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American Zionist Emergency Council, communications to
chairmen of local emergency committees, 1946.

MEMORANDUM

To Chairmen of Local Emergency Committees

Date March 25, 1946

From Harry L. Shapiro

Attached for your information are two items of special interest:

1. An analysis of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine by a competent observer who has followed the Committee's proceedings from the very beginning of the inquiry. It should be noted that the opinions expressed in this report are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Zionist officials who have been observing the Committee's hearings.

2. The section on The Jewish Commonwealth, included in the memorandum submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry by the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

HLS:MBP

CONFIDENTIAL

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY - AN ANALYSIS

For 10 weeks I have attended the hearings and conferences of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee, beginning with its opening session in the United States on January 7th. It has been an extraordinary experience to accompany the Committee from Washington to London, to Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich, Nuremberg, Prague, Vienna, Cairo and Jerusalem; to see whether the Committee members perceive in all its tragic and bitter helplessness the spectre of post-Hitler Jewry; to learn whether the Committee is aware of the pressure of events, the pressure of conflicting political forces in their labyrinthian, tortuous search for pure justice in a world in which justice is a moot term.

Perhaps this point, when the Committee pauses, when its members are visiting neighboring states, is as good a time as any to attempt an accounting and perhaps a forecast. What direction is the Committee taking? How is it responding to the pressures placed on it? How is it coming to grips with problems? What is it finally likely to do?

Unquestionably, there are many disquieting things. Some questions asked this week - 68 days after the first day's hearings in Washington - indicate that all the testimony given in the interim was apparently unable to remove whatever doubts existed in the Committee members' minds on the first day. Time and again the trend of the questions indicates that all earlier impressions are merely being strengthened, and time and again one gets the feeling that some Committee members are not seeking facts but are seeking to prove allegations made or heard. Thus a wag asserted that one might subtitle the Committee of Inquiry during the first five weeks as "The Committee To Prove General Morgan's Charges," and during the second five weeks as "The Committee To Prove General Spears' Charges."

Whatever the case may be, certain premises can be made. First and foremost: that this Committee is made up of two sections - one American, one British. This fact is as salient today, if not more so, than it was ten weeks ago. Each section approaches the problem from a different direction. Despite this, it would be blinding one's eyes to the facts not to realize that both sections are seeking to stand together in order to present a united front to the world, because this is an important test of the ability of Britain and the United States to stand together now, when the cohesive force of war is no longer present - to prove that they can be united. Here speculation regarding minority and majority reports must be viewed against the fact that both sections will strive to the utmost against two reports, and if two are issued, both sections will strive to the utmost that the split shall not be down the line - Americans on one side, British on the other - with Russia on the sidelines.

Thus, if there is a split, then whatever side remains adamant may bring the other around to its position. What are these positions? And whose is strongest?

It may be assumed that the British section would like to change the status quo as little as possible. Granted that the present state of affairs which was established by the White Paper is unpleasant and became a moral indictment; at least it's known and tested. It's nasty but it hasn't turned the British Empire topsy-turvy. No one knows what would result from any other untried state of affairs. Hence Bevin's statement that Palestine is not the sole solution, hence the questions asked throughout all of Middle Europe: but why Palestine? Why not Australia, Santo Domingo, Canada - why not rebuild Europe? Hence the curious spectacle of some members of the fact-finding committee being given the actual facts and taking it upon themselves to dispute, advise, and try to prove that the facts are otherwise.

Suggesting that the displaced Jews do not know what it is all about may

be a fact-finding process, but the Committee, after all, was not questioning children. It was questioning adults who have come to their convictions intellectually, as well as by ways of torture, agony and death.

This is not to say that all members of the British Committee are of one mind; nor is this any attempt to reflect on the personal character of the British members. It is the framework in which they find themselves placed.

On the other hand, the American section would like to press for action and for change in the status quo; not because their hearts are more touchable by the tragedy or more responsive to justice. First, the United States doesn't have the White Paper policy like an albatross about its neck. It doesn't have a White Paper to undo. Second, it is not so deeply involved in Near Eastern politics and doesn't have such large imperialistic interests. Third, the United States Government took the initiative in opening the door for action by President Truman's request for 100,000 certificates. The American section knows that President Truman would like to see action by the position he has taken - a position in which he was rebuffed.

In addition, the British realize that American good will is tremendously important for them. They still have an empire to bolster, and friendship with America is the chief anchor of British foreign policy.

The visit to the United States by the British section was an eye-opener for them. Originally, they were unwilling to come to the United States. The plan was to open hearings in London and, if necessary, visit the United States before going to Europe and Palestine. This visit to America would probably never have materialized because of the pressure of time, which has already harassed them to a point almost of desperation. But by their visit to the United States the Britishers were given insight into the situation in America. They saw the extent to which the Palestine problem has become a vital issue with a considerable section of American opinion. One member of the Committee,

who had privately objected to going to the United States, now concedes that he is glad that he had an opportunity to see how America feels with regard to Palestine. Another has also expressed himself as impressed by the public interest America is showing. "We have meetings now and then in Albert Hall in London," he said. "But we've never had anything like 20,000 men and women jamming huge auditoriums like Madison Square Garden every few weeks in order to speak their minds on Palestine."

In addition to being moved by what they have seen, the British members cannot help being aware of the state of mind of public opinion in America, and the tremendous importance of that opinion.

The British members know that Britain is in a predicament. The White Paper, the Arab League, promises suggested, if not made - they are in a predicament from which they cannot extricate themselves unless an outside factor, like the United States, helps them, supports them, says to them: Yes, this is what you must do; we'll stand by you in this difficult decision. The British, then yielding, would yield with credit and honor to themselves.

If the Americans are to be the lever extricating the British from this unhappy morass, the entire matter is reduced to the question of the attitude of the American members. But they themselves are not all of one mind. They are divided. Some are fighting to achieve significant results in accordance with the expressed will of the Congress of the United States, which they regard as a sort of moral directive in the question - which if it be a question of justice must, therefore, also be a moral question. Others are not so inclined, not because they are pro-Arab, or because they have not been impressed to the same degree as the others by the situation of European Jewry; but because - though the full impact of the desperateness and will of a people has struck them - its force has been somehow blunted by an armor which could be forged only in the United States, and which in the United States is uniquely right,

uniquely proper. These members are not inclined to take Congressional resolutions as their guide, maintaining that the question for them does not involve politics or political solutions, even while they are aware that political considerations effect the validity of their decision and that their decision cannot remain in a vacuum, but must be implemented and given substance politically.

One may well say, in analyzing the Committee and the present alignment, that the American section presently possesses greater power than the British, and that the American Chairman, as Chairman of this section, may well be the determining factor on the American side and, therefore, on the entire Committee. This may be a simplification of the situation, but touches fundamental alignments. A split in the American section, therefore, between those who stand on the basis of the Congressional resolution and those disregarding it is quite possible. A month ago, in London, a majority-minority split - two Americans and one Britisher writing the minority report, five Britishers and four Americans writing the majority report - was forecast. At this point it is likelier that if majority and minority reports are written, the split on an early vote may be four Americans and one Britisher writing the minority report, against two Americans and five Britishers writing the majority report.

The solutions being considered by the Committee include not only bi-nationalism, not only the possibility of a solution looking for a Jewish State in part of Palestine leaving outside its boundaries a large section or sections of Palestine purely Arab in population, but also a transitory solution leaving the future open. It seems certain that a complete Arab State or a complete Jewish State is currently out of the question. Whatever the case, nothing final has crystallized in the minds of the Committee, and a great deal still depends on the attitude back home in England and the United States, particularly in the United States; because at present the American section itself is too divided and too uncertain to give a strong lead unless its members feel behind

them strong backing on the part of the American Government - on the part of President Truman, of the State Department and of the American people. Public opinion - American public opinion - is still all important, still the most potent force in a tragically battered world seeking the path forward to peace.

March 15, 1946



THE JEWISH COMMONWEALTH

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A section of the Memorandum submitted to the
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry by the
Jewish Agency for Palestine

Jerusalem - March, 1946

92. The motives for entrenching the Jewish people in its own country are more compelling at the end of the Second World War than they were at the end of the first. For its lack of a home the Jewish people has paid a terrible penalty. The lesson of the catastrophe is clear: the remnant must be evacuated to Palestine, and statehood must be attained as quickly as possible. The road to statehood is, primarily, that exodus from Europe. The immigration drive must take account also of the position of Oriental Jewries and of the growing insecurity in other countries outside Europe. Side by side with this influx must go large-scale development and absorption projects, which will not materialise unless the responsibility is entrusted to those most vitally interested. Political emancipation for Jewish Palestine is rendered all the more urgent by the rising tide of Pan-Arabism.

Two questions arise: the character of the State and the process of its establishment.

93. As to the first, a self-governing State is contemplated in which all citizens regardless of race or creed shall enjoy equal rights and all communities shall control their internal affairs. The State will not be Jewish in the sense that the Jews in it will have more rights than the non-Jews, or that its Jewish community will be superior in status to other communities, or that it will be based on the Jewish religion. In what sense will it then be a Jewish State? It will be Jewish because Jews will have a right of entry to it, not limited by any political consideration; because in it Jews will be free to create a society according to their own way of life; because, in addition to its ordinary

function of ensuring the welfare of all its inhabitants, the State will have the special function of serving as the Jewish National Home and providing refuge for oppressed Jews; because by its existence it will normalise the status of the Jewish people.

94. For the State to achieve these ends, a Jewish majority is essential. The grant of self-government to Palestine based on an Arab majority would prevent further Jewish immigration and wreck the chances of the country's rapid development. In this policy the Arabs of Palestine would count on the support of the surrounding Arab States. The result would be the conversion of Palestine into an Arab State and the subjection of its Jewish minority to Arab rule. The converse fear of the Arabs being dominated by a Jewish majority is not warranted. An Arab minority would not have to rely entirely on constitutional safeguards and international guarantees. Palestine is surrounded by Arab territories. Jews everywhere else, including the Arab States, are in the minority. These two facts can be depended upon to serve as brakes on abuse of power. Moreover, the Jews are intent on development; they cannot do this successfully without the Arabs sharing in the benefits.

95. In order to attain the goal, the first requisite is a clear decision that Palestine is to become a Jewish Commonwealth. On the basis of that decision, the Jewish Agency should be invested with powers to conduct immigration and should be granted concessions for irrigation and reclamation works. Its programme would aim, first, at the transfer to Palestine from Europe, the Orient and other parts, of the largest possible number of Jews in the shortest space of time; secondly, at the maximum development of the country's agricultural and industrial resources for the absorption of immigrants and the raising of the standard of life of all inhabitants. In the immigration programme, the transfer of homeless European Jews would have to be placed on a special footing. In regard to them, the criteria must be transport and temporary accommodation, rather than immediate economic absorption. The Jewish Agency has worked out

plans for the absorption, over a relatively short period of years, of the first one million Jews. Once a Jewish majority has been created, the Jewish State will have been effectively established.

96. It is the belief of the Jewish Agency that, on a long view, the Jewish Commonwealth offers the surest basis for a stable relationship between Jewish Palestine and the Arab world. A Jewish minority in an Arab Palestine would have little to barter for political peace. It would be much easier to oppress it than to negotiate with it. The present boycott of Palestinian-Jewish products by the members of the Arab League is a case in point. The boycott was proclaimed in the knowledge that the aggrieved party had no power to retaliate. Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth would change the situation.

97. Although at present collaboration between Jewish Palestine and the Arab world may seem unlikely, mutual interests are bound sooner or later to bring them closer together. The Middle East is clearly on the brink of far-reaching developments. It represents at present a vast, under-developed area with a sparse population living mostly in extreme poverty. Palestine has already become something of a laboratory for this region which is drawing the attention of progressive minds in the countries around. Once the Jewish Commonwealth has been set up, the stimulative effect of its example and technical resources will operate more freely than it does at present, when the Palestine issue is still in the balance. The Jews have much to contribute towards the reconstruction of the Middle East - but they can only contribute it as equals.

98. Statehood will not only clarify and normalise the relations between Jewish Palestine and the neighboring states. It is also essential to the relations of the Jewish National Home with the world at large. In the present structure of world society, no kind of special minority status can gain for the Jewish National Home admission to international councils. The Jewish people is entitled to have a voice in the international discussions which bear directly on its future. But this need for representation cannot be met by a mere token State. Membership

must rest on full-fledged national existence. This implies a substantial population in an adequate territory which cannot be smaller than present-day Palestine.

99. At the extraordinary Zionist World Conference which met in London in August, 1945, the following claims of the Jewish Agency were endorsed:

- "(a) That an immediate decision be announced to establish Palestine as a Jewish State;
- (b) That the Jewish Agency be vested with all necessary authority to bring to Palestine as many Jews as it may find necessary and possible to settle, and to develop, fully and speedily, all the resources of the country - especially land and power resources;
- (c) That an international loan and other help be given for the transfer of the first million Jews to Palestine, and for the economic development of the country;
- (d) That reparations in kind from Germany be granted to the Jewish people for the upbuilding of Palestine, and - as a first instalment - that all German property in Palestine be used for the resettlement of Jews from Europe;
- (e) That international facilities be provided for the exit and transit of all Jews who wish to settle in Palestine."

The Conference also confirmed the following resolutions of the Zionist

General Council:

"1. The Jewish State will be based upon full equality of rights of all inhabitants without distinction of religion or race in the political, civic, religious, and national domains, and without domination or subjection. All communities will enjoy full autonomy in the administration of their religious, educational, cultural, and social institutions. The Arabic language and Arab schools will enjoy full State rights. Municipal self-government will be developed in all towns and villages. The State will exert all efforts to raise and equalize the standard of living of all the inhabitants of Palestine.

"2. The Jewish people will aim at co-operating with the Arabs in Palestine in order to attain the highest degree of development of the country in the interests of all its inhabitants and will strive for an alliance of friendship between the Jewish State and the Arab peoples in the neighboring countries, on the basis of collaboration and mutual assistance for the welfare and progress of all countries in the Middle East."

CONCLUSION

100. The Jewish "displaced persons" in Europe are not an isolated problem, to be solved by ad hoc devices. This is but the latest phase of the homelessness of the Jewish people - a problem which can be solved only by territorial concentration in Palestine. Philanthropic attempts to settle Jews elsewhere have failed to elicit a creative response from them. Reconstruction must be based on historical realities.

101. By trial and error, a rich fund of experience has been accumulated which today enables Palestine to offer not merely a temporary asylum, but a permanent home. What was achieved has in no way impaired the position of the non-Jewish population. The present controversy involves the principle of self-determination on both sides. But the choice is between a constructive and a static approach. To be judged correctly, the issue must be set against a wider background. The Jewish return to Palestine is no challenge to Arab control over a huge area, no threat to Arab civilisation, no obstacle to Arab progress. On the other hand, the Arab claim to dominate Palestine must be weighed against the human need of millions of Jews and the national need of the Jewish people.

102. The issue is not merely one between Jews and Arabs. It concerns the whole world. Only the re-establishment of the Jewish Commonwealth of Palestine can lay the evil spirit of anti-Semitism and offer the Jews that freedom and security which are the birthright of every people.

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AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

MEMORANDUM

To All Participants of the
St. Louis Conference

Date April 5, 1946

From American Zionist Emergency Council

Mr. Mauer
766

At the suggestion of Mr. F. Julius Fohs, we attach for your information
reprint of an article by C. O. Willson in "Oil and Gas Journal," analyzing
the Middle Eastern oil situation.

ERH:NF
Enc.

Reprint from
"Oil and Gas Journal"
December 29, 1945

THE MIDDLE EAST -- ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE

By C. O. Willson

In this article the Journal's editor gives a summary of Middle East oil operations with a discussion of economic and political conditions which will have a bearing on immediate and long-range operations. The author in October completed a several months' trip in which he visited every major field and refinery in the Middle East and interviewed governmental officials in several of the capitals of that area. In returning to the United States he visited offices of several operating companies in London and Paris.

That part of the petroleum world commonly known as the "Middle East" is actually a part of the Middle East and the Near East extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf and from the western part of Egypt to the eastern boundary of Iran. Because its oil reserves are unimportant and its operating methods are not typical, Egypt is not included in many Middle East oil surveys. In regard to the future it is certain that as postwar programs are made effective the Middle East oil area will be extended in several directions.

The following table gives the estimated areas and population of the countries which are now considered part of the Middle East oil development shown on accompanying map:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Area</u> (<u>Sq. Miles</u>)	<u>Population</u>
Iran	628,000	15,000,000
Iraq	140,000	5,000,000
Syria	54,000	3,000,000
Lebanon	3,600	600,000
Palestine	11,000	1,600,000
Transjordan	35,000	300,000
Arabia*	1,000,000	15,000,000
Ethiopia	350,000	12,000,000
Egypt**	383,000	16,000,000
Total	2,575,000	78,500,000

*Includes Saudi Arabia and the dependencies and sheikdoms along the coasts of Red Sea, Alden Gulf, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman and Persian Gulf.

**Does not include Sudan.

This area is approximately equal to 75 percent of the land area of the United States and 60 percent of its population. This part of the world encompasses a large part of the beginnings of recorded time. Archaeologists trace early civilizations back to 4,000 B.C. Many of the social customs and economic practices of the peoples of this area predate the Christian era.

This climate is generally classified as subtropical. In the coastal sections the temperatures range from 40° F. in winter to temperatures as high as 125° F. in summer. The humidity is high particularly in the Persian Gulf area. In the areas of greater altitude high temperatures prevail in summer with temperatures below freezing in winter. The recommended time for visiting the area is from November 15 to April 15. Some of the world-famous winter resorts are located in the area.

More than 90 percent of the Middle East consists of desert, semiarid and mountainous country. Heavy rainfall is confined to the coastal areas over part of the year. Agricultural pursuits are largely confined to the river valleys and coastal sections. Satisfactory results have been obtained from irrigation projects -- notably the Nile Valley -- and mammoth plans have been outlined for the future by those seeking the rehabilitation of this section of the world, most of which has shown little economic progress over a period of several centuries. Climatic and soil conditions are sufficiently varied to assure a limited production of many agricultural products including fruits.

Reflecting in part basic conditions in agricultural and other natural resources the great bulk of the population of the Middle East live a marginal existence. It has been characterized by many writers as an area in which the extremes in standard of living prevail -- a large population not far removed from extreme poverty, a small wealthy population, and no middle class.

The foregoing conditions are outlined here because they have a bearing on present and future oil operations. They have meant in effect that except for a few population centers such as Cairo, Egypt, and Haifa, Palestine, that operating oil companies have had to supply all the living facilities for American and British operating staffs as well as thousands of nationals. The standards of living among the nationals generally have also had a bearing on political trends in the past and no doubt these conditions will have increased importance in the future with direct significance in future oil development.

The larger countries of the Middle East are recognized as independent kingdoms. During the war, Lebanon and Syria became independent of French mandate controls and are establishing republican forms of governments. Palestine and Transjordan are British mandated countries. In the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea areas there are independent sheikdoms with which the British Government has treaty rights. The entire Middle East in the past has been considered within the British sphere of influence and most of the area during the war became part of the sterling-bloc group which has meant that trading with other countries was subject to British controls.

Transportation

It is anticipated that within a few months the transportation accommodations for passengers and freight to the Middle East from Europe and the United States will be on a more extensive scale than ever before. Particular attention will be paid to airplane transportation. It is stated that T.W.A. will have a service calling for 20 hours' flying time between New York and Cairo, Egypt, with a stopover connection in Paris. It is understood that the same company will have a regular

flying service between Cairo and Dhahran, the field headquarters of the oil operation in Saudi Arabia. British Overseas Airways is to greatly improve its prewar service from England to the Middle East including Cairo, points on the Eastern Mediterranean, Baghdad, Basra, Abadan, and Bahrain Islands. In the case of the American companies the airways' fare will be reduced from 25 to 50 percent compared with the prewar rates. Eastern Mediterranean points at present are also served from Cairo by the Misra (Egyptian) lines. Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd., maintains its own airplane service from Haifa, Palestine, to its field headquarters in Iraq and Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd., operates four airplanes out of Abadan to its fields. It is now possible to go direct to all the principal oil-operating points of the Middle East by air.

Plans call for improved freight and passenger service from the United States to Eastern Mediterranean and to the Persian Gulf. Port Said and Haifa are active oil ports of the Mediterranean and their facilities for the handling of oil equipment and products are complete. While train service in the Middle East is limited the connecting system running from Paris to Basra in southern Iraq is in operation again. This transcontinental rail service and a desert bus service connecting Baghdad to Damascus are widely used to and from European points by oil men of the Middle East and their families.

Concessions

The only active oil concession in Iran at this time consists of approximately 100,000 sq. miles most of which is located in southwest Iran. In Egypt the exploration rights and concessions are all in the northern part of the country. Exploration rights or concessions cover a large part of the remainder of the Middle East oil area. There is an area in the interior of Saudi Arabia, largely unexplored, which is not under concessions and no rights or concessions have been granted by the Syrian Government covering part of that country.

The concession terms covering the actual development of proven areas for the most part are similar to those under which Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd., operates in Iran. Outside Egypt this Iranian development was the first in the Middle East and its production at present accounts for more than 60 percent of the Middle East total. The royalty payment is 8 shillings gold per ton. The actual equivalent of this royalty in terms of dollars varies with the rate of exchange but it is generally figured on a basis of 22 to 25 cents per American barrel. The Egyptian royalty is determined on a basis of 15 percent of the oil produced.

The concessions contain the usual provisions in regard to the employment and training of nationals. These terms permit the employment of American or British nationals for most of the administrative and top technical and scientific positions. In the older operations the nationals have been trained to do most of the routine construction and operating work. There are strong nationalistic trends in most of the countries of the Middle East and it is expected that more and more stress will be placed on the training of nationals to carry on all phases of the petroleum operations. Most of the exploration work has been in charge of American companies. American trained drillers and tool pushers predominate in field operations.

Type of Equipment

Except for steam-generation and power-plant facilities and their auxiliaries and part of the pumping installations, most of the equipment used in Middle East oil operations is of American design and the larger part was manufactured in the United States. Drilling operations in relation to the quantity of oil produced are small and outside Egypt no pumps are used in the production of crude oil.

American designers and builders of refinery-processing equipment have had a sizable market in the Middle East for many years. Starting in 1941 and 1942 the Allied war strategy called for the expansion of refining facilities in the Middle East as rapidly as possible. War-product plants were given as high a priority as in the United States. Complete units designed and fabricated in the United States were shipped to the Middle East plants. At the close of the war the refineries at Abadan and Bahrein Islands had large alkylation and isomerization units in operation and were important producers of 100-octane gasoline. All types of housing and utilities represent major expenditures in Middle East oil operations.

Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd., is the largest of the British oil companies and one of the major units of the entire petroleum industry. The British Government has a 55 percent stock ownership in the company. The company has other interests in the Middle East. Through Subsidiaries it has refining properties in the United Kingdom and France and its distributing facilities previous to the war covered a large part of the Eastern Hemisphere. Its general offices are located in Britannic House, Finsbury Circus, London E.C. 2, England.

Joint Ownership

Arabian American Oil Co. and Bahrein Petroleum Co., Ltd. are jointly owned by Standard Oil Co. of California and The Texas Co. The Bahrein company is incorporated in Canada and Arabian American is an American company. Through the California Texas Oil Co., Ltd., (Cal-Tex) the same parent companies are joint owners of a marketing organization which operates over part of the Eastern Hemisphere. The headquarters of the Bahrein company are located at 135 East Forty-second Street, New York City, and the main offices of Arabian American are located at 200 Bush Street, San Francisco.

Each of the following companies owns a 23 3/4 percent interest in the Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd., (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd.) Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., (Royal Dutch-Shell); Compagnie Francaise de Petroles (controlled by French Government); and Near East Development Co. (Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc.). C. S. Gulbenkian, owner of the original concession, and associates own the remaining 5 percent. The four major interests are associated in the ownership and management of Petroleum Development Co., Ltd., (Qatar). These same four companies have concessions or exploration rights as follows: Mosul Petroleum Co., Ltd., in northwest Iraq; Petroleum Development, Ltd. in Cyprus, part of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, Trucial Coast, Oman, and Dhofar; Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., in Aden and Hadramaut; Basrah Petroleum Co., Ltd., in southern Iraq. The general offices of these associated companies are located at Ling House, Dominion Street, London, E.C. 2, England.

Kuwait Oil Co., Ltd., is jointly owned by Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd., and Gulf Exploration Co. (Gulf Oil Corp.). Its general offices are located at Britannic House, Finsbury Circus, London E.C., England.

Exploration and Reserves

Several estimates of petroleum reserves of the Middle East have been made covering part or all of the areas. Taking into consideration the different approaches used in arriving at the estimates the figures are in substantial agreement. There is agreement that the large structures ranging from 45 to 160 sq. miles in area with producing columns of from 500 to 1,500 ft. justify the large reserve estimates that have been given to all the principal producing areas. The actual recovery per acre-foot based on these estimates, it is pointed out, is small compared to the recoveries in the United States with its smaller formations.

The foregoing does not apply to Egypt and the producing formations so far found in Bahrein Island are not comparable in column thickness with those of other Middle East fields.

The most publicized reserve report of the Middle East was that made in 1943 by the Technical Oil Mission sponsored by Petroleum Administrator Harold L. Ickes and headed by E. DeGolyer. A summary of this investigation follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Proven Reserves (1,000 Bbl.)</u>	<u>Indicated Reserves (1,000 Bbl.)</u>
Iran	6,000,000	7,000,000
Iraq	4,000,000	5,000,000
Kuwait	4,000,000	9,000,000
Saudi Arabia-		
Bahrein Island	2,000,000	9,500,000
Qatar	<u> </u>	<u>1,000,000</u>
Total	16,000,000	29,250,000

Since this report was made there have been no major new discoveries other than the completion of a wildcat well in Saudi Arabia which is now known as the Qatif field. This discovery is interpreted to add substantially to the proven reserves of that country.

Because of the large reserves found in a small part of the Middle East in recent years it is assumed that large additions will be found over the next few years. Estimates of expected reserves run into 12 figures. Those in charge of operations including some geologists who have had long experience in the area are more conservative regarding the future pointing to the dry holes that have been drilled in recent years.

An extensive exploration program -- delayed by war conditions -- will get under way during 1946 in all parts of the Middle East now under concessions and as expressed by one veteran operator "by 1948 or 1949 we should know more about the potentialities of the Middle East."

Production Practices

As revealed in Table 1 little development drilling has been necessary in Middle East with the exception of Egypt where conditions in regard to producing formations are comparable to those found in several areas of the United States. With the exception of Kuwait all of the production comes from limestone. The Kuwait production is obtained from Upper Cretaceous sands. The sand column of more than 1,000 ft. is broken with shale. This field has not produced crude oil in commercial quantities and the method of operation has not been finally determined.

In the other fields there is sufficient uniformity in producing formations conditions to justify in all cases an operation in which current output is being secured from a few wells. The Kirkuk field in Iraq and the five fields in southwest Iraq which are producing at this time are comparable in reservoir conditions and the recovery practices are similar. Oil and gas seepages are found at several points in the entire area and part of the exploration work has been tied into these surface indications.

The outstanding characteristic of the Kirkuk and the southwest Iranian fields is the presence of fissures which provide a free interconnection between wells and in effect permit the uniform draining of the producing structure from a few outlets. In the case of the Kirkuk field the structure is 65 miles long and $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 miles wide. The present production of 90,000 bbl. daily is coming from 10 wells located at one end of the field over an 8-mile area. It is planned to increase this production to 300,000 bbl. daily by 1949 from 20 wells located over an 11-mile area. The entire structure is not only interconnected but the fluid characteristics are similar throughout the field. The method of operating a well is largely determined by the gas liquid and pressure tests made of the producing formations at the time the well is completed. Wells which are spaced on a "contour" basis are located at points which will facilitate uniform recovery from the reservoir.

In addition to the fissured characteristic the producing structures of the Iraq and Iranian fields have a common reservoir condition of hydrostatic pressure at the base of the column and gas pressure at the top. Through gas-oil and water-oil observation wells and changes in the operation of the flowing wells a field procedure has been perfected in which uniform water-oil levels and gas-oil levels are maintained throughout the fields. These important operations were explained in some detail in the series of articles appearing in this publication describing activities by areas. Full use of reservoir pressures is made in maintaining the required equilibrium conditions within the producing structures, in flowing the wells, and in the pipe-line movement of the oil on the surface.

Structural conditions in regard to fissures are not the same in the new Saudi Arabian fields. The limestone is more porous but the same situation applies in regard to hydrostatic and gas pressures. Observation wells for the determination of water and gas levels are an important phase of the operation in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain Islands.

A unique operation has been carried on in the Masjid-i-Sulaiman field, the first major discovery in Iran and a field which up to this time has produced in excess of 750,000,000 bbl. of crude oil and is still flowing at the rate of 75,000 bbl. daily. In order to maintain a refinery operation at Abadan in balance with the market demands the Anglo-Iranian company operates a topping plant in the M.I.D. field. When necessary part of the crude oil is topped of its light ends which are transported along with the crude-oil shipments to the refinery. The residual stock of the required viscosity is returned to the formation through injection wells connected to the gas reservoir. Tests have shown that the heavy oil settles to the water level and moves up with the water as the crude oil is removed from the reservoir. The company plans to recover the fuel oil in later operations. One theory is that the fuel oil releases more crude oil from the limestone formation than does the water contact. This operation has been reversed and the light fractions returned to the formation.

Refinery Operations

Table 2 summarizes refinery operations in the Middle East. With one exception the refineries are operated by the companies which own the producing operations and the stock ownership of these concerns has been previously explained. The exception is Consolidated Refineries Ltd. which operates the new 90,000-bbl. refinery at Haifa. This company is owned jointly by Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd., and Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., Ltd., (Royal Dutch-Shell), two of the four principal owners of Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd. The plant is operated under direction of the Anglo-Iranian company. The refinery also processes crude oil for the other owners of the Iraq Petroleum the products being distributed in the Mediterranean and European area.

Properties of Supplies

Properties of the principal crude-oil supplies in the Middle East are shown in Table 3. In the case of Kuwait, Kirkuk, Bahrein Island, and Damman the marketed production is confined to one field so that Table 1 gives the available output for those countries. A recent breakdown of the production by fields in Iran shows the following daily output: Masjid-i-Sulaiman, 75,000 bbl.; Haft Kel, 195,000 bbl.; Agha Jari, 40,000 bbl.; Gach Saran, 43,000 bbl.; Naft Khaneh and Nafti-i-Shah fields on the Iran-Iraq boundary, 15,000 to 20,000 bbl. All of the production in Egypt with the exception of 1,500 bbl. daily in the Hurgada field comes from the Ras Gharib field. The methods used in making the distillation tests varied in the different areas and for that reason an exact comparison of all properties is not possible.

All the crudes of the Middle East would be classified as "sour" in the American sense that term is used. A relatively high sulfur content is common to all the crudes and this fact along with H_2S in the crude oil and gas has necessitated special stabilization and refinery operations. In the Kirkuk field all crude oil passes through a stabilization operation before being tendered to the pipe line. This serves the double purpose of removing most of the H_2S and the fixed gases. Previous to the installation of the field stabilizer there were complaints from residents of French cities in which refineries operating with the Kirkuk crude oil are located.

The presence of the sulfur compounds is of course reflected in the refinery processing and treating methods. Special attention is paid to minimizing corrosion in the crude-oil distillation and cracking operation and special studies have been made in regard to the metals giving the most efficient service. The treating operations are comparable to those used with some of the West Texas crude oils. Large quantities of sulfuric acid are required and most of the plants have their own equipment for its manufacture using the H_2S as the base material. In the refining of the intermediate products extending from the heavy naphthas to the light distillates the SO_2 process is extensively used. With this operation a kerosene is obtained which is comparable in specifications to the kerosenes from sweet crudes of the United States. This process is also used in obtaining aromatics which played an important part in high-octane aviation gasolines.

The large demands for the intermediate products of crude oil and the smaller percentage requirements for motor gasoline, compared to United States conditions, is reflected in the processing operations. The demand for the gas-oil cuts for diesel fuel and other uses from crude oils are so great that previous to the war there was comparatively little gas-oil cracking. The straight-run distillation of the crude oil supplied the gasoline markets and this was supplemented with large reforming installations to operate with the heavy naphtha cuts. These reforming operations improved the antiknock and volatility ratings of the blended motor fuels. None of the Middle East companies manufacture lubricating oils.

Supported War Program

During the war all of the plants were operated to give maximum support to the Allied program. With the exception of the Abadan and Bahrein Island refineries little change was made in the processing methods, the plants being operated to secure the largest possible yields of asphalt, residual, fuel oils, diesel fuels, and other intermediate products. In carrying out this program the reforming units of the 90,000 bbl. Haifa refinery were not operated because those directing the war operation did not want to undergo the volume loss that results.

At Abadan, which is the petroleum industry's largest single refinery in point of crude-oil throughput, a large yield of 110-octane gasoline was secured without the installation of catalytic cracking. Isomerization and Alkylation units were installed. The refinery operation incorporated a number of superfractionating installations to secure the part of the cuts used in the alkylation operations and for blending purposes. The reforming operations which exceeded 100,000 bbl. daily in capacity played an important part in securing the required hydrocarbons and blending stocks.

At Bahrain Island a refinery with a prewar 35,000-bbl. daily crude-oil capacity was expanded to double that capacity. The original plant included reforming, polymerization, and gas-oil cracking operations. The expansion was directed largely to a war-product operation. During the closing months of the war the refinery operation included catalytic cracking, isomerization, and alkylation operations and the refinery was the largest producer of 100-octane gasoline in the Eastern Hemisphere. The new 50,000-bbl. refinery at Ras Tanura which is scheduled for a 100 percent capacity operation by January 1, 1946, incorporates the conventional type of Middle East refinery operation of combination atmospheric and vacuum crude-oil distillation and naphtha reforming with complete facilities for processing and treating a wide range of intermediate products required by the civilian markets of the Middle East.

Future Operations

Barring the discovery of new fields closer to the marketing outlets of the Mediterranean area than those now producing it does not appear probable that the crude-oil production and refinery output of the Middle East will be increased materially over the next two years. Several of the operations in the language of the operators need to be "rounded out" before further expansion is expedient. The war program necessitated the maximum output with minimum materials and operators generally are anxious to install supplementary equipment and make other changes in their field and plant operations which were not possible during the war.

The plans for extended exploration programs have been explained. Development drilling will be necessary on an expanded scale in most fields. Most of this work, however, is necessary to maintain present production and no company has announced plans for an immediate expansion of its production.

Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. has announced plans to install extensive catalytic cracking equipment at its refinery. Other processing and treating equipment is needed. A new office building at the Abadan refinery is projected and extensive housing facilities of various types are to be built at Abadan and in the fields when materials and manpower are available.

In Saudi Arabia the immediate program calls for a pipe line which will give the Abqaiq field its first outlet. This crude is needed for the 100,000-bbl. daily operation now required to support the new Ras Tanura refinery and the 45,000 to 50,000-bbl. production which is supplied to the refinery on Bahrain Island. All of this production is now coming from the Dammam field. The company has a drilling program for the Abqaiq field which at present has five wells and it will also be drilling additional wells in the new Qatif field which is approximately midway between the Dammam field and the Ras Tanura refinery. It is estimated that more than 500 houses and other housing facilities will be built in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain Islands over the next two years.

The owners of the Arabian American Oil Co., have announced plans to build a big-inch pipe line connecting its present fields to an Eastern Mediterranean port. This is the largest project now under consideration in the Middle East as this time. It is assumed that two or more years will elapse before this project is completed. It involves extensive development work in existing fields and an extensive exploration program looking to the discovery of additional fields. It is understood that in addition to the local refineries the Arabian American company expects to make offshore shipments to European refineries.

The largest program actually under way is that of Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd., which has placed orders for 16-in pipe which will be used in a new system paralleling the present 12-in lines from Kirkuk field to the terminals at Haifa, Palestine, and Tripoli, Lebanon.

Some additional drilling will also be necessary in the Kirkuk field. When this program is completed in late 1948 or 1949 the deliveries to the eastern Mediterranean will be 300,000 bbl. daily instead of the present 90,000 bbl. daily. Previous to the close of the war all of the crude oil delivered at the Haifa and Tripoli terminals was being refined at the Haifa refinery. Since then part of the crude oil belonging to the French interests is being refined in France.

Refinery Permits

As part of this expansion program the American interests in Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd., (Standard of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc.) have been granted permits by the government of Lebanon to build refineries at Tripoli. The capacity of these plants has not been announced. All of the interests associated in the Iraq operation have refineries in France and in the case of the British and American companies at other European points. It is assumed that all of the increased output of the Iraq company will be used to supply crude oil for these European operations now being rehabilitated.

A more immediate operating situation has stood with disposal of the 285,000-bbl. increase that has taken place in Middle East fields and refineries since 1938. Over the next 12 to 18 months this increase presumably will not necessitate any changes in prewar distributing operations. It is now believed that at least 18 months will elapse before the Japanese-occupied Far East and Burma fields will be back to their prewar operating status. In the meanwhile the Persian Gulf fields and refineries will be called upon to supply a large part of this deficit and also the heavy demands of the American and British military in the Pacific area. Some of the civilian demands normally served by the Middle East supplies have also increased.

When these temporary outlets are ended new outlets will have to be found for the additional Middle East output. Economists have interpreted this situation to mean that increased quantities of Middle East products in the future will go to the United Kingdom and northern Europe. Except for the 90,000-bbl. output of Iraq Petroleum Co., Ltd., most of which went to French refineries previous to 1939, comparatively little of the Middle East production was absorbed in European markets. These markets were supplied largely from South American, Dutch West Indies and United States sources.

The fact that the tanker distances from these Western Hemisphere sources of supply are less than from the Persian Gulf largely accounted for this operating situation previous to the war. Economists have interpreted this situation to mean that Middle East operators will absorb any additional transportation costs that exist in relation to Eastern Hemisphere markets and thus provide for the increases in supplies over the prewar period and the growth assured over the next five years and later.

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL

Constituent Organizations

Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization of America
Mizrachi Organization of America
Poale Zion-Zeire Zion of America
Zionist Organization of America

342 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.
MURRAY HILL 2-1160

April 12, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Friend:

All of us are awaiting with great impatience the recommendations that will be made by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, which is now writing its report in Lausanne, Switzerland. Our future program of activities will depend largely on the nature of that report, and you and your committee will undoubtedly be called upon to give expression to American Zionism's reaction, once the Joint Committee's recommendations have been made.

You will surely understand that what will be required above all is a united reaction and unity of purpose in our ranks. It would be most unfortunate if the American public were to be presented with differing Zionist reactions to the Committee's report. The American Zionist Emergency Council has, therefore, communicated with the heads of the various national Zionist bodies, requesting them not to issue any public statements on the report until the Emergency Council has had an opportunity to study the Committee's recommendations and to establish a line of policy in harmony with that of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. The Council will, of course, meet promptly upon the publication of the report.

We feel it essential that the same request be addressed to you, so that you may advise the members of your Emergency Committee to refrain from commenting publicly on the Committee of Inquiry's recommendations until you have heard from us. Zionists must be particularly careful of recommendations which, though they may gratify us by providing for the emigration to Palestine of a given number of our unfortunate brethren in Europe, will disregard or perhaps injure our Zionist objective - the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth. We do not know what the Committee's report is likely to be, but we do know what the classic Zionist goal is - and it is to achieve that goal of the Jewish State that we are working today.

May we, therefore, expect that in this matter you will be careful to observe Zionist discipline, and that you will await the recommendations of the American Zionist Emergency Council before giving public expression to your attitude on the Committee's report. We have sent this communication to all Chairmen of local Emergency Committees.

With Passover greetings,

Sincerely yours,

Abba Hillel Silver

Abba Hillel Silver

Stephen S. Wise

Stephen S. Wise


Chairmen

AS:SW/MS

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THE REPORT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY:
A BRIEF ANALYSIS

By A Veteran Zionist Observer



THE REPORT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY;

A BRIEF ANALYSIS

The report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine is, except for two recommendations, completely unfavorable to Jewish aspirations. It is favorable in the following respects:

- (1) The recommendation to admit, as soon as possible, 100,000 displaced Jews of Europe into Palestine.
- (2) The repudiation of two principles of the British White Paper of 1939: (a) the dependence of further Jewish immigration upon Arab consent; (b) the ban on Jewish land purchase in a major portion of Palestine.

The unfavorable recommendations of the report may be summarized as follows:

1. There are approximately a million Jews for whom continued existence in Europe is intolerable and who must emigrate. The Committee concedes that there are large numbers of Jews in Europe who must emigrate somewhere. But it makes provisions for only 100,000, leaving the rest at the mercy of "humanitarianism," relaxed immigration laws and many other good things, which are nonexistent in the world today. What is to become of these other hundreds of thousands of Jews who have expressed a desire to go to Palestine? It should be added, too, that the Committee's "antidotes" for European Jewry's present miserable existence have been tried repeatedly in the past, and have failed.

2. In recommending that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State, the Committee repudiates the purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, whose authors stated repeatedly that it was intended that Palestine should develop into a Jewish state, once a Jewish majority has been established in that country. The British Government has thus succeeded in maneuvering the United States into supporting a complete reversal of the international obligations with regard to Palestine subscribed to by the nations of the world, including our own through two resolutions of Congress. In its memorandum to the Committee, the Jewish Agency for Palestine clearly defined its conception of a Jewish state as one in which neither Arabs nor Jews would dominate each other, in which each people would achieve full cultural self-realization, and one which would be "Jewish" in the sense that the majority of the inhabitants would be Jews. The recommendations with regard to future immigration contained in the report will make it impossible for the Jews ever to attain a majority, thus putting an end to the possibility of

Palestine becoming a Jewish State, not in the Committee's mistaken sense of Jew dominating Arab, but in the reasonable Jewish conception, as stated by the Jewish Agency.

3. The report introduces an entirely new note in regarding the "interest of the Christian world in Palestine" as a determining factor. Never before has it been argued that "Christian interest" should dictate the nature and degree of Jewish development of Palestine. It was always understood that the Holy Places sacred to Christendom would be fully protected, and in all the years since the Balfour Declaration, the Jews have unquestionably fulfilled this stipulation. But to retard Jewish development of the country because of something vaguely defined as "the interest of the Christian world" (which, it becomes clear from a careful reading of the report really means the interest of the British Empire), will be repugnant to the Christian conscience.

4. The proposal that Palestine be deprived of self-government and remain under the rule of Great Britain until "hostility" between Arab and Jew disappears, is either naive beyond belief or is merely a way of underwriting Britain's usual policy of divide and rule. This is an invitation for Great Britain to continue its traditional technique of fostering enmity between Arab and Jew as long as the British Empire chooses to dominate Palestine. It should be noted, too, that the report explicitly recommends that a single trustee continue to govern Palestine, even under the United Nations. What we have, then, is continued British rule -- in other words, the continuation of the status quo.

5. Nothing but hearty approval can be given to the objectives outlined in the Committee's recommendation #5 for the raising of the Arab economic, health and cultural standards to the level achieved by the Jews of Palestine. But to recommend, as the report does, that this vast project be financed largely by taxation of the Jewish community of Palestine, presents a new low in cynicism. Knowing the physical as well as the moral impossibility of this proposal, the Committee in cold fact means either that it intends the Arab community to remain on its low cultural level, thereby perpetuating hostility between Arab and Jew; or that the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, saddled with a responsibility impossible to fulfill and which they are bound to resent, will give expression to their sense of despair against the British, the Arabs, or both. This will certainly not make for the "peaceful" atmosphere which the Committee members envisage as a prerequisite for self-government.

6. The Committee recommends that during the interim period until a United Nations Trusteeship is established, immigration into Palestine shall be regulated according to the terms of the Mandate. In doing this, what British interpretation of the terms of the Mandate does the Committee refer to or recommend -- the interpretation that permitted 61,000 Jews to enter Palestine in 1935, or the current view, which permits the entry of only 1500 Jew: per month?

It should be carefully noted the report states that political as well as economic considerations must be taken into account by the Mandatory in determining what the future Jewish immigration into Palestine shall be. It can be assumed that sufficient "political" excuses will always be available to the Palestine Administration in order to keep Jewish immigration down to a bare minimum, or to bar it altogether. In this connection, it is worth remarking that the one figure thrown out by the members of the Committee as a yardstick for future Jewish immigration is the 12,000 per year mentioned in the Peel Commission Report.

Moreover, in providing that it shall be the right of the Palestine Government to decide the number of immigrants to be admitted within any given period (and it is noteworthy that the Jewish Agency is nowhere mentioned in this connection), the report again relegates the entire question of Jewish immigration to a British Administration which, in the recent past, has proved most unfriendly and which, if the latest utterances of the leaders of the British Government are in any way indicative, will continue to prove hostile to Jewish aspirations in the future.

The Committee made a curious slip in basing this recommendation on the assumption that "it is the right of every independent nation to determine...the number of immigrants to be admitted." Palestine is not an independent country in two senses: (1) it is ruled by an outside power -- Great Britain; (2) this outside power accepted this responsibility under a Mandate which obliges it to "facilitate" Jewish immigration and colonization.

7. The statement that any person who desires and is qualified to enter Palestine must not be refused admission or be subjected to discrimination "on the ground that he is not a Jew," is indeed a sorry joke. Perhaps a more appropriate wording would have been: "that no person must be refused admission or be subjected to discrimination on the ground that he is a Jew." At no time has there been an instance of discrimination against a non-Jew in this respect. There are, however, hundreds of thousands of such instances where Jews are concerned.

Of course, the inevitable consequence of such a policy would be to encourage the immigration into Palestine of Arabs and others while Jewish immigration, dependent as it will be on "political" conditions in Palestine, will be discouraged.

8. The Report's declaration that "there can be no illegal immigration of Jews into Palestine" and its affirmation that any Jew who enters Palestine contrary to its laws is an illegal immigrant," indicates a complete lack of a sense of reality. The recommendations of the report, if carried out, are so stringent as to make so-called "illegal immigration" unavoidable. Indeed, these recommendations invite such immigration just as prohibition laws provided and fostered speakeasies. The concept that hundreds of thousands of Jews in dire need of a homeland must give up any attempt to enter Palestine as best they

can because a statute declares such entries "illegal," is certain to be rejected by those desperate people.

9. While rescinding the Land Transfer Regulations of 1940, the report provides new and perhaps greater obstacles to the continued Jewish settlement of Palestine. Even though, unlike the White Paper, the report provides that all of Palestine be open to Jewish land purchase, it also stipulates that the British Government of Palestine "provide adequate protection for the interests of small owners and tenant cultivators." This means that, should the British Government desire to prohibit Jewish land purchase anywhere in the country, it can do so. This recommendation of the Committee's may be fraught with greater dangers to Jewish colonization than the restrictions of the White Paper.

10. In its animadversion against the Jewish National Fund's policy of engaging only Jewish labor to work on the land bought in the name of and belonging to the Jewish people as a whole, the Committee again discards the terms and intent of the Palestine Mandate -- to build the Jewish National Home. Obviously, the Jewish people cannot create a Jewish economic or cultural life in Palestine if the Jews are encouraged to thrive upon Arab labor. In one of the greatest reversals of history, at an immense cost and sacrifice, the Jews of Palestine have transformed a large element of their population into farmers and workers on land owned by the Jewish people as a whole. One of the long-standing charges against the Jews has been that they are incapable of and unwilling to work on the soil. This charge has been refuted by the Jewish pioneers working, under Jewish National Fund auspices, on land bought and rehabilitated for a normalized Jewish national existence. This the Committee of Inquiry seems bent on destroying.

11. The assertion that "it would not be to the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine if too large a proportion of the land should become inalienable," that is to say, in plain English, owned by the community as a whole, is passing strange coming as it does from a Committee, half of which is made up of representatives of a Labor Government which was swept into power on a platform recommending precisely that program in England.

It is also worth asking whether the 3 percent of Palestine now owned by the Jewish National Fund constitutes "too large a proportion." (Also for the record, the total land area owned by Jews, including J.N.F. lands, is but a mere 6% of Palestine).

12. The Committee apparently regards all of Palestine as holy ground, to be kept free from the desecration of any secular enjoyment. If it is offensive to Christian feelings that the largest lake of Palestine should have a Spa and amusements -- which is surely not so -- it then follows that the whole of Palestine should become a museum of antiquities and the repository of holy relics, in which case all Christians, Jews and Arabs in Palestine would have to give up a normal economic and social existence.

The true purpose of this seemingly ludicrous attack on a swing band playing on the shore of Galilee becomes apparent when one reads further that "reports come to our notice of other projects, the completion of which would be equally objectionable." Obviously, the Committee has reference to the objections of fanatics to such an enterprise as the Jordan Valley Authority which, if executed, would bring well-being to all the inhabitants of the land. It can surely be no Christian ideal for the Holy Land to remain in physical misery, moral stagnation and cultural degradation.

13. The recommendation of the Committee that education become compulsory and that Arab standards be raised to those of Jewish education, again meets the hearty approval of all right-thinking people. But, as in the case of health, economy and culture in general, the Committee's proposals that the major share of Arab education be paid through taxation of the Jews, will violate every sense of justice on the part of the Jewish taxpayer. Taxation without representation, which is the present status, is bad enough; but taxation of the Jews in order to save money for the British Treasury and Arab potentates is immeasurably worse. The recommendation is not only morally unjust, it is unworkable; its realization is calculated to drive the Jews to despair or revolt.

The Committee's attack upon what it calls an "aggressive Hebrew nationalism" fostered by the Jewish schools, is both unwarranted and insulting. It is as natural and proper that the Jewish schools in Palestine should inspire among their Jewish students a love for the land and for Hebrew culture, as the efforts made in English schools to inculcate a love for England and English culture. Far from being aggressive in their nationalism, the Jews of Palestine have for the last quarter-century shown a spirit of self-discipline and self-restraint that could well serve as an example to the rest of the civilized world.

14. The report which -- apart from recommending an immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews -- offers little promise, concludes characteristically enough with a generous display of threats. After recommending conditions which, with respect to immigration, government, taxation, would do everything possible to nurture illegal activities and revolt, the Committee finally turns to the Jewish Agency and gives it -- as its only specific task in the whole report -- the duty to suppress violence and illegality. Nowhere does the Committee provide the Jewish Agency with power, responsibility, or the means to execute its legitimate purposes, and yet this hamstrung, and, in the eyes of the Committee, apparently superfluous Agency, is commissioned to preserve law and order. No more unrealistic instrument of government can be imagined than a body without legislative, fiscal, financial, or police powers, undertaking functions of the state.

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MEMORANDUM

To Chairmen of Local Emergency Committees *Date* May 1, 1946

From Harry L. Shapiro

The Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine was issued last night and appears in today's press. Attached is a copy of the Report's Recommendations. Additional lengthy chapters, which elaborate on these Recommendations will be sent to you just as soon as we can make them available.

Simultaneously with the issuance of the Report, President Truman made the following significant comment:

"I am very happy that the request which I made for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The transference of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished with the greatest dispatch. The protection and safeguarding of the holy places in Palestine sacred to Moslem, Christian and Jew is adequately provided in the report.

"One of the significant features in the report is that it aims to insure complete protection to the Arab population in Palestine by guaranteeing their civilian and religious rights, and by recommending measures for the constant improvement in their cultural, educational and economic position.

"I am also pleased that the committee recommends in effect the abrogation of the White Paper of 1939, including existing restrictions on immigration and land acquisition, to permit the further development of the Jewish national home. It is also gratifying that the report also envisages the carrying out of large-scale economic development projects in Palestine which would facilitate further immigration and be of benefit to the entire population.

"In addition to these immediate objectives, the report deals with many other questions of long-range political policies and questions of international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement."

The importance of this statement -- in which the President expresses satisfaction "that the Committee recommends in effect the abrogation of the White Paper of 1939, including existing restrictions on immigration and land acquisition, to permit the further development of

the Jewish national home," and withheld approval of the Report's long-range political recommendations -- is obvious. James Reston, writing from Washington in the New York Times this morning states, "The President's comment on the Report was considered in the embassies to be of more importance than the report itself, since the Committee of Inquiry merely had the power of recommendation, while the President's comment is regarded as a statement of United States policy."

A spokesman for the Jewish Agency for Palestine, while announcing that the Agency will make public its official comment on the Report only after careful consideration of its recommendations, went on to say that even though the proposal to admit 100,000 Jews and to permit land transfers will be welcomed by the Jewish people, the "central problem of the homeless, stateless Jewish people has been left untouched by the Report," for a "national home cannot really be secured save within the framework of the Jewish State."

A copy of the full statement of the Jewish Agency, which will speak for our entire movement, will be sent to you as soon as it is issued.

Attached is the statement issued to the Press today by the American Zionist Emergency Council, following President Truman's comment quoted above.

It is clear that a program of action must be laid down in conformity with the reaction of the Jewish Agency and that of the American Zionist Emergency Council, the latter of which declared in its statement that some of the recommendations for a permanent solution "clearly deny Jewish historic rights and aspirations with respect to Palestine and can never be accepted by the Jewish people." In all probability it will be necessary to convene a national meeting of leaders of local Emergency Committees to carry out the policies which will be determined by the Emergency Council. I will communicate with you as soon as a decision is made to hold such a meeting.

Regards.

HLS:MEB
Encs.

Recommendations of the

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine

As submitted to the President of the United States

And to the Government of the United Kingdom

April 30, 1946

CHAPTER I

RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS

THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM.

RECOMMENDATION No. I. WE HAVE TO REPORT THAT SUCH INFORMATION AS WE RECEIVED ABOUT COUNTRIES OTHER THAN PALESTINE GAVE NO HOPE OF SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE IN FINDING HOMES FOR JEWS WISHING OR IMPELLED TO LEAVE EUROPE.

BUT PALESTINE ALONE CANNOT MEET THE EMIGRATION NEEDS OF THE JEWISH VICTIMS OF NAZI AND FASCIST PERSECUTION: THE WHOLE WORLD SHARES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM AND INDEED FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF ALL "DISPLACED PERSONS."

WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS TOGETHER, AND IN ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, SHOULD ENDEAVOR IMMEDIATELY TO FIND NEW HOMES FOR ALL SUCH "DISPLACED PERSONS", IRRESPECTIVE OF CREED OR NATIONALITY, WHOSE TIES WITH THEIR FORMER COMMUNITIES HAVE BEEN IRREPARABLY BROKEN.

THOUGH EMIGRATION WILL SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF SOME VICTIMS OF PERSECUTION, THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY, INCLUDING A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF JEWS, WILL CONTINUE TO LIVE IN EUROPE. WE RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS ENDEAVOR TO SECURE THAT IMMEDIATE EFFECT IS GIVEN TO THE PROVISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER CALLING FOR, "UNIVERSAL RESPECT FOR AND OBSERVANCE OF, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS FOR ALL WITHOUT DISTINCTION AS TO RACE, SEX, LANGUAGE, OR RELIGION".

COMMENT

In recommending that our Governments, in association with other countries, should endeavor to find new homes for "displaced persons", we do not suggest that any country should be asked to make a permanent change in its immigration policy. The conditions, which we have seen in Europe, are unprecedented, and so unlikely to arise again that we are convinced that special provision could and should be made in existing immigration laws to meet this unique and peculiarly distressing situation. Furthermore, we believe that much could be

accomplished - particularly in regard to those "displaced persons", including Jews, who have relatives in countries outside Europe - by a relaxation of administrative regulations.

Our investigations have led us to believe that a considerable number of Jews will continue to live in most European countries. In our view the mass emigration of all European Jews would be of service neither to the Jews themselves nor to Europe. Every effort should be made to enable the Jews to rebuild their shattered communities, while permitting those Jews, who wish to do so, to emigrate. In order to achieve this, restitution of Jewish property should be effected as soon as possible. Our investigations showed us that the Governments chiefly concerned had for the most part already passed legislation to this end. A real obstacle, however, to individual restitution is that the attempt to give effect to this legislation is frequently a cause of active anti-Semitism. We suggest that, for the reconstruction of the Jewish communities, restitution of their corporate property, either through reparations payments or through other means, is of the first importance.

Nazi occupation has left behind it a legacy of anti-Semitism. This cannot be combated by legislation alone. The only really effective antidotes are the enforcement by each Government of guaranteed civil liberties and equal rights, a program of education in the positive principles of democracy, the sanction of a strong world public opinion - combined with economic recovery and stability.

REFUGEE
IMMIGRATION
INTO
PALESTINE

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2. WE RECOMMEND (A) THAT 100,000 CERTIFICATES BE AUTHORIZED IMMEDIATELY FOR THE ADMISSION INTO PALESTINE OF JEWS WHO HAVE BEEN THE VICTIMS OF NAZI AND FASCIST PERSECUTION; (B) THAT THESE CERTIFICATES BE AWARDED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN 1946 AND THAT ACTUAL IMMIGRATION BE PUSHED FORWARD AS RAPIDLY AS CONDITIONS WILL PERMIT.

COMMENT

The number of Jewish survivors of Nazi and Fascist persecution with whom we have to deal far exceeds 100,000; indeed there are more than that number in Germany, Austria and Italy alone. Although nearly a year has passed since their liberation, the majority

of those in Germany and Austria are still living in assembly centers, the so-called "camps", island communities in the midst of those at whose hands they suffered so much.

In their interests and in the interests of Europe, the centers should be closed and their camp life ended. Most of them have cogent reasons for wishing to leave Europe. Many are the sole survivors of their families and few have any ties binding them to the countries in which they used to live.

Since the end of hostilities, little has been done to provide for their resettlement elsewhere. Immigration laws and restrictions bar their entry to most countries and much time must pass before such laws and restrictions can be altered and effect given to the alterations. Some can go to countries where they have relatives; others may secure inclusion in certain quotas. Their number is comparatively small.

We know of no country to which the great majority can go in the immediate future other than Palestine. Furthermore that is where almost all of them want to go. There they are sure that they will receive a welcome denied them elsewhere. There they hope to enjoy peace and rebuild their lives.

We believe it is essential that they should be given an opportunity to do so at the earliest possible time. Furthermore we have the assurances of the leaders of the Jewish Agency that they will be supported and cared for.

We recommend the authorization and issue of 100,000 certificates for these reasons and because we feel that their immediate issue will have a most salutary effect upon the whole situation.

In the awarding of these certificates priority should as far as possible be given to those in the centers, and to those liberated in Germany and Austria who are no longer in the centers but remain in these countries. We do not desire that other Jewish victims who wish or will be impelled by their circumstances to leave the countries where they now are, or that those who fled from persecution before the

outbreak of war, should be excluded. We appreciate that there will be difficulty in deciding questions of priority, but none the less we urge that so far as possible such a system should be adhered to, and that, in applying it, primary consideration should be given to the aged and infirm, to the very young and also to skilled workmen whose services will be needed for many months on work rendered necessary by the large influx.

It should be made clear that no advantage in the obtaining of a certificate is to be gained by migrating from one country to another, or by entering Palestine illegally.

Receiving so large a number will be a heavy burden on Palestine. We feel sure that the authorities will shoulder it and that they will have the full cooperation of the Jewish Agency.

Difficult problems will confront those responsible for organizing and carrying out the movement. The many organizations - public and private - working in Europe will certainly render all the aid they can; we mention UNRRA especially. Cooperation by all throughout is necessary.

We are sure that the Government of the United States, which has shown such keen interest in this matter, will participate vigorously and generously with the Government of Great Britain in its fulfillment. There are many ways in which help can be given.

Those who have opposed the admission of these unfortunate people into Palestine should know that we have fully considered all that they have put before us. We hope, that they will look upon the situation again, that they will appreciate the considerations which have led us to our conclusion, and that above all, if they cannot see their way to help, at least they will not make the position of these sufferers more difficult.

PRINCIPLES
OF GOVERNMENT:
NO ARAB, NO
JEWISH STATE.

RECOMMENDATION No. 3. IN ORDER TO DISPOSE, ONCE AND FOR ALL, OF THE EXCLUSIVE CLAIMS OF JEWS AND ARABS TO PALESTINE, WE REGARD IT AS ESSENTIAL THAT A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE MADE:

I. THAT JEW SHALL NOT DOMINATE ARAB AND ARAB SHALL NOT DOMINATE JEW IN PALESTINE. II. THAT PALESTINE SHALL BE NEITHER A JEWISH STATE NOR AN ARAB STATE. III. THAT THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT ULTIMATELY TO BE ESTABLISHED, SHALL, UNDER INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES, FULLY PROTECT AND PRESERVE THE INTERESTS IN THE HOLY LAND OF CHRISTENDOM AND OF THE MOSLEM AND JEWISH FAITHS.

THUS PALESTINE MUST ULTIMATELY BECOME A STATE WHICH GUARDS THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF MOSLEMS, JEWS AND CHRISTIANS ALIKE; AND ACCORDS TO THE INHABITANTS, AS A WHOLE, THE FULLEST MEASURE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, CONSISTENT WITH THE THREE PARAMOUNT PRINCIPLES SET FORTH ABOVE.

COMMENT

Throughout the long and bloody struggle of Jew and Arab for dominance in Palestine, each crying fiercely; "This land is mine" - except for the brief reference in the Report of the Royal Commission (Hereinafter referred to as the Peel Report) and the little evidence, written and oral, that we received on this point - the great interest of the Christian World in Palestine has been completely overlooked, glossed over or brushed aside.

We, therefore, emphatically declare that Palestine is a Holy Land, sacred to Christian, to Jew and to Moslem alike; and because it is a Holy Land, Palestine is not, and can never become, a land which any race or religion can justly claim as its very own.

We further, in the same emphatic way, affirm that the fact that it is the Holy Land, sets Palestine completely apart from other lands, and dedicates it to the precepts and practices of the Brotherhood of Man, not those of narrow nationalism.

For another reason, in the light of its long history, and particularly its history of the last thirty years, Palestine cannot be regarded as either a purely Arab or a purely Jewish land.

The Jews have a historic connection with the country. The Jewish National Home, though embodying a minority of the population, is today

a reality established under international guarantee. It has a right to continued existence, protection and development.

Yet Palestine is not, and never can be a purely Jewish land. It lies at the crossroads of the Arab world. Its Arab population, descended from long-time inhabitants of the area, rightly look upon Palestine as their homeland.

It is therefore neither just nor practicable that Palestine should become either an Arab State, in which an Arab majority would control the destiny of a Jewish minority, or a Jewish State, in which a Jewish majority would control that of an Arab minority. In neither case would minority guarantees afford adequate protection for the subordinated group.

A Palestinian put the matter thus: "In the hearts of us Jews there has always been a fear that some day this country would be turned into an Arab State and the Arabs would rule over us. This fear has at times reached the proportions of terror.... Now this same feeling of fear has started up in the hearts of Arabs.....fear lest the Jews acquire the ascendancy and rule over them."

Palestine, then, must be established as a country in which the legitimate national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs can be reconciled, without either side fearing the ascendancy of the other. In our view this cannot be done under any form of constitution in which a mere numerical majority is decisive, since it is precisely the struggle for a numerical majority which bedevils Arab-Jewish relations. To ensure genuine self-government for both the Arab and the Jewish communities, this struggle must be made purposeless by the constitution itself.

MANDATE AND
UNITED
NATIONS
TRUSTESHIP.

RECOMMENDATION No. 4. WE HAVE REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT THE HOSTILITY BETWEEN JEWS AND ARABS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE DETERMINATION OF EACH TO ACHIEVE DOMINATION, IF NECESSARY BY VIOLENCE, MAKE IT ALMOST CERTAIN THAT, NOW AND FOR SOME TIME TO COME, ANY ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH EITHER AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE OR INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATES WOULD RESULT IN CIVIL STRIFE SUCH AS MIGHT THREATEN THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT, UNTIL THIS HOSTILITY DISAPPEARS, THE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE BE CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT UNDER MANDATE PENDING THE EXECUTION OF A TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS.

COMMENTS

We recognize that in view of the powerful forces both Arab and Jewish, operating from outside Palestine, the task of Great Britain, as Mandatory, has not been easy. The Peel Commission declared in 1937 that the Mandate was unworkable, and the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations thereupon pointed out that it became almost unworkable once it was publicly declared to be so by such a body. Two years later the British Government, having come to the conclusion that the alternative of Partition proposed by the Peel Commission was also unworkable, announced their intention of taking steps to terminate the Mandate by the establishment of an independent Palestine State. Our recommendations are based on what we believe at this stage to be as fair a measure of justice to all as we can find in view of what has gone before and of all that has been done. We recognize that they are not in accord with the claims of either party, and furthermore that they involve a departure from the recent policy of the Mandatory. We recognize that, if they are adopted, they will involve a long period of trusteeship, which will mean a very heavy burden for any single Government to undertake, a burden which would be lightened if the difficulties were appreciated and the Trustee had the support of other members of the United Nations.

EQUALITY OF STANDARDS

RECOMMENDATION No. 5. LOOKING TOWARDS A FORM OF ULTIMATE SELF-GOVERNMENT, CONSISTENT WITH THE THREE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN RECOMMENDATION No. 3, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE MANDATORY OR TRUSTEE SHOULD PROCLAIM THE PRINCIPLE THAT ARAB ECONOMIC, EDUCATIONAL AND POLITICAL ADVANCEMENT IN PALESTINE IS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE WITH THAT OF THE JEWS; AND SHOULD AT ONCE PREPARE MEASURES DESIGNED TO BRIDGE THE GAP WHICH NOW EXISTS AND RAISE THE ARAB STANDARD OF LIVING TO THAT OF THE JEWS; AND SO BRING THE TWO PEOPLES TO A FULL APPRECIATION OF THEIR COMMON INTEREST AND COMMON DESTINY IN THE LAND WHERE BOTH BELONG.

COMMENT

Our examination of conditions in Palestine led us to the conclusion that one of the chief causes of friction is the great disparity between the Jewish and Arab standards of living. Even under conditions of war, which brought considerable financial benefits to the Arabs, this disparity has not been appreciably reduced. Only by a deliberate and carefully planned policy on the part of the Mandatory can the Arab standard of living be raised to that of the Jews. In stressing the need for such a policy we would particularly call attention to the discrepancies between the social services, including hospitals, available in Palestine for Jews and Arabs.

We fully recognize that the Jewish social services are financed to a very great extent by the Jewish community in Palestine, with the assistance of outside Jewish organizations; and we would stress that nothing should be done which would bring these social services down to the level of those provided for the Arabs, or halt the constant improvements now being made in them.

We suggest that consideration be given to the advisability of encouraging the formation by the Arabs of an Arab community on the lines of the Jewish community which now largely controls and finances Jewish social services. The Arabs will have to rely, to far greater extent than the Jews, on financial aid from the Government. But the Jews of Palestine should accept the necessity that taxation, raised from both Jews and Arabs, will have to be spent very largely on the Arabs in order to bridge the gap which now exists between the standard of living of the two peoples.

FUTURE IMMIGRATION POLICY

RECOMMENDATION NO. 6. WE RECOMMEND THAT PENDING THE EARLY REFERENCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EXECUTION OF A TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT, THE MANDATORY SHOULD ADMINISTER PALESTINE ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE WHICH DECLARES WITH REGARD TO IMMIGRATION THAT "THE ADMINISTRATION OF PALESTINE, WHILE ENSURING THAT THE RIGHTS AND POSITION OF OTHER SECTIONS OF THE POPULATION ARE NOT PREJUDICED, SHALL FACILITATE JEWISH IMMIGRATION UNDER SUITABLE CONDITIONS."

COMMENT

We have recommended the admission of 100,000 immigrants, victims of Nazi persecution, as soon

as possible. We now deal with the position after the admission of that number. We cannot look far into the future. We cannot construct a yardstick for annual immigration. Until a Trusteeship Agreement is executed it is our clear opinion that Palestine should be administered in accordance with the terms of the Mandate quoted above.

Further than that we cannot go in the form of a recommendation. In this disordered world speculation as to the economic position of any country a few years ahead would be a hazardous proceeding. It is particularly difficult to predict what, after a few years have passed, will be the economic and political condition of Palestine. We hope that the present friction and turbulence will soon die away and be replaced by an era of peace, absent so long from the Holy Land; that the Jew and Arab will soon realize that collaboration is to their mutual advantage, but no one can say how long this will take.

The possibility of the country sustaining a largely increased population at a decent standard of living depends on its economic future, which in turn depends largely on whether or not plans referred to in Recommendation No. 8 can be brought to fruition.

The Peel Commission stated that political as well as economic considerations have to be taken into account in regard to immigration, and recommended a "political high level" of 12,000 a year. We cannot recommend the fixing of a minimum or of a maximum for annual immigration in the future. There are too many uncertain factors.

We desire, however, to state certain considerations which we agree should be taken into account in determining what number of immigrants there should be in any period. It is the right of every independent nation to determine in the interests of its people the number of immigrants to be admitted to its lands. Similarly it must, we think, be conceded that it should be the right of the Government of Palestine to decide, having regard to the well-being of all the people of Palestine, the number of immigrants to be admitted within any given period.

In Palestine there is the Jewish National Home, created in consequence of the Balfour

Declaration. Some may think that that Declaration was wrong and should not have been made; some that it was a conception on a grand scale and that effect can be given to one of the most daring and significant colonization plans in history. Controversy as to which view is right is fruitless. The National Home is there. Its roots are deep in the soil of Palestine. It cannot be argued out of existence; neither can the achievements of the Jewish pioneers.

The Government of Palestine in having regard to the well being of all the people of Palestine cannot ignore the interests of so large a section of the population. It cannot ignore the achievements of the last quarter of a century. No Government of Palestine doing its duty to the people of that land can fail to do its best not only to maintain the National Home, but also to foster its proper development and such development must in our view involve immigration.

The well-being of all the people of Palestine, be they Jews, Arabs or neither, must be the governing consideration. To reject the view that there shall be no further Jewish immigration into Palestine without Arab acquiescence, a view which would result in the Arab dominating the Jew. We also reject the insistent Jewish demand that forced Jewish immigration must proceed apace in order to produce as quickly as possible a Jewish majority and a Jewish State. The well-being of the Jews must not be subordinated to that of the Arabs; nor that of the Arabs to the Jews. The well-being of both, the economic situation of Palestine as a whole, the degree of execution of plans for further development, all have to be carefully considered in deciding the number of immigrants for any particular period.

Palestine is a land sacred to three faiths and must not become the land of any one of them to the exclusion of the others, and Jewish immigration for the development of the National Home must not become a policy of discrimination against other immigrants. Any person, therefore, who desires and is qualified under applicable laws to enter Palestine must not be refused admission or subjected to discrimination on the ground that he is not a Jew. All provisions respecting immigration must be drawn, executed and applied with that principle always firmly in mind.

Further, while we recognized that any Jew who enters Palestine in accordance with its laws is there of right, we expressly disapprove of the position taken in some Jewish quarters that Palestine has in some way been ceded or granted as their State to the Jews of the world, that every Jew everywhere is, merely because he is a Jew, a citizen of Palestine and therefore can enter Palestine as of right without regard to conditions imposed by the Government upon entry, and that therefore there can be no illegal immigration of Jews into Palestine. We declare and affirm that any immigrant Jew who enters Palestine contrary to its laws is an illegal immigrant.

LAND
POLICY

RECOMMENDATION No. 7. (A) WE RECOMMEND THAT THE LAND TRANSFERS REGULATIONS OF 1940 BE RESCINDED AND REPLACED BY REGULATIONS BASED ON A POLICY OF FREEDOM IN THE SALE, LEASE OR USE OF LAND, IRRESPECTIVE OF RACE, COMMUNITY OR CREED; AND PROVIDING ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR THE INTERESTS OF SMALL OWNERS AND TENANT CULTIVATORS. (B) WE FURTHER RECOMMEND THAT STEPS BE TAKEN TO RENDER NULL AND VOID PROVISIONS IN CONVEYANCES, LEASES AND AGREEMENTS RELATING TO LAND WHICH STIPULATE THAT ONLY MEMBERS OF ONE RACE, COMMUNITY OR CREED MAY BE EMPLOYED ON OR ABOUT OR IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. (C) WE RECOMMEND THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD EXERCISE SUCH CLOSE SUPERVISION OVER THE HOLY PLACES AND LOCALITIES SUCH AS THE SEA OF GALILEE AND ITS VICINITY AS WILL PROTECT THEM FROM DESECRATION AND FROM USES WHICH OFFEND THE CONSCIENCE OF RELIGIOUS PEOPLE; AND THAT SUCH LAWS AS ARE REQUIRED FOR THIS PURPOSE BE ENACTED FORTHWITH.

COMMENT

The Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 sought to protect the Arab tenant and small owner by prohibiting the sale of land save to a Palestinian Arab in one zone, by restricting such sales in another, and allowing unrestricted sale of land only in the third zone. Their effect has been such as to amount to discrimination against the Jews; their tendency is to segregate and keep separate Arabs and Jews. In the zones where sales are prohibited or restricted, they have protected the Arab from the temptation to dispose of his land, on which his livelihood and that of his family so often depend, for a sum out of all proportion to its real value. Though made with

the object of maintaining the existing standard of living of Arab cultivators, and of preventing the creation of a considerable landless Arab population, they afford no protection to the Arab living in the free zone. He may sell his land for a fantastic price and add to the congestion in the other zones by moving there. An Arab living a short distance away, just across the zone boundary, cannot obtain anything approximating the same sum for land of equal quality.

We are opposed to any legislation or restrictions discriminating against Jew or Arab. We recognize the need for protecting the Arab small owner and tenant, for providing against a large landless Arab population, for maintaining, indeed for raising the Arab standard of living. This necessity was also recognized in the Peel Report (Chapter IX, paragraph 10) which endorsed the following principles of earlier reports, that (i) unless there is a marked change in the methods of cultivation the land in Palestine is unable to support a large increase in population, and (ii) there is already congestion on the land in the hill districts. These principles are as true, if not truer, today.

We do not believe that the necessary protection for the Arab can be provided only by confining the Jew to particular portions of Palestine. Such a policy, suggested by the Peel Commission, is consistent with their proposed solution, partition, but scarcely with that put forward by us.

The leases granted by the Jewish National Fund contain a provision that no labor other than Jewish shall be employed by the lessee on or about or in connection with the land subject to the lease, and a further provision that a sub-lease shall contain similar terms.

As we have said we are opposed to such discrimination. We appreciate that one of the reasons for such provisions was to secure employment for Jewish immigrants on the land. We do not think that that object justifies the retention of such stipulations which are harmful to cooperation and understanding between Arab and Jews.

Land acquired by the Jewish National Fund or for a Waqf by the Supreme Moslem Council becomes inalienable. The Peel Commission expressed the view in its Report (Chapter IX, paragraph 80) that caution on the part of the Government in disposing of State domain to these bodies was desirable. The situation required watching. It would not be to the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine if too large a proportion of the land should become inalienable whether held by one organization or another.

In the small, thickly populated country of Palestine, with its rapidly increasing population, it is in the interest of Jews and Arabs alike that all land should be developed and put to the fullest possible use. The settlement of title to land should proceed as quickly as possible and the development of State lands, not required for public purposes and capable of use, should be facilitated.

The Holy Land of Palestine contains within its borders and throughout its territories places sacred to the followers of three great religions. The "Lido" with its dancing and swing music on the shore of the Sea of Galilee offends the sensibilities of many Christian people. Reports came to our notice of other projects the completion of which would be equally objectionable. We therefore feel it right by our recommendation to emphasize the necessity for close supervision and to recommend the strengthening of the law should that be required.

ECONOMIC
DEVELOP-
MENT.

RECOMMENDATION No. 8. VARIOUS PLANS FOR LARGE-SCALE AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN PALESTINE HAVE BEEN PRESENTED FOR OUR CONSIDERATION; THESE PROJECTS, IF SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED INTO EFFECT, COULD NOT ONLY GREATLY ENLARGE THE CAPACITY OF THE COUNTRY TO SUPPORT AN INCREASING POPULATION, BUT ALSO RAISE THE LIVING STANDARDS OF JEW AND ARAB ALIKE.

WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO ASSESS THE SOUNDNESS OF THESE SPECIFIC PLANS; BUT WE CANNOT STATE TOO STRONGLY THAT, HOWEVER TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE THEY MAY BE, THEY WILL FAIL UNLESS THERE IS PEACE IN PALESTINE. MOREOVER THEIR FULL SUCCESS REQUIRES THE WILLING COOPERATION OF ADJACENT ARAB STATES, SINCE THEY ARE NOT MERELY PALESTINIAN PROJECTS. WE RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT THE

EXAMINATION, DISCUSSION AND EXECUTION OF THESE PLANS BE CONDUCTED, FROM THE START AND THROUGHOUT IN FULL CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION NOT ONLY WITH THE JEWISH AGENCY BUT ALSO WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES DIRECTLY AFFECTED.

COMMENT

The building of the Jewish economy has enjoyed the advantage of abundant capital, provided on such terms as to make economic return a secondary consideration. The Arabs have had no such advantage. In principle, we do not think it wise or appropriate that plans, such as the project for a Jordan Valley Authority, should, if judged technically sound, be undertaken by any private organization, even though that organization, as suggested by the Jewish Agency, should give an assurance of Arab benefits and Arab participation in the management.

Such proposals, by reason of their magnitude and far-reaching effects, should be conceived as public projects, suitable for Government enterprise and accepted only provided that they are calculated to benefit all parts of the population. But the undertaking of a worthwhile project should not be held up merely from financial considerations which could be overcome with the aid of semi-philanthropic resources. Some compromise should not be impossible which would combine Jewish finance with Government responsibility and control.

We welcome the knowledge that the Government of Palestine has itself prepared programs of post-war development; we could wish that means might be found for projects of larger range and on a more ambitious scale; but we recognize that until political peace is restored there is great difficulty in raising the necessary funds whether from revenue or borrowing.

Meanwhile it is suggested that the Government should acquire powers, at present lacking, to investigate fully the extent of the country's water resources, to control the use of underground water and to determine rights to surface water.

We doubt whether Palestine can expand its economy to the full, having regard to its limited natural resources, without a full and free

interchange of goods and services with neighboring countries. In some respects, indeed, as in certain projects involving water supply, their active collaboration is indispensable to full development on an economic basis.

The removal of Article 18 of the Mandate would clear the way to those comprehensive tariff and trade agreements, not conflicting with any international obligations, that might be accepted by the Mandatory or Trustee, which could ultimately lead to something like a customs union -- an objective already in mind as between the surrounding countries of the Arab League.

EDUCATION

RECOMMENDATION No. 9. WE RECOMMEND THAT, IN THE INTERESTS OF THE CONCILIATION OF THE TWO PEOPLES AND OF GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF THE ARAB STANDARD OF LIVING, THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF BOTH JEWS AND ARABS BE REFORMED INCLUDING THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME.

COMMENT.

In Chapter XVI of the Peel Report, the bad features of the educational system of Palestine and the great disparity between the money spent on Arab and Jewish education were pointed out. The Report also emphasized that both Jewish and Arab education in Palestine were nationalistic in character. Particular attention was called to nationalist propaganda in Arab schools.

Our investigations disclosed that today the Jewish schools also -- controlled and largely financed by the Jewish community -- are imbued with a fiery spirit of nationalism. They have become most effective agencies for inculcating a spirit of aggressive Hebrew nationalism. We would urge most strongly that adequate control must be exercised by the Government over the education of both Jews and Arabs, in order to do away with the present excited emphasis on racialism and the perversion of education for propaganda purposes. The Government should ensure, by a careful supervision of text books and curricula, and by inspection of schools that education contributes to the conciliation of the two peoples.

We believe further that a large share of responsibility for Arab education might well

be assumed by an Arab community, similar to the Jewish community already established in Palestine. But if the Arab and Jewish communities are to set themselves the goal of compulsory education, a much higher proportion of the annual Palestinian budget must be devoted to education than heretofore, most of which will be spent on Arab education. This will only be possible if the proportion of the budget now devoted to security can be substantially reduced.

We would also stress the urgent necessity of increasing the facilities for secondary, technical and university education available to Arabs. The disparity between the standard of living of the two peoples, to which we have already drawn attention, is very largely due to the fact that the Jewish professional and middle class so largely outnumbers that of the Arabs. This difference can only be removed by a very substantial increase in the facilities for higher education available to Arabs.

THE NEED
FOR PEACE
IN
PALESTINE

RECOMMENDATION No. 10. WE RECOMMEND THAT, IF THIS REPORT IS ADOPTED, IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR BEYOND ALL DOUBT TO BOTH JEWS AND ARABS THAT ANY ATTEMPT FROM EITHER SIDE, BY THREATS OF VIOLENCE, BY TERRORISM, OR BY THE ORGANIZATION OR USE OF ILLEGAL ARMIES TO PREVENT ITS EXECUTION, WILL BE RESOLUTELY SUPPRESSED.

FURTHERMORE, WE EXPRESS THE VIEW THAT THE JEWISH AGENCY SHOULD AT ONCE RESUME ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH THE MANDATORY IN THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM AND OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, AND IN THE MAINTENANCE OF THAT LAW AND ORDER THROUGHOUT PALESTINE WHICH IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE GOOD OF ALL, INCLUDING THE NEW IMMIGRANTS.

MEMORANDUM

To Chairmen of Local Emergency Committees *Date* May 3, 1946

From Harry L. Shapiro

Attached is the second section of the Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which will supplement the chapter on Recommendations already sent to you. I assume that you and your committee will want to make a careful study of its contents.

In addition to the two sections which have been forwarded to you, there are lengthy appendices to the Report. We are making an effort to print the entire Report speedily, and as soon as this is done, we shall send you the full text, which will include the appendices.

This morning the press carried a statement of Mr. Bartley C. Crum, American member of the Committee of Inquiry, commenting on Prime Minister Attlee's declaration that the 100,000 Jews, whose speedy transfer to Palestine was recommended by the Committee, cannot emigrate unless and until the "illegal armies" are disarmed. Mr. Crum's statement follows:

"I am deeply shocked at the statement of Prime Minister Attlee that the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine this year would be conditioned by the British Government on the disarming of 'illegal armies' and the surrender of their arms. The recommendation of the Anglo-American Committee, unanimously was that these tragic victims of the Nazis should be admitted into Palestine in 1946 without conditions. The point which the Prime Minister raises was made in our discussions at Lausanne and rejected upon two grounds: first, that it would be indecent and inhuman to try to trade their lives upon the condition that the Jews of Palestine surrender their arms; second, that the so-called illegal army, the Haganah, would scarcely fight against immigration of these 100,000 people. On the contrary, it is self-evident that the Haganah and, indeed, the entire Jewish population of Palestine, will welcome rather than fight the immigration of these 100,000 persons. We had confirming evidence from the Palestine Government itself, both from the Military and the Police which supported our conclusion, that the 100,000 Jews now in Displaced Persons' Camps could be received into Palestine with very little trouble even from the extreme Arab nationalists."

A similar expression came from Mr. Frank W. Buxton, another member of the Committee. Following is an excerpt from a New York Times news item of this morning which describes Mr. Buxton's reaction:

"Mr. Buxton said that he could not understand why British members of the committee had not yet challenged Mr. Attlee's statement, and that, if the Prime Minister did not know how impossible it would be to disarm the secret armies, he was 'an incredibly stupid man.' Mr. Buxton recalled quite clearly the discussion on this subject and said that Judge Hutcheson had quoted from the United States Constitution on the right of the people to bear arms and from Thomas Jefferson on revolutionary bands.

"It was very clearly understood and it was the unanimous intent of the joint committee, he added, that the entry of the 100,000 be made possible in 1948. He further expressed the view that if Mr. Attlee made his statement as an absolute condition, it would amount to a plain rejection of the committee's report.

"Mr. Buxton disclosed that the committee members, in both open and secret talks with military officers and the Jewish police, had been implored not to recommend a program of disarmament because 'it would be difficult, if not impossible.'

"Mr. Buxton said that neither Arabs nor Jews would give up their arms, that efforts had been made time and again to disarm them, but all military authorities agreed it was hopeless. In view of these facts, he expressed the view that Mr. Attlee knew that he had raised 'an impossible condition' and that, if study of the long-range recommendations and the immediate goals were combined, not a single Jew would get into Palestine.

"Mr. Buxton added that the committee had been assured on all sides in Palestine that no matter what it did, or if it did nothing at all, there would be criticism and trouble, but that the most disturbing thing of all was Mr. Attlee's statement."

Regards.

HLS:MH
Enc.

CHAPTER II

THE POSITION OF THE JEWS IN EUROPE

1. We are required in paragraph 2 of our terms of reference "to examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression, and to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe."
2. In order to fulfil our task within the allotted period of 120 days and on account of the urgency of the problem, we divided into Sub-committees, which between the 5th and 28th February, 1946, visited the American, British and French zones of Germany and Austria. Sub-committees also visited France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Greece and Switzerland. Circumstances did not permit us to go to Hungary, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria or the Russian zone of Austria, and we did not visit the Russian zone of Germany after we were informed by the Deputy Commander of the Soviet occupation forces that in that area there was no special Jewish problem.
3. There are about 98,000 Jews from other countries - displaced persons - now living in Germany, Austria and Italy, and a small additional number scattered throughout the countries of Europe. We found that the majority of these Jews in the American and British zones of Germany and Austria were living in assembly centers, once known as "camps" where accommodation and maintenance were provided by the military authorities. The Jewish occupants of these centers are not all "displaced persons," that is to say, persons outside their national boundaries by reason of the war. Since the end of the war there has been a very considerable movement of Jews into the American and British zones of Germany and Austria. It is estimated that, so far, some 30,000 have come from Poland. There has also been some migration, though on a smaller scale, from Roumania and Hungary; this shows signs of increasing. Since we left Europe there has been a slight restriction in the movement of migrants generally, but the possibility that there may be a considerable increase in the months to come must be borne in mind.

The officer commanding the American Forces suggested the following as the reasons for the movement into the American zone of Germany: the expectation of generous treatment, the probability of finding relations there, the special activity in America on behalf of Jewish relief, and the feeling that the American zone was on the shortest route to Palestine. Detailed information covering the position of Jews in European countries is given in Appendixes II and III.

4. The nature of the accommodation of displaced Jews differed widely in character. In some centers barracks were used; in others, huts, hotels, apartment houses and cottages. For example, in Hohna, commonly referred to as Belsen, in the British zone of Germany where 9,000 Jews were accommodated, the buildings were barracks formerly occupied by a unit of the German Army. At Bindernickel, in the American zone of Austria, flats built to house workers in the neighboring Goering factory had been taken over, and in the south of Italy entire seaside villages had been made available for that purpose.

5. In the American and British zones, where the bulk of these persons were found, they were accommodated in separate centers from other displaced persons, or segregated voluntarily within a center. The maximum of self-administration is encouraged and there is usually a center committee which is responsible for directing group activities and for dealing with complaints. In many centers the occupants have their own courts for dealing with offenses and their own police.

6. UNRRA has taken an increasing part in the relief and rehabilitation of these Jews. In the autumn of 1944, it began to operate in Italy, and in February, 1945, took over administrative responsibility for the larger centers in the south of Italy. In the summer and latter part of 1945, it was assisting the Army in the American zones of Germany and Austria. At the end of February last, UNRRA assumed responsibility for the internal administration of Hohna and it now administers other centers in the British and French zones of Germany and of Austria.

Most centers in the United States zones are now operated by UNRRA teams as agents for the Army, which provides the accommodation, food, clothing and medical supplies. Voluntary agencies specially concerned with Jewish persons have been invited by military authorities and UNRRA to give assistance and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad now have representatives in the centers. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee provides specialists to assist with health, welfare and other services such as the supply of Kosher food, clothes, and material for spiritual and educational life. The Jewish Agency furnishes rehabilitation and resettlement services, particularly in regard to problems concerning projected emigration to Palestine.

7. We saw many conditions in the centers that might be criticized, owing to circumstances which were not always within the power of the military authorities to improve. There were lack of furniture, unsatisfactory cooking

arrangements, overcrowding and a shortage of beds and bedding. We have no doubt that many of these conditions have been remedied and we saw evidence of the wholehearted effort of our authorities to do everything possible towards the well-being of these unfortunate people. Nevertheless, at the best, most of the centers could not be more than the place in which the occupants were given shelter, food and clothing. While everything possible was being done for their physical needs, there was little that could be done to improve their morale and relieve their mental anguish. Coming from the horrors of Nazi persecution, it was evident that they still felt themselves outcasts and unwanted.

It is perhaps unfortunate in some respects that nearly all of these settlements were in enemy territory. The displaced Jews see around them Germans living a family life in their own homes and outwardly little affected by the war, while they, usually the last surviving members of their families, are living still, as it seemed to them, under restrictions.

8. On the whole, having regard to the many problems with which they have had to contend, we feel that military authorities, UNRRA, and the various relief organizations concerned have every reason to be proud of what they have done to succor these remnants of Nazi persecution. In particular, we would like to pay our tribute to the men and women who are working so often in such depressing circumstances to alleviate the sufferings of these unfortunate people.

9. In the cold print of a report it is not possible accurately to portray our feelings with regard to the suffering deliberately inflicted by the Germans on those Jews who fell into their hands. The visit of our Sub-committee to the Ghetto in Warsaw has left on their minds an impression which will forever remain. Areas of that city on which formerly stood large buildings are now a mass of brick rubble, covering the bodies of numberless unknown Jews. Adjoining the Ghetto there still stands an old barracks used as a place for killing Jews. Viewing this in the cold grey light of a February day one could imagine the depths of human suffering there endured. In the courtyards of the barracks were pits containing human ash and human bones. The effect of that place on Jews who came searching, so often in vain, for any trace of their dear ones, can be left to the imagination.

When we remember that at Maidanek and Oswiecim and many other centers a deliberate policy of extermination, coupled with indescribable suffering, was inflicted upon the Jews, of whom it is estimated that certainly not less than five millions perished, we can well understand and sympathize with the intense desire of the surviving Jews to depart from localities so full of such poignant memories. It must also be understood that this happened in what were regarded as civilized communities.

10. There can scarcely be a Jew in Europe who has not suffered in greater or less degree either himself or herself or by the loss of relatives. Many non-Jews of all nationalities also suffered in the concentration camps and many of them died. This must not be forgotten. We are concerned in this report with the living survivors of European Jewry. We could harrow the feelings of those who read this report by repetition of accounts we received of German frightfulness. We do not propose to do so. We wish to present a picture of the general situation as we saw it. Few of the older people survived; not many children, for special efforts seem to have been made to destroy them. The majority of the children who survived are orphans. The majority of the remaining survivors are young and middle-aged people. The latter escaped death only by their strong physique enabling them to sustain either the ordeals of forced labor in concentration camps, or the privations accompanying hiding. The young people have had little or no education save that of cruelty. It is not too much to say that they all owe their lives to liberation by the United Nations.

11. These Jewish survivors have not emerged from their ordeals unscathed either physically or mentally. It is rare indeed to find a complete Jewish family. Those who return to their old homes find them destroyed or occupied by others, their businesses gone or else in other hands. They search for relatives, frequently undertaking long journeys on hearing a rumor that one has been seen in another part of the country or in another center. Such was the system of the Germans that it is difficult for them ever to establish the death of their dear ones. They are faced also with very great difficulties in securing the restitution of their property. In Germany and in Poland, which was often described to us as "the cemetery of European Jewry," a Jew may see in the face of any man he looks upon the murderer of his family. It is understandable that few find themselves able to face such conditions.

12. In Poland, Hungary and Roumania, the chief desire is to get out, to get away somewhere where there is a chance of building up a new life, of finding some happiness, of living in peace and in security. In Germany also, where the number of Jews has been reduced from about 500,000 in 1933 to about 20,000 now, and most traces of Jewish life have been destroyed, there is a similar desire on the part of a large proportion of the survivors to make a home elsewhere, preferably in Palestine. In Czechoslovakia, particularly in Bohemia and Moravia, and in Austria, the position in regard to the re-establishment of the Jewish populations is more helpful. The vast majority of the Jewish displaced persons and migrants, however, believe that the only place which offers a prospect is Palestine.

13. Whatever the previous position in life of those in the centers, from a Judge in Memel to a young man who by reason of years of persecution has never been able to earn his livelihood, there is the widespread feeling that they have been brought to the same level of mere existence and homelessness. The first sense of happiness, following release from concentration camps and slave labor, has passed. Now they are conscious only of the constraint of their camp life, even though it is under new and more favorable conditions.

14. Work to them is associated with concentration camps and slave labor. Their aim then had been to do as little as they could to assist their persecutors, and now they are unwilling to engage in any activity which is not designed to fit them for a new life in Palestine. Even though they have spent a considerable time in a center, they still regard themselves as merely in transit to that country and, generally speaking, show little willingness even to assist in improving the conditions in which they are living. Often their days are spent in aimless wandering around. On the other hand, wherever facilities are provided for practical training for life in Palestine they eagerly take advantage of them.

15. We were deeply impressed by the tragedy of the situation of these Jewish survivors in the centers and by the tragedy of their purposeless existence. Many months have passed since they were freed from Nazi oppression and brutality, but they themselves feel that they are as far as ever from restoration to normal life. We consider that these men, women and children have a moral claim on the civilized world. Their pitiable condition has evoked a world-wide sympathy, but sympathy has so far taken the form only of providing them with the bare essentials of food, clothing and shelter. It seems to them that the only real chance of rebuilding their shattered lives and of becoming normal men and women again is that offered by the Jewish people in Palestine. Even though many might be glad to join relatives and friends in other countries, the doors of those countries at present appear to be closed to them. They are resentful because they are prevented from going to Palestine. In the meantime, as time passes, the new ties between those who are sharing this common frustration become stronger and, obsessed by their apparent rejection by other peoples of the world, their firm desire is to remain together in the future. It is this sense of cohesion, born of common suffering, which doubtless accounts for, if it does not wholly excuse, the firm resistance offered to proposals by competent bodies to remove young children to happier surroundings in other countries for careful rehabilitation. Men and women are marrying in the centers in increasing number, and, together with other members of the center communities, they wait with growing impatience for the time when they can go to the only friendly place they know.

16. If, as we hope, our recommendation for the authorization of immigration certificates is accepted, the great majority of the Jewish displaced persons whose situation requires urgent action will be provided for and it will be possible to achieve the desirable end of closing the Jewish displaced persons centers and thereby discourage the further migration of Jews in Europe. Jews have wandered through Europe almost as they wish, from center to center, zone to zone, and country to country. Such movements have added to the difficulty of tracing relatives, as has the practice, acquired by some during the War, of using various names. They have also imposed a heavy burden on the authorities who have constantly had to improvise reception arrangements. Stabilization will give sympathetic governments a better opportunity of implementing national schemes of resettlement and will encourage the Jews themselves to give more careful consideration to such opportunities. Moreover, the resources of the Allied Military Authorities are limited and it is necessary that their commitments in connection with refugees be reduced.

17. We have also been asked to examine "the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression." The Governments of the countries we visited expressed their opposition to anti-Semitism, but this is a poison which after years of infection takes time to eradicate. We hope that their efforts will be successful. We would urge also that the United Nations should exert all possible pressure in Germany and Austria to eliminate all trace of discrimination against Jews or resistance to their rehabilitation.

18. Further, a most important practical step that can be taken to assist the Jews in Europe who wish to remain is to secure the speedy restitution of their property. We realize that there are difficulties, but nonetheless we do not think that all that is possible is being done. Some governments have passed the necessary legislation; others are about to do so or have just done so. Many months have passed since the war has ended and from our inquiries it appears that only a few Jews have yet recovered what is properly theirs.

Further, we think that the governments of the countries where the Jews were persecuted should themselves provide assistance in the re-establishment of those Jews who seek to remain. This assistance might take the form of providing property in lieu of restitution.

19. Taking into account the possibility that an improvement in the economic and political conditions in Europe may affect the attitudes of those who now see no hope of re-establishing themselves in their countries, we estimate

that as many as 500,000 may wish or be impelled to emigrate from Europe.

As described by many witnesses, a factor which has greatly increased the urgent, indeed frantic, desire of the Jews of Europe to emigrate is the feeling that all doors have been shut to them and that there is no exit.

We feel that our recommendations both in regard to the authorization of certificates for admission to Palestine, and in regard to the relaxation of immigration laws generally as an emergency and humanitarian measure, will not only bring succor to those to whom certificates are granted but also in great measure relieve the feelings of urgency with which the Jews look beyond Europe. They will be encouraged either to resettle themselves in Europe, if that is possible, or wait patiently in their respective countries until their time has come to leave.



C H A P T E R I I I

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN PALESTINE*

1. The Peel Commission declared in one of the final chapters of its Report: "Neither Arab nor Jew has any sense of service to a single State ... The conflict is primarily political, though the fear of economic subjection to the Jews is also in Arab minds ... The conflict, indeed, is as much about the future as about the present. Every intelligent Arab and Jew is forced to ask the question, 'Who in the end will govern Palestine?' ... for internal and external reasons it seems probable that the situation, bad as it now is, will grow worse. The conflict will go on, the gulf between Arabs and Jews will widen." The Report concluded with a reference to "strife and bloodshed in a thrice hallowed land."

2. It is nine years since the Peel Commission made its report. The recommendations were unfulfilled, but the analysis of political conditions remains valid and impressive. The gulf between the Arabs of Palestine and the Arab world on the one side, and the Jews of Palestine and elsewhere on the other has widened still further. Neither side seems at all disposed at the present to make any sincere effort to reconcile either their superficial or their fundamental differences. The Arabs view the Mandatory Government with misgivings and anger. It is not only condemned verbally, but attacked with bombs and firearms by organized bands of Jewish terrorists. The Palestine Administration appears to be powerless to keep the situation under control except by the display and use of very large forces. Even if the total manpower in police and defense services were only half what it is reputed to be, the political implications would still be deeply disturbing. It reflects the honest fear of experienced officials that tomorrow may produce circumstances in which military operations will be necessary.

3. Official data imply the gravity of the menacing problem. They show that, apart from those convicted of terrorist activity, the number of Jews held on suspicion averaged 450 during most of the year 1945 and was 554 at the end of the year. The aggregate of persons in the whole-time police and prisons service of Palestine in 1945 was about 15,000.

* During our visit to Palestine and in the preparation of this Report, we were greatly assisted by the two volumes of the Survey of Palestine which the Government compiled at short notice for our use, and which contain a great deal of new statistical and other information.

4. The financial tables provide additional evidence of the extent to which the energies and money of the Government are devoted to the protection of life and property. About L.P. 4,600,000* (\$18,400,000) was spent on "law and order" during the financial year 1944/45 as against L.P. 550,000 (\$2,200,000) in health and L.P. 700,000 (\$2,800,000) on education. Thus even from a budgetary point of view Palestine has developed into a semi-military or police state. But, pending a substantial change in the relations between the Government and the Jews and the Arabs, the prospect of the kind of budget which characterizes a settled, civilized, non-garrisoned and prosperous community is dark.

5. Arab political leadership is still in the hands of the small number of families which were prominent in Ottoman times, of which the most notable are the Husseinis. This family controls the most important of the Arab political parties, the Palestine Arab Party, which was formally organized in 1935. The objectives of this and of all Arab parties in Palestine are the immediate stoppage of Jewish immigration, the immediate prohibition of the sale of land to Jews, and the concession of independence to a State in which the Arab majority would be dominant.

6. There has been no evidence that the Arab notables who appeared before the Committee, and whom the Committee visited in several countries, did not reflect accurately the views of their followers. The Arabic press, for example, protests as vehemently as Arab spokesmen against a Jewish influx of any kind, even if the certificates for admission were confined to old men and women and to children rescued from German death camps. In short, absolute, unqualified refusal of the Arabs to acquiesce in the admission of a single Jew to Palestine is the outstanding feature of Arab politics today; and the newly-formed parties of the Left, based on the embryonic trade union movement, display as intransigent a nationalism as the old leaders.

7. An additional reason for the insistence of the Palestinian Arabs on immediate independence is their desire for full membership in the newly-formed Arab League. The Arabs of Palestine believe themselves to be as fitted for self-government as are their neighbors in Syria and Lebanon who obtained their independence during the Second World War, and in Trans-Jordan which has since become an independent State. The formation of the Arab League has given Arab leaders in Palestine a greater confidence. They feel that the support of the whole Arab world for their cause has now been mobilized. Furthermore, the

* A Palestine pound is equivalent to a pound sterling.

presence in the United Nations of five Arab States, one of which is a member of the Security Council, insures that the Arab case will not go by default when the issue of Palestine is brought before the United Nations.

8. Just as the Arab political parties are unalterably opposed to Jewish immigration, the various Jewish parties, even though some criticize the idea of a Jewish State, are all united in their advocacy of unlimited immigration, of the abolition of restrictions on the sale of land and of the abrogation of the 1939 White Paper.

9. These parties accept the authority of the Jewish Agency which is recognized by Great Britain, according to the terms of the Mandate, as the instrument of Jews throughout the world. Article 4 authorizes the Agency as follows:

"An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

"The Zionist Organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home."

10. At first the Agency gave the Palestine Government effective cooperation. With its large revenue, its able administrators, advisers and staff, and its manifold activities, the Agency became finally and still remains the most potent nongovernmental authority in Palestine and indeed in the Middle East. The Peel Commission described it as "a Government existing side by side with the Mandatory Government." The description is even more accurate today. The Agency is now generally believed to have unofficial, but nonetheless powerful, influence over Haganah - the so-called Jewish Army - the strength of which is estimated as over 60,000. The Jews credit the Agency with most of the improvements in Palestine since the First World War. Unquestionably it has been a tremendous power

* The Jewish Agency for Palestine was recognized in 1930 in lieu of the Zionist Organization as the appropriate Jewish agency under the terms of the Mandate.

for good and has been indispensable to their protection and progress.

11. But the Agency has become so powerful and its prestige has been so far enhanced by its accomplishments, that its firm refusal to cooperate in carrying out the White Paper has caused the Government now to regard it as a distinctly dangerous influence. Viewed from the standpoint of the Palestine Government, it appears as a force for disunity, partly for reasons outside the Agency's control, partly by reason of its own activities. It has been a party to activities calculated to lead to estrangement between the Yishuv on the one hand and the Palestine Government and the Mandatory on the other, and to the consolidation of active resistance by the Yishuv to the Government's authority. These activities have undermined the authority of the Administration.

12. Many criticisms of the Jewish Agency have been made before the Committee in open and closed sessions, by Arabs and officials of the Palestine Government as well as by Agudath Israel and some individual Jews. The Agency's customary functions, which are centered on the establishment, maintenance and growth of a National Home for the Jews, were not condemned. That is easily explainable, for it has been one of the most successful colonizing instruments in history. But the present relations between the Government and the Jewish Agency must be corrected if the general welfare is to be promoted and the cause of peace in that crucial area of the world is to be protected. Unless this is achieved, Palestine might well be plunged into a civil war, involving the whole Middle East.

13. Neither Jews nor Arabs have been included in the highest ranks of the Administration. British officials hold all the important positions. They exercise as much authority as in a country where the mass of the inhabitants are in a primitive stage of civilization. District and local officials, Arab and Jew alike, bear only limited discretion and responsibility, even in their own communities. The Palestine Administration is blamed by Arabs and Jews alike for this situation.

14. In consequence of these conditions, the Holy Land is scarred by shocking incongruities. Army tents, tanks, a grim fort and barracks overlook the waters of the Sea of Galilee. Blockhouses, road barriers manned by soldiers, barbed wire entanglements, tanks in the streets, peremptory searches, seizures and arrests on suspicion, bombings by gangsters and shots in the night are now characteristic. A curfew is enforced, and the press of Palestine is subject to censorship. Palestine has become a garrisoned but restive land, and there is little probability that the

tranquility dear to people of good will, Jews, Moslems, and Christians alike, will be restored until vastly better relations are established among the principal elements of the community, including the Administration. With that assured, the various groups could be united on the basis of those fundamentals which are common to civilized people who wish to live their own lives, undeterred and unterrified by the possibility that first one faction and then another will rise in open or covert rebellion against one another, or against the Government itself.



CHAPTER IV

GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS

Geography

1. Palestine, about the size of Wales or the State of Vermont, is geographically an integral part of Syria, having no natural frontier on the north. A marked natural division within the country separates the rich soil of the coastal strip and the plain of Esdraelon from the rocky mountain areas, parched for a large part of the year, and from the southern deserts. In the wide coastal plain there are thriving towns - Acre, Haifa, Tel-Aviv, Jaffa and Gaza - with ports and a variety of industries. Here, moreover, is to be found intensive cultivation, by Arab and Jew alike, with attention concentrated on the old and profitable pursuit of citrus growing. The mountains contain not only desolate areas of barren rock and deforested hillside, but also fertile valleys and basins where cereals are grown; in addition remarkable results have been achieved in the cultivation of olives, vines and fruit trees on tiny terraced strips constructed and maintained with great patience and skill. In summer the hills are dry. In winter heavy rains tear away soil from every hillside that is not adequately protected by terracing or forest cover, and constant warfare has to be carried on against erosion.

2. Nearly all the Jews of Palestine and almost half the Arabs live in the plains, though these contain less than one-seventh of the total area of Palestine, while the mountains and the southern deserts are populated, apart from scattered Jewish colonies, exclusively by Arabs. Both Arab and Jew put forward historical and cultural claims to the whole of Palestine, and even the great desert to the south, almost rainless and with more rock than soil, are not uncontested. With a small, semi-nomadic or nomadic Arab population, their emptiness appears to the Jews as a challenge to their powers of colonization; and, despite the unpromising outlook on any economic test, the Arabs regard proposals for Jewish settlement as yet further evidence of the well-planned "creeping conquest". Geography, indeed, partly explains the intransigent claims of both sides to the whole country. The plains are too small and the mountains too poor to subsist as independent economies.

3. The significance of Palestine in international affairs, apart from its possible strategic importance, derives largely from the fact that it lies across natural lines of communication. Major railway and road communications pass through the country. It is on the route between two great centers of

Arab culture, Cairo and Damascus; between Egypt, the administrative centre of the Arab League, and other member States; and between Iraq and the newly independent State of Trans-Jordan and their outlets to the Mediterranean; and it has great potential importance in the air traffic of the future. Palestine is also deeply involved in the business and politics of the international trade in oil; for, although there are no wells in the country, a pipe-line delivers a stream of crude oil to the great refineries at Haifa; and from there tankers deliver it to countries around and beyond the Mediterranean. The American concession in Saudi Arabia may produce another stream converging on much the same point of distribution.

Population

4. According to official estimates, the population of Palestine grew from 750,000 at the census of 1922 to 1,765,000 at the end of 1944. In this period the Jewish part of the population rose from 84,000 to 554,000, and from 13 to 31 per cent of the whole. Three-fourths of this expansion of the Jewish community was accounted for by immigration. Meanwhile the Arabs, though their proportion of the total population was falling, had increased by an even greater number - the Moslems alone from 589,000 to 1,061,000.* Of this Moslem growth by 473,000, only 19,000 was accounted for by immigration. The expansion of the Arab community by natural increase has been in fact one of the most striking features of Palestine's social history under the Mandate.

5. The present density of population in Palestine is officially estimated at 179 per square mile. If the largely desert sub-district of Beersheba is excluded from the calculation, the figure is 336.

6. The Committee obtained estimates of the probable future growth of Palestine's population from Professor Netostein, Director of the Office of Population Research at Princeton University, from Dr. D.V. Glass, Research Secretary of the Population Investigation Committee in London, and in Palestine from the Commissioner for Migration and Statistics and the Government Statistician. The estimates for the non-Jewish population made by the last-named, on various hypotheses but with the constant assumption that there would be no non-Jewish immigration or emigration, ranged from 1,652,000 to 1,767,000 at the end of 1959. Professor Netostein, also assuming the absence of non-Jewish migration, extended his calculations to 1970 and arrived at a figure of 1,876,000.

The Commissioner for Migration predicted an Arab population of

* It is difficult to estimate the Arab population precisely, as the official statistics are compiled on a religious basis and a small proportion of the Christian population is not Arab. At the end of 1944 the Christians numbered 136,000.

1,565,000 in 1960 and 1,820,000 in 1970. The highest estimates were those of Dr. Glass, who anticipated a settled Moslem population (i.e., excluding the Christian Arabs) of 1,636,000 in 1961 and 2,204,000 in 1971. For the probable Jewish population at the end of 1959, on the supposition that no immigration occurred in the interval, the Government Statistician put forward the figure of 664,000.

7. The Jewish community, in the absence of immigration, would form a steadily diminishing proportion of the total population. This is clear from the comparative rates of natural increase, shown in the table below:

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE PER 1,000

<u>Years</u>	<u>Moslems</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Christians</u>
1922/25	23.27	20.44	20.13
1925/30	25.19	22.70	20.60
1931/35	24.97	20.91	20.85
1935/40	27.68	17.75	20.77
1941/44	30.71	17.83	18.89

The high Arab rate of natural increase is accounted for by a fertility which is among the highest recorded in the world, and by the disappearance under the Mandate of such counter-balancing factors as conscription for the Ottoman army and a high incidence of malaria. The fact that the rate is still rising seems to be due principally to declining mortality, particularly infant mortality.

Economic Contrasts

8. On the economic side Palestine is a country of marked contrasts. While the Arabs have remained preponderantly rural, in the Jewish sector along with the "close settlement on the land" which had been laid down as a guiding principle of Jewish colonization, there has been, particularly in later years, a remarkable industrial development. Moreover, the new Jewish colonization has assumed more and more the character of a socialist experiment. For though at many points it retains, particularly in urban industry and trade, the form of private enterprise, it is everywhere guided and supported - in finance, technical advice and other matters - by the great complex of Jewish undertakings which co-operate in the building of the National Home.

9. The passage of years has only sharpened the contrast in structure between the two economies. On the Arab side, notwithstanding some development in co-operation and trade unionism, individualism is still characteristic. In agriculture small-scale peasant farming, still largely on the subsistence principle, remains predominant; and the many signs now visible of enterprise and expansion in Arab industry conform to the same pattern of strong individualism. In the Jewish economy, on the other hand, is to be found a nexus of centralized

control. Thus the Jewish Agency, besides being a landowner on a large scale, is a promoter and financier of agricultural settlement, and has large and varied participations in industrial and other enterprises. Histadruth, which is closely associated with the Agency, is by no means simply a federation of workers' unions. It is, in addition, a vast consumers' co-operative organization; it operates large contributory social services, including unemployment insurance, and it has latterly become a capitalist employer, being the sole or controlling owner of a wide and ever-increasing range of industrial, constructional, financial and service undertakings. There have occurred lately several instances of members of Histadruth, as a trade union, striking in a wage dispute against Histadruth as owner of the employing business.

10. Not to over-emphasize the cleavage, it should be noted that there are points of contact between the Arab and Jewish economies, as in the Palestine Potash Works. There is indeed some limited interdependence, where for example the Jewish housewife buys vegetables from an Arab grower. But there can be few instances of so small a country being so sharply divided in its economic, let alone social and political, basis. Only in citriculture, which before the war provided the staple export of Palestine, do we find close association between the two sectors. It is shared about equally between the two communities, and many Jewish citrus groves employ some irregular Arab labour. Individualism is the characteristic form of enterprise in both sectors of the industry, though war-time difficulties have called for special measures of Government assistance, which in turn have tended to bring the two together in co-operative protective measures.

11. Everywhere is to be seen a marked disparity between the standards of living, however measured, of the Arab and Jewish communities. Jewish wage rates are consistently higher than Arab, those for unskilled labour being more than twice as high. There is only a limited range of competition between them; and therefore a minimum of natural pressure towards equalization. Habits of consumption, the degree of reliance on the market, whether for supplies or income, housing standards and so forth, differ widely, and in general the social services available to the Arab are extremely limited. The war has done little, if anything, to weaken the division.

War-time Economic Developments

12. In recent years, the war and changes due to the war have been the main influences governing the standard of living and economic prosperity of both sectors. Though the margin between Jewish and Arab wage rates underwent in general little change, the incidence of taxation and rationing, together with subsidies in aid of the cost of living, tended to depress the higher Jewish standard of living more than the Arab.

Another result of the war was that the Jewish sector of the economy became increasingly urban and industrial, while the Arab sector, notwithstanding the fuller utilization of its limited industrial capacity, remained overwhelmingly agricultural. In both sectors, the Government took an increasingly active part in determining the shape and direction of economic effort.

13. The closing of the Mediterranean to Allied shipping cut Palestine off from the chief market for her citrus fruits and the chief source of her imported supplies. The spread of the war zone to the Middle East converted Palestine into a base as well as an arsenal. Large numbers of troops had to be quartered there. Supplies of food and other necessities of life and of war materials had to be provided locally or imported where possible from neighboring Middle East countries, themselves subjected by the same combination of causes to severe economic pressure. Existing industries were, as far and as fast as possible, redirected into war production. Established undertakings were enlarged and new ones were set up, with Government support, in order to contribute to the needs of the military campaign and build up a higher degree of self-sufficiency. In this development the variety of manufactures was broadened to include a number of more complicated mechanical and chemical processes.

14. Thus Palestine became an important source of supply of manufactured goods not only for military purposes throughout the area but for civilian needs in surrounding countries. The skill and inventiveness of the Jewish immigrants of prewar years proved an invaluable asset, and the directed effort was supported by the Jewish Agency and the other established organs of Jewish settlement. Notwithstanding the necessity of maximum food supply, the Jewish economy became still more concentrated upon industrial activity, and "close settlement upon the land" was forced further into the background as the ruling principle of expansion.

15. The war had yet another distorting effect, which sprang from financial transactions. Vast military expenditure in Palestine for both goods and civilian services, along with shortage of shipping and potential inward cargoes, brought about a stringency in supplies and in labor. This resulted in rising prices, rising wage rates and still more rapidly rising earnings, large profits and a rapid growth of money-wealth (including bank deposits and hoarded currency), shared by both the Jews and Arabs. Taxation was increased; but taxation and voluntary saving went only a small part of the way in draining off the flow of unexpended incomes. Rationing, so far as it was applied, failed to check with sufficient promptitude the effects of competitive buying. Subsidies in aid of the cost of living were only successful in keeping a few bare essentials within the

range of the poorest peoples' resources. By allocating raw materials and by close costing of industrial processes, the Government kept a brake on the rise in prices of a wide range of military stores and essential civilian goods. But in general the inflationary trend was restrained only to an extent that made Palestine's experience less alarming than that of surrounding countries.

16. As to external finances, whereas Palestine had been hitherto nominally a debtor country - "nominally" in the sense that her debtorship on capital account did not entail the normal current remittances on account of interest and amortization - the war changed her status to that of a creditor. The bulk of her overseas assets, however, being confined within the sterling area, cannot be converted into goods until Great Britain is once more able to resume a full flow of exports or to release sterling for transmutation at will into "hard currencies".

Post-war Prospects

17. At the time of the Committee's investigations in Palestine, it could by no means be said that even the more transitory results of war pressures upon the economy had passed away. The pattern of the post-war economy is still undetermined - and this without allowing for the omnipresent uncertainty concerning the political future of the country. Even before the war ended, war orders had fallen off somewhat; but the continued shortage of imported supplies has afforded a natural protection to industry in shifting the flow of its products into the civilian market. The Arab boycott of Palestine Jewish products had had, when the Committee was in the country, little effect thus far on the general economic situation. No obvious unemployment had appeared, but some concealed unemployment was said to exist, and earnings of factory labor had probably diminished. The cost of living and wage rates remain obstinately high.

18. House-building is slowly getting under way after the long interval - resulting in shocking congestion - which began with the disturbances of 1936-39 and continued throughout the war, when all constructional activity was concentrated upon military works. There is, however, some natural hesitation in undertaking a large building programme while costs remain so high. Quite apart from the value of land, which has risen inordinately in recent years, building materials are extremely expensive, while timber, nearly all of which has to be imported, is scarce. As a result of the shortage of skilled artisans, some building operatives are earning up to L.P.3 a day, and, within recent times, have secured additional benefits such as three weeks' paid holiday and a pension scheme. Building costs, therefore, are found to be roughly L.P.20 a cubic metre - far higher than in Great Britain.

19. The situation is, indeed, replete with elements of uncertainty. There is for one thing the question, debatable on pre-war experience, how far the consolidation and further growth of Jewish industry and trade are dependent upon maintenance of the momentum provided by continuing immigration. It is a matter of conjecture whether the market as a whole is likely to shrink if more peaceful conditions in the Middle East, or a change in political status, result in a large withdrawal of British forces, including police and civilian residents, and a consequent reduction of incomes provided from abroad, though more peaceful conditions would on the other hand induce a fuller flow of tourists. Arising again from war-time growth of industry is the question whether the high costs of production, and inferior quality of some products, in Jewish industry will permit the establishment of a firm position in the home market without inordinate protection. There is the related question how far external markets can be retained - even allowing for special advantages in the new diamond-cutting industry and the fashion and women's specialty trades which together are thought to have outstanding prospects for yielding revenue from abroad - in the face of competition from advanced industrial countries and possible continuation of the boycott of Jewish products in neighbouring Arab States. Again, even though internal conditions might become fully adjusted to the inflated structure of prices and costs, the gross over-valuation of the Palestinian pound in relation to the pound sterling presents a further impediment to successful competition in export markets and an added inducement to competitive imports.

20. It is sometimes claimed that the wage structure in Palestine is far more elastic than elsewhere, so that reductions in wage-costs and prices might proceed smoothly and concurrently once the process had begun; but the war-time wage increases have been by no means wholly in the form of cost-of-living bonuses - basic rises have been widespread and substantial. The Committee could not but observe that at the time of its visit the cost-of-living index number still stood above 250 as compared with a pre-war figure of 100; that limited supplies of sometimes inferior butter were selling at the equivalent of 11/- a pound, and that, in one of the factories visited, workers already receiving L.P.12 a week were putting in 60 instead of the standard 48 hours in order to make ends meet. It remains to be seen whether the claim of elasticity will be falsified by widespread resistance to downward adjustment of wage rates. Some take the view that increased immigration and a free flow of imported supplies will "automatically" precipitate such a fall in wages and prices as will substantially reduce costs of production and bring the cost of living down to something like the British level. Others complain that the Government does nothing to reduce the cost of living, without being quite sure what the Government ought to do about it. Meanwhile

political and other causes hinder the transformation of liquid savings into long-term investment, and the pressure of large unused or unusable money resources, poured out in the process of financing the war, is substantially unrelieved.

Economic Expansion and Immigration

21. Leaving aside these uncertainties of the moment, there can be little doubt that, given some central direction, more co-operative effort, and a peaceful political atmosphere, Palestine could be made to provide further opportunities for prosperous settlement, concurrently with an improvement in the living standards of its present population. Some progress towards central direction was made under stress of war, and arrangements are in hand to provide for its continuance. The War Supply Board, under which the capacity of local industry was enlarged and directed to war production, is shortly to be transformed into a full-fledged Department of Commerce and Industry. The War Economic Advisory Council, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the Arab members, is to carry on its consultative work in the shaping and application of official policy. The Government of Palestine itself has brought to an advanced stage a programme of post-war development covering land reclamation, afforestation and other soil conservation measures and irrigation.

22. In addition, the expansion of Palestine's economy has engaged a great deal of attention on the part of non-official bodies. Some witnesses have been severely critical of the Administration for lack of vision and unreadiness to give positive support to proposals for expansion. Others have expressed the view that monetary independence would clear the way to more vigorous public and private enterprise. Opinion has been almost unanimous as to the cramping effects of Article 18 of the Mandate, which restricts the exercise of tariff-making and bargaining powers in the interests of the mandated territory. Conflicting views are held on the question whether the citrus industry will be able to regain, or even possibly to expand, its pre-war markets. Some see Palestine's future in the establishment of the coastal fringe as the industrial workshop of the Middle East; some stress the need of an expansion nicely balanced between agriculture and industry.

23. Any forecast of Palestine's long-term prospects must necessarily be viewed against the background of the country's natural resources. These are extremely limited, making Palestine peculiarly dependent on foreign trade for raw materials and supplies of many finished goods. Even the exploitation of the natural asset comprised in good soil irradiated by long hours of bright sunshine is limited by the availability of

water. Despite an abundant winter rainfall in many parts, Palestine is an arid country. In the words of the Palestine Government, "there are few countries nowadays which can say that their water resources are of such little concern to their people that legislation to control their use is unnecessary"; yet the Government of this arid country has no statutory authority to control the exploitation of its water resources, and no authority even to ascertain the extent of such water resources as exist.

24. The Commission on Palestine Surveys, an American Zionist-financed organization, submitted proposals, conceived on bold and imaginative lines, and worked out in considerable detail by American engineers of the highest standing, for a "Jordan Valley Authority". The general design is to bring water from the sources of the Jordan to the fertile Esdraelon and coastal plain, to irrigate the lower Jordan Valley, and to utilize the waters both of the Jordan River and of the Mediterranean Sea for the generation of electric power. It is claimed for the scheme that, whether carried to full completion or adopted in part - it is subdivided into stages each standing on its own merits - it would bring a bountiful supply of water at an economic cost to large areas of fertile land now yielding only one crop a year. Very large sums of money would be required, but these, the Committee were informed, would be available from external sources.

25. Such bold long-term planning presupposes willing co-operation, or at least interested neutrality, between all sections of the population and the Government. Moreover, it can have little or no bearing on the capacity of Palestine to provide an immediate haven of refuge for homeless Jews from Europe.

26. We have in this immediate context another example of the manner in which Jewish zeal and energy are ready to outrun economic caution of the ordinary Western pattern. Full recognition of the weak points in the Jewish economy and its immediate prospects does not in the least deter the insistence upon providing a home for the homeless. If this should entail an all-round cut in standards of living of the present Jewish population, so be it. There is much to admire in this demonstration of brotherhood carried, if need be, to the point of sacrifice. But it is conceivable that the passionate expansion of an economic structure, upon a dubious basis of natural resources, might lead to over-development on such a scale as to render it too heavy to the point of collapse. The argument thus returns to the need for systematic improvement of the country's basic resources, for which, as already indicated, orderly progress in an atmosphere of peaceful collaboration is a sine qua non.

CHAPTER V

THE JEWISH ATTITUDE

1. The Committee heard the Jewish case, presented at full length and with voluminous written evidence, in three series of public hearings - in Washington by the American Zionists, in London by the British Zionists, and finally and most massively by the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. The basic policy advocated was always the same, the so-called Biltmore Program of 1942, with the additional demand that 100,000 certificates for immigration into Palestine should be issued immediately to relieve the distress in Europe. This policy can be summed up in three points: (1) that the Mandatory should hand over control of immigration to the Jewish Agency; (2) that it should abolish restrictions on the sale of land; and (3) that it should proclaim as its ultimate aim the establishment of a Jewish State as soon as a Jewish majority has been achieved. It should be noted that the demand for a Jewish State goes beyond the obligations of either the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate, and was expressly disowned by the Chairman of the Jewish Agency as late as 1932.
2. In all the hearings, although evidence was given by those sections of the Zionist movement which are critical of the Biltmore Program, most of the witnesses took the official Zionist line. The Committee also heard the Jewish opponents of Zionism: first, the small groups in America and Britain who advocate assimilation as an alternative to Jewish nationalism; second, Agudath Israel, an organization of orthodox Jews which supports unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine while objecting to the secular tendencies of Zionism; and third, representatives of important sections of Middle Eastern Jewry, many of whom fear that their friendly relations with the Arabs are being endangered by political Zionism.
3. As the result of the public hearings and of many private conversations, we came to the conclusion that the Biltmore Program has the support of the overwhelming majority of Zionists. Though many Jews have doubts about the wisdom of formulating these ultimate demands, the program has undoubtedly won the support of the Zionist movement as a whole, chiefly because it expresses the policy of Palestinian Jewry which now plays a leading role in the Jewish Agency. Whether this almost universal support for the demand for a Jewish State is based on full knowledge of the implications of the policy and of the risks involved in carrying it out is, of course,

quite another matter.

4. The position in Palestine itself is somewhat different. Here, where the issue is not the achievement of a remote idea, but is regarded as a matter of life and death for the Jewish nation, the position is naturally more complex. Palestinian Jewry is riddled with party differences. The number of political newspapers and periodicals bears witness to the variety and vitality of this political life, and, apart from pressure exerted on Jews considered to be disloyal to the National Home, we found little evidence to support the rumors that it was dangerous to advocate minority views. Of the major political parties, Mapai (the Labor Party) is far the biggest and largely determines the official line. Opposed to the Agency's policy are two main groups. On the one side stand two small but important parties: the Conservative Aliyah Hadashah (New Settlers), drawn chiefly from colonists of German and western European extraction, and Hashomer Hatzair, a socialist party which, while demanding the right of unrestricted immigration and land settlement, challenges the concept of the Jewish State and particularly emphasizes the need for cooperation with the Arabs. Hashomer Hatzair, though it did not appear before us, published shortly before we left Jerusalem a striking pamphlet in support of bi-nationalism. Very close to Hashomer Hatzair, but without its socialist ideology, stands Dr. Magnes and his small Ihud group, whose importance is far greater than its numbers. Taken altogether, these Palestinian critics of the Biltmore Program certainly do not exceed at the moment one quarter of the Jewish population in Palestine. But they represent a constructive minority.

5. On the other side stands the Revisionist Party, numbering some one percent of the Jewish community, and beyond it the various more extreme groups, which call for active resistance to the White Paper and participate in and openly support the present terrorist campaign. This wing of Palestinian Jewry derives its inspiration and its methods from the revolutionary traditions of Poland and eastern Europe. Many of these extremists are boys and girls under twenty, of good education, filled with a political fanaticism as self-sacrificing as it is pernicious.

6. The Biltmore Program can only be fully understood if it is studied against this background of Palestinian life. Like all political platforms, it is a result of conflicting political pressures, an attempt by the leadership to maintain unity without sacrificing principles. The Jew who lives and works in the National Home is deeply aware both of his achievements and of how much

more could have been achieved with whole-hearted support by the Mandatory Power. His political outlook is thus a mixture of self-confident pride and bitter frustration: pride that he has turned the desert and the swamp into a land flowing with milk and honey; frustration because he is denied opportunity of settlement in nine-tenths of that Eretz Israel which he considers his own by right; pride that he has disproved the theory that the Jews cannot build a healthy community based on the tilling of the soil; frustration that the Jew is barred entry to the National Home, where that community is now in being; pride that he is taking part in a bold collective experiment; frustration because he feels himself hampered by British officials whom he often regards as less able than himself; pride because in Palestine he feels himself at last a free member of a free community; frustration because he lives, not under a freely elected government, but under an autocratic if humane regime.

7. The main complaint of the Jews of Palestine is that, since the White Paper of 1939, the Mandatory Power has slowed up the development of the National Home in order to placate Arab opposition. The sudden rise of immigration after the Nazi seizure of power had as its direct result the three and a half years of Arab revolt, during which the Jew had to train himself for self-defence, and to accustom himself to the life of a pioneer in an armed stockade. The high barbed wire and the watch-towers, manned by the settlement police day and night, strike the eye of the visitor as he approaches every collective colony. They are an outward symbol of the new attitude to life and politics which developed among the Palestinian Jews between 1936 and 1938. As a Jewish settler said to a member of the Committee: "We are the vanguard of a great army, defending the advanced positions until the reinforcements arrive from Europe".

8. The Jews in Palestine are convinced that Arab violence paid. Throughout the Arab rising, the Jews in the National Home, despite every provocation, obeyed the orders of their leaders and exercised a remarkable self-discipline. They shot, but only in self-defence; they rarely took reprisals on the Arab population. They state bitterly that the reward for this restraint was the Conference and the White Paper of 1939. The Mandatory Power, they argue, yielded to force, cut down immigration, and thus caused the death of thousands of Jews in Hitler's gas chambers. The Arabs, who had recourse to violence, received substantial concessions, while the Jews, who had put their faith in the Mandatory, were compelled to accept what they regard as a violation of the spirit and the letter of the Mandate.

9. An immediate result of the success of the Arab terrorism was the beginning of Jewish terrorism and, over more sig-

nificant, a closing of the ranks, a tightening of the discipline, and a general militarization of Jewish life in Palestine. The Agency became the political headquarters of a citizen army which felt that at any moment it might have to fight for its very existence. Deprived, as he believed, both of his natural and of his legal rights, the Palestinian Jew began to lose faith in the Mandatory Power. The dangerous belief was spread that not patience but violence was needed to achieve justice. The position of the moderates who urged self-restraint and a reliance on Britain's pledged word was progressively undermined; the position of the extremists, eager to borrow a leaf from the Arab copy book, was progressively strengthened.

10. Then came the war. Apart from a small group of terrorists the Jewish community gave more solid support than the Palestinian Arabs to the British war effort. But when the immediate Middle Eastern danger was removed, the old struggle between the moderates and the extremists began again, heightened to an almost unendurable tension by the news from Europe and by such tragedies as the Struma incident. During the war, tens of thousands of Jews learned to fight, either in the British Army or in the Palestine Home Guard. They were with Britain in the fight against Fascism; they were against Britain in the struggle against the White Paper, which they now felt was not only unjust but totally inhuman as preventing the escape to Palestine of men, women and children in imminent danger of death in Nazi Germany and Nazi-controlled Europe. When the war ended and the Labor Government came to power, the White Paper still remained in force. The Jews, who had expected an immediate fulfillment by a Labor Government of the Labor Party program with regard to Zionism, felt a sense of outrage when no change of policy occurred. The bitterness reached a new peak of intensity, and the position of the moderates became almost impossible. The Jewish Agency frankly stated in public hearing that, after V-E day, it was quite futile for it to attempt to cooperate with the Mandatory in suppressing illegal activity.

11. Any decision on the future of Palestine will be futile and unrealistic unless it is made in full cognizance of the political tension among the Jews in Palestine and the reasons for it. Both in evidence given in public hearings, and in numerous private conversations with leading politicians and with ordinary citizens, we were repeatedly advised that the maintenance by the Mandatory of its present policy could only lead to a state of war, in which the extremists would have the passive support of almost the whole Jewish population and the moderates would be swept from the key positions which they still hold. To use the words of one Jewish leader: "Our present crisis in Europe and Palestine is felt by all of us to be our Dunkirk".

CHAPTER VI

THE ARAB ATTITUDE

1. The Committee heard a brief presentation of the Arab case in Washington, statements made in London by delegates from the Arab States to the United Nations, a fuller statement from the Secretary-General and other representatives of the Arab League in Cairo, and evidence given on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab Office in Jerusalem. In addition, subcommittees visited Baghdad, Riyadh, Damascus, Beirut and Amman, where they were informed of the views of Governments and of unofficial spokesmen.

2. Stripped to the bare essentials, the Arab case is based upon the fact that Palestine is a country which the Arabs have occupied for more than a thousand years, and a denial of the Jewish historical claims to Palestine. In issuing the Balfour Declaration, the Arabs maintain, the British Government were giving away something that did not belong to Britain, and they have consistently argued that the Mandate conflicted with the Covenant of the League of Nations from which it derived its authority. The Arabs deny that the part played by the British in freeing them from the Turks gave Great Britain a right to dispose of their country.* Indeed, they assert that Turkish was preferable to British rule, if the latter involves their eventual subjection to the Jews. They consider the Mandate a violation of their right of self-determination since it is forcing upon them an immigration which they do not desire and will not tolerate - an invasion of Palestine by the Jews.

*We have not felt it necessary to enter into the historical arguments based upon undertakings given by the British Government to the Sharif Hussein of Mecca and others during the last war and interpreted by the Arabs as promising among other things that Palestine would become an independent Arab country. These undertakings, the most important of which preceded the Balfour Declaration, form an essential part of the Arab case and were examined by an Anglo-Arab Committee in London in February, 1939. The report of this Committee, containing statements of both the Arab and the British point of view, is to be found in British Command Paper No. 5974. The documents under examination were printed at the same time in Command Papers Nos. 5957 and 5964 (all of 1939).

3. The Arabs of Palestine point out that all the surrounding Arab States have now been granted independence. They argue that they are just as advanced as are the citizens of the nearby States, and they demand independence for Palestine now. The promises which have been made to them in the name of Great Britain, and the assurances concerning Palestine given to Arab leaders by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, have been understood by the Arabs of Palestine as a recognition of the principle that they should enjoy the same rights as those enjoyed by the neighboring countries. Christian Arabs unite with Moslems in all these contentions. They demand that their independence should be recognized at once, and they would like Palestine, as a self-governing country, to join the Arab League.

4. The Arabs attach the highest importance to the fulfillment of the promises made by the British Government in the White Paper of 1939. King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, when he spoke with three members of the Committee at Riyadh, made frequent reference both to these promises and to the assurances given him by the late President Roosevelt at their meeting in February, 1945. His Majesty made clear the strain which would be placed upon Arab friendship with Great Britain and the United States by any policy which Arabs regarded as a betrayal of these pledges. The same warning was repeated by an Arab witness in Jerusalem, who said that "Zionism for the Arabs has become a test of Western intentions."

5. The suggestion that self-government should be withheld from Palestine until the Jews have acquired a majority seems outrageous to the Arabs. They wish to be masters in their own house. The Arabs were opposed to the idea of a Jewish National Home even before the Biltmore Program and the demand for a Jewish State. Needless to say, however, their opposition has become more intense and more bitter since that program was adopted.

6. The Arabs maintain that they have never been anti-Semitic; indeed, they are Semites themselves. Arab spokesmen profess the greatest sympathy for the persecuted Jews of Europe, but they point out that they have not been responsible for this persecution and that it is not just that they should be compelled to atone for the sins of Western peoples by accepting into their country hundreds of thousands of victims of European anti-Semitism. Some Arabs even declare that they might be willing to do their share in providing for refugees on a quota basis if the United States, the British Commonwealth and other Western countries would do the same.

7. The Peel Commission took the view that the enterprise of the Jews in agriculture and industry had brought large, if indirect, benefits to the Arabs in raising their standard of living. Though a very large part of the Jewish purchases of land has been made from absentee landlords, many of them living outside Palestine, it is probable that many Arab farmers who have sold part of their land to the Jews have been able to make use of the money to improve the cultivation of their remaining holdings. The improvement of health conditions in many parts of the country, while due in part to the activities of Government and in part to the efforts of the Arabs themselves, has undoubtedly been assisted by the work of the Jewish settlers. It is also argued that the Jewish population has conferred substantial indirect benefits on the Arabs through its contribution to the public revenue. On the other hand, the Arabs contend that such improvement as there may have been in their standard of living is attributable solely to their own efforts, perhaps with a measure of aid at some points from the Administration. They assert that at least equal improvements have occurred in other Arab countries, and that the action taken by the Government to assist Jewish industry and agriculture has reacted unfavorably on the Arabs. Import duties for the protection of Jewish industries, for example, are said to have confronted Arab consumers with the necessity of buying high priced local products in place of cheaper imported goods. In any event the Arabs declare that, if they must choose between freedom and material improvement, they prefer freedom.

8. In exasperation at the disregard of their objection to Jewish immigration, the Arabs of Palestine have repeatedly risen in revolt. A substantial number of them still declare their allegiance to the exiled Mufti of Jerusalem and are satisfied with his policies. In the second World War, Palestinian Arabs were on the whole spiritually neutral. As Jamal Effendi el-Russeini stated in his evidence before the Committee: "The Grand Mufti in Germany was working for the interests not of the English who were warring with the Germans, but for the interests of his people who had no direct interest, at least, in the controversy." They felt that it was not their war and that the Mufti was right in taking such steps as he could to do the best for Palestine whoever might be victorious.

9. The White Paper of 1939, and the drastic limitation of Jewish immigration and of land sales to Jews which followed, met the Arab view only in part. The Arabs would have gone much further. The demands voiced by their leaders are for immediate independence, for the final cessation of Jewish immigration and for the prohibition of all land sales by Arabs to Jews.

10. So bare an outline gives only an inadequate picture of the passion with which Arabs in Palestine and in neighboring countries resent the invasion of Palestine by a people which, though originally Semitic, now represents an alien civilization. Even the Moslems of India have made representations to the Committee in opposition to Zionism.

One witnesses in Palestine not merely the impact of European culture upon the East, but also the impact of Western science and Western technology upon a semi-feudal civilization. It is not surprising that the Arabs have bitterly resented this invasion and have resisted it by force of arms. The Arab civilization of Palestine is based on the clan; leadership resides in a small group of influential families, and it is almost impossible for the son of an Arab fellah to rise to a position of wealth and political influence. Arab agriculture in Palestine is traditional, and improvement is hampered by an antiquated system of land tenure. The Arab adheres to a strict social code far removed from the customs of the modern world, and he is shocked by innovations of dress and manners which seem completely natural to the Jewish immigrant. Thus, the sight of a Jewish woman in shorts offends the Arab concept of propriety. The freedom of relations between the sexes, and the neglect of good form as he conceives it violate the entire code of life in which the Arab is brought up.

11. The Arabs of Palestine are overwhelmed by a vague sense of the power of Western capital represented by the Jewish population. The influx of Western capital and the purchase of modern equipment for agriculture and industry excite in the minds of the Arabs a sense of inferiority and the feeling that they are contending against an imponderable force which is difficult to resist. This feeling is accentuated by the fact that they realize that the Jewish case is well understood and well portrayed in Washington and London, and that they have no means comparable in effectiveness of stating their side of the controversy to the Western World. They have particularly resented the resolutions in favor of Zionist aspirations, adopted respectively by the United States Congress and by the British Labor Party. Although the Arab States have diplomatic representation and five of them are members of the United Nations, the Arabs of Palestine feel nevertheless that they have not succeeded in making their case heard. The Western countries have many Jewish but few Arab citizens, and Arabs are less familiar with modern methods of propaganda. They feel that their case is being judged and their fate is being decided by mysterious forces in the Western world, which they do not understand and which do not understand them.

13. The period since the first World War has been marked by a rising wave of nationalism in all Arab countries. Palestinian Arabs share this sentiment, and they are strongly supported in their demand for independence and self-government

by all the States of the Arab League. No other subject has occupied so much of the attention of the Arab League or has done so much to unite its membership as has the question of Palestine.

13. Those members of the Committee who traveled in the neighboring Arab countries found that hostility to Zionism was as strong and widespread there as in Palestine itself. They received from H.R.H. the Regent of Iraq a copy of a letter in which he had told President Roosevelt that "all the Arab countries.....will unite against any danger that the Arabs of Palestine may have to meet." Moreover the Governments and peoples of the neighboring States believe that a Zionist State in Palestine would be a direct threat to them and would impede their efforts towards a closer Arab union. The chief delegate of Syria at the General Assembly of the United Nations told the Committee in London that "Palestine in alien hands would be a wedge splitting the Arab world at a most vital and sensitive point." The same witness expressed the further fear of the Arabs that a Zionist State would inevitably become expansionist and aggressive, and would tend to enter into alliance with any Power which might, in the future, pursue an anti-Arab policy. "The Middle East," he wrote, "is a vital region in which all the Great Powers are interested. A Zionist State in Palestine could only exist with the support of foreign Powers. This would not only mean a state of tension between those foreign Powers and the Arab States, but also the grave possibility of dangerous alignments and manoeuvres which might end in international friction at the highest level and possibly disaster."

CHAPTER VII

CHRISTIAN INTERESTS IN PALESTINE

1. In addition to the witnesses concerned exclusively with political issues, the Committee also heard representatives of Christian churches. The Arab Christians, divided among many denominations, and numbering some 125,000, form the overwhelming majority of Christians actually living in Palestine. Their delegation, led by the Greek Catholic Archbishop of Galilee, declared their complete solidarity with the Moslem Arabs in the demand for an independent Arab State. The non-Palestinian Christian groups were unable to speak with a common voice. Indeed, Christians have so completely failed to achieve unity, or even harmony, in the practical tasks of administering the Christian Holy Places and caring for the pilgrims who visit them that the keys of the Holy Sepulcher are still entrusted to Moslems. The lamentable fact that there is no single spokesman in Palestine for Christendom tends to obscure the legitimate Christian interest in the Holy Land, which must be safeguarded in any solution of the national problem. This interest demands not only freedom of access to the Holy Places, but also that tranquillity should be achieved in a country all of which, from the Christian point of view, is a Holy Land.

2. The significance of Palestine since prehistoric times in the development of civilization cannot be overestimated. Nor should the interests of archaeology and history be forgotten. The maintenance of conditions under which such studies can be pursued is a genuine concern of civilization. Moreover, an increased pilgrim and tourist traffic would constitute an invisible export of substantial value to a country with so large an adverse balance of trade; and the contact in Palestine between these travelers from the Western world and the representatives of the Jewish and Moslem faiths would be of great importance to international understanding.

3. The extent to which the Holy Places, sacred to Christians, Moslems and Jews, are interspersed is often not fully appreciated. It is impossible to segregate the Holy Places sacred to the three great religions into separate geographical units. They are scattered over the whole of Palestine, and not, as is often imagined, confined to the Jerusalem and Nazareth areas.

4. The responsibility of the Christian world toward Palestine was well expressed by General Allenby in the Proclamation which he made on the occasion of the occupation of Jerusalem on the 11th December, 1917:

"Furthermore, since your City is regarded with affection by the adherents of three of the great religions of mankind, and its soil has been consecrated by the prayers and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people of these three religions for many centuries, therefore do I make known to you that every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer, of whatsoever form of the three religions, will be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose faiths they are sacred."

5. The religious importance of Palestine to Moslems, Jews and Christians alike makes it improper to treat it either as an Arab State or as exclusively designated to the fulfillment of Jewish national aspirations. A solution of the Palestine problem must not only heal political rivalries of Jew and Arab, but must also safeguard its unique religious values.



CHAPTER VIII

JEWS, ARABS AND GOVERNMENT

"The State within the State"

1. The Jews have developed, under the aegis of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Louni, a strong and tightly-woven community. There thus exists a virtual Jewish nonterritorial State with its own executive and legislative organs, parallel in many respects to the Mandatory Administration, and serving as the concrete symbol of the Jewish National Home. This Jewish shadow Government has ceased to cooperate with the Administration in the maintenance of law and order, and in the suppression of terrorism.

2. Quite apart from the increasing strength of the terrorist gangs, which enjoy widespread popular support, there are many signs that fanaticism and nationalist propaganda are beginning to affect detrimentally the Jewish educational system. It appears to us wholly harmful that the obligatory period of one year's "national service," instituted by the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Louni, is now partly used for military training. The "closing of the ranks," moreover, which we noted above, has increased the totalitarian tendencies to which a nationalist society is always liable. To speak of a Jewish terror would be a gross exaggeration. But there are disquieting indications that illegal organization and the atmosphere of conspiracy, which inevitably accompanies it, are having their corroding effects on that free democracy which has always been the pride of the Palestinian Jews. Every thoughtful Jew with whom we talked was profoundly disturbed by these symptoms. But none was bold enough to prophesy that they would disappear so long as the Palestine Administration carried out a policy which seems to every Jew to be in direct contravention of his natural rights.

Jewish Relations with Arabs

3. Not only is the Jewish community largely independent of and at odds with the Palestine Government, but it is also quite distinct from and in conflict with the Arab community with which, in many areas, it is territorially intertwined. In part this is a natural result of Zionist concentration upon the development of the Jewish community. If the Arabs have benefited, they have done so only in comparison with the non-Palestinian Arabs; whereas they have remained far beneath the Palestinian Jews in terms of national income, social services, education and general standard of living. This has made it easier for the Arab political leaders to

keep alive anti-Jewish feeling in the minds of the Arab masses. The economic gulf separating Jew and Arab in Palestine has been widened, in part at least, by Jewish policies concerning the nonemployment of Arab labor on land purchased by the Jewish National Fund and the refusal to devote Jewish funds and energies directly to the improvement of Arab standards of living. Efforts by the Jews in this direction might be quite as important for the growth and security of the National Home as the draining of swamp lands or the creation of Jewish industry.

4. But unfortunately there are signs of a hardening of the Jewish attitude towards the Arabs. Too often the Jew is content to refer to the indirect benefits accruing to the Arabs from his coming, and to leave the matter there. Passionately loving every foot of Eretz Israel, he finds it almost impossible to look at the issue from the Arab point of view, and to realize the depth of feeling aroused by his "invasion" of Palestine. He compares his own achievements with the slow improvements made by the Arab village, always to the disadvantage of the latter; and forgets the enormous financial, educational and technical advantages bestowed upon him by world Zionism. When challenged on his relations with the Arabs, he is too often content to point out the superficial friendliness of everyday life in town and village - a friendliness which indubitably exists. In so doing, he sometimes ignores the deep political antagonism which inspires the whole Arab community; or thinks that he has explained it away by stating that it is the "result of self-seeking propaganda by the rich offendi class."

5. It is not unfair to say that the Jewish community in Palestine has never, as a community, faced the problem of cooperation with the Arabs. It is, for instance, significant that, in the Jewish Agency's proposal for a Jewish State, the problem of handling a million and a quarter Arabs is dealt with in the vaguest of generalities.

6. We noted, however, a few hopeful signs. Reference was made above to the proposals for cooperation with the Arabs made by Hashomer Hatzair and by the Dmad group. The Committee observed with pleasure the Arab-Jewish cooperation achieved on the Municipal Commission which governs Haifa, and in the Citrus Control and Marketing Boards, as well as the joint trade union activity between Jew and Arab in the Palestine Potash Company and on the railways. But such examples of cooperation are rare in Palestine; and they are far outweighed in Arab eyes by the exclusiveness of the General Federation of Jewish Labor in its trade union policy and of the Jewish Agency in its labor policy on land purchased for Jewish settlement.

The Jews and the Administration

7. We were profoundly impressed by the very varied

experiments in land settlement which we inspected, ranging from individualist cooperatives to pure collectivist communities. Here, indeed, is a miracle both of physical achievement and of spiritual endeavor, which justifies the dreams of those Jews and Gentiles who first conceived the idea of the National Home. Of Jewish industry in Palestine it is too early yet to speak with confidence. There is boundless optimism and energy, great administrative capacity, but a shortage of skilled labor and, as a result, more quantity than quality of output.

8. As pioneers in Palestine the Jews have a record of which they can be proud. In Palestine there has been no expulsion of the indigenous population, and exploitation of cheap Arab labor has been vigorously opposed as inconsistent with Zionism. The failing of Palestinian Jewry is a different one. The Jews have always been in the biblical phrase a "peculiar people" which turned in on itself and suffered the consequences of its peculiarity. In Palestine, under the special conditions of the Mandate, they have regained their national self-confidence, but they have not been able to throw off their exclusiveness and tendency to self-isolation.

9. We believe that this failure is, in part at least, attributable to the relations between the Palestine Administration and the Jewish community since 1939, which have undoubtedly exaggerated the natural Jewish tendency to exclusiveness. Moreover, the Jews feel that they have enough to do defending their own position, without taking on the Arab problem as well.

10. A second factor of great importance is the failure to develop self-governing institutions. The Jews, like the Arabs, are completely deprived of all responsible participation in central government. Their democracy can only work within the Jewish community, and to a limited degree in local affairs. Thus, they have not had the opportunity which self-government brings, to learn the lesson of responsibility for the good of the whole State. They have been driven back on themselves. This may in part explain the fact that at least one-third of the Jews who have settled in Palestine during the last ten years have failed to apply for Palestinian citizenship. But nothing which we saw in Palestine gave us any reason to believe that, charged with the democratic responsibilities for which they are undoubtedly fit, the Jews of Palestine would not master the lessons of self-government.

Arab Leadership

11. The Arabs are divided politically by the personal bickerings of the leaders, which still center round the differences of the Husseinis and their rivals; and socially

by the gap which separates the small upper class from the mass of the peasants - a gap which the new intelligentsia is not yet strong enough to bridge. Consequently they have developed no such internal democracy as have the Jews. That their divisions have not been overcome and a formally organized community developed is in part the result of a less acutely self-conscious nationalism than is found today among the Jews. It is, however, also the outcome of a failure of political responsibility. The Arab leaders, rejecting what they regard as a subordinate status in the Palestinian State, and viewing themselves as the proper heirs of the Mandatory Administration, have refused to develop a self-governing Arab community parallel to that of the Jews. Nor, so far, have they been prepared to see their position called in question by such democratic forms as elections for the Arab Higher Committee, or the formation of popularly based political parties. This failure is recognized by the new intelligentsia which, however, is unlikely to exercise much power until it has the backing of a larger middle class.

Need for Arab Education

12. Many Arabs are graduates of the American University at Beirut; a few have studied in universities in Cairo, England, Europe and the United States; others have received higher education at the Arab College for men and the Women's Training College in Jerusalem, both of which are efficient but inadequately financed Government institutions. The Arabs are aware of Western civilization and increasingly eager to share its benefits. But the numbers receiving such education are still miserably small, since the only university in Palestine, the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, teaches only in Hebrew. So, too, with secondary education. There are only some fifteen Arab secondary schools in the whole of Palestine, and one fully developed agricultural school - the Kadoorie School at Tulkarm which specializes in the training of teachers of agriculture for Arab schools. With only 65 places, however, it too is totally inadequate. The problem of teaching modern methods of agriculture to a population 80 per cent of which gains its living by farming has not yet been solved by the Government, or faced by the Arab politicians. Facilities for technical education are no better - a single school with some 60 places.

13. On the primary level the position is slightly better. The schools are under the control of the Administration and financed by public funds. As far as it goes, the primary education is well planned and administered. It is not merely a bookish education, but includes also manual training and instruction in agriculture, where the equipment is available. Some of the school gardens which surround the schools in the Arab villages are models of neatness and skill. But the fact remains that something less than half the Arab children who would like to attend school can do so today.

Even in a wealthy town like Haifa, we were told by the Municipal Commission that half the Arab boys and the majority of the Arab girls receive no education at all. In most of the country districts the situation is still worse, particularly with regard to the girls. Only one Arab girl in eight receives any education.

14. This is all the more tragic since the desire for education is now strong throughout the poorer classes, not merely in the cities, but in almost every Arab village. Indeed, some villages visited by the Committee had either built their own schools completely from voluntary subscriptions by the villagers or had contributed largely to their cost on their own initiative.

15. The lamentable condition of Arab education is a real cause for discontent. This discontent is increased by the contrast with the opportunities offered to the Jewish child. Jewish education in Palestine is financed by the Jewish community and by the fees which Jewish parents can afford to pay. Practically every Jewish child has the opportunity for primary education, and those who can afford the fees have ample opportunity for technical, secondary and university education in Palestine. The Government contributes only a small per capita grant in aid and exercises little control of the curriculum.

16. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the time has come for the Arab community to assume the same responsibility with regard to education as the Jewish. With advice and financial aid from the Government, and with a new sense of responsibility on the part of the Arab leadership, compulsory education could, we were informed, be introduced within the next ten years. This is not only essential from an educational point of view; there can be no real unity between a literate and an illiterate population.

The Administration

17. Palestine is administered by officials of the British Colonial Service. Subject to the provisions of the Mandate, all major decisions of policy are taken in London as they would be for a Colonial territory. As Mr. Churchill has said: "the suggestion that the High Commissioner either has a policy of his own in contradistinction to that of His Majesty's Government, or that, if this were so, His Majesty's Government would permit him to carry it out, would be foreign to all the traditions of British Administration." Indeed, the Administration of Palestine has probably less freedom of action than the

Administrations of some less developed territories, simply because the affairs of Palestine arouse more public interest, are the subject of more questions in the House of Commons, and must therefore be supervised more closely by the responsible Minister.

18. While admitting this difficulty, we must express the view that this system militates most gravely against the chances of reconciliation between Jew and Arab. A delicate situation - and the situation in Palestine is always delicate - cannot be met successfully by remote control. Within a general directive, the man on the spot, like the general conducting the battle, must be given the responsibility. If this is not done, the chance of reconciling the interests of the National Home with those of the Arabs of Palestine is small indeed.

19. In Palestine itself, we also found a tendency to centralization which was criticized by the Peel Commission but which is in part at least another inevitable consequence of the dominant role of politics in the life of the country. Since every administrative question, however insignificant in itself, is liable to be transformed into a political issue by one community or the other, there is a natural tendency for every action to be carefully scrutinized at the center. The slowness of the Administration in dealing with matters not at first sight political, against which complaint is often made, is partly a result of this and partly of the fact that the Chief Secretary, through whose hands all important business must pass, is himself obliged to give much of his time to conducting relations of a quasi-diplomatic character with the leaders of the Arab and Jewish communities.

20. Palestine is a unique country, bearing no resemblance to most of the countries administered by the British Colonial Service. It may be questioned therefore whether an Administration of the Colonial type is the ideal instrument for governing two peoples each of which, in the absence of the other, would probably by now be enjoying complete independence. On the other hand, it seems difficult to foresee radical changes in the system so long as the division between Arabs and Jews compels British officials to assume so extensive a responsibility, and in view of the fact that their actions must be accounted for both to Parliament and to an international organization, each responsive to a keenly interested public opinion.

21. What is not open to question is the patience and loyalty to their task of the officials on whose shoulders rests the main burden of this heavy responsibility. We were impressed also by the generally high standard of the

district administration. It is difficult for those who have not visited Palestine to imagine the tension under which these officials -- Arab and Jewish, as well as British -- are compelled to live and work. We were especially impressed by the anxiety, loneliness and nervous strain to which many police officials are unavoidably exposed. It also seemed to us that the Civil Servants in Palestine were subjected to an additional anxiety which we could not regard as unavoidable or in the best interests of the country, as a result of the generally and sometimes pitifully inadequate salaries which they at present receive.



CHAPTER IX

PUBLIC SECURITY

1. Palestine is an armed camp. We saw signs of this almost as soon as we crossed the frontier, and we became more and more aware of the tense atmosphere each day. Many buildings have barbed wire and other defences. We ourselves were closely guarded by armed police, and often escorted by armored cars. It is obvious that very considerable military forces and large numbers of police are kept in Palestine. The police are armed; they are conspicuous everywhere; and throughout the country there are substantially built police barracks.

2. We do not think that the conditions in Palestine since the Mandate have been fully appreciated throughout the world, and accordingly we have thought it right to set out in Appendix V a list of the main incidents of disorder. It will be seen that up to the year 1939 the Jews exercised very great restraint. It is in recent years that the threat to law and order has come from them.

3. A revival of the illegal immigration traffic has occurred since the end of the war in Europe. During the summer of 1945 there was an influx on a substantial scale by land over the Northern Frontier. More recently there have been successive cases of entry by sea. The Jewish organizations are actively engaged in these operations, carried out latterly by the purchase or charter of ships for voyages from Southern Europe in the absence of effective control of embarkation. Armed clashes are liable to arise from the efforts to prevent interference; a number have arisen from the search for illegal immigrants and arms. Moreover, as recent incidents directly concerned with illegal immigration, may be cited the sabotage of patrol launches and attacks on coastguard stations.

The present scale and method of illegal immigration by sea can be seen from three recent cases. Two ships arrived towards the end of our stay in Palestine, and one a few weeks previously. All three were intercepted and, in accordance with the usual procedure, the illegal immigrants taken to a clearance camp where, subject to check, they were released, their numbers being deducted from the immigration quota. The first of these ships sailed from Northern Italy. It was her maiden voyage. She carried 911 immigrants, 554 men and 357 women. Practically all were young people. The second carried 247 immigrants, of whom 89 were women. With one exception, all were young people. The third,

which arrived on the day of our departure from Palestine, was reported in the press as coming from a French Mediterranean port and carrying 733 immigrants.

The second ship, according to press reports, was expected to land the immigrants at Tel-Aviv, and the plans for screening the immigrants were evident in the sporadic incidents which occurred in that area. Apart from firing on the police, there were incidents of mining and blocking of access by road and rail which could only be designed to isolate the approach to the beach.

4. A sinister aspect of recent years is the development of large illegal armed forces. The following is the structure as stated to us by the military authorities.

The general organization is the "Haganah". It is an illegal development of the former organization, in the days of Turkish rule, of armed watchmen who protected Jewish settlements. Today it is completely organized, under a central control and with subsidiary territorial commands, in three branches, each of which includes women, viz:-

A static force composed of settlers and townsfolk, with an estimated strength of 40,000;

A field army, based on the Jewish Settlement Police and trained in more mobile operations, with an estimated strength of 16,000;

A full time force (Palmach), permanently mobilized and provided with transport, with an estimated peace establishment of 2,000 and war establishment of 6,000.

It is known that the Haganah has been procuring arms over a period of years. Vast quantities have been obtained from the residue of the campaigns in the Middle East. Arms and ammunition are kept and concealed in specially constructed caches in settlements and towns. The following are particulars, furnished to us by the military authorities, of a search which was conducted at Biriya Settlement about the time of our arrival in Palestine.

During the night of 27th/28th February, 1946, shots were fired at a sentry of the Arab Legion at his post distant some mile or mile and a half from Biriya. Although wounded in the thigh, he returned the fire. Next morning blood stains and bandages were found and police dogs carried a line direct from there to Biriya.

Biriya is situated in a commanding position on the hills of Northern Galilee. It can only be described as a fort.

The population of Biriya were detained. They consisted of 26 men. Their identity cards showed that they came from other parts of Palestine. It was apparent that they were a platoon undergoing training.

A search in the neighborhood revealed two arms caches. They contained, among other equipment, one Sten gun, one Bren, four modern rifles, one wireless set, and grenades.

Numerous documents were also discovered in the caches. Their substance connected the caches with Biriya, and a police dog taking scent from the documents identified one of the men in the building at Biriya. The documents included standing orders for the camp, notes on the structure and duties of the Haganah, training manuals, notes on neighboring military and police camps.

5. Something in the nature of conscription is in force, as is shown by two press notices of the 6th November, 1945:-

Palestine Post.

"A year's national service in communal settlements will now be required from all Jewish senior school children aged 17-18; till now it was obligatory only to those who had already left school."

HaBoker (in this case a translation from Hebrew).

"The national institutions have decided to widen the scope of the year's service duty, which up to now has been imposed on graduates of the secondary schools, and to impose it on all girls and boys aged 17-18.

The Council of Youth Organizations decided, at its session on 31.10.45 immediately to begin fulfillment of the order given to the Youth. The Council assumed the responsibility of enlisting immediately all members of the Movements who were born in 1928. The enlistment of the pupils of the secondary and trade schools will be carried out at a time which is to be specially fixed. Before 11.11.45 every Movement must submit to the Jewish Agency's Recruiting Department in Tel-Aviv a roster of its members, male and female, who must enlist."

A useful adjunct for training purposes is provided from the Jewish Settlement Police, a supplementary police force originally formed in 1936 for the close protection of Jewish settlements. The minimum term of service is six months during which period they are paid by the Government. We were informed that it often happens that they leave the police force after a short period of service and thereafter serve in the Haganah.

6. Apart from the Hagannah, two further illegal armed organizations exist, both having cut away from the parent body. One is the "Irgun Zvai Lumi", which was formed in 1935 by dissident members of the Hagannah. The other is the "Stern Group" which broke away from the Irgun early in the war when the latter announced an "armistice". The Irgun operates under its own secret command mainly in sabotage and terrorism against the Mandatory; its strength is estimated at from 3,000 to 5,000. The Stern Group engages in terrorism; its strength is said to be between 200 and 300.

7. It seems clear that the activities of all these bodies could be greatly reduced if there was any cooperation with the authorities by the Jewish Agency and its officers, and by the rest of the population. Unfortunately the Jewish Agency ceased to cooperate with the Government, or at least reduced the measure of their cooperation as from the end of the war.

We set out in the form of an extract from the Palestine Post of the 30th December, 1945, the attitude of the Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency after the murders of the 27th December, 1945. In the course of his evidence before us Mr. Ben Gurion said that he took responsibility for giving this statement to the press:

"Following upon the outrages which occurred on Thursday night, His Excellency the High Commissioner summoned Mr. D. Ben Gurion and Mr. M. Shertok to see him at Government House on Friday morning. It was officially stated yesterday.

It is learned that during the interview, Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Shertok declared that the Jewish Agency completely dissociated themselves from the murderous attacks on Government and army establishments perpetrated on Thursday night. They expressed their profound sorrow at the loss of life caused by the attacks.

But, they stated, any efforts by the Jewish Agency to assist in preventing such acts would be rendered futile by the policy pursued in Palestine by His Majesty's Government on which the primary responsibility rests for the tragic situation created in the country, and which had led in recent weeks to bloodshed and innocent victims among Jews, Britons and others.

The Jewish Agency representatives added that it was difficult to appeal to the Yishuv to observe the law at a time when the Mandatory Government itself was consistently violating the fundamental law of the country embodied in the Palestine Mandate."

So long as this kind of view is put forward by the leaders of the Jewish Agency it is impossible to look for settled conditions.

All three organizations to which reference has been made are illegal.

We recognize that until comparatively recently, efforts were made by the Jewish Agency to curb attacks; we regret that these efforts appear to have ceased. We believe that those responsible for the working of the Jewish Agency - a body of great power and influence over the Jews in Palestine - could do a great deal towards putting an end to outrages such as we have described, which place the people of Palestine as well as British soldiers and police in constant danger.

Private armies ought not to exist; they constitute a danger to the peace of the world.

8. The position of Great Britain as Mandatory is not a happy one. The Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency said that, in the event of the withdrawal of the British troops, the Jews would take care of themselves. Jamal Effendi Hussaini, replying to a question, said that it was the wish of the Arabs of Palestine that British forces and police should be withdrawn forthwith. Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, also representing the Arab Higher Committee, expressed his agreement. Jamal Effendi Hussaini stated that he did not expect bloodshed but that, on the withdrawal of British forces, there would be a return to the condition which preceded the first World War (i.e. pre-Balfour Declaration). We are clear in our minds that if British forces were withdrawn there would be immediate and prolonged bloodshed the end of which it is impossible to predict.

CHAPTER X

GENERAL

1. In view of the dissolution of the League of Nations and of the statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons on the 13th November, 1945, we assume that the British Government will in the near future prepare a draft Trusteeship Agreement for eventual submission to the United Nations, and that this Agreement will include the terms under which Palestine will be administered. We do not propose to refer to the existing Mandate in detail; it is set out in Appendix VI.
2. Our views on future immigration policy are contained in Recommendation No. 6 and in the Comments thereunder, and we have nothing to add to them.
3. With regard to the future government of Palestine, we have reviewed the question of a solution by partition.

The Peel Commission stated (Chapter XX, paragraph 19): "Manifestly the problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or the Jews all they want. The answer to the question 'which of them is the one and will govern Palestine?' must surely be 'Neither.'" That is the view which we also have formed. They recommended the termination of the Mandate, the partition of the country between the Arabs and the Jews (excepting the Holy Places) and the setting up of two independent States in treaty relations with Great Britain. These recommendations were rejected by the Arabs and they did not meet with the complete approval of the Jews. They were adopted in the first instance by the Government of Great Britain, but subsequently a technical Commission was sent to Palestine to ascertain facts and to consider in detail the practical possibilities of a scheme of partition. As a result of the Partition Commission's Report, His Majesty's Government announced their conclusion that the examination by the Commission had shown that the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine were so great that the solution of the problem was impracticable. The proposal accordingly fell to the ground, and His Majesty's Government continued their responsibility for the government of the whole of Palestine.

We have considered the matter anew and we have heard the views of various witnesses of great experience. Partition has an appeal at first sight as giving a prospect of early independence and self-government to Jews and Arabs, but in our view no partition would have any chance unless it was basically acceptable to Jews and Arabs, and there is no sign of that today. We are accordingly unable to recommend partition as the solution.

4. Palestine is a country unlike any other. It is not merely a place in which Arabs and Jews live. Millions of people throughout the world take a fervent interest in Palestine and in its Holy Places and are deeply grieved by the thought that it has been the seat of trouble for so long and by the fear that it may well become the cockpit of another war. Lord Milner in 1923, having declared himself a strong supporter of pro-Arab policy, said:-

"Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the other Arab countries. You cannot ignore all history and tradition in the matter. You cannot ignore the fact that this is the cradle of two of the great religions of the world. It is a sacred land to the Arabs, but it is also a sacred land to the Jew and the Christian; and the future of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be determined by the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the country of the present day."

The Peel Commission having cited those words wrote (Chapter II, paragraph 51): "The case stated by Lord Milner against an Arab control of Palestine applies equally to a Jewish control." That expresses our view absolutely.

Efforts have been made from time to time to encourage both Arabs and Jews to take part in the Government of the country but these efforts have failed through mutual antagonism; perhaps they might have been pursued further. It is not the case of a backward people going through a period of tutelage; the issue lies between Jews and Arabs.

We believe this can only be met by acceptance of the principle that there shall be no domination of the one by the other, that Palestine shall be neither an Arab nor a Jewish State. The setting up of self-governing institutions is dependent on the will to work together on the part of Jews and Arabs. There has been little sign of that in recent years and yet we hope a change may take place if and when the fear of dominance is removed. We do not think that any good purpose would be served by our going into further detail; once the will to work together appears, representatives of both sides will be of help in framing a constitution; until that happens no step can be taken.

Meantime Palestine must remain under some form of Mandate or Trusteeship. We have suggested elsewhere in our Report that much can be done to encourage general advancement by the improvement of educational facilities and measures directed to narrowing the social and economic disparities. We feel, too, that it should be possible to draw the communities closer together, and foster a popular interest in self-government at the local level. Especially in the country districts, a spirit of good neighborliness exists among the common people, Arabs and Jews, despite the general state of political tension in the country. Practical cooperation is evident in day-to-day affairs. We suggest that local administrative areas might be formed, some purely Arab or Jewish in composition, but some of mixed population where a corporate sense of civic responsibility can be encouraged and a new beginning made in the development of self-government.

5. Land questions have been the cause of much friction and dispute between Jews and Arabs. We are opposed to legislation and practices which discriminate against either, and for the reasons already given we recommend the rescission and replacement of the Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 and the prohibition of restrictions limiting employment on certain lands to members of one race, community or creed.

We are aware of the criticisms of the existing Land Ordinances and we do not wish it to be thought that we consider that they afford adequate protection to the Arab small-owners and tenants. In our opinion it should be possible to devise Ordinances furnishing proper protection to such Arabs no matter in what part of Palestine they may reside.

6. We have already stated that the 100,000 certificates for Palestine, the immediate authorization of which we recommend, will provide for only a comparatively small proportion of the total number of Jewish refugees in Europe. The general problem of refugees must, we feel, be dealt with by the United Nations. In our considered opinion it is a matter for regret that this distressing problem has not been dealt with before this time. True the great Powers have had many problems facing them and they have dealt with many displaced persons, but the fact remains that Jews and others have remained in camps or centers for very many months.

We observe that at a recent meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations the problem of displaced persons and refugees of all categories was recognized to be one of immediate urgency, and it was referred to the Economic and Social Council which has since established a special Committee for its consideration. Without presuming to advise that Committee, and with no desire to go beyond our Terms of Reference, we cannot but observe that international bodies already established for dealing with refugee problems have been unable, through insufficiency of financial resources or other reasons, to fulfill the hopes placed in them at the time of their formation. The world looks forwards, we believe, to the birth of a truly effective agency of international collaboration in the humanitarian task of migration and resettlement.

We make grateful acknowledgment of our deep indebtedness to the civil and military officers of our two Governments. They have given us willing and able assistance throughout our long journeyings and made it possible for us to complete the report within the period allotted.

Our staff listed in the Appendix has worked admirably and efficiently under pressure and often in difficult circumstances.

Finally, we desire to tender our sincere thanks to our efficient Secretaries, H. G. Vincnet, L. L. Hood, H. Beeley, and E. M. Wilson.

Signed at Lausanne, Switzerland, on April 20, 1946.

Joseph C. Hutcheson,
American Chairman.

John E. Singleton,
British Chairman.

Frank Aydelotte (US)

Frank W. Buxton (US)

W. F. Crick (UK)

R. H. S. Crossman (UK)

Bartley C. Crum (US)

Frederick Loggett (UK)

R. E. Manningham-Buller (UK)

James G. McDonald (US)

Morrison (UK)

William Phillips (US)

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H. G. Vincent,
British Secretary.

Evan M. Wilson,
American Secretary.

H. Booley,
British Secretary.