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Ben-Horin, Eliahu, 1946-1947.

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CONFIDENTIAL

July 9, 1946

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
Mooselookmeguntic House
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Dear Dr. Silver:

Thank you very much for your letter, which I found upon my return from Washington. You received, no doubt, the wire I sent you from Washington concerning my talk with the British Ambassador. Here is a more detailed account.

As I mentioned in my telegram, our conversation was informal and friendly -- and I have no doubt that it will prove useful from a Zionist viewpoint. In addition to the Ambassador and myself, two more people attended the lunch: a British Commander (whose name I did not catch) who seems to be a member of the Embassy Staff, and a Mr. Grady, an American who is the head of the Communications Division of the United Fruit Company and who is an old acquaintance of Lord Inverchapel.

During lunch a general conversation went on touching on everything and on nothing in particular (including Palestine, the difference between the Hebrew and Yiddish languages, etc.). After lunch, however, when we retired to the drawing room, the Ambassador invited me to a corner where we sat by ourselves and had a long talk. I will recall here the main points worth noting:

1. - Commenting on my article in Harper's, Inverchapel said that there was nothing he was so much interested in as in the achievement of a British-Soviet understanding. To this I replied that whereas my article offers a plan for the solution of all the problems of the Middle East, I cannot see any middle way for a British-Soviet understanding. Either this plan is accepted, or it is rejected but no patching up of single problems would provide a stable and lasting solution. With this statement of mine, Inverchapel seemed to agree.

2. - He said about my article that I seem to be "too hard on the British." To which I replied that, on the contrary, I was far too lenient. I reminded him that it was Zionists who time and again advocated a permanent affiliation of a Jewish Palestine with a British Commonwealth of Nations, and that it was the British who rejected it and have chosen a pro-Arab orientation instead.

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3. - This brought us into another question. I told the Ambassador that as a Jew I know that we never had a better friend in the world than the British, to which he retorted: "I fully agree with you."

Then I said: "But you too never had better friends in the world than the Jews - in this country, in Europe and in the Middle East." I enlarged on this subject reminding him of the role played by American Jewry in the first World War and in this war, adding: "Pardon my frankness, but I think it is sheer idiocy on the part of the makers of Britain's foreign policy to betray the only reliable friends they have in the world for the sake of an alliance with the Arabs of doubtful value. If you brought about such a situation when Dr. Silver, the most outstanding leader of American Zionism and American Jewry stands up in Madison Square Garden and expresses doubt as to whether Britain could be trusted with an American loan - this is a distinct 'achievement' of Britain's policy with regard to Palestine. I may also add from my contacts with the rank and file of American Jewry that it is Dr. Silver who represents the feelings and temper of American Jewry with regard to Britain's policies." This statement of mine was received by Inverchapel with a sad nod of helpless consent.

4. - He then said that he believed that the recent actions of the British in Palestine, regrettable as they were, were done in good faith. I took issue with him on this point, telling him that I lived through three pogroms in Palestine and that if it were not for the Hagana, the Jewish Yishuv would be annihilated; that the Hagana was a legitimate organization whose existence was acknowledged by the British Government; that the Palmak was created in cooperation with the British High Command during the war for post invasion guerrilla warfare in Palestine; and that how could he possibly believe that it was done in good faith, as the entire action was built on the assumption that the Jews in Palestine should entrust their security to a Government which is unfriendly, mildly speaking, and which failed to protect them in the past, as it has been confirmed in official British documents (I referred him to the Peel Report). He listened to this very attentively, and remarked that all this was new to him and that it certainly puts a different complexion on things.

5. - When our conversation touched on the Mufti, Inverchapel said: "I know that you maintain that the British were responsible for his escape. I assure you that it was not so and that we had no part in it." To this I replied: "If I accept your assurance, would you admit that during the many months of the Mufti's stay in France the British were well in a position to lay their hands on him if they wanted?"

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"This I must admit," the Ambassador answered. You will understand what was my reply to that and how I got him to admit that the fact that they did not get the Mufti into their hands amounts practically to their co-responsibility for his return to the Middle East.

6. - When Inverchapel spoke of the recent developments in Palestine, he said something to this effect: "As the Mandatory, Britain could not tolerate this state of affairs." I took him up on that, stating that the same Mandate under which Britain rules Palestine officially recognizes the status of the Jewish Agency. Under what concepts of law can the British Government raid the Jewish Agency and arrest its members? I went on to say that if I were arrested and forced into a car on the Sabbath, it would not have been so bad because I am not a religious observer, but to do that to a Jewish Rabbi is a distinctly Nazi-like practice. His reply to this was that he, of course, regrets it very much, especially the imprisonment of his good friend Mr. Shertok.

7. - Inverchapel said to me, on his initiative: "You seem not to think much of the military strength of the Arabs in the Middle East. In this I tend to agree with you." We then discussed Pan-Arabism, and he said that we cannot hold Mr. Bevin responsible for the British attitude in this matter for it was inaugurated under Churchill. He further said that when this line of policy of support for Pan-Arabism was adopted by Britain, it was not meant as an anti-Russian move.

To this I retorted that it might not have been at the time, but it certainly is now and that Russia is bound to regard it as such; and because I am sure of that I am not perturbed - from a Zionist viewpoint - by occasional anti-Zionist utterances coming from Moscow, because in the long run the Arab League must be a component of the anti-Soviet setup in the Middle East, and that there is no escape from these realities. With this analysis, Inverchapel seemed to agree.

8. - I now approached his \$64 question. While during lunch we spoke of Soviet Russia's attitude towards Palestine and Zionism. Later, when the two of us conversed, Inverchapel came back to this topic asking me to tell him more about the indications for a pro-Zionist change in Russia's attitude. I told him, making clear that all these are indications and reasoning on my part rather than actual facts. Then, he put to me the following question: "Do you think that Soviet Russia may stand a chance of winning the souls of Palestine and world Jewry by adopting a pro-Zionist attitude?"

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I took great care to give him the right answer. I spoke at length of the state of total despair into which the British have driven the Jewish people; of the conclusion which has taken root in Jewish minds that Britain is faithless and that no reliance can be placed in any of her promises; and that a conviction is spreading that no one could be worse than the British. For all these reasons, I said that I believe that under certain circumstances Russia could win over the souls of the Jewish people.

I noticed that he was tremendously impressed by this answer, and I do not doubt that it will form an important part of his report to London of our conversation.

I mentioned my forthcoming trip to London, of which I wrote to him in my first letter, and I said that the only reason for my stopping over in London was my desire to meet British statesmen and to talk to them about the Middle Eastern and Palestine problems, adding that if he would feel like introducing me to some people in London for this purpose, I would appreciate it. He offered then to give me letters of recommendation to Mr. Hall, the Colonial Secretary and to Mr. Crossman, the only member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry whom he knows well. I gratefully accepted his offer and he promised to send me these letters to New York.

I believe to have covered comprehensively the highlights of our conversation. He was very cordial up to the very end, and escorted me downstairs to the exit. Judging by the fact that although I did not pull my punches in the conversation, he was willing to introduce me to people in London, he must have been favorably impressed.

I did not think it advisable to take initiative in suggesting a meeting between you and him, and I feel sure that you will approve of this. However, should you consider it desirable to meet the Ambassador after some time, you will surely find that my talk with him has laid the groundwork for your visit.

I also saw in Washington, Dr. Millsbaugh and have had a nice talk with him. He, too, is giving me introductions to London; one to the man in charge of the Middle East in the British Foreign Office and another to a former British Ambassador to Iran.

This morning, I received the first reply to my letters to London; from Dr. Edith Summerskill, Member of Parliament and Under Secretary in the Ministry of Food. She is fairly

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influential in the leadership of the Labor Party, and she writes that she will be very glad to meet me when I am in London.

It seems that I will postpone my departure until July 18, hoping that the additional three days will give me time to write one chapter for Crum's book and also to draft your introduction for the Foreign Policy Association's book.

With my very best regards to you and Mrs. Silver, I am

Cordially yours,

E. Ben-Horin

EBH:RW

Eliahu Ben-Horin

*P.S. I attach a copy of my
today's letter to Churchill.*



THE COCKPIT OF THE MIDDLE EAST

ELIAHU BEN-HORIN

SOME months ago, an office in Washington, interested in news from and about the Middle East, placed an order for such material with a clipping service. At the end of the first month, the man in charge was amazed and greatly perturbed by the size of the bill. It amounted to over ten thousand dollars.

This furnishes a tangible illustration of the place occupied by the Middle East in current world developments. The range extends all the way from a local rebellion by a Kurdish chieftain in Iraq to the fear of a new conflagration over the Soviet-Iranian conflict in the UN's Security Council in New York. Or does it end there? Is there a single issue among the many perturbing the world today that does not cut across Middle East realities?

Though this may sound like a hyperbolic statement, it is far from that. In some cases, the crucial importance of the Middle East has become clear to everyone. In others, observers at a distance fail to detect the explosive potentialities until the eruption actually takes place. It takes time to see the connection between disturbances in Azerbaijan and two hundred years of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia; between demands presented to Turkey on behalf of the Georgians and Armenians and Russia's need for a free outlet to the warm seas if she is not to remain a landlocked empire;

between anti-French riots in Damascus and British-French disagreement over European issues; between terroristic outbursts in Palestine and Britain's determination to maintain its dominating position in the Middle East; between the sudden declaration of Transjordanian independence and the UN's plans for trusteeships over mandated lands; between an American airfield in Saudi Arabia or an American trans-Arabian oil pipeline and Mr. Byrnes' indignant speeches on Russia's failure to withdraw her forces from Iran.

More than any area on earth, the Middle East is a jigsaw puzzle with enough pieces in it to cause bewilderment even to experts at the game. Yet this puzzle, like all others, has a solution. All the pieces can be made to fit.

SOME of the components of the Middle East puzzle are tangible or visible. Here they lie before us in utter disorder: Arabs and Jews; Christian minorities of all churches, including some whose very existence is unknown to most Americans (Melkites, Nestorians, Chaldeans, etc.); Moslems of a variety of sects; Assyrians and Armenians; Druzes and Kurds and even sun-worshippers; the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf and also the Dardanelles—the latter to be included in the Middle East if we take this term to cover also the

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Near East. There is more oil in the Middle East than in any other single region of the world; its strategic and communications values are unparalleled. This is where the invisible components of our puzzle come into play: the interests of the great powers in whose hands the local factors are no more than pawns. The stake in this game of rival imperialisms is the domination of a region which holds one of the keys to world power.

The ingredients of internal strife, apt to produce worldwide repercussions, are present in the Middle East in great abundance. Azerbaijan was not invented in the Kremlin, and if tomorrow the world is faced with the question of the Kurds and their demand for the formation of an independent Kurdistan, this, too, will not be the invention of some evil mind. There are Kurds in the Middle East, some three million of them, and they were even promised, after World War I, that they would have an independent state of their own. In other words, the pawns have been there all the time, but their moves are timed and directed by world interests.

Because of the Middle East's crucial importance in the world picture, it would be of little use to analyze any single local problem on its limited merits. They are all interwoven in one pattern, the threads of which do not end in the Indian Ocean in the east or in the Dardanelles in the west. The threads go on to London, Moscow, and Washington. It would be futile to try cutting the knot in Cairo, Jerusalem, or Teheran.

There is enough dynamite amassed in the Middle East to explode into a worldwide conflagration. On the other hand, wise statesmanship could use the dynamite as a lever in a great constructive effort on behalf of humanity. Oil moves tanks and bombers, but it also feeds tractors and diesels. A diversity of national and religious groups can easily breed trouble, but it can also produce a more colorful civilization.

II

OIL is now on everybody's lips. Oil is seen behind every clash and difficulty in the Middle East. The existence of nearly thirty billion barrels of petroleum

in the ground of the Middle East lands has indeed been established beyond doubt. Fairly competent guesses speak of an additional seventy billion barrels. This is a very respectable amount of oil, far exceeding the total home reserves plus the Caribbean reserves of the United States, and probably equaling the combined known and undiscovered reserves of the Soviet Union. Yet, I venture to say, the importance of the oil factor in Middle Eastern rivalries is both over-emphasized and over-estimated.

On the face of it, it was Russia's desire for oil concessions in northern Iran that was the cause of all the recent agitation in the UN's Security Council. However, a sober analysis of the Soviet-Iranian conflict would prove that oil played but a minor part in the development of events. Does Russia need Persian oil so badly as to risk a serious clash between the Big Three? Is it known with any degree of certainty that there are substantial petroleum reserves in Iran's five northern provinces, and do the Western powers entertain any ambitions of their own with regard to the oil of that area?

The honest answers to all the above questions would be in the negative. Without mentioning her present control over all the oilfields of eastern and central Europe, Russia has enough oil within her own boundaries, not only for her current needs but also to fuel an extensive program of reconstruction and industrialization. To be sure, Russian oil production suffered during the war, and new sources would be welcome. But the need is hardly acute enough to warrant war. Britain and the United States have no reason whatsoever to oppose a Soviet concession in northern Iran, a region which traditionally belongs to the Russian sphere of political and economic influence and which is virtually inaccessible to profitable exploitation by any other power. This region, moreover, is as yet unexplored and its petroleum potentialities have never been established. The British own the rich oilfields of southwest Persia and the Americans have tried to get a concession in the southeastern part of Persia. In addition, Britain and America control all the oil reserves of the Arab lands. No British or American com-

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pany wants concessions in northern Iran, for the simple reason that it would not pay.

A look at the map will show that the five northern provinces of Persia—Ghilan, Azerbaijan, Astrabad, Mazanderan, and Khorassan—are so cut off from world markets that an oil industry there could not compete with other producing areas. These provinces lie near the Caspian Sea and Russian developments in that region. The conclusion is indicated that no oil concession to any nation is practical politics in this area, unless it is obtained and worked with Russia's consent.

If it was not oil that caused all this trouble, what was it? The truth of the matter is that none of the great powers was half so interested in obtaining the oil of northern Iran, as in not letting the other fellow have it. Russia does not need the oil, but she would hate to see Britain established so close to her borders and to the Caspian Sea. Britain does not need the oil of northern Iran, but she is determined to prevent or to slow down Russia's thrust toward the Persian Gulf.

THE real crux of the problem is this: Who is to control the strategic heights in the Middle East? All the rest is camouflage, not always artistically executed, but widely used by both parties. British-American indignation over Russia's use of Azerbaijan to achieve its aims in Persia or to create a Soviet-dominated puppet state can hardly be taken seriously in the light of Britain's own record. One could recall the case of the Assyrians after World War I. Britain raised the question of the Assyrians, when she demanded that the Mosul district be cut off from Turkey because the Christian Assyrians could not be safely left under Turkish rule. But as soon as Mosul was incorporated in Iraq and the British secured for themselves the oil of Mosul, they forgot the Assyrians completely—even to the extent of condoning their mass massacre by the Arabs of Iraq.

We do not have to go as far back as that. At the very time that the Security Council was preoccupied with the Soviet-Iranian controversy, the British government in London announced the independence of Transjordan. This land lying east of the Jordan, an integral part of the area under

the jurisdiction of the Palestine mandate of the League of Nations, was suddenly transformed into a sovereign kingdom. Who had taken the decision to abolish the League's mandate? Not the League of Nations; not its mandates commission; not the United Nations; not even a conference of the Big Three. It was done unilaterally by Great Britain. It was done, moreover, in great haste, without waiting for the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine or for the decisions of the UN's Trusteeship Council which is supposed to take over the League's mandates.

To be sure, Transjordan will be no more independent now than before. Granting it the nominal status of "kingdom" and its ruler, Emir Abdullah, the title of "king," will not change the basic conditions of its national existence. There will still be only about 300,000 inhabitants, mostly nomadic illiterate Bedouins, with no industry, little commerce, poor communications, no cultural institutions, no economic development. Transjordan and its "king" will still be totally dependent on Britain politically, militarily, and financially. If Britain were to stop its subsidy to "King" Abdullah and his Arab Legion of 16,000 (British-officered) men, the king and his soldiers would have to beg for alms.

One is entitled to ask: If Britain may set up a puppet state in Transjordan, in disregard of international covenants, why should not Russia be allowed to do the same with Azerbaijan today, or Kurdistan tomorrow, or a larger Soviet Armenia the day after?

III

THE sun does not set on the British Empire. Nor, for that matter, does it set on the Russian Empire. A Labor government in Britain and a Soviet regime in Russia cannot change these physical realities. Mr. Attlee and Mr. Stalin are engaged, not in an ideological dispute between Socialism and Communism, but in a clash of two mammoth empires. The main scene of their duel is the Middle East. Nothing happens today in the cockpit of the Middle East without being affected by this over-all rivalry between Britain and

Russia. Its ultimate outcome must be either the most annihilating war in history or peaceful collaboration between the two empires, with America as a third partner and arbiter. There seems to be no middle way.

This is the light in which the various Middle Eastern issues, big and small, must be seen. An American expert who possesses first-hand knowledge of Persia and the Middle East recently tried to take the bull by the horns and offer a solution for the Iranian problem, which, if accepted, would set the pace for a peaceful and constructive settlement of the many complicated problems of the entire Middle East. I refer to the statement issued in April by Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh, of the Brookings Institution, who served as administrator general of Persia's finances from 1922 to 1927 and again from 1943 to 1945. What Dr. Millspaugh suggested was an American-British-Soviet guardianship over Iran for twenty-five to seventy-five years as the only alternative to competitive concession grabbing and the only way to establish a progressive and enlightened administration in the interests of the masses of the people rather than of a few feudal lords.

Here is how Dr. Millspaugh describes conditions in Iran:

... Discontent and disloyalty are widespread. The government neither represents nor serves the people; and, without outside control, it is, in my opinion, incapable of doing the things that are necessary if Iran is to establish stability at home and command respect abroad. In Iran, neither independence nor self-government is a reality; and neither can become a reality if it is assumed that Iranians are now politically capable of solving their own problems. What Iran needs for a time is more foreign interference, but interference of a new and constructive kind.

If this is true of Iran, an independent and self-governing state for thousands of years and, in the past, a conquering empire, how much truer must it be of the many little states of the Middle East to whom nominal independence was indiscriminately granted after World War II, regardless of their qualifications for statehood in general, and progressive self-government in particular. We have mentioned the case of Transjordan. Syria and Lebanon, as well as Iraq, are in the same category. So is Lybia, where, it seems, a

similar plan for nominal independence and factual dependence on Britain has been set in motion, as a counter-move to the Russian demand for sole trusteeship over that ex-Italian colony. By now it should have been clear to Britain's statesmen that the setting up of satellite-states is a double-edged weapon. Two can play at this game, and in this kind of politics the Kremlin certainly lacks neither ability, nor experience, nor connections, nor appeal to the imagination of the masses.

INDEED, what the dispassionate expert, Dr. Millspaugh, has suggested with regard to Iran, was recently advocated, if not explicitly, by a leading British weekly. In a penetrating analysis of the forces at play in the Middle East, the *New Statesman and Nation* arrives at the conclusion that present British policy is suicidal. After describing the elimination of France from the Middle East with Britain's active support and the erection of the Arab League—once again with active British support—the paper says:

... From the Soviet point of view, the only conclusion that can be drawn from British policy is that it is an effort to organize the Middle East against the USSR. They have plenty of material to justify this view, just as the British can cite much Soviet propaganda and intrigue to prove that Russian policy is to destroy the British Empire. ... In deciding to found their future on a presumably anti-Soviet Arab bloc, British policy appears to us to be founded on sand. The Arab League is of no military account; its economic resources are small; it is beset by internal rivalries; and there is not the slightest reason to believe that it will remain "loyal" to the British Empire. ... In our present bid for Arab support we British can only go a certain distance before we cut our own throats. Anglo-American commitments of all kinds are such that we cannot offer the moon. The Russians can always go one better; the strength of the Russian appeal in the long run is that it offers the miserably poor Arab peasants the hope of a modernized economy and the end of landlord exploitation.

I apologize for this extensive quotation, but the *New Statesman and Nation* has stated so succinctly the relative positions in the Middle East and the dangers inherent in present policies that I have not been able to withstand the temptation of borrowing its description. On the strength of this apology, I should like to reproduce the concluding passages of the article, as well:

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... If the rising tide of pan-Arabism, set in motion by ourselves, but now also fostered from Moscow, submerges the Jewish establishment in Palestine and the Christian Lebanon, the only friends whose loyalty has never wavered will have been sacrificed to the romantic chimera of a great Arab union, resuscitating the glories of the Caliphate, linked to Britain by bonds of gratitude and amity.

This has never been an intelligent dream, and it does not take account of present reality. It would surely have been wiser for both the British and the Russians to maintain the original policy of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, which was, verbally at least, to accept the facts of each other's power, co-operate on the basis of respect for each other's interest, and work together to improve the living standards of backward peoples.

Thus Dr. Millspaugh's detached American approach and the British weekly's concern for the future of the empire dictate the same conclusion. Anti-Russian intrigue by Britain will produce payment in kind by Russia. If the present clash is allowed to continue, it must lead to a catastrophe. Anglo-Soviet-American co-operation in the Middle East would seem to be a far more "intelligent dream."

IV

UNDER existing conditions, any adjustment in the Middle East can be no more than a temporary expedient liable to break down under the impact of either Soviet or British-American onslaught. As long as mistrust and hostility continue to dominate the relations between the two empires, there cannot be even a minimum of stability in the recently proclaimed independence of Transjordan, in the statehood of Syria and Lebanon, in a new British-Egyptian Treaty, in a British-American decision with regard to Palestine, in a UN-negotiated settlement of Soviet-Persian relations, in an international agreement with regard to the Straits, in any number of other decisions and agreements about Lybia, Greater Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan, oil, Kurdistan, Georgia, Eritrea, Sudan, the Suez Canal.

Should the Big Three, however, adopt the wiser policy of co-operation, the problems could be solved in a manner which would at once safeguard the legitimate interests of the big powers and assure justice for the small peoples. Analysis of the major problems will substantiate this.

Let us, first of all, formulate the chief legitimate interests of the great powers. Britain's interest in the Middle East has priority from the viewpoint of both oil and communications. Unlike Russia, Britain has no petroleum at home. Unlike Russia, the British Empire is not a compact land-mass but a chain of possessions spread all over the globe. Accordingly, if Britain is to exist as a great power and retain her empire, she must be sure of her oil supplies and line of communications.

Russia has two main concerns in the Middle East: she needs an outlet to the warm seas and fears an anti-Russian or anti-Soviet *cordon sanitaire* in the Near and Middle East. The first consideration is responsible for the Soviet maneuvering in Persia with an eye on the Persian Gulf and for the Russian, Armenian, and Georgian demands on Turkey—demands actually centered on the Straits. The second consideration motivates all Russian intrigues against Britain and the Empire.

Both the United States and France are interested in Middle Eastern oil and other economic resources, and have religious and sentimental attachments to the area.

THESE legitimate aspirations of the great powers are not wholly irreconcilable, while their harmonious co-habitation would benefit the peoples of the Middle East—and I mean the peoples, not the ruling cliques—much more than the present system.

A genuine agreement between the great powers would easily dispose of the three major international assets of the Middle East: oil, the Suez Canal, and the Straits. As far as oil is concerned, if mutual fear and mistrust are eliminated, there should be no difficulty in the division of exploitation areas among the various parties. There is enough oil in the Middle East to satisfy all needs. These natural riches, moreover, could and should contribute to the welfare of the Middle Eastern peoples themselves. As matters stand today, the Arab fellah, the Bedouin, or the Persian peasant derive hardly any benefit at all from the abundance of liquid gold in their soil. The nearly one hundred million dollars paid by the oil companies to Iraq have not improved the lot of that

country's downtrodden masses. The same is true of the oil royalties paid to King Ibn Saud, or to the sheiks of Kuwait and Bahrein. Actually, these Moslem potentates can do nothing with their oil unless it is developed, produced, refined, piped, shipped, and marketed by Western capital and industry. It is well within the capability of the Western world to see to it that the capital invested in Middle East lands be used for a program of development which would elevate the masses from their present misery.

If the questions of the Straits and Suez are treated together rather than separately and the same yardstick is applied to both, a just and logical solution can easily be reached. Each is an international waterway in which one major power is primarily interested. The Suez Canal is the chief artery of Britain's naval communications, while the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles are Russia's only outlet to the Mediterranean. There is a third essential similarity between these two waterways: both lie within the geographic boundaries of small states. In fact, the Suez is probably the main obstacle in Egypt's way to independence and the Straits constitute the main danger to Turkey's national security. These slices of international power are too large to rest safely in the hands of small peoples. The Straits were once internationalized, after World War I, but later were returned to Turkey's jurisdiction. The Suez Canal, now in Britain's hands, should revert, by 1968, to Egypt's possession and full control. The solution lies, of course, in the establishment of international administrations over the two waterways, with a Briton at the head of the Suez administration and a Russian at the head of the Straits administration. Egypt and Turkey should get their revenues from the traffic in the waterways, but neither of them could expect or should desire to be charged with the sole responsibility for strategic positions of such international significance.

V

IF THE same principle of international collaboration could be applied in good faith to the local problems and conflicts

of the Middle East, all of them could be resolved. The former Italian colonies in North Africa, Lybia, and Eritrea, will continue to cause an international headache as long as Britain tries to prevent Russia's penetration into the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Russia had demanded sole trusteeship for herself over Lybia, probably as a bargaining device in the controversy over the Straits. Britain encourages the Arab League to ask for the independence of these territories, which is a mere joke, for these desert countries are utterly incapable of exercising statehood. An American-British-Russian trusteeship, with a possible cession of part of Eritrea, including an outlet to the Red Sea, to Abyssinia, is the only regime which could develop these lands economically, culturally, and politically in the interests of the local populations.

Continuing our examination of local problems from the fringes of the Middle East to the center, we come to the question of the Azerbaijanians, Kurds, Armenians, and Georgians. Today, the demands of these groups for national self-determination or for more *Lebensraum* sound very much like Soviet intrigue. They may be, but there is no way of proving it and certainly no justification for refusing Azerbaijan or Kurdistan what is granted to Lybia or Transjordan. As in Lybia, so in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, condominium administrations by the Big Three would be the best remedy. As to the demands of the Armenian and Georgian Soviet Republics, an international inquiry into the historic background and present conditions should precede any decision. However, it should be remembered that there is only one large group of Armenians outside of Russia: over 100,000 in Lebanon. If the question of Lebanon is solved in such a way as to safeguard the existence and development of its Christian communities, the problem of these hundred thousand Armenians would lose its urgency.

We have still to consider three major Middle East groups: the Moslem Arabs, the Jews, and the Christian minorities other than the Armenians. All three now face a common enemy—fanatical Pan-

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Arabism, promoted by reactionary chieftains, feudalistic landlords, and backward clergy, and sponsored by Great Britain. Pan-Arabism today stands opposed not only to a Jewish Palestine and a Christian Lebanon, but also to the vital interests of the Arab masses. The adverse effects of Pan-Arabism on the relations between the great powers have already been mentioned. Its effects on the progress of the Middle East are no less detrimental. That there is anti-foreignism among the Arabs—as among many other peoples—cannot be denied; but if the Arab League were deprived of the artificial aid given it by the conflict of rival imperialisms, it would remain with very little real power, whether political, military, economic, or religious.

The fear of Pan-Arab reaction is often cited as the main reason for the non-fulfillment of the Balfour pledge to the Jewish people. If it were not for that fear, most people would agree that Palestine was promised to the Jews and that the Jews are entitled to a homeland. The failure of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine to offer a plan for the final solution of the problems, was, once again, due fundamentally to the fact that Soviet Russia was not invited to share in the inquiry and in the responsibility.

BRITAIN shows no inclination to transfer Palestine to the jurisdiction of the UN. Not only the proclamation of Transjordan's independence militates against this, but also the fact that at the liquidation session of the League of Nations in Geneva, in April of this year, Lord Robert Cecil, speaking for the British government, state that while Britain was willing to hand over her mandates in Africa (Tanganyika, the Cameroons, and Togoland) to the UN, the question of the Palestine mandate had to be postponed. Britain, moreover, is busy building extensive military installations in Palestine at the cost of many million dollars, enlarging her garrison there, and showing every sign of

transforming Palestine into her main military and naval base in the eastern Mediterranean. This stands to reason, in the light of the pending withdrawal of Britain's forces from Egypt.

The establishment of a British-American-Russian trusteeship over Palestine and of a French-British-American administration in Lebanon would solve the Jewish and Christian problems in the Middle East, as no other device could. In twenty or thirty years, Palestine would become a predominantly Jewish republic and the Lebanon a Christian state. Both of them would be loyal collaborators with progressive humanity. Both of them could be trusted to respect the legitimate interests of the great powers and take care of the social and economic needs of their working masses. All they need is a chance, and that can be given them only by the great powers acting in concert.

ONCE the civilizing influences of the great powers and of Jewish Palestine and Christian Lebanon were firmly established, the way would be open for progressive promotion of Arab statehood in Iraq, Syria, and the Arab Peninsula. For in cases such as these, formal concepts of independence are without practical meaning. In the words of Dr. Millspaugh, what these states need is "more foreign interference, but interference of a new and constructive kind." Great power condominiums over the Arab states would make possible not only the utilization of their petroleum resources for the benefit of the Arab masses, but also the inauguration of development programs of historic magnitude. The prerequisites for such development are there; they have been waiting many centuries for intelligent and well-meaning administrators to come and set to work.

The fate of humanity is now being determined in the cockpit of the Middle East. Which is it to be: a new Armageddon or a better world?

Eliahu Ben-Horin published his book *THE MIDDLE EAST: CROSSROADS OF HISTORY*, in 1943. In it he wrote, "A little more interest in the Middle East in times of peace might go a long way toward the prevention of wars." Now, almost a year after the end of World War II, the importance of the Middle East can hardly be escaped, and in this article Mr. Ben-Horin offers a constructive plan for the solution of the most pressing Middle Eastern problems.

His first article in *HARPER'S* ("The Soviet Wooing of Palestine," April, 1944) was one of the earliest, if not *the* earliest, prophecy of the postwar rivalry between Britain and Russia in the Middle East. Since then he has written for *WORLD PETROLEUM* and other magazines, as well as for *HARPER'S*, about Middle Eastern oil and the conflicts which would inevitably arise over demands for oil concessions.



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HAD LONG EXTREMELY SATISFACTORY TALK WITH BENES STOP AGREED CABLING ATLEE AND HARRY
REGARDING IMMEDIATE SITUATION ENPOWERING ME PREPARE DRAFTS CABLES PROVIDED LOCAL
ATLEE BEVIN AGREE STOP LOCAL BEVIN NOW PARIS AM PHONING BENGURION TO CONTACT HIM STOP
BENES ALSO PROMISED COMMUNICATE STALIN REGARDING ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL EITHER DELEGATION
OR INTERVIEW FOR MYSELF STOP BENES WILL INFORM ME PALESTINE STALIN'S REPLY PROBABLY
WITHIN FORTNIGHT STOP CABLE SILVER'S REACTION KLM AMSTERDAM REGARDS

BEN HORIN (1047P AUG 7 1946)

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AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver's Secretary

Date December 5, 1946

From Eliahu Ben-Horin

Enclosed please find copies of three letters, which
Dr. Silver may find of interest. Kindly keep them for him.



EBH:MF
Encl.

C O P Y

November 29, 1946

The Honorable Harry S. Truman
President, United States
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I take the liberty to draw your attention to my letter in the New York Times of the 26th, showing the discrepancies between the translation and the original Arabic letter of King Ibn Saud.

As such alterations are unusual in diplomatic correspondence, I think that more caution is to be exercised before accepting translations of Arabic documents bearing the signature of a responsible head of a State.

I further draw your attention, Mr. President, to the reference made by Ibn Saud to the Jewish people as "a tyrannical, oppressing and aggressive band". It is without precedent in history that the head of a state maligns a whole people to the head of another state in which millions of that people live as peaceful and law-abiding citizens.

I must add that Ibn Saud's country is closed to the Jews, and that he has never seen a Jew in his life. All he says about the Jews is whispered to him by his Syrian advisers who have been among the most vociferous denouncers of Zionism.

In order to show the differences in the Arabic text and the English translation, I give in a separate sheet the exact translation of the letter and the translation as given in the New York Times.

Believe me, Mr. President, to be

Yours most respectfully,

ASY:lmr

A. S. Yehuda

December 2, 1946

(BBH LETTERHEAD)

Lord Inverchapel
British Ambassador to the United States
British Embassy
Washington, D. C.

Your Excellency:

I have just returned from my trip to Europe and the Middle East. While in London, I made use of two of the three letters of introduction which you were kind enough to let me have. I saw Mr. Richard Crossman and Mr. Robert Howe, with whom I had interesting talks. I did not see Mr. George Hall, then Colonial Secretary.

On my way from London to the Near East, I stopped over for a few days in Prague, where I was received by President Benes. He was greatly interested in the problems which I had the pleasure of discussing with you prior to my departure.

I found my stay in Palestine, which lasted for over three months, a most instructive one. Despite the abundant reports from Palestine, I do not think that one can properly realize the state of affairs there, the lights and shadows, unless one sees it with his own eyes. The economic development in the Jewish sector is wonderful, and goes on despite political insecurity, repressions, terror and a state of lawlessness and anarchy. In the political field, however, there is a great deal of confusion. The deterioration of British-Jewish relations in Palestine is simply heart-breaking - at least for all those who firmly believe in British-Jewish friendship over Palestine and in general.

Thanking you once again for your kindness, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

Eliahu Ben-Horin

BBH:MF

December 4, 1946

(BBH LETTERHEAD)

Honorable Alf M. Landon
Topeka
Kansas

Dear Governor:

I just returned from a trip to Europe and Palestine, and found your kind letter of August 9th. I spent more time abroad than I intended to because of the TWA strike, but I must admit that post factum I don't regret it for it gave me more time to observe things in Palestine and to round out my impressions.

I wish I could tell you at length of my experiences and impressions - in London, Prague (where I had a long talk with President Benes) and in Palestine - but it is difficult to do so in writing. I am afraid it will have to wait until you come to the East, unless I receive some lecture engagement in your part of the country.

This much, however, I can say now. I was tremendously impressed by what I saw in Palestine. Despite the abundant reports from there, I do not think that one can properly realize the state of affairs in Palestine, the lights and shadows of the situation, unless one sees it with his own eyes. The economic development in the Jewish sector is wonderful, and goes on despite political insecurity, repressions, terror and a state of lawlessness and anarchy. In the political field, however, there is a great deal of confusion. The deterioration of British-Jewish relations in Palestine is simply heart-breaking. It is virtually a Jewish-British war, in which the Arabs take no part at all.

Unfortunately, American policy in the Middle East is still totally dependent upon second hand information, reaching Washington via Downing Street in London. In fact, I doubt whether one can speak of an independent American foreign policy in general and in the Middle East in particular. I wonder how it will be now, after your party won such a brilliant victory. What are your ideas on the subject?

With kindest regards to you and Mrs. Landon,

Cordially yours,

BBH:MF

Eliahu Ben-Horin

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver's Secretary

Date December 12, 1946

From Eliahu Ben-Horin

Kindly keep the enclosed copy of my report for Dr. Silver's attention.

EBH:MF
Encl.

REPORT BY MR. ELIAHU BEN-HORIN. AT A MEETING HELD AT THE OFFICE
OF THE AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL. DECEMBER 5, 1946.
AT 3:00 P.M.

PRESENT:

Eliahu Ben-Horin; Dr. Benjamin Akzin, Beatrice Cohen, Elissa Eskol, Gerold Frank, Dean Howard M. LeSourd, Marvin Lowenthal, Sulamith Schwartz, Abe Tuvim.

MR. ELIAHU BEN-HORIN:

I will begin my report with the more pleasant parts and then come to the disquieting or not so happy aspects of what I found in Palestine.

I was really overwhelmed with what I saw in Palestine after nine years absence; although I knew Palestine pretty well. I could not seem to find my bearings. There was a tremendous development in the economic field; the Yishuv had developed into a nation - not in form, perhaps, but with the feeling of a nation, the size of a nation and the growth of the boundaries. The frontiers of Jewish Palestine have moved to a far larger area and this also applies to the Negev. Many settlements have sprung up in upper Galilee and on top of the mountain. I also visited the settlements in the Negev which had been established during the war years and also the more recent ones. I had long talks with people who had done research work in the Negev. In the South there is an area of 8,000,000 dunams, of which about 4,000,000 is definitely cultivable land. It just presents you with a different picture of the possibilities. The Keren Kayemeth possesses about 1,500,000 dunams and here is an area two or three times as large which could be utilized for Jewish colonization.

In some of the settlements in upper Galilee you see about 25 people - 15 boys and 10 girls - and a few barracks just started. The nearest settlement is about 35 miles away - in case of an emergency these young people could be placed in a very bad situation if attacked, but they did not seem to mind or show any fear. This applies equally to the settlements in the Negev

which are in a similar position, especially when the Mandatory is looking for arms instead of providing protection.

New colonies are being established almost every second week. The old colonies are in a very prosperous state; some of them look like small garden cities - for example, those in the Jordan Valley. All the comforts of life have been introduced.

In the industrial field, the development is no less remarkable - there are about 60,000 workers (180,000 souls) living on industry. About one-third of the Jewish population lives on industry. The percentage sustained by agriculture is considerably smaller. There are some industries which grew during the war; the diamond industry underwent a remarkable development and the yearly diamond export amounts to \$24,000,000. France is ordering ladies' fashions from Palestine; Switzerland, leather goods of the best quality; Denmark, textiles; Greece, industrial chemicals; Argentina, Hebrew books; United States, wines and works of art.

While political insecurity is very great, there is, at the same time, no relaxation of the economic effort. There is not only economic development under the Jewish Agency and other organizations, but also under the auspices of private capital which invests tremendous amounts of money.

I visited many buildings which have been erected on a very modern scale and in which hundreds of thousands of pounds are being invested. This, of course, is not being matched by political optimism.

The Arab boycott in Palestine itself is not being observed or, at least, to a very little extent. Every day you can see Arab men and women

entering Tel-Aviv to buy goods. There are also purchasers from Syria and Lebanon inasmuch as goods from abroad is not available at present and will not be for some time. For example, orders placed in England for certain goods will not be filled for three years; too, the quality of English goods has deteriorated a great deal and does not compare with the quality of Palestinian goods. Syrian and Lebanese Arabs have developed a method of circumventing the boycott. A special office has been established under an Arab name and the goods being sent through this office bear Arab labels - however, this material, which is Jewish produced, is being shipped to Syria and Lebanon.

I was assured by representatives of the manufacturers associations that losses sustained by Jewish industry through the Arab boycott were being well made up by European orders and by the opening of new markets.

In the economic field Palestine presents a very bright picture. Not only is there unemployment not worth speaking of, but there is actually a shortage of labor - in both colonies and industries. In fact, the building program which should be speedily developed cannot go on because of the lack of help.

The British failed miserably in their attempt to place the iron hand on the Jews. When I arrived in Palestine the curfew was still in operation. From seven in the evening all traffic on the roads was stopped and everyone had to remain wherever he was at that time. While this caused a financial loss to the Jews, they took the matter cheerfully and more or less laughed it off. The British, however, paid a terrible

price for the curfew. After it was absolutely certain that from seven in the evening only British vehicles would be on the roads, the roads were mined by the terrorist organizations since they felt that the people most likely to be affected would be the British. The British, in turn, felt that in that event it would be practical to have Jewish protection on the roads and so they removed the curfew.

The Government was also compelled to stop all the railway traffic in Palestine since they had to pay such a heavy penalty. The British have the jitters - they feel very uncomfortable.

A few days after my arrival in Palestine I had applied for my press card at the Public Information Office in Jerusalem. They promised to mail it to me, but it did not arrive for some time. In the meantime, one morning in Tel-Aviv a curfew was announced for the day. I decided to take a chance and to walk out with my Harper's credentials. The city was deserted. I spied a vehicle and asked the soldier to bring me to an officer who would be in a position to help me. After seeing various officers along the chain of command, I was told that they could not help me unless I could present my Press Information card - they refused to call the Information Office in Jerusalem to check there. One of the officers said to me "you are probably a very respectable man, but in this country there are many who are not." To which I replied that in other countries there are also many that are not. I was then provided with an escort of one armed soldier. The two of us walked through the deserted town. Suddenly, the soldier charged his rifle because he felt that there were too many innocent looking faces in the windows of the homes we passed.

The British are unable to apprehend the terrorists; they cannot find any sizeable amount of arms; their experiences of persecution of the members of the Jewish Agency and others did not prove successful. Therefore, they take out their vengeance on innocent people. Their attitude is worse than that of victors in an enemy-occupied country. The people are in a state of absolute helplessness. The British are armed - they are not. This does not improve matters. The result of all this is an indescribable deterioration of British-Jewish relations in Palestine. Each side looks at the other as at an enemy and the Jews do not see the possibility of reaching a rapprochement with the British.

The Arabs do not appear in this war at all. They have profited a good deal - some of them are wealthy and better off than they used to be. Very few of them would risk changing their prosperity today for a doubtful political fight in which they would stand to lose their lives or their wealth, or both.

I spoke to leaders of the Hagana and the Irgun, but was not able to be in touch with anyone in the Stern group.

The Hagana, with the Palmach, contains excellent youth. I heard that they receive wonderful training and that they do a job excellently. I have little doubt, however, that they are in a bad moral state since these youth are systematically suppressed and are not allowed to act in the light of the greatest provocations on the part of the British. The only activity permitted them and the others

in the Jewish community is protest meetings, which is not satisfactory to them. There is a great deal of sympathy, on the other hand, with the Irgun which, I understand, is in a state of daily growth.

The Stern group is a very small organization, comprising about a few hundred people. They are completely out of bounds. They are not strong enough to act according to a strategic plan and use hit-and-run tactics.

There is a great deal of confusion with regard to the political situation. During the sixteen years I spent in Palestine I never found so much confusion. The people do not know whom to believe and whom to disbelieve. I had talks and met people of all parties, starting with the Mapai, the Achduth Haavodah, and ending with the Aliyah Chadosha.


The confusion begins at a very high level on both sides.

The British in Palestine are at a loss. They are doing their best to carry out the orders which they receive from London and answer terror with terror - they are trying to maneuver the Jews into such a position where they will accept whatever is imposed upon them.

During the election campaign for the Congress not one party would come out openly and say that they favor partition. All of them, in their speeches and literature, spoke of Jewish statehood, of a sovereign Palestine, of a sovereign Jewish State. Partition is very unpopular in Palestine - whatever is the outcome of the Zionist Congress, I do not believe partition would be put over in Palestine - certainly not with the younger generation.

The greatest impression which I bring back from Palestine is the Palestinian youth. It is the most wonderful thing on earth. I have not seen such a youth anywhere in the world. I am referring to the young Yemenite of the Stern group who, lying before the Court badly wounded, refused to answer questions because he felt that the British Court had no jurisdiction over him since he was a prisoner of war, as well as to the boy in Palmach who is dead against the Stern group, but who is capable of blowing up a British ship in the heart of Haifa Harbor. I speak of the makeup of the young generation - a generation without fear, without hesitation.

It is a wonderful generation which will certainly not let go of Palestine no matter what happens.



AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

Date December 17, 1946

From Eliahu Ben-Horin

You may be interested in reading the enclosed copy of a letter I received the other day. It is rather remarkable that he wrote this letter 5-6 months after my article appeared.

I am trying to find out whether the author of the letter occupies any position of importance in the Navy Department. If so, he might be of use to us, especially on the question of oil.

EBH:MF
Encl.

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NCS 11

Address Radioman in Charge, "A" Watch
U. S. Naval Radio Control Station

NAVY DEPARTMENT

NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

U. S. NAVAL RADIO CONTROL STATION

G. C. WARREN, RM10
RM 340 FED BLDG
SAN FRANCISCO
CALIF 8 DEC 1946

Eliahu Ben-Horin
c/o Harper's Magazine
49 East 33rd Street
New York City, N. Y.

Sir:

I have, at this moment, finished studying your article, "The Cockpit of the Middle East", published in the July issue of Harper's Magazine.

It is with great personal regret that I am unable to thank you personally for expressing views and proposed plans which are so much in accord with my own in a publication read so widely by people who are liable to do more than merely ponder over the matter.

The scales are balanced, a most horrible war tugging against peaceful collaboration among the great powers. Let us hope our statesmen see clearly the labels and act accordingly.

I earnestly thank you for a clearer analysis than I've been able to grasp heretofore.

Sincerely,

(Signed)

GEORGE CHARLES WARREN

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

Date December 16, 1946

From Eliahu Ben-Horin

I enclose for your information a copy of a letter from Dean Acheson which we received today. It deals with our request for publication of the documents pertaining to the Mufti seized in Germany.

EBH:MF
Encl.

C
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Y
Address official communications to
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
867N.404/11-1146

December 13, 1946

My dear Mr. Shapiro:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of November 11, 1946, urging on behalf of the American Zionist Emergency Council the early publication of certain documents relating to the activities of the Mufti of Jerusalem which you understand are in the possession of the Department of State.

At the present time the numerous documents which representatives of this Government in Germany and Italy have been able to seize pertaining to the war and to activities of Nazi and Fascist leaders and collaborators are being examined, analyzed, translated and classified preparatory to presentation to the public. It is contemplated that such material relating to the Mufti, as well as to other persons who during the war cooperated with the Axis Powers, as may be found among these documents will be made public in due course.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) DEAN ACHESON

Acting Secretary

Mr. Harry L. Shapiro
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York, 17, New York

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver's Secretary

Date December 17, 1946

From Eliahu Ben-Horin

Kindly keep the enclosed copy of a letter I received today
from Mr. Summer Welles for Dr. Silver's information.

EBH:MF
Encl.

C
O
P
Y

SUMNER WELLES

250 Via Bellaria
Palm Beach, Florida

December 9, 1946

My dear Mr. Ben-Horin:

Thank you very much indeed for your letter of December 2. I am glad to know that you are safely back from your trip to Europe and I have been exceedingly interested in the impressions which you have been kind enough to give me by means of your letter. I am particularly glad that I was able to be of some assistance to you.

If by any chance you come to Florida this winter, I hope you will give me an opportunity of seeing you here. I expect to be here during the next three months.

With my kind regards, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) SUMNER WELLES

Mr. Eliahu Ben-Horin
254 West 82nd Street,
New York, 24, N. Y.

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver's Secretary

Date December 19, 1946

From Eliahu Ben-Horin

Kindly keep the enclosed copy of my today's memorandum for
Dr. Silver's information.

EBH:MF
Encl.



Mr. Abe Tuvim

December 19, 1946

Elishu Ben-Horin

As you know, I saw Alf M. Landon first and then Herbert Hoover yesterday. It seems to me that it would be worthwhile to have on record, for Dr. Silver's and Harry Shapiro's information, a report of these conversations, especially of that with Mr. Hoover.

My interview with Landon was very short, because he was leaving the same evening for Topeka, Kansas, and I therefore had to restrict myself to a couple of immediate matters in which we need his assistance. Together with Dean LeSourd, whom I introduced to Mr. Landon, we presented to him the matter of the Children's Memorial Forest in Palestine, asking for his endorsement of this plan. This he granted us, and in a few days time he will send from Topeka his approval for a letter for publication to this effect.

Next, I submitted to him, at the request of Mrs. Shepard, the question of his addressing the Junior Chamber of Commerce in Minneapolis on January 14, 1947. In this talk he has to include the Palestine problem. He consented to do that, too. I promised to send him a draft of the portion of the speech dealing with Palestine.

I may add that Landon was extremely friendly and recalled, on his own initiative, how right I was in my analysis of the post-war situation of European Jewry which I presented in a lecture to the High Twelve Club in Topeka, Kansas, late in 1943 or in 1944. He said that he thought about it a good many times during these years.

My conversation with Hoover, which lasted for about forty minutes, touched mostly on general political problems. I gave him my impressions from Europe and Palestine, and he made several remarks with regard to reactions here in America to the march of events.

* Speaking of Britain, he said that there are indications of a break in the line-up of Britain and America. He pointed to Britain's deserting America in the UN on the question of the atomic bomb, joining hands with Russia. He also said that the Labor Government in Britain is trying to organize a Western Bloc in Europe, which would strive for an understanding with Russia, rather than with America.

* He asked me what about partition, and I told him what I thought of it. As you know my opinion on the subject, I don't have to enlarge here on what I told Hoover. He seemed to agree with my argumentation.

* When I told him about my interview with President Benes in Czechoslovakia and mentioned Benes' reaction on the question of Palestine, namely his suggestion that the Palestine Arabs be transferred to Iraq, Hoover smiled and said that as time goes on more people will turn to this idea, and added, "I wish they would start doing something about it."

December 19, 1946

* He said that there is great disgust in America with the proceedings in UN and that isolationist feelings are growing, for people lose faith in the ability of UN to settle any problem and to evolve a system of durable peace.

I asked him who, in his opinion, would shape the foreign policy of the United States under a Republican Administration. He answered that it is too far ahead and it would be difficult to say now. However, if a Republican Administration would take over tomorrow then Vandenberg would be the Secretary of State.

* Returning to the Palestine scene, I described to him the brutality of the British in Palestine in their attitude to the peaceful population and in their dealings with the transports of illegal immigrants. To this he remarked: "Well, I was never an admirer of the British."

Before parting, I mentioned to him the matter of the Children's Memorial Forest in Palestine and asked him whether he would agree to endorse it. He said that he would.

EBH:MF



MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

Date December 31, 1946

From Eliahu Ben-Horin

I mailed you yesterday copies of Mr. Taubman's and Judge Herold's letters. I now enclose a copy of my reply to Mr. Taubman in which I voice certain apprehensions with regard to the eventualities of the situation.

I would appreciate having your views on the subject.

Kindest regards.

EBH:MF
Encl.



CONFIDENTIAL

December 31, 1946

Mr. Herman P. Taubman
808 Gulf States Building
Dallas 1, Texas

Dear Mr. Taubman:

Thanks for your kind letter. It reached me simultaneously with a letter from Judge Herold, who writes that he is in full accord with your evaluation of the recent developments in the oil industry regarding the Saudi-Arabian concession.

It seems that Judge Herold will be preoccupied with an important trial until the end of January. I believe, therefore, that our Oil Committee would not be convened before sometime in February.

In the meantime, it would be advisable to closely follow all that happens in this field.

Your optimistic evaluation would be justified if the New Jersey Company were to introduce a more sober appreciation of the respective factors in the Middle Eastern economic and political picture, but suppose she does not? Suppose, the New Jersey Company accepts, for reasons of expediency, the present stand of Aramco in political matters (Arabs, Jews, Palestine, etc.)? Then, our position would be much worse than ever before, for we shall be facing a united front of all the big companies with interests in the Middle East.

Mind you, I don't say that the latter eventuality must take place, or will take place, but as long as we do not know the political course which the New Jersey and Socony Companies are likely to adopt, optimism on our part would be premature. I think, moreover, that now is the time - before the deal between the two sets of companies is concluded - for us to exert some pressure in the right direction.

I would appreciate having your reaction to the above, as well as that of Judge Herold and Mr. Fohs, to whom I sent copies of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

Elijah Ben-Horin

P.S. Kindly note that my surname is not "Horin,"
but "Ben-Horin."

Copies to: Judge Sidney L. Herold
Mr. F. Julius Fohs

EBH:NK

MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, The Temple, Date June 27, 1947
Cleveland, Ohio

From Eliahu Ben-Horin

Abe Tuvim arranged for me to meet James G. McDonald, whom I never met before, to discuss with him a number of things. I had lunch with Mr. McDonald yesterday and I want to report to you about our conversation, as a number of things which cropped up may be of interest to you.

1. McDonald said that nothing will come out of the Buxton initiative with regard to a statement by the American members of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, because Hutcheson won't sign. Not that he, McDonald, attached any practical importance to such a statement, but it would have made a certain impression. However, as it hinges on unanimity of the American members, Hutcheson's refusal to sign would kill the whole thing. He told me that according to a letter from Buxton which he had received the day before, Hutcheson refused to lend his name to it.

2. It has been suggested that McDonald take the initiative to bring us together with Vera Micheles Dean, the Research Director of the Foreign Policy Association. As you may recall, I met Mrs. Dean last year and had a talk with her. My impression on that occasion was that Mrs. Dean was externally extremely polite and sympathetic, but that she was not prepared to commit herself in any way or do anything for us. McDonald told me that he knew Mrs. Dean since she was a young girl, and, indeed, it was he who introduced her into the F.P.A.; that she was a cold and calculating person who would not let her sentiments for the underdog interfere with her career; that she seemed to be utterly disinterested in the Palestine problem, despite her Jewish origin which she never announces. She was disinterested in Palestine to such an extent as to never ask McDonald about his impressions on his recent trip to Palestine or his views on the present situation. Under the circumstances, McDonald doesn't feel that it would be proper for him to approach her on the question of Palestine. With this I agree.

3. I told Mr. McDonald of the Middle East Trends project. This was the one point in our conversation about which he was almost enthusiastic. So much so, that I found it possible to inquire of him whether he would take an active hand in the project. His answer was that he might. He emphasized very much one point in my outline, namely, that the national and religious minorities in the Middle East should be actively brought into the picture. He felt that this was a thing long overdue, and he was also optimistic as to the possibility to raise the necessary funds for the materialization of the project. I am sending him today a copy of my memorandum to you outlining the Middle East Trends project, and we shall probably meet again to discuss this matter after he reads the memorandum.

Best regards.

EBH/lb

E.B.H.