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Confidential notes, Abba Hillel Silver, 1944-1947.

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CONFIDENTIAL NOTES

- TAFT, ROBERT A. -- Oct. 9, 1944 -- Telephoned me at home. Had spoken to McCloy about military objection to Palestine Resolution. Majority of War Cabinet agree no longer military objection. McCloy asks whether formal reply to inquiry to Secretary of War Stimson wanted.
- WISE, Stephen S. -- October 12, 1944 -- Dr. Wise visited White House. Requests President to send message to ZOA Convention meeting in Atlantic City.
- SHULMAN, Herman -- Telephoned re conversation reported by Dr. Wise with President. re money for Democratic Campaign, etc.; also re communication to ZOA Convention. Shulman reads draft of letter President to send.
- DEWEY, Governor -- Oct. 12 -- Interview at Hotel Roosevelt. Governor Dewey says "Dr. Silver, I shall never let you down." Statement issued to Press.
- EXECUTIVE MEETING OF EMERGENCY COUNCIL -- Oct. 12, 1944 - P.M. -- Dr. Wise's action reviewed - also Rabbi Silver's meeting with Gov. Dewey.
- PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT (Exhibit A)
- DEWEY'S STATEMENT (Exhibit B)
- STIMSON -- Secretary of War -- October 13, 1944 -- Letter sent to Taft re Palestine Resolutions (no longer military objection)
- MORGENTHAU, Secretary of Treasury -- Oct. 25, 1944 -- Interview -- I explain my position of neutrality as chairman of American Zionist Emergency Council.
- EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEETING - Oct. 30, 1944 -- Advisability of proceeding with resolutions discussed.
- STETTINIUS, Ass't Sec'y of State -- Interview -- Nov. 9, 1944 -- Dr. Wise and Nahum Goldmann also attend. We ask for green light on Resolutions. He says will get in touch with President. Discussion of partition. Says no action taken yet on Palestine by our Government; also no announcement imminent. Discuss representative our view be attached to American delegation -- projected visit between Roosevelt and Churchill.
- JOSEPH, Bernard -- Nov. 9 -- at Plenary session of Council in evening -- says Smuts told him on Aug. 29 in So. Africa: "There must be a Jewish State" from British point of view.
- SACK, Leo -- Nov. 16 -- I telephone Mr. Sack - ask him to get in touch with Senator Wagner to see President. Told him to tell Wagner of conversation with Stettinius.
- TAFT, Robert A. - I call him. Ask him to see Wagner. Said he would see Connally re advisability not having hearings before Foreign Relations Committee.

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WISE, STEPHEN S. - Nov. 17, 1944 -- Dr. Silver calls him. Conversation re Stettinius and Wise.

DREW PEARSON ORGANIZATION -- Jan. 24, 1945 -- Hear of appointment of Col. Harold Hoskins as successor of Judge Landis as Economic Minister in Middle East.

CABLE FROM JEWISH AGENCY LONDON -- August 28, 1945 -- Received cable to close Washington Office of Emergency Council.

Sept. 13 - Committee of Eight decide to cable -- Washington office should remain open.

SWOPE, HERBERT -- August 29, 1945 -- Spent evening at home of Mr. Swope. Discussed whole situation.

TRUMAN, Harry S. -- Sept. 13, 1945 -- Informed President authorized Senator Gillette to announce letter sent to Attlee asking for transfer of 100,000 Jews to Palestine.

STRAUS, NATHAN -- September 19, 1945 -- Meeting with Nathan Straus who is to have meeting with President.

GOLDSTEIN, NATHANIEL -- September 19, 1945 -- Met with him -- request to contact Dulles in London to have him see Weizmann.

BARUCH, BERNARD -- September 19 -- Dinner at his home -- told him of serious situation which developed.

BERNARD SWOPE - September 20 -- Telephoned Swope. -- Baruch, was told, had been in touch with "White House. Told President "political dynamite" to let Jews down.

MEETING IN SEVERANCE HALL, CLEVELAND - Sept. 20 -- Report of London Conference. Advise people to write letters to President.

WEIZMANN, CHAIM -- Sept. 21, 1945 -- Dr. Weizmann telephones from London. Telephone Wise.

CONNELLY (Sec'y to President) - Sept. 21 -- Receive letter from him informing of appointment to be made to see President.

HOWARD, ROY (Seripps Howard) - Sept. 24, 1945 -- 1½ hour conversation with Roy Howard. Promise to send him memorandum.

BLACK, HUGO -- September 26, 1945 -- Discussion with him on Zionism.

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Sept. 25 and 26 -- Arranged for Senate "show" for Monday October 1st.

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SEPTEMBER 26, 1945 -- MEET WITH CONGRESSMEN BLOOM, Celler, Coppelman and Raphael. Frank discussion of role of Jewish Congressmen in Jewish problems which arise. Meeting date for Dr. Silver with President discussed. Also meeting with Senators.

Invite Morgenthau to Madison Square Garden. Not free.

Arrange for Gov. Dewey to address meeting.

WHITE HOUSE - Sept. 27, 1945 -- White House called -- President would see Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver Sat. 10:30 A.M. Dr. Wise unable to come on Friday.

TRUMAN, HARRY -- Sept. 29, 1945 -- CONVERSATION with President.

MADISON SQUARE MEETING - September 30, 1945 -- 70,000 people in and outside Hall. Dewey tells Dr. Silver Proskauer in touch with Medallie to urge Dewey to tone down speech and not speak of "Jewish Commonwealth."

NATIONAL EMERGENCY CONFERENCE - WASHINGTON -- October 4, 1945 -- All Day Conference. Delegates call on congressmen and senators.

BYRNES (Secretary of State) Send wire asking for appointment. Byrnes just returned from London.

STATE DEPARTMENT release President Roosevelt's letter to Ibn Saud -- Oct. 19, 1945.

EMERGENCY COUNCIL PLENUM meeting -- Oct. 20, 1945 -- Vote unanimously to re-introduce congressional resolution subject to approval of Committee of Eight.

BYRNES, (Secretary) -- Oct. 23, 1945 -- meet with Byrnes. Also Wise. Present him with Memorandum.

3:00 P.M. - Conference at which Memorandum released.

4:00 P.M. - Meet with Senators Taft, Brewster and Vandenberg. Agree to have Taft and Wagner call on President to get reaction on re-introducing resolution.

5:15 P.M. Meet with Senator Wagner

TAFT, WAGNER - October 24, 1945 -- Speak to both of them.

SACK, LEO--October 25, 1945 -- Instruct him to see Wagner and Taft -- resolution not to be introduced without signal from us.

SACK, LEO -- October 26 -- Mr. Sack called. Senator Wagner determined to introduce resolution immediately. Call Wise. See full notes.

OCTOBER 29, 1945 -- Emergency Committee and Committee of Eight approve Resolution.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN -- October 30, 1945 -- "ise and Dr. Silver send telegram to President opposing Joint Commission as reported in Press.

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- WEIZMANN, CHAIM -- Nov. 9, 1945 -- Weizmann arrives country. Asked by Emergency Council not to make statement to press on landing.
- BEVIN -- Nov. 13, 1945 -- Bevin makes statement announcing creation of Anglo-American Committee to investigate Palestine problem.
- SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE -- Oct. 14, 1945 -- Take up our Resolution.
- BLUM, LEON -- April 2, 1946 -- meeting and conversation with Blum at French Embassy.
- BACKER, GEORGE -- April 9, 1946 -- Backer just returned from Europe. Conversation with him via telephone, re partition. General picture.
- WEISGAL, MEYER -- April 9, 1946 -- Telephone conversation with Weisgal who had spoken with Shertok in Switzerland. Ask Weisgal to ask Shertok to telephone directly to Cleveland.
- SHERTOK -- April 11, 1946 -- Shertok telephones from Switzerland.
- APRIL 27, 28, 29, 1946 -- Talks with Neumann, James G. McDonald, Mr. Crum re report of Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry. Statement of President Truman which is to be issued.
- BEVIN -- May 1, 1946 -- Neumann told by Crum that Bevin asked Byrnes to ask President not to issue any statement; Hutchason likewise.
- ATTLEE, Prime Minister -- May 1, 1946 -- statement by Attlee in House of Commons.
- PIERST, HERBERT -- May 6, 1946 -- speaking for Dean Acheson -- confidential conference being called to discuss influx of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe into American zone
- GOLDMANN'S VISIT -- August 5-9, 1946
- LETTER OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO SENATOR WAGNER
- INTERVIEW WITH LORD INVERCHAPEL -- British Ambassador
October 20, 1946
- MEMORANDUM -- October 3, 1946
Re: Dr. Wise seeing President; conversation with Mr. Crum; telephone conversation with Eliahu Epstein.
- PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT -- October 4, 1946
- ELIAHU EPSTEIN -- Nov. 11, 1946
Telephone conversation -- also with Mowrer re getting senators to write to Secretary Byrnes.

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- ERNEST BEVIN -- Interview -- at Waldorf Astoria -- Nov. 14, 1946. Lord Inverchapel present. Bevin defended position of England. Critical of resistance in Palestine, illegal immigration, etc. British Government trying to solve problem. If it fails, whole subject to be submitted to UNO. Looked upon Grady-Morrison proposals as implementation of Anglo-American Committee Report. He is anxious for Jewish Agency to come to London Conference.
- VANDENBERG, Senator -- Nov. 14, 1946 -- Discussion of entire situation since elections. He for viable Jewish state in which all men will enjoy equality regardless of race or creed. If U.S. prepared to move forward can count on his fullest support. Said he would discuss subject with Byrnes.
- BREWSTER, Senator -- Nov. 18, 1946. AHS telephoned Brewster. Informed him of conversatio with Vandenberg. Also telephoned Senator Taft who was out.
- TAFT, Senator -- Nov. 19, 1947 -- Senator Taft called me. Informed me hat Byrnes would see me during week.
- INVERCHAPEL, Lord -- Nov. 19, 1946 -- phoned me. Said Mr. Bevin would like to see me again -- Wed. at 10 A.M.
- INVERCHAPEL -- Jan. 6, 1947 -- Interview. Explained to him resolutions of Basle Congress.
- Byrnes, James -- Jan. 6. 1 47 -- Meeting with Secretary Byrnes.
- MASS MEETING -- Jan. 6. 1947 -- at Manhattan Center. Report on Congress. Splendid enthusiasm.
- NEUMANN, EMANUEL -- Jan. 7. 1947 -- Called from Switzerland. Also Shertok called from London. E fort being made for informal talks with British Government outside framework of London Conference.
- FANNY HOLZMANN -- Jan. 7, 1947 -- Drafted cable to Williams of 10 Downing Street.
- SHERTOK -- Jan. 10, 1947 -- called from London. Cable sent to Mr. Shertok.
- LEO SACK -- Feb. 1, 1947 -- phoned from Washington. Report of conversation with Loy Henderson re Acheson and British Ambassador. U.S. wants decision now. England must take responsibility.
- GARDNER, Ambassador (to Great Britain) Feb. 3, 1947. Interview with him. Mr. Gardner passed away on Feb. 6.
- MARSHALL, George (new Secretary of State) Feb. 4, 1947 -- interview re position of U.S. Government.
- VANDENBERG, Senator -- Interview
Feb. 4, 1947
- LOY HENDERSON -- Luncheon -- Feb. 5, 1947. Requested me to see Acheson.
- SENATOR BREWSTER -- Interview. He agrees that Republican leadership should speak up immediately and make position known.

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- DEAN ACHESON -- Interview -- Feb. 14, 1947
- GOVERNOR DEWEY -- Feb. 19, 1947 -- Telephone conversation. Discussed Bevin's statement before House of Commons. Asked for his advice.
- PATTERSON, SECRETARY OF WAR -- Interview -- Feb. 25, 1945 -- He was sympathetic, intelligent and well informed. He waiting for Hoover's report.
- FEBRUARY 26, 1947 -- Action taken in Washington in view of Bevin's speech in House of Commons. Discussion in Senate. Dinner for senators in evening to meet Newmann and AHS. Very helpful discussion.
- GOVERNOR DEWEY -- Feb. 27, 1947 -- called me. Had spoken to Dulles who promised to discuss our case favorably both with Marshall and Bevin in Moscow. Conference to be held in fortnight.
- HERBERT SWOPE -- March 3, 1947 -- Interview. Eager to cooperate. Will talk to F.F. and B.B. in connection with possible interim action and Palestine immigration.
- DULLES -- March 3, 1947 -- interview.
- HERBERT HOOVER -- March 3, 1947 -- interview. He will speak to President Truman. Visited DP camps.
- LOY HENDERSON -- interview -- April 18, 1947. Also present were Merriam, Wilkins and others. Discussed referral Palestine issue to UN. Discussed Jewish representation at UN.
- SENATOR VANDENBERG -- April 17, 1947 -- interview. Discussed same as above.
- SENATOR BREWSTER -- April 17, 1947 -- telephoned him. Brewster just returned from Palestine. Agreed letter to be sent by senators who visited Palestine to State Department urging immediate immigration relaxation.
- LOY HENDERSON -- JUNE 19, 1947 -- Interview. Criticized attitude of our government in not assisting Committee of Inquiry of UN by indicating its present position.
- GEORGE MARSHALL -- June 19, 1947 -- Interview. Left memo elaborating on arguments made to Mr. Henderson. His attitude friendly.

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CONFIDENTIAL

SUNDAY EVENING, OCTOBER 9, 1944 -- 8:00 P.M.

Senator Taft called me at my home. He said that he had talked with McCloy about the military objection to our Palestine Resolution. He had had one conversation with him previously. McCloy stated that the question had been discussed by the War Cabinet. While there was difference of opinion, the majority had decided that there was no longer any military reason which could be brought against these resolutions, that it was a political question now which should be handled by the State Department.

Senator Taft also reported that his secretary had then been called by McCloy and asked whether the Senator wanted a formal reply to his inquiry which he had addressed to Secretary of War Stimson. The Senator said he did want that reply in writing and that he is waiting for it.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1944

On my arrival in New York in the morning, I read in the paper that Dr. Wise had visited the White House and asked the President to send a message to the Convention of the ZOA which meets in Atlantic City on Friday. The Emergency Council had decided at its last meeting that the ZOA should not request a message from the President for its Convention. The paper reported that Dr. Wise said, following his interview with the President: "I think it is not too much to say that the President, a candidate, gives his full support to this plank (The Democratic Plank)." The papers also carried the report that following his visit to the President, Dr. Wise had told the newspaper men that he is not partisan in the campaign, he does not care who is elected, the President or the Republican candidate.

Mr. Shulman reached me during the morning and told me that Dr. Wise had reported to him on Wednesday evening, after his return from Washington concerning his conversation with the President. Dr. Wise had discussed with the President money for the Democratic Campaign, speaking for the Democratic Party, etc. along with a communication which the President was to send to the ZOA Convention through Senator Wagner. The Emergency Council had at its last meeting also opposed this move. Mr. Shulman read to me the draft of the letter which the President was to send. The substance of it was that the President, as a candidate, approves of the Democratic plank, that he hopes that action will be taken soon either through the United Nations or through joint action of the American Government and Great Britain. I told Mr. Shulman that the term, "as candidate" was most unfortunate. He agreed, but thought that nothing could be done about it. I also warned about bringing "United Nations" into the picture because that would mean postponement of any decision until after the war.

I knew that there would be no change in the President's intended letter unless some pressure were brought. I immediately got in touch with Nathaniel Goldstein who came to see me at the Commodore. I presented to him the draft of the statement which I thought that Governor Dewey should issue at an interview which the Governor was to hold with me later in the day. The Governor had previously expressed a desire to meet with me. He was coming to New York for the Columbus Day Parade. Later in the morning, Nathaniel Goldstein telephoned me that George Medallie and Roger Straus would like to come over to see me. They came to my quarters at the Commodore Hotel and suggested the elimination of the word "Jewish" from the term "Jewish Commonwealth," and one or two other changes. I told them that unless Governor Dewey's statement was a clear and unequivocal endorsement of the Jewish Commonwealth, it was better to issue no statement at all because it would fall far short of the statement which the President would issue. They agreed and Roger Straus telephoned Mr. Dulles who likewise agreed.

I met with Governor Dewey in his suite at the Hotel Roosevelt at about 3:30 P.M. We had a very pleasant talk on many things. A statement he heartily approved was issued. At the conclusion of our interview, the Governor said to me: "Dr. Silver, I shall never let you down." The Governor's statement was immediately released to the press.

At the meeting of the Emergency Council, later in the afternoon, the action of Dr. Wise was fully reviewed by the Committee -- seeing the President alone, his asking for a statement for the ZOA Convention, the injection of Senator Wagner into the picture, the mix-up of Democratic politics with Zionist affairs in his

conversation with the President, and more especially his announcement that he was backing the President in connection with a visit which had to do with the Zionist Movement.

I reported to the Committee my interview with Dewey and the reasons for it. I read them the statement which Dewey had issued. The Committee was highly pleased that the statement had been obtained.

The Dewey statement was immediately conveyed to Mr. Shulman who began a series of feverish negotiations with Senator Wagner and contacts with the President and his advisers, (Mr. Shulman had announced that he spent over \$400 in telephone conversations) as a result of which the President's letter to the Senator was finally revised to read as follows: (Exhibit A)

Dewey's statement appended herewith as (Exhibit B).



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

Conveyed in letter to Senator Wagner

"Knowing that you are to attend the forty-seventh annual convention of the Zionist Organization of America, I ask you to convey to the delegates assembled my cordial greetings.

"Please express my satisfaction that, in accord with the traditional American policy and in keeping with the spirit of the four freedoms, the Democratic Party at its July convention this year included the following plank in its platform:

"We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth."

"Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if re-elected I shall help to bring about its realization."



GOVERNOR DENEY'S STATEMENT

"I heartily endorse the Palestine plank in the Republican party platform. Again I repeat what I previously stated to the great leader of the American Zionist movement and distinguished American Dr. Abba Hillel Silver that I am for the re-constitution of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth in accordance with the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the Resolution of the Republican Congress in 1922. I have also stated to Dr. Silver that in order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jews driven from their homes by tyranny I favor the opening of Palestine to their unlimited immigration and land ownership.

"The American people have time and again declared themselves in favor of these principles. The Republican party has at all times been the traditional friend of the movement.

"As President I would use my best offices to have our government working together with Great Britain to achieve this great objective for a people that have suffered so much and deserve so much at the hands of mankind."



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, October 13, 1944

On my arrival in Atlantic City there was a message for me from Senator Taft's secretary in Washington, Mr. Martin. I telephoned Mr. Martin and he read to me the copy of the letter which Secretary of War Stimson had written to Senator Taft in which he states the following:

"I refer to your letter of September 12, 1944, regarding S.E. 247, introduced by Senator Wagner and yourself on the subject of opening the doors of Palestine to the free entry of Jews into that country.

"At the time your resolution was being considered by the Foreign Relations Committee the endorsement of such a proposal by the Congress had grave implications which would seriously have interfered with the progress of the war. In response to your inquiry I have reviewed the considerations which applied at that time. I find that there is still strong feeling on the part of many officers in my department that the passage of such a resolution would interfere with our military effort. However, I do feel that the military considerations which led to my previous action in opposing the passage of this resolution are not as strong a factor now as they were then.

"In my judgment, political considerations now outweigh the military, and the issue should be determined upon the political rather than the military basis."

On Saturday morning, the newspaper carried the announcement from Washington, evidently released by the War Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1944 -- Interview with Secretary of the Treasury, Morgenthau, at his office in the Treasury Department. 3:45 - 4:15 P.M.

I explained to him the reasons for the attitude of neutrality which I, as head of the American Zionist Emergency Council, felt called upon to maintain in the present political campaign. I read him what I said in my speech in Atlantic City about the non-partisan character of our Movement. I asked him to explain my position to the President. He suggested that I write to him. He and his friends in the Administration had gotten the impression that I was working for Governor Dewey. Some have told him that I wanted to be "head of the Republican Jews of America." I asked him whether he could point to any statement of mine which would indicate that I had publicly declared myself for Governor Dewey. Upon reflection, he said that he could not. He did not feel that neutrality was possible. The situation "cut too deep." I told him that heads of national movements such as Zionism have no right to comm it their movements by publicly endorsing one candidate or another.



CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY - OCTOBER 30, 1944

At the plenary session in the evening of the Emergency Council, a discussion developed over the advisability of proceeding with the Congressional Resolutions. While no decision was arrived at, it appeared as if the representatives of the Zionist Organization had previously caucused and had agreed to urge deferral of action. We are to see Stettinius on November 9, a postponed date which he asked for. We had an appointment with him for Tuesday, October 31.

Dr. Wise begged off from reporting on his interview with the President fearing criticism from the body. During the afternoon meeting of the Executive he had no comments to make on the minutes of the previous meeting which sharply criticized his action. At the evening meeting, Judge Rothenberg raised the question of post-ponement on the resolution. For postponement or abandonment — Judge Levinthal, Shulman, Boukstein spoke; Lipsky and Neumann against. Wertheim thought that it perhaps should be delayed until the next Congress and Neiditsch and Mereminsky likewise thought that action should be delayed for the time being.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1944 -- 10:00 A.M.

I visited Mr. Stettinius together with Wise and Nahum Goldmann. We asked him for the green light on our Congressional Resolutions in view of Stimson's letter removing the military objections. Stettinius said he would get in touch with the President and let us know within a week. We asked him whether there had been any decision on partition. He asked, "partition of what?" We explained to him. He said he would call up the British Embassy at once and in our presence he telephoned Mr. Wright whom he said was the best informed person at the Embassy. Wright told him that there was no decision reached on partition, that no announcement on Palestine was imminent. Stimson also said that our Government had not been informed about it and would in all probability be informed before any action was taken.

We asked him whether the subject of mandates had come up at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. He said it did not.

In anticipation of the projected conference between Churchill and Roosevelt, and the possibility of Palestine being discussed by them, we requested that an expert representing our point of view be attached to the American delegation. Stettinius inquired whether we had someone to recommend. We said that we did not have at the moment, but that we would present such a name to him. He said that he would take the matter up with the President.

In the evening Bernard Joseph addressed the plenary of the Emergency Council. Among other things he reported that Shertok, who recently returned from London reported that Churchill had made the statement that the United States was heavily committed to Zionism. Also reported that Smuts had told him, on August 29 in South Africa that "there must be a Jewish State" from the British point of view.

CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, November 16 -- 1:30 P.M.

Called Leo Jack, Washington. Told him to get in touch with Senator Wagner to see the President and urge upon him to give us the green light and to explain why a delay at this time would be bad. He was to tell Mr. Wagner of our conversation with Stettinius and that Stettinius was planning to see the President.

At 1:40 P.M. I called Senator Taft. Told him of our meeting with Stettinius. Asked him to see Wagner. He said that he would talk to Connally and let me know. Told him that it would be advisable not to have any hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1944 - 1:15 P.M.

Telephoned Wise having heard from Shapiro that Stettinius had spoken to him. Wise said that he had mailed me a memorandum on Stettinius' conversation to the effect that he had spoken to the President who suggested that we do not go through with it just now. He may go over soon and presumably he will take up the subject with Churchill and perhaps Stalin. I reminded him of the ill effects of postponement. The matter will be discussed at the Executive next Tuesday.



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1945 -- 1:00 P.M.

While in the office of Charles Rosenbloom, Pittsburgh, Pa., Mr. Moore of the Drew Pearson organization, telephoned me stating that he had information that the President would in a day or two appoint Col. Harold Hoskins as the successor of Judge Landis as Economic Minister in the Middle East. Col Hoskins, of course, is a bitter anti-Zionist. Mr. Moore stated that two people might be seen in this connection -- Leo Crowley and Secretary Stettinius.

I telephoned Arthur Lourie in New York and conveyed the information to him.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1945

Received a cable from London stating that the Executive decided that our Washington Office be closed and that only the Jewish Agency office in Washington operate. The Emergency Council sent protest. (See exchange of cables.)

On September 13 the Committee of Eight met and decided to cable unanimous opinion of Committee that Washington office should remain open.



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1945

Spent the evening with Mr. Herbert Swope at his home in the company of Mr. Landau. Discussed the whole situation with him. He telephoned Frankfurter. Swope suggested that we see Acheson. Frankfurter thought that we should first see Ben Cohen. Swope undertook to arrange meeting between me and Baruch.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1945

Informed that the President authorized Senator Gillette to announce that he has sent a letter to Atlee asking that 100,000 Jews from the concentration camps be permitted to migrate to Palestine.

Mr. Charles G. Ross, White House Secretary, informed Leo Sack that there is something of that sort pending, but he was not authorized to say anything. (See Memo of Leo Sack)



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1945 - 3:00 P.M.

Meeting with Nathan Straus at his office. He is to see the President. I told him some of the subjects which he should discuss with the President. He is very anxious to be of help.

5:00 P.M. - SEPTEMBER 19

Meeting with Nathaniel Goldstein, Attorney General of New York State - in my rooms at the Commodore. I asked him to request Governor Dewey to contact Dulles in London and have Dulles see Weizmann in London. I also took up the possibility of having Dulles represent us in Washington.

8:00 P.M. - SEPTEMBER 19

Dinner at the home of Bernard M. Baruch with Herbert G. Swope and Mr. Landaу present. Told Baruch of the serious situation which had developed - the Reuters report of the sub-committee of the British Cabinet recommending practically the retention of the White Paper. Asked him to help. Covered the whole field.

CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1945

I telephoned Swope. Swope told me that Baruch had already been in touch with the White House. He had told the President that it was "Political dynamite" to let the Jews down, etc.

8:00 Pm.. - September 20

Addressed meeting Severance Hall -- Cleveland, Ohio -- where I gave report of London Conference. Told those present to write letters to the President.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1945

Another conversation with Dr. Weizmann who telephoned from London. He is to see Byrnes tomorrow and Mr. Bevin on Wednesday. Evidently Baruch's intervention has borne results. I reported to him what was being done in this country. He felt that our Government should intimate concretely to the British Government that it intends to help in the reconstruction work in Palestine.

Following our conversation, I telephoned Wise and told him of the conversation, of my meeting with Baruch. He told me that he had not yet succeeded in arranging a meeting with the President.

I received a letter from the President's Secretary, Mr. Connelly, saying that the President will see me, but at a little later time. I wrote Mr. Connelly enclosing the Reuter's dispatch, stressing the urgency of the situation and asking for a very early appointment.



CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1945 -- 3:00 P.M.

Had an hour and half's talk with Roy Howard of Scripps Howard to interest his chain of newspapers in aggressive campaign in our behalf. He is well informed on the subject with a definite anti-Russian bias which leads him to believe that a favorable pro-Jewish solution might drive the Arabs into the Soviet Camp. I promised to send him a memorandum.

Spent Tuesday and Wednesday in Washington. Arranged for a Senate "show," for Monday, October 1. To participate: Senators Taft, Brewster and Vandenberg for the Republicans; Murray, MacMahon and Mead for the Democrats -- possibly also Barkeley.

Spent considerable time with all of these Senators. Also saw Senator Guffy.

On the afternoon of the 26th, spent an hour and half with Justice Hugo Black in his Supreme Court Chambers. Had a very interesting discussion of Zionism and the whole Jewish problem. He promised to send a letter to the Madison Square Garden meeting on September 30th.



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1945 -- 7:00 P.M.

Had dinner at Statler with Congressmen Bloom, Celler, Coppelman and Raphael. A very frank discussion of the role of the Jewish Congressmen in Jewish problems which arise. Congressman Bloom said that he would see that an early date is set for our meeting with the President. A meeting was also planned for all the Jewish Congressmen with the President.

I spoke with Morgenthau. Invited him to the meeting in Madison Square Garden. He was not free to come.

Arranged from Washington to have Governor Dewey address the meeting.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1945 — 11:00 A.M.

The White House called stating that the President would see me and Dr. Wise on Saturday morning at 10:30. They had hoped that the engagement would be for tomorrow morning, but Wise could not come on Friday. The White House arranged for transportation.



CONFIDENTIAL

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1945 -- 10:30 A.M.

Dr. Wise and I see the President in the White House. Conference lasts thirty-five minutes. See attached notes.



CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES ON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN
Saturday, September 29, 1945

The President seemed to be under strain because of the failure of London Conference. "War is far from over." There are many problems that have to be solved. We must have patience. He cannot be rushed. There is too much pressure. Six million Poles, five million Italians and five million Jews. Will not be confronted by past commitments. Will work things out his own way. A matter of votes.

He wants good conditions for Jews everywhere -- Poland, Germany. He implied that this is more important. He doesn't favor a religious state -- a Catholic state or a Jewish state. When he was explained what was meant by the Jewish Commonwealth, he was not opposed to such a Jewish state being built in Palestine.

We took up with him the matter of the 500,000 soldiers who he thought would be needed to keep the peace. He is strong on the subject of America's non-involvement.

When asked whether he thought that his request of Prime Minister Attlee for 100,000 certificates would be granted, he said he was very hopeful. He knows this is only the first step in total solution. He denied that Great Britain had asked the United States to share in the responsibility. He refused to issue a statement.

He thought that a Congress Resolution might be helpful at the psychological moment. Will know better when Byrnes comes back. Would be glad to see us again. We should see Byrnes when he returns.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1945

Great demonstration meeting in Madison Square Garden. 70,000 people in and outside of hall.

Governor Dewey told me at the meeting that Proskauer had been in touch with Medallie to urge Dewey to tone down his speech and not refer to "Jewish Commonwealth." Proskauer said he was quoting someone at the White House.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, October 4, 1945

All day meeting of the National Emergency Conference in Washington. 500 delegates representing 40 states. Delegates call on their congressmen and senators.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1945

Sent a wire to Secretary of State Byrnes who had just returned from London, asking for an appointment.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1945

Flew to New York. The State Department released President Roosevelt's letter to Ibn Saud.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1945

Meeting of plenum of Emergency Council. Votes unanimously to re-introduce congressional resolution subject to approval of Committee of Eight.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1945 -- 11:00 A.M.

In Washington. Wise and I meet with Secretary of State Byrnes and present him with Memorandum.

3:00 P.M.

Conference at which Memorandum released.

4:00 P.M.

Meeting with Senators Taft, Brewster and Vandenberg in Senator Vandenberg's office. Agree to have Taft and Wagner call on the President and get his reaction to re-introducing the resolution.

5:15 P.M.

Saw Senator Wagner.

CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1945

Spoke with Taft and Wagner. They had seen the President and Secretary of State Byrnes. They have no objection to the introduction of the resolution. They suggest that we wait until Friday because tomorrow (Thursday) Bevin is likely to make a long awaited statement on Palestine, suggesting that a joint commission representing Great Britain and the United States be appointed to look into the entire matter.

Wagner and Taft anxious to introduce their resolution on Friday.

Rabbi Thurman saw the President at 12:45. He went to Washington at our suggestion.

Today is the big open air protest meeting in New York City.

Spoke long distance with Senators Wagner and Taft. They had seen the President and Secretary Byrnes. Byrnes informed them that they would not oppose the re-introduction of the congressional resolution, draft of which they showed them. They asked that the Senators wait until Friday before introducing resolution because Bevin was likely to make statement on Thursday. Bevin would suggest a joint British and American commission to study the situation.

Received also a report of Rabbi Thurman's visit with President Truman

Thursday, October 25 -

Spoke to Leo Sack, instructed him to see Wagner and Taft again and to impress upon them that the resolution is not to be introduced without first getting the signal from us. Sack conveyed the message to both Senators.

Friday, October 26 - 11:30 A.M.

Mr. Sack phoned from Senator Wagner's office stating that the Senator is determined to introduce the resolution immediately. He had spoken to Secretary of State Byrnes and Byrnes again told him to go ahead with the resolution. I then asked to speak to Wagner and told him that he must delay the resolution until after our Monday's meeting in New York. I am committed by the action of the World Zionist executives not to proceed with the resolution before getting unanimous consent of the American Committee of ~~A.A.~~ that in fact I will have to resign if the resolution were introduced immediately. I told him that I ~~would~~ ^{would} not even be able to contact Dr. Wise and to read him the resolution because Dr. Wise was in Chicago at the convention of the Hadassah.

I told the Senator to get in touch with Dr. Wise immediately. He said he would.

I immediately called Dr. Wise but by the time I reached him Senator Wagner had been in touch with him. The Senator told Dr. Wise that ~~he~~ ^{he} had asked for a delay but Dr. Wise felt that in view of the article in the New York Times about the agreement between Great Britain and the United States that it would be very helpful to introduce the resolution at once.

When I reached Wise he told me of his conversation with Wagner. I reminded him of the resolution, that we must consult the Committee of ~~A.A.~~ ^{A.A.} I also told him that neither he nor the Committee of ~~A.A.~~ ^{A.A.} had seen the resolution which Wagner had introduced and I suggested to him that he get in touch immediately with Wagner and urge him not to introduce his resolution. He said that he would and he did phone his office but by that time the Senator was already on the floor of the Senate and had introduced his resolution.

Before reaching Dr. Wise on the telephone I also got in touch with Mr. Martin, the secretary of Senator Taft and urged him to rush to the floor of the Senate and get Senator Taft to stop Wagner.

I called Senator Wagner about 12:30 again and was informed by him that he had already introduced the resolution. I told him that I was deeply put out and felt very much embarrassed, that I might have to consider issuing a public statement. He persuaded me not to. He told me that he had spoken to Byrnes again. ~~I~~ ^I told him that the report in the New York Times was not true and that he, Wagner and Taft both felt that the introduction of the resolution at this time might be very helpful in bringing additional pressure on Great Britain. If we wish to consider changes in the wording of the resolution that might be done later on in the Committee. I requested him to telephone Dr. Wise and explain the situation.

At 12:45 I called Dr. Wise, told him of my conversation with Wagner and read to him the text of the resolution. He thought it was a very good resolution, would be helpful at this time and we would explain to our people how it came to be introduced without their consultation.

Rabbi Silver



CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1945

Emergency Committee and Committee of Eight approve of the Resolution which was introduced by Senators Wagner, Taft and Walsh in the Senate on Friday, October 26.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1945

Wise and I send a telegram to the President opposing the Joint Commission as reported in the press on Friday, November 9.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1945

Weizmann arrives in the country. Emergency Council asks Weizmann not to make any statement on landing in this country. I write letter on November 8 to the American members of Executive of Agency indicating what I regard Dr. Weizmann's role to be while he is in this country.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1945

Bevin makes his statement in Parliament announcing the creation of the Anglo-American Committee to investigate the Palestine problem.



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1945

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee takes up our Resolution. Connally raises objection. Members of Committee feel that there should be another "Whereas" clause referring to the Anglo-American Committee. The Committee decides to appoint sub-committee of five to see Byrnes and attend to revision of Resolution which is to be brought up at a special meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate next Monday.

I spoke with Senator Taft in Washington. He is hopeful about its passage.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 1946 -- 5:00 P.M.

Saw Mr. Leon Blum at French Embassy in Washington. He looks well in spite of the things which he has been through. I discussed with him (a) the question of the Mufti. Blum did not know that he was in France. Urged close surveillance of Mufti lest he escape. Blum said that he would keep that in mind.

Discussed the matter of Zionist activities in French territory in North Africa. Requested that there be no interference with Zionist activities, Hachsharah and emigration. Blum felt that we need have no fear on that score. I expressed the hope that at UNO, the French representatives would be in sympathy with our cause if and when it is brought up. Blum felt that France would be friendly. DeGaulle had expressed friendship before.

We discussed the forthcoming report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Blum felt there would be difficulty with England. He asked about Dr. Weizmann -- where he was. He had promised him to visit Palestine this Spring. Instead he had to come to the United States "begging."

I left with him a document of the Lebanese Habib Joseph Awad.



CONFIDENTIAL

APRIL 9, 1946

I telephoned George Backer Tuesday afternoon, April 9th, at the Berkshire Hotel, New York. He arrived from Europe on Saturday and gave me his picture of the situation. The American delegation is standing firm for 100,000 immigrants this current year. The British, while they would like to spread this figure over a number of years, are likely to accept.

The difference in the American ranks concerns bi-nationalism or partition. He had spoken to Ben Gurion who told him that while he is not prepared publicly to come out for it, he would accept partition on the basis of the Peel Report plus Galilee, plus the Negev. He believed that Shertok, Kaplan and Weizmann will also support it, that 80 to 85 percent of the Jews of Palestine would accept it. The only ones who oppose it would be Magnes, the Mirachi and the Shomer Hazair.

Crum, McDonald, Crossman and possibly Buxton are for partition. He had the right to feel, he stated, that the Administration is prepared to indicate its approval of partition, and if it did, the other members of the American delegation would favor it. He expressed the thought that much depended on my position in the matter.

Bi-nationalism, Backer felt, would be a constant source of irritation.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH WEISGAL

On the same afternoon I spoke to Weisgal. He had just heard from Shertok from Switzerland. He informed me that our War Department had been asked who would pay the bill for the moving of the D.P.'s to Palestine. The cost would be about \$8,000,000. The J.D.C. is prepared to spend three to four million for the transfer. Weisgal informed me that the President had sent a cable to Judge Hutcheson urging him to stand pat and to bring a unanimous American decision, a positive report. Weisgal reported that Shertok expressed the thought to him that if we cannot get a ^{unanimous} decision satisfactory to us that they would prefer an Interim report.

I asked Weisgal to ask Shertok to telephone me directly to Cleveland.

CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY EVENING, APRIL 11, 1946

Shertok telephoned me from Geneva, Switzerland. Said that we should contact Washington. Not to insist upon agreement among all the twelve members of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Such a telegram has gone forth from the White House. Shertok also suggests no publicity or speculative reports about attitudes of members of Commission. He thought that two favored partition and three bi-nationalism. I conveyed to him the request of the Emergency Council to come to the United States. He is unable to come to the United States. Must go to London and Palestine first.



CONFIDENTIAL

SATURDAY EVENING, APRIL 27, 1946

Upon my return from the Aircraft Carrier Tarawa, I received the report of the Anglo-American Commission on Inquiry from Mr. Neumann. It was certainly far different from that the advanced press released led one to believe. They justified all that I had said about it a few months ago.

SUNDAY, APRIL 28 -- 9:00 A.M.

James G. McDonald came to my room at the Commodore to have breakfast with me. I gave him my frank reaction to the Report. I told him that it was both bad and sad, and represented a complete repudiation of the Zionist program. He gave me some of the background of how the Report came to be written, what even worse recommendations the British had threatened to make. He was clearly most concerned about my reaction and what I was likely to say in public about the Report. I told him that the President, in issuing the Report, should make a statement approving of the recommendation for the removal of the one hundred thousand refugees to Palestine, the land and immigration provisions, specifically calling attention that as far as long range political policies recommended by the Committee are concerned, that he would merely take them under advisement for future study. McDonald felt that that was a way out.

SUNDAY, APRIL 28 -- 12:00 Noon

Met with Mr. Crum at the St. Regis Hotel. Spent three hours with him and again gave him my sharp criticism of the Report. He spent a great deal of time explaining how it all happened. I told him what I thought President Truman ought to do. He too, agreed. In the course of the conversation, he told me that the man whom the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office fear most in the world is Rabbi Silver. He also told me that the fate of the Report was in my hands.

At the St. Regis, Neumann and I drafted the statement which we believed President Truman should make. We left it with Mr. Crum.

I called a meeting of the Emergency Council for the following Monday.

MONDAY, APRIL 29, 1946

Crum and Aliak Epstein phoned me from David Niles' office in Washington. Crum had seen the President. The President would issue the Report. He would like to have included a statement about the protection of the Holy places, to which I had no objection, of course. Crum also requested me to indicate the kind of a reaction we would make to the Report if the President consented. I told him that I would telephone back to him the text.

In the meantime the Emergency Council was in session. I recounted to them all foregoing, read to them the draft of the statement which Truman was to issue and also the draft of my statement representing what the Emergency Council would issue. Certain revisions in the text were suggested, but during the discussion, another

telephone call came in from Washington and McDonald said that the President would also like to have a sentence about the Arabs included in his statement. I objected to it, but said that I would take it up immediately with the Committee and would let him know. The Committee suggested some verbal changes in the sentence which McDonald had read to me, which changes were accepted by McDonald and Crum, to whom I also read the draft of our statement which had been approved by our committee. The statement, Mr. Crum said, was statesmanlike and was entirely satisfactory. (See the attached draft of the statement to be issued by the President and our statement, and also the original sentence about the Arabs and our revision of it.)

Eliahu Epstein who was in Washington in Niles' office all through these discussions said that he had spoken to Shertok, that Shertok strongly urged the procuring of the statement from the President. Epstein thought that it would be an historic achievement and strongly urged upon me to agree to it. Later in the afternoon, while attending the Executive meeting of the ZOA, he again called me from Washington and congratulated me upon the arrangements which by then had been finally made.

The proposed statement of President Truman, which Neumann and I had drafted, was read by Dr. Wise before we gave it to Crum, and he approved of it.

Earlier the same day I spoke to Ben Gurion over the telephone to London and he indicated that the Agency would issue a statement approving of what was positive in the Report, but rejecting all its negative features. I told him that I am in complete agreement with it.



The sentence proposed by Mr. Crum and Mr. McDonald to be included in the President's statement read: "One of the most significant factors in the report is that it ensures complete protection to the Arab population of Palestine, not only their civil and religious rights, but also guarantees a constant improvement in their cultural, educational, and economic position."

After bringing it to the Executive Committee, the following changes were recommended which were accepted by Mr. Crum. "One of the significant features of the report is that it aims to ensure complete protection to the Arab population by guaranteeing their civil and religious rights, and by recommending measures for a constant improvement in their cultural, educational and economic position."

AHS:jm

4/29/46

5

This is the statement which President Truman is to issue when he releases the report of the Anglo-American Committee to the press. The original draft was made by me and Mr. Neumann, approved by Dr. Wise, and submitted to Mr. Crum. Mr. Crum, upon presenting it to the President, recommended the inclusion of the two sentences on the Holy places and on the Arab population. Mr. Crum also suggested the change from the words "the Government" to the words "I will". Our own Committee suggested the inclusion of the words "and questions of international law" in the final sentence. The statement then will read as follows:

"I am very happy that the request which I made for the immediate immigration of one hundred thousand Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The transference of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished with the greatest despatch. The protection and safeguarding of the Holy places in Palestine sacred to Moslem, Christian and Jew is adequately provided for. One of the significant features of the report is that it aims to ensure complete protection to the Arab population by guaranteeing their civil and religious rights, and by recommending measures for a constant improvement in their cultural, educational and economic position. I am also pleased that the Committee recommends in effect the abrogation of the White Paper of 1939, including existing restrictions on immigration and land acquisition to permit the further development of the Jewish National Home. It is also gratifying that the report envisages the carrying out of large-scale economic development projects in Palestine which would facilitate further immigration and be of benefit to the entire population. In addition to these immediate objectives, the

report deals with many other questions of long-range political policies and questions of international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement."



AHS: jm

4/29/46

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 1, 1946

I learned from Emanuel Neumann who was told by Crum that on Monday Bevin asked Byrnes (the two are meeting at the moment in Paris) to ask the President not to issue any statement, that Hutcheson likewise urged him not to issue any statement, that Hutcheson likewise urged him not to issue a statement, but that Crum and Hanegan persuaded him to do so.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 1946

Prime Minister Attlee spoke in the House of Commons and indicated 1) that the Report will have to be taken as a whole, 2) that the transference of the one hundred thousand refugees will be contingent upon the disarming of the Jews of Palestine, and 3) that the British will want to know first to what extent the United States will be prepared to share in the military and financial responsibilities.

There is a clear dissatisfaction on the part of the British of President Truman's statement and a desire to stall.



ASSOCIATE REPORT OF PRIME MINISTER ATTLEE'S STATEMENT IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS MADE MAY FIRST

2
"It is clear from the facts presented in the report requesting private armies maintained in Palestine and from the recent activities that it would not be possible for the government of Palestine to admit so large a body of immigration unless and until these formations had been disbanded and the arms surrendered.

As the Report points out, private armies constitute a danger to the peace of the world and *ought not* to exist. Jews and Arabs in Palestine alike must disarm. The committee has drawn attention to the failure of the Jewish Agency to cooperate in dealing with this evil and for expressing the view that the Agency should at once resume activities and responsible cooperation with the mandatory power. The British Government regard as essential that the Agency should take a positive part in suppression of these activities.

They hope that both Jewish and Arab leaders will give council of patience and restraint.

The British Government and the United States jointly appointed the Committee and the Report is addressed to both governments.

The British Government are now studying it and will consult with the United States as soon as possible.

~~The~~ The Report must be considered as a whole in all its implications.

Its execution would entail very heavy, immediate and long-term commitments.

The British Government wish to be satisfied that they will not be called upon to implement the policy which would involve them single-handed in such commitments and in the course of a joint evaluation they ~~would~~ wish to ascertain to what extent the United States will be prepared to share the resulting additional military and financial responsibilities.

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 6, 1946

Herbert Fierst speaking for Dean Acheson telephoned me this morning saying that Acheson is calling confidential conference to discuss the influx of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe into the American zone in relation to the Anglo-American Committee. He invited me to attend. Others invited are Wise, Monsky, Proskauer, Warburg, Mrs. Epstein and Judge Rifkind. I requested Mr. Emanuel Neumann to substitute for me at the meeting.



Monday Aug 5. - Cable from N. & to
meet him in N.Y. arriving with
instructions from Paris. (see lab)

Tues. Aug. 6. Fly to N.Y. from
Plymouth. H.J. came to Coney
Island c. 4:30 P.M. Shows us
instructions (7 v.) & says we
have agreed. Then together by
plane for Washington, arriving c. 7:30.
9 P.M. meet in my room. Staller
H.J. reports his story to group
(Murray, Atkin, Etkin, Cohen,
et. al). Agree to not to write
par. 2, but strategy to press
for short-term in implementation.
After discussion, particularly
as suggested by others, we should
rephrase then of par. 2. H.J. agrees.
- Then plan to write of
Zion. Ever. Council tomorrow
4 P.M.

WE - Aug. 7. h.f. does not contact
us all day. Does not ask us to
go with him to any of his
4 R.R. meetings (Ex. - want for
h.f. two hrs.

When he arrived, he again told his
mission. Ex. discusses it. I
turn on tape, along with 1 person
listening. h.f. continues (see
minutes).

He did not tell meeting that he
had already seen Roberts & Upp
Parliament. has to do to inform

us - that he is to see C. with
rule later that evening for same
purpose. - C. informs us that h.f.
is planning to write letters to his

Thurs. Aug. 8. Epstein disturbed at
h.p. midday. & secretary returns, asks
me to meet with H.p. at 3 P.M.
which I decline.

Knappert with Wankly H. will see
Patterson at his residence later &
Clark.

Meeting 7 Aug. Amer. Com. members
& Lady Com. going on. They
(Aug. Amer) & Wankly in flying
Honey report.

Fri. Aug. 9. Being odd from 11:30
to cooperate with h.p. Kelly (21
Cables).

Com. ends session. Reports that
this report is "dead".

Leaves by plane 3 P.M. Land in
Newark - wait for Bortus collection

Then Comm at 7. Tell me situation
is bad. Report that (Bor.) may
accept Lady report with my let

1. duplicate. I change my plan
- fly back to Washington Aug
11 Mz.

Sat. Aug 10. Spoken phones - Allen
has the the phone. Will not reveal
time what h.f. has done in back.
Vignette to telephone h.f.


Even phone Postman is talk
pleased. fits story. Pres. is now
in partnership to J. State. Hebron
will use it in name, as sent.

Answered more than one phone.

h.f. had been in back with Lanny
discussed by story in "Times" that
Pres. will accept "decision" with slight
changes as Jody Plan. Lanny Lanny
from me. I asked him whether h.f.
had told him what he did as Wash.
Answer. No. I told Lanny to tell
h.f. that we know the facts & are
wishing to do anything that might

to at this purpose I am doing
work. set in afternoon.

At 2:30 p.m. telephoned from
Free Island. Reported, celebrating an
What Z. had learned from Pentecost
It had see the persons who address
Obliteration were to make it to the
with approval of Pres. Paul Report +
hopes - J. Stat. - Graham was for
a J. Stat. now. Graham had phoned
F. to that effect - U.S. had suggested
that a statement should see be
circled for public as wanting no
preparation of negotiations. Paul had
also phoned to Patterson (U.S. & Mark.
went there together). So out now
that H. will accept —



THE WILLARD HOTEL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

As you know I am away for a few more days. Here is the only trouble about additional action in this house. There are $\frac{1}{2}$ M. Jews. Socialists and other million who want to go there of all shades - sort, but, indifferent on the other side; the speakers there are 70 M. workers out to cut their throats. I want to avoid a massacre.

Anything said or done over here will add fuel to the flames.

I hope at this juncture no branch of our party will act.

Everybody knows what American hopes are. If we talk about them too much we will hurt (?) purpose.

MEMORANDUM - GOLDMANN'S VISIT

MONDAY - August 5, 1946

Cable from N.G. to meet him in New York. Arriving with instructions from Paris. (See Cable)

TUESDAY - August 6, 1946

Fly to New York from Plymouth. N.C. came to Commodore at 4:30 P.M. Shows me instructions of (V.) and gives me background. Leave together by plane for Washington, arriving at 7:30.

9:00 P.M. meet in my room Statler. N.G. repeats his story to group (Neumann, Akzin, Epstein, (Cohn, et. al). Agree not to urge par. 2, but strategy to press for short-term implementation, if out of discussions, partition is suggested by others, we should inform them of Par. 2. N.G. agrees.

Invite him to meeting of Zionist Emergency Council tomorrow - 4:00 P.M.

WEDNESDAY - August 7, 1946

N.G. does not contact me all day. Does not ask me to go with him to any officials.

4:00 P.M. Meeting of Executive — wait for N.G. two hours.

When he arrived, he again told his mission. Executive discusses it. I summarize, along line of previous evening. N.G. concurs. (See Minutes.)

He did not tell meeting that he had already seen Acheson and urged partition. Nor does he inform me that he is to see Crum with Niles later that evening for same purpose. C. informs me that N.G. is planning to write letters to President.

THURSDAY - August 8, 1946

Epstein disturbed at N.G. independence and secretive action. Asks me to meet with N.G. at 3:00 P.M. which I decline.

Breakfast with Monsky. He will see Patterson at his invitation and Clark.

Meetings of Anglo-American Committee members and Grady Committee going on. They (Anglo-American) unanimous in offering Grady report.

FRIDAY, August 9, 1946.

Receive cable from Mizrachi to cooperate with N.G. Reply (See Cables).

Committee ends sessions. Informed that their report is "dead."

Leave by plane 3:00 P.M. Land in Newark. Wait for Boston connections.

Phone Crum at 7. Tell me situation is bad. Report that President may accept Grady report with slight modification. I change my plane and fly back to Washington arriving 11:00 P.M.

SATURDAY - August 10, 1948

Epstein phones. Akzin had spoken to him. Will not reveal to me what N.G. has done in Washington. Urges me to telephone N.G. Crum phones Proskauer in Lake Placid. Gets story. President is now for partition and a Jewish State. Acheson will urge it in name of our Government.

Around noon Manson phones. N.G. had been in touch with Lourie. Disturbed by story in "Times" that President will accept "decision" with slight changes in Crady Plan. Later Lourie phones me. I asked him whether N.G. had told him what he did in Washington. Answer - No. I tell Lourie to tell N.G. that, not knowing the facts and not wishing to do anything that might be at cross-purposes, I am leaving Washington in afternoon.

At 2:30 N.G. telephones from Fire Island. Reported, elaborating on what C. had learned from Proskauer. He had seen the proposal which Acheson and Henderson were to make to Britain with approval of President. Peel Report and Negev - Jewish State - Acheson was for a Jewish State now. Acheson had phoned F.C. to that effect. N.G. had suggested that a statement should now be issued for public is waiting on progress of negotiations. Pres. had also spoken to Patterson (N.G. and Proskauer went there together). Is not sure that Britain will accept.



LETTER OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO SENATOR WAGNER

As you know, I am away for a few more days. Here is the only trouble about additional action in either house. There are 1/2 m. Jews. Besides another million who want to go there of all shades, good, bad, indifferent.

On the other side of the picture there 70 M. moslems out to cut their throats. I want to avoid a massacre.

Anything said or done over here will add fuels to the flames.

I hope at this juncture no branch of our government will act.

Everybody knows what American hopes are. If we talk about them too much we will hurt (?) purpose.



CONFIDENTIAL

INTERVIEW WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR -- LORD INVERCHAPEL

FRIDAY, October 20, 1946 -- 10:30 - 11:15 A.M.

Saw British Ambassador in Washington. Reception very cordial throughout. Lord Inverchapel does not seem to be in complete agreement with the present policy of the British Government. He deprecated the shooting of the Tommies. He wondered whether many of the legal immigrants coming to Haifa were really not refugees but those coming from Roumania, Hungary, etc. If he had had his way he would have admitted the hundred thousand at once and allowed the Jews to take full responsibility. He did not think that the United States was doing enough for the immigration of refugees. He felt that the Zionists should go to the London Conference even if the Agency basis is not accepted. The Government is not committed to a Jewish State. The people of England have not been sold on the idea, but they do understand the Jewish National theme. However the mind of the Government is not closed. If the Jews in Great Britain could come to an agreement on the right kind of solution, his Government, he felt would go through with it regardless of the Arabs. There is nothing to be lost in going to the Conference even if the Conference fails.

I asked that the Agency members be set free from LaTrune to enable the Agency to go to the Conference and as indicating a new turn in relationship. The Ambassador was skeptical of the soldier-mind -- the military in Palestine and their reaction to the proposal. He thought that concerning Western Gallilee we ought to be able to negotiate with the Arabs (or with Abdullah). Implied in what he said was the thought that the Negev might be included in the Jewish area. He assumed that we would have no objection to the British having some air bases there. He was convinced that the Jews were not anti-British.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM — October 3, 1946

2 copies to me

Dr. Wise had been to see the President in the company of Mr. Lehman on Thursday, September 19. Mr. Carl Sherman, with whom I spoke about the situation, had interested himself in the matter and had seen Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Feighan of the Democratic Party. It was they who had arranged the meeting. Mr. Tuvim had made an appointment for me to meet with Mr. Fitzpatrick at Democratic Headquarters in New York, and so the meeting was not held. Mr. Niles had a hand in the final arrangements to have Lehman and Wise see the President. Wise twice asked me to call a meeting of the Emergency Council to report on his meeting with the President. Due to the holidays, the Executive did not meet until Tuesday evening, October 1. But at this meeting, after much hesitation, Wise finally announced that he could not make a report at the meeting because the conversation was so very confidential. I met Wise after the meeting at the Biltmore Hotel after the meeting and he told me what the conversation was about. He had explained to the President the feeling of the Jews about the inactivity of the Jews in the Democratic Party. He stated that further promises would be of no value and that the Zionists were expecting action, etc. Dr. Wise failed to tell me what the President said. Evidently the President said nothing. He showed me the draft of a letter which Lehman was to send to the President summarizing their representations to him. This letter asked the President to put the authority of the Government aggressively behind the Agency partition scheme which the State Department seemingly approved of.

During the week, Mr. Crum phoned me stating that he had been in touch with Hannegan and that he had urged upon the President through Hannegan to ask Great Britain to start immediately with the transportation of the children and the aged and sick from the concentration camps as the first step, etc. I expressed my serious concern about this proposal and later on I requested Mr. Neumann to communicate with Crum, which he did.

A memo was then drafted by Mr. Crum in which he incorporated what we wanted the President to do, namely, throw the power of the Government behind the Agency proposals seeing that the Government approved of them, and that we are no longer in position to ask for more in Washington, and at the same time ask for the moving of the hundred thousand as the first step in the realization in the program.

This afternoon Mr. Eliahu Epstein phoned and stated that he had been reliably informed that the President would issue a statement tomorrow outlining what the Administration has done for Palestine during the year. I told Mr. Epstein to telephone Mr. Niles and to tell him that unless the statement vigorously calls for action and is the index of a real determination on the part of our Administration to bring about results, that I would promptly attack the President's statement. We would not fall for the bait on the eve of another election. Mr. Epstein said that he would communicate with Mr. Niles immediately.

This morning Oscar Cox phoned and told me that he had been asked to draft a statement for the President. I told him that statements are no good. What we want is action, that the Jews begin moving into Palestine.

CONFIDENTIAL

OCTOBER 4, 1946

The President issued today a fifteen hundred word statement on Palestine reviewing the Administration's efforts during the year strongly urging Mr. Attlee to allow "substantial immigration" immediately into the country and saying that the American people would back the Agency proposal for partition.

This was clearly the result of the pressure on the Administration from all sides. I doubt the value of this statement. It would have been much better if the President had carried on intensive diplomatic negotiations with London rather than issue a public statement. It has all the earmarks of another pre-election maneuver.



NOVEMBER 11, 1946

Eliahu Epstein phoned me from Washington and asked me to speak over the telephone to Mr. Edgar Mowrer who was in his office. Mowrer suggested that I get eight or ten Republicans to address letters to Secretary Byrnes now that Byrnes is to discuss the Palestine situation with Bevin. I expressed to him and to Mr. Epstein my hesitancy in the matter in view of the fact that I do not wish to seem trespassing on the work of the Jewish Agency, that I had not been contacted by Mr. Ben Gurion who has been in the country two weeks. Mr. Epstein urged me to go ahead saying this was purely an American matter.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, November 14, 1946 -- 10:30 - 11:30 A.M.

At his rooms at the Hotel Pennsylvania, met with Senator Vandenberg. Had a long friendly chat about the whole situation since the elections and since the Republicans came into control of Congress. He understands fully that the Republican leadership must now assume joint responsibility with the Administration for the solution of the Palestine problem. He drafted a letter while I was there to Byrnes in which he told him that he was glad that Byrnes will not personally devote himself to the Palestine problem, that he feels that this matter is now very urgent, that this may be the last chance. He knew of the Agency proposal. He himself was always for partition as a solution of the problem. He had been greatly impressed by the Peel Report. He is for a democratic and viable Jewish state in which all men will enjoy equality regardless of race or creed. If the United States Government is prepared to move forward aggressively in this direction it can count upon his fullest support. He also said that he would have dinner with Byrnes on Sunday and that he would go to town with him on the subject.

SATURDAY - November 16, 1946

I telephoned Senator Brewster and informed him of my conversation with Vandenberg. I also telephoned Senator Taft who was out. The Senator called me back on Monday, November 18. I told him of my conversation with Vandenberg and what Brewster said about Byrnes, namely that Byrnes had told him that he was in favor of the Jews going back to their original homes six months ago and that he was still in favor of it. I expressed the feeling to Senator Taft that Byrnes is the weak link in the whole chain. I thought that it would be helpful if I could have a quiet chat with the Secretary of State. He said that he would communicate with Byrnes.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1946

Senator Taft called me in the morning and said that he had talked to Byrnes, that Byrnes would be pleased to see me sometime during the week and asked that I inform him where I can be reached during the week. I sent the following telegram to Secretary Byrnes at the Waldorf Astoria: "Senator Taft telephoned me that you would be pleased to see me someday this week at your convenience. I am deeply grateful for the opportunity. I can be reached at The Temple Cleveland, Ohio all week. My telephone number is Randolph 0822. Kindest Regards."

At 11:00 A.M. the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel telephoned me and said that Mr. Bevin would like to see me again and could I come on Wednesday morning at 10:00 o'clock.

M E M O R A N D U M

November 26, 1946

When I called on Senator Vandenburg at the Hotel Pennsylvania on Thursday, November 14, he drafted a letter to Secretary of State Byrnes in which he said that he had seen in the newspapers that the Secretary had finally decided to take over the Palestine matter into his own hands. He was glad that it was so. That while the responsibility was still the Secretary's and the Administration's, he could not resist the impulse to tell him that he was on the trail of a possible settlement at long last unless the situation was to go from bad to worse. This might be the last chance.

The only possible answer under existing circumstances is a satisfactory partition, with the Jews being given a viable democratic state which will at last approximate their long-time pledged rights in which, of course, there will be complete racial and religious equality of freedom. He respectively urged that Byrnes should consider whether our Government should not put every possible emphasis upon the necessity of solving this problem, and he would welcome an opportunity of supporting an affirmative and positive action on the part of our Government.

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CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, JANUARY 6, 1947

Saw Lord Inverchapel in the morning from 10 to 11. Explained to him the resolutions of the Basle Congress. Told him that a new situation can be created which would make it possible for us to attend the conference either by word i.e., acceptance by Great Britain of the principle of Jewish statehood or by way of an act beginning to move the refugees from the D.P. camps and the sending immediately of three or four boatloads to Palestine. He said that he would transmit to London.

At four o'clock met with Secretary of State Byrnes. Also told him about the Congress and also suggested what I had told to Inverchapel. He thought well of the idea and said that he would get in touch with the British Ambassador.

In the evening I addressed the big Mass meeting in Manhattan Center at which I reported on the Congress. Splendid enthusiasm at the gathering.

b7c

TUESDAY, JANUARY 7, 1947

Heard from Emanuel Neumann from Switzerland by telephone and from Shertok in London. Effort is being made to have informal talks with British Government outside of the framework of the London Conference. I reported to Shertok my conversations with Lord Inverchapel and Byrnes. Also received cable from Ben-Gurion in Paris giving gist of conversation with Creech-Jones.

In the afternoon met with Fanny Holzmann. Drafted cable to Williams of 10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, January 10, 1947 at 1:30 PM. - Mr. Shertok called from London


They were informed that, inasmuch as we had decided not to go to the London Conference and the Government was unable to accept our conditions, informal meetings be held with the Government to discuss the situation, without reference to the London Conference. The date suggested was January 22. The meeting is to be held in the Colonial Office, to be attended both by the Colonial Minister and by the Foreign Minister. He suggested that I should come on for the meeting.

Shertok is leaving for America tomorrow and will arrive either Sunday or Monday. He plans to remain here five or six days. He had spoken with Neumann, who is going on to London right away. He has also informed all the members of the Executive.

Rabbi Gold is on his way to America. He had spoken to Goldie Myersen in Jerusalem. There is a lull there but she is not sure how long the truce will be maintained.

At 2:45 P.M. I sent the following Cable to Mr. Shertok:

"The date you mentioned in your conversation so close to date of formal meeting as to lead to misinterpretation and confusion. I had hoped that informal discussions could be held prior to announced date. If not they should be postponed to later date when they would be clearly dissociated from the announced conference. Regards. (Signed) Silver"



CONFIDENTIAL

SATURDAY - FEBRUARY 1, 1947

Leo Sack phoned from Washington. He had had a conversation with Loy Henderson who reported that Acheson had called in the British Ambassador four days ago and told him that the United States wants a decision on Palestine now, that it favors partition, that it is opposed to cantonization, that we would find it easier to support partition than any other plan, that it wants a considerable amount of immigration now and more later, that it will not send any troops. Great Britain must take the responsibility. She is prepared to support the plan and give it considerable support. That England must take the responsibility.

Late in the afternoon I spoke with Emanuel Neumann in London. Conveyed to him the report of Leo Sack. Asked him to see Ben Gurion and make sure that the Haganah is not used to fight the Irgun and thus start civil war. Also repeated to him the thought that our representatives should not propose partition at the next meeting with the British representatives but wait for them to make proposals. Told him that I was to see Marshall and Vandenberg on Tuesday.



CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1947

Visited the new ambassador to Great Britain, Mr. Gardner, at the State Department in connection with his departure for England.

Mr. Gardner died on Thursday, February 6.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1947 -- 11:45-12:15

Called on the new Secretary of State, Mr. Marshall. Asked him what the position of the American Government is in connection with the London Conference. He asked me whether he could trust me and whether the information would be kept out of the press. The American Government had been contacted by London and London was informed (1) that the American Government favors partition, (2) immediate transference of the hundred thousand.

I spoke to him about the rapid deterioration of the situation in Palestine and the threat of martial law, and requested that the American Government intervene. I found Marshall friendly and desirous to be helpful.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1947 -- 2:00 P.M.

Called on Senator Vandenberg. He stated that he had just had luncheon with Marshall at which the situation of Palestine was touched on and Marshall had said to him that on that subject they should be in complete accord because the State Department had been guided in its present position by the letter which Vandenberg had written to Secretary of State Byrnes late in November.

Senator Vandenberg regretted that he had not touched on the Palestine problem when he spoke on the International Forum in Cleveland. I told him that this is the time for him to declare his position in public. He said that he would seriously consider my suggestion and would let me know. He was sending to Marshall immediately a copy of his letter to Byrnes with a covering letter.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1947 - 1:00 P.M.

Luncheon with Loy Henderson at the Willard. Nothing new. Requested him to get the State Department to intervene in the situation in Palestine which has developed following the ultimatum of the military. He felt that London would probably propose as a first proposal a modified Grady-Morrison scheme. We discussed the attitude of the Arab states to partition and of Ibn Saud to Zionism. He felt that Great Britain would ultimately send the Palestine question to UNO, but he did not know whether that would be following an announced solution by Great Britain or before. He himself had been opposed to the Grady Plan. He suggested that I see Acheson, that people had misrepresented me and my position to Acheson.

CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1947 - 4:30 P.M.

Saw Senator Brewster. He agreed with me that the Republican leadership should speak up immediately and make its position known.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1947 --3:45-4:30 P.M.

Interview with Dean Acheson at State Department. I referred to my conversation with Secretary Marshall and what he said was attitude of American Government. I called attention to the fact that the British proposals are a rejection of the American attitude. I asked what the Government intends to do now. He thought that negotiations had not yet been entirely abandoned, that the Arabs were still in London. (He was wrong -- that very afternoon the papers published a statement that official negotiations of Devin ended in a break-down). He felt that the discussion should continue.

I asked him what would happen to the refugees if the matter were turned over to the Assembly of the UN which was not likely to meet until September. He thought that an increase in immigration was indicated. He was rather hopeful about it.

He thought that a five-year trusteeship would mean five years of continued unrest and struggle and he deprecated it. He said that he would get in touch with the British Ambassador about the immigration schedule.

I took occasion to set him right about many misrepresentations concerning myself to which he had been subjected, my attitude towards Great Britain, extremism, and the reasons for my opposition to the partition proposals of the Jewish Agency. He referred time and again to Great Britain's problems in the Middle East, implying the Russian problem, of course. He did not feel that official representation to Great Britain at this time would be helpful. He referred to the fact that Great Britain was, after all, responsible for Palestine to which I replied that Great Britain had never asked for America's political or military aid, and that economic aid had been promised by our Government. I told him that the so-called terror in Palestine could not be checked unless large-scale immigration began at once.

CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1947 - 3:00 P.M.

Spoke by telephone to Governor Dewey in Albany. Discussed with him Devin's statement before the House of Commons and the need for liberalizing immigration to Palestine. Asked for his advice. He mentioned Vandenberg and Taft. I told him of the action both Taft and Vandenberg have taken. I suggested that he might wish to get in touch with Marshall. He said that Marshall is not listening to Republicans these days. He did not consult Dulles and it is doubtful if he would ask Dulles to go along with him to Moscow. Bi-partisan arrangement may not be working out under Marshall. He would, however, contact Dulles as soon as he gets back from Mexico and ask him what can be done in the situation. He will also consult some of his other friends about it. He thought that Taft ought to build a fire under Vandenberg and have the leader speak in the name of the Republican Party.

Earlier in the day, Col. Julius Klein of Chicago called and said he had made an appointment for me with Secretary Patterson next Tuesday at one o'clock.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY - FEBRUARY 25, 1947 -- 1:00 P.M.

Had luncheon with Secretary of War, Patterson, at the Pentagon Building. Found him very sympathetic, intelligent and well-informed on the problem of the DP's. Asked for his cooperation in pressing for relaxation of the immigration schedule to Palestine. He said that he would contact again the State Department on the subject. He was waiting for Mr. Hoover's report.

WEDNESDAY, February 26, 1947

In view of Mr. Bevin's speech in the House of Commons where he attacked the President and held him responsible for wrecking Bevin's Palestine negotiations, considerable action had to be taken in Washington.

5:00 P.M.

Attended the Senate where Senators Brewster and Barkley spoke on Bevin and Senators Taft, Magnusson, Hatch participated in the discussion.

7:00 P.M.

Dinner at the Mayflower arranged by Senator Brewster to meet Newman and myself. Fifteen senators in attendance. Among them, eight members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Among those present were Vandenberg, George, Hatch, Pepper, Ives, Wiley. A very helpful discussion took place at this dinner.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1947

Governor Dewey phoned me this morning to Cleveland. Said that he had spoken to Dulles. Dulles promised to discuss our case favorable both with Marshall and Bevin in Moscow. The Moscow Conference will be held in a fortnight.

CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 1947 -- 4 P.M.

Saw Loy Henderson in the State Department. Present also Merriam, Wilkins Vidal (?). Discussed the subject of referral of Palestine issue to UN. State Department hoped for a short special session with a restricted agenda to the appointment of the committee. There were various proposals as to the composition of the committee. The issue was not settled. U.S. leaned to a small neutral committee excluding English and Arab States, and by implication also all the other big powers including the U.S.

I raised the question of Jewish representation. H. thought there was merit although the legal formula was not yet clear which would make it possible. America is not inclined to take initiative or to press its solution until after the committee will have rendered its recommendations. The American Government still stands on the policy announced by the President on October 4. He felt that in the interim pending final decision immigration should be relaxed but doubted whether the American Government is prepared again to make official representation on this score. He was sure that Marshall had not discussed the Palestine matter with Bevin in Moscow. He deeply regretted the execution of Gruner and the other men.

The British may not be very earnest about referring the matter to the UN. But they better be. They may have tried to put the baby at the door of some other nation, but they will not be able to defy the decision of the UN.

THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1947 -- 10 A.M.

Saw Senator Vandenberg at his office. Spent an hour with him. Discussed the matters as with Mr. Henderson. He gave me much the same information that Henderson had. He still feels that our Government should press when the time comes for partition as the only possible solution. I proposed to him the idea of having the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate write to the Secretary of State drawing attention to the resolution adopted by Congress etc. He was not prepared to declare himself on the subject although he felt that the resolution was no longer practical politics. He thought that we should see the President and bring pressure on him so that the U.S. would take an active part. The President would then contact, he was sure, the Democratic leaders of New York to find out how the Jews felt about it. He himself had stated his position and he stood by it.

Prior to my leaving Washington, at 2:00 P.M. I spoke to Senator Brewster who had just returned from Palestine. We agreed that a letter be sent by the senators who visited Palestine to the State Department urging immediate immigration relaxation.

CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1947 - 2:15 P.M.

Interview with Mr. Henderson at the State Department prior to my interview with Mr. Marshall. Criticized the attitude of our Government in not assisting the Committee of Inquiry of the United Nations by indicating what its present position on Palestine is and to what extent our Government is prepared to implement the recommendations of this special committee. I called his attention to similar positions taken in the past, technically and formally correct, but thoroughly unsound, such as the appointment of the Grady Commission, the early attitude of the U. S. delegation at UN, and indicated that our Government is following similar unsound line now which will later on bring down great criticism upon it. Mr. Henderson was rather close-mouthed and indicated that our Government would be prepared to present its views when the Committee of Inquiry would ask for it. It did not want to take the initiative lest the impression be given that the recommendations that will emerge will be of the U.S. making. The U. S. policy is not yet crystallized, he suggested and he did not think that the British had any fixed position.

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1947 - 2:30 P.M.

Interview with Mr. Marshall lasting about 20 minutes. Left a memorandum with him elaborating upon the arguments which I made to Mr. Henderson, and also discussed the subject with him. He stated that the subject of Palestine was very much in the mind of our Government, but that the Government cannot formulate or announce America's position definitively until certain things are worked out, presumably of international import. He did not specify what these certain things were. But the Government will not confront us with any fait accompli. He will invite us before long for a full discussion. His attitude was friendly.

That same evening, I reported the interview with Mr. Marshall to Sumner Welles who said he would see Mr. Henderson over the week-end.

CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 7 -- 6-7:30 P.M.

Meeting with Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones at the home of Miss Fanny Holtzman -- 24 E. 84.

A cordial and frank discussion took place. Mr. Creech-Jones expressed the thought that no 2/3 vote on the majority report was at present in sight. He thought that the Arabs and Jews should make another try to talk things over among themselves in view of the new situation which has been created by the British announcement of withdrawal. He was not clear in his mind on what basis this new discussion should take place. He suggested that there are serious differences among the Arabs themselves, referring to King Abdullah. He stressed time and again that Great Britain will get out of Palestine and that plans already are on the way for evacuation. Great Britain is anxious to get quick and decisive action at this Assembly. It is not sparring for delay.

Great Britain is not yet ready to indicate what it would do by way of implementation if the majority report is adopted but he gave a broad hint that his Government may cooperate in case the majority report is approved.

Among other things, he said that Mr. Bevin is not opposed to partition, that Mr. Beeley is not the policy-maker on Palestine. His role should not be over-estimated.

I spoke to him, among other things, of the desire to continue on the friendliest terms with Great Britain after the Jewish State is set up, as a tradition of friendship between two peoples which has been unfortunately seriously marred by the efforts of the last few years. I also suggested to him that the report of the UN offers the one possibility for the great powers to unite on any one issue before the UN. This would enormously add to the prestige of the UN which is in danger of being undermined by the hopeless wrangling and division which has developed between the great powers on every issue before the UN. Mr. Creech-Jones seemed to be impressed by both of these statements of mind.

CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1947 -- 10:30 A.M.

Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones called on me at my room at the Commodore and spent 40 minutes with me following up the line of discussion of October 7. I was particularly anxious to make sure that his address before the UN scheduled for that afternoon should not be critical of the Report, nor of the position of the U. S. Government, nor that it should give the impression that after the withdrawal of British forces chaos will result thereby creating a mood of panic among the delegates. On all these matters, Creech-Jones re-assured me. The meeting was most cordial. Our conversation of last week was evidently forwarded to London and the Cabinet meeting which followed authorized Creech-Jones to adopt a more moderate and constructive line which was reflected in the speech which he delivered that afternoon.

I asked him to reread his speech with an eye of its total effect on the listeners to the address to make sure that it would be constructive rather than critical and non-cooperative. He indicated that the British Cabinet while not adopting a resolution in favor of the majority report indicated that it would not oppose such a solution if approved by the UN and that Great Britain might assume a share in the implementation.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1947 -- 11:30 A.M.

Governor Dewey telephoned me from Albany. He had tried to reach me the night before. He said that he had been in the last 24 hours that the U. S. Government is not only not helping, but is apparently sitting on its hands in relation to the Latin American Governments. As a result the Arabs have made great progress among these countries. He feels that there is a real danger of our not getting the required 2/3 vote. Only Marshall has the power to change the situation. Our Government has great influence with the South American countries but is not using it. Unless our Government will tell you that they have approached these people in Latin countries and that they have their votes, the situation is precarious.



Oct - 1947

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency, yesterday announced that the closing presentation of the case of the Jewish Agency before the ad Hoc Committee on Palestine will be made by Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department, and that an invitation has been extended to Dr. Chaim Weizmann, former president of the Jewish Agency, who is visiting the U.S.A. to make a concluding statement before the Committee.



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MEMORANDUM - THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1946

INTERVIEW WITH MR. ERNEST BEVIN IN THE PRESENCE OF LORD INVERCHAPEL AT THE WALDORF ASTORIA

3:30 to 4:20 P.M.

I greeted Mr. Bevin by saying that I should like to meet the man whom I have been attacking so much. Mr. Bevin spent most of the time defending the position of his government, criticising the failure of the Jews to cooperate, and especially criticised the American Government for utilizing the Palestine issue in connection with its own election needs.

His government had tried to do all that it could. It had continued Jewish immigration at the rate of 1500 a month in spite of the White Paper and his government was by way of making a satisfactory solution when the President intervened with his request for 100,000 which threw the whole Arab world into a turmoil.

He was critical of the resistance in Palestine, illegal immigration and acts of terrorism with which the Agency at times was associated, and which made it necessary for England to keep troops in Palestine which should have been demobilized long ago. He resented the fact that a good deal of the financing of illegal immigration came from the United States. His government had recently made another gesture of good will by releasing the prisoners from Latrun and elsewhere. He implied that there has not been a corresponding move on the part of the Yishuv. As a result of what was happening in Palestine, the killing of British soldiers, etc., anti-Semitism is growing among the common people in England.

His government was beset with many grave problems all over the world and we should have been more patient with it. The Balfour Declaration had made commitments to both peoples of Palestine, a national home to the Jews, and the protection of their rights to the Arabs. This made the solution of the problem very difficult. A Jewish State was never promised to the Jews.

The British Government is trying to solve the problem. If it fails, it will have to submit the whole issue to U.N.O. He himself stakes his political career on the proper solution of the problem. He will not, however, yield to force majeure.

He looked upon the Grady-Morrison proposals as the implementation of the Anglo-American Committee Report. His government wants these proposals to be on the agenda when the London Conference reconvenes. He was aware of the Agency's proposal for partition. The Agency is free to present and to discuss its proposal at the Conference. His government did not have a closed mind on the subject. It is prepared to consider it.

I took occasion, of course, throughout the interview to refute and correct some of Mr. Bevin's statements, which was not difficult to do. I need not restate them here. The answers would readily suggest themselves to any well-informed Zionist. I did take occasion to point out how the American people felt about the whole matter, and the terrible misconception that many in England seem to be laboring under -- that the subject of Palestine is only a by-product of American political campaigns. This is a dangerously misleading piece of propaganda which will make sound political thinking and action on the subject impossible. The American people, not to speak of the American Jews, are determined to keep this issue alive until a just solution is arrived at.

I carried away the following impressions with me from the interview:

- 1) Mr. Bevin is deeply disturbed and deeply concerned about the whole problem. It has gotten under his skin. He knows more about it now than he did when he spoke so cavalierly about the entire subject a year ago. There is still much that he does not know about it.
- 2) He does not seem to have a clear plan in his own mind. His confidence in the Morrison-Grady Plan as a solution seems to be pretty well shaken. He will probably not insist upon it as a basis for discussion when and if the London Conference reconvenes. He does not yet seem to be prepared to accept the Agency proposal as a basis for discussion. He expressed no criticism of the Agency proposal and repeated two or three times during the interview that they have an open mind on it and that they are prepared to consider it.
- 3) Pressure from America, while it is greatly resented, is very much present in Mr. Bevin's mind. He is not under-estimating its importance. Should the American Government very firmly and determinately now begin to insist upon a quick and satisfactory solution, Mr. Bevin would be clearly urged on to a definitive solution he does not wish to make at this time.
- 4) He is very anxious for the Jewish Agency to come to the London Conference.



CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, MARCH 3, 1947 — 2:00 P.M.

Saw Mr. Herbert D. Swope at his home. He is eager to cooperate. He will talk to F.F. and to B. B. in connection with possible interim action in connection with Palestine immigration. He suggested Dulles and Donovan and Nylan and *Saw Mr.* as people to be considered to help us with UN.

3:45 P.M.

Saw Dulles who is leaving in day or two for Moscow. Talked about interim action and also reference of Palestine issue to UN. He was not clear what England intended to do. He expressed the thought that English attitude on Palestine was due to desire to make U.S. more committed. He made light of Arab military opposition. He promised to speak in Moscow to Bevin and Marshall. I tentatively talked to him about taking up our work in U.N. and we will discuss the matter further when he returns from Moscow. He regretted continued delay in reaching a decision on Palestine. The delay increases Arab opposition and also anti-Semitism in England.

5:00 P.M.

Saw Mr. Herbert Hoover. He will speak to President Truman. He had seen Rabbi Bernstein in Germany and had visited some camps of the Jewish D.P.'s. He is rather discouraged about getting action from the government in connection with many parts of his report.

COPY

From: M. S. Comay

To: Executive 31/7/47.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Talk with General Smuts, 24/7/47.

I had a twenty minute talk with the Prime Minister about Palestine. After I had reported briefly he asked what recommendation could be expected from the Special Committee. I replied that it was still obscure but it seemed that some members were leaning towards Partition, but the local Administration were throwing their weight against any Jewish independence even in part of the country. The P.M. asked, in a rather exasperated tone, what the Administration wanted as an alternative. When I suggested that they wanted to hang on to as much of the status quo as possible through some sort of Morrison Plan, he said he failed to see how they could possibly carry on in Palestine without a radical change of policy, now that they had turned the whole Jewish community against them.

The position was becoming impossible and every effort had to be made to get UNO to reach a fair decision and put it over, in the near future..If this did not happen the whole National Home policy might be placed in jeopardy.

He himself had always been strongly opposed to Partition, as the country was so small after Transjordan had been cut off. Transjordan was definitely meant to be available for Jewish settlement - he could remember saying at the time that the Highlands of Moab were not unlike the Highveld and were capable of development. Then the British found themselves embarrassed by promises some of their people had made to the Arabs - "or promises which were not made; I have never known just what was promised and what wasn't" - so they cut off Transjordan and gave it to them. After that there could be nothing more due to the Arabs.

The Jews still had a big opportunity to make a Jewish country out of Western Palestine, but they had missed the bus. If only they had taken full advantage of the next decade, if they had forced the maximum immigration and colonisation, things might have been different. But the response was poor and the tempo of advance very slow. Ten years after the Mandate the whole situation started to deteriorate. One had the rise of Hitler and at the same time the growing pressure of Arab nationalism. The British tried to placate these new forces by putting obstacles in the way of the rush of new immigrants, and from that point Palestine policy got deeper and deeper into the mire. Today we were faced with a situation which could not have been anticipated originally. A strong Arab national movement had grown up in Palestine and the whole of the Arab world with it: six independent States was lined up in support of it. British policy had turned against Zionism, and he, Smuts, had very reluctantly come to the conclusion that the only way out of the impasse was a decent Partition scheme which would give the Jews control of their own affairs and some room for development. He realised that this way out was very unpalatable to many Zionists but he regarded it as the best we could get under existing circumstances. He felt that with our intelligence, our drive and the financial resources we could command we would make the most of this opportunity, if given a free hand; maybe it might even become possible at a later stage to expand, and regain some lost ground. If the situation was allowed to drag on our work might become more and more difficult, and the Arab pressure on it even greater. What he feared was that Britain might be nearing the point where ~~she would~~ she would consider extricating herself from Palestine altogether. He had not been given an official indication to this effect from London but he regarded this development as not improbable. What was supposed to be a strategic area for them had now become something of an Achilles' heel.

He asked me if I could explain why Bevin was against this solution. I replied that it had been under consideration a little while ago, but we understood that both the Foreign Office and the Military people had come down heavily against it. The P.M. wanted to know what the Agency felt about it. I replied that the Agency is not prepared at this stage to put forward any scheme, but was willing to consider one if it was proposed, and if it was warranted to put it before Congress. It was interested, however, in having the best

possible scheme put forward from other quarters so that it should have something worth considering. On present indications there was no assurance that even a decent Partition scheme, which was the bare minimum, would emerge from the UNO discussions, in view of the British opposition to it, and Washington's present silence.

After giving him some indication of the views held by other Dominion statesmen, such as Evatt and Fraser, I suggested that General Smuts might find it possible to give a lead to the others, and so bring about a Commonwealth attitude, which might influence both London and Washington. He was non-committal, but the suggestion seemed to have lodged in his mind, since he said that these other Dominion Statesmen had refrained from taking a public attitude on Palestine but that the Commonwealth would have to take some stand on it. I referred to the "President Warfield", the immigrants of which were being returned to France. He felt that the French may have agreed to cooperate up to a point, and he did not see any prospect of effective intervention. He did not expect that these refugees would be deported again from France to some fresh destination, but they would probably be looked after by the French until they could return to Palestine under some new policy. I sounded him about receiving a delegation from the Federation on this matter, but he did not feel that it would serve any good purpose.

In conclusion he stressed that the thing which most concerned him at present was to find those conditions which would permit of further growth for the National Home. He considered that the growing Arab hostility was the biggest threat; and might succeed in postponing our independence and retarding our work unless we made a bid for that independence now. I gave reasons for our assumption that the Arab front was not as solid as it seemed, and dealt particularly with Abdullah's angle. The P.M. attached importance to Ibn Saud and thought that if his pressure could be diminished somehow it would have a big effect.



COPY

TO: Executive Council.

From: M.S. Comay.

31/7/47

Subject: Talk with Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr.

With the sanction of the Chairman and the two Vice-Chairmen, I had an informal chat on Friday, 17th July with Mr. J.H. Hofmeyr, Deputy Prime Minister. The talk took place in his office at Union Buildings, and lasted from 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.

I gave him a general resume of the political position with regard to U.N., and some impressions of the special Committee now in Palestine. In commenting on this he said that he had never liked partition, but was inclined to agree with General Smuts that it was probably the best way out of the present impasse. He wanted to know what the Agency's attitude was. I explained that the Agency had indicated its willingness to consider proposal for a viable Jewish State in an adequate area, but was committed to nothing in advance. It would not itself put forward any concrete proposals, partly because it was itself divided on the subject, and partly because it feared such proposals would be taken to be merely the opening bid for an ultimate compromise. He wanted to get a clearer picture of the whole matter, so I produced a National Fund map with Jewish areas marked on it, and explained to him why certain areas such as Western Galilee and the Negev were essential to us. He asked to have the Morrison Plan explained to him, and I dealt with that fully, detailing our reasons for refusing to consider it. We then discussed the attitudes of Britain, U.S.A. and Russia in the light of present indications. I dealt fairly fully with British policy, listing the series of misjudgments on which it was based, and the present near-collapse of the Administration in Palestine. He was surprised at this inside view, and obviously had not realised what the actual situation was on the spot. He found it hard to imagine that Britain could still hope to hang on to the status quo. Regarding the U.S., he said that Crum's book, which he had read, was a damaging revelation of the policies followed by the State Department.

Coming back to the recommendations which might emerge from the sub-committee, he said that he could appreciate a genuine reluctance to carve up the country completely. There were certain matters such as communications, defence and development which obviously should be the subject of common arrangements; the problem would then be whether it would be possible to retain such "Federal" elements and yet provide a "state entity" for the Jews.

I ended up by giving him some indication as to the attitude of Dr. Evatt and Mr. Fraser, and expressing the hope that South Africa might somehow join forces with Australia and New Zealand at U.N., and take the initiative in getting the Dominions to break away from Britain's Palestine policy. He thought that there was something in this, but it would have to lie with General Smuts to do something about it. He was prepared to make the suggestion to General Smuts, but thought that I should myself report to him and put over the same idea. Finally, I asked him whether General Smuts would be going to U.N. in September. He said he thought this was doubtful. I asked if he, Mr. Hofmeyr, would be going if General Smuts did not. He said this did not necessarily follow. The matter had not yet been discussed.

Confidential

October 27, 1947

MEMORANDUM

The Financial Requirements of Jewish
Resettlement and Economic Development
in Palestine

1. The Jewish Agency for Palestine plans to resettle approximately one million Jews in Palestine during the next decade. Taking into account the natural increase of the 650,000 Jews now in Palestine and the growth to be anticipated from the immigrant stock, it will be necessary to provide for an expansion in the Jewish population of nearly 1,200,000.

2. The total funds that will be required to provide for this increase of 1,200,000 in the Jewish population may be estimated extremely roughly at \$3 billion. (This estimate is based on the level of wholesale prices in the United States at mid-year 1947, which was 87 percent above the 1935-39 average. Should Jewish resettlement in fact be dependent, in any substantial degree, on resources drawn from the inflated Middle Eastern market, the costs would be correspondingly greater.) A minor part, perhaps one-sixth, of this \$3 billion will be required for special welfare services: transportation of immigrants, their transitional care and re-training, the prolonged care of orphaned children, etc. The major part of the capital will be needed to provide the normal facilities of a modern society: housing, agricultural machinery, irrigation installations, manufacturing equipment, public utilities, etc.

3. In addition to the approximately \$3 billion for its own needs, the Jewish community will require perhaps \$500 million for the subsidization of the Arab population of Palestine. The UNSCOP Majority Report imposes on the Jewish State an initial annual subsidy of approximately \$16 million for the benefit of the Arab State. If this subsidy were to be continued for a decade, at the same level, it would impose a burden of \$160 million.

Moreover, apart from this inter-State subsidy, very large sums will be required within the Jewish State to accelerate the cultural and economic progress of its non-Jewish citizens. To close the gap between the Jewish and Arab standards of living as rapidly as possible, the Arabs will need more schools, expanded health services, better housing, training and equipment for agricultural intensification, etc. It will not be feasible for the non-Jewish population to finance these improvements wholly from its own savings and its own contribution to taxation: there will have to be implicit subsidization on a very wide scale. The financial burden involved will unquestionably be much larger than that of the direct subsidy to the Arab State because the Jewish State will not be content with the standard of social services provided hitherto, by the Mandatory, for the non-Jewish population.

4. Approximately \$3½ billion will be required, therefore, for Jewish resettlement -- including the related Arab subsidization -- in Palestine during the next decade. This is not a staggering amount in relation to the total property recently owned by the Jewish communities of Europe. The six million Jews who were killed by the Nazis, together with the minority of Jews who survived in the German-occupied areas, were deprived of property worth, at the very least, twice as much as the amount required for Palestine in the next decade. In so far as the Jewish people is now applying to the United Nations for assistance in carrying the financial burden of resettlement, it is merely asking in effect that the needs of homeless people be met by restoring to the Jewish people a part of what was taken from them under peculiarly inhuman circumstances. It is because of the failure of the programs adopted hitherto to provide adequate reparation and restitution that there is an acute financial problem connected with Jewish resettlement.

5. The Jewish Agency believes that many aspects of the public policy of the Jewish State now in process of formation will have to be guided by the objective of securing the capital needed for development. First, the Jewish economy in Palestine will have to aim at high productivity, a modest standard of living and high savings. Second, every measure will have to be taken to encourage the importation of private capital into Palestine. Third, world Jewish contributions will have to be mobilized, on an unprecedented scale. Fourth, national and international public financing institutions will have to be called upon to play their part in the resettlement and development process.

6. The outcome of these policies, in quantitative terms, is necessarily uncertain. The Jewish Agency believes that it would be a magnificent achievement if the first three lines of action indicated above should succeed in making available as much as \$1½ billion to \$2 billion during the next decade. Though every effort will be made to induce private savings, to import private capital, and to elicit private contributions, private resources cannot do the whole job. All in all, sums of the magnitude of \$1½ billion to \$2 billion will be required from public sources -- either as reparations, loans, or grants.

7. The Jewish Agency turns to the Government of the United States first with this financial problem because of the preeminent position of the United States in the world capital market, because of the leadership in economic reconstruction now being undertaken by the United States through the Marshall Plan, and because of the sympathetic interest taken by both the Executive and Legislative branches of the American Government in the problem of Palestine. On October 4, 1946, President Truman expressed this interest most pointedly in specific

reference to the economic problem of Palestine. The President generously announced: ".....should a workable solution for Palestine be devised, I would be willing to recommend to Congress a plan for economic assistance for the development of the country".

The Jewish Agency suggests that the principles of a workable solution have now been devised. This solution has received the support of the Government of the United States. Its economic implementation must now be taken in hand.

8. The Jewish Agency anticipates that ways can be found through the United Nations to make a modest contribution to the most immediate requirements of Jewish resettlement. In this connection, the Agency thinks particularly of the budget of the IRO and of a possible further ad hoc budget specifically connected with the Palestinian settlement. It seems clear, however, that there can be no major reliance on the financial resources of the United Nations organization as such either for grants or for loans. The budgetary position of the United Nations would not permit grants commensurate with the requirements, and the United Nations is now in the course of formally divesting itself of the power even to make recommendations to the International Bank with respect to loans. It seems, therefore, that such public assistance as may be accorded Jewish resettlement and Palestinian development, while made in accordance with United Nations policies, cannot rely to any considerable extent on United Nations mechanisms.

9. The Jewish Agency suggests that there may be a reasonable analogy between the requirements of Jewish resettlement and those of European reconstruction now being considered under the Marshall Plan. Both are in fact reconstructions, though the Jewish one is necessarily accompanied by a change in location. Both are involved in the "normalization" of the European economy: such "normalization" is impossible without solving the displaced persons problem as well as the problem of those persons who, while not formally "displaced", are living in places where they cannot remain permanently. It is our understanding that, in view of balance of payments difficulties, the United States Government may be prepared to suggest to Congress that all or part of the assistance extended under the Marshall Plan should be conceived as a grant rather than a loan. We would suggest, with all due reserve, that -- so far as the basis of need is concerned -- a grant for Jewish resettlement might perhaps claim a stronger foundation in equity than a grant for any other purpose. Most of the Jewish persons who require resettlement are penniless survivors of the people which suffered on a far greater scale than any other from Nazi aggression and the Nazi extermination policy. A grant of, let us say \$250 million, to be used for Jewish resettlement in Palestine, during the four years 1948-51, would go to meet needs perhaps

more basic in the scale of human requirements than those included on behalf of any of the sixteen European nations who have made submissions under the Marshall Plan.

Nevertheless we recognize fully that the question of a grant for Jewish resettlement in Palestine is one with respect to which the Government of the United States must take into account a variety of considerations on which we are not competent to pass judgment. We have merely ventured to call attention to some points which we believe are relevant.

10. Whatever the policy determination of the United States Government with respect to a Palestine grant, we trust that the United States Government will find it possible to make a major contribution to the economic development of Palestine through the use of the regular channels of the Export-Import Bank. Extremely preliminary explorations with the Export-Import Bank indicate that this also would require an Executive recommendation and affirmative action by Congress. While the Bank may be in a position now to lend moderate amounts for medium periods, its reserve of uncommitted lending power is not adequate for a large Palestine Program.

It is suggested that a Congressional authorization for a long-term development program for Palestine (including loans for such long-lived assets as irrigation and power installations) might appropriately grant authority to the Bank to lend for a period up to forty years. Loans should be made only for sound, repaying productive purposes. In view of current supply shortages, the Bank might be granted discretion with respect to the concentration of all expenditures in the United States. The appropriate borrowers should be the Jewish State, the Arab State, the Joint Economic Board and any authorities entrusted by the U.N. with carrying out all or part of their functions during the transition period. While the purpose of the loan program should be Jewish resettlement and Palestinian development, the Bank should have discretion to lend also to countries neighboring Palestine where the engineering requirements of what are primarily Palestinian projects call for collaboration of neighboring countries. (The neighboring countries in question would, in fact, be Transjordan and the Lebanon.) To make a major contribution to Palestinian development, the lending program authorized should be of the order of magnitude of five hundred million dollars.

The advantage of such a general lending authorization to the Export-Import Bank would be many. The Bank would retain complete discretion to lend only for sound projects. It would be possible to plan a program of dimensions appropriate to the problem and not

work in terms of unconnected year-to-year fragments. The Bank would acquire a relationship of trust, confidence and guidance which would be most healthy in the economic development of the new Palestinian States.

11. The Jewish Agency recognizes that the Jewish State will have to develop a borrowing program also in connection with the International Bank. Such a program will be submitted promptly after the Jewish State will have come into being and acquired the membership in the International Bank which is a prerequisite for any loan application. If, however, -- what we regard as most undesirable -- the transition period should last, as the UNSCOP suggested, for as long as two years, we will not be in a position to apply to the International Bank for some time. In any case, the International Bank is only beginning its operations and has a long waiting list. Moreover, under no circumstances will Palestine be able to rely exclusively on the International Bank for its external public borrowing. Palestinian requirements of capital from public institutions, which, as indicated above, might total one and a half billion dollars or two billion dollars, would be too large a part of the total lending power of the International Bank.

12. The Jewish Agency is confident that the Government of the United States is fully aware of the importance of an early resolution of these financial questions, in so far as a resolution is possible at this time. We cannot, of course, anticipate a one-time solution of all future difficulties but only a constructive beginning.

A constructive beginning with public financing will permit careful planning. It will also help to create an atmosphere in which a large flow of private investment funds into Palestine may reasonably be anticipated.

STRICTLY SECRET

Notes of a Conversation between His Excellency, Sir Alan Cunningham, and
Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, on January 27th, 1948.

I spent a full hour in a rather "meaty conversation" with the High Commissioner. It was a very friendly and open conversation. There was no feeling of embarrassment on either side, both of us speaking frankly and friendly. H.E. was evidently anxious to tell me his side of the story.

"Dr. Silver, you've come in troubled times".

"Yes", I replied, "and I have been considerably troubled". I began to tell him the story of our convoys being attacked, of the murders, etc., which happened during my visit here. It was incomprehensible to me that Government was seemingly unable to keep a short road safe. Whereupon H.E. said: "We are as interested as you in keeping the road safe. We too need it". He then discussed military patrols and protection at specially dangerous spots. "We're doing our utmost and shall continue doing our utmost. We plan to keep the road open and safe - but it isn't easy". "Is the British Empire prepared to acknowledge that its armies are unable to keep open this road in Palestine", I asked? "Not at all", he replied, "we are making no such acknowledgement and we intend to keep the road open".

I then mentioned the sore problem of the Old City. H.E. said: "We must find a solution. The present situation is intolerable. We have appealed for a truce, but so far no positive answer from the Arabs. The people at the top don't agree". He repeated again his eagerness for a truce. He referred to the presence of the Haganah in the Old City as irritating the relationships between the Jews and Arabs there. I asked him whether he believed that the safety of the Jews in the Old City could be left to the tender mercies of the Arabs in that quarter who are being incited by the Mufti and his gangs? He replied that there were British forces there. I asked whether the British authorities are prepared to take full responsibility for the safety of the Jews in that quarter. He replied he could do so only to the degree that the military authorities could assume responsibility anywhere. I suggested to him that another forceful appeal for a truce in the Old City might be helpful, and that he would certainly find the Jews ready to cooperate fully.

In the course of the conversation about the Old City and the truce he mentioned Rabbi Herzog who, he said, would favour such a truce. I said that Rabbi Herzog is disappointed at the fact that H.E. would not see him; whereupon Sir Alan replied that he had felt greatly hurt and aggrieved by the statement of the Chief Rabbi at the time when the British people were suffering so many disasters at home. He had then said that this was the visitation of God on the English people for their actions in Palestine. I then replied that I could not conceive of a man like Rabbi Herzog, whom I knew to be a God-fearing and kindly man to have made such a statement. Rabbi Herzog could not reconcile himself to the situation as it existed in the Old City, and felt definitely that something should be done. The High Commissioner here mentioned the attack on the gates of the Old City by our people, to which I replied that he realised that we were not the ones to start the trouble.

Then I discussed the question of the infiltration across the borders. I said I am confronted by people who say to me here are three items which clearly indicate the cynical unwillingness of the Administration to maintain law and order: (a) the murders on the highways; (b) the besieged Old City. (I used to come here time and again and my first visit was always to the Wailing Wall, which is my sacred place; today I could not go there); and (c) the infiltration across the borders of armed bands of Arabs.

The High Commissioner began to explain to me the problem of infiltration. He said that Government never was able to control the borders against smuggling adequately. I called his attention to the latest band that had come over and concentrated round Nablus, and asked what he would be doing about it. He said that at the moment he was doing things only in a diplomatic way. To which I replied: "Why not militarily?" To which he replied: "That might come later". I told him that he must surely be fully informed of the seriousness of this thing. Here were Jews prevented from coming into the country by the sea blockade, but the land frontiers were open for Arabs to pour in

with their weapons. H.E. said he doubted whether they were really pouring in and what amount of weapons they were bringing with them.

I then passed over to the larger problem. I asked how he visualised the transition period? The time was fast approaching and he could not accept the idea that the British would leave one day and the United Nations Commission would be able to step in the next day and take everything over. To which he replied: "No". On the other hand, he said, he did not know the final position which his Government would take on that subject. He referred to the statement which Bevin had made on this. I suggested that Bevin as Foreign Secretary may not know of the great administrative difficulties involved in handing over the apparatus of one government to another and he may not understand the time that that requires, whereas His Excellency, close to the problem here, undoubtedly knows much more. To which H.E. replied that Government was now busy making complete records of everything so that when the United Nations Commission comes in they will be able to take over. For example, they were making microphotos of all their records. In the engineering departments they were making what he called "hand-over" instructions: where the work will end, where the material is and how it can be resumed. "I assure you", he said, "it is farthest from our intention to leave anything here in chaos".

I then asked him how he envisaged the security problem here when the British would leave? Did he think law and order could be maintained without an international force? To which he replied: "Frankly, in my experience of 2½ years I do not believe so". I then asked him whether he thought of an international force in terms of the large powers or smaller ones? To which he replied that he thought it would be an easier achievement if it were made up of the smaller powers because the large powers would present internal problems. And here he said: "If you will not quote me - I wonder why it cannot be arranged that the special police force envisaged in the U.N. Report, could not be immediately organised and sent here, and why the Governor cannot be appointed and come at once?"

Well, I thought, the delay seemed to be due to the insistence of the British, and not to the unwillingness of the U.N. If it were known that the Mandatory had no objections to such a regime being established as quickly as possible and an international force sent to the Jerusalem area (which to H.E. seemed to be the critical area), then I was sure the U.N. would take quicker action. My impression was that more progress had been made in working out the details for the international zone than for the setting up of the two States. I told him he was in a key position to pass the word on to the proper authorities, especially as this was something his mind was clear on and very definite. I expressed the opinion that the 600 militia which were to be appointed for Jerusalem were clearly not sufficient to maintain law and order in this area, to which he agreed.

I then took up the question of the searches of our convoys. He was a little apologetic about that and the impression I gathered was that they are reconsidering this entire subject, though he did not say so in so many words. He did say that they allowed two people in each car, to which I replied that this was clearly inadequate and that others had been disarmed. I said I had never heard of any instance where people who were defending themselves against murderous bands had been disarmed, except here. How would it be in London or in New York if such a thing were to happen? He was somewhat defensive on this score.

He then criticised some things, not in a bitter spirit. He complained about Goldie Myerson and a statement she had made to the effect that the position of our people was that they are out for offensive defence. I myself did not know where she had made this statement, but I said that it meant the Jews had no intention to stand up as targets to be shot at. The best form of defence is sometimes offence. He said he felt such a phrase was a provocative one. He also referred to the threat which had been made, evidently by the spokesman of the Jewish Agency, implying that our people might blow their way into the Old City. He thought that would be a terrible thing and would lead to unpredictable serious consequences. I replied that if such a threat had been made it was the result of desperation on the part of people who felt themselves trapped and besieged and saw no other way out.

In the same way he asked me whether I had read the report on Palestine in the House of Lords. I said, yes, I had read what had appeared in the press about it. H.E. then told me that someone in the House had said that the Revisionists were saying they objected to the partition proposal and intended to fight it. "Well", I said, "you know how strong the Revisionists are in Palestine, and you know the strength of the Revisionists the world over. The Jewish people is behind the Jewish Agency and the Jewish Agency has loyally accepted partition. I had personally presented the case of the Jewish Agency before the United Nations, and while the plan was far from meeting all we had hoped for, reluctantly we accepted it as a compromise solution. I said we were not losing any sleep over the position of the Revisionists on this subject, and no one else need do so. The people you most dislike have publicly said that they do not intend to resort to violent acts against this proposal".

I also referred to the fact that I understood that the relationship between him and my colleagues on the Jewish Agency had been a little strained of late. It seemed to me that the most cordial kind of relationship should prevail between the Government which was winding up its administration and ourselves who were charged with the grave responsibility of building up an administration for the Jewish State. The British had after all loyally accepted the U.N. decision, even though they were unwilling to assume responsibility for implementing it, and the Jewish Agency is as loyally carrying out that decision. I could understand that there were points of friction, as the problem was a difficult one, and the handing over from one Government to another was not easy, but a measure of good-will and understanding could greatly help the situation. I said that what was basically wrong was that ever since ~~ever~~ the British representative at U.N. had accepted the decision, the Government has said nothing else about it. The Government has given no indication of the fact that it has reconciled itself to the decision that there would be a Jewish State here. There are surely many things which the British Empire did not like, but reconciled themselves to them. If such an indication were given it would help to lift the pall which hangs over all our relationships. To that H.E. nodded. The impression which I gathered was that direction on all such matters of policy must after all come from higher quarters.

His Excellency felt that the matter of reprisals on our part made his position difficult. I asked him to put himself in our place. Suppose the seven men who were slaughtered the other day at Yezur were Englishmen and the Government charged with responsibility to protect them had not done so, what would be his reaction? Would you condemn reprisals in that case? To which he made no reply.

There were many more things we talked about. He was not at any time bitter against the Jewish Agency or against the Jews. He said he was sorry that his term of office was ending on a note of failure. He had hoped he could achieve peace in the country. I said I hoped he would come back when the Jewish State was established and that he would be welcomed as an honoured guest. I said again there would be peace in the country, especially if the U.N. took a firm position and if my country did the same, which I said I hoped would be the case.

That I think is the heart of the things we talked about. He insisted time and again that they were most eager to maintain law and order, and he said he resented it very much when people questioned his motives or those of the Government as to their desire to maintain law and order.

I referred again to what took place Sunday near the Castel and asked him how could such a thing have happened? Here were gangsters shooting at people. The army was not around to stop the bands from doing that, and here were our defenders who came to drive off the attackers, and then the army appears on the scene, begins to shoot indiscriminately and kills four of our defenders, and what is more, then starts to disarm the others. H.E. replied to this that he was investigating the matter, and while he did not say that the facts were not as I had stated them, the intention of the army was an honest one. They had meant to break up that engagement.

His Secretary, who had met me at the door, and who later escorted me out, also said that he hoped for peace. He said he had been in the last war and it had led to ruin and destruction. I said that as a Rabbi I certainly agreed with him on that score.

Before I said good-bye to His Excellency, he said he hoped I would not be "too naughty" when I got back to America. I told him that I fight hard but I always try to fight fair. I am sure that he approved of that principle. My last words to him were that there were two things in my judgment which should be done immediately because the eyes of the world were focussed on them: (1) to make the roads of Palestine safe and secure for lawful travel, and (2) to lift the siege of the Old City

AHS/RH



Abe Tuvim

January 28, 1948

Elishu Ben-Horin

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

When I came yesterday morning to see Mr. T.O. Thackrey in order to hear about his conversation with the President, it turned out that in addition to President Truman, Thackrey also interviewed Mr. Forrestal and Senator McGrath. He told me at considerably length about these three extremely interesting and outspoken talks, and I shall try to reproduce this account here as accurately as I possibly can. By the way, it is not correct that the President invited Mr. Thackrey to see him. It was the other way around: Mr. Thackrey asked for this interview.

First of all, let me give you Thackrey's overall impressions of the President. Mr. Truman impressed him as being sincerely patriotic, wishing to do the right thing but completely lost in the maze of the great responsibilities which he is facing without being able to adequately cope with them. Truman may not believe in "My Country, right or wrong", but he simply cannot conceive that his country and the President of the United States can possibly be wrong. It is, therefore, only natural for him to be extremely resentful of obstacles, protests, criticisms and adverse views. He was very nervous, jumpy, and cursing throughout the conversation. Time and again he jumped off his seat, walked the room and repeatedly "damned this, that and the other": "Damn the Russians, damn the British, damn the Jews".

Mr. Thackrey came to the President to discuss Palestine. According to the report he gave me, he presented the case very forcefully, and indeed time and again pressed the President for answers far out of proportion in light of the respective positions of the two men. To the President, Thackrey did not spell out the Democratic Party's angle in this situation. That he did with McGrath, however. The President was fully aware of this implication.

On the question of the embargo, President Truman stated in very definite terms that he was not going to lift it, but that he was for the establishment of an international army. (It should be kept in mind that he spoke of the general international army of the U.N. which is under debate for a long time, and not of the international force specifically for Palestine.) To that Thackrey replied that judging by the developments in the U.N. there is little evidence of the United States really pressing for an international army. The President said that he considered this remark of Mr. Thackrey unfair. Then, Thackrey formulated differently his remark, asking the President what he thought of the prospects for the materialization of an international army in time to be effective in the present Palestine situation.

January 28, 1948

The President answered this question by saying, "I hope so".

Mr. Thackrey was not taking any of that, and said: "Mr. President, I did not ask for your hopes but for your opinion; whether you honestly think that there is a chance for an international army to come into being soon enough to take care of the Palestine situation".

✓ "To hell, no", was Truman's reply to that.

There was another illuminating feature of the conversation, indicating a new bill of goods sold to Truman by his entourage. Truman spoke a great deal about Russia and the possibility, even the probability, of a new world conflict. At one stage, he got very excited and said: "If this is what they want, we will let them have it; we shall put our chips on the table and see what is what". Speaking about the Middle East against the background of a forthcoming war with Russia, Truman said: "Don't forget that Britain may stay neutral in the war and together with her all the Arab States of the Middle East..." Obviously this is the bill of goods sold to Mr. Truman.

If I may step aside for a minute from the account of the conversation to interpret this "new line", it is apparent that only in light of such an approach - utterly unrealistic as it is - America can get excited about the British-American rivalry for economic and other positions in the Middle East. For, otherwise, if one proceeds on the assumption that in case of a new world conflict, Great Britain will be firmly aligned with the United States, then, from the viewpoint of grand strategy, there is really little difference whether it is the United States or Britain who holds this or that economic or strategic position in the Middle East. It seems that our "friends" in the State Department and in the higher military councils have realized this simple truth, and that they now seem to have launched this new theory about Britain staying neutral in a future war.

To return to the interview, having said this piece, the President went on to enlarge on the subject and to point out how adversely the American position in the Middle East was affected by partition.

This, I believe, covers the salient points of the Thackrey-Truman conversation. Thackrey's second talk was with McGrath and it lasted for four hours. Thackrey reports that McGrath is genuinely very much concerned about the Palestine problem both on its merits and from the viewpoint of its possible effect on the election. He is so much concerned that he feels that it may cost the Democratic Party the national election. He even contemplates resigning from the chairmanship of the National Committee. It seems that McGrath and Truman do not see eye to eye on this question. McGrath promised Thackrey to seek an interview with the President on this problem within the next few days and to do his best. Thackrey is going to see McGrath again before the end of this week.

One utterance of McGrath is worth reproducing: He said: "The thing is being represented as a matter of overwhelming national self-interest on

our part. The fact of the matter is that there are very considerable personal interests of a small group of people but not national interests. Furthermore, I can't see Ibn Saud being greatly concerned about this little strip of territory which Palestine forms. I am sure that if he is at all concerned it isn't enough to outweigh our gold American dollars which he cannot get from anywhere else. He cannot get either Russian rubles, French francs, or British pounds to compensate him for what he is getting from us."

James Forrestal was very outspoken and straightforward in his conversation with Thackrey. Here is the place to mention, that in Thackrey's judgment, and to put it in his own words: "There are two hurdles which we must jump: Loy Henderson and James Forrestal, and Forrestal is by far the higher one." Forrestal said that his job is to take care of the United States security. He judges the Palestine problem from this viewpoint and from this viewpoint alone. He doesn't make policies. He is a member of President Truman's cabinet. Whatever policy Mr. Truman formulates, he would do his best to carry it out unless it is a policy directed towards the ruin of the armed forces of the United States, when he would put up a fight. However, he cannot be expected to favor a policy which would make his job more difficult. He can be expected to hold views on every question which would be most helpful to the job which he has to do. "For all I know", Forrestal said, "If I were not in the position I am and if I were on the outside of the government and its responsibilities, I probably would have been with you in this fight for partition, but I am where I am and therefore my attitude is dictated by my job and its responsibilities."

Forrestal went on to say that even if he grants Thackrey that in the case of a war against Russia the United States would not be able to maintain or preserve its oil fields and installations in the Middle East even for one week, he is still vitally interested in postponing such an occurrence as long as he possibly can; he is still vitally interested in having the flow of oil from the Middle East uninterrupted for as long as he possibly can. "Three months is better than one month, two weeks is better than one week. Every day of uninterrupted pumping, piping, and shipping of oil from the Middle East to safer places adds to the national security of the United States in Greece, in Europe and at home."

That is where Mr. Forrestal stands and he didn't budge from this position. In reply to my question, Mr. Thackrey said that in his opinion Forrestal's mind is not only made up but it isn't open at all any more to argument or to a contrary presentation of America's self-interest in this situation.

After listening for about an hour and a quarter to Mr. Thackrey's report of the three conversations, I asked him a few questions which further elucidated the situation. Mr. Thackrey is definitely of the opinion that the intention of the State Department as well as of Forrestal is to bring about a revision of the U.N. decision on Palestine intended to squash the whole thing. I asked for Thackrey's advice as to what we could

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do in addition to what we are doing in order to combat this danger. He thinks that the key man to the whole thing is Marshall. He said that President Truman not only adores General Marshall but adulates him. He considers him the greatest man on earth. Furthermore, there might be some jealousy between Marshall and Forrestal. If we could get at Marshall the right way and once again get his support, then we may still be able to win. Thackrey thinks that Baruch and/or Swope could get to Marshall. He further told me that he could get Baruch or Swope to do it if we want him to.

KBH/lb



Meeting of Executive Committee held in Washington Monday, Feb. 7 at 4:00 p.m.

DELEGATION TO PRESIDENT

Dr. Silver reported that on Feb. 3 a letter was received from General Watson, aide to the President, stating that the President agreed to receive the following persons on Feb. 14: Dr. Wise, Dr. Silver, Dr. Goldstein, Mr. Monsky, Mr. Blaustein and Mr. Held. The letter went on:

"I understand ~~this conference~~ this conference has been requested of the President in order to discuss the continuance of immigration into Palestine and the settlement of refugees there. Will you please notify me of your ability to attend at that time."

Message received during meeting from S.R. asking to see Dr. Silver at three o'clock Tuesday.

Attitude to be taken discussed

AGREED: to indicate to S.R. that the expression of opinion at the Exec. is that it is impossible for us under the circumstances to accept the partnership with the other group, that we insist on a separate appointment ... unless there is an assurance that no statement is issued unless previously approved by us. Dr. Silver to select someone to go with him to see S.R. After Dr. Silver's meeting with S.R., Executive to meet again.

CONGRESS RESOLUTION

Discussion re inclusion of word "ultimately" in resolution-raised by Mr. Szold. Action: Agreed that it should be kept in mind that we want to change the wording, but should wait for the proper time.

NATIONAL PETITION

Have authority to proceed. Take up within week.

DELEGATION TO LONDON

Dr. Silver indicated he had made application for passage. Indicated he would like to be here until Resolutions out of the way. Thought the delegation ought to go before the invasion starts.

Before delegation goes, should like to take up question of Jewish Agency office in Washington and NG's relation to the Political Bureau of the J. Agency.

Action: Sense of this body that Louis Lipsky, member of the Jewish Agency Executive, should go to London.

KEREN HAYESOD GRANT TO AGENCY OFFICE

Sense of this body that the Keren Hayesod be asked to continue grant until return of American delegation from London.



Executive Committee meeting - Feb. 7 - evening session

Report given on Orthodox delegation to Mr. Hall.

Possibilities of Resolution being voted out of Committee discussed - also dangers.

Plans for speakers to present Zionist case on Tuesday discussed. Messrs. Neumann, Shulman and Lipsky appointed committee to work out answers to questions which might be asked our ~~representatives~~ speakers.

Exec. Meeting February 8 (Tuesday) - Washington

Hearings for following day discussed.

DELEGATION TO PRESIDENT

Dr. Silver reported on his 2 hour talk with S.R. Advisability of requesting a statement from the President, preferably not to a delegation, discussed.

Action: Consensus that the only thing for us to do is to press forward with our Resolution (and try to get postponement of meeting with Pres. and statement by him).

INTERNAL INFORMATION BULLETIN

This bulletin contains items of confidential and secret information from authentic sources which are intended exclusively for the recipients and are not to be communicated to unauthorized persons.

1. April 15 On April 12th, Lopez met representatives of the Egyptian UNO delegation who told him that Egypt would agree to a continuation of the British administration in Palestine and that they were conducting negotiations with other Arab countries to prepare the ground toward this end.
2. April 16 The State Department called Dr. Magnes to come to the United States immediately. They wish to present him as a moderate Jewish leader who does not insist on the establishment of a Jewish State. Magnes' reply was that he accepted the invitation but that he was ill and required a nurse and his wife to accompany him on the trip. On April 19th, Palcor reported that Dr. Magnes left Palestine by air for the United States.
3. April 21 At a press conference conducted exclusively for Arab reporters on April 20th, at Lake Success, Dr. Malik and Jamal Hussein outlining the present situation said that the task of the moment for reporters is to help in raising the morale of the Arab people and to assist in restoring their confidence in their leaders.

In answering questions with respect to the truce,

Hussein declared that a truce will be acceptable only if:

- a. Jewish immigration is stopped.
- b. All terrorists are exiled from Palestine.
- c. There is the assurance that a truce will not serve as a basis for further discussion of partition.

4. April 20 Dr. Arce of Argentina is reported to have said:
"It looks like a lot of politics. It's a bad time to raise the Palestine question, in view of what is going on in Europe.
However, I think Palestine will be partitioned to save the face of the United Nations. Argentina does not approve of partition, but I think it will accept it, if there are three armies to enforce it, those of the United States, France and England".
5. April 21 Parodi told one of his acquaintances in the UNO that France agreed to send troops to Palestine to assist in the implementation of the trusteeship plan. France gave her consent to this arrangement after having secured the sanction of the Pope, who would like to see French participation in the administration of the Holy Land. The British, however, expressed their opposition to having French troops sent to Palestine. The French have therefore changed policy and will now be concentrating their efforts on securing peace in Jerusalem with the hope of taking part in the international force for Jerusalem.
6. April 21 On April 20th, the Arab delegations received a cable from Azzam Pasha, in which he states, that owing to the grave military situation of the Arabs in Palestine, immediate help is needed in the form of intervention of regular Arab armies. He asks in what way an invasion of the regular Arab armies, prior to May 15th, will affect the General Assembly. He requests that the reply be worded: bad, dangerous, or advisable. The delegations met for three hours that day but did not come to any decision.

7. April 22 After two additional meetings of the Arab delegations, it was decided on April 21st to cable Azzam that the participation of the regular armies of the Arab States was inadvisable before May 15th.

Later on in the day, Emir Feisal met with Creech Jones and towards evening, he conferred with the American delegation. The results are not yet known.



SECRET

COPY

5:30 P.M. May 17, 1948

Direct Instructions from the State Department to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations.

The following is American strategy at the Security Council:

They will try to get a cease-fire order within thirty-six hours. If they do not manage to put through a cease-fire order they will put a resolution to find a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. They will use all their power to put that through in the Security Council. They will then be in a position to modify the embargo. The reason why they do not wish now to lift the embargo is that they want to find an act of aggression first. They will then be in a position to ask for the imposition of economic sanctions and blockade. At that point they think the Arab world will give in. Once a finding of aggression is made in the Security Council the Arab leaders will be able to go back to their people and say that it is all up. If they do not succeed at that point they are prepared to proceed to Article 106 of the Charter.

TRANSLATION

Secret

AHS.
NF.

FROM THE DIARY OF H. BERMAN

8/4/48

On my own request, I had a meeting with the French Consul. This meeting took place after a considerable interval in which we had not seen one another.

Latterly, various rumors had reached me of a change in the attitude of the Consul towards us; I, therefore, thought it proper to renew my contact with him.

He received me with his customary cordiality at the end of office hours and we spent more than one and a half hours together.

He had innumerable complaints. I shall state what I heard from him without special reference to what I on my part told him.

1. We indeed have a good information service but do not know how to use it.
2. We don't understand the psychology of the Arabs and we don't know how to conduct psychological warfare.
3. Most people of the world are against us--for all kinds of reasons. And the fact that we allow the Arabs to proceed in the manner they have done these four months, has impressed the world with the strength of the Arabs.
4. The Arabs have shown a wonderful capacity for organization and during the four months have performed wonders in this field, particularly in regard to publicity and propaganda. The publicity and propaganda are indeed based mainly on falsehoods and exaggerations but this is the way they have been proceeding, and this is the best way for the Arabs.
5. We are now paying a heavy price for the weakness we showed at the beginning of the war and ~~we~~ do not have the confidence in our victory in the struggle.
6. He doesn't believe that our matter will be decided around the ^{Capone Table} ~~presentable~~ in the course of political discussions and we should have foreseen this from the outset and prepared for it. Finally, when the war came on us, we were unprepared and weak.
7. In the most favorable circumstances, we could put into the field an army of 35,000. This number was insufficient for the protection of our entire Yishuv spread, as it was, across the country and simultaneously for the protection of the borders. It was to be assumed that with the development of the struggle, large Arab forces would continue to stream into Palestine.
8. The lack of military ^{planning} ~~preparation~~ and ^{low caliber} ~~low standards~~ of our officers was ~~due~~ too much in evidence; unpardonable mistakes have been committed.
9. The fact that the Zionist movement had been unable to come ^{to an} ~~into~~ agreement with the dissident ~~or~~ organizations showed that there was not yet sufficient ~~organization among us~~ recognition among us that we were in the midst of a war. In time of war all manner of political considerations should be set aside and ~~for~~ the military forces should be concentrated together.
10. It is true that the world as a whole is poor in leadership ^{at the same time} ~~but~~ our leadership, which proved its ability in time of peace, is not suited for the conduct of war.
11. He asserted that the Stern Group was in contact with the Communists (possibly through the instrumentality of the Yugoslav Consulate) and it was accordingly our duty to hasten to come to an agreement with them so that we could have some control over them and their conduct.
12. It was his opinion that M. Shertok in his speeches and actions was not following what was the best line for us in these days. It would be worth our while to advise him to change somewhat the tone of his declarations, etc.

13. He was very much afraid that with the development of the struggle we would be found wanting in heavy equipment.
14. Until the last moment he does not believe that the British will leave although they have already informed him officially that they are evacuating one of the large buildings belonging to him, presently occupied by the army.
15. There is much in common between the interests of the French and of the Jews. He and also all his comrades in the Middle East continually bring this to the notice of their Government in Paris--but no heed is paid.
16. In his opinion, France should officially and openly sell arms to the Jews and would thus show a strong hand towards the Arabs and not follow the path of appeasement. But his opinion was not proving acceptable.
17. He ~~will~~ well understood that we were the factor which could serve as a bulwark against the spread of communism in this part of the world.

- Incidentally I learned that he is in very close contact with Amcarate--in accordance with a hint from Paris.
- Throughout the conversation there was discernible a tendency to under-estimate ~~the~~ our strength.
- I, on my part, dwelt at length on our growing strength and on the significance to the democratic world of a Jewish State.
- I effused optimism and it seemed to me that I succeeded in transmitting that feeling to him.
- Towards the conclusion of our talk, we touched shortly on the difficulties caused to consuls and consular officials by the various guards when they come to the Jewish quarter and I explained to him our difficulties.
- He showed me the many bullets that had pierced the consulate building and the great damage they had caused. He told me that he had telegraphed the Mufti and had ~~succeeded~~ asked him to instruct his men to be careful not to violate the consulate. No answer had been received as yet.