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Confidential notes, Abba Hillel Silver, 1943-1944.

I N D E X

CONFIDENTIAL NOTES

- BERLE, A. A., JR. -- Interview - June 4, 1943
Guidance on American policy re Palestine.
- BLOOM, SOL -- Interview - October 11, 1943
Discussion of White Paper -- attitude of our Government.
- FRANKFURTER, Justice Felix -- Interview - October 12, 1943
Discussion of campaign against White Paper.
- CELLER, Congressman Emanuel -- Interview - October 12, 1943
Dr. Silver asks Celler to Delay action on resolution until
he hears further from American Zionist Emergency Council.
- ROSENMAN, Sam J. -- Interview - October 12, 1943
Discussion of White Paper and attitude of our Government
towards it.
- BERGSON, Peter - Interview - October 12, 1943
Bergson outlines new project for League for Free Palestine.
- MEAD, Senator James M. - October 12, 1943
Senator Mead telephoned. He said in general way optimistic about
situation -- attitude of give and take would bring about
satisfactory solution.
- KAUFFMANN, Henrik de (Danish Minister) - October 12, 1943
Dr. Silver pays call on Minister -- expresses admiration
for evidence of humanity towards Jewish citizens in
Denmark.
- STEINHARDT, Ambassador -- Interview -- October 18, 1943
Steinhardt says attitude of FDR basically friendly to
Zionist cause.
- MENDELSON, Colonel Morris)
NATANYAHU) - Interview - October 18
Discussed coming in of Revisionists into Zionist Emergency Council.
- PAASSEN, Pierre van -- Interview - October 18, 1944
Van Paassen pledges help.
- LEHMAN, Governor - Interview - October 29, 1943
Discussion of conference on relief and rehabilitation of United
Nations. Also discussed White Paper and attitude of our Government
toward it.
- STETTINIUS, Edward E. Jr. -- Interview - October 29, 1943
Dr. Mahum Goldmann also present. Discussion of White Paper and
Government's contacts with Ibn Sa'ud. Stettinius suggests we
write letter soliciting information and asking for guidance on
subject of Ibn Sa'ud.

WELLES, SUMNER -- Interview - October 29, 1943

Discussion of White Paper -- need for guidance from our government officials.

MEYER, Eugene -- Interview -- October 29, 1943

Report of conversation Meyer had with President. (See report of Henry Monitor on this subject)

MORGENTHAU, Henry Jr. -- Interview - November 8, 1943

Spoke of recent visit to No. Africa -- concerned about militarization of Jews of Palestine. M. depressed about gen. fate of minorities at this time. Expressed desire to be of help.

HALIFAX, Lord -- Interview -- November 8, 1943

Discussed (1) Is White Paper policy fixed?

(2) What is status of Jewish Nation Home in Arab Fed. which is being discussed and presumably fostered by British Government?

BERLIN, I. of British Embassy -- telephoned Nov. 10, 1943

Stated that statement will be made in House of Commons on subject of White Paper.

LODGE, Henry Cabot Jr. -- Interview -- Nov. 19, 1943

Discussion of White Paper, Palestine as National Home, introduction of resolution -- reaffirmation of Lodge Palestine Resolution -- in Congress. Senator Lodge offers support and cooperation.

McCORMACK, John W. -- Interview -- Nov. 19, 1943

Elihu E. Stone also present. Discussion along similar lines to one with Lodge. Discussed absorptive capacity of Palestine. Advisability of introducing resolution in Congress. McCormack promises to speak with FDR.

MURRAY, Wallace -- Interview -- Nov. 19, 1943

Paul Alling, Gordon Merriam, Dr. Wise and Dr. Goldmann also present. Discussed stories in paper re partition and establishment of Arab Federation; also attitude of British Government.

MEAD, James -- Evening at home of Mr. Leichtman -- Nov. 29, 1943

The Senator reports on recent trip around world with particular reference to Great Britain, No. Africa and Palestine. Behind British position is question of oil in Arab countries.

BLOOM, Congressman -- Interview -- Nov. 30, 1943

Congressman Bloom thinks Palestine Resolution should be introduced in Senate, preferably by Senator Barkley. Urges that Dr. Wise should attend hearing of Foreign Affairs Committee on Resolution.

TAFT, Robert A. -- Interview -- Nov. 30, 1943

Taft given background of present situation with ref. to Palestine and White Paper. Indicates real interest.

"CHEDER" Group -- meeting at home Mr. Taub -- Nov. 30, 1943

40 economists, scientists, etc. present. Discussed present status of Zionist Movement in America, story of American Jewish Conference, present British policy with reference to Palestine; also of our own government.

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EXECUTIVE MEETING - American Zionist Emergency Council -- Dec. 1, 1943
Unanimous opinion that Commonwealth idea should be tied up with
campaign against White Paper.

MENDELSSOHN, Col. - meeting -- Dec. 14, 1943
Ben Horin also present. They are asked to answer two questions asked
by Pal. Exec. to which Ben Horin wrote reply which was forwarded
to Jerusalem.

PRESS CONFERENCE -- Dec. 14, 1943
Told 30 representatives of Jewish press the work of the Emergency
Council. Discussion developed around activities of Bergson group.

HILLMAN, Sidney - Interview -- Dec. 15, 1943
Hillman does not think wise for him assume chairmanship of Labor
Committee. Is prepared to all he can to help cause.

WALKER, Postmaster Frank -- Dec. 23, 1943
Postmaster Walker telephoned. Said no change in attitude of President.
Said we would hear from President before long, that there would be something
which would please us.

STRAUS, Nathan - January 11, 1944
I telephone him. Ask if anything further from Postmaster Walker.
Following morning Mr. Montor relays message to me.

HULL, Cordell -- Interview - January 12, 1944
Said statement from Churchill should be forthcoming before end of
March. Anxious to leave no doubt that his Department much interested
in Palestine. Show him our resolution.

HOSKINS, Colonel -- Interview -- Jan. 12, 1944
We discuss his earlier memorandum which I criticized. Said sole
object was to keep peace during war. He thought there was danger
of arousing anti-Semitism in country by too strong Palestine
aggression.

CLARK, Senator Bennett Champ -- Interview - Jan. 12, 1944
Said he would vote for Palestine Resolution.

BARKLEY, Senator -- Interview -- January 12, 1944.
He will vote for Resolution -- said it was good and mild enough.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - January 27, 1944
Palestine Resolution introduced by James A. Wright, of Pa. and
Ranulf Compton of Conn.

SENATE - February 1, 1944
Palestine Resolution introduced by Senator Wagner of N.Y. and Senator Taft
of Ohio

TAFT, Robert A. - Interview -- Feb. 2, 1944.
Discussed resolution.

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WAGNER, Robert -- Interview - Feb. 2, 1944

Discussed resolution. Wagner brought matter up that morning before Foreign Relations Committee. Vandenberg wanted know attitude of War Department and Secretary of State. Committee awaits word.

BLOOM, Sol -- Interview -- Feb. 2, 1944

Impression that Bloom in complete sympathy with resolution and will work for it. Hearings set for Tues. Feb. 8. Wolsey, for Council for Judaism, asks to be heard in opposition.

WADSWORTH, James M. -- Interview -- Feb. 3, 1944

Concerned with British and military angle.

BOLTON, Congressman Frances -- Interview -- Feb. 3, 1944

ERTEGUN, Ambassador Murir -- (Turkish) -- Interview -- Feb. 3, 1944

I requested at request of Shertok larger quota of transfer visas for refugees through Turkey. Ambassador said he would convey request to his government.

PRESS CONFERENCE -- Feb. 3, 1944

Held at Hotel Willard -- attended by group of Washington newspapermen representing all press services of the country. Questions and answers about White Paper, Palestine.

BERLE, Adolf A., Jr. -- Interview - Feb. 3, 1944

Discussed what being done as first acts of War Refugee Board. Took up matter of Turkish transfer visas.

NOTES RE INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT.

Originally set for December 2 - postponed by Dr. Wise to Feb. 14.

HEARINGS BEFORE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF HOUSE - Feb. 8, 1944

Dr. Silver spoke in A.M.

ROSENMAN, Judge Samuel -- Interview -- Feb. 8, 1944

Discussed coming appointment with President.

Discussed advisability of President issuing statement on White Paper and Jewish Commonwealth in reply to the many petitions which reached him. Dr. Silver drafted statement for submission to the President.

ROSENMAN, Judge Samuel -- Interview Feb. 10, 1944

Meeting with President postponed. War Department sent letter to Foreign Relations Committee and Foreign Affairs committee speaking against consideration of Resolutions at this time.

Nahum Goldmann had been calling on Rosenman frequently, representing himself as official spokesman of Zionist Emergency Council.

MARSHALL, General (Chief of Staff) -- Feb. 23, 1944

Appears before Foreign Relations Committee in opposition to Palestine Resolution.

MCCLOY, John - Ass't Sec'y of War - Interview -- Feb. 23

F. F. and McCloy meet and F.F. goes over ground.

NILES - at White House -- contacted by Feuer and Heller -- to get expression from White House on Resolutions or on White Paper.

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STETTINIUS -- Interview -- Feb. 24, 1944

Stettinius suggests I see Breckenridge Long.

LONG, Breckenridge -- Interview -- Feb. 24, 1944

I make it clear that failure of State Department to express itself negatively when consulted, encouraged us to go on with Resolution.

WAGNER and NILES TO SEE PRESIDENT next Monday.

WALKER, Postmaster General Frank -- Interview -- Feb. 28, 1944

Walker promised to inquire of President as to situation and would let me know.

KNOX, Secretary of Navy -- Interview -- Feb. 28, 1944.

Knox is friendly but called attention to military situation in Italy and to oil negotiations in which U.S. interested. Said he would see President.

WALKER, Frank -- Telephoned him -- March 1, 1944

Walker stated State Department view prevails. Attitude of War Department holds. It may change in future.

FEUER, Leon -- Telephoned me from Washington -- March 4, 1944

Said Senator Wagner had seen President -- President reassuring words about Palestine. President indicates willingness to see leaders of Movement. Wagner repeats telephone conversations and states appointment made for Wise and me March 9. Wise in Florida.

FISHER, Judge called -- March 6, 1944

Sees McCormack who also conveys reassuring report. Indicated that President would get in touch on Monday or Tuesday with Churchill.

Cabinet meeting held previous Saturday at which decided not to do anything about matter at this time.

New York Times and Herald Tribune of New York carry front page stories of Marshall's intervention in Congress Resolution; also Arab protests.

ROOSEVELT, Franklin D. -- Interview - March 9, 1944

Dr. Wise and I received by President. We are authorized to issue statement by President. President states our Government never gave its approval to White Paper of 1939.

BLOOM, Sol -- March 17, 1944

Bloom calls meeting of Foreign Affairs Committee at which McCloy and military present. Take formal action to defer action on our resolution and issue statement.

MADISON SQUARE GARDEINS -- March 21, 1944

Demonstration against White Paper held. Addressed by Senators Taft, Wagner, Barkley, Matthew Woll, Dorothy Thompson and myself.

EMERGENCY COMMITTEE MEETING - March 27, 1944

Full meeting held. Set-to with "W" over calling of conference of Community Contact Chairman.

EMERGENCY COMMITTEE MEETING - April 3, 1944

All-day session. "W" presses for appointment of political steering committee. Referred to program committee.

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DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION -- Notes July 14 - 20th, 1944
Palestine plank included in Democratic Platform.

EXECUTIVE MEETING OF EMERGENCY COUNCIL -- August 14, 1944

Dr. Wise reads letter from Nahum Goldmann in which conversation which Goldmann with Stettinius reported. Appointment with AHS and Stettinius postponed.
(See letter in Confidential Notes addressed to Emanuel Neumann and Dr. Wise under date of August 18.)

AHS RESIGNATION - August 16, 1944

(See Letter to Arthur Lourie - that date.)

MEETING OF PROGRAM COMMITTEE - August 22, 1944

Re resignation of Dr. Silver. Resolutions submitted. (See Confidential Notes)

FULL SESSION AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL -- September 14, 1944

Dr. Silver attends meeting. Agreement reached. (See Confidential Notes)

TAFT, Robert A. - September 5, 1944

Dr. Silver telephones Senator - asks his advice about Resolution.
Taft says he would write letter to War Department inquiring about its present attitude; also he would speak to Senator Wagner.

ZARITSKY - September 8, 1944

Dr. Silver telephones Z. Asks him to get in touch with Wagner.

TAFT, Robert A. - September 12, 1944

Dr. Silver telephones Taft. No word received as yet from Stimson. Talked with Senator Connally who is non-committal. Thought Congress may adjourn October 1-7

ZARITSKY - September 12, 1944

Dr. Silver speaks with Z. Not yet able to contact Senator Wagner who is out of city.

SACK, Leo -- September 19, 1944

Sack telephones Dr. Silver. Had seen Connally who said would be no action on Resolutions unless War Department removed its objections; also had advised Wagner to see Stimson. Since then had not seen Wagner nor had he had report. Felt sure something would be done immediately after war about Palestine. He not against resolution.

SHULMAN, Herman -- September 19, 1944

Dr. Silver telephones Shulman. Reports conversation with Sack. Shulman states appointment made to meet with Assistant Sec'y of War, McCloy, on Wednesday, September 20. Suggest contact with Bloom re quick action on Resolution.

TAFT, Robert A. -- September 19, 1944

Dr. Silver telephones Taft. No reply yet to Taft's letter to Stimson.
Dr. Silver tells him of delegation and Senator Wagner's meeting with McCloy and suggests that Taft get in touch with McCloy. Taft had spoken to Senator Austin -- not in favor of taking action on Resolution before adjournment of Congress.

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KELLY, Gene -- March 28, 1944

Mr. Kelly dictates statement to Miss Borowsky. President has weekly press conference at White House at which he says because of military situation can find no fault with Army opposition to continuation of Jewish immigration into Pal, etc.

HURLEY, General Patrick -- Interview -- April 4, 1944

AKSIN, Benjamin -- April 4, 1944

Aksin calls on me. Approves of introduction of resolutions.

WOLFSON, Leo -- Interview - April 4, 1944

Consult with him about proper person to head our Washington Bureau. He is eager to be helpful.

WAINHOUSE, Colonel -- meeting -- April 4, 1944

Said he thought British might welcome some form of shared responsibility with American Government in Near East to offset Russian influence.

GOLDSTEIN, Attorney General Nathaniel L. -- luncheon-- May 2, 1944

Discussed introduction of plank in Republican Platform.

FORTAS, Mr. - Interview -- May 3, 1944

At New Interior Building - Washington. Believes arrangement between U. S. and Great Britain re Arabian oil will help Jewish National Home. Suggests Jewish Agency make gesture to assist Saudi Arabia thro UNRA. Convinced Wallace Murray hostile element and should be removed. Thought intervention of military unwarranted.

VANDENBURG, Senator -- Interview -- May 4, 1944

Senator of opinion military objection is decisive -- no action until military situation cleared up.

GILLETTE, Senator -- Interview -- May 4, 1944

Feels Great Britain behind action of military. Thinks key to situation lies there and in State Department. He is anti-British, as is Vandenburg.

BRITISH EMBASSY -- May 24, 1944

Lourie and Isaiah Berlin and AHS visit British Embassy.

COMMUNITY CONTACTS CHAIRMEN Conference -- May 23 and 24.

Held at Statler Hotel - Washington. Excellent meeting -- good spirit. Conference closed with testimonial to Dr. Lowdermilk.

TAFT, Senator Robert A. -- June 12, 1944

Taft telephones from Washington. Senator Bridges and he had been requested to submit letter to State Department or President on rights of United States in Palestine. (See Confidential notes June 12, 1944)

REPUBLICAN CONVENTION -- HISTORY OF INTRODUCTION OF PALESTINE PLANK IN REPUB. PLATFORM.
April 26 - June 28.

EXECUTIVE MEETING - AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL - July 10, 1944

Full report of adoption of Palestine plank in Republican Platform made. Criticisms on part of some of part criticising President.

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TAFT, Robert A. -- September 19, 1944

Senator Taft called from Washington. Had talked to McCloy. McCloy had made official inquiry -- no reply.

SHULMAN, Herman -- September 19, 1944

Dr. Silver called Mr. Shulman - informed him of what Senator Taft said; also that Vandenburg said there would be difficulty getting quorum in Foreign Affairs Committee. Shulman said had been in touch with Goldstein who said he would get in touch with Bloom

SACK, Leo - September 20, 1944

Mr. Sack phoned from Washington reporting meeting with McCloy.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, JUNE 4, 1943

10:30 - Meeting with A. A. Berle, Jr. - Washington, D. C.

Ask for guidance on American policy re Palestine -- criticism in our ranks because of apparent "withdrawal" -- approaching American Jewish Conference.

Answer of Assistant Berle - dictated by military considerations. U. S. in control of Western Mediterranean -- Great Britain of Eastern Mediterranean. Military informed of possibility of "explosion". Turkey does not wish to have situation disturbed. Mr. Berle regards our policy at the moment as ill-advised. The most we can get at present - population equality with Arabs and bi-national state.

After bridge-heads are established in Europe -- from three to four months -- situation may be different. Even the British policy on the White Paper may change.

The United States may help in post-war if the American people will sanction U. S. assuming a measure of military responsibility in Palestine. (As in rest of Europe, etc.)

President Roosevelt had spoken to Churchill -- "opened" not "concluded" conversations - "status quo".

MONDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1943

4:30 to 6:10 P.M. -- Interview with Congressman Sol Bloom.

I discussed with him the White Paper and our concern about the attitude of our Government. I told him of the coming campaign against the White Paper and how important it is to have some indication of the attitude of our Government. I impressed upon him the importance of using his influence to see that the attitude of our Government is made clear in keeping with its traditional policy of friendship to the Jewish National Home.

Bloom felt that there was no fixed attitude, that the resistance of the Government was due to war conditions and that it changes as these conditions change. He had spoken to Richard Law about the 25,000 visas still available under the terms of the White Paper, and that these should be allowed to enter after March. He did not indicate whether Richard Law agreed with him. Bloom did not favor demonstrations in fighting the White Paper; only personal contacts with the proper officials. He complained that there were too many delegations who came to Washington, each speaking in the name of American Jewry.

He did not know that Colonel Hoskins was to do anything more at Ibn Saud except arrange for the visit of his two sons to the United States. He was surprised when I told him that we had been led to think that he was to sound out Ibn Saud about Palestine, etc.

Bloom was grateful for the considerable information which I gave him on the present situation and he asked to be guided in the future.

At three o'clock in the afternoon of October 11th, I held a Press Conference attended by some twenty representatives of newspapers and syndicates.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1943

11:00 - 12:00 — Interview with Justice Felix Frankfurter.

As in the case of Congressman Bloom, I told him of the campaign which we launched against the White Paper, and the urgency for discovering the true attitude of our Government. I outlined in detail our experiences with government officials in the last year, and the negative and disturbing results. I asked him about the advisability of introducing a resolution into the Congress reaffirming our Government's position of 1922. I told him of the Memorandum on the Absorptive Capacity of Palestine which we were drafting for Secretary Hull, it being clear that our Government officials had been persuaded of two things: (1) that Palestine cannot absorb large numbers of Jews and (2) that another territory should be found for refugees. *Angola* is figuring prominently.

Justice Frankfurter stated that he had ~~not~~^{not} spoken to Roosevelt about Palestine (how recently he did not say) and that he really did not know his mind. On the basis, however, of his general impressions, he felt that fundamentally, the President has not changed his mind toward Palestine, but that he has not given it much thought and that perhaps he would like to see consideration of the whole subject postponed for the time being. He thought that Mrs. Roosevelt had been impressed by her son James, whose attitude was generally friendly, but who was greatly disturbed about the possibility of Arab-Jewish strife. He said that the Near East Section in the State Department, and Mr. Murray, had always been more or less hostile. Murray was pro-Arab. Berle was unfriendly.

From Casey, an honest, but as far as Zionism is concerned, a naive person who has been following the official Colonial Office line, he nevertheless learned by inference that Churchill was not sold on that official line and that he had his own attitude on Palestine.

F. F. thought that we ought not to attack Great Britain because that would be playing into the hands of American isolationists and anti-Britishers. The

attack should be on the Palestine Government, and the appeals should be made to the sense of justice of the English people whom he greatly eulogized. He deprecated the sharp words which we have used in our publicity, and in some of my addresses.

As to the Congress resolution, his first reaction was negative, but he did not have a closed mind on it. He suggested that we explore among our friends in the House and Senate to learn whether the passage of such a resolution would be assured. He urged that our Memorandum on the Absorptive Capacity for Palestine be a first-rate document and that it be submitted to the President, ~~directly~~ ^{preferably} through Mr. Rosenman, and that he would like to see it before it is put in final shape.

He thought that that the Government should give an indication as to its present position.

12:30 P.M. -- I called on Congressman Celler. He has been very active in the State Department and elsewhere in Government circles to (1) get a statement opposing the White Paper, ~~and~~ (2) get representatives of Jewish organizations to the forthcoming Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. -- He himself would like to be sent to this Conference--and (5) sounding out the Jewish members of Congress concerning the introduction of the resolution. He had had contacts with Hull of whom he asked a letter concerning the White Paper. Such a letter was finally received, but was pure verbiage and indicated nothing. He had also spoken to Berle, Breckenbridge, Long, and others.

I thanked him for his great interest in the cause. I suggested to him that on the subject of the resolution he should delay action until he hears further from us. As far as representation to the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee is concerned he might contact the Interim Committee of the American Jewish Conference which will undoubtedly discuss the subject. From his experience I gathered the definite impression that the State Department had reached a definite position on the White Paper from which only heroic measures will be able to dislodge it. It sees eye to eye with the Palestine Government on the subject, I am afraid.

3:00-4:00 P.M. - - I saw Mr. Sam J. Rosenman at the White House. My approach was the same as with F. F. and with Congressman Bloom. I stressed, furthermore, the developing resentment among the Jews of America to the negative attitude of our Government, the silence of the State Department on the White Paper, and in general, the "changed" attitude which we have sensed within the past year, a resentment which is bound to make itself felt during the coming year. I told him that we have been left in the dark by our Government, and that therefore our propaganda frequently takes on an agitated and desperate character which could be easily obviated. Mr. Rosenman stated that he could not, of course speak for the President. He wasn't authorized, nor did he speak for the President at any time during the American Jewish Conference, nor to his best knowledge, had the President expressed any opinion about the American Jewish Conference. He was, however, confident that the President's friendly attitude had not changed, nor that of Mr. Hull. He seemed to agree with me that an expression from our Government is at present greatly indicated. He thought very highly of the Memorandum on the Absorptive Capacity of Palestine which should be presented to the President. He wondered why F. F. himself does not present it. He should be very happy to see it before it is finally drafted.

He thought that it was Col. Strong who was stressing with the State Department and others the Arab danger and the imminence of conflict in Palestine. He greatly deprecated the activities of the Bergson group, thought that something should be done to stop it. Judging from some of the reactions which he has had from non-Jewish circles, he thought that "Hitler would have been glad to pay for those ads." I indicated to him that it was due to our failure to get anywhere with the present administration that was responsible for the success of the strategy and tactics of the Bergson group. Even the conservatives might ~~have to~~ be driven to aggressive measures if they became convinced that the attitude of the present administration has become hostile to the Jewish National Home, and is playing along with the White Paper policy. Mr. Rosenman believed that our contact should be continued with Government officials before large scale public action is taken. He talked of the possibility of

sending a small commission of neutrals to investigate and to gather the true facts about Palestine to be presented to the President and to Mr. Churchill. I told him that I had no opinion at the moment on the subject, but that as far as information was concerned, it was plentifully available from objective and unimpeachable sources. The important thing is the interpretation of the facts which in the last analysis is determined by one's attitude for or against the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

I appealed to Mr. Rosenman to become our spokesman, occupying as he does, one of the few key positions in the world today in one of the most decisive hours in Jewish history. Throughout I found him most cordial and sympathetic.

5-6 P.M. Met with Peter Bergson at the Dorchester House.

I had him do most of the talking. He outlined the new project for ~~freedom~~ ^{a League of Free} Palestine which they are planning to launch in the near future. The underlying idea is that Palestine is already a Jewish state which needs to be freed. The Jewish nation in Palestine finds itself in the same position as Holland, France, etc. under enemy occupation. It needs to be set free and restored to its independence. Conceivably, he and his friends are the constituted Palestine Government in Exile. The Jewish Agency can no longer function because it does not represent Palestine Jewry. Its members are Englishmen, Americans, Poles, etc. All stateless Jews in all parts of the world would have the right to declare themselves Palestinian citizens. In launching this movement he stated he ^{would} ~~did~~ not like to supplant the present Zionist Movement, but to supplement it, although he, in the same breath, indicated that its ideology and technique are as completely antiquated as the "Bilu".

He indicated that his group had nothing to do with the Revisionist Group in America, or for that matter in any other part of the world except Palestine. He felt that ^{the} Ir Gumi of Palestine would accept this ideology which he was projecting.

I had begun the conversation by recalling that two years ago an effort was made to join our activities, and wondered whether now, on the eve of the final effort, it was still possible to integrate our work. There was no reaction to this suggestion, except in a general expression of good will and desire to avert controversy and conflict.

When I heard the contemplated new project of his group, I concluded the conversation with two observations: (a) That we might continue our discussion at some future time and (b) I called attention to the fact that the sensational and dramatic technique used by his group failed as completely as the conservative procedure of the other groups, and having failed both on the subject of the Jewish Army and on the rescuing of European Jewry, he should reconsider the validity of his technique on the American scene.

6:00 P.M. Senator Wendell of New York telephoned that he had hoped to meet me during the day but was absorbed with Government work and had to leave for Boston that evening. He hoped he would have an opportunity to meet with the same group with whom he had met prior to his going overseas. He told me that in a general way he was optimistic about the situation. He had spoken with our people in Palestine, and some who were not friendly to us both in London and Cairo. He felt that an attitude of give and take would bring about a satisfactory solution. In all his contacts with Arabs in North Africa, he had heard none of them mention Palestine. That did not concern them at all. He felt that the Arabs would be given many important concessions in North Africa and Arabia, and that Palestine should be given to the Jewish people. The attitude of Russia and our own Government would be very helpful. I suggested that he convey that information and his impressions about Palestine to the President and to other Government officials. I arranged to meet him at a later date in New York.

2:00 P.M. At the suggestion of some friends in Washington, I called upon the

Danish Minister, Mr. Henrik de Kauffmann, to express the admiration of the Jewish people for the magnificent way in which the people of Denmark and their King ^{ties} reacted to the unspeakable Nazi brutality/ against the Jewish citizens in Denmark. We were heartened by the magnificent evidence of brotherhood and humanity -- a candle lit in the dark house of Europe. The Minister was greatly moved. He told me how the people of Denmark and the underground movement were cooperating in helping Jews to escape to Sweden and stated that the latest information is that some 6,000 people escaped, and ninety percent were Jews.



MONDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1943

12:00 noon -- meeting with Ambassador Steinhardt at his office - 30 Pine Street.

I told him of our concern with the attitude of our Government, generally, towards Palestine. He had spoke to the President about Palestine. He would speak to him again. He felt that the President had been subjected to some pro-Arab propaganda and that a cabal is at work both on the President and on Churchill which has raised doubts in their minds concerning their earlier sympathetic attitude towards Zionism. It has made them more cautious. He felt, however, that the President's attitude remains basically friendly, that he would be in favor of eighty to ninety percent of the Zionist program. He thought that the attitude of our Government should be ascertained, and that we are entitled to know it as a guide in our future conduct.

He felt that Turkey was not interest one way or another in the proposed Arab Federation. Turkey was nationalist and isolationist in the main.

He deprecated the attacks which had been made upon him. They were unjust.

11:00 A.M. -- Had a meeting with Colonel Morris Mendelsohn and Natan Yahu in my room at the Commodore.

They discussed with me the coming in of the Revisionists into the Zionist Emergency Council. They would consider coming in as a party, accept the discipline of the Emergency Committee and work on the basis of the Biltmore Resclution to fight the White Paper and for the Jewish Commonwealth. They indicated a definite break with the Bergson group. They will communicate with me further.

2:00 P.M. - spent an hour with Pierre Van Paassen.

He is prepared to help us in our work to the fullest extent.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1943

10:30 - 11:20 -- Met with Governor Lehman at the State Department.

We discussed the forthcoming conference on relief and rehabilitation of the United Nations. Governor Lehman indicated that the basic questions of the conference are still to be determined as to its scope, as to the definition of what constitutes a war victim and as to the extent of the participation of the United Nations in the contributions towards the relief program. He suggested that there may be room later on for non-governmental agencies to cooperate with the work of the relief administration and that in that case, Palestine would not be overlooked.

I discussed with him the subject of the White Paper and the attitude of our Government to it. He was deeply interested. He felt that from Cairo there are emanating influences which were decidedly hostile. He indicated that other colonization possibilities had been discussed in government circles -- Tanganyika, Madagascar and others. He had taken the occasion to indicate how impracticable all those schemes were. He indicated, too, that the economic argument had been employed, namely, that the present prosperity in Palestine was due to the war, and that it could not be self-sustaining country after the war. I dwelt at length on the role which Palestine could play in the industrial development in the whole Near East. He suggested that I see the President at the earliest opportunity. I appealed to him to speak of Palestine when he next had the opportunity of a conference with the President.

3:00 - 3:20 -- Saw Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Acting Secretary of State at the State Department with Dr. Nahum Goldmann.

We discussed with him the White Paper and our Government's contacts with Ibn Sa'ud. He was very optimistic on the subject of the White Paper, seemed to be well-informed about the subject. He told us more than once that he was eager to help and that we could count on him. He suggested that we should see the President immediately. We told him that while we were always aware of friendship and understanding in high Government circles, we felt an hostile attitude on the part of the Near East section. Mr. Stettinius replied, "You mean Murray".

He suggested that we write a letter to him soliciting information and asking for guidance on the subject of Ibn Sa'ud and that he would reply to us. Such a letter was forwarded to Mr. Stettinius the same afternoon.

He was highly elated with the news which had been coming in about the Moscow Conference. He felt that the results would be helpful all around and would "help you, too" in your own problems.

5:00 - 6:00 P.M. -- Pleasant hour and Tea with Mr. Sumner Welles at his home at Oxen Hill Manor, Maryland.

I spoke at great length about the White Paper, the seeming "withdrawal" of our Government officials from the subject of Palestine and the need which we had

for guidance from our Government officials as to their present attitudes. Mr. Welles felt that the withdrawal was due entirely to military considerations and did not indicate any change in the friendly attitude of our Government. Those who feel that President Roosevelt has in any way changed in his attitude are mistaken.

Welles was greatly encouraged by the report which Colonel Hoskins brought back. This is as ~~far~~ as he could say about it at this time. He felt that the first step has been taken. The next step might perhaps be direct contact between us and Ibn Sa'ud. Welles had been very greatly impressed by Dr. Weizmann and had great confidence in his leadership.

I told Welles of our concern that the President had been influenced by arguments concerning the absorptive capacity of Palestine and that he was thinking of other colonization projects to meet the situation. Welles, too, felt that the figures which had been suggested by Dr. Weizmann -- two or three million -- were too high. There may be need, he thought, and there has been thought given to other colonization schemes -- the Columbian Plateau, Angola, Madagascar -- where Jews, along with others, could settle. This was not, of course, in any way to be regarded as a substitute for large immigration into Palestine and the establishment of the Jewish National Home. Palestine he fully realized was intended as a national solution for the problem of the national homelessness of the Jewish people. It is this and the moral and spiritual element in the movement which has appealed to him strongly.

As to the post-war arrangements, Welles envisaged an economic union or federation between an autonomous Syria, an autonomous Lebanon, an autonomous Palestine and perhaps also an autonomous Transjordan under some international trusteeship. I inferred from what he said, although he did not state it, that he implied an autonomous Jewish Palestine. He was aware that there would be great difficulties in such a post-war arrangement because of French Nationalism and its interests in Syria, and also British resistance to an international trusteeship. He did not seem to warm up to the idea of a Jewish Commonwealth within the British Empire although he did not declare himself specifically on the subject. Welles felt that very frequently public agitation defeats the effectiveness of quiet negotiations which must be carried on in behalf of a movement like ours. He understood fully the difficulty which we experienced in restraining our people from public demonstrations under the tense circumstances in which we find ourselves. He would see the President in the very near future and would convey to him our concern about the White Paper and in general our desire for the helpful cooperation of our Government in realizing the objective of the Jewish National Home. Welles suggested a small executive committee to whom the President could confide about his plans and activities, and who in turn would guide our following in a way that would not embarrass the negotiations and activities of our Government in our behalf. He will write me later about it.

10:00 P.M. -- Visit with Mr. Eugene Meyer in his editorial rooms at the Washington Post Building.

He reported to me the conversation which he had had with the President about the White Paper. (See Mr. Henry Montor's full report on this subject which is identical to what Mr. Meyer reported to me.)

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1943

11 - 11:50 A.M. -- Meeting with Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Jr. at the Treasury Department.

We spoke about his recent visit to North Africa. He had been to Cairo and had been spoken to by people there of the Military; also by Cyrus Sulzberger about the militarization of the Jews of Palestine, the tension in the country, the gun-running, etc. I took pains to explain to him that this was all part of the panic propaganda campaign to keep the White Paper in force and to discredit the Jewish Agency. I spoke to him of the Irgun, and the sharp distinction between that small body and the Jewish Agency and organized Jewry in Palestine.

Mr. Morgenthau was depressed about the general fate of minorities at this time and in the reconstruction period. He seemed to feel that reactionary forces are and will be in control. He alluded to anti-Semitic elements in our own State Department.

He expressed his eager and continuing desire to be of help. I told him about the White Paper and suggested ways in which he could be helpful.

12-12:30 -- Interview with Lord Halifax at the British Embassy.

Very warmly received, and the conversation was on the friendliest basis. I took up two matters with Halifax: (1) Is the White Paper policy fixed and irrevocable? Or is it being recanvassed and reconsidered in view of the great changes which have taken place in the world generally and specifically with the Jewish people since 1939? (2) In the Arab Federation which is being discussed and presumably fostered by the British Government, what is the status of the Jewish National Home? What was the thought of His Majesty's Government on the relationship between the Jewish National Home and any such contemplated Federation?

I indicated to H. that whereas Zionism has taken no position on the subject of an Arab Federation, regarding it as a matter of Arab concern, we would of course strongly resist any attempt to build such a Federation on the principle of the White Paper and at the sacrifice of Jewish rights. I stated further that any project, political, economic or otherwise which might be to the advantage of the Arab peoples would naturally meet with our sympathy and approval because a prosperous Jewish Palestine must presuppose a prosperous Arab world enclaving it. However, such development in the life of the Arab peoples must not and need not be predicated upon the curtailment of rights acknowledged to the Jewish people by international agreement in Palestine.

Lord Halifax stated that he was confident that the subject of the White Paper was being reconsidered and carefully studied. He fully understood that much has changed since 1939, and that a re-investigation of the whole subject was clearly indicated. He understood fully the problem of Jewish refugees and of immigration after the war and that these would have to be taken into consideration. He was not prepared to say when a declaration on this subject would be made by His Majesty's Government, nor what it would contain. But clearly, the matter was not closed. He indicated that in our campaign against the White Paper that violent criticism might well be avoided. Consideration should be given to the difficulties in which the British Government finds itself and it should not be attacked as if it were completely and altogether bad.

I replied that in our attacks on the "White Paper we have never overlooked the traditional friendship of the English people towards our people and towards the Jewish Homeland, that England has had no better friends anywhere and that the Jewish community in Palestine has been the one dependable element in the Near East in the present war. Laughingly the Ambassador replied to all this: "You really haven't been as bad as you might have been."

On the subject of the Arab Federation Lord Halifax said that he ^{knows} did not know how serious these conferences which have been held in Cairo looking towards an Arab Federation have really been. The idea of an Arab Federation appears and re-appears from time to time. He assured me that we would not be confronted with a fait accompli, and that when the discussions entered a serious stage the obligations undertaken with reference to the Jewish National Home would be given full consideration.

Lord Halifax told me that there were many friends of ours in England who felt that an Arab Federation (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan) would make it possible for larger Jewish immigration into Palestine and for doing many things which otherwise could not be done. I reiterated that we would be friendly disposed to any arrangement which would not put us in a strait jacket and would not impinge upon our rights.

Lord Halifax expressed the difficulties in the way of such a Federation and referred to the French factor. I suggested to him that our basic and original conception of Palestine was that of a Jewish commonwealth within the framework of a free association of British commonwealths and that this was the original thought of the men who helped to frame the Balfour Declaration and who championed the cause of the Jewish National Home in the beginning -- Balfour Smuts, Lloyd George, Wilson and Churchill. Lord Halifax said that Churchill has been a great friend of the movement right along. There would be risks and difficulties involved in such a set-up, Lord Halifax declared. I replied: The British Empire is accustomed to taking risks. Why not take the risk with us? It would have no more loyal ally.

Lord Halifax said that he would transmit the conversation to London and would inform us of any new developments which arise in the sphere of the two subjects which I broached.

He sent his warmest regards to Dr. Wise, whose greetings and good wishes I conveyed to him.

CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1943

11:00 A.M. - Mr. L. Berlin of the British Embassy in Washington telephoned me for the Ambassador that a statement will be made in the House of Commons by the Colonial Minister on the subject of the White Paper which would not be displeasing to us. He did not know the contents, but he thought that it would be published in the public press today or tomorrow. I thanked him and asked him to convey my thanks to the Ambassador.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFERENCE ■ DR. SILVER AND SENATOR HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. OF MASSACHUSETTS

On Friday, November 19th, 1943, at about 2 P.M., pursuant to arrangements, Dr. Silver visited Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. of Massachusetts, at the latter's office, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Senator Lodge received Dr. Silver in a most cordial manner, after saying that any introduction would be superfluous since he knows of Dr. Silver and has heard him speak. The meeting lasted about an hour, which was characterized by an exchange of views and, what is most important, a meeting of minds.

The Senator opened the conversation by saying to Dr. Silver: "By the way, it isn't a Home that was pledged to the Jews in Palestine, but a National Home. The British, in their talks about Palestine, omit the term 'National', and speak of it as a home. Well, National Home implies Statehood, etc."

Dr. Silver pointed out that the Balfour Declaration which was incorporated in the Mandate, is the basis for the British presence in Palestine. Under the terms of the Mandate, Great Britain was to facilitate Jewish immigration and colonization in the National Home. 52 nations are signatories to the Palestine Mandate; The United States of America gave its assent to the establishment of a Jewish National Home by the adoption of the Lodge Palestine Resolution 22 years ago, with which you are quite familiar. In fact, the Balfour Declaration was inspired by the statesmanship of the United States during the First World War. President Wilson had a hand in it. What the Jews did in Palestine is really an epic.

Senator Lodge interjected by saying that he knows of the creditable Jewish achievements in Palestine.

Dr. Silver continued: Great Britain is now confronting us with a White Paper which, in effect, nullifies the Balfour Declaration, and after ^{April} ~~March~~ 1, 1944,

only about 31,000 Jews will be permitted to enter Palestine, otherwise the Jewish National Home would be frozen and the Jewish people in Palestine sentenced to the status of a permanent minority in their own national home. Palestine, under the White Paper, would be the only country under the jurisdiction of the United Nations that would have discriminatory legislation against Jews, as such, since the restrictions do not apply to any other people.

What is most unfortunate at this tragic hour in the life of the Jewish people is the fact that the United States seems to have withdrawn from Palestine. The Administration has manifested a disinterestedness and an abandonment of the Jewish National Home, which is disturbing.

At this point Senator Lodge inquired as to the underlying reasons for that attitude on the part of the Administration.

In reply, Dr. Silver stated that the American Administration seems to be impressed by the reasoning of the British Government to the effect that:

First, there is no room in Palestine for any additional people;

Second, the pursuit of any other course would result in bloodshed in Palestine.

Dr. Silver proceeded by saying that the first reason has no basis in reality. It is a fact that long ago the British Government advanced the idea that immigration reached the saturation point in Palestine, and that there is no room even for an ADDITIONAL CAT. However, since that time more than 300,000 homeless Jews entered Palestine, where they established themselves industrially and agriculturally. The Jewish people created space in Palestine by their own sweat, and with their energy they expanded the absorptive capacity of Palestine through intensive agriculture, reclamation, irrigation and industry. As to the second contention of the British Government, it is correct to say that Palestine is as safe and free from disturbances as any other part of the British Empire.

Senator Lodge offered to say that he had heard these two contentions in

Egypt from British high officials and military officers, and this seems to be the premise on which British policy in Palestine is based.

Dr. Silver continued to point out that it is the considered judgment of experts and the impartial opinion of those who made a study of the absorptive capacity of Palestine that there is room there for an additional 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 people. This is the objective opinion of such an authority as Dr. Lowdermilk of our own Department of Agriculture. Palestine, therefore, could well serve to solve the problem of Jewish homelessness in Europe. Hitler murdered so many of our people that only about two million Jews will probably survive outside of Russian Jewry. Our demand is free immigration and colonization.

What we hope for is a positive and favorable attitude on the part of the Administration in order to stop the implementation of the White Paper, and particularly a favorable attitude on the part of the President, who seems at this time to be more interested in the Arabs who did nothing to help the United Nations.

At this point Senator Lodge remarked: "YOU MEAN LESS THAN NOTHING."

Thus, the contacts with Ibn Saud are disturbing even though it involves oil. At this point Senator Lodge observed: "Oil is very important at this time. We cannot permit Great Britain to grab all the oil in the Near East. The American people are quite oil-minded at this time," added Senator Lodge.

Indeed, oil is very important, agreed Dr. Silver. As an American, I am interested in the future of our country. However, the Arabs have an empire and we Jews merely desire an opportunity to help solve the problem of Jewish homelessness through immigration and colonization in Palestine with a view of eventually establishing a Jewish Commonwealth which was the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration, as interpreted by Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill himself, who, by the way, originally opposed the White Paper.

Senator Lodge commented that somehow the Jewish cause has not been presented to the non-Jewish world in the proper light; that "Jewish public relations are terrible." The recent ads and statements that appeared in the press are not helpful from the point of view of public relations.

Dr. Silver stated that these ads and statements are not the work of responsible Zionist leaders. On the contrary, they emanate from a small group of Palestinian Jews who are accountable to no one, and over whom we have no control. Their importance has been exaggerated beyond all proportions.

Senator Lodge agreed and added that he personally is familiar with the facts and does not confuse that group with the Zionist leadership. However, most people make no such distinction. "May I say (continued Senator Lodge) that such a declaration from a distinguished Jewish leader, who stated that I have been an American only 65 years and that I have been a Jew for 3,000 years, is in bad taste. It creates the wrong impression of Jewish patriotism."

Dr. Silver commented by saying: I assure you, Senator, that the man who said it is a great American and a true patriot. Of course, the utterance was an unfortunate one, observed Dr. Silver.

"What can be done now to meet the threat of the White Paper?" inquired Dr. Silver. "Would a reaffirmation of the Lodge Palestine Resolution, on the part of the U.S. Congress, be in order at this time?"

The Senator replied that he personally would be glad to support such a resolution. However, before such a resolution is introduced, it is imperative that the situation be canvassed and all loose ends mended so that when it reaches the committee, it should proceed like clock work. All forces must be mobilized to avoid a violent controversy on the floor of the Senate. I will be glad to do what I can.

(Senator Lodge was reminded that his grandfather took charge of such a resolution 20 years ago. "Well," said he, "my grandfather was at that time the majority leader of the Senate and Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Re-

lations, and 72 years old. I am indeed proud of what my grandfather did for Palestine!")

At the close of this conference, reference was made by the Senator to the Pan-Arab movement. It was the considered judgment of Dr. Silver that the Pan-Arab movement is being fostered by Great Britain for its own purposes, and that Great Britain is attempting to liquidate the Jewish National Home through the medium of extravagant Arab nationalism. Senator Lodge stated that during his visit to the Near East and Egypt, he had heard a good deal about the smuggling of amunitions on the part of Palestine Jews. He was interested to know more about it.

Dr. Silver stated that he was familiar with it. In fact, the smuggling of arms in Palestine is an old story, which began immediately after the downfall of France. It is an established fact that with the advent of the Vichy regime, the French military readily disposed of their ammunition for a consideration. Arabs were brought to trial on the charge of illegal possession of weapons, and have been sentenced to 30 or 40 days in prison. No fuss was made about it, and the local press hardly took notice of it. It seems that the British administration in Palestine was determined to try to discredit the Jewish Agency, hence the trial of Jews on the alleged charge of acquiring ammunition illegally was staged and correspondents were called in, and undue publicity given.

Senator Lodge nodded understandingly and continued: "Well, I am not disturbed at all about the possibility of bloodshed. I do not like it. However, bloodshed is not always bad. We know that it is historically true that some great things came into being as a result of bloodshed. I understand that the Jewish boys would give a good account of themselves; that would do the Jewish reputation no harm. In fact, it would go a long way toward dampening anti-Semitism."

Dr. Silver was accompanied by Elihu D. Stone of Boston who arranged the conference.

The meeting came to a close with the Senator offering Dr. Silver his cooperation and support, and both Dr. Silver and the Senator expressed the hope that they will meet again soon.

CONFIDENTIAL

Conference: Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Congressman John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, Majority Leader House of Representatives, and Elihu D. Stone, Friday, November 19, 1943, Washington, D.C.

As arranged by Mr. Stone, Dr. Silver visited Congressman John W. McCormack on Friday, November 19, 1943, at about 3 P.M., at the office of the Majority Leader, in the Capitol, Washington, D. C.

The Majority Leader greeted with warmth Dr. Silver as one whose reputation as a leader preceded the meeting of the two men.

Congressman McCormack pointed to a letter which he received from one of his constituents, with the enclosure of a poem entitled "Rabbi McCormack." The poem was anti-Semitic in tone and decried the liberalism of the Massachusetts Congressman. The Majority Leader went on to say: "As Elihu well knows, I do not care what some of them think about my doings. I will never be guilty of bigotry. I will treat all men alike, regardless of their race or creed." Thereupon, a few pleasantries were exchanged between Dr. Silver and the Congressman, etc.

Dr. Silver proceeded to argue the case substantially along the same lines as he presented it to Senator Lodge. However, Dr. Silver stated with great emphasis "that the most discouraging part of the whole situation is the fact that the American Administration has completely withdrawn from Palestine, and this is particularly true of the President himself. The Jewish people are homeless as never before, and all our appeals to Washington for the purpose of enabling some of our people to be rescued into the Jewish National Home were of no avail." Dr. Silver continued with great earnestness: "The Jewish people in the United States are most resentful of that attitude..."

At this point, the Majority Leader broke in with the assertion that "the Jewish people have no better friend than President Roosevelt. He is a great humanitarian and a great man. He is the best friend the Jews have. It seems that the President is being deserted by his friends. Labor, for whom he has

done so much, is deserting him; the colored people are deserting him and now the Jews are deserting him. Perhaps I should say the wealthy Jews."

Dr. Silver replied: "There can be no argument about that, that President Roosevelt has been a good friend of the Jewish people. I share your confidence in his friendship. However, it is a fact that the doors of Palestine are practically closed to the Jewish people and that our government has done nothing to help us."

Congressman McCormack interjected by inquiring: "Do you know of any specific case of denial of admission of Jews to Palestine?" Said Dr. Silver: "There are many instances of cruel denial of such admission on the part of the British authorities." Thereupon, Dr. Silver proceeded graphically to describe the tragedies of the Patria and Struma.....

The Congressman was visibly impressed and he inquired of Dr. Silver: "What is it that you want me to do?" Dr. Silver replied: "I should like you, if possible, to make known our views and our grievance to the President of the United States."

Congressman McCormack, in a spirit of evident sincerity, replied: "I should be glad to present any petition or brief on behalf of your cause to the President as soon as possible." (Mr. Stone interjected by saying that a mere delivery of such a petition or brief would not suffice; that it would be desirable that the Congressman convey his personal views on this matter.) Mr. McCormack remarked that that is exactly what he had in mind when he used the word "I shall be 'PLEASED' to do so" in his reply to Dr. Silver's request. The term "PLEASED" meant that, was added by the Congressman. He further stated that he would be glad to deliver it to the President as soon after such a petition or brief was given by us to him on behalf of our cause in Palestine.

The Majority leader inquired whether or not Dr. Silver conversed with any responsible official in the State Department. Dr. Silver made reference to his visit with Secretary of State Hull. Dr. Silver also recalled his visit

at the home of Sumner Welles, former Undersecretary of State. The Majority Leader made the observation that Sumner Welles is a great man, a good friend of his, and that HE WILL COME BACK.

The conversation developed along the lines of the absorptive capacity of Palestine and the security of the country. Dr. Silver refuted the contention of the British Government that there is no room in Palestine for newcomers and that there would be bloodshed if the White Paper were abandoned.

Dr. Silver described vividly, even though succinctly, the Jewish tragedy in Europe, where only a few million will remain after Hitler's slaughter of them, and pointed out that if Zionism was right during the First World War and during the days of President Wilson who did so much for the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, it is certainly a thousand times right today, in view of the recent terrible Jewish experiences.

Congressman McCormack nodded in agreement and stated that he would cooperate and do all he can to help.

At this point, Dr. Silver inquired whether or not the Congressman would advise the introduction of a resolution in the United States Congress, reaffirming the Palestine Resolution of 20 years ago, and specifically call for freedom of Jewish immigration into Palestine, freedom of land purchase, colonization, etc. The Congressman thoughtfully replied that before he could give advice, he himself would like to consult with President Roosevelt and that he would be glad to do so at the first opportunity and as soon as possible, and get the President's advice. (The Congressman said, I DO NOT KNOW HOW SOON THAT CAN BE, BUT WILL DO IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE).

The hour was coming to a close and Dr. Silver had only a few minutes left to make the 4 o'clock train to New York. In an atmosphere of mutual cordiality this conference came to a close, with the Majority Leader's pledge of cooperation.

Dr. Silver expressed the hope that this visit is only a preliminary one and that he would like to have the opportunity in the near future of meeting the Congressman again - ^{his} anticipation ^{was} shared by the Majority Leader himself.

Interview with Mr. Wallace Murray,
State Department November 19, 1943 Washington, D. C.

Present: Mr. Murray, Mr. Paul Alling, Mr. Gordon Merriam, and one other member of Mr. Murray's staff; Dr. Goldmann, Dr. Silver and Dr. Wise

An appointment had been asked for because Mr. Murray was said to be going to England on the invitation of the Foreign Office to discuss Near East problems. (in the meantime, it had been learned that for the present at least Mr. Murray is not going.)

Dr. Goldmann opened the conversation by saying that some time had passed since the conversations of Dr. Weizmann and his associates with Mr. Murray and his. At that time the Zionists had submitted their program and their demands concerning the solution of the Palestine problem. Recently the press had been carrying stories concerning discussions in Cairo about the establishment of an Arab Federation and about a new scheme of partition in Palestine as a solution of the problem. The Zionists therefore thought that the time had come to discuss with Mr. Murray and his colleagues what the position actually is and to learn what proposals are being considered in any conversations about Palestine.

Mr. Murray said he knew nothing about the cable which had appeared in the press concerning the partition of Palestine. As for the conversations in Cairo about an Arab federation, he did not think they could be taken too seriously. He thinks there is no chance of establishing a real federation among the Arabs in view of the religious, political and dynastic differences among them. As far as he understood it, the program which is being discussed in Cairo refers to a customs and postal union, and some cultural cooperation, but this could not be regarded as a real federation or union. The Egyptians are racially not Arabs; there are dynastic differences between Ibn Saud and the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq; the King of Egypt may be considering reviving the caliphate and becoming caliph. Mr. Murray did not think that Palestine played a part in the discussion of all these problems.

Mr. Merriam added that some Arab leaders took the position that the Palestine problem must be solved before the discussions proceeded, but not all the Arab leaders agreed to this point of view.

Dr. Silver then said that the American Zionists and American Jews were deeply interested in knowing the attitude of their government concerning Palestine. The traditional policy of this country is to favor the Jewish National Home, as evidenced by the unanimous resolution of Congress in 1922 and the statements of every president from Wilson to Roosevelt. Recently Zionists have felt that there may be a withdrawal of the attitude from the traditional policy of friendliness to the Jewish National Home and Zionists sought advice and guidance, so as to be able to guide its constituents. This government endorsed the Mandate and certainly has the right to be interested in the Palestine situation. The White Paper of 1939 practically cancels Jewish rights under the Mandate and liquidates the Jewish National Home; in view of the traditional attitude of this government, Zionists have a right to feel that it will help restore Jewish rights under the Mandate.

In reply, Mr. Murray said it must be borne in mind that the British have the supreme responsibility in that part of the world, that they are America's allies, and that, therefore, it was understandable that this government is most reluctant to do anything which might embarrass Great Britain while the war is on.

Dr. Silver said there had been no hesitation in the Lebanon situation.

To this Mr. Murray replied that in that instance military security was endangered and, should a similar situation arise elsewhere a position would have to be taken. As for the attitude of the American government in the whole matter, it should not be forgotten that America did not enter the League of Nations and has not assumed any responsibility for the Mandate. The Treaty which was signed merely protects the rights of American citizens in Palestine.

Dr. Goldmann said the discussion was not about public statements of the American government during the war which might embarrass the British, but what was of concern was the post-war solution of the Palestine problem, which is surely being prepared during the war. In various conversations which Dr. Wise, Dr. Silver and Dr. Goldmann had had with Mr. Sumner Welles and with the Secretary of State, it had always been stated that this government took the position that Great Britain alone could not decide the future of Palestine, but that this government would have to be consulted on this as on other post-war problems and the assurance was always given that the Zionists would be informed about such discussions and not be faced with a fait accompli. In view of the fact that more and more news is being published indicating that discussions are going on about the Palestine problem, Zionists felt that they had to come to the State Department and make clear that they expect to be consulted before a decision is reached, otherwise a decision may be made which will have to be violently opposed.

Mr. Murray said he understood the Zionist position, but that he knew of no real negotiations. He believed that when the peace conference was convened, the Jewish delegation would be there, as it was at the Paris Peace Conference, and would have the opportunity of submitting their demands.

Mr. Alling added that the final solution would probably be based on "give and take."

Dr. Goldmann replied that the Paris Conference and the decisions about Palestine which were reached there did not fall from a clear, blue sky. They represented years of preparation. The Balfour declaration had been negotiated before the Peace Conference and the American delegation, headed by Wilson, took a very active part -- as a matter of fact, without the support of the American government, it might never have been issued. Therefore the opportunity to appear before the Peace Conference may be too late, especially since there is a possibility that a formal peace conference may not be called for many years after a transition period when all the solutions may have been implemented, and only the formal act of fixing signatures may be required. Zionists must be in the picture while the solutions are being prepared.

Mr. Murray said that, to continue the parallel with the situation in the last war and the Paris Peace Conference, he did not believe that the stage had been reached where real negotiations about Palestine have yet been started. He then said that the man who should know most about this was Dr. Weizmann and he was in London. The Palestine problem would be decided by men on the highest level. Dr. Weizmann has had talks with British statesmen on this level before and he should know what the position is. He asked whether there was any information about these talks and what the position of Mr. Churchill was.

Dr. Goldmann answered that the general impression of Dr. Weizmann was that the situation in London concerning Palestine was beginning to unfreeze; that the British were beginning to discuss Palestine, which they were not prepared to do in the first years of the war. As for Mr. Churchill, Dr. Weizmann believes that he has not changed his fundamental pro-Zionist attitude, as was indicated in his criticism of the White Paper. On the other hand, Dr. Weizmann believes, and we share this opinion, that the best way to enable the British Government to get out of its various commitments and entanglements would be for America to take a hand in the matter and to make a new start through Anglo-American action, and that is why the attitude of this government is of such fundamental importance to a constructive solution of the Palestine problem.

Dr. Wise said he felt that the President had remained friendly and that he would not be ready to agree to the White Paper policy as the final policy with regard to Palestine, but that the friendly attitude of the President would be strengthened by the understanding and cooperation of the State Department.

Dr. Silver added that recently spokesmen of this government had begun to express doubts about the absorptive capacity of Palestine, saying that the country is too small to absorb large masses of Jews. He referred to the "expert" opinion of Sir John Hope Simpson ten years ago which reported that Palestine could not absorb a single new Jew, whereas since then 350,000 have entered Palestine. Other countries for Jewish post-war migration are being discussed. Experience has shown that Palestine is the best country of immigration for Jews and other experiments have failed, as, for example, Santo Domingo.

(Mr. Murray said he would like some reliable information on Santo Domingo and it was promised to send him the Brookings Institute report.)

Dr. Silver continued by saying that it would take ten, twenty, or more years to prepare other countries for large Jewish immigration, whereas Palestine is already prepared to absorb large numbers of Jews.

Dr. Wise added that unfortunately it was not necessary to think in terms of many millions; after the war, there may be only two million left, outside of Soviet Russia and Great Britain, of which half a million or a million will have to go to Palestine after the war.

Mr. Murray then asked about the conflict between Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Ben Gurion.

Dr. Goldmann said there was no conflict between them on the fundamental program. Both are among the originators of the Biltmore program asking for a Jewish Commonwealth; but the Zionist Executive is laboring under great technical and geographic handicaps;— they have no travel facilities and no diplomatic pouch. Differences about tactic and procedure arise which would be easily straightened out by coming together and talking it over.

Dr. Silver said that even in this country there are conflicts which lead to resignations without fundamental issues being involved.

Mr. Murray asked what Jewish opinion in this country was about partition.

Dr. Silver and Dr. Wise replied that the large majority had been against the partition plan, but that the majority of the Congress, in view of the plight of eastern European Jewry and the urgent necessity for large immigration opportunities, authorized the Zionist Executive to proceed with negotiations; but the plan was subsequently abandoned by the British government.

Dr. Goldmann added that those who had been in favor of partition at the time, such as Dr. Weizmann, Mr. Ben Gurion and himself, would not favor it today, because they feel that in the light of the tragedies of European Jewry in the past years, an opportunity must be made for a radical and not a piece-meal solution, through years and decades of slow immigration into Palestine. As many as can be got there must be transferred immediately and, therefore, a partitioned Palestine would not suffice. In one of Dr. Weizmann's recent letters he took the same attitude.

Mr. Murray asked whether the Zionists did not believe that the British government realized that the White Paper could not stand, especially in view of the well-known attitude of Mr. Churchill.

Dr. Silver said he thought that the British had begun to realize that this policy would have to be changed, but that the friendly attitude of this government and its cooperation would make it much easier to bring about a change and overcome the resistance of the Colonial Administration to it.

Mr. Murray said he believed that in opposing the White Paper all Jewry was united, even including the American Jewish Committee. He further said he thought that the American Jewish Committee was against Jewish nationalism and the Jewish National Home.

The reply to this was that the American Jewish Committee is on record as supporting the Balfour Declaration and joined the Jewish Agency on the basis of the Balfour Declaration. Its opposition is directed against any political and national ties between Jews outside of Palestine and the Jewish Commonwealth. On the question of the Jewish Commonwealth, their main objection was that it was premature to come out with such a demand now.

Mr. Murray concluded the conversation, which lasted an hour, by thanking us for having come and expressing the hope that there could be an exchange of views from time to time.

NG

Washington, D. C.

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11/28/43



MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1943

Evening - Had dinner at the home of Mr. Leichtman, 760 West End Avenue, at which Senator Maad was a guest. The Senator reported on his recent trip around the world with particular reference to Great Britain, North Africa and Palestine. Everywhere he went he found British officials talking about Palestine and the tension there, but the Arabs never mentioned it. Lady Astor had told him that the English were not averse at all to having America handle the Jewish Palestine problem, which irritated the Arabs, while the English posed as the champions of Arab interests. Behind the British position with reference to the Arabs today is the question of oil in Arab countries and the competition for concessions with the United States. The British are also suspicious of the Russian influence in the Middle East.

TUESDAY - November 30, 1943

11:30 - 1:10 P.M. -- Meeting with Congressman Bloom at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. Asked him about the prospect of the Rogers resolution. I got the impression that the Foreign Affairs Committee would vote out the Bill but not in its present form. It will have no provision for the appointment of a Commission and that if it is passed, it will be shelved. He was expecting to hear by cable from someone an announcement which would blanket the entire matter. He did not favor adding a Palestine amendment to the resolution. He thought that a Palestine resolution should be introduced in the Senate, preferably by Senator Barkley and that it had a good chance of passing. It would be channeled to him through the Foreign Affairs Committee and would pass the House. He urged that Dr. Wise, who had requested an opportunity to appear at a hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Resolution, should attend such a hearing.

5:00 P.M. -- Met with Senator Taft at his office in the Senate Building. Gave him background to the present situation with reference to Palestine and the White Paper. He indicated real interest, asked for additional information which I promised to send to him, and suggested that he would be helpful when the proper time came.

8:30 P.M. - Met the "Cheder" group in the home of Mr. Taub, 1629 Columbia Road. About forty economists, scientists, etc. were present. Discussed with them the present status of the Zionist Movement in America, gave them the story of the American Jewish Conference, something about the present British policy with reference to Palestine and that of our own government, and a general and helpful discussion developed.

Later in the evening, at my hotel, Mr. Elikan, Robert Nathan, Mr. Cass, Eli Ginzberg and a few others discussed with me in greater detail a survey to be made, to be completed within the next nine months, to learn the actual capacity of Palestine, real and potential, to absorb large scale Jewish immigration after the war.

CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1 -- 4:00 P.M. -- A special meeting of the Executive of the Zionist Emergency Council for a consideration of the emphasis to be placed on the White Paper and the Commonwealth. It was the almost unanimous opinion of the Committee that the Commonwealth idea should be tied up with our campaign against the White Paper.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1943

- 2:30 P.M. - Meeting with Colonel Mendelssohn and Mr. Ben Horin in my room at the Commodore. Asked them to answer the two questions asked by the Palestine Executive to which Ben Horin wrote out a reply which was forwarded to Jerusalem.
- 7:00 P.M. -- Press Conference at the Pythian Temple. Some thirty representatives of the Jewish press in attendance. Told them of the work of the Emergency Council. Discussion developed around the activities of the Bergson group, and Jacob Fishman made sharp attack on it.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1943

- 4:00 P.M. - Interview with Sidney Hillman, 15 Union Square. Feels that it would not be wise for him to assume chairmanship or be a member of the Labor Committee of the Council because of his more or less official standing in Washington, but is prepared to do all he can to help the cause along.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1943

3:00 P.M. - Postmaster Frank Walker telephoned me from New York and after exchanging greetings of the season he said that he hoped that I didn't think that he had neglected the matter which we discussed, that he simply had no opportunity to have the kind of a talk he wanted (The President absent from the country). He could reassure me that there has been no change at all in the attitude of the President on the subject of Palestine. There is the same sympathetic understanding that there always has been. He could safely say that we would hear from the President sometime before long.

I asked whether there was anything more specific that he could tell me. He replied that he could only say that we would hear from the President later on -- in the next few weeks.

I inquired whether the President had talked to others on his trip. He replied that his answer pretty well covered the entire situation, that there would be further developments of which we would be apprised before long, and that we would be pleased with them.



Tuesday, January 11, 1944

I phoned Mr. Nathan Straus and asked him whether he had heard anything further from Postmaster Frank Walker. He said that he would get in touch with him.

The following morning the following message was relayed to me through Mr. Montor from Mr. Straus:

"That the President is planning to say something terribly important most acceptable to your people within ten days. He will send you an invitation to meet with him to give exact details of what is to be said and done."



INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY OF STATE
CORDELL HULL AT THE STATE
DEPT. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1944 - 11:30 - 12:10

There has been considerable time on discussion of Declaration of the four nations at Teheran and opposition of Catholic hierarchy.

He was anxious to leave no doubt that his Department was very much interested in the subject of Palestine. He had been in touch with the British on the subject frequently. He had conveyed to the British authorities the deep interest of the American Government and the attitude of five million Jews among the best citizens of our country.

He said that Mr. Churchill wishes to see the Balfour Declaration put into effect and the Jewish National Home established. He feels that some statement from Mr. Churchill should be forthcoming, logically before the end of March. Churchill is evidently waiting for proper timing.

He knows that the British have been considering various proposals including partition. He twice referred to partition. He felt that the White Paper was definitely not the last word.

What he conveyed to me followed conversations with the President who had talked with Mr. Churchill. I asked him whether the President is likely to make a statement soon. This question he parried by saying that the President has always been interested in whatever concerns the Jewish people and will at the proper time do what is necessary.

I showed him our proposed resolution on Palestine, which he read very carefully. I asked him whether it would embarrass the Department of State if such a resolution were introduced. He gave no indication of any disapproval. He did not say that the Department saw no objection to the resolution because he said that that might be construed as indicating that the Department approved. That was a matter for Congress. He preferred to be cautious on all such matters of legislation.

I raised the question of the persistent hostile attitude of the Near East Division towards our cause and confidential reports which were circulated ostensibly in the name of the Department of State among Congressmen and others suggesting that our Government was opposed to Jewish aspirations in Palestine. This, he said, was without any justification whatsoever. He would look into the matter. Whenever he talks to the people in his Department he makes it quite clear just how he feels on the subject.



Wednesday, January 12, 1944

10 A. M. - 11:30 A. M.

Interview with Colonel Hoskins

After exchanging pleasantries, I took up the subject of his earlier memorandum, which I criticized severely. I told him that I believed that an Arab could have written it without changing a dot or a comma. He replied that he was only interested in giving the "other side" since the Jews had full opportunity to present their side. I replied that his report was not presented as such but as an objective study of the situation in Palestine which had back of it presumably the authority of the military and as such was misleading. He replied that his sole object was to keep the peace during the war. The purpose of the joint statement of Churchill and Roosevelt, which was not issued, was not to muzzle the Jews of America but simply in the interest of not irritating the situation. ^{IP} He thought that there was the danger of arousing anti-Semitism in this country by too strong Palestine aggression. I told him that what Poles and Czechs and other American citizens were doing during the war to see that the interests of their ancestral homes should be safeguarded the Jews in America will also continue to do. And if that makes certain people anti-Semitic, well that is ^{just} too bad; they would have to get over it. Political decisions of the most decisive character are now being made with reference to many countries, and possibly also with reference to Palestine, and we do not wish to be confronted with the fait accompli. ^{IP} He thought that everyone is agreed, even responsible Arabs, that the White Paper cannot stand. The reason why the government of the United States or of Great Britain has not taken us more fully into their confidence is that they

simply did not have any policy to talk to us about. He referred to the possibility of a conference between Jews and Arabs. I reminded him of the history of the London Arab-Jewish round-table and told him that such conferences are doomed to failure unless Great Britain and the United States are prepared to put the moral authority of their government behind a just solution. He said that he is very eager to be most helpful; that the situation is fluid; and that he is most eager to continue contact and further discussion with us.



INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR BENNETT CHAMP CLARK
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1944.
2:30 P. M.

He asked for reasons for opposition to Zionism. I explained to him that it was largely fear. He thought he understood that. The Jews and Catholics in his State were afraid to fight the KKK after the last war.

He felt strongly that England has been treating Palestine as a crown colony instead of a mandate territory.

He will vote for the Palestine Resolution.

5 P. M.

INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR ~~CLARK~~ Bardley

He thought the Resolution was a good one - mild enough - and will vote for it.

CONFIDENTIAL

Palestine Resolution introduced in the House, Thursday, January 27, 1944
by Representatives James A. Wright (D) of Pa., and Ranulf Compton (E) of Conn.

Similar resolution introduced in the Senate of the United States by
Senator Wagner of New York and Senator Taft of Ohio on February 1, 1944.

COLLEGE BOND

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CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1944

9:30 A.M. Called on Senator Taft. Discussed the resolution.

10:00 A.M. called on Senator Wagner. Discussed the resolution. Wagner brought the matter up the same morning before the Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Vandenburg wanted to know what the attitude of the War Department and the Secretary of State would be. Committee decided to await word.

3:00 P.M. Called on Congressman Sol Bloom, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Have the definite impression that Bloom is in complete sympathy with the resolution and will work for it. Hearings have been set for Tuesday, February 8. Wolsey, for the Council for Judaism, asked to be heard in opposition.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1944

- 9:30 A.M. - Saw Congressman James M. Wadsworth, of New York. Concerned with the British and military angle.
- 10:30 A.M. - Saw Congressman Frances Bolton.
- 11:30 A.M. - Called on Turkish Ambassador Murir Ertegun, at the request of Shertok, to request a larger quota of transfer visas for refugees through Turkey. Turkish Ambassador said that he would convey the request to his Government.
- 1:00 P.M. - A Press Conference at Hotel Willard attended by a very representative group of Washington newspaper men representing all the press services of the country and quite a number of important American newspapers. Spent an hour and a half in questions and answers about the White Paper, Palestine, etc.
- 4:30 P.M. - Spent forty minutes with Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Berle indicated what was being done as the first acts of the War Refugee Board: (a) to ease up many transfer regulations, (b) to work with the underground, especially in Hungary to help as many escape from the Nazi clutches as possible, (c) notice has been served on the satellite states who have been putting out all kinds of peace feelers that the consideration which will be shown to them will depend very much upon their attitude to the Jews.

Took up the matter with him of Turkish transfer visas. Said he would follow up that line and perhaps a plane could be made available which would transport taily refugees: frcm Istanbul to Palestine. Told him about the cable which I received from Chief Rabbi Herzog with reference to Rabbis stranded in Shanghai. He was afraid that not much could be done for them at this time with the Japanese. There is difficulty even in exchanging prisoners and getting American citizens out. He thought perhaps something could be done through the International Red Cross or the YMCA to ease up their plight in Shanghai. He said that he could arrange priorities for transportation to England, if necessary.

CONFIDENTIAL

Appointment with the President through Nathan Straus and Postmaster General Frank Walker. Negotiations were carried on for the last few weeks concerning an interview with the President. Such an interview was finally granted to us for Wednesday, February 2. Dr. Wise, who was instructed by me, in the name of the Emergency Council, to ask for the interview at an early date, received word from General Watson that the interview would be had on that date. Dr. Wise, who had a lecture tour scheduled for the Pacific Coast, then asked, on his own, and without consultation, for a postponement of the interview to February 14, when he will be back from the Coast. The Emergency Committee greatly resented this fact. I urged upon Dr. Wise before he left for the Coast, to request the re-instatement of the original date. This was not done.

On February 3rd, I received a telegram from Dr. Wise, in Los Angeles: "If you and ~~Straus~~ feel he should substitute for me, I am entirely satisfied. This cannot be done without consulting Judge ~~Rosenberg~~^{Edson}." But in the meantime, I received word from General Watson that the date was fixed for February 14. An effort is being made to bring Proskauer and others into this appointment.



TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1944

Hearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House on the Palestine Resolution. I spoke in the morning.

In the afternoon -- 2:00 P.M. -- I spent nearly two hours with Judge Samuel Rosenman in the White House. We talked of the delegation which is scheduled to meet with the President on February 14. I conveyed to Rosenman the information which I had received from Mr. Monsky that Blaustein and Proskauer had informed him that should the question of the Jewish Commonwealth come up for discussion at the President's Conference, they would be compelled to speak against it. It was therefore thought advisable to postpone the Conference.

We discussed the advisability of the President issuing a statement on the White Paper and the Jewish Commonwealth, in reply to the many petitions which have reached him. I drafted a statement for submission to the President. Judge Rosenman also asked for a copy of the statement which I made at the hearings in the morning, because he was especially interested in my treatment of the Jewish Commonwealth angle. I send him a copy late in the afternoon.

The hearings continued through Wednesday.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1944

At the request of Judge Rosenman I called to see him again at the White House at 12:30. Was with him about forty minutes. The meeting with the President has been postponed. He had not yet submitted my draft of the statement to the President. He will do so and let me know. We talked about the hearings. He knew that the War Department had sent a letter to the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committee speaking against the considering of the Resolutions at this time. He suggested that the President knew about the letter. I told him that the Administration would be blamed for it as in the case of the Cremieux Decree. Judge Rosenman thought that the Commonwealth idea should not have been pressed at this time. A resolution against the White Paper could pass very easily, and from there we could move on easily. The President was not prepared to discuss definite proposals about Palestine with the Zionists because he did not believe that that stage has yet been reached.

I talked with Judge Rosenman about the need to have someone close to the President with whom we could take counsel frequently in regard to Palestine. Rosenman thought that an excellent suggestion and he mentioned the name of Stettinius. He said that he would talk to the President about it.

Nahum Goldmann had been calling on him frequently, representing himself as the official spokesman of the Zionist Emergency Council. Goldmann had agreed to the joint delegation to the President.



Visited Washington Wednesday and Thursday, February 23rd and 24th with Mrs. Silver.

On Wednesday morning, Chief of Staff, General Marshall, appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in opposition to the Palestine Resolution. Senator Connally hastily called that meeting. Neither Senator Wagner nor Senator Taft was present. No action was taken.

At the invitation of Mr. John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, F.F. had a meeting with him at which he went over the ground. McCloy indicated that he would more circumspect in his declarations on the attitude of the War Department towards the Resolution.

The hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee which was scheduled for Thursday, February 24, was postponed at our request.

Contacts were made with Mr. Niles at the White House by Feuer and Heller, also through Lubin, to get an expression from the White House on the Resolutions or on the White Paper. It was agreed that our people be asked to wire the President.

On Thursday, February 24, around noon, I saw Mr. Stettinius briefly and at his suggestion, Mr. Breckenridge Long, for about three-quarters of an hour. I made it clear to both that the failure of the State Department to express itself negatively when it was consulted, encouraged us to go on with the Resolution, and that the present intervention of the War Department has greatly embarrassed our Movement. Neither could give any advice.

To Mr. Long I spoke very forthright about the indefinite and generally negative attitude of the State Department over a period of years to Jewish aspirations in Palestine. I left no doubt in his mind as to the growing resentment of the Jews of America.

Senator Wagner is to see the President next Monday. So is Mr. Niles.

Have not heard from Judge Rosenman.

CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1944

12:00 Noon -- Talked with Postmaster General Frank Walker. He said that he would inquire of the President as to the whole situation and would let me know.

3:30 P.M. -- Interview with Secretary of the Navy Knox. Knox is friendly but called attention to the military situation in Italy and to the oil negotiations in which America is vitally interested. He asked whether in view of these facts we regard the pressing of our case as immediately urgent, and whether we could not wait. He too said that he would see the President and inquire whether some statement clarifying the situation could not be made by the Chief Executive.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 1st.

At 4:00 P.M. I telephoned Frank Walker from Chicago where I went to address nearly 2000 electors to the American Jewish Conference. He stated that the State Department view prevails. He is in no position to quote the Chief, but that the attitude of the War Department holds. I asked him whether we should see the Chief Executive. He said that he could not say any more but that the view of the State and War Departments hold. It may change in the future.

CONFIDENTIAL

SATURDAY, MARCH 4, 1944

Rabbi Feuer phoned from Washington saying that Senator Wagner had had luncheon with the President on Friday, March 3, and that the President had given him reassuring words about Palestine: that 150 thousand Jews would be permitted to enter Turkey with the understanding that they would remain there no more than six months -- the thought being that they would in due course find their way to Palestine. Senator Wagner suggested that the President see the leaders of the Zionist Movement and convey that information to them. The President said that he would be most happy to do so.

I telephoned Wagner and he repeated the conversation and indicated that the President would see me and Wise on Thursday, March 9 at 12:30. I telephoned Wise in Florida, told him of the appointment, asked him to come on and if he was unable to leave, that Robert Szold would substitute for him.

MONDAY, MARCH 6, 1944

Judge Fisher called. He is in Washington seeing some people. He had a long conversation with McCormack, majority leader of the House, who had just come from a conference with the President. Like Wagner, McCormack conveyed a reassuring report. He indicated that the President would get in touch, Monday or Tuesday, with Churchill.

In the meantime, it was reported that a meeting of the Cabinet was held last Saturday, at which it was decided not to do anything about the matter at this time. Vice-President Wallace, who is scheduled to address a public dinner of the American Palestine Committee, next Thursday, may have been dissuaded from making his scheduled address on that occasion.

On Sunday and Monday of this week, the New York Times, and also the Herald Tribune of New York, carried front page stories of General Marshall's intervention in the Congress Resolution, and extensive reports in the New York Times of the protests of the Arab Governments.

CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, March 9, 1944 -- 12:10 - 1:00 P.M.

Dr. Wise and I were received by the President of the United States who authorized us to issue the following statement: "The President authorized us to say that the American government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939.

"The President is happy that the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees and that when future decisions are reached, full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish National Home, for which our government and the American people have always had the deepest sympathy and today more than ever, in view of the tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees."

FRIDAY, March 17, 1944

Congressman Sol Bloom hastily calls a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee at which McCloy and the military are present. Take formal action to defer action on our resolution and issue a public statement: "advice and information given us by those responsible for the conducting of the war have convinced the committee that action on the Resolution at this time would be unwise."

MARCH 21, 1944.

A great demonstration against the White Paper held in Madison Square Garden, addressed by Senators Taft, Wagner, Barkley, Matthew Woll, Dorothy Thompson and myself.

MONDAY, MARCH 27, 1944

8 P. M. Meeting of the full Emergency Committee. Serious set-to with "W" over the calling of a conference of Community Contact Chairmen which had been voted at the previous meeting of the Executive Committee. He had not been aware of the fact and felt that he had not been consulted.

MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1944

All-day session of the Emergency Committee. (Morning and Evening). Executive Committee in the afternoon. In the evening, "W" presses for the appointment of a political steering committee - a sort of office committee, which I abolished when I took over. He is defeated and the matter is referred to the program committee where it will probably rest.

March 28-1944

3/28/44

Dictated by Gene Kelly over the phone today at 4:30 PM to Naomi Borowsky

The President had his weekly press conference at 4:10 PM at the White House. At the press conference, President Roosevelt said that because a temporary military situation is involved, he could find no fault with Army opposition to a continuation of Jewish immigration into Palestine.

Mr. Roosevelt was reminded that Rabbi Wise and Dr. Silver said that President had authorized them to announce that the American Government never has given its approval to the British White Paper. He was asked how his position fitted in with the Army opposition to further immigration.

Mr. Roosevelt said one was a military subject and the other entirely different, a civilian matter for the future, to be worked out when there is a more permanent peace. He said the military situation causing the temporary ban was a very serious matter.

Asked whether there was any fear of disturbing the situation in the Middle East, the President said the main question was what to do with refugees and not all of them Jews. He said refugees were coming out of Europe through Spain and through the Balkans into Turkey but beyond this he would not enter into a general discussion of the Palestine situation.

APRIL 4, 1944

A visit to Washington.

11:30 A. M. to 1 P. M. visit with General Hurley, 1210 Shoreham Bg.
(See attached report).

2 P. M. Benjamin Aksin called to see me at the office. He approved of the introduction of the resolutions, thought that much had been accomplished, even though action on the resolutions had been deferred. Suggested that we might have informed the military authorities further. Also advised greater action to stimulate editorial opinion. He thought that an informal meeting of some representatives of the Revisionists and of our group would be helpful.

3 P. M. Called on Mr. Leo Wolfson at the Land Office Department of Interior. Consulted him about the proper person to head our Washington Bureau. He will think through the subject and make certain recommendations. He is eager to be helpful. Would be glad to serve in an informal committee or cabinet around the head of the Bureau to be selected.

5:30 P. M. Met with Colonel Wainhouse in the lobby of the Shoreham Hotel. He thought that the British might welcome some form of shared responsibility with the American government in the Near East to offset Russian influence. He thought that Ben Horin's article in Harper's this month had something to it.

CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, MAY 2, 1944 -- Luncheon with Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General, State of New York, at the Commodore Hotel. Discussed with him the introduction of a plank in the Republican Platform and the importance of the Republicans acting to bring the Palestine Resolution onto the floor of Congress. He will talk to Dewey about the proposed plank.

WEDNESDAY - ^{May} April 3, 11:45 A.M. -- Interview with Mr. Fortas at the New Interior Building, Washington, D.C. It is his belief that an arrangement between the United States and Great Britain in the matter of Arabian oil will help the Jewish National Home.

He suggests that the Jewish Agency should make some gesture to assist Saudi Arabia through UNRAH.

He is convinced that Wallace Murray is a hostile element and should be removed. Ickes had seen the President about him. He was not at all impressed with the intervention of the military which he regarded as unwarranted.

THURSDAY - May 4 -- 10:00 A.M. - Met with Senator Vandenburg. The Senator is still of the opinion that the military objection is decisive and that the resolutions will not be able to be acted upon until the military situation has cleared up. The newly appointed Senate Committee on Post-War Planning is considering the larger aspects of world organizations after the war and is not likely to discuss detailed subjects.

11:30 A.M. -- Interview with Senator Gillette. He feels that Great Britain has been behind the action of the military. The key to the situation lies in his judgment there and in the State Department. He is quite anti-British, as is Vandenburg.

CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 1944 -- 3:30 P.M.

I went with Isaiah Berlin to the British Embassy together with Mr. Lourie. Berlin has just returned from London where he had seen Weizmann, and had canvassed the whole situation. It is clear that a decision has been tentatively reached. Stanley has stated as much. The British Colonial Office is far friendlier than it was. They are waiting for the proper time. Agitation here is not likely to alter that decision one way or another. It was not clear from what Berlin stated whether the decision is linked up with partition or not. It might well be. The realization is gaining ground in England that the White Paper policy can not hold and that a new policy based on a new political formula is called for. The new policy will probably be imposed rather than negotiated.

TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY, MAY 23 and 24, 1944

Conference of Community Contacts Chairmen held at Statler Hotel, Washington, D.C. An excellent meeting. Good spirit. On the morning of the second day the delegates contacted their congressmen and senators. The Conference closed with a testimonial banquet given to Dr. Lowdermilk which was a gala event, both delightful and impressive.

CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, June 12, 1944 — Senator Taft called Long Distance from Washington to say that Senator Bridges and he had been requested to submit a letter to the State Department or the President on the rights of the United States in Palestine. They had been requested to do it by the Bergson group. He asked me what he should do about it. I asked him to send the letter on to me, which he did, and on June 15, I sent him the following reply:

"Thank you for your kind letter and for the inquiry which you have addressed to me. There are two reasons which suggest themselves to me why the draft of the letter which was submitted to you should not be sent.

"The first has to do with the people who, you indicated, are back of the project to send this letter, and who will exploit the fact that their letter was sent as proof of their political effectiveness in Washington and, by contrast, the ineffectiveness of the official Zionist bodies which have so far failed to get any action on the Palestine Resolutions in Congress. This small Bergson group which recently opened the fake 'Hebrew Embassy' in Washington, and is now launching a rival organization to the constituted Zionist bodies in this country, has been repudiated by all sections of American Jewish public opinion. They represent nobody in this country, and in Palestine, a small terrorist group which has been outlawed and which the official Zionist bodies in Palestine have condemned. This small group which has created one front organization after another and which keeps itself alive by sensational full page ads in the public press should not in any way be encouraged.

"The second and more important reason is that a statement such as is being suggested, covering the rights of the United States in Palestine under the terms of the Mandate, was presented to our Government a few years ago. This detailed statement, properly documented, I had read into the record of the Hearings on our Resolutions before the Committee on Foreign Affairs last February, and it is now published on pages 47-64. The only response which this representation elicited from Secretary Hull at that time was that the United States would do its best to protect the rights of American nationals in Palestine, and equality of treatment for them with all other foreign nationals. I am afraid that another representation along the same lines at this time will elicit from the State Department another negative statement similar to or worse than that issued in 1938. Obviously the effect of such a statement would be very bad and would in a large measure nullify the assurance contained in the President's statement to Dr. Wise and myself on March 9.

"The cause of the Jewish National Home, in which you and Senator Bridges are so vitally interested, can best be served at this time by a strong pro-Palestine plank in the Republican Party Platform and by action of Congress on the Palestine Resolution. The feeling among our group is that the Resolution should be brought up for action some time in August or early September when it is hoped the military situation will be considerably and favorably advanced.

"With all good wishes, I remain

AHS:BK

"Most cordially yours, "

June 12, 1944

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" P.S. Under separate cover I am sending you the statment on the
'Rights of the United States to Participate in any Disposition
of Palestine' to which I refer above; also the account which
appeared in the 'New York Times' of the representation made to
Secretary Hull."



CONFIDENTIAL

I called on Senator Taft at his office in Washington on Wednesday, April 26, at which time I raised the subject of the introduction of the Palestine plank in the Republican Platform. Senator Taft seemed agreeable to the idea and stated that in all likelihood, he would have much to do with the drafting of the Platform.

At that time Senator Taft suggested that I see Mr. Dewey and elicit his opinion. On Tuesday, May 2, I saw Attorney General Nathaniel L. Goldstein of New York, and told him of the conversation which I had with Senator Taft, and the advisability of eliciting an opinion from Mr. Dewey. Mr. Goldstein was very friendly to the idea and said that he would arrange a meeting between Mr. Dewey and myself. On May 5, I wrote to Senator Taft and told him of my meeting with Attorney General Goldstein and of the contemplated contact with Mr. Dewey. On May 19 I received a letter from Senator Taft stating that he is drafting the Palestine plank and that I would have an opportunity of seeing a copy of it before he went to Chicago. The thought was that the Senator's plank would follow closely the Resolution which he introduced in the Senate. He suggested, furthermore, that we do not agitate publicly for it.

On June 1, in company of Attorney General Nathaniel Goldstein, I met Governor Dewey at Hotel Roosevelt in New York. I told him of our hope that a Palestine plank would be included in the Republican Platform and I showed him the Resolution which had been introduced in Congress. Governor Dewey read it very carefully and said: "I agree most heartily." He said he would talk to Senator Taft about it in a few days when he planned to see him. On June 2 I wrote to Senator Taft and told him of the meeting which I had with Governor Dewey in New York.

In order to indicate to the Senator more definitely the kind of a plank we would prefer, I had Mr. Herman Shulman draft a plank which I sent on to the Senator on June 9. (See Exhibit A)

In the meantime, Attorney General Goldstein suggested that we publish an attractive folder on Palestine to be distributed among the delegates and members of the Resolutions Committee who would attend the Republican Convention. He requested that a statement of his on Palestine be included, among others, feeling that that would give the endorsement of an important Republican leader to the cause. This booklet was published and distributed. (See Exhibit B)

On June 16, Mr. Harrison E. Spangler, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, telephoned me from Chicago and invited me to deliver the invocation at the session of the Republican Convention on Tuesday, June 27. I accepted. The invitation was confirmed in a telegram and letter on June 20. The Resolutions Committee of the Republican Convention met in Chicago beginning Wednesday, June 21. I arrived in Chicago that morning, together with the staff from our office including Mr. Manson, Mr. Leo Sack, Mr. Elihu Stone. We stopped at the Shoreland Hotel, a considerable distance away from the headquarters of the Convention which were at the Stevers Hotel downtown. Our purpose was first not to give the impression of a lobby and secondly not to announce our presence in such a way as to arouse any possible opposition on the part of anti-Zionist forces in the country who might have bombarded the Resolutions Committee with telegrams, etc. urging it not to adopt any Palestine plank. I remained in Chicago for the 21 and 22, going to Cincinnati to attend the sessions of the Central Conference of American Rabbis over the week-end and

returned to Chicago Monday morning, June 26 and remained until after the Platform was announced and approved by the Convention.

On the 21st and 22nd, I saw Senator Taft who gave us the names of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and of the Drafting Committee who might be contacted. I spoke with Attorney General Goldstein long distance to Albany (the Attorney General did not arrive until Sunday morning) suggesting that it would be advisable for Governor Dewey to telephone to his campaign manager in Chicago, Mr. Brownell, and through him to his other representatives that the Palestine plank must be inserted in the Platform. I called upon Mr. Brownell, and at that very time the Governor called him up and spoke to him about our plank. Mr. Brownell indicated that there would be no difficulties at all. I also saw Mrs. Anna McCormack Simms, a leader of the Dewey forces in the Mid-west. Mr. Mason, Mr. Sack and Mr. Stone interviewed quite a number of other leaders including Miss Mary Donlon, Senator Austin of Vermont, William L. Hutchison of Indiana, Representative Joseph W. Martin of Mass. who was the permanent chairman of the Convention, Mr. McCaffer of New York, Senator Danaher of Conn. and quite a number of others.

When I left at midnight on Thursday, June 22, the situation was well in hand. But it had completely changed when I ~~had~~ returned to Chicago on June 26. Opposition to our plank had developed. Numerous changes in the plank were suggested. The original authors of these suggestions were not always revealed to us. It may well be that some anti-Zionists had made their opposition known to Mr. Goldstein. It may also be that opposition developed among the members of the Drafting Committee. But by Monday morning, our representatives in Chicago received two substitute drafts which the Committee was prepared to act upon, one prepared by Miss Mary Donlon (Exhibit C) which was completely negative and worthless. The other one was given by Senator Taft to Mr. Leo Sack (Exhibit D) which omitted reference to "Commonwealth."

Upon my being informed of the situation, I called Attorney General Goldstein and told him that these substitute planks were entirely unsatisfactory, that they would insure the defeat of the Palestine Resolutions pending in Congress because if the Republican Party was not prepared to refer to "Commonwealth" in a Party Platform which is, after all, not legislation, its representatives in Congress would certainly not feel inclined to vote for a "Commonwealth" in a Congressional resolution. I told him that rather than have that kind of a negative resolution I would prefer none at all, and that if a revised resolution such as was presented is insisted upon, I should have to leave the Convention and not participate in the Tuesday evening program. The Attorney General said he would re-canvass the situation and let me know. At the same time I got in touch with Senator Taft and expressed my misgivings. I told him that I would send down to him a revised draft of the resolution which I thought would meet the situation, although preferring the original draft which I submitted to him on June 9. My revised draft (Exhibit E) and the accompanying letter (Exhibit F) are appended herewith.

At 10:15 that morning, I telephoned Dr. Wise in New York, read to him Senator Taft's draft which eliminated the "Jewish Commonwealth" and asked him whether failing to obtain the inclusion of "Commonwealth" in the draft we should accept Taft's draft, or reject it and have no plank at all. It was Dr. Wise's

thought that the Taft Resolution, while it does not go as far as we should like, should not be turned down if we cannot get the "Commonwealth" resolution.

At 12:30 Monday noon, Mr. Dulles, who is political adviser to Mr. Dewey, telephoned me, evidently at the suggestion of Mr. Goldstein, to discuss with me the proposed revised resolution. He read it to me over the telephone, and what he read was another revision of the Taft resolution eliminating "unrestricted immigration" and substituting the word "constitute" for "reconstitute." He argued that no nation had unrestricted immigration and that if the Jews had a state of their own they would not accept such a principle. To meet his suggestion, I suggested that the sentence should read "in order to give refuge to millions of Jewish men, women and children" (instead of men, women and children).... "we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration" (instead of to unrestricted immigration.) He also announced for the first time the intention of the Resolutions Committee to include in the resolution a condemnation of the President because of his failure to insist that the mandatory of Palestine should carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration in its Mandate while he pretends to support them. I urged Mr. Dulles not to include that sentence as it was unnecessary and provocative. His reply was that that was not the concern of us, but of the Republican Party. This was not a resolution which the Zionists were adopting, but which the Republican Party was adopting and that it was their right to express themselves on the weaknesses of the present Administration if they so wished.

The draft of the resolution as submitted by Mr. Dulles over the telephone Monday morning is appended here as Exhibit G.

This was the situation as of Monday evening. The Resolutions Committee and the Drafting Committee met to the early hours of Tuesday morning. Towards the close of its long deliberations on the Platform, the Palestine plank came up for discussion and here strenuous opposition developed to the resolution at the hands of Senator Danaher of Conn. who was opposed to the "commonwealth" clause and also to our telling Great Britain what to do in a matter which really did not concern us. Senator Danaher was a problem to us in Washington. As a result of his objections, our plank was tabled, and as of Tuesday morning there was no resolution on Palestine to be included in the Platform. (This information was conveyed to us early Tuesday morning by Attorney General Goldstein.)

On Tuesday morning, the entire Resolutions Committee reconvened at ten o'clock. I got in touch with Mr. Brownell and apprised him of the situation. He said that he would get in touch immediately with their supporters on the Resolutions Committee. We telephoned about extensively to members of the Resolutions Committee whom we believed to be our friends. The situation lined itself up as follows: We could have a resolution such as was shown to us by Senator Taft passed, but this would exclude any reference to "commonwealth" and would endanger our position in Congress; or we could ask that no resolution at all on Palestine be introduced. In spite of the opposition which had developed, I felt that our position in the general political picture was strong, that the Republican Party leaders knew that it was worthwhile to consider the desires of the Jewish citizens of America. I therefore took the chance and the responsibility to notify Senator Taft that unless the term "commonwealth" were included in the resolution, I preferred that no resolution at all be adopted. I dictated a letter to him which I sent down with Mr. Leo Sack around 10:30 Tuesday morning. It is herewith appended as

Exhibit H.

At noon, I went down to the Hotel Stevens where the Resolutions Committee was in session. Shortly after I arrived, the Resolutions Committee adjourned its meeting. We were then apprised that our resolution came up for discussion, that Senator Danaher had opposed it, that Alfred Landon of Kansas, Miss Mary Donlon, Mr. McCaffery of New York and others spoke enthusiastically for it and that the Resolutions Committee approved of it and authorized the Drafting Committee to make the final revisions which would meet some of the objections raised.

At three o'clock, Senator Taft gave us the final draft of the resolution which is appended as Exhibit I.



EXHIBIT "A"

Draft of plank by Mr. Herman Shulman submitted to
Senator Taft.

In this most tragic hour for the Jewish people of Europe, of whom millions of innocent men, women and children have been brutally massacred by the Nazis, we favor the taking of immediate and effective measures to rescue those who still survive, and in accordance with the traditional American policy we call for the opening of the doors of Palestine to the free entry of Jews into that country and for the granting to them of full opportunity for colonization and settlement so that Palestine may be reconstituted as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth, in which all its inhabitants shall enjoy religious, cultural and civic equality, and in which the holy places, a heritage to mankind, will be fully safeguarded.

EXHIBIT "C"

Substitute draft prepared by Miss Mary Donlon

In order to give refuge to millions of Jewish people driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of the doors of Palestine to the entry of Jews into that country and for the granting to them of opportunity for colonization and settlement.



EXHIBIT "D"

Revised Draft By Senator Robert A. Taft - given to
Mr. Leo Sack on June 25, 1944

PALESTINE

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and land ownership and the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, all in accord with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of Congress adopted in 1922. We call on the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration contained in its Mandate.

EXHIBIT "E"

Dr. Silver's revised draft to Senator Taft
Submitted Monday morning, June 26

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and land ownership, so that the Jewish people may, in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of Congress adopted in 1922, reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth. We call on the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate.




EXHIBIT "F"

Letter sent by Dr. Silver to Senator Taft enclosing
revised draft.

June 26, 1944

Hon. Robert A. Taft
Stevens Hotel
Chicago, Ill.

My dear Senator Taft:

I am enclosing herewith the revised draft which I think meets the objections which have been raised, and at the same time does not do harm to the chances of the resolutions still pending in Congress. I am following closely the draft which you gave to Mr. Sack last night.

I am still of the opinion that the original draft which I sent you some time ago is the one which most adequately meets the situation and will arouse the greatest satisfaction among our people. However, use your own good judgment as to which of the two should be adopted.

I am profoundly grateful to you for your continued and loyal interest in this great cause.

Most cordially yours,

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

AHS:BP
Encs.

EXHIBIT "G"

Draft of Resolution submitted by Mr. Dulles to Dr. Silver
at 12:45 P.M. - June 26.

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that the Jewish people may, in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of the (Republican) Congress adopted in 1922, constitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth. We condemn the failure of the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate while he pretends to support them.




EXHIBIT "H"

Letter sent by Dr. Silver to Senator Taft on June 27.

June 27, 1944

Hon. Robert A. Taft
Stevens Hotel
Chicago, Ill.

My dear Senator Taft:

I have been informed that there has developed in the drafting committee certain opposition to the inclusion of the term commonwealth.

I think it will be a serious mistake to drop the term, inasmuch as it would practically make the resolution valueless. It would also serve notice that the Republican Party has officially declared itself against the resolution which you introduced in the Senate and which is now pending, which resolution embodies the true aspirations of the Jewish people and the only practical solution for the salvation of several million of our oppressed people and for the age-old tragedy of Jewish national homelessness. The revised plank, therefore, far from being a welcome endorsement of Jewish aspirations would, indeed, be a whittling down and a repudiation.

I do not believe that the objection of one or two people ought to be sufficient to force a revision of the plank to which Governor Dewey and many of the foremost leaders of the Party have given their unqualified approval. If it is sufficient, then I would like to request that no plank on Palestine whatsoever be included in the platform. Against the present political background here and abroad, a plank which calls for less than a commonwealth is a defeat.

The American Jewish Conference, meeting last September in New York and representing organized American Jewry, voted almost unanimously for a Jewish commonwealth.

I send you my warmest greetings.

Most cordially yours,

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

AHS:BP

P.S. You may reach me at the above address (Plaza 1000) all morning.

A.H.S.

EXHIBIT "I"

Final draft of Palestine Resolution which was included in
the Republican Platform.

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the Resolution of a Republican Congress in 1922, Palestine may be constituted as a free and democratic Commonwealth. We condemn the failure of the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provision of the Balfour Declaration and ^{of} the Mandate while he pretends to support them.



CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY - July 10, 1944

At the meeting of the Executive of the Zionist Emergency Council, I made a full report of the adoption of the Palestine plank in the Republican Platform. I presented a resolution to be adopted by the Executive hailing with satisfaction the section of the plank which put the Republican Party behind our cause. Considerable opposition developed on the part of Goldstein, Levinthal, and from the Hadassah, Mrs. Halprin and Mrs. Epstein. They felt that we should specifically dissociate from that part of the plank which criticized the President. Behind some of their reasoning one could detect the feeling that the Republicans may have made some friends among the Jews because of this plank. Most of the leaders of our Movements are in one way or another entangled in the Democratic machine. But by a vote of 6-4 the recommended resolution was passed.

I understand that Goldstein and others met in the offices of the Jewish Agency where all sorts of proposals were made to counteract the effect of the resolution which was adopted. They finally agreed to ask me to call a special meeting of the full Council. On Tuesday morning, I received a telegram from Israel Goldstein, attached herewith to which I replied with a letter, also attached herewith.

Upon my return to Cleveland, Wednesday morning, I received a telegram from Goldstein calling for a special meeting of the Executive of the ZOA, evidently to consider what action the ZOA should take. I phoned Judge Rothenberg, and Herman Shulman, and Irving Miller telephoned me. I advised against any independent action in the ZOA which could only be interpreted as a repudiation of the Emergency Council's action and which would also re-introduce the practice of the constituent agencies of the Emergency Council going off on their own in political action, thus undermining the very purpose for which the Emergency Council exists.

I was informed by Rabbi Miller that at the meeting of the Executive of the ZOA, a motion to issue a special statement was decisively voted down. Those who spoke for issuing such a statement were Levinthal, Szold and Boukstein. Rothenberg, Shulman, Fishman, Rabbi Greenfeld and many others voted against it.

NOTED BY	REFER TO
CLASS OF SERVICE	DATE
<p>This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.</p>	<p>AH</p> <p>JUL 11 1944</p>

WESTERN UNION

A. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

1200

SYMBOLS

DL - Day Letter
NL - Night Letter
LC - Deferred Cable
NLT - Cable Night Letter
Ship Radiogram

Filing time also valid for one on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

ANSWERED

1944 JUL 11 AM 9:05

NAC1 35=NEWYORK NY 11 805A

DR A H SILVER, AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL=

41 EAST 42 ST=

BY YOUR OWN DEFINITION AND GENERAL AGREEMENT MATTERS OF
POLICY MUST BE DECIDED BY LARGER COUNCIL AND NOT BY ITS
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE THEREFORE DISCUSSION RE PLANK SHOULD
BE REFERRED TO COUNCIL URGE CALLING MEETING IMMEDIATELY=

ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN.

July 11, 1944

Dr. Israel Goldstein, President
Zionist Organization of America
41 East 42nd Street
New York City, N. Y.

My dear Dr. Goldstein:

I received your telegram this morning. Presumably it was sent before Mr. Shapiro spoke to you and conveyed the information to you, that I had read the resolution, which was adopted last evening, to Dr. Wise and that he was very pleased with it.

With reference to the contents of your telegram, permit me to say that according to the Constitution and By-Laws under which we operate, the Executive Committee is fully authorized to transact all business between meetings of the full Council, and that, as you well know, has been the practice right along. For the sake of convenience I have made it a practice that when the Executive and full committees meet on the same day - as they do on the third Monday of every month - that we divide the agenda, the Executive transacting what might be called routine business matters and the full Committee taking up political questions. It is quite clear that it would seriously interfere with the effective prosecution of our work if we were to adopt the practice of leaving all political matters, or those which certain members might interpret as political, to the full Committee, which meets only once a month.

From time to time, as you well know, the Executive Committee arranged for an additional meeting of the full Council. Sometimes I have myself called for an additional Council meeting, when the situation warranted. This is in keeping with our By-Laws, which prescribes: "Special meetings (of the full Council) may be held from time to time, as may be determined by the Executive Committee, or upon call of the Chairman, or upon the written request of seven members of the Committee."

I believe that the resolution which was adopted last evening was a very good one. In checking over the official text of the plank on Palestine in the Republican Platform, after the meeting, I found that the Palestine plank was expressed in a single paragraph. To meet the objection of Judge Leventhal on this point, I substituted for the words "the paragraph in the plank" the words "the section in the plank", so that the sentence now reads: "The American Zionist Emergency Council meeting hailed with satisfaction the section of the Palestine Plank which was included in the Republican Platform" etc. This revision

Dr. Israel Goldstein

- 2 -

July 11, 1944.

makes it even more pointed and clearly indicates what we approve of is only a section of the adopted plank, which concerns Palestine and that we are not approving of anything else in that plank.

With all good wishes, I remain

Cordially yours,

Abba Hillel Silver

AHS:BI



THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

Wise and Shulman arrived in Chicago, Friday morning, July 14. On Saturday morning, I returned the call of Dr. Wise who tried to reach me on Friday evening. I spoke to him and Shulman and Manson.

Upon his arrival in Chicago, Wise went to McCormack and asked for permission to appear at the public hearings before the Platform Committee. Permission was granted. Our people were later informed that following Wise's request, permission was also granted to Rabbi Lazaron to appear. I told them all that was highly undesirable. Later in the morning, I drafted a memorandum which I telephoned in to Chicago for Wise and Shulman. (Copy attached herewith) Manson read the memorandum to Dr. Wise. Dr. Wise did not agree with my position. He felt that his appearance before the Committee was sufficiently important to over-ride all my objections.

MONDAY, JULY 17, 1944 — Noon

Mr. Manson telephoned and reported that on the surface everything looked all right. They had seen the members of the sub-committee. They had not seen Mr. Hannegan nor the draft of the platform which had been expected from Washington. They were afraid of a postcard platform which would be bad for us. The New York Times had carried the news that Judge Rosenman had made the original draft of the Platform which was later reduced and revised by others.

I was informed that Rabbi Binstock would offer the invocation. Wise informed me that he had refused. Manson now reports that Wise is sorry that he had refused. Manson reports conversations with Wise in which Wise was considering what they would do in case no Palestine plank is included. He is probably looking for an alibi and for a way of defending the Democratic Party. Judge Fisher of Chicago, a Democratic machine politician, in a conversation with Wise, already defended the Democratic Party's possible failure to include a Palestine plank and expressed deep regret that the Republican Party had included such a plank. Wise agreed with him.

Dr. Goldstein is in Chicago, having been invited by Dr. Wise to join him (without consulting me).

MEMO TO DR. WISE SATURDAY, July 15, 1944

It would be a great blunder to have a debate on the Palestine plank before the Resolutions Committee.

1) Public attention will certainly be drawn to it by the press. It will dramatize the sharp division among the Jews of America on the subject of Palestine. It will give the minority an important sounding board which it craves.

2) As a result of press reports our opposition throughout the country may be stirred into action and will flood McCormick and his committee with telegrams against the resolution.

3) In order to satisfy the opposition and to satisfy everyone the resolutions committee will be inclined to pass a whittled down and washed out Palestine plank which would be acceptable to American Jewish Committee and to the American Council for Judaism, the kind of a plank which, from what has been reported, is in the mind of Mr. Rosenman.

4) It was a mistake to have asked for a hearing before the committee. It is not too late to withdraw the request especially if Lazaron's request was based on the assumption that our side would have a hearing before the committee.

5) McCormick should be seen at once, the situation explained to him, and he should be urged to advise Rabbi Lazaron at once that inasmuch as the Zionists will not be heard by his committee, there is no occasion for the anti-Zionists to be heard. This should also be explained to the Baltimore representative who presented Lazaron's request.

Lazaron has probably not yet left Baltimore and if a telegram is sent to him today he will probably not come on.

What Dr. Wise has told me about the constituency of the committee, is very favorable to us. You can work with the members individually as I am sure you have done. A public appearance is the last thing we want, nor do I believe will the Resolutions Committee be happy over the spectacle of a sharp class of opinion among the Jews over this issue at a public hearing. It will only embarrass them.

If the Palestine plank is not included following your appearance it will be a public repudiation of our representatives.

-2-

MONDAY, JULY 17 -- 11:30 P.M.

Manson telephoned from Chicago to report on the Public Hearings. Lazaron did not show up. Wise, Israel Goldstein and Herman Shulman spoke. Judge Levinthal was present. The gist of all their remarks was that the Republicans had included a platform which had made a great appeal to the Jews of America and that as good Democrats they pleaded with the Democratic Convention to include a similar if not a better Palestine plank in the Democratic Platform. Wise indulged in an anti-Republican tirade, said that the Democratic Party had performed nobly in the past but that it needed now the promise of backing a Jewish Commonwealth in order to counteract the Republican Platform. This was in reply to a question by Senator Hatch. Goldstein spoke as a Democrat and warned of the effectiveness of the Republican plank among the Jews of America. He quoted Cleveland from which he had just come.

The draft of the Platform sent by Washington was not yet available. Hannegan, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee was avoiding our delegation.

TUESDAY, JULY 18 -- MIDNIGHT

I telephoned Manson in Chicago and got the following report:

As of the hour there has been no change in the picture. They have been unable to reach either Hannegan or Rosenman or Niles or Wagner. From Marton Agronsky they learned that the statement on Palestine will be in the most general terms.

Congressman Celler had appeared before the Resolutions Committee with a Palestine plank of his own asking for unrestricted immigration and the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, and Wise later on persuaded him to withdraw his plank.

Wise and Shulman had decided to telephone me in the morning in order to ask my opinion on what they should do if a "Rosenman" washed-out plank is offered -- whether they should accept it or not. The idea, of course, is to involve me in their failure and to unload the responsibility for a decision on me.

Wise, Goldstein and others have been making the rounds of the delegates warning them that Silver will stump for Dewey and that he is out to destroy the Democratic Party, that he intends to use Zionism to attack the Democratic Party. All these arguments are being used to persuade the Democratic Party to put in an adequate Palestine plank. The gentlemen seem to be afraid of failure. They are "shivering in their boots," "mad with envy" at the fact that I succeeded in getting a plank in the Republican Platform and terribly worried about their prestige.

-3-

WEDNESDAY MORNING, JULY 19 -- 9:00 A.M.

As I had expected, Mr. Herman Shulman telephoned me from Chicago recounting what I already knew. He stated that neither Hannegan, Rosenman, Niles or Jonathan Daniels would see any of them, that they had finally written a letter to them requesting in strongest terms, a meeting. He then confronted me with the problem of what they should do in case a short platform is adopted and Palestine referred to only in the most general terms. They wanted my judgment. I told him as follows:

The last time I talked to you was Saturday. It is now Wednesday. So much has happened that it would be folly for me to attempt to advise you. I advised you and Wise on Saturday not to make a public appearance before the Resolutions Committee. You ignored my advice. You must now see it through in your own way and I hope that you will succeed.

I also told him that a newspaper man had telephoned me from Washington asking me whether I would stump for Dewey and that the Zionist leaders were circulating the information among the delegates that I am out to attack the Democratic Party and the President. You know, of course, that unlike Dr. Wise, I have never stumped for any presidential candidate. This irresponsible use of my name is unwarranted and dangerous if I am to continue to work for Zionism in Washington. Please pass the word down that my name is not to be used.

Mr. Shulman said that Dr. Wise had said that if there is no adequate Palestine plank he would remain silent in the campaign. I told him that silence is not enough. If he means to accomplish anything he should serve notice that he will denounce the Party for failure to include a proper Palestine plank.

3:00 P.M. - July 19, 1944

Mr. Manson called, and in the course of conversation Mr. Shulman also appeared. The situation hasn't changed. The question is that the Platform will be as it was written in Washington. The hearings before the Resolutions Committee will be almost entirely window-dressing. Wise is to see Flynn and the N.Y. delegation and also Mr. Hannegan this afternoon. The general feeling of our men in Chicago is that if the Rosenman plank is included they will do their utmost to have no plank at all. I told them to try to see Byrne and Senator Truman and to concentrate on one man who will speak up for us when the Resolutions Committee finally comes to draft the Platform. I also told Shulman to tell the men not to be discouraged. The situation is far from hopeless. I suggested that Wise take a very aggressive position with the key-men at the Convention.

-4-

JULY 19, 1944 -- 12 o'clock Midnight

Mr. Manson telephoned. He reported that Mr. McCormick had told Dr. Wise that the Resolutions Committee had adopted a plank on Palestine which calls for unrestricted immigration and for a policy which will make it possible for the Jewish people to build a free and democratic commonwealth. Mr. Manson was not sure whether that action was final or whether it was subject to the approval of higher-ups. He would let me know.

JULY 20, 1944 -- 11:30 A.M.

Mr. Herman Shulman phoned from Chicago. He thought that there is a serious possibility that the term "Jewish people" would be eliminated from the resolution so that it would read:

"We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization and for such a policy which would result in the establishment of a free and democratic commonwealth."

They are in the dark as to what will be the final upshot. Shulman, Wise, Goldstein, Levinthal, Manson are of the opinion that the resolution even if it omits "Jewish people" and "commonwealth" should be accepted rather than ask for the complete omission of a Palestine plank. I told him that naturally I would have to go along with them. I asked him whether it was still possible to include reference to the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. Shulman thought that it was too late. I told him that I was afraid that our Jewish enemies would make capital of such a resolution. He felt that the references to Palestine in both political party planks would help us in our future negotiations.

JULY 20, 1944 -- 3:15 P.M.

Mr. Herman Shulman telephoned and he said that Congressman Celler had seen the official draft of the resolution and that it includes the phrase, "Free and democratic commonwealth." If true, this is highly gratifying.

CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1944

At the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Emergency Council, Wise read a letter from Nahum Goldmann in which Goldmann reported conversation which he had with Stettinius in which the latter thought that the meeting with Wise and me could be postponed for a later date and that no announcement about the new policy would be forthcoming until after the end of the war. Goldmann's visit to Stettinius was a deliberate intrusion under some phoney excuse to horn in on the situation. The matter is explained more fully in the letter which I wrote to Mr. Emanuel Neumann and to Dr. Wise, attached hereto.



(COPY)

August 18, 1944

Dr. Stephen S. Wise
Camp Willanette
Lake Placid, New York

My dear Dr. Wise:

I received your letter of August 16th but you failed to enclose the report of which you spoke. You did enclose a copy of the letter which you addressed to Stettinius. It were better if you had not suggested a date so far off as August 29th for the meeting. This would encourage him, if he decides to see us at all, to suggest an even later date. In the meantime, all the preliminaries necessary to prepare for action on the Resolution in Congress are stymied, as well as most of our propaganda work.

You have probably been informed that I sent in my resignation a few days ago. I find it impossible to carry on under existing conditions. Two separate agencies doing Zionist political work in the United States in the name of organized Zionism is stupid and dangerous. I have called attention to the situation time and again. As early as last February Nahum Goldmann injected himself in the prolonged negotiations which we were carrying on with Judge Rosenman touching a meeting with the President, and while we were insisting on a meeting of an exclusively Zionist delegation with the President, Nahum Goldmann was agreeing with Rosenman to a joint delegation which would include Proskauer, Balustein, Held, and so forth. The situation proved terribly embarrassing and led to considerable unpleasantness but nothing was done about the matter.

When Goldmann returned from England recently he immediately rushed to the War Department to discuss the question of a Jewish Army and got in touch with American oil interests and officials in governmental departments to discuss the delicate oil question -- all on his own without consulting the Emergency Council, as if these matters were none of our business.

I appointed a special committee with Judge Rothenberg as chairman to handle this matter; the committee never met. I again referred the subject to the program committee, and on May 25th I wrote to Shulman urging him to take the matter up with his committee. I am enclosing herewith a paragraph of the letter which I wrote to Shulman. Nothing was done. At the meeting of the program committee last week I again urged that the matter be taken up. It was again postponed on the slim excuse that the hour was late.

And then at the meeting on Monday I was confronted with this outrageous business of Goldmann calling on Stettinius on some phoney excuse and upsetting the apple-cart. (He pulled a similar excuse in horning in on the discussions with Rosenman. The many organizations with which he is identified offer him ample opportunities for acting as a sort of a roving ambassador in Washington for the Jews of America, the Jews of Palestine and world Jewry.) You must have seen the shocked expression of everyone at the meeting. The only one who tried to defend Goldmann was yourself.

I am prepared to put up with a lot of things and much aggravation to serve the cause, but it would be the height of folly for me to spend my time and energies day and day in behalf of the cause and then see carefully laid plans frustrated and out-maneuvered by a gentleman who presumes to speak in the name of a superseding body and whose actions are not subject to the control of the American Zionist Emergency Council which is charged with the responsibility to carry on the work in the United States.

This is not an issue between Dr. Goldmann and myself and it should not be put on that plane. This is a matter for the American Zionist Emergency Council to determine whether it has the authority and possesses the competence to carry on the full Zionist political program in the United States visavis our own government and the British Embassy or whether it requires the intervention of another Bureau.

I had assumed that the purpose of the Bureau of the Agency in this country was to look after its Latin American interests and the economic projects which Dr. Weizmann in the name of the Agency had initiated here.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

(Signed) Abba Hillel Silver

P.S. I received the enclosed telegram this afternoon from the Revisionists. What answer should I give them?

COPY

August 16, 1944

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
Commission on Palestine Surveys
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Emanuel:

I am sorry that you were unable to attend the meeting of the Emergency Council last Monday. Irving Miller who was there could tell you the story of how Goldmann pulled another one of his shyster tricks, went to Stettinius last week on some phoney excuse in anticipation of our appointment with him on August 15th, and messed up the situation in the same way he did with Judge Rosenman, you will recall, some months ago. As a result of his intrusion, Mr. Stettinius, who promised to see us on August 15th, will not see us until perhaps the end of September, and no announcement on Palestine will be forthcoming until the end of the war. These were the tidings which were conveyed by Goldmann in a letter to Dr. Wise. I was kept in ignorance of the entire matter until Wise pulled out the letter at the meeting. I, of course, blew up and told them plenty. Everyone was shocked by the action of Goldmann, and the only who tried to excuse it was, of course, our friend Stephen, who undoubtedly has been in collusion with Goldmann right along. It was voted to have the program committee look into the matter immediately and bring in a definite recommendation for the next meeting of the Executive Committee. I have been urging action on this, as you know, for a long time. I knew the situation would deteriorate very rapidly, knowing as I do the character and ambitions of this political gigolo, and the impossibility under any circumstances of carrying on a consistent political activity in Washington through two competing agencies. I wrote to Shulman as far back as May 25th about this matter. Prior to that I appointed a special committee to handle the matter, which never met. I also wrote to Dr. Weizmann about it some months ago, but of course he passed the buck back to us here, undoubtedly guided by Weisgal and Goldmann. At the last meeting of the program committee, when this matter should have been brought up, it was again postponed on the slim excuse that the hour was late and that Goldmann had to leave.

Under the circumstances I see no other way out of it for me than to send in my resignation, which I did this morning. I am prepared to put up with a lot of things and much aggravation to serve the cause, but it would be the height of folly for me to spend my time and energies day after day and to see my work periodically frustrated and conspiratorially out-manuevered by a gentleman who presumes to speak in the name of a superseding body and whose actions are subject to no control by the American Zionist Emergency Council which is burdened with the responsibility of carrying on the work in the United States.

I am sorry that I must do it at this time and on the eve of momentous events. I should have liked to remain on with the Emergency Council until our new status in Palestine is defined and to help direct the Council toward maximum effectiveness in bringing about a satisfactory solution for Palestine; but it is impossible to work under the present conditions, not so I feel justified in assuming the responsibilities of leadership when the authority which should go along with such responsibility does not exist.

It is bad enough to have to put up with the manipulations and the hysterical prestige-complex of Wise. You will recall that astounding incident with the President when without consultation with me or with the Council he brought about a postponement of the critical interview with the President for more than two weeks because he had to be on the Pacific Coast and could not tolerate the idea of anyone seeing the President in his place. You will recall how hard he tried recently to force through a permanent political committee in an effort to curb and control my activities. I say it is bad enough to have to put up with one major source of aggravation and interference. With two it is utterly impossible.

I send you my best wishes.

Very cordially yours,

(Signed) Abba Hillel Silver



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY - AUGUST 16, 1944

I sent the following resignation:

"Mr. Arthur Lourie, Secretary
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Lourie:

Please present to the next meeting of the American Zionist Emergency Council my resignation as its co-chairman and as chairman of its Executive Committee. I need not here elaborate on the reasons which force me to take this step. I pointed them out as forcibly as I could at the last meeting of our Executive Committee.

I regret that I will not be able to attend the meeting of the Executive Committee on August 28th.

Very cordially yours,

(Signed) Abba Hillel Silver"

CONFIDENTIAL

AUGUST 22, 1944

A meeting of the Program Committee, to which my resignation was referred held. As a result of the meeting, which I did not attend, but which Goldmann attended, and at which Neumann, Lipsky, Shulman Wertheim, Halpern and Gellman spoke for the position which I took, some more affirmatively than others, Wise being restrained in his criticism, Goldmann and Weisgal vehement and Rothenberg strangely equivocal, the following recommendations were adopted:

"It has been agreed by the Program Committee that all the approaches to the American Government or its officials on matters related to the program of political activities of the Emergency Council shall be undertaken by representatives of the Movement only with the approval of the Executive Committee of the Council or of such sub-committee as may be designated by it.

"It is suggested that the co-chairmen of the Council alone or with additional persons designated by them confer with Dr. Goldmann with a view to the procedural implementation of these decisions.

"In view of the action taken the Committee expresses the hope that Dr. Silver will withdraw the resignation he has tendered which should not be made a matter of record."

On Wednesday, August 23, Neumann read me recommendations and I told him the third paragraph nullified the first, and that the resolutions as they stand are not acceptable. He said that he would revise them and let me hear from them.

A further meeting of the Program Committee was held on August 24 at which the following resolution was adopted:

"The Program Committee recommends to the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council for favorable action the following:

"1. All approaches to the American Government or its officials on matters related to the program of political activities of the American Zionist Emergency Council shall be undertaken by representatives of the Movement only with the prior approval of the Executive Committee of the Council.

"2. Dr. Goldmann, as a member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, has assented to this view and has agreed to act in conformity therewith and in fullest cooperation with the Emergency Council and its co-chairmen.

"3. It is agreed that the co-chairmen of the Emergency Council, and Dr. Goldmann confer between meetings of the Executive Committee of the Council with the view to carrying out the purposes of this understanding and achieving the fullest measure of cooperation between the representative of the Jewish Agency in the United States and the Emergency Council."

This resolution was presented to a meeting of the Executive of the Zionist Emergency Council on August 28th, (See Minutes), which adopted the following resolution:

"The following motion was adopted by the affirmative vote of all the members present at the meeting with the exception of Mr. Neumann who wished to be recorded as not voting:

"The Executive Committee finds it impossible to accept the resignation tendered by Dr. Silver as its chairman and earnestly requests him to withdraw said resignation which should not be made a matter of record.

"In view of the situation which has arisen the Executive Committee expresses its approval of the principle embodied in paragraph one of the resolution drafted by the Program Committee which reads as follows: 'All approaches to the American Government or its officials on matters relating to the program of political activities of the American Zionist Emergency Council shall be undertaken by representatives of the Movement only with the prior approval of the Executive Committee of the Council.'

"It urges Dr. Silver to confer with a sub-committee of the Executive Committee to discuss how this principle can best be put into effect in order to insure the maximum amount of coordination in the political work."

I notified the Committee that the resolutions were unacceptable through a statement which was read by Rabbi Feuer from my office to Mr. Shulman on August 30.

On August 31 another meeting of the Executive of the Emergency Council was held at which it was decided to postpone the matter for final action to a full meeting of the plenum of the American Zionist Emergency Council on September 14. In the meantime I was requested to hold my resignation in abeyance.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944 - 8:00 P.M.

Full session of the American Zionist Emergency Council to consider my resignation. I did not intend to attend the meeting but the Misrachi, Poale Zion, the Office Staff and Meyer Berlin's cable from Jerusalem and others urged me to come on.

On the preceding Tuesday, the matter was discussed at the ZOA Executive Board -- Goldmann present -- Heller doing the talking for the opposition. It was resolved there to appoint a committee to meet with me and work out a satisfactory formula, failing which, the ZOA members of the Council would vote as a bloc to approve the resolutions adopted by the Program Committee. Goldstein, Szold, Wise, Boukstein, Heller, etc. regarded this an opportunity to force the acceptance of my resignation.

On Wednesday evening, I met with Rothenberg, Shulman, Lipsky, Neumann and Feuer at the Commodore, where a satisfactory formula was worked out. The following afternoon, the committee appointed by the ZOA, with which I did not meet, tried to alter the formula in such a way as to embarrass me.

Thursday evening, prior to the meeting, I called Lipsky and Shulman in, but Goldstein, Levinthal and Heller tramped along. A heated argument ensued and I told them that their revised resolutions were utterly unacceptable. They yielded. So that at the meeting of the Council in the evening, the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

1. All approaches to the American Government or its officials on matters relating to the program of political activities of the American Zionist Emergency Council shall be undertaken by representatives of the movement only with the prior approval of the Executive Committee of the Council.
2. To further the implementation of paragraph 1, between meetings of the Executive Committee the co-chairmen of the Emergency Council and Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Lipsky on behalf of the Jewish Agency Bureau will consult with respect to all emergency matters or courses of action not previously determined upon by the Emergency Council or its Executive Committee which involve approaches to the American government; and all matters relating to the program of activities of the Emergency Council which come to the attention of Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Lipsky requiring immediate action in order to determine what immediate steps should be taken concerning such matters, by whom and in what manner.
3. It is understood that nothing contained herein shall be deemed to limit or restrict freedom of action of the American Zionist Emergency Council.

After the adoption of the resolution, I stated forthrightly that the resolution did not go far enough even as it was, that the Agency Bureau should be closed, that I intended to insist that all political work shall be channeled through the Emergency Council and that I intended to direct London and Jerusalem to direct their communications hereafter directly to the Emergency Council. There was no objection to my declaration.

Rabbi Miller had informed Feuer that a few days before this meeting he had been called in by Dr. Wise and Dr. Goldmann and high pressured into declaring himself against me and for them. Rabbi Miller flatly refused.

CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY - SEPTEMBER 5, 1944 -- NOON

I telephoned Senator Taft to ask his advice about the Resolutions. He thought that he would write a letter to War Department formally inquiring as to its present attitude, and that he would also speak to Senator Wagner.

Senator Taft mentioned getting touch with Connally and calling a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee. I suggested that no meeting be called until he will have found out the opinion of the War Department.

FRIDAY - SEPTEMBER 8, 1944

At noon today I telephoned Zaritsky and asked him to get in touch with Senator Wagner which he promised to do immediately.

TUESDAY - September 12, 1944 -- 11 o'clock

I telephoned Senator Taft. He had written to Stimson but he had not yet heard from him. He had been informed that Senator Wagner had spoken to him, but he could not learn as to what was said. Senator Taft had talked to Senator Connally. Connally was non-committal. He too mentioned the fact that Wagner had been in contact with Stimson, evidently as a result of my conversation with Zaritsky. He thought that Congress may adjourn October 1-7.

TUESDAY - SEPTEMBER 12, 1944 - noon

I spoke to Mr. Zaritsky. He had not yet been able to get in touch with Senator Wagner who is out of the city both as to Washington and New York.

TUESDAY - September 19, 1944

Leo Sack called from Washington. He had seen Connally. Connally had told him that there would be no action on the Resolutions unless the War Department removed its objections, that Senator Wagner had seen him a few months ago and was anxious to have action on the Resolutions. Connally advised Wagner to see Stimson, but since that time Connally had not seen Wagner, nor did Wagner report to him on his visit to Stimson. Connally assumed that Stimson's reply had been negative or non-committal. He felt that Congress would adjourn probably this week. He was sure that there would be something done immediately after the war about Palestine. He himself is not against the resolution.

Following the conversation with Sack, I telephoned Herman Shulman and told him of what Sack had reported. He informed me that an appointment had been made by our delegation to meet with Assistant Secretary of War, McCloy, tomorrow, Wednesday, at 4:30 P.M. I told him to get in touch with Lipsky or Goldstein to reach Bloch. Possibly quick action could be gotten on the Resolution in the House. He said that he would get in touch with them.

CONFIDENTIAL

3:30 P.M. - SEPTEMBER 19, 1944

I telephoned Taft to see if he had received any reply from Stimson to his letter. He had received no reply. I told him of our committee and Senator Wagner calling on McCloy tomorrow afternoon and suggested to Taft that he get in touch with McCloy since McCloy is a Republican. Taft, who had previously hesitated to get in personal communication with Stimson, very readily said he would get in touch with McCloy and would let me know of the conversation. At the time that I called Taft, Leo Sack was with him.

Taft also said that he had spoken to Senator Austin about the possibility of his communication with Stimson but that Senator Austin was not in favor of taking any action on the resolution before the adjournment of Congress.

4:30 P. M. - September 19, 1944

Senator Taft called back from Washington. He had talked to McCloy. The whole matter had been referred to him. He had made official inquiry of the Chief of Staff and asked his opinion. He had not yet received a report. Senator Taft asked him if he could have a reply by Thursday. McCloy thought that that was possible. He thought that the visit of our delegation, with Senator Wagner, would be helpful. He had impressed on McCloy his desire to have action on the Resolution before Congress adjourns.

6:45 P.M. - September 19, 1944

I telephoned Mr. Shulman at his home in Stamford and informed him of what Senator Taft had told me and also what Vandenberg had said about the difficulty of getting a quorum of the Foreign Relations Committee. He said that he had been in touch with Goldstein and that the latter would get in touch with Bloom.

CONFIDENTIAL

SEPTEMBER 20, 1944

Mr. Leo Sack phoned from Washington and at 10:30 P.M. Mr. Herman Shulman phoned from New York reporting on the meeting with McCloy at 4:30.

The War Department is not yet prepared to withdraw its objections to our Resolutions. The report from "B" too has been negative. McCloy is still sounding out the Chief of Staff and Stimson, and will let us know in a couple of days. He did not see why we should take a chance in pressing for the Resolution now since the war is coming to an end now in a few weeks. He himself has read up a lot on the subject and has become friendlier to it.

Sack said that Wagner had indicated to him that he would see the President on Thursday after the latter returns to Washington.

Szold, Wise, Shulman and Senator Wagner constituted the Committee.



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