration the American-Soviet proposal that there should be twenty billion dollars of reparations with 50 per cent to the Soviet Union.

The President said that the word "reparations" [illegible] since he thought the people in America would think it meant reparations in cash.

Someone replied that this could be easily avoided by using the term "compensation for damages caused by Germany during the war" instead of "reparations."

Mr. Molotov said that the Moscow commission would have the duty of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula.

The Prime Minister replied that the British Government could not commit itself to any figure.

Marshal Stalin replied that there was no commitment involved but it might be said that the commission might take this material for discussion [illegible] American-Soviet formula.

The Prime Minister then read a telegram from the War Cabinet which said that they considered it inadvisable to mention any figure until an investigation had been completed on the spot and that at any rate the figure of twenty billion dollars was too great. It was equal to Germany's export trade in times of peace and it was beyond the capacity of Germany to pay. It was true that some of these reparations would come from Germany's capital assets but that in turn would make it more difficult for Germany to pay her bills. The payments would mean that certain German imports and if these imports were not given a priority ahead of reparations it would mean that the other countries would be paying for German reparations to those countries receiving them.

Marshal Stalin said he did not want to go into the consideration of the telegram the Prime Minister had just read. The experts may be right, but that all they were preparing was a figure to be used as a basis for discussion—it could be reduced or increased by the commission in Moscow.

The President then suggested that the whole matter be left to the commission in Moscow.

Marshal Stalin said that he felt in principle that Germany should pay reparations which would be stated by the three Governments here.

Mr. Molotov said that yesterday Mr. Harriman had analyzed the results of the meeting and had reported full agreement on the first two points of the Soviet proposal.

Now the question was what countries should receive reparations and the type of reparations and differences only appeared between the United States and the Soviet delegation on the one hand and the British on the other in regard to the naming of a sum.

Mr. Eden said that rightly or wrongly, the British Government felt that even the naming of a sum as a basis of discussion would commit them.

[illegible]

Marshal Stalin [illegible] following [illegible] heads of the Governments agreed that Germany must pay compensation for the damage caused to the Allied nations as a result of the war and (2) that the Moscow commission be directed to consider the amount of reparations. This was agreed to by the conference.

There was then a short intermission.

The President inquired whether they could discuss the last part of the paragraph on frontiers to be added to the Polish statement. Mr. Molotov replied that he had not yet received the Russian translation.

Marshal Stalin then said that he would like to say a few words about the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles. He said the treaty was now outmoded. As he recalled, the Japanese Emperor played a big part in the treaty, even greater than that of the Soviet Union. The treaty was linked with the League which does not exist. Nor is the Japanese Emperor present at this conference. Under the Montreux Convention the Turks have the right to close the straits not only in time of war but if they feel that there is a threat of war. He said that the treaty was made at a time when the relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were not perfect. But he did not think now that Great Britain would want to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese. The treaty needed revision. He thought that there would be no objection to a consideration of the revision of that treaty. He said in what manner the treaty should be revised he did not know and he did not wish to prejudge any decisions, but he felt that the interests of Russia should be considered. He said that it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia's throat. He added, however, that it should be done in such a manner as not to harm the legitimate interests of Turkey. This was a question which an appropriate organization could consider and, he thought, that the three foreign ministers who were to meet periodically—every two or three months—might well consider this matter at their first meeting and report to their respective cabinets.

The President said he had one general observation to make and that was that in the United States we had a frontier of over 3,000 miles with Canada and there was no fort and no armed forces. This situation had existed over a hundred years and it was his hope that other frontiers in the world would eventually be without forts or armed forces on any part of their national boundaries.

The Prime Minister said that Marshal Stalin had reminded them of the question of the Straits when they were in Moscow last autumn. They had said then that they were in sympathy with the revision of the treaty and had suggested to the Soviet Government that a note be sent on the subject, but none has as yet been received. He said that he thought that the method proposed by Marshal Stalin was a wise one. The British certainly felt that the present position of Russia with their great interests in the Black Sea should not be dependent on the narrow exit. He said if the matter is brought up at the meeting with the Foreign Ministers he hoped the Russians would make their proposals known. In the meantime, it might be well to inform the Turks that the matter of revision of the Montreux Convention would be under consideration. This was particularly true if the Allies desired them to come into the war on their side. Mr. Eden reminded him that he had mentioned the matter several times to the Turkish Ambassador in London. He said it might be advisable to give the Turks at the same time some assurance that their independence and integrity will be guaranteed.

Marshal Stalin replied it was impossible to keep anything secret from the Turks and that such assurance should be expressed. The President agreed to this.

Marshal Stalin said the Foreign Ministers could meet at the United Nations Conference and discuss the question of the Straits.

The Prime Minister said that he thought that this matter affected the position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean more than it did that of the United States and that he felt that if the Foreign Ministers had a meeting in London that that would be the proper place to discuss this question. He went on to say that some years ago he had tried very hard to get through the Dardanelles and then the Russian Government had made available an armed force to help but it did not succeed.

Marshal Stalin said that the Prime Minister had been in too much of a hurry in withdrawing his troops since the Germans and Turks were on the verge of surrender.

The Prime Minister replied that by that time he was out of the Government because of the Dardanelles campaign and had nothing to do with that decision.

Marshal Stalin then inquired who was taking down decisions reached at the conference.

Mr. Eden replied there would be an agreed upon communique as well as a list of the decisions taken.

The President then said he wished to propose some small amendments in the paragraph regarding frontiers on the Polish statement. He said these amendments were necessary for American constitutional reasons.

He suggested that instead of the words "the three powers" he would like to substitute "the three heads of government" and that in the second sentence the words "three powers" be eliminated, and in the last sentence the word "feel" instead of "agree" should be used.

These amendments were accepted by the conference and the following text approved:

"The three heads of government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. It is recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."

Mr. Molotov said he had one suggestion and that was to add to the second sentence "with the return to Poland of her ancient frontiers in East Prussia and on the Oder."

The President inquired how long ago these lands had been Polish.

Mr. Molotov said very long ago, but they had in fact been Polish.

The President said this might lead the British to ask for the return of the United States to Great Britain. Marshal Stalin replied that the ocean prevented this. He added that at the present the draft said nothing specific about frontiers, which he thought was very important for the Poles.

The Prime Minister said he would prefer not to mention the frontier in the West since he shared the same difficulties the President had spoken of.

Mr. Eden said that they had always said that they would accept any line up to the Oder that the Poles desired.

The Prime Minister said that there was no stopping place between what we proposed to do and the line of the Oder, and if the question is asked about ancient territories there would be no answer. He said that he was not against the line of the Oder in principle if the Poles so desired.

Mr. Molotov said he thought it might be worth while considering this wording.

Marshal Stalin said he would withdraw the Soviet amendment and leave the British draft as it had been.

The draft of the last paragraph regarding Polish frontiers was accepted.

The President then remarked he would have to leave Yalta tomorrow at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

The Prime Minister remarked that he doubted if it would be possible to get all the work done by then, particularly the communique and the final text of the documents.

There followed a discussion between the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden concerning the possibility of preparing the communique before the time set for the President's departure.

Marshal Stalin remarked that there was very little time and felt it was impossible to complete the work in view of the dinner. He suggested that the dinner might be canceled.

After some discussion it was decided that a drafting committee for the communique should come to the villa and report at 12 o'clock to the Foreign Ministers and heads of government.

The meeting then adjourned.

(MATTHEWS FILES)

MATTHEWS MINUTES

TOP SECRET

The President opened the meeting, which was delayed owing to an earlier discussion between Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin by asking Mr. Eden to render a report on the foreign secretaries' meeting of last night and this morning.

EDEN: I should like to report that with the exception of two points outstanding we have reached a decision on the Polish question. I believe that we have since worked out an agreement with regard to these two points. (He reads the Polish formula which after some discussion as to wording was finally agreed to.)

PRIME MINISTER: There is no reference in this formula to the frontier question. The world at large will ask about that. We are all agreed I believe about the Eastern frontier. We are all agreed in principle about the Western frontier. The only question is where the line is to be drawn and how much to say about it in our communique. We are doubtful about going further in mentioning frontiers at this stage. I have received a telegram from the War Cabinet deprecating any frontier going as far West as the Neisse. They feel that the population problem is too large to handle.

PRESIDENT: My position is that I would rather hear from the new government of national unity what they think about it. Therefore, I think we had better leave out all references to frontiers.

PRIME MINISTER: On the West?

STALIN: It is important to say something.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree. People will immediately ask what is the settlement on the question of the frontiers. We think that the Eastern frontier is settled. On the West the wishes of the Polish provisional government of national unity must be consulted.

PRESIDENT: I do not believe we should say anything in the communique. I have no right to make an agreement on boundaries at this time. That must be done by the Senate later. Let the Prime Minister make some public statement when he returns if that is necessary.

[illegible]

MOLOTOV: I think it would be very good if something could be said about full agreement of the three heads of Government on the Eastern frontier. We could say that the Curzon Line is generally representative of the opinion of all present. It is possible that there might be criticism of this for some time but that would be better in the long run. We should either agree or leave to the three foreign ministers to find a formula. I agree that we need say nothing about the Western frontier.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree we must say something.

MOLOTOV: Yes, but less specific if you wish.

PRIME MINISTER: We must say that Poland is to get compensation in the West; also that there is to be left for discussion with the Polish Government before the line is drawn.

MOLOTOV: Very good.

PRIME MINISTER: We must go on now with the rest of our communique on Poland. (Matter is referred to the three foreign ministers.)

STALIN: That could be done during our intermission.

EDEN: I shall next report on the declaration on liberated areas. Mr. Molotov kindly withdrew his amendment of last night with regard to the third from last paragraph and has proposed the following wording at the end of the penultimate paragraph. (There followed considerable discussion as to the exact wording that was agreed upon and finally Marshal Stalin accepted the following:

"Shall consult together on the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration." (In this form it was approved.)

I should like to add a sentence with regard to the French which we proposed last evening to clear up the ambiguous situation in regard to France. (The following was approved:

"In issuing this declaration the three powers express the hope that the provisional government of France will associate itself with them.")

President: I should like to say that I have changed my mind with regard to the position of the French on the Control Council for Germany. The more I think of it the more I think that the Prime Minister is right and that a nation with a zone of occupation must sit in on the control machinery. I think it would be easier if France is on the commission to get De Gaulle to agree to join the liberated areas declaration and many other things.

Stalin: I have no objection. (It is agreed upon.)

Prime Minister: Of course France may say that she will have no part in the declaration and reserve all rights for the future. (Laughing) We must face that.

Molotov: We must be ready to receive a rough answer.

Eden: Next is the question of Yugoslavia. We prepared a draft on this which is still under discussion. [illegible] contention between the British and Russians [illegible] a draft telegram to Yugoslavia is agreed upon. (Copy attached.)

Molotov insisted that the telegram should be short and should be sent today.

The Prime Minister wanted the joint telegram to contain not only the exhortation that the Tito-Subasic agreement be put into effect immediately and the new unified government formed but also the additional points which the new government would be asked to accept (Subasic recommendations): First that the AVNOJ be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary parliament; and, two, that legislative acts passed by the AVNOJ would be subject to ratification by a constituent assembly. The British also tabled a third provision to the effect that the government is only temporary pending the free expression of the will of the people but dropped this at the Russians' request as offensive to Yugoslav sensibilities. On that basis the telegram was agreed upon by all three after considerable discussion by the Prime Minister and Stalin, the latter wanting originally to confine the telegram to the question of the execution of the Tito-Subasic agreement and wait till the government was formed before taking up the other points.

There followed a lengthy and at times somewhat heated discussion between Marshal Stalin and Churchill on the question of reparations. This was the only time during the conference that Stalin showed some annoyance. He obviously felt suspicious of the British opposing Russian reparations as part of a program to build up a strong Germany.

At one stage in the discussion he asked point blank if the British did not want the Russians to receive reparations they should say so frankly. This, of course, Mr. Churchill emphatically denied. Stalin proposed that the three governments accept the principle of reparations in goods. (The President made it clear that what he feared was a system of reparations paid in money.) And second that the Moscow Commission should be asked to find out the total of possible reparations and report to the respective governments. He also asked that the three governments agree that Germany must pay in kind for losses suffered in the course of the war.

MOLOTOV: We must give the Moscow Commission on Reparations the task of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula. The commission need only take that as the basis.

PRIME MINISTER: We have had a very important communication from our Government on this question. We cannot accept any specific figures in any formula.

STALIN: I propose that that

LEAVING TALKS: Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson in the British headquarters after a conference of the Chiefs of Staff of the Big Three at Yalta.

WITH FUR CAP: Prime Minister Churchill arriving for a meeting in Yalta.

Reparations and Jewish Problems Were Considered at a Tripartite Night Meeting

ON HAND FOR CONFERENCE: Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, greeted by Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Eden was arriving for Yalta talks.

the three heads of government agree that Germany must pay for losses to the Allied Nations. There, the Moscow Reparations Commission is given the task to consider the amount to be paid. We bring our figures before the commission and you bring yours. (To Churchill.)

(This was followed by an all-commission during which the formula to be used on Polish frontiers for inclusion in the communiqué was largely worked out.)

PRESIDENT: Marshal Stalin and I do not wish to talk a little or some question after our conversation and I now invite him to do so.

STALIN: I should like to say a few words on the Morgenthau proposition. We believe that it is not out of date. The Morgenthau proposition was one of the factors in it. In fact, he plays a greater role in it than the Soviet Union. This treaty was made at a time when relations between Britain and Russia were not very good. Now that is all changed. I do not think that Great Britain would win the help of the Japanese want to eliminate Russia. The Morgenthau proposition should be considered. I do not wish to go into details. I do not wish to go into details of the Morgenthau proposition. The interests of Russia should be taken into account and observed. The legitimate interests of Turkey must not be infringed. The question is how to do it. We can, of course, ask a certain sum of money, but I am against it. We can discuss this question. We have agreed that the three Foreign Ministers should meet from time to time. Perhaps they could discuss the question at their first meeting and report to the three governments. This would be a preparatory step to settling the question.

PRESIDENT: I only want to say that we have three thousand miles of ocean between Canada. There is no rail or no road ship on this entire ocean. If other parts of the world would be the same it is a wonderful thing.

PRIME MINISTER: Marshal Stalin mentioned the question to me and to Eden in Moscow. We viewed it with sympathy. We agreed with the Soviets that the Montreux Convention should be revised or reconstructed. We asking the Soviet Government for a note with their ideas. This has not yet been received. The suggestion of Marshal Stalin is a wise one. I certainly feel that the present position of Russia for Black Sea dependent on the narrow exit—is not satisfactory. I hope our Russian allies will state their proposal. Meanwhile if Turkey wished to discuss war we should tell her beforehand that this matter is to be brought under consideration. They should know that but, before going into the war. I believe we are obligated to tell them. (After conferring with Mr. Eden): Eden and I met in the Turkish Ambassador in London, in general terms. We have kept our engagement. It is worth considering whether when changes are made some alternative should be given Turkey that her independence will not be affected.

STALIN: Certainly we should give such assurance when the Foreign Ministers meet in April in the United States at the end of the conference could they not discuss the question of the straits.

Prime Minister: Well, I think this question affects Britain with her Mediterranean interests more than the United States. Therefore, I believe that the meeting should be in London.

I think some time ago in get through the Dardanelles (illegible) and the former Russian Government had two active corps ready to help me at the other end. However, we did not succeed in joining hands. I consequently have some feeling on this question.

STALIN: You were in too much of a hurry to take away your troops. Perhaps in another week you would have won as the Germans and Turks were getting ready to withdraw.

Prime Minister: I had nothing to do with that decision. I was already out of the Government. It was decided that the question would be discussed by the three Foreign Ministers in London.)

President: The only thing left now in the unsettled list on the frontiers of Poland. (The list is then read for consideration by the Russians who had received the Russian text.)

STALIN: I should like to suggest an amendment in the phraseology to indicate that Poland should receive the return of her ancient frontier of East Prussia and the Oder.

President (replying to Prime Minister): Perhaps you would want us back."

Prime Minister: Well, you might be as indigestible for us as it might be for the Poles if they took too much German territory.

Stalin: This change would give great encouragement to the Poles.

Prime Minister: I prefer to keep it as it is.

Minister: But there is no question of evasion in the west. What about the Oder? No exchange was mentioned.

Prime Minister: Well, between what we propose and the question of specifying ancient territories up to the Oder there seems to be no stopping place.

Stalin: I withdraw my suggestion and agree to leave it as drawn.

The President's suggested changes (change "agreed" to "consider" in the first sentence and change "The three powers" to "The three heads of Government" in the third sentence) are accepted. This I believe is our last point of decision.

President: There only remains the question of the communiqué. I must leave tomorrow at 5 P. M. I hope we can get the communiqué done and I suggest that if we meet at 11 tomorrow we can finish it by lunch. (This suggestion is vigorously opposed by Churchill and to a lesser degree by Stalin, both of whom maintain that the communiqué is most important and should not be drawn too hastily.)

The matter was left indefinite with the representatives of the three governments assigned the task of concluding their drafts. An American and British draft had already been prepared for submission to the Big Three.

The meeting then adjourned.

(HISS COLLECTION)
HISS NOTES

Plenary
(-55)

ED: reported on meeting of 1st subs. — We reached agt. on Pol. There were two outstanding Qs. Perhaps I may come to that in a moment. Read draft as it now stands (included some changes and agreed to by Church and M. in their private meeting before plenary session) included the Atlantic Charter and was passed.

"(1) (2) will exchange notes by which regrets the respective govts will be kept informed about the situation in Poland."

CHURCH: We have made no reference to Frontiers but of course people will see at once about frontiers, what we have agreed. We are all agreed about the E. frontier, we are all agreed now the question should be put about W. frontier. The only Q is where to go to be exactly drawn and how govts to decide and check it. We are agreeing that the Poles are to go to the line of the Oder if they so desire. We are very doubtful about going further at present—leaving it for final settlement at the peace conference. We have not a bit from our War Cab. strongly approaching that—not going as far as W. Neisse because they think the problem is larger than we could manage at present—Glatz and—A native Yalta.

PRES: We should rather keep from the Pole Govt's of Sol. Lodz.

We had better leave out all reference to Stalingrad.

CHURCH: On west?

MAISKY: On east we should have no objection to mentioning any west in the declaration about the frontier. We have no objection to mentioning Stalingrad.

PRIME MINISTER: Marshal Stalin mentioned the question to me and to Eden in Moscow. We viewed it with sympathy. We agreed with the Soviets that the Montreux Convention should be revised or reconstructed. We asking the Soviet Government for a note with their ideas. This has not yet been received. The suggestion of Marshal Stalin is a wise one. I certainly feel that the present position of Russia for Black Sea dependent on the narrow exit—is not satisfactory. I hope our Russian allies will state their proposal. Meanwhile if Turkey wished to discuss war we should tell her beforehand that this matter is to be brought under consideration. They should know that but, before going into the war. I believe we are obligated to tell them. (After conferring with Mr. Eden): Eden and I met in the Turkish Ambassador in London, in general terms. We have kept our engagement. It is worth considering whether when changes are made some alternative should be given Turkey that her independence will not be affected.

Stalin: Certainly we should give such assurance when the Foreign Ministers meet in April in the United States at the end of the conference could they not discuss the question of the straits.

Prime Minister: Well, I think this question affects Britain with her Mediterranean interests more than the United States. Therefore, I believe that the meeting should be in London.

I think some time ago in get through the Dardanelles (illegible) and the former Russian Government had two active corps ready to help me at the other end. However, we did not succeed in joining hands. I consequently have some feeling on this question.

STALIN: You were in too much of a hurry to take away your troops. Perhaps in another week you would have won as the Germans and Turks were getting ready to withdraw.

Prime Minister: I had nothing to do with that decision. I was already out of the Government. It was decided that the question would be discussed by the three Foreign Ministers in London.)

President: The only thing left now in the unsettled list on the frontiers of Poland. (The list is then read for consideration by the Russians who had received the Russian text.)

Stalin: I should like to suggest an amendment in the phraseology to indicate that Poland should receive the return of her ancient frontier of East Prussia and the Oder.

President (replying to Prime Minister): Perhaps you would want us back."

Prime Minister: Well, you might be as indigestible for us as it might be for the Poles if they took too much German territory.

Stalin: This change would give great encouragement to the Poles.

Prime Minister: I prefer to keep it as it is.

Minister: But there is no question of evasion in the west. What about the Oder? No exchange was mentioned.

Prime Minister: Well, between what we propose and the question of specifying ancient territories up to the Oder there seems to be no stopping place.

Stalin: I withdraw my suggestion and agree to leave it as drawn.

The President's suggested changes (change "agreed" to "consider" in the first sentence and change "The three powers" to "The three heads of Government" in the third sentence) are accepted. This I believe is our last point of decision.

President: There only remains the question of the communiqué. I must leave tomorrow at 5 P. M. I hope we can get the communiqué done and I suggest that if we meet at 11 tomorrow we can finish it by lunch. (This suggestion is vigorously opposed by Churchill and to a lesser degree by Stalin, both of whom maintain that the communiqué is most important and should not be drawn too hastily.)

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Hiss Records Show Working Draft of a Proposal for a United Nations Conference

(Bohlen Collection)
BOHLEN SGTE

SECRET

At the last plenary session, the communique was discussed and most of the conversation dealt with the details of language, the results of which are apparent in the final communique agreed upon. The Soviet suggested that in the part on voting procedure no reference be made to the fact that the proposal accepted was put forward by the President. Marshal Stalin stated that there would be no objection to the President, or any other American official making it public that the United States' proposal had been adopted, but he felt such a reference did not properly belong in a communique. The Soviet suggestion was adopted.

(HISS COLLECTION)
HISS NOTES
2/11 12:15 P. M.
Plenary

Communique

P M likes draft but too many "points" (—), Also states separate para re reparations.

MAL: We have an amendment that does that.

The 1st part: prefer none detail, naming personalities who took part.

CHURCH: At end.

ST: Recess at beginning. Was at Tehran.

FEIS: ANW P. M.; OK.

ST: No other remarks on opening.

CHURCH: Put in generals as well."

ST: Yes.

CHURCH: I agree with that.

ST: Name whatever you like a Defense of Ger.

MOL: words.

CHURCH: In point of publication is disturbing word "resistia." It, naturally it. We would prefer "Nazi" Germany.

MOL: Withdrawn stated. (re Hitlerite Ger).

CHURCH: Leave out "peat," goes without saying National Church, amusements.

H. OK with Pr.

ED: Ought make it clear how long it is to be given.

Shouldn't indicate we have decided the Fr. demand.

"Limits of the Fr. zone will be agreed by the 3 Govt's thru their reprs. on the EAC."

MOL: After II a new chap. on reparations.

We consider the Q. on the basis by Gov. of loss to Allied Govts in the war it is fair to exact from Ger. reparations in kind in the greatest poss. amt. to the greatest extent possible. A commission is created on reps. which will have as its task determining the amt. of reps.

The rule will sit in Mos.

FREE: Only 4, as whether it is worthwhile to have Sup. chairman or work it in. I can't find a good place.

HL: MOL after 1st 3 paragraphs add:

It has been also resolved to recommend to the govt. to invite the Ukr. (Ukraine) and Wh. R. (White Russia) as orig. members.

FREE: Very embarrassing to Ec.

CHURCH: If brought out pub now without any explanation by us, position will cause trouble.

3 Members of the War Cab. are objecting to the prin. of more than 1 vote. This only shows controversia it will raise. We are all pledged to it in the draft, conclusions.

I should have to ask for adjournment to consult governors. It might take several days. But we put it all down in the conclusions.

ST: Withdraw it. But in Mol. Paragraphs 4 and 5. These paragraphs should read as follows:

Concerning voting proc. in the Sec. Coun. of the projected org. contained with our early draft. Say they have no copy of last draft and "put forward by the pres."

MOL: If the level which we reached last night (Sir in unified draft of Brit. and Ams we didn't know it. It is agreed.

E.R.S. asked Pres. if it would affect him positively back home if "put forward by the Pres." is retained and Pres. said it would not, Pres. preferred to leave the phrase in.

P. M. wants to eliminate 1st sentence of Chap. V on pol. Chap. IV agreed to.

ED: Didn't Stty intervene: "We were impressed by the failure of any divergence of policy between the major allies toward Poland."

ST: Leave it out altogether.

CHURCH: Would prefer Ed's amended form.

ST: This is only a statement that proceedings of various representatives, Stettinius may have impressed, others not.

Pres. read our prepared new sentence.

Agreed.

CHURCH: Wants to say det. pol. will be very heavily attacked in Eng. It will be said we have yielded completely on the numbers and the whole matter to R."

ST.: Is it in earnest? I doubt it.

CHURCH: I assure you it is. Lon. Poles will raise a dreadful outcry.

ST.: But the other Poles will be dismayed.

CHURCH: I hope you're right. It's not going back on it. It's a q. of Sov. of Poles but of cause for which Brit drew sword. Will say you have completely swept away the only pol. govt. of Pol. However I will defend it to the last of my ability. Vi. Ing.

Pres. translate ATNOF.

ST: That's right, Nic. every one will understand.

CHU. agreed.

Prisoners of war.

ST. suggests mention of prisoners of war should be deleted.

CHU: It's a Q. among ourselves. We take doc. but not take to pub.

ED: Says he and Ed agreed some up in meeting for misunderstanding: But can be published?

Agreed be published separately when text completed this afternoon.

IX. UNRY O K with St. Publicity was dropped O K.

IX. Church: What does "wait" mean. "It means proviso on our desire."

Mol: Will this communique be signed by the heads of govt.

Pres: Just at at Teheran.

Should be signed first by S. because has been such a Wonderful host.

ST: I object.

CHURCH: If take alphabet I'll be first.

ST-AM Rho.

CHURCH: If you take age I also come first.

ST: If St. 10 signature will say he lead. Insists he be in last place who will take charge of final text.

CHURCH: Bridges.

ST: Perhaps to the For Min for final checking.

FEIS: Early.

ST: Vishinsky; he is not interested in lunch.

FEIS: For. Min. there to read it over in place of F. M., Mar and me.

ST: Who will make list of days, assign this task to somebody else. . . . . , for list of decisions prepared in the United States delegation, see page, P. ——

FEIS: On summary of conclusions re orgs cl. E. for present) entirely open to us with few changes.

CHURCH: Not for publication.

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

February 11, 1945, 4:20 P. M.

PRESENT
United States
Secretary Stettinius
United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Eden
Soviet Union
Foreign Commissar Molotov
(BOHLEN COLLECTION)
BOHLEN NOTE

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers to approve the "Summary of Proceedings of the Conference."

At this meeting, the discussion was almost entirely related to language and drafting problems. Mr. Eden, supported by Mr. Stettinius, proposed that Saudi Arabia be included among those countries which, if they declared war on the common enemy before March 1st, would be invited to attend the United Nations conference at San Francisco. Mr. Molotov said that he could not accept that proposal without reference to Marshal Stalin and suggested that, since time was so short, that it would be reserved for possible future consideration. Mr. Molotov's suggestion was accepted.

(HISS COLLECTION
HISS NOTES
2/11 4:20 P. M.

FEIS Crimea.

Final meeting of For. Secs.

EDE: Is subject to approval of ——————.

Sir Edward Bridges was communique.

Re D. O.

MOL: Marshal Stalin said should say what is said in conversations that was agreed at meeting and not that Presidents proposal had been adopted.

No objection if Mr. S. or anyone else should say this was the proposal of the Pres.

Is no other place is it said on whose motive it has been done.

EDE: This was discussed this morning in presence of Mol. and Pres. and I discussed it a night with Pres. Would be very diff. for me to agree.

Mol: Was to agt. on this special point.

We said we had another Q on this par.

Simultaneously with the pub. of com. you or someone say this was the proposal put forward by the Pres. We don't want to hush-hush this fact.

EDE: Agreed to eliminate the reference to Pres.

Re constitution.

Re on procedure—Us is to approach Ch. and Fr. favorable that consultation be done as soon as possible—48 hours if possible as will be great interest in the subject.

2/11
EDE Chair.
For mins.
(After intermission)
Summary of conclusions
P. 1 Mol: What would = the title: "Decisions."

Agreed: Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea underscore.

Main First phase.

The Crimean conf. of the 3 heads of the govts of U. S., B. E., U. S. and Ch. first which took place in the Crimea from Feb 4 to Feb 11 came to the following conclusions:

Ed: Would like to add South Arabia before Turkey.

Mol: Why?

Ed: They did want to declare war as we encouraged them.

Mol: This q was not discussed. There would then come there (i.e. new suggestions).

Ed: Good to have Moulton or two. Too hard to having —up of coffee with Pres.

E.R.S.: I have no objection. They have assisted in the progression of the war to some extent.

MOL: I don't know if Saudi Arabia will be much help. Think it over and consider at suj of proposal.

P. 2. San Francisco inserted.

MOL: I want to be there.

P. 3. E.R.S. "or in the preliminary consultations."

Agreed.

P. 5. Insert protocol replace of reparations section.

Agreed.

P. 6. E.R.S. agreed re Yug.

P. 10. E.R.S. suggests elect "among the for sec."

Suggests eliminate last sentence.

MOL: "Mr. Mol. agreed to this proposal."

EDEN: Should not say views will be conveyed "with any views" instead any could not be approved.

Pravda.

MOL: Suggests instead "Mr. Ed., Mr. S. and Mr. Mol. exchanged views on the sit. in Iran" otherwise eliminate altogether.

ED.: Add "it agreed that the matter would be pursued through the dip channel."

Montreux (underscored).

MOL.: After "convention" which ceased to correspond to the contemporary sit."

It's a hunt in regard to change.

E.R.S.: We should consider sh before give a hint.

ED.: Alternative: Proposals which it was understood the Soviet govt. would put forward in relation to the Montreux con.

Agreed to Ed. alternative with last sentence omitted.

ED.: We will inform the Turks.

MOL.: About the fact that this Q will be raised.

ED: Insert informal "at the appropriate moment."

MOL.: Insists on his amend.

ED: Willing to stop there and leave sentence point. Transmit to Pres. copy of what. protocol and of Ed. tels to.

Ed.: Submitted the draft cable of 48 C. re zone of occup and control com.

E.R.S.: Agreed.

MOL.: Didn't hear time to 1945.

Ed. gave to polish. subject May 31 but not sure then. Will give his answer tonight.

Saudi Arabia—Mol. to let Ed. know.

HISS COLLECTION
Working Draft of the Protocol of Proceedings Revised by the Foreign Ministers
February 11, 1945
CRIMEA CONFERENCE

Protocol of the proceedings of the Crimea conference.

The following conclusions were arrived at:—

I. World Organization

It was decided:

(1) That a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

(2) The nations to be invited to this conference should be:

(A) The United Nations as they existed on 1st/5th February 1945; and

(B) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term "associated nations" will mean that the eight Associated Nations and Turkey (margin: "and Saudi Arabia") and Soviet Republic, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

(3) That the United States Government on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

(4) That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

INVITATION

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of ——— to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th of April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of —— desires to submit observations or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating governments."

TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP

It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (A) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (B) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (C) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (D) by decisions of those states directly concerned which territories in general territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in the preliminary conversations and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

II. Declaration on Liberated Europe.

The following proposal has been approved:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means urgent political problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To bolster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the Governments will jointly assist the peoples in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where in the opinion of the three Governments conditions in that state may require, (a) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (b) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct concern to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated area or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, a pledge in the declaration by United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration the three powers express the hope that the provisional government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested."

III. Dismemberment of Germany

It was agreed that Article 12(A) of the surrender terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarization and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for the future peace and security."

The study of the proposal of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Eden (chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. Zone of Occupation for the French and Control Commission for Germany.

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Commission for Germany.

V. Reparation.

The following protocol has been approved:

It was agreed that a Reparation Commission should be set up in Moscow. This commission will comprise one representative from the U. S. A., U. K. S. R. and U. K., each representative being assisted by such expert advisers as may be necessary. The commission should begin its work as soon as possible.

It was agreed that the following should be the basic principles of exaction of reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

1. Reparations are to be presented in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labour as a way of reparations, this question is to be considered as a later one. reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the following forms:

(A) Removal in a single payment, in the end of the war from the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, rolling stock, German investments abroad, means of internal transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany etc.). These removals are to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

(B) Annual deliveries of commodities during 10 years after the end of the war.

3. Germany is to pay compensation in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations during the war and the Reparations Commission shall have the task of considering the amount of reparations to be paid.

VI. Major War Criminals.

The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference.

VII. Poland.

The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference: "A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish provisional government which can be more broadly based than has been possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional government which now exists should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Polish circles abroad. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties should have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with deviations from it in some regions of five to [illegible] kilometers in favour of Poland.

They recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should therefore await the peace conference.

VIII. Yugoslavia

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(A) That the Tito-Subasic agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement.

(B) That as soon as the new government has been formed it should declare:

(1) That the National Liberation Committee will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and

(2) That legislation will be passed by the National Liberation Committee will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

And that this statement should be published in the communique of the conference.

IX. Italo-Yugoslav Frontier

ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American-Soviet-Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations

There was an exchange of views among the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance.

The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state.

Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved.

Mr. Eden also suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. Southeastern Europe

The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(A) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.

(B) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.

(C) Oil equipment in Rumania.

XII. Persia

Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius drew attention to the importance of observing the tripartite treaty and the Teheran declaration of 1st December 1943, particularly in so far as concerned requests for all concessions in Persia.

XIII. Meetings of the three foreign secretaries.

The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three foreign secretaries. they should meet, as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. The Montreux Convention and the straits.

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three foreign secretaries to be held in London they should consider proposals which Soviet Govt. will make in regard to the Montreux Convention and report thereon to the three governments.

XV. Iran

Agreed that the Tripartite Commission, provided for in the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance with Iran of 29th January, 1942, should be asked to investigate and report to the three governments the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran, the time limit to be fixed, counting from the date of the cessation of hostilities with Germany.

XVI. Future Meetings

It was agreed that the next meeting of the Foreign Secretaries should be held in Moscow when the United States of America and United Kingdom delegations will be the guests of the Soviet Government.

XVII. Publication of Decisions

It was agreed that the decisions of the conference should be published at 10 A. M. Washington time on Wednesday, February 14th, simultaneously in Moscow, London and Washington.

United States Delegation Drafts of Announcements Regarding the United National Conference

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The proposals for a general international organization emerging from the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks have been considered, and agreed proposals have been worked out on the major points left open at those conversations.

Our views are being transmitted to the Government of China and to the Provisional Government of the French Republic for their consideration.

As soon as these consultations have been completed, the proposals agreed upon will be made public and invitations will be issued to a United Nations conference to be held in the United States about April 15.

This conference will prepare the charter of the general international organization.

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)

TOP SECRET
(Yalta) 11 February 1945

Argonaut 187 top secret. For Acting Secretary of State from Secretary Stettinius. To be delivered immediately.

1. The conference has agreed upon our proposal on voting procedure and we are to consult China and France on behalf of the other two powers.

The date of the United Nations conference has been fixed for April 25, 1945, and the location as San Francisco. The substance of the foregoing will be announced in the communique to be issued Monday night, for Tuesday morning's papers although the communique will not state that the voting procedure which was proposed by the United States.

2. It is however understood that we are to shortly simultaneously with the release of the communique to state that our proposal on voting procedure was the one that was adopted. Mr. Early is separately taking care of this latter statement, but if there is any slippage in the communique time you will wish to make that fact public at the time the communique is issued.

3. It is of the utmost urgency that our consultations with China and France be as brief as possible because of the interest throughout the world as to the substance of the voting procedure which are not to be made public until the consultation is completed.

Mr. Eden said at this afternoon's final meeting that he hoped the consultation could be completed within forty-eight hours. This will give you an indication of the urgency with which the matter must be handled.

4. The text of the invitation is agreed upon and ready for issue.

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of ——— to send representatives to a conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th of April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above-named governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:—

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of ——— desires to submit observations or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating governments."

5. It was agreed that the five Governments with permanent seats in the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships which would apply only to (A) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (B) territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of the war; and (C) any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

It was further agreed that no discussions of specific territories will take place during the preliminary consultations on functional conference (as to existing conference itself. Only machinery and principles of trusteeship will be formulated at the conference for inclusion in the Charter and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories within the categories specified above will actually be placed under trusteeship. I think that this subject should be covered in your conversations with China and France.

6. We are relying on you to conduct the consultation with France and China in such manner as seems to you most effective and most expeditious and thereafter to publish the text of the voting provisions in concert with the other two powers.

7. I am leaving tonight for Moscow for a visit of only one or two days and ask to reached through the embassy. Please cable me necessary of press and other public reaction to the communique as soon as it is available.

8. Alistair herewhere

(HISS COLLECTION)

United States delegation draft announcements regarding invitations to Saudi Arabia to attend the United Nations conference.

(Yalta) Feb. 11

It's Refused to Agree

Mr. Early

Please inform the President on behalf of Mr. Stettinius that at today's final meeting of the Foreign Ministers being shortly after the President left, Mr. Eden proposed and Mr. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius agreed that Saudi Arabia be added to the eight associated nations and Turkey as entitled to be invited to the United Nations conference on April 25 at San Francisco if they declare war by March 1.

We consider this as a desirable move and suggest that the President should inform Ibn Saud of this when the two meet in the next few days.

In any event Colonel Eddy, our minister who will accompany the King to the Quincy, should be informed of this and should inform Ibn. ——

Will you please give the above information also to Admiral Leahy and to Admiral Brown.

(Roosevelt Papers), Telegram.

The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Administrative Assistant (Daniels).

TOP SECRET
(YALTA) 11 February 1945
From Secretary Early to Jonathan Daniels, White House.

Communique text will be dispatched tonight. Sent you two declarations today, one on Poland and the second on liberated Europe. Emergent provisions on structure and insert these texts where indicated in communique and title "Declaration on Poland" and insert without title in text of communique according to instructions to come. About one hundred words from beginning make read "are authorized as a commission to consult" instead "are authorized to consult." About fifty four words from end make read "they recognized that Poland" instead "it is recognized."

The following statement should be prepared for release simultaneous with communique but should be given out as a separate story, not even as an annex. "A comprehensive agreement was reached at the Crimea Conference providing detailed arrangements for the protection, maintenance and repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians of the British Commonwealth, American, Union and United States liberated by the Allied forces now invading Germany.

Under these arrangements each ally will provide food, clothing, medical attention and other needs for the nationals of the others until transport is available for their repatriation. In caring for British subjects and American citizens the Soviet Government will be assisted by British and American officers. Soviet officers will assist British and American authorities in their task of caring for Soviet citizens liberated by the British and American forces during such time they are on the Continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom.

We are pledging to give every assistance consistent with operational requirements to help to ensure that all these prisoners of war and civilians are speedily repatriated.

... BOHLEN COLLECTION .

United States Delegation List of Tripartite Decisions at Yalta

List of decisions arrived at by the three heads of government at the Crimean conference.

1. To include the word "dismemberment" in the German terms of surrender.

2. To appoint a commission composed of Mr. Eden, Ambassador Winant and Ambassador Gousev to study the question of dismemberment.

3. To adopt proposal of the United States with respect to the voting procedure in the Security Council of the proposed world organization.

4. To hold a United Nations conference on April 25, 1945, in the United States, to prepare the charter of the proposed world organization.

5. To authorize The United States, on behalf of the three powers, to consult the Government of China and the provisional Government of France with respect to Decisions 2 and 4.

6. That the five governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult with each other prior to the United Nations conference on providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships which would apply only to (A) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (B) territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of the war; and (C) any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

It was agreed that no discussions of specific territories will take place during the preliminary consultations on functional conference (as to existing conference itself. Only machinery and principles of trusteeship will be formulated at the conference for inclusion in the Charter and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories within the categories specified above will actually be placed under trusteeship. I think that this subject should be covered in your conversations with China and France.

7. That the consultation with France and China in such manner as seems to you most effective and most expeditious and thereafter to publish the text of the voting provisions in concert with the other two powers.

8. That the five governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult with each other prior to the United Nations conference on providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships which would apply only to (A) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (B) territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of the war; (C) any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

It was agreed it would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the preceding categories would actually be placed under trusteeship and that no discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations conference.

9. That the United States and the United Kingdom to support, at the United Nations conference, the Soviet request that the Ukraine and White Russia be admitted as initial members of the world organization.

10. To issue the statement on Poland agreed to at the conference.

11. That there should be immediately established in Moscow a consultative commission of German representatives composed of Mr. Molotov, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Mr. Harriman, which would be guided by the following agreed principles: (A) Germany must pay in kind for losses caused by it to the Allied governments. (B) the amount of reparations to be paid by Germany should be considered by the Moscow Reparations Commission and reported by it to the three governments; (C) the three governments will submit to the commission those proposals and data relating to the question of German reparations.

12. To issue the declaration on liberated Europe agreed to at the conference.

13. To accord to the provisional government of France a German zone of occupation, and representation on the German control commission.

14. To send a joint telegram to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic, the text of which was agreed to at the conference.

15. To hold periodic meetings of the three foreign ministers, the first meeting to be held in London in June, 1945.

16. That, at their next meeting, the three foreign ministers will consider revision of the Montreux convention.

(Hiss Collection)

British Drafts of Telegrams to General de Gaulle

(Yalta, February 11, 1945)

Draft telegram to General de Gaulle from three heads of governments (to be communicated to General de Gaulle by the ambassadors of the three powers in Paris at the same time as the publication of the communique).

You will observe that the communique which we are issuing at the end of the conference contains, at Appendix, a declaration on liberated Europe.

You will also see that, in the last paragraph of the declaration, we express the hope that your government may be associated with us in the union and procedure suggested.

Had circumstances permitted we should have greatly welcomed discussion with you of the terms of this declaration. The terms are, however, less important than the joint obligation to take action in certain eventualities; and we feel that it is of the highest importance, in the interests of Europe, that

Statements on War Prisoners and Other Matters as Drawn Up by the Conference

the Provisional Government at once to the conclusion that it will be highly desirable for the French Republic should agree, jointly with her three Allies, to accept such an obligation.

Draft telegram to General de Gaulle from three heads of governments:

We have been considering the question of the control of Germany after her defeat and have arrived

OTHER CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

which means physical assistance by U. S. transports other British trans-Atlantic shipping is primarily of large type. This changes U. S. conception at time of original British request, referred to in Paragraph 1 above when it was understood all movement would be in British ships at cost to U. S. transport capabilities which it was estimated could be accepted.

* * *

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov), conveying the enclosures, "sets out the components of Dr. Eden.")

SECRET

(Yalta), 5th February, 1945.

You will remember that during the Moscow conversations of last October I discussed with you and with Marshal Stalin the question of calling in and pooling all agreements with them about the treatment of Soviet citizens liberated by the Allied armies in Western and Southern Europe and Italy and Austrians and Germans liberated by the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. The Yalta Charter of Hull agreement on the draft text of such an agreement, yesterday and I understand that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be taking it today. As I agreed that the text is approved by the United Kingdom and U. S. Governments respectively for Allied forces in the field, we shall be in a position to take the matter up with Soviet forces in the east of Europe as soon as possible.

In present circumstances, where the Soviet forces are more than 100 miles nearer to Berlin than the British and United States frontier at present, I realize that you may think very late, and we should know that a number of British prisoners of war (though not recovered) how many are to be released from Soviet hands and no doubt some United States prisoners of war may be in Soviet hands. I am glad to say that it is really urgent to reach that a similar draft was put forward to the United States Government on this draft agreement covered at the same time.

In view of the congested character of the Allied communications in western and southern Europe, it seems to be essential, if chaos is to be avoided during the latter part of this agreement should be brought into force as soon as possible. I would suggest that this agreement should also be applied to the same Britannic and Soviet experts, so that agreement can be reached upon it during the present conference.

I hope very much that you will agree with these suggestions and will instruct your experts to meet their British and American colleagues at once. I tell that the conclusion of this agreement would be a very happy result of the present conference and would give the greatest satisfaction in our two countries where so many families are affectionately there.

I have given a copy of this letter to Mr. Stettinius.

I enclose a copy and the British redraft of the suggested agreement.

(ENCLOSURE)

Redraft of Soviet Government's draft relating to prisoners of war and civilians liberated by the Soviet armies and Allied armies.

ARTICLE .

All Soviet citizens [herein] by forces operating under Allied command and British subjects and American citizens liberated by the Soviet forces will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been [duly] sent to the Soviet or Allied authorities as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

Allied and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

ARTICLE .

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other contracting party regarding citizens or subjects of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to [comply with all the] provisions of this agreement. Soviet and Allied repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens or subjects are located and they will have the right to appoint the [camp] administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transference of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are [sufficient] officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander [who will appoint a commandant, who will have the final responsibility for the internal administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned].

The removal of camps as well as the transfer from the camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

ARTICLE 3.

Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of U. N. R. R. A. (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent Allied and Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens and subjects of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the normal posture relating to military rank.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for [the] or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens or subjects of the other contracting party.

ARTICLE 4.

Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party. Similarly, each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party.

ARTICLE 5.

Soviet and Allied military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective Governments to liberated subjects and citizens of the other contracting party in the competent Soviet and Allied authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and Allied Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens or subjects, necessary settlements with the Government of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

ARTICLE 6.

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may until their repatriation, be employed on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with the military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces or civilian who is unwilling to perform such work will be exempt from any obligation to perform such work.

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Washington, February 7, 1945.

War Department has just made available message dated February 7 from Marshall which indicates that J. C. S. in February 2 approved with certain changes British preliminary text as agreement with Soviet Union for exchange of prisoners of war and apparently also [liberated] persons. (This is our message No. 27) While it is not definitely clear what preliminary British text is referred to, it is in the preliminary text included in J. C. S. 1266—(not printed. See text agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.) The agreement would not appear to cover the following specific points which were incorporated in the United States counterproposals forwarded to J. C. S. Staff with you:

1. Protection of Geneva Convention which we have informed Soviet Government we will accord to Soviet citizens [interned in Germany, unless they demand such protection].

2. Soviet citizens in the United States not prisoners of war whose cases the Attorney General feels should be dealt with on basis of traditional American policy of asylum.

3. Persons liberated by United States forces no longer in their custody.

4. Question of the liberation and repatriation of other United Nations citizens.

5. Persons claimed as citizens by the Soviet authorities who were not Soviet citizens prior to outbreak of war and do not now claim Soviet citizenship.

(Alleged horsetrade) It is felt that these questions and others referred to in JCS 1266/1 should be brought to your attention in order that consideration may be given to them before final agreement is reached.

* * *

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew).

(Paraphrase)

TOP SECRET

(Yalta, February 8, 1945)

Argument 127. The text of the British redraft referred to in your No. 400 of February 8 (II) is a redraft of the Soviet redraft submitted to

[(I) The date is not given on the paraphrase and the original text has not been found. Internal evidence would indicate February 8 as the most likely date.

(II) This is the telegram of February 7, (supra) the American and British governments of January 20 and is a SHARP paper in origin. Subsequently the British have made a few changes in it which without reservation I feel we can accept.]

This draft the British are most anxious to give to the Soviets today for their consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree fully. Insofar as we are concerned, I can see no objections to the redraft and have authorized separate documents based on it. This draft does not cover the numbered points given in your telegram under reference which were given in the Department of State's note to the Soviet Embassy dated February 1. (III).

[(III) Not printed. This note dealt with the application of the Geneva Convention to certain prisoners of war of Russian origin who were in German uniform when captured by United States forces.]

Here the comment is invited on our military, that it would not be wise to include matters regarding the protection of prisoners of war connection with Soviet citizens in the United States in an agreement which covers primarily the exchange of German [illegible] Russia as the Soviet [illegible] prompt [illegible] the [illegible] in the [illegible] Kingdom

ROOSEVELT PAPERS

The Secretary of State to the President

(Yalta), February 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Article VII of the Armistice Agreement

Before I left Washington Mr. Clayton left me that the British were anxious that we should never maintain Article VII. For this reason Mr. Churchill has attempted to persuade me that you are not in favor of [illegible] This [illegible] on the part of the Prime Minister has tended to encourage the British to take an attitude on the [illegible] Empire [illegible] matters.

I think it would be [illegible] this question at the Prime Ministers meeting. I find that we are both in accord with the important fact that, whatever the Italian armistice and action have been in the past few years, we are faced with a real problem of the future Italy and will remain so important factor in Europe whatever we may think of the present.

It is surely in our joint interest for us to do whatever we properly can to foster her progress in recuperation by developing return to normal democratic processes, the development of her own responsibilities and the other steps as necessary in preparing the long hard road of Italy's return to the community of peace-loving democratic states. To this end I believe we are both agreed that we must give her both spiritual and material help. I am impressed with the dangers for us both in Italy's present condition of semi-anarchy and of the fact that those who fish in troubled waters will be the only ones to gain from her present conditions approaching [illegible]. I know that our soldiers share this view and feel that there is definite inherent danger in the situation to our joint military operations.

I believe that some constructive steps should be taken to move away from the present clandestine situation of coercion and obsolete surrender terms which are no longer pertinent to the situation today. I hope that Foreign Office and the State Department will be able to work out some mutually satisfactory procedure to satisfy this [illegible] Department].

As you know, we accepted the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive to General Alexander along the lines suggested by Mr. Macmillan. Although we felt that the directive was greatly watered down and much of its substance lost, we went along with you in the hope that we may reach some agreement on further steps in the near future.

At any rate, I want you to [illegible] Russia on the Advisory Commission are both attending. Since [illegible] conference. Since Secretary Stettinius and I decided to exclude [illegible] from the conference, I wish to make the following brief report to you.

The United States Government, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have approved without reservation the unconditional surrender instrument, the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and the agreement on control machinery. (1) If the control machinery is to be made an effective instrument, it will be necessary to obtain [illegible] agreements between the three governments on directives to the [illegible] commanders in chief which are in fact agreements between the three powers on basic policies. The directives are on broad lines without detailing and provide a groundwork for Allied cooperation in dealing with [illegible] problems that affect Germany. I hope these directives will have your support.

China

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State (excerpt).

Washington, February 5, 1945.

TOP SECRET

1. Soviet-Chinese conversations. Chiang Kai-shek and Soong have assumed Hurley that the Soviet Government has agreed to receive Soong as a personal representative of the Generalissimo either late in February or early in March. Discussions will cover establishment of closer relations, Soviet participation in the war against Japan, Soviet-Chinese relations in Korea and Manchuria, post-war economic matters and the Sino-Soviet border. Hurley invites suggestions regarding this agenda for Chiang. He desires full cooperation. Hurley points out that in September conversations Molotov referred to him that Russians are supporting Chinese Communists who are not Communists and desires closer relations with China. Molotov also stated that Russia does not want dismemberment of China. Chiang is [illegible] whether this represents Soviet attitude. [illegible] sixteenth message [illegible] Acting Secretary to the Secretary since the departure of Hurley from Washington.]

United States-British Policy in Italy

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew).

Yalta, 7 February 1945.

SECRET

Argument 45. Ref your [illegible] clearly stated in the minutes of the American memorandum [illegible] the COAC, the report [illegible] which was finally [illegible] on Italy [illegible] as far as [illegible] what we believed it would [illegible] and has in it no little or no [illegible] for the Italians, that [illegible] would have a disappointing [illegible] which would [illegible] U. S. and in Italy [illegible] great initiative and [illegible] the idea of having us [illegible] that was what [illegible] on the Italian [illegible] that [illegible] of your [illegible] moral and material [illegible] would result from the discussion on the Mediterranean problem [illegible] has anticipated to be [illegible] and gives some [illegible] reasons to [illegible] some [illegible] at this time. Mat[illegible] I discussed this matter with Ambassador Kirk and he generally shares our view [illegible] somewhat.

* * *

ROOSEVELT PAPERS

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

(Yalta), February 11, 1945.

Dear Winston: You have expressed some concern with regard to our different viewpoints concerning the policy to be pursued about Italy. I am happy to tell you that Mr. Matthews on behalf of the Department of State went over the ground on the matter with Alec Cadogan yesterday afternoon. As a result of their conversation, Matthews reports that although there are admittedly some differences in emphasis in our respective viewpoints, there seems to be no basis for any [illegible] between us. I find that we are both in accord with the important fact that, whatever the Italian armistice and action have been in the past few years, we are faced with a real problem of the future Italy and will remain an important factor in Europe whatever we may think of the present.

It is surely in our joint interest for us to do whatever we properly can to foster her progress in recuperation by developing return to normal democratic processes, the development of her own responsibilities and the other steps as necessary in preparing the long hard road of Italy's return to the community of peace-loving democratic states. To this end I believe we are both agreed that we must give her both spiritual and material help. I am impressed with the dangers for us both in Italy's present condition of semi-anarchy and of the fact that those who fish in troubled waters will be the only ones to gain from her present conditions approaching [illegible]. I know that our soldiers share this view and feel that there is definite inherent danger in the situation to our joint military operations.

I believe that some constructive steps should be taken to move away from the present clandestine situation of coercion and obsolete surrender terms which are no longer pertinent to the situation today. I hope that Foreign Office and the State Department will be able to work out some mutually satisfactory procedure to satisfy this [illegible] Department].

As you know, we accepted the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive to General Alexander along the lines suggested by Mr. Macmillan. Although we felt that the directive was greatly watered down and much of its substance lost, we went along with you in the hope that we may reach some agreement on further steps in the near future.

At any rate, I want you to [illegible] Transport

know that we are determined to pull together with you in Italy as we are in other areas and that we believe that by full and continuous consultation and goodwill on both sides there is no danger of any serious split between us on this important question.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Subjects for Discussion Through Diplomatic Channels

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov).

Copy bears notation: "Mr. Stettinius with Mr. Eden's compliments."

Alepha, 11th February, 1945

Owing to lack of time there are a few questions on which we were not able to conclude our discussions during the Crimea conference. These were

(A) The Austro-Yugoslav frontier.

(B) The Italo-Yugoslav frontier (Venezia Giulia)

You kindly undertook to study the suggestions on these matters contained in the papers which I circulated at the Foreign Secretaries meeting on February 10. With regard to (A) you will remember that the United States delegation expressed certain doubts regarding the [phraseology of our proposal]. I therefore submit a redraft of my note which I would ask you to submit for the one in your possession.

(C) At our meeting on February 10 I mentioned our attitude towards a pact between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and suggested that an indication of our views might be conveyed to the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments. You said that you would consider my suggestion.

I also circulated at our meeting on February 10 papers on the subject of

(D) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly in regard to reparations.

(E) The Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Bulgaria.

(F) Oil equipment in Rumania.

I should be grateful if you would consider the points raised in the foregoing three papers.

May I also ask you to give favorable consideration to the proposals regarding

(G) Relief supplies for Europe, contained in a paper which I enclosed in a separate letter today and

(H) The despatch of personnel to the Soviet component of the Control Commission for Germany in London, in regard to which I attach a memorandum.

On all these matters I suggest that, after the close of the Crimea Conference, discussion should proceed through the diplomatic channel.

Molotov V. M. Molotov.

SIGNED AGREEMENTS EXCHANGE OF NOTES

BOHLEN COLLECTION

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin.

TOP SECRET

(Yalta), February 10, 1945

My dear Marshal Stalin: I have been thinking, as I must, of possible political difficulties which I might encounter in the United States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three great powers will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure wholehearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the world organization to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you would perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference. I would greatly appreciate your letting me have your views in reply to this letter. I shall, of course, keep them completely secret.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

BOHLEN COLLECTION

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Top Secret

(Yalta) February 10, 1945.

Dear Winston:

As I said the other day, I am somewhat concerned over the political difficulties I am apt to encounter in the United States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three great powers will have only a single vote in the Assembly. I understand from our conversation that you would have no objection if I found it necessary to seek some way of giving the United States additional votes in order to have parity. I am writing you this letter alone I know you understand as well as I do the political situation in the United States and I hope in reply to this letter you can give me your agreement to the suggestion I

I find it necessary for our public opinion to make some proposal along those lines at the forthcoming United Nations Conference.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have written to Marshal Stalin on the same subject.

Most sincerely your,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

BOHLEN COLLECTION

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

(Yalta), February 11, 1945

My Dear Franklin:

I have given consideration to your letter of February 10 about the political difficulties which might arise in the United States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three great powers will have only one vote in the assembly.

Our position is that we maintained the long established representation of the British Empire and Commonwealth, that the Soviet Government are represented by its chief members and the two republics of the Ukraine and White Russia; and that the United States should propose the form in which their undisputed equality with every other member state should be expressed.

I feel hardly anxious you should [illegible] everything possible to assist you in this matter.

Yours very sincerely,

WINSTON CHURCHILL

BOHLEN COLLECTION

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

(Translation)

appears on the original

Kuvin, February 13, 1945.

Dear Mr. Roosevelt: I have received your letter of February 10. I entirely agree with you that, since the number of votes for the Soviet Union is incongruous to three in connection with the inclusion of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia among the members of the Assembly, the number of votes for the U. S. A. should also be increased.

I think that the number of votes for the U. S. A. might be increased to three as in the case of the Soviet Union and of the two republics. If it is necessary I am prepared officially to support this proposal.

With sincere regards

J. Stalin.

TRILATERAL DOCUMENTS

Communique Issued at the End of the Conference

REPORT OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

For the past eight days Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain; Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America and Marshal J. V. Stalin, chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have met with the foreign secretaries, chiefs of staff and other advisers in the Crimea.

In addition to the three heads of government, the following took part in the conference:

For the United States of America:

Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Secretary of State.

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. N., Chief of staff to the President.

Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President.

Justice James F. Byrnes, director, Office of War Mobilization.

General of the Army George C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. N., chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, commanding General, Army Service Forces.

Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator.

Major General L. S. Kuter, U. S. A., staff of commanding general, U. S. Army Air Forces.

W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U. S. S. R.

H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department.

Alger Hiss, deputy director of special Political Affairs, Department of State.

Charles E. Bohlen, assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisers.

For the United Kingdom:

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport.

Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow.

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Sir Edward Bridges, secretary of the War Cabinet.

Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord.

Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence.

Together with

Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.

Field Marshal Wilson, head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington.

Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington together with military and diplomatic advisers.

For the Soviet Union:

V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R.

Admiral Kuznetsov, People's Commissar for the Navy.

Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

A. Y. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R.

I. M. Maisky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R.

Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov.

F. T. Gousev, Ambassador in Great Britain.

A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in U. S. A.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America and the chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the conference.

1. THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

We have considered and decided the military plans of the three Allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allied [illegible] before, the fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope and coordination of the new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the East, West, North and South have been fully agreed and [illegible] in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future wherever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only realize the cost of their defeat heaped to themselves by attempting the [illegible] impossible.

II. THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed.

These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a Central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the Three Powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces, break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the devastation wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public offices and from the cultural and economic life of the German people and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when barbarism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the family of nations.

III. REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the United Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A commission for the computation of damage will be established. The commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied country. The commission will work in Moscow.

IV. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our Allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference hastens able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25th, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

V. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

We have drawn up and subscribed to a declaration on liberated Europe. This declaration provides for concerting the policies of the three powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the declaration is as follows:

Declaration on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of France

The Provisional Government of France and the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe in order to concert and coordinate during the temporary period immediately after the termination of organized resistance in Germany the measures to be jointly undertaken to discharge the joint responsibilities resting upon them to assist the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the countries which formerly were her satellites in Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of peace, which will command the support of the overwhelming majority of the world, and which will lay the foundations for security for many generations to come, is the first duty laid upon the United Nations. They are determined to fulfill this duty in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national life must be achieved by processes which will allow the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and the provisional authorities or other governments in exile in connection with matters referred to in this declaration when in the opinion of the three governments it is appropriate to do so.

By mutual consent, the governments concerned will keep the European Advisory Commission informed of any action taken under the provisions of this declaration.

Done in the Crimea this eleventh day of February, 1945.

Joseph V. Stalin

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Winston S. Churchill

Agreements Prepared by the European Advisory Commission Regarding Germany

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State.

No. 2071.

(London) 9 February 1945.

I have the honor to inform you that Mr. Eden, Mr. William Strang (representing Great Britain on the European Advisory Commission), Alexander Cadogan, who represented

U. S.-Soviet Agreement Covered the Disposition of Released Prisoners and Civilians

united with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration of the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

VI. POLAND

We came to the Crimea conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussion we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish provisional government of national unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major powers.

The agreement reached is as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

VII. YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed, it should declare that:

"The portion reading, 'It should declare that:' is handwritten in the original and initialed in the margin by Charles E. Bohlen.

(1) The anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary parliament; and

(2) Legislative acts passed by the anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.'

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

"The words "anti-Fascist Assembly of" are handwritten on the original, as is also "(AVNOJ)", the latter replacing the word "committee" as typed. These changes are initialed in the margin, as in the case mentioned in the previous footnote.

VIII. MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the conference, besides the daily meetings of the heads of governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations conference on world organization.

IX. UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with continuing and growing cooperation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
J. STALIN

February 11, 1945.

Protocol of Proceedings

Released to the press by the Department of State March 24, 1947.

Protocol of the proceedings of the Crimea conference.

The Crimea conference of the heads of the governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to 11th came to the following conclusions:

I. WORLD ORGANIZATION

It was decided:

(1) That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945 and should be held in the United States of America.

(2) The nations to be invited to this conference should be:

(A) The United Nations as they existed on the 8th February, 1945; and

(B) Such of the associated nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term "associated nation" was meant the eight associated nations and Turkey.) When the conference on world organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and the United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

(3) That the United States Government on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

(4) That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations conference should be as follows:

Invitation

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of —— to send representatives to a conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th of April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. Voting

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of —— desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating governments.

Territorial Trusteeship

It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

II. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

"The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

"To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise those rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

"The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

"When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

"By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

"In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (A) of the surrender terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarization and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Eden (chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

(The word "council" is a substitution, in handwriting, for "commission" as typed. The change is not initialed in margin.)

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms: (The word "is" is handwritten, replacing "are" as typed. The change is not initialed in margin.)

(A) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(B) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

(C) Use of German labor.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparations Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America. (The original bears the notation in handwriting at this point: "This to be added as in protocol." The title was not added, but the following was inserted in handwriting: "The heads of the three governments have agreed as follows:" The change is not initialed in margin.)

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (A) and (B) of the Paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50 per cent of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparations Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference.

VII. POLAND

The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. (The phrase "of the western part of Poland" read "of western Poland" as typed, but was revised by hand in the original, with no initials in the margin.) The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government, and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three heads of government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."

VIII. YUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(A) That the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement.

(B) That as soon as the new government has been formed it should declare:

(1) That the anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

(As typed, this sub-paragraph began "That the National Liberation Committee." The changes were made in handwriting, with the initials of Charles E. Bohlen in the margin.)

(2) That legislative acts passed by the anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; (As typed, this sub-paragraph began "That the National Liberation Committee." The changes were made in handwriting with the initials of Charles E. Bohlen in the margin) and that this statement should be published in the communiqué of the conference.)

IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER

Italo-Austria Frontier.—(No [illegible] on the Italian-Austrian frontier has been found. Examination of the minutes of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10, of the British proposals submitted thereto and of the British note of February 11 suggests that the heading "Italo-Austria Frontier" should read "Austro-Yugoslav Frontier.")

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(A) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.

(B) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.

(C) Oil equipment in Rumania.

XII. IRAN

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and M. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. (Changed by hand from "Persia" as typed in the original. No initials in the margin.) It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their governments. (The original as typed the phrase at the end of this sentence read "to the three governments." The change was made by hand with no initials in the margin.) The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The foregoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean conference, February 11, 1945.

E. R. Stettinius Jr.
V. Molotov
Anthony Eden



THESE PENCILED NOTATIONS are part of the Yalta papers made public last night. They were identified as "apparently in Stettinius' handwriting except for Hiss' notation at the top." Secretary Stettinius' notes referred to San Francisco as a likely site for United Nations conference. Hiss' note at top says, "Also cleared with Byrnes re transportation aspect—exp. [word illegible] order forbidding travel to [word obscured] nations."

Protocol on German Reparation

Released to the press by Department of State March 24 1947.

Protocol on the talks between the heads of the three governments at the Crimean conference on the question of the German reparation in kind.

The heads of the three governments agreed as follows:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind are to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

A. Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

B. Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

C. Use of German labor.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives, one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (A) and (B) of the Paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
J. STALIN.

February 11, 1945.

Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan

(Released to the press by the Department of State March 24 1947.)

TOP SECRET AGREEMENT

The leaders of the three great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:

(A) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

(B) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U. S. S. R. restored,

(C) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U. S. S. R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

J. STALIN
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

February 11, 1945.

BILATERAL DOCUMENT

Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning liberated prisoners of war and civilians.

(Released to the press by the Department of State, March 8, 1946, printed as Department of State executive agreement series No. 505, also in 59 Stat 1874.)

Agreement relating to prisoners of war and civilians liberated by forces operating under Soviet command and forces operating under United States of America command.

The Government of the United States of America on the one hand and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other hand, wishing to make arrangements for the care and repatriation of United States citizens freed by forces operating under Soviet command and for Soviet citizens freed by forces operating under United States command, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1

All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United States command and all United States citizens liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

United States and Soviet military authorities will respectively take the necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

ARTICLE 2

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens of the contracting party found by them, and will at the same time take the necessary steps to implement the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and United States repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the dispatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of an access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified by agreement with the competent Soviet or United States authorities. The removal of camps and transfer of liberated citizens may, in exceptional circumstances, also be effected without preliminary agreement provided the competent authorities are immediately notified of such removal or transfer with a statement of the reasons. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

ARTICLE 3

The competent United States and Soviet authorities will supply liberated citizens with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall, subject to the provisions of Article 8, be fixed on a basis for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers. The basis fixed for civilians shall as far as possible be the same as that fixed for privates.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens of the other contracting party.

ARTICLE 4

Each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens held by the other contracting party.

ARTICLE 5

Soviet and United States military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective Governments to liberated citizens of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and United States authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated nonenemy territory, the Soviet and United States Governments will effect, each for advances made

End of the Yalta Documents

to their citizens necessary arrangements with the Governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

ARTICLE 6

Ex-prisoners of war and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and United States authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labor shall be determined by agreement between these authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers.

ARTICLE 7

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

ARTICLE 8

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

ARTICLE 9

This agreement shall come into force on signature.

Done at the Crimea in duplicate and in the English and Russian languages, both being equally authentic, this eleventh day of February, 1945.

For the Government of the United States of America:
JOHN R. DEANE.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
LIEUTENANT GENERAL GRYZLOV.

POST-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

EDITORIAL NOTE

In the course of compiling the present volume a few hitherto unpublished documents were found in which important participants at the Yalta Conference made authoritative statements on the proceedings, or portions of the proceedings, at the conference itself. Since these statements supplement the contemporary conference record, they have been reproduced at this point.

For previously published statements by participants regarding the proceedings at Yalta, the reader may wish to consult the following: [illegible] ... Charles E. Bohlen, nomination of Charles E. Bohlen to be United States Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 83d Cong., 1st sess. passim.

HISS COLLECTION

The director of the office of special political affairs (Hiss) to the Secretary of State (carbon copy).

Secret

(Washington), March 19, 1945

1. Attached is a draft message from the President to Marshal Stalin along the lines you indicated to Mr. Raynor over the telephone Saturday. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky strongly recommend that the President should not at this time send a message to Stalin on this subject for the reason that there are three or four other urgent matters of great importance which will require messages of this nature. (One of these has already been sent.) Mr. Dunn feels that it will rob this method of communication of its true importance when so many messages are sent at once. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky feel that you should take this matter up yourself with Ambassador Gromyko along the lines of the attached outline of points to be made.

2. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky also feel strongly that we should not attempt, at least at this time, to get out of the commitment on this subject which was made at the Crimea. They, therefore, think that any message from the President that might be sent despite their recommendation should not go into that subject and should be limited simply to the precise issue raised by Gromyko last Saturday.

(It appears that the proposed telegram from Roosevelt to Stalin was not sent, but that a note was sent by Stettinius to Gromyko on March 29, 1945, indicating that at Yalta "no obligation whatsoever was assumed in regard to the question of the presence of representatives of these republics at San Francisco.")

(ATTACHMENT 1)

Secret

Draft message from the President to Marshal Stalin.

Last Saturday Ambassador Gromyko informed the State Department that a party of thirty representatives of the Ukraine and White Russian Soviet Republics would arrive at San Francisco to attend the conference. I feel certain that there must be some misunderstanding about this communication. During the Crimean Conference it was very clearly settled that these two republics would not be invited to send representatives to San Francisco and would not be separately represented there. It was agreed that the United States and the United Kingdom would support at San Francisco a Soviet proposal, to be presented at the conference when the question of initial membership is under discussion there, that the two republics be included among the initial members of the United Nations Organization when created.

I want you to know that since my return to Washington I have been giving this matter very considerable thought. I have in particular been considering how the objectives you have in mind could be carried out most effectively. Quite frankly the difficulties, both in relation to the effect on American public support for the proposed organization and to the attitude of other governments, seem to be far greater than I had realized. I expect to communicate further with you on that aspect of the matter later, but in the meantime I should appreciate it if you would take steps to clear up the misunderstanding which has led to Ambassador Gromyko's communication of Saturday.

(ATTACHMENT 2)

SECRET

Memorandum of points to be made by the Secretary in talking to Ambassador Gromyko.

1. I am very much disturbed about the statement made to Mr. Dunn last Saturday.

2. It was clearly settled at the Crimean conference that the two republics would not be invited to San Francisco and would not be separately represented there.

3. In accordance with this decision, no invitations have been issued to them.

4. It would be most embarrassing and contrary to the Crimean arrangements if their representatives should come to San Francisco.

5. Ambassador Gromyko should take this up with his Government immediately and have any misunderstanding eliminated.

(ATTACHMENT 3)

SECRET

Memorandum of decisions reached at the Crimean conference in the matter of the two Soviet republics. (Although this memorandum is not referred to as an attachment in the covering memorandum, it appears to have been prepared as an accompaniment to the memorandum of March 19. The author was presumably Hiss.)

The Soviet representatives proposed that two or three of the Soviet republics should be invited to the San Francisco conference and should become initial members of the organization.

This matter was referred to the foreign ministers for consideration. At the foreign ministers' meeting Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden jointly agreed that in the course of the San Francisco conference the Soviet representatives would propose that the Ukraine and White Russian Republics be named as initial members of the organization and that this proposal would be supported by the British representatives. Mr. Stettinius said that he would have to reserve his position. This meeting was held at the British delegation's headquarters with Mr. Eden presiding. A drafting committee composed of Mr. Jebb, Ambassador Gromyko and Mr. Hiss was appointed to draft the report of this meeting, to be read at the next plenary session by Mr. Eden as chairman of that day's meeting of the foreign ministers. The draft agreed upon by the drafting committee was in the foregoing sense. Subsequently, without clearing with or informing Mr. Hiss or, presumably, Ambassador Gromyko, the British representatives changed the report so that it stated that representatives of both the United Kingdom and the United States will support the proposal to admit the Soviet republics to original membership. The British representatives said that they had cleared this change with Mr. Stettinius but this was not the case, as he did not understand that any such issue was presented to him. At the afternoon plenary session Mr. Eden read the revised report and before the matter could be clarified the President expressed his agreement as a matter of policy.

The question of whether or not the two Soviet republics should adhere to the United Nations Declaration prior to April 25 and the question of whether they should be invited to the conference were both discussed fully at the plenary session and a negative decision was reached on each point.

* * *

HISS COLLECTION

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss). The copy is unsigned, but the author was presumably Hiss.

SECRET

Excerpts from handwritten notes of plenary session of February 6, 1945.

Dictated at San Francisco, June 3, 1945, on the basis of longhand notes made during the meeting of February 6, held at Livadia Palace, Yalta.

President Roosevelt asked Mr. Stettinius to explain the United States' proposal on the voting formula at Mr. Stettinius was at Dumbarton Oaks and none of the three heads of delegation was. The President said that he felt strongly that people are going to insist on getting something that will insure peace, not for all time, but say for fifty years.

Mr. Stettinius then read "Statement on the American Position on Voting in the Council," and concluded by making further remarks based upon the memorandum entitled "Supplementary Arguments for Use of Secretary." He concluded by expressing the hope that America's two great allies would be able to agree with the American proposal.

The President then suggested that Mr. Stettinius read the types of decisions which would require unanimity of the permanent members under the American proposal. The President's suggestion was agreed to and Mr. Stettinius then read the bottom half of Page 1 and all of Pages 2 and 3 of the memorandum entitled "Formula for Voting Procedure in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization and the Analysis of the Effects of That Formula." (He did not read again the actual proposed voting formula which is set forth in the first half of Page 1 in the memorandum under reference. Before he read from this Mr. Stettinius distributed copies of it to the British and Soviet delegations.)

In reading from the memorandum Mr. Stettinius specifically distinguished between the two categories of questions. In reading the first group of topics he said: "I shall first present six situations in which the unanimity of the great powers must be maintained at all times." Before reading the second list of items he said: "I shall now read the situation which also require affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council, including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party, in other words unanimity except when involved to which it is a party in other words unanimity except when involved in a dispute."

The President then stated that that ended the reading and the explanation of the procedure involved in the American proposal. He said then that we have to remember that the objectives of the five great nations and of all nations is the same and that on the question of procedure there ought not to be any real difficulty.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion brought about by Stalin's question as to in what respect the voting formula as read by Mr. Stettinius differed from the texts submitted by the President in his telegram of December 5.

* * *

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)

RESTRICTED

San Francisco, June 3, 1945 (Received 7 P. M.)

5. Please transmit the following to the President as from me: "Referring to our telephone conversations yesterday on the Yalta aspects of the voting procedure, the precise general point, as to which there has been a great deal of confusion especially in the press, is whether the Yalta formula applies to the part of a great power not involved in a dispute as to its position that great power to prevent having a situation discussed in the Council where such discussion is merely for the purpose of enabling the Council to decide what if any action it should take or recommend. We are all in agreement that the unanimity of those great powers not involved in a dispute should apply to substantive decisions which the Council is called upon to make. The question of whether such a great power can in a preliminary way prior to the taking of substantive decisions was not covered either at Dumbarton Oaks or at Yalta. Moreover, the British and we have always assumed and we have so stated publicly that any determination as to whether or not the Council itself undertake any such preliminary discussion should if a vote is required at all, be decided by not more than a procedural vote, i.e. without any of the great powers as such being able to exercise a veto. We are still hopeful that we will be able to reach agreement with the Soviet delegation on the interpretation of this question which is of course one on which we feel we cannot retreat.

You may be interested to know that in the course of the statement on voting procedure which I made for the February 6 plenary session at Yalta I emphasized the importance which we ascribe to full and free discussion. That conference addressed itself only to the issue of a great power abstaining from voting in a dispute. However, my statement was in such broad terms that, especially when taken in conjunction with later interpretative public statements issued by the department on the precise issue now under consideration, there can be no possible basis for any contention that our present position could be considered to be in violation of the Yalta agreements. According to the best records available to us here the exact language of the two paragraphs in my Yalta statement which referred to freedom of discussion was as follows:

Our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the council is permitted, the establishment of the world organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated."

(Notation on file reads: "Message sent to the White House 6/1/45 8:30 A. M.")

TALK BACKGROUND GIVEN BY HOPKINS

He Told How Uncertainties About Future Allied Plans Led to Parley at Yalta

The Yalta conference was an effort to solve problems looming with the imminent defeat of Germany in World War II and the attempt to enlist Soviet forces in the Allied war against Japan.

President Roosevelt was said to have approached the Far Eastern phase of those February, 1945, talks aiming "to [illegible] China's interest in these negotiations."

The conference brought together the President, British Prime Minister Churchill and Soviet Premier Stalin for the first time since they agreed on plans for invading West Europe, at the Teheran conference, which ended Dec. 1, 1943.

How the Yalta conference came about was described in a memorandum written in October, 1945, by the late Harry Hopkins, Mr. Roosevelt's closest adviser, and recorded in the book "Roosevelt and Hopkins," by Robert E. Sherwood.

The memorandum said:

"As early as the middle of September, 1944, the President was contemplating a second conference with Stalin and Churchill. There were a variety of pressing problems which the President believed warranted such a conference and both Churchill and Stalin were agreeable to the conference. Churchill was, indeed, insistent on it. The reasons were obvious.

Accords on Germany Lacking

"By this time we had agreed upon our full-out and final assault on the German citadel and yet there were no firm agreements as to what was to be done with Germany once she was defeated. The machinery of the European Advisory Council moved so slowly that it was quite possible to visualize the collapse of Germany without any plans of agreements having been made.

"Altho at Teheran, Stalin had made a firm commitment [illegible] Soviet participation in the war against Japan was concerned, that needed to be clarified as to precise date and the extent of Soviet participation.

"On the political side there was no agreement as to reparations against Germany; the problem of dismemberment of the Reich was hanging fire. There was no agreement as to Soviet; nothing as to whether or not we were going to recognize or discharge a central German Government or indeed in what way the Allies were going to insure [illegible] machinery. The policy toward [illegible] [illegible] was unresolved; the [illegible] of trouble in Poland [illegible] the eastern frontier [illegible] Far East [illegible]

[illegible]

Their Papers Form Part of the Yalta Documents

Charles E. Bohlen at Yalta when he was assistant to the Secretary of State and interpreter for Roosevelt. He has since become U. S. Ambassador to Soviet Union.

H. Freeman Matthews, then director, Office of European Affairs. His files include some Yalta papers not found in other collections and notes on ten meetings.

Alger Hiss, then deputy director of Office of Special Political Affairs, an aide rather than a policy maker. He recently finished serving prison term for perjury.

M'CARTHY CHIDES TWO EISENHOWERS

Charges President Violates Campaign Pledge on Yalta —Links Milton to 'Risks'

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 16—Senator Joseph R. McCarthy attacked the President's brother, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, and the President himself in the Senate today.

The Wisconsin Republican accused the President of having broken his campaign promise in not repudiating the "Yalta Agreement." He classed John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, with the President in this respect.

He sought to associate Dr. Eisenhower with accused "security risks" and said of the [illegible]

[illegible]

Fair Blow Since Creation

[illegible]

"I would like to point out," Senator McCarthy interjected, "that one very responsible official of the State Department admitted to me yesterday that as many as 150 people at a time had been engaged in censoring the papers. He maintained that they had done a good fair job * * * but what we get will not be the entire picture."

"That may or may not be the case," Senator George replied.

Letters to Lattimore Era

Senator McCarthy brought Dr. Milton Eisenhower's name into his speech by reading what he said were letters from the educator to Owen Lattimore and to Mrs. Esther Brunauer.

Mr. Lattimore, a specialist in Far Eastern affairs, was described by the Senate Internal Security subcommittee in 1952, Mr. McCarthy declared, as "a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy."

Mr. Lattimore, as such, has denied any such connection and the heart of a subsequent perjury indictment against him has twice been thrown out of Federal Court.

Mrs. Brunauer was one of many persons accused by Mr. McCarthy in 1949 as "security risks." He told the Senate today that she had been "removed from the State Department on security grounds."

A Democratically controlled Senate committee that investigated Senator McCarthy's accusations against Mrs. Brunauer and the others named found the charges to be "a fraud and a hoax."

According to Mr. McCarthy's showing in the Senate today, Dr. Eisenhower, who is now president of Pennsylvania State College, had written on Oct. 11, 1943, to Mr. Lattimore while the latter was with the Office of War Information.

In the course of this note it appeared that Dr. Eisenhower had invited Mr. Lattimore to "carry on a few forum discussions" at Kansas State College, of which the educator was then president. This was about nine years before the Senate subcommittee's accusations against Mr. Lattimore.

As to Yalta, Senator McCarthy read from the 1952 Republican platform the promise that "the Government of the United States under Republican leadership will repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings, such as those of Yalta, which aid Communist enslavements."

There had been "some [campaign] speeches of ringing eloquence on this subject by the [Republican] Presidential candidate and his Secretary of State," Mr. McCarthy continued. But, he added, after the election "powerful pressure from the State Department and the White House" actually prevented the adoption of a Congressional resolution repudiating Yalta.

This was partly due, he asserted, to "hold-overs" from Democratic administrations, but he added:

"Not all, however, are holdovers. * * * A man whose advice is accepted above anyone else at the White House is Milton Eisenhower."

Yalta Conferees Had 45 Toasts At Celebration After the Parley

Stalin Paid Churchill Eloquent Tribute —Party at Crimean Palace Described by Bohlen, Adviser to Roosevelt

By ALLEN DRURY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 16—After the Big Three got through disposing of the world at Yalta, everybody went to a party and had a grand time.

Forty-five toasts were drunk in the Yusupovsky Palace in the Crimea the night of Feb. 8, 1945. Joseph Stalin paid Winston Churchill the highest tribute he ever paid the British leader. Churchill himself was at his most ingratiating. And Franklin D. Roosevelt carried off the occasion with a flair that belied his failing health.

The scene is described in the just-released Yalta papers by Charles E. Bohlen, then a State Department adviser to President Roosevelt and now President Eisenhower's Ambassador to Moscow.

In Mr. Bohlen's words, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at Yalta were at the supreme moment when they literally held in their hands the destinies of mankind.

Within two weeks from that convivial night, the American President was dead. Four months later the British Prime Minister was out of office. The Russian lived on to die March [illegible]

Although the Briton later returned to office and did his best to restore the vision of those stirring days, Big Three unity by then had been destroyed.

Description of Stalin

That night at the Yusupovsky Palace Stalin was described thus by Mr. Bohlen as the Russian toasted Churchill:

"Marshal Stalin proposed a toast to the health of the Prime Minister, whom he characterized as the bravest governmental figure in the world. He said that due in large measure to Mr. Churchill's courage and staunchness, England, when she stood alone, had divided the might of Hitlerite Germany at a time when the rest of Europe was falling flat on its face before Hitler.

"He said that Great Britain under Mr. Churchill's leadership had carried on the fight alone irrespective of existing or potential allies. The Marshal concluded that he knew of few examples in history where the courage of one man had been so important to the future history of the world. He drank a toast to Mr. Churchill, his fighting friend and a brave man."

Churchill, returning the compliment, was described thus:

"The Prime Minister, in his reply, toasted Marshal Stalin as the mighty leader of a mighty country, which had taken the full shock of the German war machine, had broken its back and had driven the tyrants from her soil. He said he knew that in peace no less than in war Marshal Stalin would continue to lead his people from success to success."

Then Stalin turned to the President of the United States. He and Churchill, he said, had been faced with relatively simple problems of self-defense in their own countries. But there was a third man "whose country had not been seriously threatened with invasion, but who had had perhaps a broader conception of national interest and even though his country was not directly imperiled had been the chief forger of the instruments which had led to the mobilization of the world against Hitler."

Post-War Prospect

"The President in reply to this toast," Mr. Bohlen reported, "said he felt the atmosphere at this dinner was as that of a family, and it was in those words that he liked to characterize the relations between our three countries. * * *"

Stalin came back a little later with another toast. In wartime, he said, when the common task was to defeat the common enemy, unity among allies was easy to maintain. The difficult task, he said, came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the allies.

"He said he was confident that the present alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty to see that it would, and that our relations in peacetime should be as strong as they had been in war."

It was Churchill who responded to this. He felt, he said, "that we were all standing on the crest of a hill with the glories of future possibilities stretching before us."

"He said that in the modern world the function of leadership was to lead the people out from the forest into the broad sunlit plains of peace and happiness," the account went on.

"He felt this prize was nearer our grasp than any time before in history and it would be a tragedy for which history would never forgive us if we let this prize slip from our grasp through inertia or carelessness."

DOG LICENSES READY

Tags May Be Obtained by Mail or in Person for $3

The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 441 East Ninety-second Street, announced yesterday that 1955 dog licenses were ready. They will be mailed to dog owners, or may be picked up at any one of the five shelters of the society, on payment of $3.

Every dog kept within the city limits, regardless of age, must be licensed on or before April 30 each year.

Warren W. McSpadden, the society's general manager, said the license had protective advantages. "If your dog has a license and wears it," he said, "you will be certain of the pet's return if it strays from home. No licensed dog is subject to requisition by an experimental laboratory."

2 U. S. AGENCIES CLASH

Agriculture and Labor Units Differ on Mexican Labor Plan

WASHINGTON, March 16 (UP)—Congress received conflicting advice today on how long and under what terms to continue the program for recruiting Mexican farm laborers.

The Agriculture Department asked that authority for the program be made permanent without change. The Labor Department called for a four-and-a-half-year extension with several changes.

The program under which 309,033 Mexicans were imported last year operates under a United States-Mexican agreement, which expires Dec. 31.

The opposing views were outlined to a House Agriculture subcommittee by Karl M. Hughes, Administrator of the Agriculture Department's Commodity Stabilization Service, and Rocco C. Siciliano, Assistant Secretary of Labor.

One of the amendments Mr. Siciliano recommended would require that American workers be offered transportation, housing and insurance benefits comparable to those provided foreign workers under the program.

Another proposed change would be designed to "clarify" the law and make it clear that American farmers might not employ Mexican workers for less pay than domestic workers.

Rahway Gets Administrator

Special to The New York Times

RAHWAY, N. J., March 16—Clifford W. O'Key, former chief finance officer of Milford, Conn., assumed today his new post as business administrator and director of public works here. He will receive a salary of $8,500. The Municipal Council aims to coordinate departments for economy, Mayor James G. Egeli said.

FULL OF STOLEN GOODS

3-Room Apartment Is Raided and 2 Women Are Seized

Stolen jewels, [illegible] radios and clothing [illegible] piled in complete [illegible] a three-room apartment [illegible] Mulberry Street [illegible] Mrs. Lena Basile [illegible] and her daughter [illegible] 24, were charged [illegible] station with receiving stolen property.

Detectives who raided the fourth-floor apartment [illegible] [illegible]

Some items were [illegible] stolen in the neighborhood [illegible] Jan. 25. The entire collection is being catalogued [illegible] and victims of recent burglaries will be notified to identify their valuable belongings.

Mrs. Basile described herself as a housewife and her daughter as a clerk.

Van Fleet Visits Karachi

KARACHI, [illegible] 16 (Reuters)—Gen. James A. Van Fleet, retired commander of the United States Eighth Army in Korea, arrived today by air from Karachi, Pakistan, for a [illegible] private visit.

DUMBARTON OAKS A YALTA PRELUDE

'44 Washington Conference Produced Basic U. N. Ideas That Matured Later

The Yalta conference was one of two meetings at which the basic framework of the United Nations was laid. The other was the Dumbarton Oaks conference of 1944. It took its name from the estate in Washington where the conference met.

Issues left outstanding at the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks were settled by compromise at Yalta. The result was the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. These were elaborated and expanded at the San Francisco conference of the United Nations in 1945 into the Charter of the United Nations.

Planning for an international security or general organization to replace the League of Nations was begun within the United States Department of State before this country entered World War II in 1941. The Moscow conference of the foreign ministers of Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States and of the Ambassador of China in October, 1943, agreed that "a general international organization" should be established "at the earliest practicable date."

The United States pushed the project by arranging the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. These exploratory talks were held in two phases. The first part included only the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States. It was held from Aug. 21 to Sept. 28. The second part had as participants China, Britain and the United States, to enable the Soviet Union to continue its position of neutrality in the Pacific war. This phase was held from Sept. 29 to Oct. 7.

Joint Proposals Drafted

On the basis of tentative proposals from the United States, joint proposals were drafted. These only sketched the outlines of the organization that was to emerge.

They envisaged an organization with the primary function of maintaining international peace and security. It was to have a secondary function of promoting international cooperation in the solution of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems.

The organization was to be composed of, and open to, "peace-loving states." This was understood to mean those that had declared war against Germany. A continuation of the wartime alliance of the United Nations and the associated states was clearly intended.

The principal organs were to be a security council, dominated by the larger powers, a general assembly, an international court of justice and a secretariat. A complicated procedure for handling security questions was proposed, with final responsibility centered in the security council. An economic and social council, subsidiary to the general assembly, was sketched briefly as a minor organ.

Questions Left to Yalta

No agreement was reached on several questions. These were left for three-power decision at Yalta.

One was the question of voting procedure in the security council.

Another was the extent to which the great powers were to be able to "veto" decisions or actions backed by the other security council members.

Still another was the Soviet demand that all sixteen Soviet "republics" should have membership, a demand that conflicted with agreement that states members were to be limited to those having "sovereign equality."

Finally, the whole question of colonies was left for future discussion.

CELLER SCHEDULES WIRETAP HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, March 16 (UP)—Representative Emanuel Celler, Democrat of New York, today scheduled public hearings on wiretapping for next Wednesday. He said all requested witnesses "who doesn't want to come will be subpoenaed."

Mr. Celler, chairman of a House Judiciary subcommittee, said the hearings would be "extensive," and would delve into telephone eavesdropping.

Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr. is expected to be the first witness. He will be followed by sponsors of pending bills, and various state and local police officials.

Others being "invited" are spokesmen for telephone companies and electronics concerns which manufacture tapping and recording devices, the chairman added.

Referring to the recent exposure of illegal wiretapping in New York, Mr. Celler said the practice has reached a point where it has "become a racket for blackmail and extortion."

"It's evil and has got to be controlled," he declared.

Mr. Celler said the committee would weigh legislation to authorize wiretaps and use in Federal courts if wiretapped evidence in treason, espionage, sabotage or kidnapping cases but no other wiretapping.

One bill by Mr. Celler would permit wiretapping in national security cases only if permission were obtained from a Federal court.

Mr. Brownell has asked in the past that he be given free rein to decide when telephones should be tapped. Mr. Celler has said he opposes "vesting such authority in any one man."

Stock Inquiry Halt Opposed

The national legislative committee of the Liberty party urged yesterday that the stock market inquiry be continued. The committee said that "if the economic stability of our nation is to be insured the Fulbright investigation must not be stopped mid-way."

HISS IDENTIFIES YALTA NOTATION

Memo Against 3 Soviet Votes in U. N. Drafted by Him as Aide to Stettinius

Alger Hiss confirmed last night that he had unsuccessfully opposed Soviet proposals at the Yalta Conference to admit three Soviet Republics as independent members of the United Nations.

Yalta conference documents, compiled by the State Department, had contained an American delegation memorandum of Feb. 8, 1945, on this issue with the notation "(authorship not indicated but presumably Hiss)."

Mr. Hiss, a State Department staff adviser at Yalta, has steadfastly maintained his innocence of charges of perjury, involving his denials that he passed Government secrets to a Communist spy ring in the Nineteen Thirties. He was released last Nov. 27 from Lewisburg Penitentiary after having served three years and eight months, and is now on probation.

Asked about the Yalta document, he said last night that he had considered that "my position at all times was pro-American," rather than anti-Soviet. He declared the memorandum represented both the position of State Department experts and "my personal conviction."

Proposal 'Premature'

The Hiss memorandum dealt with a Soviet proposal to include the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania—republics of the Soviet Union—as voting members of the United Nations from the outset. Asserting the Soviet proposal was "premature" and should be deferred until after the United Nations was formed, it added:

"We should allow a longer time to elapse and have available more experience as to the international relations of the Soviet Republics before we consider this question.

"The question is such a novel one in international relations that the other members of the organization should have a chance to consider the question before a decision is reached.

* * *

"The Soviet Constitution does not permit the Soviet republics to control their own foreign policy or affairs. Other aspects of central control over the republics are all inconsistent with the republic being sovereign."

Mr. Hiss recalled that the then Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius Jr., had defended this position in a meeting of Foreign Ministers. To his surprise, Mr. Hiss went on, Foreign Secretary Eden of Britain later showed Mr. Hiss a set of minutes reporting that the United States had accepted the British view that the Ukraine and Byelorussia should be separate United Nations members.

Stettinius' Book

Mr. Hiss remarked that, according to Mr. Stettinius' book "Roosevelt and the Russians," the agreement had apparently been reached by Secretary Eden in a private talk with President Roosevelt, despite the objection of the United States experts.

The [illegible] published at Yalta, Mr. Hiss said, left out the agreement on the Soviet republics because President Roosevelt and Mr. Stettinius wished to be able to explain it to members of Congress first. The United States, Mr. Hiss added, received a Soviet pledge to support two additional United States votes in the United Nations if the United States decided on such a demand.

Without having seen the text of the documents released by the State Department, Mr. Hiss preferred last night to avoid most comment. He said it had been his job at Yalta "to prepare minutes and summaries of the United States position on the United Nations." He was then a special assistant to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, State Department.

There was no agreed set of minutes for all delegations at Yalta, as there had been at Dumbarton Oaks, Mr. Hiss said. This was because it was felt an attempt to work out such records would cause too many difficulties and keep the conferees from talking as freely as they otherwise might.

Each delegation thus kept its own records, he said. But he asserted there has been "no disagreement on what was said so far as the actual wording is concerned, even though there have been disagreements on meanings."

Nearly Left Off Group

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 16—Alger Hiss was nearly left off the Yalta delegation.

This was disclosed tonight in publication of the long-sought official record of the Big Three meeting among President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill in the Crimea.

At that time Hiss was a highly regarded State Department official. This was four years before he was convicted of perjury for having denied that he had passed secret documents to Whittaker Chambers, who [illegible] had confessed he had been a Soviet spy.

State Department records show that President Roosevelt originally opposed inclusion of "[illegible]" in the United States delegation to Yalta. Hiss and other advisers were included only after the late Edward R. Stettinius Jr., then Secretary of State, had asked Harry Hopkins to intercede with Mr. Roosevelt. Hopkins was the President's principal assistant.

In the documents [illegible] Hiss was a policy [illegible] Yalta. On the con[illegible] records show him as [illegible] usually representing the United States Government, working [illegible] with [illegible] Jebb, now British Ambassador to France, and Andrei Gromyko, now a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister.

Stalin Called Himself a Zionist But Cited Soviet Jewish 'Problem'

He Told Roosevelt at Yalta Parley of Failure of Birobidzhan Settlement Plan —Picture of Red Leader Unfolded

By HARRY SCHWARTZ

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 16—Premier Stalin told President Roosevelt at the Yalta conference that he himself was a Zionist in principle but that Soviet Jews had posed a difficult problem for him.

This is one of the many sidelights of the image of himself that Stalin attempted to put before his colleagues during the 1945 meeting, as revealed by the record of the Yalta conference.

In general that record shows Stalin to have been a hard bargainer, but one eager to convince his fellow negotiators that he was a man of his word and a reasonable man.

It shows him arguing as one responsible for Soviet national interests before the public opinion of his country, rather than as an exponent of world Communist rule or as one ruled by ideological goals.

On the subject of Soviet Jews, Stalin said that they presented a difficult problem. He referred to the effort to establish a Jewish national home in Birobidzhan, but indicated that the effort had failed because Jews stayed there for only two or three years and then drifted off to other cities. He indicated his belief that Jews were naturally traders rather than farmers or industrial workers.

President Roosevelt broke in at this point to say he was a Zionist and to ask whether Stalin was one. Stalin's reply was that he was a Zionist in principle, but that he recognized the difficulty of the matter.

It is not entirely clear from the text as released why Stalin began talking about the Jewish problem. A line of asterisks preceding Stalin's statement seems to raise the possibility that one of Stalin's high-level colleagues may have initiated the discussion of Jews with a statement that has been censored from the published text.

Stalin spoke explicitly as the defender of Soviet national interests in fighting for concessions with regard to both Poland and the Far East.

Arguing for the Curzon Line to be established as the Polish boundary, Stalin said the line had been drawn by non-Russians and then asked what Russians or Ukrainians would say if he retreated.

"They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau," he said. "I cannot take such a position and return to Moscow."

Similarly Stalin argued that he needed concessions to justify to the Soviet people his country's entry into the war against Japan. If his political conditions, such as Soviet control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad in Manchuria, were met, he said, the Soviet people would know that their national interests were involved and they would support the war against Japan.

Stalin hailed Lend-Lease as a remarkable invention without which victory against Germany would have been delayed. He said Lend-Lease was particularly remarkable because it was not given in a manner that did not produce resentment on the part of the recipient. This assertion was completely contradicted by the post-war Soviet line that Lend-Lease had made no important contribution to the Soviet war effort.

Stalin proved a poor prophet when he predicted during the conference that the British Labor party would never be able to take over the British Government. Half a year later the British Labor party won a Parliamentary election and did take over the Government.

At one point in the discussion President Roosevelt remarked on the difficulties caused in French politics by the multiplicity of political parties. Stalin then declared that experience had shown that a one-party system was very convenient for the leader of a state, apparently implying himself.

As part of his image as a reasonable and faithful partner to the Allies, Stalin told Roosevelt and Churchill that the Soviet Government had abandoned the Czarist policy of suppressing and assimilating the Poles. Instead, he said, the Soviet Union wanted a Poland that would be a good friend of all the Allies.

At many points in the record, Stalin stresses that the most powerful nations must have a decisive voice in world affairs. He ridiculed the notion that Albania should have an equal voice with the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States. On the same ground he opposed French participation in the government of occupied Germany.

DETROIT STIRRED BY SEAWAY ISSUE

Resignation of Waterways Agency Head Points Up Lag in Plan for Traffic

By DAMON STETSON

Special to The New York Times.

DETROIT, March 16—Michigan's slow pace in preparing for the St. Lawrence Seaway received some critical attention here last week.

It started after the resignation of Bert Robb as director of the State Waterways Commission, effective March 31.

He charged that Michigan was taking a "do-nothing" attitude toward preparing harbor and dock facilities for deep-draft ocean-going ships. Such ships will be able to sail from the Atlantic to Midwest ports along the Great Lakes when the Seaway is completed.

Mr. Robb made no secret, however, of the fact that his resignation was prompted primarily by personal monetary considerations. He received a salary of $6,800 as director and said he was forced to continue a part-time practice of law.

Nevertheless, Mr. Robb's resignation set off editorial criticism in newspapers here.

Two Newspapers Critical

The Detroit Free Press, in commenting on how Michigan is lagging in preparing to take advantage of the Seaway, said:

"Mr. Robb's action should serve to dramatize for the public just how laggard we have been in this matter. That applies to Detroit as well as to Michigan."

The Detroit Times commented:

"World commerce will ply the Detroit River one day in the not too distant future. But unless our contemplative public servants get busy we will have no port facilities on that day."

Max W. McCray, former director of the Port of Detroit Commission, resigned that post last year for reasons similar to those given by Mr. Robb in his resignation. A successor is scheduled to be appointed in the near future. In the meantime, however, Roger Boynae has been serving as acting director.

Mr. Boynae expressed agreement with the editorial criticisms and asserted that the State Legislature had failed to adopt legislation giving the port group adequate authority and autonomy to do the job required. The commission's activities are currently under the control and direction of the Wayne County Board of Supervisors.

Mr. Robb explained that the State Waterways Commission's assigned task had been to build recreational harbors and docks for pleasure craft. The state commission, he said, had not had sufficient funds to institute any state-wide studies or surveys of the new facilities needed as a result of the Seaway development.

Both he and Mr. Boynae agree that not much has been done to date or is likely to be done in the near future to prepare for the expected increase in volume of cargo at potential Seaway ports. [illegible] other public officials have taken the view, however, that caution and prudence are better than haste.

Special Problems Stressed

Detroit has some special problems, [illegible], as it contemplates [illegible] development. Most of its river frontage is already occupied by factories and other commercial structures. That makes the cost a front foot extremely high, according to Mr. Robb. But the potential commerce of the United States side on the Detroit River, he says, would require more than three and one-half miles of waterfront.

Mr. Robb has recently completed a [illegible] survey of the port of Windsor, Canadian city across the Detroit River from Detroit. He notes that Windsor has the available waterfront frontage south of the Ambassador Bridge between the two cities.

"Space requirements of the City of Detroit for marine frontage could not be realized except at excessive costs," he says, in his report. "The leadership requirements of the Detroit metropolitan region are not being effective now though [illegible] a Port of Detroit Commission. That commission has been in operation for over twenty years and has not without pressure given indication of developing a comprehensive port improvement program in all that time.

"Detroit does not have space within its environs for a port development. Detroit has today no solution for its port development problems and opportunities. Windsor can provide the answer for these problems, and benefit greatly by its ability to answer Detroit's needs."

PROBLEMS IN SUBURBS

Meyner Says Growth Opens New Planning Frontiers

TRENTON, March 16 (AP)—Gov. Robert B. Meyner today said the movement of people to suburbs was opening up a new frontier in the field of community planning. He said part of the answer to the problems caused by the movement to the suburbs lay in more State and local cooperation.

In a speech before the annual New Jersey Planning Conference, the Governor said 28 per cent of the nation's population growth between 1940 and 1950 took place [illegible] in suburban areas.

"This [illegible] has [illegible] a [illegible] way of [illegible]," he said.

"New [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

"Now it seems to me a [illegible] is emerging in the field [illegible]. It is up to us to [illegible] and cultivate it."

MORE CHOOSE TEACHING

Jersey Pay Rise Found to Add to College Enrollments

TRENTON, March 16 (AP)—[illegible] of the New Jersey Department of Education said today an increase of teachers' minimum salaries to $4,000 a year had resulted in a 21 per cent [illegible] in applications for enrollment in the state's teachers colleges.

Robert H. Morrison, assistant commissioner for higher education, made the statement before the Legislature's Joint Appropriations Committee, which is considering Gov. Robert B. Meyner's proposed 1955-56 budget.

Mr. Morrison told the lawmakers that his department accepted 1,323 applicants last year for enrollment in the state's six teachers colleges, while this year's number of applicants was 1,5[illegible]. He estimated that about [illegible] of this year's candidates would pass entrance examinations this month.

COLOMBIAN FIGHTS PANAMA CHARTER

Supreme Court Suit Alleges Nation's 1914 Pact With U. S. Is Unconstitutional

Special to The New York Times.

CALI, Colombia, March 2—A Colombian citizen has begun court action to set aside as unconstitutional the treaty signed between the United States and Colombia in 1914 settling their differences over North American support of Panama's independence.

The United States paid a $25,000,000 indemnity to Colombia and the treaty was ratified in 1921. Now a resident of the Department of El Valle, of which Cali is the capital, has filed suit with the Colombian Supreme Court, declaring that the Congress of Colombia had no constitutional right to recognize Panama's independence.

The question of Panama and the Canal Zone has become of great interest to Colombians again because some of them still have hope that a second canal may be built through Colombian territory. United States experts have ruled out the possible routes as too expensive, but the United States is considering the possibility of a second canal, and Colombians have dreams of new importance for their country.

In December, 1947, Governor J. C. Mehaffey of the Canal Zone submitted a detailed report on the result of studies of thirty proposed routes for a new canal. The conclusion, based on eighteen months of studies by experts and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of the Navy and the Atomic Energy Commission, was that any of the seven proposed routes lying all or part in Colombia would be impractical.

Cost Held Prohibitive

It was ruled that any of these routes would involve so much excavation that the cost would be prohibitive. They all involved use of the Basins of either the Atrato River, running south to Colombia from the Caribbean parallel to the Pacific Coast, or the Truyo River, running from Colombia northwest through Panama to the Pacific, or a combination of the two.

Against all these possibilities the Mehaffey report recommended conversion of the present Panama Canal to a sea-level route.

It was estimated in 1947 that the job could be done in ten years at a cost of $2,500,000,000. The result would be a broader canal, capable of taking larger ships than any yet built, and without the dangerous curves of the present route.

While a lock canal could be put out of action for two or three years, according to experts, by destruction of one of [illegible] locks, the sea-level canal would be easily kept open.

"There is considerable tidal difference at times between the Atlantic and Pacific ends of the Canal. This, it was said, could be controlled by a tidal [illegible] [illegible] current through the [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] operation of the Canal [illegible]

Loss of Panama Resented

The purpose of the latest Colombian suit to abrogate the treaty with the United States is not clear, but many Colombians still resent the loss of Panama.

While Colombia was still discussing the conditions for the [illegible] of the Panama Canal, Panama, on Nov. 3, 1903, declared her independence. The United States recognized the new Government ten days later and on Nov. 18 signed a treaty with Panama on the Canal question.

Colombia recognized Panama's independence in 1914 and signed a treaty with the United States that was ratified in 1921 after some modifications called for by the United States Senate.

The original Canal treaty with Panama was revised in 1936, to increase royalty payments by the United States from $250,000 to $430,000 a year. This, in effect, only compensated for devaluation of the dollar. On Jan. 25, 1955, a new treaty was signed, modifying various details of relations and increasing royalty payments to $1,930,000 a year.

Premier Backs Nomura As Tokyo Defense Head

TOKYO, March 16 (AP)—Premier Ichiro Hatoyama today recommended former Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura—Ambassador in Washington at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack—for Japan's top defense post. He would succeed Seiichi Omura, director of the Defense Board.

Mr. Hatoyama said at a press conference he thought Admiral Nomura was the best man to gain United States understanding of Japan's defense building program.

H. Struve Hensel, Assistant United States Secretary of Defense, sharply criticized Japan's rearmament effort March 4, saying it must be speeded if Japan wanted increased American military assistance.

The Premier's selection stirred an immediate protest from the left Socialist party, which said it would violate a constitutional ban on military men holding Cabinet posts.

Mr. Hatoyama said he had been advised by two legal experts that the ban did not apply to men not in active service.

OPEN DOOR AT FORDHAM

College Paper Asks Welcome for Russian Students

Fordham announced yesterday that "visiting students from all countries are welcome at Fordham University," adding "They require no special invitation."

The statement came as a result of an editorial in the college newspaper, The Ram. The editorial urged the university to invite to Fordham the eleven Soviet student editors who will visit the United States shortly.

"The only credentials we ask are that the visitors be of open mind and honest motive, and that they be officially escorted. There are no iron curtains at Fordham University," the university said.

The Ram editorial, written by Raymond Schroth, cited the "universal brotherhood of students."

CZECHS OUT OF LINE

Newspapers, Unlike Soviet's, Mark Molotov's 65th Birthday

LONDON, March 16 (Reuters)—Czechoslovak newspapers were out of step with Moscow in connection with the sixty-fifth birthday last week of Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov.

Soviet newspapers, which normally publicize the birthdays of top leaders only when they are 50, 60 or 70, did not refer to the Molotov birthday, celebrated March 9.

Czech newspapers just received here carried telegrams of congratulations to Mr. Molotov sent by Foreign Minister Vaclav David and by the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist party.

PEIPING HAILS DEFECTOR

Former Chief of Chiang Forces in Manchuria Arrives There

TOKYO, Thursday, March 17 (AP)—The Peiping radio announced today the arrival in Red China of the first important Nationalist general to defect since the civil war ended on the mainland in 1949.

He is Gen. Wei Li-huang, who once commanded Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's forces against the Chinese Communists in Manchuria. He entered Canton from Hong Kong Tuesday.

It was the first victory of the current Chinese Communist propaganda campaign calling on Nationalist officers and men to come over to the Reds. And General Wei in 1949 was put on Red China's list of "war criminals."

Eden Gains Over 'Flu

LONDON, March 16 (AP)—Sir Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, was reported "somewhat better" today, but still in bed with influenza.

ISLAND RADIO BAN ON WHISKY ASKED

Munoz Requests Legislature to Bar Liquor Ads Unless Industry Sets Up Code

Special to The New York Times.

SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico, March 16—Governor Luis Muñoz Marín has recommended to the Legislature a law barring rum, whisky and other hard liquor advertisements from radio and television.

Many of the local radio sports programs are sponsored by rum producers. Underscoring the popularity of these broadcasts among young Puerto Ricans, the Governor believes they can contribute to the use of alcoholic beverages.

But the Governor still hopes that this law will be made unnecessary by voluntary agreement among hard liquor producers. He explained:

"I am proposing to do by law what in the United States is done by voluntary action on the part of the liquor producers. If a voluntary agreement should be reached in the Commonwealth similar to that prevailing in the U. S., I will not insist on my recommendation to the Legislature."

Asks Exclusion of Beer

In his message to the Legislature the Governor recommended that it consider the exclusion of wine and beer from the proposed law. Of the twenty-three commercial radio stations in Puerto Rico almost all carry rum, brandy, whisky and other hard liquor advertising. The two TV stations carry almost no hard liquor advertisements.

Beer companies spend about $500,000 yearly in radio and television advertisements while the hard liquor producers, especially local rum companies, spend approximately $250,000, mostly in radio.

Mr. Muñoz Marín's bill, now before the Judicial Committee of the House of Representatives, has stirred a spirited controversy. The principal advertising agencies, the local branch of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the Puerto Rico Rum Institute, the Protestant churches and many writers-to-the-editor side with the Governor.

But Tomás Muñiz, owner of radio station WIAC and for several years president of the Broadcasters Association, has different ideas. He says:

"If the barring of liquor advertisements from radio and television will benefit our youth, very well, we accept the fact since our youth is worth more than all the money in the world. But we won't accept any discrimination. The bar should be generalized to include newspapers, magazines and all other types of advertising."

Miguel Angel García Méndez, lawyer, sugarcane landholder, president of the Republican Statehood party and owner of a rum distillery that sells all of its produce in the States, sides in part with the Governor.

Favors Code of Ethics

"A code of ethics or a set of regulations with equal purposes in radio and television would be an effective remedy," he said.

Gilberto Concepción de Gracia, president of the Puerto Rico Independentist party, says:

"The Governor wants to exclude wines and beer from the proposed law. If so, the problem would still be alive because there is more wine and beer advertising by radio and television than hard liquor advertising. And it is just as bad to ask youngsters to drink wines and beer as it is to ask them to drink rum or whisky."

Under the measure the Government would refuse alcoholic beverage licenses to any producer, importer, wholesaler, etc., who would not agree to refrain from radio and television advertising.

Behind the bill is Senator Juana Rodríguez Mundo, formerly on the Faculty of the University of Puerto Rico and one of the two women members of the upper chamber. The Senator is a close friend of Governor and Mrs. Muñoz Marín.

She is chairman of the Education Committee of the Senate, before which the bill would go once it passed the House.

RECORD OF YALTA GIVEN TO PUBLIC

Continued From Page 1

and stability thereafter depended on holding the wartime coalition together.

¶ The Russians did not get everything they demanded at Yalta, as has often been asserted. In particular, they did not get the concessions they wanted in Turkey and Iran, or all the reparations they demanded from Germany. But the documents disclosed very little controversy—indeed, very little discussion—over the demands they made for Southern Sakhalin, the Kuriles and concessions in China.

¶ Alger Hiss, the former State Department official who was later convicted of perjury for denying that he had passed official documents to a confessed Soviet spy, figured prominently in the documents as a reporter rather than as a policy maker.

The Yalta conference was held Feb. 4 through 11, when the battle for Germany was reaching its climax, and the documents bore the sharp anti-German atmosphere of that time.

For example, President Roosevelt, after riding through the areas of Southern Russia devastated by the Nazis, told Stalin and Churchill that he not only wanted to divide Germany into five "or seven" parts, but wanted the Germans held down after the war to the standard of living of the Russians.

Though Churchill had criticized the President at the Teheran conference, which came earlier, for proposing a toast to the execution of 49,000 Germans, Roosevelt raised the question once more with Stalin at Yalta, this time proposing the execution of 50,000.

Moreover, the President told the other members of the Big Three that the United States would not repeat the "mistake" of the Nineteen Twenties, when Washington made large loans to the defeated Germans. Nor was he at all hopeful that the United States would be able to maintain troops in Europe for long after the fighting. He foresaw withdrawal within two years.

The documents portray Stalin as a firm, cynical, at times stubborn, but often friendly man. He did not make any great argument for the territorial concessions he wanted in the Far East. He merely stated that the Soviet people would not understand having to fight in the Japanese war unless they got something tangible out of it. Both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to go along with this, and to promote it with the Chinese Nationalists.

Stalin was supremely cynical about the small nations and openly scornful of the French, whom he charged with having opened their gates to the Germans.

Though Roosevelt had earlier taken the position that he would not try to settle territorial questions until after the war, the Yalta papers make it clear that both Stalin and Churchill felt that the time had come in early 1945 to delineate spheres of influence.

Stalin questioned Churchill about Britain's activities in trying to assert her authority over Greece, and when Churchill bridled a bit over this, merely remarked that he was curious about it but had no intention of intervening.

On small matters, however, Stalin was patiently stubborn. Roosevelt had proposed the conference in the first place, suggesting that it be held in northern Scotland, but seven months lapsed before the Big Three got together. Meanwhile either Churchill or Roosevelt suggested that they meet in Egypt, Turkey, Italy, Sicily, "the Riviera," Jerusalem or Alaska, without getting the slightest encouragement from the Soviet dictator.

The documents illustrate that the Big Three had no doubts about their "bigness" or their exclusiveness. They defended the rights of small powers, and at one point, when Charles E. Bohlen, the United States interpreter at the round table, mentioned the importance of public opinion in the United States, Andrei Y. Vishinsky told him the American people should learn to "obey their rulers."

The documents do not clear up many of the controversial aspects of the Far Eastern settlement. There is little in the documents about this settlement and the conversations on the subject were apparently so secret that James F. Byrnes, who was at Yalta as a Presidential adviser, got in trouble later when he became Secretary of State for saying that no final disposition of the Kurile Islands had been made.

He had to retract this statement when the Russians produced a signed agreement, concluded at Yalta, saying that "the Heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union [in the Kuriles] would be unquestionably satisfied after Japan had been defeated."

One of the interesting things about this is that the President took with him to Yalta a series of "briefing books" that defined the State Department's views on all questions expected to come up at Yalta.

The Yalta briefing book on the Far East, for example, clearly reflected an official apprehension about the future of United States-Soviet relations in that part of the world which Roosevelt's conversations at Yalta do not reflect. The Far Eastern briefing book said in part:

"There exist areas of potential discord between our policies and those of the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. toward China. * * * There are reports that elements among the British, out of imperial considerations, desire a weak and possibly a divided China in the post-war period. The British are undoubtedly less optimistic—more cynical—than we are regarding the future of China, but neither the British Government nor the British people will derive benefit from an unstable China in the post-war period."

In its doubts about the 'shore' of Soviet policy the State Department's briefing paper continued:

"Some apprehension has been voiced lest the Russians may utilize the Chinese Communists to establish an independent or a Communist area in North China and Manchuria. There is nothing in Russia's present attitude, as officially disclosed to us, to substantiate these fears. But if Russia comes into the war in the Far East, or if an open break between the Kuomintang and the Communists occurs, Russia may be strongly tempted to abandon the policy, declared in 1924, of nonintervention in China's internal affairs."

While Churchill and Stalin were constantly talking about political [illegible] about the post-war settlement, the President was obviously thinking in terms of winning the war. Also, when post-war political questions did come up, he often took positions that were anti-British.

For example, he suggested the "internationalizing" of the British colony of Hong Kong and proposed that Korea should be placed under a "trusteeship" with the British excluded. Stalin indicated that he did not think this was a good idea and added that "Churchill would kill us."

Korea was later to become the scene of bloody fighting, but at that point Roosevelt and Stalin were in agreement that there should be no "foreign troops" in that country.

On one occasion the President was quoted as saying the British were a "peculiar people" who "wished to have their cake and eat it too."

The documents were not presented as the full story of Yalta and it was generally agreed here that their publication would stir up considerable controversy both at home and abroad.

On China policy, Polish policy and the German policy, the likelihood was that Roosevelt's action at Yalta would be made objects of future attacks on the Democratic party, as in the past.

These points are noted in support of this thesis:

¶ The lack of any detailed discussion about the territorial concessions to the Soviet Union in the Far East, and several of the President's comments about the Chinese Nationalists.

For example, at one point, in a discussion of how to "keep China alive," Roosevelt was quoted as having said that the trouble in getting the Chinese together as a nation lay more with the Kuomintang and the Nationalists than with the "so-called Communists."

¶ Roosevelt was not as active in his support of the anti-Communist Polish Government as was Churchill, though at one point he referred to the large body of Polish voters he had to keep in mind.

Nor was the publication of the documents expected to lead to any great wave of pro-Americanism in Britain or West Germany. Indeed, it was this knowledge of the sharp anti-German atmosphere of the talks that led some officials here and in Britain to oppose publication at a time when the future of Germany was so delicately balanced between East and West.

The State Department released the documents this evening after Senators William F. Knowland of California and Styles Bridges of New Hampshire had discussed them with Secretary of State Dulles.

It was known that a few deletions from the records had been made in preparing them for publication. These were made by the State Department in the national interest and to avoid offense to some groups and countries. Later, in the printed proofs, two short paragraphs were obliterated. These concerned whether France should have a zone of occupation in post-war Germany and a seat on the Allied Control Commission.

POLES' FATE FIXED AT CRIMEA TALKS

Continued From Page 1

place in the proposed interim regime. These were Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, former Premier; Tadeusz Romer, former Foreign Minister, and Stanislaw Grabski, former Speaker of the Polish National Council in London.

Other names considered were those of Wincenty Witos, veteran leader of the Peasant party, who had remained in Poland throughout World War II, and Adam Stefan Sapieha, then Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cracow.

Stalin, on whose territory the conference was taking place, had led against Churchill at first. On the record he never refused to invite Polish nationalist leaders to the Crimea. He just did not know how to reach them, Stalin said.

He did not have Witos' address, for example. And as for the members of the Lublin Government, he had fostered throughout the war, he said he had tried to reach them on the telephone but they did not answer, being out of the city.

The Lublin regime, by this time, had installed itself in Warsaw and held the whip hand, and subsequent events made clear Stalin [illegible] it was impossible to form a Polish Government at Yalta.

"I am called a dictator and not a democrat," he said, "but I have enough democratic feeling to refuse to create a Polish Government without the Poles being consulted."

Besides, he contended it would be difficult to bring the men of the rival London and Lublin Polish Governments together: there were too many past recriminations between the two camps.

Stalin added he, for one, was perfectly satisfied with the Lublin regime, saying it had a "democratic basis equal at least to that of de Gaulle [Gen. Charles de Gaulle] in France."

The Communist regime, for example, has not "badly handled" the task of securing the Soviet Red Army's rear in Poland, while agents of the London Government were causing nothing but trouble behind the line, operating clandestine radio transmitters and killing Russian soldiers, according to Stalin.

"Without a secure rear there could be no more victories for the Red Army," he said.

Churchill Disputes Stalin

Churchill agreed that anyone who attacked the Red Army should be punished. But he said he found it impossible to believe that the men of Lublin represented more than one-third of the Polish people. He predicted they would be turned out of power if there were a free election.

A more broadly based government, "might be an unsound but nevertheless an important document," he said. He urged Stalin to accept the idea of having Allied observers oversee the post-war election.

Churchill declared Britain would welcome observers from the United States and the Soviet Union when elections were held in Greece, for example. He said his were not idle requests, recalling that King Farouk of Egypt had refused to allow his Premier, Nahas Pasha, to call an election while he was in office because "whatever government held the election won."

"I don't believe much in Egyptian elections," Stalin retorted. "It is all rotten corruption there. They buy each other."

Scornfully he asked Churchill: "What percentage of the people can read and write in Egypt?" In Poland, 70 per cent can read and write."

Churchill admitted that he did not know the current literacy rate in Egypt and said he meant no comparison between the two countries. "I only wanted fair elections," he said.

"I do not care much about Poles myself," he said at a later stage in the discussion. He declared his problem was that "in Parliament I must be able to say that the election will be held in a fair way."

Poles Called Troublesome

Stalin and Roosevelt agreed on one proposition: That the Poles were "quarrelsome people." The wartime President said they were quarrelsome "not only at home but also abroad," and he again asked assurance in behalf of Poles in the United States that the elections would be free and fair.

Roosevelt proposed, but said he was not insisting, that the Curzon Line, along the western Bug River, be the eastern frontier, while urging that the Soviet Union leave the city of Lwow and the oil deposits of Lwow Province within Poland. Such a concession would have a "salutary effect," Roosevelt said, and Churchill likewise urged an "act of magnanimity."

Stalin was adamant, saying: "It is necessary to remind you that not Russians but Curzon and Clemenceau fixed this line" (Marquess Curzon, British Foreign Secretary at the time of the Versailles Conference, proposed the boundary that bears his name. George Clemenceau was Premier of France in the same period.)

Stalin said he could not accept less than the Curzon line, because he would then be "less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau" and "could not return to Moscow and face the people."

Toward the close of the conference, Churchill predicted that the Yalta declaration on Poland would be heavily attacked in England.

Churchill said he would be accused of yielding completely to the Soviet Union.

"Is it, in earnest?" Stalin asked. "I doubt it."

"I assure you it is," Churchill replied. "The London Poles will raise a dreadful outcry * * *. It is not a question of numbers of Poles but of the cause for which Britain drew the sword. They will say you have swept away the only constitutional government of Poland."

PLAN TO REDUCE CREWS IS SCORED

Officers of 3 Unions Assail Lundeberg's Program for American Vessels

SAN FRANCISCO, March 16 — Officers of three maritime unions today assailed Harry Lundeberg, West Coast sailors leader.

U. S. to Be First to Put Freighter Powered by Gas Turbine to Sea

Converted Liberty Will Be Ready by End of Year, New Maritime Chairman Says —He Sees Atomic Energy Used by '60

By GEORGE HORNE

Private Yards Push Studies

Long Wait Forecast

Democrats Meet April 15

TRANSPORT NEWS OF INTEREST HERE

Coast Guard Revises Rules on Ship Entry—Airline Is Expanding Bermuda Run

Daily Service to Bermuda

Boston Has Hopes

BOSTON, March 16 — Boston's last coast-wise general cargo service will be discontinued April 5, officials of the Pan Atlantic Steamship Corporation said that a $700,000 loss in 1954 prompted the move.

18 Tankers Hired by Navy

Trucker Retains Agent

WEATHER THROUGHOUT THE NATION

The Summary

A band of cloudiness, rain and showers extended yesterday from the lower Mississippi Valley through the Middle Atlantic States to New England. Some snow fell in extreme northern Maine, and snow flurries were reported in the upper lake region, the upper Missouri Valley and the central and southern Rockies. The weather was colder in this area extending from the upper Mississippi Valley and the lake region through the Ohio and Tennessee Valleys to Arkansas.

The Forecast

NEW YORK RECORDS

RECORDS ELSEWHERE

Fire Records

Virginia U. Teacher Ends Life

CHARLOTTESVILLE, Va., March 16 — Dr. Philip Williams Jr., Associate Professor of English at the University of Virginia, shot himself to death today, the police reported. He was 37 years old.

BERNSTEIN'S SUIT SETTLED AT LAST

Fight Over Nazi-Era Sale of Ship Properties Ends as Court Approves Terms

1947 Decision Deplored

50% FUEL SAVINGS for DIESEL POWER PLANTS DIESEL VESSELS

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LOST AND FOUND

LOST

FOUND

Cats, Dogs and Birds

PUBLIC NOTICES AND COMMERCIAL NOTICES

Commercial Notices

SHIP YOUR CAR TO FLORIDA

LET US SHIP YOUR CAR

Fashion's new fancies are found first on the Women's Pages of The New York Times. Read The New York Times every day for the latest in fashion news.

SHIPPING—MAILS

ALL HOURS GIVEN IN EASTERN STANDARD TIME

Outgoing Passenger and Mail Ships

Ships That Arrived Yesterday

Incoming Passenger and Mail Ships

Today

Tomorrow

Saturday, March 19

Sunday, March 20

Monday, March 21

Tuesday, March 22

Wednesday, March 23

West Coast Military Arrivals

Ships That Departed Yesterday

Reports From Foreign Ports

Freighters and Tankers Due Today

Outgoing Freighters Not Assigned Mail

Dodgers Overwhelm Orioles; Giants Defeat Cubs; Yankees Bow to White Sox

BROOKS REGISTER 18-TO-8 TRIUMPH

Dodgers Collect 18 Safeties, Orioles 11 at Vero Beach —Black Pitches Well

By ROSCOE McGOWEN

VERO BEACH, Fla., March 16. The Dodgers and the Orioles ... a lot of scoring today. The ... made eighteen hits with... home run and the Orioles ... hits with one home run. ... in 18-8 Brooklyn triumph. ... Maxwell, a portside ..., belted a three-bagger over the high right-field ... with nobody on in the ... inning—the first inflow ... one there this spring.

... each side made four errors ... resulted in six unearned ... for the Brooks and four for ... Orioles.

... were only two orderly innings pitched. Joe Black ... Walt Alston's middle ..., set the Orioles down in ... in the sixth inning. Bill ..., a former Yankee southpaw, did the same with the ... in the fourth.

... Coleman, Paul Richard's starting pitcher, suffered most ... from hits and errors. The ... scored seven runs off ... in five and two-thirds ... five in the first frame ... four hits, one in the second ... six hit and five scoring ... in the third on four hits ... In the latter inning Coleman ... a wild throw on a ball by ... Hook that opened the gates ... all the runs.

Hook Makes Low Throw

Ed Roebuck, who hasn't allowed an earned run in eight innings, was scored on three times in the third today. Hook ... clouted a low throw that ... scored the unearned runs.

However, in that inning there were doubles by Willie Miranda ... Hoot Evers and an infield hit by Billy Cox. Evers' blow ... in two runs.

Black did well in his second outing—he had batted three times against the Braves—giving up two runs, one unearned, in the ... A single by Lee Maye, ... Gilliam's error, accounted ... the tally.

Two Joe allowed only a single ... Kemp in the next two innings. Mayer was belted soundly ... in the seventh, his first frame ... four straight hits, the final one ... a triple to right by Chuck Diering, brought two runs.

... might have been more ... for Don Zimmer's quick ... by of Boyd Hunter's throw to ... Gus Triandos, who was SUP... TO HAVE hit for a double ... Jackie Robinson had a perfect day with a single, a walk and a triple. He drove in three runs. ... Campanella, Sandy Amoros, ... Furillo and Hank Sauer ... a pair apiece. Two of the ... runs were scored on ...

Furillo Batting .450

Furillo, who was played in ... every game except one, is batting .450. He stole the club in ... and is tied with Gil ... with seven. Gil's blows ... one homer and two ... Campanella is hitting .300, but has driven in only three ... and has no homers.

For Gus Keeps started for the first time and played three innings. He filled out to left and batted twice. The captain had only one assist, but fielded an... deep one that went for a ...

Paul Richards didn't get into ... He had his right knee ... trying to show Hal Smith ... catching about sticking your ...

The Orioles general and field ... appears interested in a pitch... from the Brooks to replace ... Ken Pukwa seems ... to be the man. . . . For some ... unexplained reason Alston put ... Amoros in the third-base slot ... today. Al Campanis, who ... the announcing, told the ... the Brooks would be back ... their own August in future ...

THE BOX SCORE

[box score]

Furillo Batting .450

[duplicate]

Yacht Reaches Havana

HAVANA, Cuba, March 16 (AP) ... last of twenty-six yachts ... St. Petersburg-Havana ... arrived today. The Good ... a 54-foot yawl owned by ... Jr. of Tampa, reached ... Harbor at 4 A. M. ... be a contender in the ...

Y. Namas Co-captains

... Perlow and Ralph Nel... were elected co-cap... City College's lacrosse ... Hofer. The Beavers will ... season March 25 at ... Ohio State.

GETTING INTO SHAPE: Jon Gehrmann, once king of the milers and still world's 1,000-yard indoor record holder, puts on spikes before workout at Milwaukee. Gehrmann, who plans to compete again, said he ran a 1:58 half-mile at Madison three weeks ago. He has a job as business manager and director of a boys' camp near Milwaukee.

Irvin Ace as World Champions Notch 5-3 Victory at Phoenix

Monte's 3 Straight Singles Figure in All Giant Runs—Thorpe Stars for Cubs

By JOHN DEERINGER

PHOENIX, Ariz., March 16. Lee Durocher played it with the varsity today and the result was gratifying. For the Giants went back to performing in the role of world champions as they brought down Stan Hack's Cubs, 5 to 3, to take a 2-1 lead in the spring series.

Sal Maglie, Johnny Antonelli and Hoyt Wilhelm did yeoman work on the mound, even if the latter did toss a 10 to nine the end of his stretch. In the attack, Monte Irvin was the key man.

Irvin rolled off three successive singles and each shot figured in the Giant scoring. In the first, in the fourth, frame Willie Mays came after the latter had doubled.

The second single, coming in the sixth, put Mays in scoring position after Willie had walked. A sacrifice fly by Henry Thompson brought in the run.

Monte's third safety came in the seventh, with the bases full and the score tied at 2—all. It cleared the decks and put about settled the game. Because of an error by the center fielder, Irvin scored with the first of the three runs.

Maglie Works 7 Innings

Maglie, who is grooming himself very carefully this spring, worked only two innings and one just a little roughing up with two out in the first. A pass a double and single gave the Cubs one tally. The Batter changed down on the Cloverleaf in the second and called it a day.

Antonelli bowled through the next three rounds. He held the Bruins scoreless and gave up only single. His control, however, was a bit off. He walked three, the passes in the fifth filling the bases.

Wilhelm went the rest of the way. For a change it was Hack who seemed to have been trouble with his famed knuckler from the catcher.

Ray Katt clung to everything but Wilhelm walked five and that a close call in the ninth.

With the Giants leading 5—2, Wilhelm walked two and new Ernie Banks just miss clearing the bases with a lusty blow. But he was held to a double as Mays' swift recovery and only one run came in. Then Hoyt ... ended out the final two to end the game.

Hack's biggest scoring rally came in the fifth when Bob Thorpe, a left-straight pitcher with Stockton in the California League last season, gave up three scoreless innings and gave up one hit. Al Lary was the victim of the Giants' three-run outburst in the seventh.

Manager Sent to Minneapolis

Ramon Monzant, the Venezuelan right-hander who was having transportation difficulties getting here, is not going to make it at all. The Giants have optioned him to Minneapolis. He will report to Manager Bill Rigney at Sanford, Fla.

It isn't often Mays registers any emotion, but he was more than a little exasperated in the first when, with Dark on third, he rifled a wellplayed shot ... Dark was charged with an error.

The Box Score

[box score]

Tarley's Second Outing

This was Turley's second outing in the Grapefruit League. It was like his showing against the Cardinals last week, unimpressive. Turley gave up seven innings. He has allowed seven hits, six walks and seven runs.

To put it bluntly, the Yankees have expected better things from the man who won fourteen games with the lowly Baltimore Orioles last season.

Kucks fell behind in the second when he walked Chico Carrasquel, the lead-off man. Minnie Minoso singled and Jim Rivera's double drove in the first run.

In the second Bob Nieman was safe on a high throw by Billy Hunter and Chico Courtney was hit by a pitched ball. Chakales sacrificed and Carrasquel singled home two runs.

The Yankees scored a single run in the fifth with Gil McDougald on first. Bob Cerv drove through with the run-scoring double.

McDougald did score unexpectedly in the sixth. Cerv, who singled, and Elston Howard, who hit the only Yankee hit, advanced.

Bobby Avila's double [illegible] Rivera's ground double [illegible] to ground to Hunter, who [illegible] and in the seventh and C... and Carrasquel advanced on ... Minoso opened the eighth ... a single and, after the ... Kucks was angled. Jo Dona... and Turley [illegible] Minoso's Marvelous.

In the ninth Courtney sing... and Jim Brideweser walked. Lou Ameche, a pinch-hitter, tried to steal third and Chakales threw him out, T... helped, too.

219 Deals for Lane

Frank C. Lane, the general manager of the Pale Hose, ... registered 219 deals, involving 421 players, since Nov. 1, 19...

Howard made two fine ... in the left field. . . . Joe Cu... who was the right-fielder took advantage of a mental ... by Courtney in the sixth. ... catcher dropped a third ... then picked up the ball ... rolled it to the mound. Co... spun to first base and Courtney was charged with an error. ... Carrasquel, with two singles ... three walks, had a perfect ... at bat.

The box score:

[box score]

Exhibition Baseball

[box score]

Minnesota Elects Junior

MINNEAPOLIS, Minn., March 16 (UP)—Dave Nolan, a junior guard from Arlington, Minn., was elected captain of the 1955-56 University of Minnesota basketball team today.

Flam, Brown Tennis Victors

PALM BEACH, Fla., March 16 (AP)—Mark Flam of Beverly Hills, Calif., defeated Ulf Schmidt of Sweden, 3—6, 7—5, 7—5, in the Everglades Club invitation tennis tournament today. Tom Brown Jr. of San Francisco also gained the semi-finals. He beat Dwight Goldthorpe of New York, 6—0, 6—0.

CARRASQUEL'S HIT TOPS BOMBERS, 3-1

Chico Gets 2-Run Single for White Sox—Yanks' Kuck Impresses on Mound

By LOUIS EFFRAT

Special to The New York Times.

ST. PETERSBURG, Fla., March 16—John Kucks, who may still develop into the Yankees' pitching ace of the spring, was the losing hurler as the Bombers bowed, 3—1, to the Chicago White Sox today.

The 21-year-old right-hander from Hazleton, N. J., started shakily and yielded all the runs in the first two innings.

However, Manager Casey Stengel did not fret over the ex-serviceman's performance. Once he lost his apparent nervousness, Kuckwa got by the last three of his five rounds rather neatly.

Nor did the pilot seem to worry because Bob Chakales and Sonny Gonsoulin held the Yankees to three hits. For the most part, Stengel used juveniles.

If Stengel showed any concern, it was over Bob Turley's four-inning stint. The rambling right-hander allowed four Orioles blanked. On Feb. 28 but his was not a smooth trip.

The visitors had a runner in scoring position in each of the four frames as Turley gave up four hits and three walks.

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The box score:

[box score]

'Haven't Heard a Word,' Says Cronin, On Report Williams Will Rejoin Red Sox

Special to The New York Times.

SARASOTA, Fla., March 16—Ted Williams was reported today to be ready to return to the Boston Red Sox. The heavy-hitting outfielder had announced at the close of last year what he was quitting the game.

Joe Cronin, general manager of the Boston club, said he hoped the report of Williams plan to retire was true. But he hadn't had any new word from the player.

Williams has been hitting at a camp near Islamorada, in the Florida Keys.

"I haven't heard a word from the boy since Feb. 15, when I arrived here to prepare for spring training," Cronin said. Cronin would be the man for Williams to reach if he wanted to negotiate a 1955 contract.

If Williams should change his mind about retiring, reasonably ... he would be offered a contract no worse than his last five years with Boston. He received close to $100,000 a year on each of those documents.

"Ted told me on the phone," Cronin said, "that he was up to his neck trying to straighten out his personal affairs. This matter was so much on his mind that he couldn't think of anything else. He didn't mention anything about coming back. But he promised that when his domestic situation was settled he would call me."

Williams is divorced in a Mexican action.

It was suggested that Williams wouldn't have phoned Cronin unless he had been thinking of playing ball again.

"There could be something to that, all right," Cronin said. "I'm ready to talk whenever Ted is."

Sports of The Times

By ARTHUR DALEY

Johnny on the Spot

VERO BEACH, Fla., March 16—Johnny Podres was sitting in the Dodgers' dressing room on that fateful day in October of 1953, waiting for Yankees and ... pennant. He had pitched his team to victory in the first game of the Series and ... had pitched the next before and he was ... in the World Series against the Yankees. ... was wonderful.

But with facing left-handed pitchers, ... the expert to be knock-wobblers, ... Sal Maglie asked ... by Pee Wee ... the captain of the team.

... pitching today, Pee Wee?" asked ... he sauntered alongside the Li... Dodger.

"... and Podres. "Charlie ... announced yet. Wait a minute. Here ... now. Hey, Charlie, Johnny wants ... who's pitching for us today.

... snapped Charlie, and walked away. Podres stood for a moment ... looked backwards at the knot ... Yankees.

The Nightmare

Podres was still screenwriting when the fifth game of the world series began. Gene Woodling opened his second pitch for a home run. But he did get past the next two batters without difficulty. Then came ... Landis.

Phil Rizzuto tried to spoil the third and was decapitated. Podres knocked down Woodling's smash and threw him out. He might have escaped from the fitting if the weary ... Gil Hodges had held Joe Collins' ... But it caromed away from Hodges' ... Then Podres hit Hank Bauer with ... pitch and walked Yogi Berra to ... bases.

... settled down. Enos ... Johnny on the mound and fed Mickey Mantle ... Hector Rizzuto helped the first guy ... a base hit. Johnny and that was that.

... and pitch in the 1955 world ... between the Brooks neighborhood ... engagement. It's quite likely ... may have made it at Johnny had kept ... But he was hotter than a 32 ... with a 7-room-and-2-bath record. ... a nine-inning winner. But he ... and on June 23 not even ... There's the day, most likely, the ... got the pennant.

Confidence Regained

"I just couldn't wait to get back," Podres said. "I knew I was in shape and I got better every time I came back. I've never ... What helped me most was that I began to ... Before, I regained my confidence by pitching batting practice to David with a ... I could have kept ...

Johnny Podres
A nervy pitcher

FELLER STARS ON MOUND

Indian Hurler Blanks Giants' B Team for 2 Innings

TUCSON, Ariz., March 16 (AP)—Bob Feller pitched three scoreless innings today as the Cleveland Indians' ace defeated the New York Giants' B team, 4—0, before a crowd of 6,500.

Feller gave up only two hits and struck out three batters. He pitched ... first two innings and ... the third.

The Indians scored three runs off Bob Lemon, Jim Hearn and Dick Littlefield in the fourth inning. Feller ... Mayo and Rod Anderson ... two outs.

The Giants signed Feller right off Bob Lemon, ... Hearn and Dick Littlefield ... Feller pitched ... innings, striking out three batters.

PRESENTING

[illustration]

Don't Read This Ad

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DUQUESNE TO MEET CINCINNATI TONIGHT

NEWCASTLE WINS, 2-0

Defeats Huddersfield Town in British Soccer Replay

Sports Today

BASKETBALL

[illegible]

POLO

[illegible]

Lombardy Victor at Chess

William Lombardy, New York state champion, and Alexander Kevitz, former champion of the Manhattan Chess Club, were winners in the first round of the championship qualifying tournament yesterday at the Manhattan Club. Their opponents were Edward Lasker and James T. Harmon, respectively. The winner will get a place on the Lasker team going to Europe in June.

English Cricket Team Wins

DURBAN, South Africa, March 16 (Reuters)—A Western Province team, which included a Test player, was defeated by an innings and 129 runs in a cricket match that finished today. Warren Bardsley, the Australian batsman, scored 164 for the Province.

Quality-wise whiskey buyers say—

Today's Carstairs is the most underpriced fine whiskey you can buy!

All over, men who know fine whiskey are choosing Carstairs as the outstanding value in the market today.

Carstairs is made from premium-priced grain—by expensive methods—with 120 quality controls from grain to bottle. Yet, strange thing about Carstairs is every cent it costs to use!

No wonder it's the top whiskey buy—the whiskey you can serve with pride—and pleasure!

[illustration]

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The Man who Cares says:

CARSTAIRS White Seal

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Three U. S. Aces Win in Mexico City, Brazilian Tops World Record

RICHARD IS VICTOR IN 200-METER TEST

Posts Second Pan-American Triumph—Da Silva Excels in Hop, Step and Jump

MEXICO CITY, March 16 (AP)—Rod Richard, Barbara Jones and Bob Barkus won championships for the United States in the Pan-American Games today. However, their efforts were overshadowed by a world record hop, step and jump by Adhemar Ferreira Da Silva of Brazil.

Heavy scoring by the North Americans in track and field enabled the United States to raise its lead to 279 points in the unofficial team score. Argentina was second with 90½, with Mexico and Brazil tied at 46½. Cuba was fifth, with 30.

Da Silva thrilled the gallery of 25,000 when he won with an effort of 54 feet 4 inches. The Brazilian thus regained the world record from Russia's Leonid Scherbakov. The Russian had set his mark in 1953 with a performance of 53 feet 2½ inches.

Richard, an Army lieutenant formerly of U. C. L. A., who previously had won the 100 meters, became a double gold medalist. He won the 200-meter dash in the Games' record time of 0:20.7. Charley Thomas of the United States was second.

Engel in Second Place

Barkus, a muscle man from Tufts who took up weight-lifting to cure a siege of spinal meningitis, won the hammer throw. He set a Games' record of 180 feet 1¾ inches. Martin Engel, a soldier from New York, was second, with 173 feet ¾ inch.

Miss Jones, a Chicago girl, captured the women's 100-meter dash in 0:11.5. Mae Faggs of Tennessee A. and I. was second. The winner's time also was a Pan-American record, beating the 0:11.6 that Miss Jones achieved in a preliminary heat yesterday.

Richard's time in the 200 was one-tenth of a second faster than the Pan-American mark made yesterday by Jose Telles of Brazil. It was only a tenth of a second slower than the best time ever recorded for the distance around a curve. Andy Stanfield turned in 0:20.6 at Los Angeles on June 26, 1952, on a curved track.

After Thomas, it took a photograph to decide third place was a dead heat between Telles, the defending champion, and Mike Agostini, the Fresno State student who runs for his native Trinidad.

Davis Mark Not Allowed

In the 110-meter hurdle preliminaries, Jack Davis of Los Angeles won his heat in 0:13.7 to better the Games' record. However, the mark was disallowed because of a favoring wind. The Pan-American record is 0:14, set by Jack Atlassy at Buenos Aires in 1951.

Norbert Schemansky, 225-pound Detroit policeman, won the heavyweight crown in weight-lifting with a total of 1,035¼ pounds. Schemansky bettered his own world record on the snatch with a lift of 303¼ pounds. His record was 301¼.

In fencing, three United States foil experts qualified for the individual final. They were Albert Axelrod, Harold Goldsmith and A. B. Wiklet, all of New York.

There was an anti-United States demonstration tonight. The outburst was occasioned by a bout in which Ward Yee, an airman from Youngstown, Ohio, won a split decision over Chile's Roberto Lobos. The United States bantamweight gained the final round.

He receiving the decision although the Mexican referee, Salvador Moreno, had harassed him frequently. He received 3 warnings on which he lost points. He failed to get credit for a knockdown when the Chilean hit the canvas in the second round.

The fans' actions disturbed the few United States spectators more than the referee's.

The United States water polo team was beaten by Brazil, 6—5, when a strong rally fell short of success.

Mexico Pentathlon Leader

Mexico moved into first place in the team standings in the modern pentathlon after the shooting events. The United States, which dropped out of first place as a result of the fencing yesterday, moved into second on the basis of the marksmanship.

Mexico has 37 demerits, the United States 44, Chile 78, Brazil 104 and Paraguay 132.

Luis M. Gallo of Chile is in first place in the individual competition with 14 points against him. William J. Andre of Montclair, N. J., is second, with 15.

The United States baseball team held its first-round lead by defeating the Netherlands Antilles, 12—1.

In tennis, Art Larsen of San Leandro, Calif., and Edward Moylan of Trenton advanced to the men's singles semi-finals. The United States women's doubles team of Dennis Brashear and Jean Clark was eliminated.

Larsen defeated Esteban Reyes of Mexico, 6—4, 7—5, 6—4. Moylan downed Gustavo Palafox, the Mexican Davis Cup player, 6—8, 6—2, 6—3, 6—3.

The United States women's basketball team won its third game, downing Chile, 75—55.

O'BRIEN WINS A BRIDE: Parry O'Brien, victor in the shot-put championship this week at Pan-American Games, drinks toast with his bride, the former Sandra Cordrey, after their marriage yesterday. They were wed in a civil ceremony in Mexico City, where the meet is being staged.

DYKES CUTPOINTS GAVILAN AT MIAMI

Bobby's Long-Range Attack Earns Unanimous Verdict and His 100th Victory

MIAMI, March 16 (UP)—Bobby Dykes of Miami defeated Kid Gavilan tonight. He gained a unanimous ten-round decision before 5,000 in Miami Stadium. It was the second straight defeat for the former welterweight champion in his comeback attempt.

Dykes had lost to the Cuban in their previous bout on Feb. 4, 1952. Tonight Dykes beat the 29-year-old ex-champion at long range and smothered the attacking "Keed" at close quarters.

Gavilan weighed 152½ pounds to Dykes' 161. The former titleholder went into the ring favored at 2-1.

The defeat was a great disappointment to Gavilan. The Kid had dropped a disputed decision to Hector Constance at Trinidad at Miami on Feb. 23. The Constance fight was the second for Gavilan after losing his 147-pound title to Johnny Saxton last Oct. 20. In his first comeback bout on Feb. 4, the Kid outpointed Ernie Durando.

Gavilan tried desperately to win tonight against the 27-year-old Dykes. He carried the fight to Bobby in every round, but it was the back-pedaling Bobby who landed the most punches and the more effective blows.

Dykes' right uppercuts and long straight rights shook the ex-champion several times. It appeared in the second, third and fourth rounds as if they might tag Gavilan with the first knockout of his career.

There were no knockdowns, but the Kid slipped to his knees when he missed a punch in the sixth round.

The 4,417 paying customers saw an excellent fight. The three officials scored for Dykes on a "10-point must" basis as follows: Referee Petey Barron, 98—94; Judge Sam Margolis, 99—91; Judge Mark Ervin, 98—92.

TOKYO, March 16 (AP)—Shigeru Kaneko of Japan knocked out Boy Escobar of the Philippines tonight to retain the Orient featherweight championship.

Referee Jack Sullivan stopped the bout at the end of the 10th round. Escobar's face was a pulpy mass by then.

National Hockey League

Last Night's Results

Rangers 1, Chicago 1.
Detroit 5, Boston 4.

Standing of the Teams

	W.	L.	T.	Pts.	G.	O.G.
Montreal	40	16	11	91	225	145
Detroit	40	17	11	91	194	132
Toronto	23	23	22	68	145	132
Boston	23	25	21	67	166	164
Rangers	16	34	18	50	145	204
Chicago	12	39	17	41	137	227

Tonight's Game

Detroit at Montreal.

College and School Results

BASEBALL

[illegible]

BASKETBALL

[illegible]

BOWLING

[illegible]

GIRLS BASKETBALL

[illegible]

RIFLE

[illegible]

Pan-American Games Summaries

By The Associated Press

TRACK AND FIELD

[illegible]

RANGERS TIED, 1-1, ON ST. LOUIS RINK

Mosienko Tallies for Hawks After Goal by Murphy—Wings Nip Bruins, 5-4

ST. LOUIS, March 16 (UP)—Ron Murphy and Bill Mosienko scored tonight as the New York Rangers and the Chicago Black Hawks played a 1-1 tie in a National League hockey game.

Neither New York nor Chicago, at the bottom of the N. H. L. standings, had anything important at stake in the game. Both are out of the Stanley Cup play-offs. At times they played with noticeable nonchalance.

In the third period each team appeared to prefer to settle for a tie rather than gamble for a victory.

Murphy's first-period goal might well have been credited to the Chicago goalie, Al Rollins. He raised his glove just as the puck was sailing overhead. That deflected it into the net. Lou Fontinato and Pete Conacher drew assists on the lucky marker. It stood up until 11:36 of the second period.

At that time Mosienko took a short pass from Metro Prystai in center ice. The Hawk skater threaded his way through the New York team for the goal. His performance was the one spectacular feature of a generally listless contest.

Chicago finished its six-game St. Louis season tonight. The Hawks' record here was three ties, two defeats and one victory.

The line-up:

[illegible]

Reibel's Goal Decides

BOSTON, March 16 (UP)—Earl (Dutch) Reibel's goal at 14:58 of the third period brought the Detroit Red Wings a 5-4 victory over the Boston Bruins tonight. The game at Boston Garden was watched by 7,917 fans. With the triumph the Wings gained a first-place tie with the Montreal Canadiens in the National Hockey League.

The Red Wings entered the final frame trailing by 3—2. Bionda assisted on Johnny Wilson's close-in goal at 3:45. [illegible] helped put Detroit ahead [illegible]

Howe's second tally of the game at 9:26.

The Bruins tied the score at 10:52. Reibel's goal then decided.

The line-up:

[illegible]

Duca Accepts Redskin Pact

WASHINGTON, March 16 (UP)—The Washington Redskins received a signed contract today from Sam Duca, former Arizona State guard and now a Marine corporal.

AMERICAN HOCKEY LEAGUE

[illegible]

Richard Barred Rest of Season, And Also From Hockey Play-Offs

Ban for Boston Fight Likely to Cost Ace Scoring Title, Hurt Montreal in Race —Fans Threaten League Head

MONTREAL, March 16 (CP)—Maurice (The Rocket) Richard was banned today from all remaining National Hockey League games this season. He was also barred from the post-season play-offs for the Stanley Cup.

The fiery Montreal Canadien star was suspended by Clarence Campbell, the league president. His action stemmed from a fight during last Sunday night's game in Boston. Richard had been charged with punching Linesman Cliff Thompson and attacking a Boston Bruin player, Hal Laycoe, with a hockey stick.

The penalty stunned the Canadiens. They are engaged in a close race with the Detroit Red Wings for first place in the regular-season play.

Campbell's decision is almost certain to cost Richard the league scoring title. It was in his grasp for the first time in his thirteen seasons with Montreal.

Montreal fans reacted angrily. The switchboard at the league office was swamped with calls. Many threats were made against Campbell's life.

Campbell's ruling followed a hearing this morning. He said the Canadiens could appeal the ruling to the league's board of governors.

An appeal could be carried to the governors before the start of the play-offs. There was no possibility, however, that Richard could play in the final three games of the regular season.

Richard is the most heavily fined player in hockey history. But he did not suffer a direct financial penalty today. However, the suspension could cost him several thousand dollars.

The league scoring champion receives $1,000. Each player on the N. H. L. championship team also receives $1,000. There are bonuses for victory in the cup play-offs.

Richard, with 74 points, has a two-point lead in the scoring race. His team-mates, Bernie Geoffrion and Jean Beliveau, have 72 and 71 points respectively.

Campbell held a 3¼-hour hearing in his office.

"The time for probation or leniency (for Richard) is past," he ruled.

Campbell also referred to a fight in Toronto three months ago. He said, "the pattern of conduct by Richard was almost identical, including his constant resort to the recovery of a stick to pursue his opponent, as well as his flouting of the authority of the official."

Richard was fined $250 as a result of the Toronto incident.

TWO SHARE MEDAL IN PINEHURST GOLF

Mrs. Jones, Miss Jansson Register 75's to Head Field by 3 Strokes

PINEHURST, N. C., March 16 (AP)—Mrs. Mae Murray Jones of Montpelier, Vt., and Mary Patton Janssen of Charlottesville, Va., each carded a 75 to tie for the medal honors today in the fifty-third North and South Amateur golf tournament.

The co-medalists led their nearest rivals in the field of seventy-four by three strokes. A score of 88 was needed to qualify for one of the thirty-two championship match-play positions starting with tomorrow's first round.

THE QUALIFIERS

[illegible]

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1	KODAK '35' F3.5 CTD. LENS, FL. SH.	86.50	29.95
1	RETINA IIC F2 CTD. XENON	127.50	95.00
1	RETINA IIIC F2 CTD. XENON	185.00	129.95
1	ARGUS C3 F3.5 COATED LENS	44.50	19.50
3	TENAX (NEW) F3.5 COATED LENS	66.55	29.50
6	ARGUS 21 F3.5 CTD. W. CASE	65.50	24.95
2	CONTESSA 35 F2.8 CTD. TESSAR	142.00	89.50
3	EXAKTA F3.5 CTD. TESSAR	199.50	54.50
1	LEICA IIC F2 COATED LENS	355.00	79.50
2	CANON IV F2 COATED LENS	259.00	86.50
1	AUTO ROLLEI F3.5 XENAR, FL. SOL.	219.50	75.50
6	CIROFLEX B F3.5 COATED LENS	74.50	27.95
4	CIROFLEX C F3.5 COATED LENS	97.45	34.50
1	CIROFLEX D F3.5 COATED LENS	87.90	29.50
1	AUTO ROLLEIFLEX F3.5 TESSAR LENS	279.50	89.50
1	ROLLEICORD III F3.5 CTD. XENAR	133.75	57.00
1	POLAROID 95 60 SECOND CAMERA	89.75	42.00
1	SUPER IKONTA C F3.5 CTD. TESSAR	114.00	49.95
1	SUPER IKONTA A F3.5 TESSAR LENS	102.00	29.50
1	SUPER IKONTA B F2.8 TESSAR LENS	145.00	69.50
	MOVIE CAMERAS		
2	CINE KODAK MAG-8, F1.9 CTD. LENS	149.55	$ 54.00
1	KEYSTONE K8 WITH F2.5 LENS	92.75	17.95
2	REVERE 88 F2.5 COATED LENS	99.50	34.50
1	KODAK BROWNIE F2.7 COATED LENS	37.50	14.50
	MOVIE PROJECTORS		
1	REVERE 85 750-W. F1.6 LENS	$159.50	$ 59.50
1	DEJUR 1000 1000-W. F1.6 LENS	167.50	94.50
1	B&H REGENT 750-W. F1.6 LENS	169.95	99.50
	SLIDE PROJECTORS		
2	REVERE 888 300-W. WITH CASE	$ 69.95	$ 27.50
2	GOLDE MANUMATIC 300-W. 7" LENS	65.00	19.95
2	TDC MODEL D 150-W. 5" LENS	64.50	24.50
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2	7x50 ZEISS, CENTRAL FOCUS	175.00	89.95
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

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

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Knickerbockers Turn Back Celtics and Tie Eastern Play-Off Series

NEW YORK'S RALLY DECIDES, 102 TO 95

Clifton Paces Victory Over Boston With 25 Points at Garden—Braun Gets 21

By LINCOLN A. WERDEN

The New York Knickerbockers beat the Boston Celtics, 102 to 95, at Madison Square Garden last night. The New Yorkers' victory evened the National Basketball Association Eastern Division play-off series at one game apiece.

The Celtics scored a 122-101 triumph in Boston on Tuesday in the series opener. The deciding game will be played Saturday afternoon at the Garden. The winner will meet Syracuse for the Eastern title.

Led by the shooting of Ed Macauley, the Celtics posted a better than .500 average in gaining a 50-44 edge at half. Macauley made eight of nine field-goal attempts and sank four from the foul line.

After that, the Celtics' shooting slumped. They were able to connect on twelve of forty-one shots during the remainder of the game.

Fails Key Action

Changes in the Knicks' lineup at the start of the third period seemed to make a difference. Ray Felix, who had been on the sidelines previously, started with Dick McGuire, Carl Braun, Rowels Clifton and Jim Baechtold. The Celtics' margin had been cut to 57—56 by the end of the third period.

The entire complexion of the game changed with a hard-driving New York offense. The Knicks took two brief leads in the third period and then gained decisive early in the final quarter.

The Knicks tallied 26 points to the visitors' 18 in the fourth period. The New Yorkers led in the first minute and a half by 97 to 78.

The Knicks were ahead by only a point following Bill Sharman's basket, but they added 7 more points before Boston scored again. By the six-minute mark they had a 10-point advantage.

Boston's Shooting Off

Boston succeeded in getting only four more field goals and 21 points. The Knicks registered 8 more points to clinch the game.

Clifton was the leading Knick scorer with 25 points. Braun had 21.

Cousy led the Celtics with 26 points. Macauley, limited to 2 points in the second half, had 23.

The Knicks made numbers of forty-two shots in the second half. They had an overall record of forty-six baskets in eighty-six attempts.

Talmudical Academy of Manhattan won the Metropolitan Jewish High School league title by defeating Rabbi Jacob Joseph High School, 51 to 48, in the preliminary game. Paul Rosenthal of the losers was the high scorer with 24 points. Irv Goldsmith tallied 14 for Talmudical.

The Knicks line-up:

FINGER-TIP CONTROL: Jim Baechtold of the Knicks pushes in 5 points despite guardian of Ed Macauley of Boston during first half at Garden. New York rallied to win, 102-95.

MINNEAPOLIS FIVE NIPS ROYALS, 82-78

Lakers Capture First Game of Best-of-Three Play-Off Series in Western Group

ST. PAUL, March 16 (AP)—A last-minute rally gave the Minneapolis Lakers an 82-78 victory over the Rochester Royals tonight. It was the first game of the Western Division playoff in the National Basketball Association.

Jim Holstein, a substitute, scored in the Lakers' closing minutes.

Bobby Wanzer of the Royals was the game's high man with 20 points. Rochester outscored Minneapolis from the field, 27—26. The Lakers dropped in thirty-nine free throws to the visitors' thirty-four.

The second game in the series will be played Friday night in Rochester. If a third is necessary the teams will return to St. Paul Saturday night.

Rochester broke away to a first half lead, leading the Lakers, 40—36, at the end of the first session.

Clyde Lovellette, whose 26 points led the Lakers, paced a second-period barrage of 31 counters against only 2. This gave Minneapolis a margin it held until the opening minutes of the third period.

Both clubs hit near one-quarter of their shots from the field in the final session.

The Line-Up



JASPERS PICK GRADY

Selected as Captain of Manhattan's Squad

ENGLEWOOD GOLF CLUB



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March 16—New York 102, Boston 95.
March 19—Boston at New York.

WESTERN DIVISION

March 16—Minneapolis 82, Rochester 78.
March 18—Minneapolis at Rochester.
March 19—Rochester vs. Minneapolis at St. Paul (if necessary).

Spear Defeats Spingel

Vincent Spear defeated Silvio Spingel, 40 to 39, in the New York State open three-cushion billiard tournament at the Forty-fourth Street Academy yesterday. The match lasted eighty-two innings.

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Nance's Lad Takes Stakes in Florida

FAVORITE SCORES 2-LENGTH VICTORY

Nance's Lad Survives Claim of Foul to Defeat First Cabin at Gulfstream

HALLANDALE, Fla., March 16 (AP)—Nance's Lad won the $[illegible] added Fountain of Youth Handicap at Gulfstream Park today. Those fans who backed him down to 2-to-2 favoritism had several anxious minutes before his victory was confirmed by the stewards. A crowd of [illegible] spectators was present.

Bennie Green, who finished second on Ackel-Nall Stable's First Cabin, lodged a foul claim against John Choquette, Nance's Lad's rider. The stewards, after viewing the movies of the race, said they had seen no evidence of interference.

About fifty yards from the wire, Nance's Lad ducked in sharply. Green pulled up his mount. However, the stewards ruled First Cabin was not bothered at the point where Nance's Lad veered to the rail under the sting of Choquette's whip.

Virtual Two-Horse Race

Nance's Lad, owned jointly by his breeder, Hollon (Rabbit) Dodson, and C. J. [illegible], finished two lengths in front of First Cabin. They virtually made it a two-horse race after the first half-mile.

Four lengths farther back came H. C. Fruehauf's stretch-running Blue Lem. [illegible], in the field with Colonel Jay, was fourth, four more lengths away.

The big disappointment of the handicap was C. F. Mooers' Munchausen, the second choice. Munchausen finished seventh in the field of thirteen 3-year-olds.

Nance's Lad, who set a track record for six and one-half furlongs in winning the Hutcheson Handicap a week ago, carried top weight of 117 pounds and went the mile and a sixteenth in 1:43 1-5. He paid $5, $3.50 and $2.50 for $2 across the board. First Cabin returned $4.70 and $3.10. Blue Lem paid $4.20.

Earnings Reach $29,850

Nance's Lad earned $13,550. That increased his total for 1955 to $29,850. In all he has won four races this winter, with one second and one third. He was unplaced only in the Everglades Handicap at Hialeah, which was won by Prince Noor.

The Fountain of Youth was a prep for the $100,000 Florida Derby March 26. Belair's Nashua, the Flamingo winner, is an early Derby favorite. Nance's Lad qualified impressively for it, as did First Cabin. The others seemed lacking in speed.

The summaries:

[illegible]

A SIGN OF SPRING: Exult, racegoers, at this incontrovertible evidence. Workmen at Jamaica are repairing and painting the stands for season opening here April 1.

Wood, Field and Stream

Talk of Channel Bass Dispels Mirages on North Carolina's Dunes of Dare

By RAYMOND R. CAMP

OUR beach-running correspondents from the outer [illegible] of Dare on the North Carolina outer banks seem more interested in mirages these days than in the surf casting prospects. This is rather strange in view of the imminence of spring and the arrival of the channel bass.

The ability to distinguish a mirage along the outer banks depends largely upon the amount of [illegible] tea [illegible] ployed in "those" [illegible] [illegible] funds. Still, there are a few visitors who can [illegible] plish surprising things on nothing but water. According to Aycock Brown, who "reps" the beaches from Nags Head to Hatteras Village, recent mirages have been interesting and varied, but not one of them involved a channel bass.

This does not mean these coppery fighters are not present, for normally the fish arrive offshore a week or two before they move into the surf. Last year the first "drum," as they are called, was beached on March 23. This year it is hoped that the initial fish will be taken not later than the first day of spring, which means that a lot of "bankers" will go fishing on Monday.

The "foreign" surf casters usually wait until some of the local enthusiasts have taken a few fish before they load their long rods into cars and head for Nags Head, Buxton or Hatteras. Now that a hard road has been constructed between Oregon and Hatteras Inlets, hotels, motels and cottages have emerged. The visiting angler no longer has to depend on the Coast Guard to haul his car out of the soft spots.

The entire beach, including Hatteras Point, is now open to surf casters, and local angling prophets insist that the storms all point to a big channel bass year.

Those who yearn for some of the peace and rustic simplicity of the old days, before the highway came to Hatteras, will have to move on across Hatteras Inlet to Ocracoke. A small car ferry makes a [illegible] trip across the inlet daily. But once on Ocracoke it pays to read the tide tables, let most of the air out of the tires and run the beach only at low water.

We made a trip to Ocracoke last year, and except for the addition of one large house in the village, it seemed as quiet, quaint and peaceful as ever. Not a hot dog or hamburger stand is to be found, but you can always drink for [illegible] [illegible], cheese and [illegible] the general store.

The surf caster visiting the outer banks for the first time would find it an economy, when you figure wear and tear, to rent a beach buggy at Hatteras for making the Ocracoke trip. Even experienced beach runners get bogged down, and the Coast Guard does not seem as accommodating as it once was, except where boats are concerned.

Table for High Tide for Waters Adjacent to New York

[illegible]

Reports on Ski Conditions

ALBANY, March 16 (UP)—The State Commerce Department today received the following reports from operators of ski areas:

North Creek—2-24 inches base, skiing fair.

Saranac Lake—12 inches packed, fair.

Speculator—2-12 inches frozen granular, bare spots, fair.

The Boston Weather Bureau yesterday at 4 P. M. issued the following forecasts and listed these conditions as reported by operators of ski areas:

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Forecast—Fair, with temperatures below freezing today.

[illegible]

VERMONT

Forecast — Same as for New Hampshire.

[illegible]

Bowie Results

[illegible]

Shoemaker Gets 5 Winners

ALBANY, Calif., March 16 (UP)—Willie Shoemaker, who rode five winners today, piloted Il Bacio(?) [illegible] to a four-and-a-half-length victory in the Fisherman's Wharf Purse at Golden Gate Field. Shoemaker also won with Thumb Ball, Mr. Boots, Glory II and The Honks. [illegible] paid $109 for $2.

HOCKEY VICTORS RETURN

20,000 Cheer World Amateur Champions in Penticton

PENTICTON, B. C., March 16 (CP)—The world champion amateur hockey team, Penticton V's, returned home today. The players received a rousing welcome at the Municipal Airport. They then rode into town in a three-mile parade.

Green and white paper streamers, the colors of the squad, hung across the streets. A crowd of approximately 20,000 cheered the athletes as they rode by.

Acting Mayor [illegible] presented to each player and club official a commemorative silver tray from the city.

Lincoln Fields Track Sold

CHICAGO, March 16 (AP)—The Lincoln Fields race track was sold today to a group of business men for $2,100,000. The purchasing group is headed by Russell L. Heineman(?), Chicago steel firm executive; Hubert K. Howard, Chicago industrialist and horseman, and Herbert Herff, Memphis, Tenn., oilman. The group stated that it is hopeful of obtaining the approval of the Illinois Racing Board to conduct its 1955 meeting at Washington Park in Homewood, Ill.

WEXLER TOPPLES IVKOV IN 39 MOVES

Wins Sixth-Round Match in Argentine Chess Event—Szabo Takes Lead

Bernardo Wexler of Argentina defeated Boris Ivkov of Yugoslavia in the sixth round of an international chess masters tournament at Mar del Plata yesterday, according to a report from Buenos Aires. It was Ivkov's first loss in the competition.

Ivkov, playing the black, resorted to the Dutch defense, but drifted into an unfavorable situation. Wexler scored in thirty-nine moves.

Ivkov dropped to second place as Laszlo Szabo of Hungary defeated Gunnar(?) Idigoras(?), Argentina, in thirty-one moves with a King's Indian defense. Szabo's score includes five games won and one drawn.

Oscar Panno, the champion of Argentina, also is undefeated. He is in third place with a score of 4—2. Panno's opponent yesterday was Emilio Dodano(?), Argentina, who had the white pieces.

Although he adjourned his game with Boris De Greiff, Colombia, Miguel Najdorf, ex-champion of Argentina, held fourth place with 3½—1½.

Rodrigo Flores of Chile and Rene Letelier, also of Chile, drew. This gave Flores a quadruple tie with Svetozar Gligoric of Yugoslavia, Ludek Pachman of Czechoslovakia and Hector Rossetto of Argentina.

Gligoric was paired with Rossetto in a Queen's Gambit and won in thirty-eight moves. Pachman, playing the white, lost to Herman Pilnik of Argentina.

Lorenzo Bauza, Uruguay, and Roman Toran, Spain, adjourned.

STANDING OF THE PLAYERS

[illegible]

COURT COACHES SEEK FOUR RULE CHANGES

The metropolitan college basketball coaches yesterday went on record as favoring the adoption of the pro rules in college play next year.

The mentors also the [illegible] toward forming a Metropolitan College Basketball Coaches Association. [illegible] McDermott [illegible] in New Rochelle [illegible] temporary president. [illegible] City College; [illegible] Hofstra [illegible] of St. [illegible]

[illegible]

The [illegible] coaches favor the adoption of the following rules [illegible]:

A [illegible] limit on shooting.

An allowance of five fouls per quarter for each team.

The widening of the foul throw lane to twelve feet.

The awarding of two free throws for each back court foul.

In addition to Norton, McDermott, Rosenthal(?) and Johnny Bach of Fordham were slated to represent local colleges at the convention.

Costa and Lopes End Drills

Carmelo Costa, Brooklyn featherweight, and Joey Lopes, Sacramento (Calif.) lightweight, completed training yesterday for their ten-round bout. It will be held at Madison Square Garden tomorrow night. Both fighters have signed to enter the ring at 132 pounds, give or take a pound. The bout will be the first Garden main event appearance for each man.

SYMPHONY HALL
tonight at 8:05
on WQXR presents
BACH
Suite No. 2 in B minor for Flute, Strings and Continuo
Performed by [illegible]
SCHUBERT
Rosamunde: [illegible] B flat
Wilhelm Furtwängler conducting the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra.
SZYMANOWSKI
Violin Concerto No. 1
Eugenia Umińska, violinist, with the Philharmonia Orchestra, Gregor Fitelberg conducting.
WQXR
Radio Station of The New York Times

PLANNERS IRKED BY PUMPER CURB

Approve $495,000 to Buy 33 as 65 New Defense Fire Engines Stand Idle

The City Planning Commission yesterday raised the question why the city should have to buy new fire pumpers while sixty-five virtually new ones bought for civil defense purposes stand relatively idle.

The commission approved $495,000 in capital funds to buy thirty-three new pumpers at $15,000 each. This brought to light that the planners had first inquired whether the city could convert the sixty-five civil defense pumpers to its own regular fire-fighting use.

Fire Commissioner Edward F. Cavanagh Jr. notified the commission that agreements with the Federal Government prevented the city from following the planners' suggestion. The sixty-five pumpers, costing $945,000, were bought jointly by the city and the United States for civil defense.

Mr. Cavanagh's finding was echoed in a letter from City Administrator Luther H. Gulick. Dr. Gulick's letter was submitted to the commission by Fire Chief Peter Loftus, who appeared briefly in favor of the appropriation for new pumpers.

'Emergency' Use Permitted

After the commission meeting, Chairman John J. Bennett and his associates were represented as feeling it was "a shame" that about $1,000,000 worth of civil defense pumpers should stand almost idle, growing obsolete, while the city was forced to seek out additional funds for new equipment.

In fire "emergencies" the city has the Federal Government's permission to use the civil defense pumpers. "Emergencies" have been defined as three-alarm fires or worse.

The commission members' feelings about the idle civil defense pumpers were sharpened considerably when Commissioner Cavanagh several weeks ago asked for $1,320,000 in capital funds to buy eighty-eight new pumpers.

In cutting the authorization to $495,000 for thirty-three new pumpers, the planners noted in a report purely that this would permit the Fire Department to replace all of its existing pumpers that are more than twenty years old.

Individual members of the commission, however, expressed the hope privately that, in accordance [illegible], the city [illegible] working out [illegible] the civil defense [illegible] had been [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

Firehouse Funds Approved

The commission also approved capital funds amounting to $785,000 to begin work this year on a [illegible] firehouse in the vicinity of Eighty-sixth Street and [illegible] Avenue. The new house is to accommodate Engine Companies 44 and 22, as well as Hook and Ladder Company 13.

The building will combine quarters for Engine Company 44, now at 221 East Seventy-fifth Street in a structure built in 1904; Engine Company 22, now at 159 East Eighty-fifth Street in quarters built in 1858, and Hook and Ladder 13, now at 159 East Eighty-seventh Street, in a firehouse built in 1865.

The commission approved an application filed by the 316 West Fifty-sixth Street Corporation for construction of a garage to accommodate 300 motor vehicles.

The garage is to be housed in a building to be erected on a site having a frontage of 100 feet on the south side of West Fifty-seventh Street, 275 feet west of Eighth Avenue.

The applicant, according to a commission report, plans the erection of an eight-level open-type mechanized parking garage in which cars will be picked up by hoists and deposited in stalls on the upper levels. One entrance will be on Fifty-seventh Street. There will be an entrance and exit on Fifty-sixth Street.

Dennis Day Has Pneumonia

Special to The New York Times.

LOS ANGELES, March 16—Dennis Day, the singer, is in St. Vincent's Hospital for treatment of lobar pneumonia. His condition yesterday was described as not critical. Mr. Day had been scheduled to appear, with Fred Allen on the National Broadcasting Company's "Entertainment 1955," which is slated to open N. B. C.'s "Color City" at its Burbank studio here on March 27. The engagement has been canceled.

Television Notes

A television script-writing contest for undergraduate students in any accredited American college or university was announced yesterday. Telent Associates, Ltd., which produces and packages TV shows, said three awards would be given for the best original half-hour plays—drama, comedy or documentary.

The first prize will be $1,000, the second $500 and the third $250. If a script is produced a minimum of $1,000, including prize money, will be paid to the writer.

Professional television writers will judge the entries. They are N. Richard Nash, Robert Alan Aurthur and David Shaw. Details may be obtained from Telent Associates, Ltd., 41 East Fiftieth Street, New York 22, N. Y.

The Procter & Gamble Company will become the full-time sponsor of the television comedy series "My Favorite Husband" beginning May 7. It currently shares sponsorship with the Simmons Company.

French Traitor Doomed

RENNES, France, March 16 (Reuters)—René Besson(?), 34, a Frenchman who betrayed British and United States airmen trying to escape from occupied France during World War II, was sentenced to death by a military court here today.

ON TELEVISION

Channel 2 ... WCBS-TV; Channel 4 ... WRCA-TV; Channel 5 ... WABD; Channel 7 ... WABC-TV; Channel 9 ... WOR-TV; Channel 11 ... WPIX; Channel 13 ... WATV

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 1955

12:30—St. Patrick's Parade—(11).

1-1:30—Family Theatre: "Trial at Tara." St. Patrick's Day Salute—(9).

8-8:30—Ray Milland Show: Peggy prevails on Prof. McNulty to write a play, with Phyllis Avery, comedy—(2).

8-8:30—Groucho Marx: Audience participation show, "You Bet Your Life"—(4).

8-8:30—Soldier Parade, talent show, featuring the Fort Hood soldiers' chorus, with Arlene Francis, hostess—(7).

8:30-9:30—Shower of Stars: Musical version of the Broadway play, "Burlesque," with Dan Dailey, Marilyn Maxwell, Joan Blondell, Jack Oakie, Jimmy Burke (color)—(2).

8:30-9—Justice: "Guilty Secret," with Mark Richman, Pat Breslin, Gary Merrill—(4).

9-9:30—Dragnet, with Jack Webb—(4).

9-9:30—Star Tonight: "The Murderer," a two-character psychological suspense drama based on a story by Joel Townsley Rogers; Charles Aidman, Buster Crabbe—(7).

9:30-10—Four-Star Playhouse: David Niven, as psychiatrist in Western locale in "Henry and the Psychopathic Horse"—(2).

9:30-10—Play: "Celebrity," a socialite is accused of murdering her ex-husband, with Joanne Dru, Dennis Morgan—(4).

9:30-10:30—Play: Adaptation of John Galsworthy's play, "The Silver Box," drama, with Tom Helmore, Roddy McDowall portraying a father and son whose contempt for the law leads to a miscarriage of justice—(7).

9:30—Basketball: National Invitation Tournament, from Madison Square Garden, Duquesne-Cincinnati—(11).

10-11—Video Theatre: "It Grows on Trees," with Ruth Hussey, Robert Preston; windfall of money—(4).

(•DENOTES PROGRAMS DESCRIBED ABOVE)

DAYTIME

[illegible]

EVENING

[illegible]

ON RADIO

WABC 770 · WCBS 880 · WRCA 660 · WOR 710 · WQXR 1560 · [illegible]

7:55—Exhibition Baseball: Yankees-Cardinals, at St. Petersburg, Fla.—WINS. Dodgers-Baltimore, at Daytona Beach—WMGM.

8-9—St. Patrick's Day Concert—WQXR.

[illegible]—Saga: "The Reno Moby Dick," based on Herman Melville's story—WABC.

[illegible]—Piano Classics: Leonid Hambro and Jascha Zayde (Recorded)—WQXR.

[illegible]—N. I. T. Basketball: Dayton vs. Fraternity of St. [illegible]-Cincinnati—WMGM.

[illegible]—Official Detective: "The Fatal Fix," with Craig McDonnell as Detective Dan Britt—WOR.

[illegible]—The Whistler: "A Matter of Odds," with William Forman—What happens when a criminal appears about to escape the law—WCBS.

8:05-9—Symphony Hall: Featuring Szymanowski's Violin Concerto No. 1—WQXR.

8:30-9—Bob Hope Show: Edmond O'Brien, Rhonda Fleming(?), guests—WRCA.

8:30-9—Nightwatch: Detective Unit 16 investigates "Unknown Trouble"—WCBS.

9-9:30—"Can Discipline Curb Delinquency?"—William C. Kvaraceus, psychologist; Ernest Papanek, Wiltwyck School for Boys—WEVD.

9-9:30—Cooper Union Forum: Prof. Sidney Hook of N. Y. U. discusses "Communism"—WNYC.

9:05-9:30—The Spoken Word: Dylan Thomas' poetic readings (Recorded); Iola Chasman, hostess—WQXR.

(•DENOTES PROGRAMS DESCRIBED ABOVE)

DAYTIME

[illegible]

EVENING

[illegible]

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[illegible]

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From Preceding Page

Houses—New Jersey

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Virginia

Florida

Lots—Manhattan

Lots—Bronx

Lots—Staten Island

Lots—Queens

Lots—Nassau-Suffolk

Lots—Westchester County

Lots—Connecticut

Summer Homes—Queens County

Summer Homes—Nassau-Suffolk

Summer Homes—Westchester Co.

Summer Homes—Orange County

Summer Homes—Sullivan County

Summer Homes—New Jersey

Summer Homes—Connecticut

Real Estate—Miscellaneous Wanted

Real Estate for Exchange

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Manhattan

Houses—Pennsylvania

Houses—Connecticut

Houses—Westchester County

Houses—Orange County

Houses—New York State

Houses—New Jersey

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Farms & Acreage—Ulster County

Farms & Acreage—Connecticut

Farms & Acreage—New York State

Farms & Acreage—Maine

Other Sections

Apartment Houses Wanted

Westchester County

Apartment Houses Wanted

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Business & Industrial

Buildings & Factories

Manhattan

Bronx

Brooklyn

Queens

Buildings & Factories

Manhattan

Taxpayers—Taxpayers Also Wtd.

Taxpayers—Taxpayers Also Wtd.

Lots—Manhattan

Lots—Bronx

Lots—Brooklyn

Lots—New Jersey

Stores—Bronx

Stores—Staten Island

Stores—Queens

Stores—Nassau-Suffolk

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4½ ROOMS $125

GREAT NECK, 3½, 4½ Rooms

Apartments—Queens & Long Island

Unfurnished

VILLA COURT

FROM $99

FREE GAS

FREE WALL-TO-WALL CARPETING

2 RMS, $80, 3½, $97

3½, $102; 4½, $126

KRAHAM REALTY

RIGO PARK APTS

Apartments—Westchester

Unfurnished

NO. 1 VINCENT ROAD

DALEWOOD GARDENS

COUNTRY CLUB RIDGE

4½-5½ $160 UP

VILLAGE GREEN

Apartments—New Jersey

Furnished

1, 2 & 3-ROOM SUITES

$105 TO $135 PER MONTH

Unfurnished

Rare Opportunity!

Rents Drastically Reduced

PIERCE MANOR

5 ROOM (2 BEDRM) APTS

NOW FROM $129 MONTH

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Furnished

Unfurnished

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MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

Apartments Wanted—Unfurnished

To fill everyday needs

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New York's leading

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Apartments & Rooms to Share

Moving, Trucking, Storage

Florida, All Southern States

Engel Brothers CO 5-3160

ROOMS

Furnished Rooms—East Side

THE BROADWAY CENTRAL

Singles $3 Daily, $17.50 Wkly

Doubles $4 Daily $19 Wkly

HOTEL

GEORGE WASHINGTON

HOTEL LATHAM

HOTEL TUDOR

SINGLE FROM $24 WEEKLY

HOTEL SHELTON

$24 Weekly $24

One of New York's Newest

Pickwick Arms Hotel

Special Reduced

Weekly Rates from $16.00

38TH, 116 E. SUTTON PLAZA

EAST END HOTEL

WARRINGTON HOTEL

Furnished Rooms—West Side

22 St, 155 W, Hotel Stanford

23 ST, 260 WEST

CLINTON HOTEL

HOTEL GREGORIAN

HOTEL CHESTERFIELD

SINGLE, $14.00 WEEK up

DOUBLE, $17.00 WEEK up

RADIO IN EVERY ROOM

HOTEL VAN CORTLANDT

SINGLES $14 WEEKLY UP

DOUBLES $17 WEEKLY UP

HOTEL MARYLAND

HENRY HUDSON HOTEL

PARK SAVOY HOTEL

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Sgl $12.75 Wk—Dble $15.75

DAILY FROM $1.75

STRATFORD ARMS HOTEL

From $7.50 Day & $12.50 Wk

Singles, Dbles, $8.75 wk up

76 ST, 230 W (COR B'WAY)

Hotel Imperial Court

Furnished Rooms—West Side

HOTEL PARK CRESCENT

HOTEL VANCOUVER

ALL NEW—1-RM HSKPG

Hamilton Res Hotel—Hsk'g

COMPARE—HOTEL MOWAY

THOS. JEFFERSON—HSKPG.

"ARVIA HOUSE"

112 St, 611 W—Colonial Hse

ALL NEW—1-RM HSKPG

Furnished Rooms—Bronx

Furnished Rooms—Brooklyn

HOTEL ST. GEORGE

Board—Rooms for Rent

Convalescent—Nursing Homes

Manhattan & Bronx

Westchester County

New York State

HELP WANTED

Help Wanted Female—Agencies

O'APPROVED

7 E 42nd Room 801

"Happy St. Patrick's Day"

GET A JOB

SEE THE PARADE

Exec Secty, RTW exp $100

Fash Gal F/L lt steno $75

Secy to exec, Park Av $75

JOBS IN RADIO CITY

Fash Mag Recept Typ $55

Recept, lt typing, PBX $50

Page Girls, top publshr $49

LOUISE C. MANN

TRIAD 11 W 42 ST

E-D-W-A-R-D-S

CAREER BUILDERS

ALL-AMERICAN

509 5 AVE (42-43 STS) 20 FL

RECEPTIONISTS!!!

IBM KEY PCH OPRS, TO $270

UR CENTER TYPISTS, $55-$65

JOBS IN RADIO CITY!!!

JOBS IN AIRLINES!!

AIRL RESERV TRNES TO $270

O'PUBLIC

"Happy St. Patrick's Day"

GET A JOB

SEE THE PARADE

Brody Agency

A. K. OSTRANDER

505 FIFTH AVE

Fee One Week's Salary

CONSOLIDATED PLACEMENT

ELIZABETH EWERS

JAMES AGENCY

BROOKLYN

O'BEST

9 E 40th St 2d Floor

"HAPPY ST. PATRICK'S DAY"

GET A JOB

SEE THE PARADE

Receptionists

TRY THE "BEST" WAY

WALL STREET

EXECUTIVE

SERVICE CORP

19 West 44th St

CAROLYN G. DODD

475 5th Ave (Opp Library)

M-E-R-I-D-I-A-N

ABBYE

O'PROVIDENT

30 Church St, Rm 834

"Happy St. Patrick's Day"

GET A JOB

See The Parade

O'PROVIDENT

7 E 42 ST, RM 810

"Happy St. Patrick's Day"

GET A JOB

SEE THE PARADE

HAMILTON

(EST. 1920)

30 CHURCH STREET

SECYS-STENOS:

BOOKKEEPERS:

TYPISTS:

GENERAL DEPT.

TRAINEES:

LILLIAN-K-SERVICE

Kahn Agcy

Recps & Asts $50-$75

Stenos $50-$70

Switchbd Oprs-Rcptns $45-$55

Clk Typist Recepts $45-$55

STAR, 110 NASSAU ST.

NATIONAL

30 CHURCH STREET

Private Secy

Secy-Steno

Secretary

Secy-Steno

Secy-Steno

Insurance Co

Secy-Steno

Steno-Typist

Clerk-Steno

Typist

Tellers

Receptionist

O'KNICKERBOCKER

489 5 AVE.

"Happy St. Patrick's Day"

GET A JOB

See The Parade

Receptnst, Front Ofc $45

Phone Answerers $50

Help Wanted—Nurses' Registries

Help Wanted—Female

ACCTS REC CLERK

ADDRESSOGRAPH OPER

ADMIN ASST, TO $60

ARTIST—TEXTILE

ARTIST

ARTIST TRAINEE

Active Teletype Op—$230

ASSISTANT BOOKKEEPER

Help Wanted—Female

BEAUTICIAN

BILLER-ACCOUNTS RECEIV

HOTEL SAVOY PLAZA

BILLER, $55

BILLER-TYPIST

BILLER

BILLER-TYPIST, $50

BILLER-TYPIST, EXP

BILLER-TYPIST, $60

BILLING CLERK

BOOKKEEPERS

BOOKKEEPERS

UNLIMITED

AGENCY

BOOKKEEPER—COMPL

REM-RAND 281

DEPENDABLE

BOOKKEEPER, EXPD

Must Have Hospital Exper

BKPR—FULL CHARGE

BKPR, F CHRG, $75

BOOKKEEPER

BOOKKEEPER ASST

BOOKKEEPER-PAYROLL CLK

BOOKKEEPER-STENO

BOOKKEEPER

BOOKKEEPING CLK

$55 FEE PAID

BURROUGHS F7800

MACHINE OPERATOR

BURROUGHS #2100 OPER

BUYER'S CLERICAL

Help Wanted—Female

CASHIERS

WALLACHS

CASHIER

CASHIER

ARNOLDS

PHONE NOW

CLERICALS

BLOOMINGDALE'S

Fine opportunities for experienced young women to do important work in our offices

5 DAYS—40 HOURS

Liberal employe benefits

Apply Employment Office

BLOOMINGDALE'S

CLERICAL POSITIONS

CLERICAL—GOOD SALARY

CLERICAL

CLERICAL, Typist, F/G, $55-$60

CLERKS

CLERK-TYPIST

CLERK

CLERK

CLERK, PAYROLL

CLERKS

CLERKS, $55

CLERK-TYPIST

CLERK

CLERK-TYP, EXCEL SAL

CLERK, Typist, F.G.

CLERK-TYPIST

Cont'd on Following Page

MERCHANDISE OFFERINGS

AIR-CONDITIONING—HEATING

3/4 hp, $169

ANTIQUES

BUSINESS—OFFICE MACHINES

RENTAL-PURCHASE PLAN

IBM'S—CALCULATORS

CALL LO 5-0396

CALCULATORS—IBM'S

CARPETS, RUGS, LINOLEUMS, ETC.

FURS—WEARING APPAREL

Home Furnishings

HOME FURNISHINGS

LEXINGTON WAREHOUSE

BUY DIRECT FROM WAREHSE

SHOWROOM SAMPLES

30%-60% REDUCTIONS

ATLAS WAREHOUSE

207 E 80 ST RE 4-1671

PASSOVER SPECIALS!

MARY TARSHIS

LLOYDS, 116 EAST 80 ST

GEORGE'S, 105 W 21 ST

JEWELRY, DIAMONDS, GOLD, ETC.

MACHINERY AND TOOLS

ELECTRIC FORK TRUCKS

MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS

Office Furniture

CONTINENTAL'S

SUPER-BARGAIN FESTIVAL

MUST SACRIFICE AT ONCE

SAVINGS 25-40%

540 Broadway WO 4-6510

OFFICE PARTITIONS

IRWIN CASPER, INC

STEEL SHELVING

TYPEWRITER DESKS

MUST SACRIFICE AT ONCE

STEEL CLOTHES LOCKERS

Continental Office Furn. Co.

540 Broadway WO 4-6510

STEEL SIDE FILES

Security, 146 W 23, WA 4-1453

Desks, $10 Ea; Only 98 Left

PIANOS

Pianos

Buy Your

Hammond Organ

at Mason & Hamlin Piano Co

RENT

A Piano From

KNABE

HAMMOND ORGANS

HAMMOND ORGANS

RADIOS, TV, PHONOGRAPHS, ETC

REFRIGERATORS—FREEZERS

AMANA FREEZER—19 CU FT

Store Fixtures

HOTEL &

RESTAURANT

SUPPLIES

Formerly PERIN BROS.

REFRIGERATED SHOWCASES

MISCELLANEOUS

FLUORESCENT

CEILING FIXTURES

WANTED

TO PURCHASE

CARPETS, RUGS, LINOLEUMS, ETC

HOME FURNISHINGS

JEWELRY, DIAMONDS, GOLD, ETC.

Provident Loan Society

MACHINERY AND TOOLS

PIANOS

PIANOS WANTED

CIRCLE 7-3455

Spinets-Grands-Small Uprights

Wanted! Sullivan, JU 6-3718

REFRIGERATORS—FREEZERS

SAFES

MISCELLANEOUS

Electric Cooler (Portable)

Help Wanted—Female

Cont'd From Preceding Page

CLERKS

Good pay while you learn modern office techniques

CALL MRS. WADE

New York Telephone Co.

BEekman 3-9927

CLERKS & CLERK-TYPISTS

UNITED MERCHANTS & MFRS. INC

Bring Along Your Friends!

CLERK—MATURE—$70 ST

CLERKS!

100 EAST 42 ST—17TH FL

CLERKS, INEXPD, $47

FIRM PAYS FEE

CLERK-TYPIST

Clerk-Typist

Doyle Agcy, 215 Montague St

Dodgers Bldg, Bklyn

CLERK-TYPIST

CLERKS, FEE PAID, $40-$48

WITH OR WITHOUT TYPING

CLERK-TYPIST

CLERKS

COLLEGE WOMEN

NEW YORK TELEPHONE COMPANY

BEekman 3-9933

COMPTOMETER OPERS.

COMPTOMETER OPERATOR

Cosmetic Sales Mgr. $6,000

CREDIT STENO

LIBERAL EMPLOYEE DISCOUNT

WALLACHS

DICTAPHONE OPERATOR

DICTAPHONE OPERATOR

RAPID TYPIST

DICTAPHONE OPR—EXPD

DICTAPHONE-STENO

DICTAPHONE OPER, EXPD

DIETITIAN—HEAD

Help Wanted—Female

EDIPHONE

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FILE CLERK

BABCOCK & WILCOX CO

File Clk—No Typing

Doyle Agcy, 215 Montague St

Dodgers Bldg, Bklyn

FILE CLERK

FILE CLERK, $45

FILE CLERK

FILE CLK, H S GRAD

The CHARACTERISTICS of a GOOD JOB

Long Distance Telephone Operator

No experience necessary.

Good starting salary, five increases first 2 years.

Work is interesting, not dull or routine.

A highly responsible job.

Visit Our Employment Office Monday thru Friday.

32 Avenue of the Americas

LONG LINES DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY

GIRLS-WOMEN, $40-$54

GIRLS—GIRLS

HOSTESS

COLUMBIA EMPLOY. AGCY

Help Wanted—Female

IBM KEY PUNCH OPR

REVLON PRODUCTS

IBM KEY PUNCH OPER

ALEXANDER'S DEPT STORE

IBM IBM IBM

INSURANCE RATERS

KEY PUNCH OPERATOR

PECK & PECK

KEY PUNCH OPER

LAW SECRETARY

LEGAL TRANSCRIBERS

MAIL CLERK

MANICURIST

MODELS, SIZE 12

KOLMER & CO.

500 7TH AVE

DONNYBROOK, 500 7 AVE

MONITOR BOARD, RECEPT

N. C. R. #2000

NURSE, RN—SUPERVISOR

NURSE, LICENSED PRACTICAL

NURSE

NURSE, O.R., Expd, 7-3 P.M.

OFFICE ASSISTANT

Help Wanted—Female

PAGES

$200

Work In Radio City Co.

Commercial Agcy, 12 E 42 St

PAGE GIRLS—INEXPD, $200

JOBS IN RADIO CITY CO

PART TIME CLERKS

PATTERNMAKER, EXPD

PERSONNEL CLERK

LERNER SHOPS, 336 4 AVE

Personnel Dept. Type, $55

PRINTING ORDER CLERK

Proofreader-Steno, $60

PHOTO CLERK—NO EXP

PLACEMENT MGR

Receptionist

Rcpt Jrs $40-$50

CO PAYS FEE

Recept-Stenographer

RECEPT, GAL FRI, $55

Recept-Lite Typing—$60

Recept, Model, Size 12

RECEPT-TYPIST, $55-60

Recept-Swbd

RECEPT TO DENT, BDWY

Help Wanted—Female

SECY-STENO

FOR BUYING DEPT of National Chain Stores

MERIT INCREASES

PLUS MANY OTHER EMPLOYE BENEFITS

SECY-STENO

FEE REIMBURSED

SECRETARY-STENO

SECRETARY

MONTGOMERY WARD

SECRETARY TO CONTROLLER

KIPPEY CLOTHES

SECTY TO EDITOR

SECRETARY TO EXECUTIVE

SECY-STENO—Salary Open

SECY-STENO

SECY-STENO

SECRETARY

SECYS—STENOS

DICTAPHONE OPERATORS

FEE REIMBURSED

SECRETARY

SECRETARY

SECRETARY

SECRETARY

SECY TO PERSONNEL MGR

SECRETARY-STENO

SECRETARY—JUNIOR

SECRETARY, $70

Secy, Emp St, $65-75

FASHION, TO $75

STENO, TO 25, $75

EXEC, A-1 CO, $75

Help Wanted—Female

SECRETARY

ELECTRONICS DIVISION

OTIS

ELEVATOR CO

SECRETARY

RADIO-TV

N. W. AYER & SON INC

SECRETARY TELEVISION SALES

NATIONAL BROADCASTING CO

SECRETARY

SECRETARY-STENOGRAPHER

BABCOCK & WILCOX CO

SECRETARY

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

. . . SECRETARIES . . .

SECRETARY—EXPORT

SECTY-STENO—$60

SECY-STENO

SECRETARY-STENO, $60

SECRETARY TO EXECUTIVE

SECY-STENO FEE PD

SECRETARY, $60—$65

SECY, $70 WEEK

Secy to Publisher, to $75

SECTY—STEAMSHIP, $70

Secty to Sales Mgr. $75

SECTY TO PRES $75

SECY-RECEPT FILMS $65

Secy, Jr, Trade Agcy, $50

Secy, Exec, Public $75

Secy-Steno, Theat Agy, $60

SECY STENOS, JR, $50-$55

SECTY, FEE PD, $50-$60

Showroom Secy, Sportswr, $65

SKIP TRACER—INSIDE

STAT TYPISTS

Help Wanted—Female

STENOGRAPHERS

M. W. KELLOGG CO.

STENOGRAPHER, JR.

RADIO-TV

STENOGRAPHER

LIBERAL EMPLOYEE DISCOUNT

WALLACHS

STENOGRAPHER-CLERK

STENOGRAPHER

STENO—LEGAL EXP.

STENO-OFFICE ASST

STENOGRAPHER

STENO-TYPIST

STENO-TYPIST

STENOGRAPHER-TYPIST

STENOGRAPHER, TO $60

STENOGRAPHER, JR

STENO . . . EXPERIENCED

STENOGRAPHERS

120 W 42 ST, 17TH FL

STENOGRAPHER

STENOGRAPHER

STENOGRAPHER-TYPIST

STENOGRAPHER

STENO-CLERK

STENOGRAPHER, $55

STENOS EXPD

STENO

STENOS—TYPISTS—TEMP

STENO, DICTAPHONE—EXPD

STENO-TYPIST

STENO-STATISTICAL TYPIST

STENO, EXPERIENCED

STENOGRAPHER

STENOGRAPHER

STENO-TYPIST, 8:30—5

STENOGRAPHER—$70

STENOGRAPHER—LEGAL

STENOS (TEMP) TYPISTS

STENOGRAPHER, $60 WEEK

Steno, Publicity Dept. $65

Steno, Expd, Genl Office Wk

Help Wanted—Female

STENOGRAPHERS

THERE'S A LOT TO LIKE ABOUT THIS JOB!

UNITED MERCHANTS & MFRS. INC

STENOGRAPHERS

IN GRAND CENTRAL AREA

"A Good Place to Work"

STENOGRAPHER

OTIS ELEVATOR CO.

STENO-SECRETARY

STENO-SECTY

LERNER STORES, 356 4 AVE

STENOGRAPHER

STENOGRAPHER, JR—$65

STENO-CLERICAL

Switchboard-Typist

SWITCHBOARD OPER

SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR

SWBD Opr PBX #555, to $55

APEX AGCY, 232 W 42 ST.

MICANOLD RADIO CORP

Techn-Electrocardiograph

TEMPORARY

TYPIST-CLERK

TYPIST—STATISTICAL

TYPIST, $1.50 PER HOUR

TYPIST

TYPISTS, ELEC

TYPIST

TYPIST, EXPD IBM

TYPIST-RECEPTIONIST

TYPIST

TYPIST, W/WO STENO, $55

TYPIST, FEE PD, 18 - $55

TYPISTS Co Pays Fee, to $60

Typist, Booking Dept, TV, $55

TYPIST-CLK, FEE PD, TO $59

Help Wanted—Female

TYPIST

IN GRAND CENTRAL AREA

"A Good Place to Work"

TYPISTS

TYPIST-CLERKS, $50

Rm 2307, Empire State Bldg

TYPIST-CLERK

TYPIST

BABCOCK & WILCOX CO

TYPIST—RAPID

430 Park Ave 4th Fl

TYPISTS

TYPIST

ALEXANDER SMITH, INC.

TYPIST—EXPERIENCED

TYPIST-CLERK

TYPIST-CLERKS

TYPISTS

MICANOLD RADIO CORP

TYPIST—EXPD

Typists-Steno-Dictaphone Ops

TYPIST

TYPIST

TYPISTS, EXPD

TYPISTS—EXPD—TEMP

DICTAPHONE OPERATORS

TYPIST

TYPIST-CLERK, $50

TYPIST—5-DAY

TYPISTS

120 W 42 ST, 17TH FL

TYPIST, $55

TYPIST-CLERK

TYPIST-BILLER

TYPIST-BILLER

Typ-Clk, Yg, Emp St, $50

BUYING OFFICE-TRAINEE

LERNER SHOPS, 336 4 AVE

MACY'S

Needs Full Time

STENOGRAPHERS

COMPARISON SHOPPERS

TYPIST

AND OTHERS

APPLY

MACY'S

EMPLOYMENT OFFICE

166 WEST 35TH ST.

Help Wanted—Female

Agencies Solicitous

Call Saleswomen & Filer

& Children's Wear

SALESGIRL

SALESLADY, EXP'D

SALESLADIES
MARTIN'S
FULL TIME—5 DAY WEEK
PART TIME DAILY
DRESSES
COATS & SUITS
MILLINERY
SPORTSWEAR
ACCESSORIES
MANY BENEFITS
MARTIN'S

SALESLADY, Age 28-35

SALESLADIES, AGE 25-40

MACY'S
Needs Full Time
SALESWOMEN
and
Sales Demonstrators
for Housewares
MACY'S
Employment Office
16th West 35th St

BE A BEAUTICIAN
MOLER ACADEMY

EARN WHILE
YOU LEARN

CAMBRIDGE

Help Wanted Male—Agencies

O'PROVIDENT
20 CHURCH ST. RM. 834
ACCOUNTING
2 Accts. Career Jobs. Open
COMMERCIAL
TECHNICAL

O'PROVIDENT
7 E 42St. Rm 810

WALL STREET

HAMILTON
(EST. 1920)
50 CHURCH STREET
ACCTS. PAYRL.
COMMERCIAL DEPT.

ALL-AMERICAN SERVICE

O'APPROVED
7 E 42nd Room 801
Employment Assoc.
TRAINEE CLERKS
STOCK BROKERAGE
CONSOLIDATED PLACEMENT

Graham-Van Houten
141 NASSAU ST

Help Wanted Male—Agencies

Wehinger Service
180 Broadway 1 Flight Up
Acctg & Commercial

Financial & Real Estate

INSURANCE

WILMAN
BANKING & BROKERAGE
Cogen P & S, Margin, to $90
TRAINEE CLERKS
20-49 Yrs. $40-60
TYPIST, 20-35 Yrs. to $60
COLLEGE GRADS
BOYS—TOP CO'S, $40-45
3d FLOOR TRAVEL, $50-60
INTERVIEWER TRAVEL
COMMERCIAL & INSURANCE

ROSS

O'PUBLIC
50th 5th Ave 10th Fl

O'BEST
9 E 40th 2d Fl
BY THE BEST WAY

BISHOP
PERSONNEL BUREAU
Wall St Cks, Exptl, $60-90
Mfrng Unlisted Positions
E.D.W.A.R.D.S.

NATIONWIDE!

Help Wanted Male—Agencies

CHURCH
BANKING & WALL ST

INSURANCE & COMML

ENGINEERING

EDWARDS

DRAFTSMAN, ELECTRIC
MACHINE DESIGNERS
Brody Agency
239 BWAY (Opp City Hall)

COMMERCIAL

O'KNICKERBOCKER
489 5 AVE. RM 702

Lynch Employment
1 Park Row Entrance Ann St

MERIDIAN

PERSONNEL ASSOCIATES

Help Wanted Male—Agencies

Industrial

GENEVA
80 Wisconsin St. Call At
MEN-BOYS, $40-5
HUNDREDS OTHER

Help Wanted—M

Robt. Half, cpa

Adv Acct Supvsr

Help Wanted—Male

Architectural
DESIGNERS
& DRAFTSMEN
Positions are available for men trained and experienced in architectural design and drafting.
VOORHEES WALKER
SMITH & SMITH
ARCHITECTS
101 Park Ave, New York 17

BOYS $40-45 BOYS

ARCH'L DRAFTSMEN

ARTIST
LAYOUT LETTERING

ARTIST...$55

ARTIST

ARTIST TRAINEE

Jr. A-1 Mfg Corp $70

ASST CONTROLLER

CHEMIST

AUTO PAINTER

BACTERIOLOGIST

BANK CLERKS
(Securities)

BEAUTICIAN

BOOKKEEPER

BOOKKEEPER

Bookkeeper-Asst. Receptionist

CLERK—NO TYPING
GOVT PROPERTY CLERK
CLERKS, $45-60
CLERKS $45-65
CLERK—TRAINEE $50-55
CLERKS, $60
CLERKS, TOP CO. $55-$60
College Grads, Tax Dept
COLLEGE GRADS TO $5,000
COL GRADS TO $5,600
COLOR MATCHER

Construction Superintendent

CONTROLLER

COST ACCOUNTANT

COST ACCT. $110

COUNSELOR

CREDIT
CORRESPONDENT

REVLON PRODUCTS
745 5 Ave, grn fl (57-58 Sts)
CREDIT CLERK, $285

CUSTOMS ENTRY CLERK

CUTTER'S ASSISTANTS

DENTAL TECHNICIAN

Design Draftsman, $6-7,000

Help Wanted—Male

DESIGNERS-
DRAFTSMEN
STRUCTURAL
INSTRUMENTATION
ARCHITECTURAL
PROCESS PIPING
HEATING & VENTILATION
ELECTRICAL
CIVIL

DEVENCO
INCORPORATED
117 LIBERTY ST., N.Y.C.
Telephone: Digby 9-4477

DESIGNERS
AIRCRAFT
STRUCTURAL
STRESS ANALYST
MECHANICAL
ELECTRONIC
TOOL DESIGNERS
LOCAL & OUT OF TOWN
TAAG DESIGNS, INC

DESIGNERS
DRAFTSMEN
INDUSTRIAL
Structural
Foundations
Electrical
Heating & Ventilating
Electrical
BYRNE ASSOCIATES, INC.

DESIGNERS &
DRAFTSMEN
ELECTRICAL
THE LUMMUS COMPANY

DESIGNER-STRUCTURAL
SALARY OPEN

DESIGNERS
& DRAFTSMEN
ALL DEPTS
AND ALL GRADES

DESIGNERS
AVION INSTRUMENT CORP

DESIGNERS
Marine Ventilation
H. Houston Whittaker, Inc.
17 Battery Place, tel. 3-8280

DESIGNERS-ENGINEERS

STRUCT. DESIGNERS

DESIGNERS

DESIGNERS

DETAILERS
Structural Steel Up Only
MOTORS RU 3-2888

Help Wanted—Male

Continued From Preceding Page

DICTAPHONE OPER. EXPD

DRAFTSMEN
Mechanical-Design

DRAFTSMEN
CABLE WIRING LAYOUT
LEHIGH ENGINEERING

DRAFTSMEN
DESIGN
Scientific & Electrical
Sperry & Stephens, Inc.

TRACERS

Draftsman, Mech. Design

DRAFTSMEN, A & E

DRAFTSMAN

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT

ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS
SR. ENGINEERS

ENGINEERS
JR. ENGINEERS

AVION INSTRUMENT CORP

ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS

VITRO LABORATORIES

ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS

THE AUSTIN COMPANY

ELECTRONIC
RADIO
ELECTRICAL
ENGINEERS

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Phone Plaza 3-0790 today for personal appointment

Boeing offers top assignments in its new Boeing plant and on its modern test field. If you have experience in

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BOEING

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BURST MAIN HALTS SUBWAY IN QUEENS

IND Service Is Disrupted—Large Section of Sidewalk Torn, Hospital Is Flooded

Water gushing from a burst main flooded a Queens street, tore up a large section of sidewalk and disrupted service on an IND subway line yesterday.

The burst occurred shortly after noon, sending coffee-colored water swirling into the street and cascading down into a subway station at Jackson Avenue and Forty-fifth Avenue, Long Island City.

The water main and the subway station are directly in front of St. John's Hospital. Across the street is the Queens County Court House.

With thousands of gallons of water pouring into the station and onto the tracks, power was shut off at 12:30 P. M. Trains of the GG line bound from Forest Hills to Brooklyn were stranded at Queens Plaza in the Avenue of the Americas and Thirty-seventh street in Manhattan.

Trains bound from Brooklyn to Queens were stopped at the Bedford-Nostrand Avenues station in Brooklyn, where passengers were transferred to surface cars.

Fifty passengers had to make their way by catwalk back to the Queens Plaza station when their train was halted just outside the station at Forty-fifth Avenue.

Eight stations between Queens Plaza and Nostrand Avenue were left without service as a result of the break.

At 2:45 P. M., normal service from Queens to Brooklyn was resumed. Service in the opposite direction was resumed at 4:05.

The homesick water, flowing through a twenty-four-inch cast iron pipe under a pressure of sixty pounds a square inch, erupted with such force that it tore a hole fifteen feet long, ten feet wide and six feet deep in the sidewalk and part of the street.

Several cars parked along the curb were towed or driven away. One car parked where the pipe burst did not fare so well. It began to sink into the water-filled hole. However, a Fire Department hook and ladder truck finally hauled it to safety.

At 12:45 P. M., forty-five minutes after the main had burst, two water gates, or valves, were shut off by officials of the Department of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity. The flood waters began to recede, leaving a deposit of brush silt, rocks and other debris.

Officials at St. John's Hospital reported that several inches of water had covered the floor of the hospital's basement, where its out-patient department is situated.

The hospital's normal water needs were not affected by the break. Like most, if not all, hospitals, St. John's has a secondary water feed.

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

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