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Crum, Bartley C., 1946-1947.

BARTLEY C. CRUM

ATTORNEY AT LAW

RUSS BUILDING

SAN FRANCISCO, 4

August 30, 1946

Rabbi Abba Hillil Silver,
Manomet, Massachusetts.


Dear Dr. Silver:

Thank you much for your wire of the 22nd. Since my return to the Coast I have had occasion to talk with a number of Jewish Groups, both Zionist and non-Zionist. Quite frankly they are bewildered and dismayed. While they, of course, want in every way to back up the decision of the Agency, there is, as a result of the secrecy surrounding the negotiations between the American Government and Nahum, the feeling that the whole structure for which they have worked and prayed is in jeopardy.

I have written to Nahum explaining what I had found in the East and what I also find in the West. Only last night I addressed a mass meeting in Los Angeles. Rabbi Nussbaum urged me in particular to make a plea for the support of the Agency at this crucial time. Of course I did. But the reason he felt it necessary to urge me to do so was because of the uneasiness felt in Jewish circles in Los Angeles as to what is happening.

Warmest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,



BARTLEY C. CRUM

BCC:jh

BARTLEY C. CRUM

ATTORNEY AT LAW
RUSS BUILDING
SAN FRANCISCO, 4

September 6, 1946.


Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, President
Zionist Organization of America
41 East 42nd Street
New York 17, N. Y.

Dear Rabbi Silver:-

I am enclosing copy of an attack on me, which appeared in the San Francisco News, and which also appeared, I understand, in the New York World Telegram, together with my reply.

I thought you would be interested.

Sincerely,



BARTLEY C. CRUM

BCC:H
Enclosure

CRUM'S STATE DEPT. ATTACK RAISES CRY OF 'COMMUNISM'

Writer Views Some Aspects of Henderson Case

BY FREDERICK WOLTMAN
World-Telegram Staff Writer

NEW YORK, Sept. 4.—A move to force the resignation of Loy Henderson, career diplomat and one of the State Department's top experts on Russia and Eastern Europe, is being spearheaded by a staunch supporter of Communist-controlled fronts, it was learned today.

He is Bartley C. Crum, of San Francisco, who, shortly after conferring with President Truman several weeks ago, demanded Mr. Henderson's resignation.

Mr. Crum a few months ago became vice chairman of the newly organized National Committee to Win-the-Peace. This is the successor to the American Peace Mobilization which the Communist Party created to undermine the late President Roosevelt's defense preparations and foreign policy while the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pact was in existence.

DEFENSE OF TITO

Soon after the current dispute arose between the United States and Yugoslavia, Mr. Crum's Win-the-Peace Committee rushed to the defense of Russia's satellite dictatorship under Marshal Tito.

Although unarmed American planes were shot down by Tito forces and five airmen killed, this committee charged the American Government had "put the security of our nation and the peace of the world in peril by brash acts of our diplomats and military leaders who are talking through their guns."

The Communists have been gunning for Mr. Henderson ever since he incurred the Soviet's displeasure by persistent attempts to get to the bottom of the Reubens-Robinson passport fraud case while he was charge d'affaires of our Embassy in Moscow.

Later he was made chief of Eastern European affairs. Maxim Litvinov, then Soviet ambassador, inspired his removal from the Russian division, according to reports in Washington at the time President Roosevelt named him minister to Iraq.

In calling for Mr. Henderson's resignation, Mr. Crum, until recently a presidential appointee to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, charged that the middle level of State Department officials had frustrated American policy on Palestine since President Wilson's Administration.

'FEAR OF RUSSIA'

Britain's Palestine policy, he asserted, was dictated by fear of war with Russia and fear that the Arabs would turn to the Soviet Union should Palestine be opened to large Jewish immigration.

Thereafter, Dean Acheson, acting secretary of state, defended Mr. Henderson's division and took full responsibility for its actions. Mr. Crum, in reply, declared he would not let the matter drop until alleged secret State Department notes to Arab leaders are made public.

In addition to the Win-the-Peace Committee, Mr. Crum is:

Vice president of the National Lawyers Guild, from which A. A. Berle Jr., Morris Ernst, Robert Jackson, Ferdinand Pecora and other prominent lawyers resigned some years ago, claiming it was Communist controlled.

Vice president, American Committee for Spanish Freedom, a party-line group that works closely with the Communists.

Active sponsor of American Youth for Democracy, formerly called the Young Communist League, which J. Edgar Hoover, FBI director, attacked last January as a disguised agency of the Communist Party.

Initiating sponsor, Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and the Professions, which has become one of the most active mouthpieces of the Communist Party line in the past year.

Mr. Crum supported Harry Bridges against the Justice Department's unsuccessful efforts to deport him. He opposed legislation to remove the Communist Party from the ballot in California.

S. F. Attorney Brands Charge as 'Inspired Smear'

Bartley C. Crum, San Francisco attorney, today denied he was a Communist or followed the Communist Party line, and charged that Loy Henderson, State Department expert on the Middle East, had "inspired a Red-label smear against me to cover up the department's anti-Semitic policy in Palestine."

"The issue is not whether I'm a Red," Mr. Crum said. "That's ridiculous as everybody familiar with my record knows. The real issue is:

"Have Loy Henderson and the State Department engaged in double-dealing? Has the State Department promised one thing to the Jews publicly and another to the Arabs secretly?"

STATE DEPARTMENT FILE

He threatened again to make public a secret State Department file which, he has charged, proves the "middle-level" career diplomats of the State Department have obstructed and sabotaged American policy on the Palestine question.

"If Henderson and his collaborators continue these smear attacks on me, I may be forced to make the content of the file public. I saw it and know what's in it—but it would come with greater propriety from the State Department itself," Mr. Crum said.

"Loy Henderson has a bitter, personal prejudice against the Soviet Union. That's his right—but he shouldn't be in position to exploit his personal bias by sabotaging our public promise to 100,000 homeless Jews in Europe."

(Mr. Crum has previously charged that the State Department was obstructing the United States' own policy of moving 100,000 displaced Jews to Palestine, in order to curry favor with the Arabs and prevent the Arabic-speaking world from seeking help from the Soviet Union.)

REPUBLICAN 26 YEARS

He laughed at reports that he followed the Communist Party line. "I'm a Roman Catholic and have been registered Republican for 26 years. On all but two occasions in that quarter of a century—1932 and 1944—I have supported Republican candidates.

"I was one of many Americans who spoke and worked for lend-lease when it was an unpopular stand, who urged the United States to recognize our part in the world struggle against Hitler—and all this long before the Nazis attacked Russia, despite Henderson inspired innuendos.

"Calling a man names is an easy way to avoid issues. When I supported Willkie in 1940 I was a patriotic American. When I supported Roosevelt in 1944, for reasons obvious to all but the most rabid partisans, I was a dirty New Dealer. When I supported Mayor Roger Lapham against the recall movement here, I was 'an internationally known lawyer.' Now, because I support European Jewry's fight for life against British and American diplomatic strangling, I'm a Communist. Bah!"

Mr. Crum denied also that he belonged to any Communist front organization. The National Lawyers Guild, he said, "contains such notable 'Reds' as Atty. Gen. Robert Kenny of California and the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, Phil S. Gibson."

ON BRIDGES' CASE

He opposed the deportation of Harry Bridges, he said, because he opposes the deportation of anybody "simply because he is a militant labor leader. I represent employers in labor disputes—and I expect the other side to be ably represented, which was Mr. Bridge's sole crime. I not only opposed his deportation, but I think he's a great American citizen."

"But these red-smears are ridiculous," he said. "Let's not be sidetracked from the main target:

"Shall Loy Henderson and his kind get away with sabotaging American foreign policy, at the same time costing thousands of Europe's harassed Jews their only chance to live?"

C O P Y

CONFIDENTIAL

October 1, 1946

Honorable Robert Hannegan
United States Postmaster General
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bob:

Carrying on our conversation of today, I believe it would clear the atmosphere so far as American Jewry were concerned if two things were done: (1) that the President should make a strong request to the British Government urging, on humanitarian grounds, that issuance of Palestinian certificates to the displaced Jews of Europe be begun immediately, without prejudice to the present negotiations, and that this request be followed through to the point of consummation in the immediate future; and (2) that our government help to speed the negotiations in London to a successful conclusion.

It is essential that action be obtained from the British at once.

If the British Government began the immediate issuance of certificates, as unanimously suggested, it could do so on strictly humanitarian grounds. In addition, it could make it clear that such admission was without prejudice to the ultimate political status of Palestine.

At the same time, it is my opinion that our Government should make it clear to Britain that (as it already may have done) the American Government wants to do everything in its power to bring about the permanent solution of the problem. Having transmitted, as our Government did, the proposal of the Jewish Agency for the establishment of a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine, it would seem to me to follow that we must back up the Agency in every way possible -- to make the negotiations a success. Under the circumstances, it is expected that our government will make full use of its resources and influence to bring a satisfactory outcome of the negotiations now proceeding in London.

I have been reliably informed that the Zionist movement of America (which includes Rabbi Wise and Rabbi Silver) that that organization, although it was not too happy about partition, will nevertheless back up the Jewish Agency as proof of Jewish unity.

This means, of course, a united Jewish front in America, with the exception of Lessing Rosenwald. The only other important group, the American Jewish Committee, which is headed by Judge Joseph Proskauer has also indicated his readiness to support the Jewish Agency's position.

If the President thought well of the first suggestion, it would seem to me that Ed Pauly would be an ideal person to press for a quick implementation of the President's wishes.

The result of such a position by the President would be to put heart into the more than 6,000,000 citizens of Jewish blood in the United States who are now most disheartened. If you will recall, I talked about this matter to Paul Fitzpatrick of New York in August at your home and I think he would agree with me that it is imperative that some action be obtained at once.

Warmest personal regards,

(signed) Bartley C. Crum

October 1, 1946

Crum

Honorable Robert Hannegan
United States Postmaster General
Washington, D. C.

*Please return to
E. N.*

Dear Bob:

In the course of our conversation, my speech in Los Angeles on September 22 came up.

I understand my speech was treated in the Eastern press as if I had called for a third party. I did no such thing.

What I did say was that after the November, 1946 election the liberals would have to face the issue of whether a realignment of political forces was not necessary in the United States and whether or not this might lead to the establishment of "a new party".

What I had in mind specifically was this: I did not vote in 1944 for the foreign policies of Senator Vandenberg.

I voted for the foreign policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.

If both parties are going to be ultra-conservative, I will have no place to vote. What I was trying to say is that, under such circumstances, what we would need is a second party.

In the foreign field, I quite agree with Mr Brynes on a policy of firmness in relation to Russian expansionism, and I think it is clear that Americans everywhere reject, without reservation, communism or totalitarianism in any form.

But that rejection does not mean that they will accept or will defend British imperialism.

It is in short, a double rejection by America: both of communism, totalitarianism, and British imperialism.

In short, what Americans want is an American policy. They would like, in my opinion, to see that policy enunciated by the President of the United States.

In every speech I have made, I have paid tribute to President Truman for his great efforts in trying to save the remnants of the Jewish people. I will continue to do so. That goes without saying.

But I am disturbed, I must admit, when on the one hand we say that we cannot utilize our Armed Forces to help the Jewish immigration into Palestine, while at the same time we can anchor an aircraft carrier off

the coast of Greece at about the time of the Greek elections.

The point I am trying to make is that, while I intend to fight for the President in every way, I also think that he needs to have it made plain that, in a government as large as ours, sometimes at lower levels all of his wishes are not carried out; and that, in the final analysis he is calling the shots on foreign policy.

Warmest regards,

Bartley Crum



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WESTERN UNION

JOSEPH L. EGAN
PRESIDENT

1220

DL = Day Letter
NL = Night Letter
LC = Deferred Cable
NLT = Cable Night Letter
Ship Radiogram

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A.FB315 NL PD=SANFRANCISCO CALIF 20

1947 FEB 20 PM 10 47

RABBI ABBA HILLEL SILVER=

THE TEMPLE CLEVELAND=

GERTRUDE AND I WILL BE DELIGHTED HAVE DINNER WITH YOU
REFERENCE TO UN MEANS TO ME BRITAIN INTENDS TRY TO GET
INTERNATIONAL SANCTION TO CARRY OUT PURPOSES OF INFAMOUS
WHITE PAPER BELIEVE BRITAIN WILL CONTEND (1) PURPOSE OF
MANDATE IS COMPLETED AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER
JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE WITHOUT "CONSENT" OF
PRESENT MAJORITY (2) RECOGNATION SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM
JEWISH AGENCY ON GROUND ORGANIZATION AND CONSTITUTION
ARE NO LONGER IN OPINION OF MANDATORY "APPROPRIATE" SEE
MANDATE ART. 4 (3) UNDER GUISE OF SERVING DEMOCRATIC
PRINCIPLES A NEW STATE SHOULD BE CREATED WITH "PROPER
SAFEGUARDS TO RIGHTS OF MINORITIES" SIMILAR GUARANTEES
WERE WRITTEN INTO EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONS AT END OF FIRST
WAR YOU KNOW THE RESULT. I PREDICT THAT IF THIS IS ALLOWED
TO HAPPEN HAJ AMIN EL HUSSENI WILL "ESCAPE" FROM CAIRO
AND EMERGE AS HEAD OF ANY ARAB STATE CREATED IN PALESTINE
IN ENSUING=
END ONE.

1 2 ART 4 3.

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

SERVICE

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WESTERN UNION

JOSEPH L. EGAN
PRESIDENT

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SYMBOLS

NL = Night Letter

LC = Deferred Cable

NLT = Cable Night Letter

Ship Radiogram

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

A • FB315 1/2 NL PD RABBI ABBA HILLEL SILVER CLEVE =

1947 FEB 20 PM 10 47

DISORDERS BRITAIN WOULD BE "COMPELLED" TO KEEP PRESENT
LARGE BODIES OF TROOPS INDEFINITELY IN PALESTINE "TO
MAINTAIN ORDER" BRITAIN IS PROCEEDING ON THREE FRONTS
(1) DELAY AND DIVIDE EXAMPLES (A) ANGLOAMERICAN COMMITTEE
(B) ATTEMPTS TO SPLIT AMERICAN AND JEWISH PUBLIC OPINION
(2) BETRAYAL EXAMPLES (A) 1939 WHITE PAPER (B) REPUDIATION
OF BEVINS PROMISE CARRY OUT ANGLOAMERICAN COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS. (3) ATTACK. EXAMPLES (A) SUSPENSION OF
CIVIL LIBERTIES (B) ATTEMPTED DESTRUCTION OF HAGANAH IN
SPITE OUR COMMITTEE'S CONVICTION THAT TO ASKS JEWS TO LAY
DOWN ARMS AT THIS TIME WOULD BE TO INVITE POGROMS.

(C) BEVINS ATTACK YESTERDAY ON AMERICAN ZIONISTS REGARDING
YOUR SUGGESTION I WOULD THINK THAT IF SENATOR TAFT AND
SENATOR WAGNER CALLED JOINTLY AT WHITE HOUSE URGING THAT
PRESIDENTS COMMITTEE BE CALLED TO WASHINGTON FOR
CONSULTATION OBJECTIVE YOU HAVE IN MIND MIGHT BE
ACCOMPLISHED BELIEVE HUTCHESON RELUCTANT TO ACT WITHOUT
WHITE HOUSE INVITATION =

BARTLEY C CRUM.

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TELEGRAM TO BARTLEY CRUM -- DAY LETTER
2-20-47


WILL BE DELIGHTED TO SEE YOU IN CLEVELAND ON FEBRUARY 28.
CAN YOU HAVE DINNER WITH ME AT MY HOME THAT EVENING STOP
REFEREE OF PALESTINE ISSUE TO UNO WHICH ACCORDING TO BEVIN
MAY NOT CONSIDER THE MATTER FOR A YEAR AND MAY NOT ARRIVE AT ANY
DECISION FOR A LONG TIME THEREAFTER POINTS UP THE TRAGEDY OF THE
REFUGEES WHO WILL CONTINUE TO LANGUISH IN THE CAMPS STOP. BEVIN
HAS STATED THAT PRESENT IMMIGRATION SCHEDULE OF 1500 WILL CONTINUE
STOP IS THERE ~~XXX~~ ANYTHING THAT CAN BE DONE BY THE AMERICAN
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY AT THIS TIME TO CALL UPON
OUR GOVERNMENT TO PRESS VIGOROUSLY FOR A RELAXATION OF
IMMIGRATION SCHEDULE PENDING FINAL DECISION AT UNO STOP KINDEST
REGARDS.

ABBA HILLEL SILVER



CROSSROAD IN PALESTINE

BY BARTLEY C. CRUM



*Reprinted From Collier's
Issue Dated March 22, 1947*

In the fall of 1945 after President Truman had urged that 100,000 displaced persons from Europe be allowed by the British to enter Palestine, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee replied that he did not know whether this was feasible and suggested that an Anglo-American fact-finding committee study the situation. Such a committee was named, including six Americans and six Britons. One of the American members, appointed by President Truman, was a Republican, Bartley C. Crum, San Francisco corporation lawyer. The committee held hearings in Washington, New York, London, Cairo and Jerusalem, and investigated the condition of displaced persons in Europe as well as the relations between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. It later issued a unanimous report urging the admission of 100,000 refugees to Palestine and making other recommendations. In this article Mr. Crum looks behind the record of British and American dealings in Palestine. It is an excerpt from his forthcoming book, *Behind the Silken Curtain*, and represents the viewpoint of one member of the committee

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WHEN I was appointed one of the six American members of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, I was brought face to face with a problem which, I was to discover, presents the greatest issues of our time in microcosm. I was to learn much about how governments govern; about the prejudices that underlie the thinking of the leaders of nations; about the way democracy must go if it is to survive; and, particularly, about one of the great social and national experiments of our time—the tangled, tragic, yet deeply promising twentieth-century history of the Jews.

American foreign policy is, of course, of prime importance to the American people. We desperately need an honest, forthright policy, so grounded on moral principle that it will hold equally for China, the atomic bomb, Germany or Palestine. The basic question in Palestine, indeed, is whether the Western democracies possess such a moral principle. If they do, then we, the free people of the West, will win out. If they do not, the Middle East may well become the breeding place of new wars.

It is imperative that we think clearly on this subject. But we cannot do so if the facts are veiled. It is for this reason that I write now.

Almost the very afternoon I arrived in Washington for our Committee's first hearings I was briefed on the subject of Palestine. Loy W. Henderson, chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the State Department, took me aside, and observed, "Mr. Crum, one fact faces both the United States and Great Britain: That

is the Soviet Union. It would be wise to bear that in mind when you consider the Palestine problem."

Sometime later I heard the same view expressed by a representative of the British Foreign Office: British policy was based on the protection of British interests against Russia and it should be to our advantage to fall in line with that policy.

This viewpoint was iterated when we embarked on the Queen Elizabeth for Europe. Climbing the stairs to the sun deck to attend our first shipboard meeting, I was chatting with Evan Wilson, of the Near Eastern desk of the State Department and chief of the American experts assigned to us. "If your Committee reaches a decision on Palestine which could be interpreted as too favorable to the Jews," he was saying, "an aroused Arab world may turn to the Soviet Union for support. The Committee must consider that seriously."

I turned to him. "If your words reflect the position of the State Department," I said, "how can you square that with all the assurances this government and the British Labor party have made to the Jews? Or does anyone know the real position of the State Department?"

Wilson looked at me quizzically. "The Department can't always make its confidential records public," he said. "But I can tell you that our concern is shared both by the British Foreign and Colonial Offices!"

I had a chance to read some of those confidential records on our third day out. I was handed a document marked "Contents of file of

Despite top-level battling, Arabs and Jews live peacefully together when their settlements meet in the desert, the Anglo-American Committee members reported



CROSSROAD IN PALESTINE

Continued

confidential communication on Palestine supplied by Division of Near Eastern Affairs for use of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry." It dealt with seventeen items—dispatches, cables, correspondence, memoranda of conversations. This was a resumé of the State Department secret file on Palestine, the existence of which apparently not even President Truman had known.

According to this file, since September 15, 1938, each time a promise was made to American Jewry regarding Palestine, the State Department promptly sent messages to the Arab rulers discounting it and reassuring them, in effect, that regardless of what was said or promised publicly to the Jews, nothing would be done to change the situation in Palestine without consulting the Arabs. (When I charged last summer that the middle levels of the State Department had sabotaged President Truman's Palestine policy, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson denied my charges. I challenged him then to make public the communications in this secret file. To this writing, Mr. Acheson has remained silent.)

It was a sorry and bitter record for an American to read. When I had finished I said, "I think I ought to book passage home as soon as we arrive in Southampton. I don't see that there is any purpose in going on with our work."

Sir John Singleton, the British co-chairman of our Committee of Inquiry, said dryly, "It appears that Great Britain is not the only power who promises the same thing to two different groups."

My reading of the record recalled to me the promises which the Jews had been given throughout the years of the Roosevelt Administration. Two of them stood out: The first was the Democratic party plank adopted at the 1944 convention in Chicago, reading, "We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."

A Personal Pledge from F.D.R.

The other was President Roosevelt's letter in October, 1944, to Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York, which was to be read before the convention of the Zionist Organization of America. In his letter the President not only reiterated the plank of his party, but also committed himself personally as follows: "Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim, and if re-elected I shall help to bring about its realization."

I remembered, too, President Roosevelt's statement, made after his Red Sea visit with Ibn-Saud, and less than a month before his death, in which he reaffirmed his pro-Zionist stand. Dr. Stephen S. Wise, the veteran Zionist leader, was authorized to quote him: "I made my position on Zionism clear in October. That position I have not changed and shall continue to seek to bring about its earliest realization."

But the State Department record presented a very different picture. Here, for example, was proof that when the Iraq prime minister questioned the authenticity of the statement quoted by Dr. Wise, he received a secret cable from the State Department assuring him that the statement "referred to possible action at some future date," and adding that when

President Roosevelt wrote his letter to Senator Wagner he was "of course keeping in mind the assurances made to certain Near East governments regarding consultations with the Arabs."

The chronological story was as follows: On May 26, 1943, a highly confidential note to King Ibn-Saud from us asserted that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine would be reached "without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews." On October 26, 1943, in a secret cable to the acting foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, the U.S. took the position that "we sympathize with the aspirations of the people of the Near East to attain full independence and strengthen the ties between them."

While this message may have been designed to offset the pro-Axis broadcasts then being made from Berlin by the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem,* it certainly encouraged the Arabs at this critical moment to believe the United States might repudiate the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine.

Secret Messages to the Arabs

From time to time, as American Jewry obtained Congressional support, our State Department—on February 24, 1944, again on March 4, 1944, and on March 28, 1944—reassured Cairo, Yemen, Bagdad, Beyrouth, Damascus and Jidda by secret diplomatic cablegram that President Roosevelt's views remain unchanged and there would be no decision without consultation with the Arabs.

Then came Dr. Wise's statement of the President's position. This was followed not only by the reassuring message cited above to the Iraq prime minister, but by similar messages to King Ibn-Saud of Saudi Arabia, the regent of Iraq, the prime minister of Lebanon, the emir of Trans-Jordan, and the prime minister of Egypt. The only part of this correspondence made public so far is the now-famous exchange between Ibn-Saud and President Roosevelt in March and April of 1945.

Similar messages were sent by the State Department under President Truman's Administration. On August 16, 1945, President Truman revealed that he had discussed Palestine with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Attlee at Potsdam, and that they wanted to allow as many Jews into Palestine as possible. But shortly after, on October 23d, in a confidential cable to Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus, Beyrouth and Jidda, the State Department explained this away by asserting that President Truman and the prime ministers "engaged in exploratory correspondence on this subject and naturally mentioned Palestine as one of the havens for homeless Jews, but there has been no change in this government's previously announced attitude on Palestine." On November 15, 1945, another similar reassurance was given to the Arab world.

No doubt those who drafted these dispatches to the Arabs believed themselves astute. I can think of no more perfect illustration of the danger of power politics and secret diplomacy than this "secret file." It exists in our State Department. Its counterpart undoubtedly exists in the British Foreign Office. Many are apt to say that open covenants openly arrived at are not practical. But the results of British and Amer-

*The Mufti reached the high point of his exhortations to the Arabs on March 4, 1944, when the United States Monitoring Service heard him broadcast to the world: "Arabs! Rise as one and fight for your sacred rights. Kill the Jews wherever you find them. This pleases God, history, and religion. This saves your honor. God is with you."

ican policy in the Middle East, based upon this cynical belief that one can be all things to all people, has only been to alienate both Jews and Arabs and to bring about among the small peoples of the world a profound disillusionment with the great democratic powers.

The attitude of some of the British members of the Committee of Inquiry to these disclosures was painful to me. Sir Frederick Leggett, a noted Labor conciliator and a friend of Ernest Bevin, was almost amused. Richard Crossman, the brilliant Labor Member of Parliament, said he could not understand the stupidity that would permit us to do a thing like that, "but I must say it pleases me to find the British and the Americans are in the same boat."

Sir John Singleton, our British co-chairman, consoled me. In his stateroom he explained matters. "Really, the Jews are not the most important factor at all," he said. "The important thing is Anglo-American co-operation. Since these promises of yours have put both nations in the dock together, it only serves to bring us closer in the world ahead."

As for the reaction of the Americans on the Committee, I think I was more deeply depressed than any of them. Dr. James G. McDonald, Honorary Chairman of the Foreign Policy Association of New York, was a veteran in the diplomatic business, as was Ambassador William C. Phillips. I am afraid neither of them was very surprised. Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., of the Fifth Circuit Court, Houston, Texas, who was the American co-chairman of the Committee, was most displeased, but felt that as agents of President Truman we should not consider ourselves bound by the State Department records. Frank W. Buxton, then editor of the Boston Herald, a Republican and former Willkie man, put the best possible face on it. He said, "In spite of all the correspondence, we'll call the shots as we see them."

I sought to get a clarification of the British point of view on Palestine from Harold Beeley, a member of the British Foreign Office who had been assigned to the Committee as a Near East expert. One evening in the ship's lounge he explained his views to Buxton and me. The Palestine issue, Beeley said, must be seen in the framework of strong Soviet expansionism. The Russians planned to move down into the Middle East. The United States, therefore, would do well to join Britain in establishing a *cordon sanitaire* of Arab states. If Palestine were declared an Arab state, it would be a strong link in this chain.

Beeley was frankly pro-Arab. He had

tremendous influence with the British committee members. The impression I had been given was that our experts were to be neutral on the Palestine question. We were a committee of inquiry, charged to find the facts; surely we should be able to turn to our experts for advice. Yet, if the British brought a pro-Arab adviser, we were not guiltless either.

Among the letters I carried aboard the Queen Elizabeth was one from a Washington newspaperman. He had enclosed a newspaper clipping reporting a speech in which one of our American experts, an authority on Semitic languages, had ascribed Palestine's troubles to the "misguided efforts of the Zionist movement to secure political control of the country for the Jews." The note that accompanied the clipping concluded, "You wouldn't say the cards are being stacked, would you?"

Surveillance on Shipboard

Once in London, I felt for the first time the strange sensation of being watched. I do not say that I was being trailed day and night. But aboard the Queen Elizabeth I had been told that it was not wise to send confidential messages over the ship's radio to Washington. Beeley was in charge of our arrangements in London and when we arrived I discovered that I was to share a room in the Hyde Park Hotel with one of my British colleagues. It seemed reasonable to suppose that members of governmental committees might have rooms of their own. I was keeping a diary, making and receiving many personal telephone calls, and I preferred privacy. I broached the subject a number of times, and on the third day I was given a room of my own.

Nonetheless a British member of the Committee cautioned me to be careful to whom I spoke and particularly to choose my words when I was on the telephone. I took this as a pleasant way of letting me know that my conversations were being tapped, that we were under some form of surveillance. I was to be aware of this curious sense of espionage throughout the course of our investigation in Europe, Egypt, and Palestine, where finally whoever was opening my letters did not trouble to reseat them.

One afternoon I returned to the London offices of the Committee to find George Wadsworth, our minister to Lebanon, closeted with one of the American members. I was interested to know what an American diplomat, stationed at Beyrouth, was doing in London. He had come to us, it developed, as an emis-



sary of the Arabs. The Arabs wished to testify before us—but in private.

I was against this as were most of the Committee. All witnesses had given evidence publicly so that the opposition had been able to hear what was said and had had an opportunity to refute it. Wadsworth must have gained a rather lively impression of our reaction to his suggestion, for the following day word was received from the Royal Egyptian Embassy that five Arab spokesmen wished to appear before us—publicly.

In London I was most eager to see how the British Labor party would meet the issue of its pledges on behalf of Jewish development of Palestine. In December, 1944, the Labor party had adopted a Palestine plank reading, in part, "There is surely neither hope nor meaning in a Jewish National Home unless we are prepared to let the Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority. There was a strong case for this before the war, and there is an irresistible case for it now, after the unspeakable atrocities of the cold-blooded, calculated German-Nazi plan to kill all the Jews of Europe." How would Labor M.P.s react to this pledge now? Part of the answer came in the testimony of Thomas Reid, Laborite Member of Parliament.

Hasty Labor Party Resolutions

Reid was forthright: His party's pledges on Palestine had been "hurried through" the Labor party conferences. There was practically no discussion of them. He added, smiling, "I think the average party member had about as much knowledge of the Palestine problem as I have of the moon. These resolutions were put forward and accepted because nobody objected, as far as I can remember."

One of the British members of the Committee, Wilfred Crick, adviser to the Midland Bank, leaned forward. Precise and formal, he asked: "Would you care, for the benefit of our American colleagues, in particular, to give us your view as to the weight which is to be attached to these declarations? There might be some presumption that a declaration passed by the party conference could be expected to hold out a flag as to the direction in which the government might move when it assumed office. Have you any comment to make for our American friends on that prospect?"

"Would you agree," Crick continued, "that it is not entirely without precedent that political parties, when they are faced with the responsibility of government, do sometimes qualify the policies they have expressed?"

"I am afraid it is worse than that," said Reid promptly. "Sometimes political parties make promises which they do not at all carry out. I do not think the Committee need pay an enormous amount of attention to vague resolutions passed at Labor party conferences."

Dr. James McDonald spoke up sharply:

"I'm a good deal troubled by these answers, Mr. Reid. Being a naïve Amer-

ican, I had thought much about the pronouncements of the Labor party. I had supposed that while they might not indicate a binding obligation, they definitely indicated a party line. I suppose that is not the line which you have suggested. Is that correct, Mr. Reid?"

Reid rubbed his nose. "You must not ask me, sir," he said.

I was studying the memorandum Reid had presented to the Committee. One paragraph seemed to call for explanation. I read it to him:

"On pages 8 and 9 you state: 'The Arab states occupied some of the most important strategic positions in the world at least before the atomic bomb upset former world strategy. It behooves the practical man either to get their friendship, sealed in treaties, or to exterminate the lot, not a very paying proposition. Then

"As I have stated in the memorandum," he said, "this Committee should not bother their heads about the oil or the greatness of the position of Ibn-Saud, but simply on the question of justice and legality."

I had no further questions to ask of Reid, but I could have wished that someone else had appeared as their spokesman. As I left this session of the hearings I came upon Harold Laski, the theoretician of British Socialism. I checked with him on Reid's statement that the Palestine pledges were vague and hurried.

Laski denied this emphatically. "Far from hurried," he said. "The Palestine plank was carefully studied for several years, I can tell you, and it represented the mature opinion of Labor party members. I regard it as absolutely binding on the party."



"You've got to hand it to them, the way they went at getting us to leave. First, running out of liquor, then getting the kid to play his violin, then bringing out the home movies—and finally . . ."

COLLIER'S

SALO ROTH

Saudi Arabia has a lot of oil which the world needs. The practical man will conclude that the great warrior king, Ibn-Saud, is worth cultivating."

"Would you mind explaining that a little further?" I asked.

There were some chuckles from the gallery, and Reid reddened. "I am glad you gave me a chance of pointing out that I totally disapprove of the views of the narrow practical man, as stated here," he asserted. "I want to make it quite clear. I quoted the narrow practical man because I disagree with him."

"You don't think our decision should be made on the basis of oil and of friendship with Ibn-Saud?" I asked.

I myself had the opportunity to see a promise made and broken in the course of the next few weeks. While in London, Foreign Minister Bevin tendered our Committee a luncheon. He spoke frankly to us. The British government would take our counsel. "We will accept your recommendations," he declared.

I have since charged publicly that Mr. Bevin made this promise and the only reply to date is that the British Foreign Office "has no record" of it.

Bevin and Attlee Criticized

I may say that I never dreamed that when we finally produced our report urg-

ing that 100,000 Jewish displaced persons from Europe be permitted to enter Palestine immediately, our entire report would be discarded by Mr. Bevin and Mr. Attlee. Here, after all, were the unanimous recommendations of a joint commission of investigation representing two great nations and set up at the invitation of the British government.

Yet, I suppose I should have suspected that there was more truth than fiction in Beeley's casual observation toward the end of our stay in Lausanne, Switzerland, where we wrote our report. He made it with a twinkle in his eye—an offhand remark—"Well, after all, we certainly won't implement any such program as this."

And I remember Sir John Singleton's repeated warning with a hesitant cough and clearing of throat, "You know, Crum, these are only recommendations."

Yes, they were only recommendations, but they were made in good faith and in the belief that governments base their acts on decency and morality. Our Committee had gone through the crowded displaced persons' camps in Germany, Austria and Italy. We had seen the unspeakable conditions in Poland. We had heard the testimony of competent Jewish, Christian and Arab witnesses. We had studied Arab-Jewish relationships on the spot in Palestine, and had realized that the political conflicts on high levels did not affect the relations between the men on the street.

We had conferred with British military authorities in Cairo and Jerusalem, and we had been assured that it was feasible to allow 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine, that the repercussions likely on the part of the Arab world were highly exaggerated and no great trouble was anticipated; and it was our unanimous opinion that it would be consonant both with human decency and the best interests of the peoples of all the Middle East to make this recommendation. Our report was filed with President Truman, who endorsed it. He said there was no reason for the British to delay further the issuance of these 100,000 certificates.

Every newspaper reader knows the bitterness and disorder that have followed. Unrest in Palestine is part of the troubled pattern of the entire Middle East, and it is to our own interest as a nation to work out democratic policy which will keep that area from being a springboard to new wars.

I am convinced that the free development of the Jewish community of Palestine is the key to the democratization of the Middle East. We must support that program whose wider implications were first seen by the great statesmen who framed the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine. If Britain now does not have the vision, the strength, to take the path to tomorrow rather than that to yesterday, we must point the way for her. She needs our help. Her burdens are many. For our own protection and hers, we must contribute our thought and our energy to that end.

THE END

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WRHS



THROUGH COL JOHN GOTTLEIB OF CHICAGO I TALKED ON TUESDAY
WITH GAEL SULLIVAN AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MOSHE
SHERTOK TO SEE HIM WEDNESDAY YOU PROBABLY KNOW RESULTS
BY NOW GOTTLEIB ALSO TALKED WITH KILLION NILES MATT
CONNELLY AND OTHERS WHO SHOULD BE ABLE HELP WADSWORTH
DEFINITELY OUT AM SEEKING ARRANGE CONTINUANCES ON PENDING
MATTERS AND WILL ADVISE YOU TOMORROW FRIDAY SHALOM=
BART CRUM..

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PHILIP KIDD
OF COUNSEL

May 9, 1947

Dear Dr. Silver:

You have doubtless seen the attached clipping
from today's New York Times.

What would you think of the possibility of
trying to get Crum, Hutcheson and Aydelotte either
to testify before the U.N. committee and/or to sub-
mit a statement to it?

Sincerely,

Oscar Cox

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Enclosure

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, MAY 9, 1947.

46 PALESTINE REPORT UPHELD BY AMERICANS

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

JERUSALEM, May 8—The recommendations of last year's Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine are still fully applicable despite altered conditions, according to three American members.

Cabled views to this effect from Judge J. C. Hutcheson of the Circuit Court of Appeals of New Orleans, Bartley Crum of San Francisco and Frank Aydelotte of Princeton, N. J., have been received by the Tel Aviv newspaper Mishmar, organ of the Socialist Hashomer Hatzair. They will be published tomorrow.

The Mishmar solicited answers to these questions: "First, do you still stand by the report of your committee? Second, what is your estimate of what would be the present situation if the report were implemented? Third, what would you recommend now to the United Nations? Fourth, what is your judgment on the present situation and the prospects of a settlement?" In general, all three agreed that conditions here would be much better if this committee's recommendations had been adopted.