



Abba Hillel Silver Collection Digitization Project

Featuring collections from the Western Reserve Historical Society and
The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives

MS-4787: Abba Hillel Silver Papers, 1902-1989.

Series II: Harold P. Manson File (Zionism Files), 1940-1949, undated.

Sub-series B: Additional Manson Material, 1943-1949, undated.

Reel
109

Box
38

Folder
471

Miscellaneous notes, 1942-1947.

Monday Aug 11-

5:30 PM Band called me

Had spoken to Marshall.

Told him failure to adjust Pol. situation
will endanger Br. negotiation line.

Asked him to talk to Vandenberg.

W. not very communicative. As Am. plan.

B. mention Arthur Brock's article in Times
which he inspired.

B. will see Lay Henderson.

Mrs. Faver Bolton had requested lunch
see 2 people whose names B. did
not at the moment have before him

I told B. about Mrs. Bolton.

(Had dinner previous at B's home in Port
Washington Tues. Aug. 5. with Swope

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

THE TEMPLE

EAST 105TH STREET AT ANSEL ROAD
CLEVELAND, OHIO

Tues. - Aug. 12 - Surke phoned
He had talked to Seey Snyder. They
suggested that I call the Presidents. Seey
counselly tomorrow - and asked for
reassurance from Pres. on Galt.
~~at~~ present attitude towards Pol.
+ refugees.

Wed. Aug. 13. - Sack phoned from Wash
no statement from State Dept. as
+ affected.
I asked him to phone Chapman
in re an proposed meeting this
week with Snyder
+ Sack had spoken to Sullivan
this morning. Latter is on way
to White House. He had heard
from all parts of country de
Pol.

2 Time That Something
Be Done if Ever.

U.S. is much concerned
over present situation
& wants solution now

Immerchapel has
advised Gout at Once
this was 4 days ago

emphasized that U.S.
wants decision along
lines of Satisfactory
Partisan Plan, U.S.

National Press Club

Washington

Acheson & L. Murchafel
(Tues Jan. 28)
4 days ago at L. Murchafel's
Request —

And Reflecting Marshall
men who had discussed
subject several times with
Acheson & Henderson

Was told that U. S. deems
it essential that present
conference come to a
Happy Termination; That
~~some~~ now is the

4
was emphasized that
British will have to
enforce whatever
decision arrived at

I mentioned we were told
"we will find it easier
to support Partition
than any other Plan".

Ambassador was advised

"we will find it
extremely difficult to
support any ^{immediate} ~~plan~~ plan
which did not



National Press Club

Washington

Inclined to Support ~~to~~
Parties ~~also~~ but would
not give a Blank Check
was emphasized to But
That They must Take
Responsibility for Decision;
U.S. will not take Responsibility
nor will U.S. enter into
any arrangement for
sharing responsibility
nor will U.S. send
troops troops x

National Press Club

Washington

4
As well as our
economic support

No Blank Checks

But Partition

No talks with Na-

him Said so 40 min.
with Tr but no
mention Palestine + Jim
they got around to
it was time for
lunch

5 Contemplates Considerable
Amount of Immigration
now + Large Numbers
Later with self
Autonomy for Palestine
Jewish ~~to~~ Area
now is time was
Repeated frequently.

British told if any
Satisfactory Plan
involved will have
over public support

Pinkerton has denied
reports that Amer want
to move or necessity
for it - St Left
issued denial

London Conf for
cantonnement plan St Left
advised x

Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the request of the State Department, postponed action for the time being on the Palestine Resolution, we wish to record our own personal approval of the Resolution which calls for the free entry of Jews into Palestine and full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may as soon as practicable reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth.

Elmer Thomas
Arthur Capper

Sen. F. Hughes
Charles D. Tamm
Benjamin Chas. Clark

Robert La Follette

Frank B. Rowland

Wm. H. Shipstead

Paul H. Reubens

James H. Doolittle

James E. Murray

James H. Doolittle

From Leo R. Sack

For the American Zionist Emergency Council

For Immediate Release

Washington, Dec. 14- Twelve members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seven Democrats and five Republicans, which earlier this week postponed action on the Palestine Resolution at the request of the State Department today signed a joint statement recording their "personal approval" of the resolution.

They are Senators Joseph F. Guffey, Pennsylvania; Claude Pepper, Florida; Bennett Champ Clark, Missouri; Elbert D. Thomas, Utah; James E. Murray, Montana, James M. Tamm, Delaware and Robert R. Reynolds, North Carolina, Democrats; Senators Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., Wisconsin; Arthur Capper, Kansas; Gerald P. Nye, North Dakota; Henrik Shipstead, Minnesota and James J. Davis, Pennsylvania. The twelve Senators constitute two-thirds of the Senators who participated in the Foreign Relations Committee discussions. The Resolution was rejected because Secretary of State Stettinius told Senators that passage "at the present time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation."

Here is the statement of the Senators:

"Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the request of the State Department, postponed action for the time being on the Palestine Resolution, we wish to record our own personal approval of the Resolution, which calls for the free entry of Jews into Palestine and full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may as soon as practicable reconstitute Palestine as a free and Democratic Commonwealth."

Senator Wagner, Democrat, of New York, one of the sponsors of the Resolution is out of the city. Senator Taft of Ohio, the other sponsor, is not a member of the committee. ----

7) Ready to offer his ^{new} party
on that subject.

8) Recalled his early visit
to Vol. - 11/31/11 -
50 yrs on Hezbollah
- but only 60 yrs - &
that before -

9) Huffy that Pol. had
in so many refugee
land & children

10) Asked him to stay in
Iran - will consider favorably

Barrett - ① Stand by - but due to
desert goal, historic causes -
② J. Nat. Home in Pol-
and migration to absorption
capacity - which Jews can
create ③ Am. & J.B. on
parties in Turkey ship & Pol.
Nat. Jewish / Am. parties in East
Ore. destinations were together
④ Nothing can stop us once
we open as Pol. - for
salvation lies in that open-
ment ⑤ Asked when he was
⑥ Refused to go Bre Sado
- Not to play

① difficult to see
that would

- not in line to move
Project - Can settle -

13/ ① of in progress - was

looked for Hezbollah
if we own the world

11) Recalled that he
found with Pol.

Tr. 7-4548

HERBERT BAYARD SWOPE
745 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N.Y.


March 12, 1946.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
The Temple,
East 105th St. at Ansel Road,
Cleveland, Ohio.

Dear Dr. Silver:-

Mr. Bernard M. Baruch has asked
me to advise you that he has made arrangements
for you to meet Mr. Churchill. At the moment
the exact time and place have not been set,
but the meeting will take place after March 15th.

Faithfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "H. A. Miller". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

Secretary to Herbert Bayard Swope

Sat. Dec. 14. 7 P.M.

Conversation with Ch. W.

W.: Our views are far apart. He is for going to Conference, against terms of all kinds. He was not informed of Ex. decision as subject in Nov. 1946. He is resolved regardless what the Curves decides on issues not to talk free again. He is there. He has had a belly-ful. But Ben Truman is Pol. + we he would be in a bad spot. Regards any position as dangerous. He has no objection to my stepping in leadership - but he will not interfere. He will also not cooperate.

I asked him why he changed his mind about the resolution which he introduced in his letter to Hall. He said that he was glad to do, as had the movement by the Exenters. He never believed in it.

I told him that the cause, the Co. in last 4 months was disastrous. If they

wanted Parkhurst - they bumped it. He said
that he was ill at the time it was done.

I said that from all indications they will
not get Parkhurst. Saw him very impressive
of Berlin and Byrnes. He was not sure his
talk with Crook-Jones left him more satis-
fied.

I said that the Byrnes should declare
itself clearly on the issues. If his line
is adopted he and those who think with
him should carry on. He said that if
that were so, I should not be a member
of the Executive. I said certainly. I would
never dream of it.

We exchanged 2-3 times assurances
of mutual respect. He reminded me
that in London, Lisbon & in Cleveland
he suggested my coming into the
world movement.

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION

1220

(00)

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter
NT = Overnight Telegram
LC = Deferred Cable
NLT = Cable Night Letter
Ship Radiogram

R. B. WHITE
PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

NH71 123 GOVT=THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC 13 1200P
HONORABLE ROBERT F WAGNER=
=530 EAST 86 ST=

DEAR BOB:

KNOWING THAT YOU ARE TO ATTEND THE FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA, I ASK YOU TO CONVEY TO THE DELEGATES ASSEMBLED MY CORDIAL GREETINGS.

PLEASE EXPRESS MY SATISFACTION THAT, IN ACCORD WITH THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN POLICY AND IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE FOUR FREEDOMS, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AT ITS JULY CONVENTION THIS YEAR INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PLANK IN ITS PLATFORM:

"WE FAVOR THE OPENING OF PALESTINE TO UNRESTRICTED JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION, AND SUCH A POLICY AS TO RESULT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT THERE OF A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC JEWISH COMMONWEALTH."

EFFORTS WILL BE ^{made} ~~made~~ TO FIND APPROPRIATE WAYS AND MEANS OF EFFECTUATING THIS POLICY AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.

WITH CORDIAL REGARDS AND BEST WISHES=
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT.

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION

1220

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter
NT = Overnight Telegram
LC = Deferred Cable
NLT = Cable Night Letter
Ship Radiogram

R. B. WHITE
PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVEN
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

NH96 65 GOVT=THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC 14 1207P
1944 OCT 14 PM 12 37
HOW ROBERT F WAGNER=
530 EAST 86 ST=

DEAR BOB: YOU MAY ADD THE FOLLOWING TO MY TELEGRAM TO YOU
OF YESTERDAY QUOTE I KNOW HOW LONG AND ARDENTLY THE JEWISH
PEOPLY HAVE WORKED AND PRAYED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
PALESTINE AS A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC JEWISH COMMONWEALTH. I
AM CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE GIVE THEIR SUPPORT
TO THIS AIM AND IF REELECTED I SHALL HELP TO BRING ABOUT
ITS REALIZATION UNQUOTE=

FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT.

Congressman Flood did not want
this mentioned publicly —
He wants the Council to prepare
a speech which he will
immediately deliver on the floor
& use as basis for pressure
with President & State Dept

Ramon Weiss



PALESTINE FORMULA AGREED UPON BY MR. BEN-GURION AND MR. MAURICE WERTHEIM

June 5, 1942.

1. To act in common

- a) For the maintenance of Jewish rights under the Mandate in Palestine for the immediate future.
- b) For the fulfillment of the original purposes of the Balfour Declaration, whereby through unrestricted Jewish immigration and large-scale colonization under a regime designed for this purpose Jews may constitute a majority in Palestine and establish an autonomous commonwealth, it being clearly understood that
 - 1) In such a commonwealth, all the inhabitants, without regard to race or religion, shall enjoy complete equality of rights.
 - 2) The establishment of this commonwealth will in no way affect the political or civil status and allegiance of Jews who are citizens of any other country.

2. To set up a sub-committee to study and define the ways and methods best calculated to secure the achievement of the above aims.

C

O

P

Y

(TELEGRAM)

DECEMBER 5 1944

WE ARE GLAD TO LEARN THAT PALESTINE RESOLUTION SR 247 IS ABOUT
TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE PASSAGE
OF THE RESOLUTION MOST EARNESTLY DESIRED BY ENTIRE AMERICAN
JEWISH COMMUNITY WE FEEL IT VITAL TO CAUSE WHICH WE REPRESENT
AND TO AVOID FUTURE AMBIGUITIES THAT THE WORD QUOTE ULTIMATELY
UNQUOTE BE OMITTED FROM PRESENTLY PENDING RESOLUTION AND THAT
THE TERM QUOTE JEWISH UNQUOTE BE RETAINED BEFORE QUOTE COMMONWEALTH
UNQUOTE KNOWING HOW FRIENDLY YOU ARE TO OUR CAUSE WE APPEAL TO YOU
TO SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION IN THAT FORM

DAVID WERTHEIM, NATIONAL SECRETARY
POALE ZION, LABOR ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
45 EAST 17th STREET, NEW YORK

C
O
P
Y

(Telegram)

DECEMBER 5, 1944

WE EARNESTLY URGE YOU REPORT OUT FAVORABLY PALESTINE RESOLUTION
FOR ADOPTION BY PRESENT CONGRESS STOP IMPORTANT REMOVE WORD QUOTE
ULTIMATELY UNQUOTE WHICH HAS ALREADY LED TO MISUNDERSTANDING LIKEWISE
IMPORTANT RETAIN WORD QUOTE JEWISH UNQUOTE BEFORE WORD QUOTE COMMONWEALTH
UNQUOTE YOUR COMMITTEES FAVORABLE ACTION WOULD BE DEEPLY APPRECIATED
AS FULFILLMENT PRESIDENTS MAGNIFICENT MESSAGE TO LAST ZIONIST ORGANIZATION
CONVENTION AND OVERWHELMING AMERICAN OPINION AS EXPRESSED RECENTLY IN
BOTH PARTY PLATFORMS

ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN, PRESIDENT

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
41 East 42nd St., New York

C
O
P
Y

(Telegram sent to Senator Wagner and Senator Connally)

DECEMBER 5 1944

WITH REFERENCE TO THE PENDING RESOLUTION SR 247 PRESENTLY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, I HAVE THE HONOR TO SUBMIT FOR YOUR INFORMATION THE FOLLOWING QUOTATION FROM A RESOLUTION ADOPTED TODAY AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE HELD IN PITTSBURGH, AND REPRESENTING THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE JEWS OF THIS COUNTRY, QUOTE

THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE GREETES THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND HAILS HIS FORTHRIGHT ASSURANCE TO THE JEWISH PEOPLE THAT IN ACCORD WITH TRADITIONAL AMERICAN POLICY, AND IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE FOUR FREEDOMS ... EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO FIND APPROPRIATE WAYS AND MEANS FOR THE OPENING OF PALESTINE TO UNRESTRICTED JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION, AND HE WILL HELP TO BRING ABOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINE AS A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC JEWISH COMMONWEALTH

THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE NOTES WITH SATISFACTION THAT IN THE FIFTEEN MONTHS SINCE ITS FIRST SESSION, ITS RESOLUTION ON PALESTINE HAS WON THE WARM AND SYMPATHETIC ENDORSEMENT OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE IS CONFIDENT THAT THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES WILL RECORD ITS SUPPORT AND HELP IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY ENUNCIATED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT. THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE LOOKS TO THE MANDATORY POWER AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE SPEEDY AND EFFECTIVE FULFILLMENT OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S HISTORIC DECLARATION UNQUOTE

HENRY MONSKY
CO-CHAIRMAN AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE

HOTEL WILLIAM PENN, PITTSBURGH, PA.

C
O
P
Y

(Telegram sent by Hadassah to Senators as per the
attached list.)

PITTSBURGH PA DECEMBER 5 1944

WE HAVE LEARNED THAT PALESTINE RESOLUTION SR 247 IS SCHEDULED FOR
DISCUSSION BEFORE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TOMORROW WE
KNOW YOUR DISCUSSION IN THIS MATTER IS PROMPTED BY A SENSE OF
URGENCY FOR EFFECTIVE AND SPEEDY ACTION TO MEET TRAGIC NEEDS OF
JEWISH PEOPLE ON BEHALF OF HADASSAH WOMENS ZIONIST ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN AND ITS MORE THAN 125,000 MEMBERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY
WE MOST EARNESTLY PLEAD THAT THE RESOLUTION BE FREE FROM ANY POSSIBLE
AMBIGUITY WHICH WOULD SUBJECT IT TO VARIED INTERPRETATIONS IN THE
FUTURE WE RESPECTFULLY URGE THAT THE WORD QUOTE JEWISH UNQUOTE BE
INSERTED BEFORE THE WORD QUOTE COMMONWEALTH UNQUOTE AND THAT THE WORD
QUOTE ULTIMATELY UNQUOTE BE ENTIRELY ELIMINATED WE MOST EARNESTLY
APPEAL TO YOU TO SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION IN THE FORM ABOVE INDICATED

JUDITH EPSTEIN, PRESIDENT

HADASSAH WOMEN'S ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

1819 BROADWAY NEW YORK

C

O

P

Y

(Day Letter)

(Telegram)

DECEMBER 5, 1944

ON BEHALF OF RELIGIOUS ORTHODOX ZIONISTS OF AMERICA WE DESIRE
RESPECTFULLY CONVEY THE EARNEST HOPE THAT FAVORABLE ACTION WILL
BE TAKEN ON PALESTINE RESOLUTION SR 247 IN ENLISTING YOUR SUPPORT
FOR THE RESOLUTION WE FEEL IT VITAL IN THE INTERESTS OF CLARITY TO
ELIMINATE FROM THE RESOLUTION AS AT PRESENT DRAWN THE WORLD QUOTE
ULTIMATELY UNQUOTE WHICH IS LIABLE TO MISINTERPRETATION SO THAT
THE CONCLUDING CLAUSE SHALL READ QUOTE THAT THE JEWISH PEOPLE MAY
RECONSTITUTE PALESTINE AS A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC JEWISH COMMONWEALTH
UNQUOTE

LEON GELLMAN, PRESIDENT

MISRACHI ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA


(Dictated by Dr. Goldmann to Arthur Lourie over the telephone)

Minute of Conversation with Mr. Stettinius
Wednesday, December 13, 1944

Mr. Stettinius called Dr. Wise and me into his room before meeting with the delegation. He told us that he had been in touch with the President about the statement which we had suggested he should issue. He said that the President was in a very bad mood because we had gone ahead with the Resolution and instead of acquiescing in his request to hold the matter up for the time being, had sought to bring pressure to bear through the Senate. He felt that the Zionists had lost confidence in him and Mr. Stettinius said that in the circumstances it was difficult to discuss such questions with him at this time. It would not be possible for him ^(M.S.) to issue the letter suggested.

N.G.

12/15/44



Mr. James E. Brown, Asst. to the Secretary of State, advised that Dr. Goldman's memorandum" was not quite in accordance with the Secretary's record."

"The Secretary told Dr. Wise that he had been in touch with the President as he had offered to do regarding the statement which Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver had requested him to make. The reaction that Mr. Stettinius obtained was that the President felt that this group should have confidence in his handling of the matter and that it would not be appropriate for Mr. Stettinius to issue the statement."

"Mr. Stettinius asked Dr. Wise if he would be good enough to give this information to Dr. Silver."



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 15,

RECEIVED		
NOTED BY	REFER TO	DATE
	#25	
DATE	DEC 20 1944	
	AL	
	HFM	
ANSWERED		


Dear Dr. Silver,

I received your letter written from
the Willard and, as promised, took the
question up with the President.

Rabbi Wise called in my office yes-
terday afternoon and I took the oppor-
tunity of his visit to explain the
reaction which I obtained on this. If
Dr. Wise has not already told you of
this, I am sure he will if you will
make an inquiry of him.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,



Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York City 17, New York

December 12, 1944

The Honorable Edward R. Stettinius
The Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing herewith the draft of the statement which we discussed yesterday morning and copy of which you requested at the earliest moment. You were to receive this copy from Dr. Wise by telegram from New York. Your secretary informed me that you have not yet received it and I am, therefore, dispatching it to you by messenger.

I believe, Mr. Secretary, that the issuance of this statement promptly to the public will help to allay some of the misgivings and resentments which have already made their way into the public press. The Jewish press particularly is reacting bitterly and violently to the intervention of the State Department in the situation, and the President's position is being laid open to grave misinterpretation in view of his public pronouncement on October 15th.

Should you wish to reach me, I shall be at the Willard Hotel until this evening. With all good wishes, permit me to remain,

Very sincerely yours,

Enc.

WALTER F. GEORGE, GA., CHAIRMAN

DAVID I. WALSH, MASS.
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, KY.
TOM CONNALLY, TEX.
JOSIAH W. BAILEY, N. C.
BENNETT CHAMP CLARK, MO.
FLOYD FLOOD BYRD, VA.
R. G. GERRY, R. I.
JAMES F. GUFFEY, PA.
EDWIN C. JOHNSON, COLO.
GEORGE L. RADCLIFFE, MD.
SCOTT W. LUCAS, ILL.

ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, JR., WIS.
ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG, MICH.
JAMES J. DAVIS, PA.
JOHN A. DANAHY, CONN.
ROBERT A. TAFT, OHIO
JOHN THOMAS, IDAHO
HUGH BUTLER, NEBR.
EUGENE D. MILLIKIN, COLO.
OWEN BREWSTER, MAINE

CHRISTIE B. KENNEDY, CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

January 18, 1945.

Rabbi Abba H. Silver,
The Temple,
East 105th Street at Ansel Road,
Cleveland, Ohio.


My dear Rabbi Silver:

I cannot begin to tell you how much I appreciate your thoughtful and generous note of January 15th. Commendation could come from no more appreciated source. I think you know what profound respect I have for your opinion.

I continue to deeply regret the little "unpleasantness" in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Let us hope for greater success next time. I want always to be at your service in any way I can be helpful.

With warm personal regards and best wishes,

Cordially and faithfully,



Confidential

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

April 23, 1945

Dear Dr. Wise,

Immediately on my return to the Department after talking to you this noon I requested that your letter of March 21 be handed to me personally for attention. I deeply apologize that it has not been acknowledged sooner. The letter arrived in the Department during my absence and, through inadvertence, was not referred to me when I returned.

You know I am sure, that I desire to do anything I can to be helpful to you. In this instance, however, it is not possible for me to encourage you to send representatives to San Francisco and I believe you will agree with me when I explain the matter to you.

As we have said publicly the San Francisco Conference is limited solely to the preparation of a Charter for the new International Organization for Peace and Security which will be submitted for ratification in the various countries of the world in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. To put the matter another way, the Conference at San Francisco is not designed to be a peace conference in any sense of the word. Questions of boundaries, the future disposition of any specific territories and like questions emerging from the war are not within the province of the Conference. In view thereof, I believe you will agree with me when I say that it would not seem appropriate for the Palestine question to be raised at San Francisco.

I know this will be disappointing to you but trust, in view of the explanation I have given, you will understand.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

ED (signed) (Stettinius)

Dr. Stephen S. Wise
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, N.Y.

Tawer *f Stett*
Mr. Brown, Asst. to the Secretary, advised that Dr. Goldman's memorandum " was not quite in accordance with the Secretary's record".

Mr. Brown had not talked with Secretary Stettinius himself regarding the statement that Stettinius made to Drs. Wise and Goldman, but had talked with several other people in the Department and reported back " it was not quite in accordance with the Secretary's record".

"The Secretary told Dr. Wise that he had been in touch with the President as he had offered to do regarding the statement which Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver had requested him to make. The reaction that Mr. Stettinius obtained was that the President felt that this group should have confidence in his handling of the matter and that it would not be appropriate for Mr. Stettinius to issue the statement".

"Mr. Stettinius asked Dr. Wise if he would be good enough to give this information to Dr. Silver."

WRHS



Goldman

Mr. Brown, assistant to the
Secretary of State, advised that Mr.
Goldman's memorandum "was not
quite in accordance with the
Secretary's record."

"The Secretary told Mr. Wine that
he had been in touch with the
President as he had offered to do
regarding the statement which
Mr. Wine and Mr. Silver had
requested him to make. The
reaction that Mr. Stettinius
obtained was that the
President felt that this
group should have confidence
in his handling of the

matter and that it would
not be appropriate for Mr.
Stettinius to issue the
statement.

"Mr. Stettinius asked Mr.
Wise if he would be good enough
to give this information to
Mr. Silver."



1/1/ - more cordial - ~~reception~~
2/ - aids - arrests - ^(Fishman) - ^{not terrorist} ^{promoter} - ^{but} ^{was} ^{not} ⁱⁿ ^{prison} - ^{had} ^{not} ^{been} ⁱⁿ ^{prison}.
3/ - learned 9 days after they occurred -
Device to achieve further delay - 30 days -
We ask him to intervene - off-record he had
already done so - Used various channels.
Perturbed at consequences on delicate situation in
Middle East - Rumor - Conf. in Paris - they
lead to war. of oil. - They are all
tied together - China is "on hand" -
3/ 100,000 - We visited him - 10 months old - Firm
- We asked him - whether - he had given clear direction -
- Whether in his opinion - work in 1946 - Yes.
- ~~At the age of 100,000~~ - ~~He was~~ ~~to it~~ ~~at any time~~
- Spoke of Report - fine document
- asked whether he would give a statement - (Nile)
- ① Express regret ② Not been connected ③ will mean
Him for release - normal.
no delay in pushing forward with policy, 100,000
④ Referred to his statement when made, Report
⑤ Was prepared to assume technical & financial
resp. for the transportation ⑥ Thank to Agency
"Wanted" my father's involvement in letter Jan 14
- ~~He~~ ~~of~~ ~~financial~~ ~~policy~~ - ~~house~~ ~~or~~ ~~well~~ ~~known~~

MEMORANDUM

To

Date

From

July 2, 1948

Memorandum

Visit to Mr. Truman

4/ We issued in Mr name a statement (book).

5/ From his we learned - tech. Cons. - administrative
D. B. draft demand for military and

(2) Help for work ~~set~~ education

(3) 20.000 - 10.000 -

6/ Six Am. members -



1000

1000

MEMORANDUM

11/10/10

Return to Dr. Silver

Walter

7

הנחות מדיניות.

א. היהודים בארצם הם אומה עצמאית וממשיכים לבנות ביתם הלאומי ברשות עצמם.

ב. כוח המנדט הבריטי פקע, לאחר שממשלת המנדט הפרה התחייבותיה לעם מעברי ולחבר הלאומים, קבעה בארץ משטר זדון וטירור, חיללה את הדת היהודית, תקפה את נציגות העם היהודי והתנפלה על הישוב.

ג. כל השטח הקודם של המנדט הבריטי משני עברי הירדן, אשר חופפה עליו קדושה היסטורית, צריך להקבע ע"י האומות המאוחדות כשטח נייטרלי לצמיחות. שום צבא זר של מדינה גדולה וקטנה, קרובה ורחוקה, אינו רשאי להנות בשטח זה, לעבור אותו, להקים בו בקביעות או לשעה, שום בסיס צבאי, ימי ואוירי, בשום תנאי ושום זמן, לא בימי שלום ולא בימי מלחמה.

ד. שתי מדינות חפשיה ועצמאיות, יהודה ועבדאליה, יוקמו בשטח זה, אשר יספקו את השאיפות המוצדקות של שני העמים. שני העמים יבואו מיד בדברים על חיקון הגבולות, שנקבעו באופן מלאכותי ע"י ממשלת המנדט בעבר, והפכו את מדינת עבר הירדן לפיקציה שאינה אלא כסות לשלטון בריטי. עבדאליה תקבל שטח רצוף, נושב כולו ערבים במאכזה של א"י המערבית, ויהודה תקבל בתמורה שטחים בלתי מיושבים במזרח - בעמק הירדן ובסביבות ים-המלח בעבר הירדן, באופן ששתי המדינות תהיינה בנות קימה ועצמאיות למעשה.

ה. כל אחת משתי המדינות הללו תקבע ברשות עצמה את חוקי העליה וההתישבות בארצה.

ו. במקרה שהיהודים והערבים בשטח המנדט הקודם לא יבואו באיזון שאלה שהיא לידי הסכמה - ימסר העניין לכוררות לשלש או חמש מדינות קטנות ובלתי מעונינות, שאין להם שום אינטרסים פרטיים בא"י, באופן ישר או בעקיפין. האומות המאוחדות יערכו על קיום פסק הבוררות.

1. המקומות הקדושים של הנוצרים יספרו לפיקוחם של נציגי שלוש הדתות הנוצריות: - קטולים, פרוטסטנטים ויוונים-אורתודוקסים.
2. שתי המדינות בשטח המנדט הקודם לא יחזיקו שום צבא - אלא מיליציה בלבד, לשם שמירת הבטחון הפנימי, מכיון שבטחונן החיצוני מובטח בארץ ניסרלית ע"י כל האומות המאוחדות.
- שתי המדינות יכולות סחוך הסכם חרדי לנהל במשותף על יסוד של שוויון גמור כל ענין כללי הנוגע לכל שטח המנדט הקודם, כגון פיתוח חקלאי, השקאה, מכס וכדומה.

ניו-יורק, 19 ביולי, 1946.

ד.ב.ג.1.



Extracts From Letter Received From London, dated
July 28, 1946

You cannot imagine my consternation ----- The Americans were going about quietly to accept everything the British suggested. There were a few minor skirmishes going on in the financial sub-committee but nothing serious. To say that Grady was acting as a British "stooge" is a gross understatement. He was actually publicly reprimanding his staff for venturing to differ with the British even over secondary matters. In private he explained to them that there were things more important in Anglo-American relations than the question whether 100,000 Jews were admitted to Palestine.

Gaston folded up like an accordion. Dorr has merely made a public fool of himself. The staff has been somewhat better. Hanna, some days ago, recommended that the Americans formally break-off negotiations over the 100,000 and go home. Mikesell has taken the same line and has tried - against Grady's and Gaston's sabotage to fight out some financial issues. Villard has also filed a memorandum of protest against the July 24 submissions to the two Governments. Even Rood says, "Wee fight the skirmishes but cede all the battles."


It is impossible for you to go too far in emphasizing to our friends and to the press the complete abandonment of the President's declared program by Grady. I assure you that I write with measured words and in full knowledge. For instance, when the British were veering toward suggesting a starting rate of 10,000 per month, Grady broke in to indicate that 6,000 would be quite enough. There are a score of such incidents. The British simply have not been pressed to go ahead with the 100,000, to grant the area of Jewish settlement adequate frontiers, to give the proposed provinces any real power, or anything of the kind. Grady merely says that there is a strong Jewish lobby in Washington but that Truman exaggerates its voting strength: he, Grady, is going to ignore it.

108

AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE
MEMORANDUM

DATE: September 6, 1946


TO: Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

FROM: David R. Wahl 

SUBJECT:

On the advice of Harold Manson, whom I saw yesterday in New York, I am undertaking to send memos directly to you on activities of mine which impinge on areas of interest to you. A few days ago, Robert Hannegan's office got in touch with me in connection with their concern over the Jewish vote in New York State. As a result of that conversation, I spoke with Harold Manson, Bartley Crum, and several people on the Democratic National Committee. The attached memo is now receiving the attention of Robert Hannegan and several other selected individuals in the administration. There will probably be some developments following from this on which I will inform you currently. In connection with your visit to Secretary Wallace on Friday, September 20 at 3:30, I should like to have some discussions with you beforehand. It would be desirable, before seeing Wallace, that you spend about one-half hour or an hour with Harold Young who is the solicitor of the Commerce Department and Wallace's most trusted advisor.

Best regards.



September 6, 1946

The Jewish vote in New York, as of this moment, is a vote which will go into the Republican pocket only because the Jewish population of New York is using it as its only method of fighting back against an administration which they think has failed them with respect to Palestine. A tragic situation of confusion and misunderstanding has thus arisen. Praiseworthy actions of the administration, because they are concealed from the voters, are actually driving voters into the opposition camp while those actions, if made public would gain votes and obtain tremendous political support for the administration. Two steps could be taken which could turn the tide: (1) To make known the real position taken by the President vis-a-vis Attlee, which is understood to be, in effect, that the President will have no part of the Grady-Morrison report, and in fact will not consider any kind of plan for Palestine which does not include the pre-condition of the immediate granting of 100,000 certificates, nor will the President consider any plan of the partition, etc. which does not meet with the complete favor of the American Jewish community and the Palestine Jewish community. Though it is understood that the President has made these statements to Attlee, no public announcement has been made to this effect, and, so far as the American public can know, the President has not taken this forthright stand. The President is said to have delayed in making his position known to American voters because of exigencies of Anglo-American-Soviet negotiations, and a desire on his part, upon the advice of Byrnes, not to rock the boat with what would seem to be a smaller issue. However, enough information about the President's position has become known to informed persons in the United States and abroad so that this country's position is no diplomatic secret, while the issue of the

attitude of New York and other American voters has grown to be of major importance. Therefore point 1, in salvaging the New York vote for the Party, would call for a very clear, strong stand upon the part of the President in the form of a public statement or an open letter from himself to the British Government.

(2) There has been an unfortunate lack of liaison between the White House and official authoritative leadership of the American Jewish community. The most important and authoritative elected official in Jewish life in America is Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, who is the elected President of the Zionist Organisation of America and Co-Chairman of the Emergency Zionist Council. He is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Since he is by far the most influential leader and spokesman in American Jewish life, it would be most desirable, and in fact essential, that there be continuing opportunities for the President and Silver to confer to the extent that the President would be able to hear directly from Silver or his deputy the most representative thinking of the American Jewish community, and Silver would be able to pass on to the Jewish community authoritative and authorized reports of the President's attitudes, statements, and activities with respect to matters of great interest to them.

There has been an unfortunate voicing of the myth that Silver is closely tied to the Republican party, and particularly Senator Taft. This is definitely not so. If these two steps are taken at the present time, it is possible that Silver's impressive leadership in American Jewish life can be made an important political factor accruing to the

advantage of the Democratic party. It should be borne in mind that in October there will be the national convention of the Zionist Organization of America in Atlantic City. In November there will be the World Zionist Congress session in Switzerland. In both of these places Rabbi Silver's voice will be the definitive voice in policy making; therefore, the above outlined steps should be taken at the earliest possible moment. It is specifically recommended that Paul Fitzpatrick be the person to arrange for a meeting with Silver and the President in the near future to establish the relationship.

In addition to the above two-point program, there is one specific act which would have a dramatic and immediately calculable value with respect to the Jewish vote. That would be a public statement that Loy Henderson had been removed or transferred from his present position.

Dr. Silov

In Re Loan

August 7, 1946

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Shapiro:

In connection with the British loan controversy, it was suggested to me that I give you the details of what Oscar Cox told us at a lunch last Saturday, August 3rd. My recital of that story is based on the combined recollections of Tuvim, Schulson and myself.

At that lunch, Cox told us that Acheson had informed him that Congressman Bloom had violently expressed his opposition to the British loan in a talk with Mr. Balfour, the British Minister in Washington. Balfour was very perturbed by Bloom's emphatic stand and took the matter up with Acheson. The State Department people tried to budge Mr. Bloom but couldn't. Acheson had asked Cox to try to persuade him, but Cox did not want to get involved in the matter and refrained from making any such promise. The State Department people had even thought at that stage of asking the President to press Bloom to change his attitude, but apparently that became unnecessary after the consultations between Bloom and Dr. Wise.

This information gives very much with what Mr. Graham, the publisher of the WASHINGTON POST, told me when I saw him on July 8th. He said that Bloom had been very vehement against the British loan, and that the Department of State then got in touch with Dr. Wise, who persuaded Bloom to change his stand.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw

MEMORANDUM - THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1946

INTERVIEW WITH MR. ERNEST BEVIN IN THE PRESENCE OF LORD INVERCHAPEL AT THE WALDORF ASTORIA

3:30 to 4:20 P.M.

I greeted Mr. Bevin by saying that I should like to meet the man whom I have been attacking so much. Mr. Bevin spent most of the time defending the position of his government, criticising the failure of the Jews to cooperate, and especially criticised the American Government for utilizing the Palestine issue in connection with its own election needs.

His government had tried to do all that it could. It had continued Jewish immigration at the rate of 1500 a month in spite of the White Paper and his government was by way of making a satisfactory solution when the President intervened with his request for 100,000 which threw the whole Arab world into a turmoil.

He was critical of the resistance in Palestine, illegal immigration and acts of terrorism with which the Agency at times was associated, and which made it necessary for England to keep troops in Palestine which should have been demobilized long ago. He resented the fact that a good deal of the financing of illegal immigration came from the United States. His government had recently made another gesture of good will by releasing the prisoners from Latrun and elsewhere. He implied that there has not been a corresponding move on the part of the Yishuv. As a result of what was happening in Palestine, the killing of British soldiers, etc., anti-Semitism is growing among the common people in England.

His government was beset with many grave problems all over the world and we should have been more patient with it. The Balfour Declaration had made commitments to both peoples of Palestine, a national home to the Jews, and the protection of their rights to the Arabs. This made the solution of the problem very difficult. A Jewish State was never promised to the Jews.

The British Government is trying to solve the problem. If it fails, it will have to submit the whole issue to U.N.O. He himself stakes his political career on the proper solution of the problem. He will not, however, yield to force majeure.

He looked upon the Grady-Morrison proposals as the implementation of the Anglo-American Committee Report. His government wants these proposals to be on the agenda when the London Conference reconvenes. He was aware of the Agency's proposal for partition. The Agency is free to present and to discuss its proposal at the Conference. His government did not have a closed mind on the subject. It is prepared to consider it.

I took occasion, of course, throughout the interview to refute and correct some of Mr. Bevin's statements, which was not difficult to do. I need not restate them here. The answers would readily suggest themselves to any well-informed Zionist. I did take occasion to point out how the American people felt about the whole matter, and the terrible misconception that many in England seem to be laboring under — that the subject of Palestine is only a by-product of American political campaigns. This is a dangerously misleading piece of propaganda which will make sound political thinking and action on the subject impossible. The American people, not to speak of the American Jews, are determined to keep this issue alive until a just solution is arrived at.

I carried away the following impressions with me from the interviews:

- 1) Mr. Bevin is deeply disturbed and deeply concerned about the whole problem. It has gotten under his skin. He knows more about it now than he did when he spoke so cavalierly about the entire subject a year ago. There is still much that he does not know about it.
- 2) He does not seem to have a clear plan in his own mind. His confidence in the Morrison-Grady Plan as a solution seems to be pretty well shaken. He will probably not insist upon it as a basis for discussion when and if the London Conference reconvenes. He does not yet seem to be prepared to accept the Agency proposal as a basis for discussion. He expressed no criticism of the Agency proposal and repeated two or three times during the interview that they have an open mind on it and that they are prepared to consider it.
- 3) Pressure from America, while it is greatly resented, is very much present in Mr. Bevin's mind. He is not under-estimating its importance. Should the American Government very firmly and determinately now begin to insist upon a quick and satisfactory solution, Mr. Bevin would be clearly urged on to a definitive solution he does not wish to make at this time.
- 4) He is very anxious for the Jewish Agency to come to the London Conference.



Wed. Nov. 20- '46.

10-10.45

17

Bevin - Churchill.

1. At outset B. showed me "Formula" dated Sep. 18-46 sent by G. B. - stating that G. B. would attend London Conf. to discuss situation (not conditions!) of Palestine as basis for discussion.

Asked me - whether I knew anything about it. Told him we

knew only a little from C. W. to Hall - whose conditions were clearly stated. Told him that ~~not~~ no one had any authority to ~~with~~ such a formula.

Read him from C. W. letter.

Said he is not yet prepared to give an answer to before consulting Cabinet.

Told him what situation would be at Agony - G. B. had not accepted Anglo-Am. Com. Report.

- G. B. was unwilling to implement full purpose of mandate - a J. Nat. Home in W. B. / B. D.

- Army - Am. proposals - repeated by Am. Gov. & J. Agency.

- and if Agency proposes so. not accepted

in principle by J. B. - then would be withy 12
left for Congress to do but to update
Return / Greenberg (which many say are concerned
were taken without proper authorization and are
totally untrue) - nothing as full legal
rights - ~~and the situation~~ refers to to
London Camp - and situation will continue
in the present tragic state.

J. B. said that J. B. had very much an opinion
on the situation.

J. B. asked whether ~~intention~~ I meant
that J. B. should indicate in writing that
it accepted statement given, etc. I said
that that is the essential point. Any
other indications ~~given to~~ agreement
given to me or any other movement
would serve the purpose. I assumed that
no such indications would be given under
J. B. that had made up its mind and an-
changed it.

7/ ~~Then~~ B. again said that he would assault (3)
the Embassy.

8/ B. spoke / Arab B. & Jew country with
~~that~~ country - (Jew). I said that Arab
had no reason to complain / country. They
had 1 million \$ of gold - supply -
(a) 5 Arab states state. was war. One
cared not / Pol - what did they do
~~do~~ in war? Jew forget / Pol.
Jew! Lost 6 M = 10 times a day
a / B. OVS put top 4 lines

Why do they not entitled to a state / then and

9/ B. / deterioration - mentioned Sholem.
I said could it royal - Sholem no justice
They are Jew people - from democrats
- and it is these who you got has set
out to crush

10) I mentioned effort / \Rightarrow J.D. to properly carry (4)
B. need "it is much better now"

I reminded him that \Rightarrow J.D. & J.C. will all
be able to do it soon - They must be
helped by proper pol. action w/ part
of way to stop Tenn - for down P.

1) I urged that a commission states exactly as
was indicated. R, B. - should talk to instabur
in backing log - Jan. -

2/ Am. is prepared to go along Econ. support

Do you really wish Amer. unilateral support?

Yes in the corner!

would very much like U.S. to talk as unilateral

as U.N. - I wrote right, G.B. seems
entirely on this now.

3/ for now P.B. - Out J.B. used for

G.B. used U.S. - & for an unilateral

factor - We wish to do together! G.B. must
make it possible.

Grosvenor Hotel
London, England
January 29, 1947

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio -- U.S.A.

Dear Dr. Silver:

Following is the account of today's meeting between leaders of the British Government and of the Jewish Agency, as reported to me by Emanuel Neumann:

The meeting lasted approximately two ^{and a half} hours. ~~From 2:45 until 5:00.~~ Present were: For the British Government--Bevin, Creech-Jones, and various officials of both the Colonial and Foreign Office, including Brook, Sir Douglas Harris, etc. For the Jewish Agency--Ben-Gurion, who led the delegation, Neumann, Shertok, Brodetsky, Locker, Goldmann, as well as a few members of the Agency staff.

Creech-Jones presided. In his opening statement he avoided any suggestion that this meeting was part of the formal Conference on Palestine now going on. He described it as another occasion for consultation with the Jewish Agency, at which the difficulties involved in any proposed solution would be examined. In the course of his opening remarks, Creech-Jones referred to partition as one of the proposed solutions and mentioned the difficulties that one must consider in connection with such a proposal.

Bevin was to follow Creech-Jones, but he indicated that he was prepared to wait and listen. Ben-Gurion then took the floor. He stressed that we have two objects in view: 1) to secure the return of Jews to Palestine; 2) to develop Palestine in the interest of the Jews, & of the Near East as a whole. He also emphasized that we have independence in view. He said that the Congress did not preclude our considering any proposal that may be made to us regarding a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine. That if such a proposal for a really viable Jewish State in a really adequate area were made to us, we would submit it to our people for favorable consideration. He made it clear, however, that our view is that the whole of Western Palestine should become a Jewish State with a Jewish majority. He said that 1,200,000 Jews need to emigrate to Palestine.

14/ G. had been approached about part time work
Cory. He would not be offered to it at all - due
to pressure of work

15/ Will see Ray Byrum about Pol. Matter.

16/ Hopes to leave on 29th -

17/ L. M. will contact me - if there is anything to
report -

Service now to be held when I am in Wash.

18/ (Rev. journal that at first interview
told a few jokes

Refused to say why at all, thinking it would
be better to keep them in order

19/ Refused to say what a close kindred people
to the Byrum. Told him, frankly what

but these people all their ambitions - will
again be frustrated - when Sp. act. committee
will be set up

20/ Read to B. Statement of Louis Berkman. (all)



HOTEL COMMODORE

"NEW YORK'S BEST LOCATED HOTEL"

CABLE ADDRESS
"COMODORE" NEW YORK

42ND STREET ★ RIGHT AT GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL ★ NEW YORK 17, N.Y.

Nov.
Dec. 1944 - It read - it sounds like Harold
Parker - He ^{drop} ~~ass~~ ~~un~~ ~~committed~~ ~~himself~~ ~~after~~ ~~him~~.
on subject -

4/1. TDR is - Formal Conf. will lead to no results
unless there are further ~~specimen~~ ~~substantives~~.
Hardly he ~~did~~ not want us to go there without
of prospect of sales. Settlement as well as city of
P. subject is not new. All proposals are
known - for year now - For new arguments
are being presented. It is all important
for F.B. to work up it careful ! + Bt as
known -

2/1. I mentioned that some Gov. State have
Particular B. said that he made careful inquiry
and could not find a clear favorable stand.
told him that once F.B. to S. announce it
on their policy - the Gov. State will require

Then Bevin spoke. His remarks were not well-organized, and he touched on many things including partition, which he spoke about in a negative way. He said: (The words are those used by Bevin, so far as Neumann can recall) "Just what partition scheme do you have in mind? Put all your cards on the table face up; don't keep any up your sleeve. If there's any proposal for partition, let's hear it."

But at the same time Bevin indicated clearly that he was not a believer in partition. He stressed that a "viable Jewish State" will not permit the development of a "viable Arab State" in Palestine. He indicated a strong preference for what he termed a "bilateral state," but which turned out to be a scheme of federalization -- a unitary state with provinces having a large measure of autonomy. In the Jewish area there would be opportunity for immigration (both Bevin and Creech-Jones indicated that they were prepared to go beyond the Morrison Plan in this regard), but a central Federal Government (British, of course) would take care of services for the whole country.

With regard to partition, Bevin also said that he did not think the U.N. would support such a solution. This was answered by Goldmann, who pointed out that a solution having the support of the U.S. and the Jews would certainly be upheld by a 2/3 majority in UN.

Both Bevin and Creech-Jones said that they could not go back to the Mandate, which Brook ~~defined~~ explained as meaning that they could not go back to the Mandate "as it was." In this connection Creech-Jones made some fine comments like : there is now an alien government imposed upon unwilling peoples...the situation is intolerable... and the Mandate in its old form could not be continued. If continued at all, it would have to be modified considerably.

Neumann then pointed out that the basic question involved was : ~~Are~~ Are Jewish immigration and Jewish development to be dependent on Arab consent? He pointed out that the Arabs will oppose anything that permits of such immigration and development.

Then Bevin ~~and some vigorous things~~ made a number of vigorous and uncomplimentary references to America's role. He said that he had been quite prepared to accept all 10 recommendations of the "American Committee of Inquiry," but that America wanted only immigration. He referred to the Committee of Inquiry twice as an "American" committee, until Neumann reminded him that it was an Anglo-American Committee.

In the course of his remarks about America, Bevin said that Roosevelt had made promises to both the Arabs and the Jews, and that some of Roosevelt's promises to the Arabs went further than any commitments which he, Bevin, had made -- which was embarrassing to him.

Shertok pointed out to Bevin that as "an old negotiator" he surely understands that it is not easy for us to put forward any proposal without the slightest assurance that it will be taken up. Shertok pointed out that this would involve a waiver of our historic rights, etc

Creech-Jones replied emphatically that he understands ~~Shertok's~~ this point of view, but that we should not worry, there are no tricks, "it is entirely without prejudice," it is simply a matter of exploring the possibilities.

Both Bevin and Creech-Jones pressed our people to give serious consideration to the idea of a unitary state -- without a definitive partition -- in order to see if the problem could not be worked out on that basis. Creech-Jones urged our people to state at least the principles regarding partition: "what are the elements required to make it a viable Jewish State?" Creech-Jones also wanted to know exactly what were our objections to the Morrison Plan. Could we give him an analysis stating our views, as well as an analysis of the Arab proposals and of "other plans."

Our people stressed the urgent need for immediate immigration, pointing out that without such immigration the tensions will increase and greater catastrophes may result. Creech-Jones stated that this question was very much on his mind and that the Government might consider interim measures, ~~to deal with it.~~

The meeting ended at that point. Ben-Gurion and the British leaders agreed on next Monday, February 3, as the date of the next talk. Neumann, Shertok and Brook drafted the official communique of the meeting.

Neumann says that he thinks Creech-Jones is a decent, sincere man. ---It is significant that there was no discussion whatever of the present situation-~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ in Palestine -- suppression of terrorism, etc.

~~XXXXXX~~

We have received the following additional information which we regard as reliable:

- 1) Bevin is reported to have told the Arabs informally (at a reception) that he favors a cantonization plan.
have reached London
- 2) Reports ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ that a completed plan for cantonization is in the hands of British officials in the Middle East.

With kind regards, I am

Cordially yours,

Harold P. Manson
Harold P. Manson

I called on Senator Taft at his office in Washington on Wednesday, April 26, at which time I raised the subject of the introduction of the Palestine plank in the Republican Platform. Senator Taft seemed agreeable to the idea and stated that in all likelihood, he would have much to do with the drafting of the Platform.

At that time Senator Taft suggested that I see Mr. Dewey and elicit his opinion. On Tuesday, May 2, I saw Attorney General Nathaniel L. Goldstein of New York, and told him of the conversation which I had with Senator Taft, and the advisability of eliciting an opinion from Mr. Dewey. Mr. Goldstein was very friendly to the idea and said that he would arrange a meeting between Mr. Dewey and myself. On May 5, I wrote to Senator Taft and told him of my meeting with Attorney General Goldstein and of the contemplated contact with Mr. Dewey. On May 19 I received a letter from Senator Taft stating that he is drafting the Palestine plank and that I would have an opportunity of seeing a copy of it before he went to Chicago. The thought was that the Senator's plank would follow closely the Resolution which he introduced in the Senate. He suggested, furthermore, that we do not agitate publicly for it.

On June 1, in company of Attorney General Nathaniel Goldstein, I met Governor Dewey at Hotel Roosevelt in New York. I told him of our hope that a Palestine plank would be included in the Republican Platform and I showed him the Resolution which had been introduced in Congress. Governor Dewey read it very carefully and said: "I agree most heartily." He said he would talk to Senator Taft about it in a few days when he planned to see him. On June 2 I wrote to Senator Taft and told him of the meeting which I had with Governor Dewey in New York.

In order to indicate to the Senator more definitely the kind of a plank we would prefer, I had Mr. Herman Shulman draft a plank which I sent on to the Senator on June 9. (See Exhibit A)

In the meantime, Attorney General Goldstein suggested that we publish an attractive folder on Palestine to be distributed among the delegates and members of the Resolutions Committee who would attend the Republican Convention. He requested that a statement of his on Palestine be included, among others, feeling that that would give the endorsement of an important Republican leader to the cause. This booklet was published and distributed. (See Exhibit B)

On June 16, Mr. Harrison E. Spangler, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, telephoned me from Chicago and invited me to deliver the invocation at the session of the Republican Convention on Tuesday, June 27. I accepted. The invitation was confirmed in a telegram and letter on June 20. The Resolutions Committee of the Republican Convention met in Chicago beginning Wednesday, June 21. I arrived in Chicago that morning, together with the staff from our office including Mr. Manson, Mr. Leo Sack, Mr. Elihu Stone. We stopped at the Shoreland Hotel, a considerable distance away from the headquarters of the Convention which were at the Stevens Hotel downtown. Our purpose was first not to give the impression of a lobby and secondly not to announce our presence in such a way as to arouse any possible opposition on the part of anti-Zionist forces in the country who might have bombarded the Resolutions Committee with telegrams, etc. urging it not to adopt any Palestine plank. I remained in Chicago for the 21 and 22, going to Cincinnati to attend the sessions of the Central Conference of American Rabbis over the week-end and

returned to Chicago Monday morning, June 26 and remained until after the Platform was announced and approved by the Convention.

On the 21st and 22nd, I saw Senator Taft who gave us the names of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and of the Drafting Committee who might be contacted. I spoke with Attorney General Goldstein long distance to Albany (the Attorney General did not arrive until Sunday morning) suggesting that it would be advisable for Governor Dewey to telephone to his campaign manager in Chicago, Mr. Brownell, and through him to his other representatives that the Palestine plank must be inserted in the Platform. I called upon Mr. Brownell, and at that very time the Governor called him up and spoke to him about our plank. Mr. Brownell indicated that there would be no difficulties at all. I also saw Mrs. Anna McCormack Simms, a leader of the Dewey forces in the Mid-west. Mr. Manson, Mr. Sack and Mr. Stone interviewed quite a number of other leaders including Miss Mary Donlon, Senator Austin of Vermont, William L. Hutchison of Indiana, Representative Joseph W. Martin of Mass. who was the permanent chairman of the Convention, Mr. McCaffer of New York, Senator Danaher of Conn. and quite a number of others.

When I left at midnight on Thursday, June 22, the situation was well in hand. But it had completely changed when I had returned to Chicago on June 26. Opposition to our plank had developed. Numerous changes in the plank were suggested. The original authors of these suggestions were not always revealed to us. It may well be that some anti-Zionists had made their opposition known to Mr. Goldstein. It may also be that opposition developed among the members of the Drafting Committee. But by Monday morning, our representatives in Chicago received two substitute drafts which the Committee was prepared to act upon, one prepared by Miss Mary Donlon (Exhibit C) which was completely negative and worthless. The other one was given by Senator Taft to Mr. Leo Sack (Exhibit D) which omitted reference to "Commonwealth."

Upon my being informed of the situation, I called Attorney General Goldstein and told him that these substitute planks were untirely unsatisfactory, that they would insure the defeat of the Palestine Resolutions pending in Congress because if the Republican Party was not prepared to refer to "Commonwealth" in a Party Platform which is, after all, not legislation, its representatives in Congress would certainly not feel inclined to vote for a "Commonwealth" in a Congressional resolution. I told him that rather than have that kind of a negative resolution I would prefer none at all, and that if a revised resolution such as was presented is insisted upon, I should have to leave the Convention and not participate in the Tuesday evening program. The Attorney General said he would re-canvass the situation and let me know. At the same time I got in touch with Senator Taft and expressed my misgivings. I told him that I would send down to him a revised draft of the resolution which I thought would meet the situation, although preferring the original draft which I submitted to him on June 9. My revised draft (Exhibit E) and the accompanying letter (Exhibit E) are appended herewith.

At 10:15 that morning, I telephoned Dr. Wise in New York, read to him Senator Taft's draft which eliminated the "Jewish Commonwealth" and asked him whether failing to obtain the inclusion of "Commonwealth" in the draft we should accept Taft's draft, or reject it and have no plank at all. It was Dr. Wise's

thought that the Taft Resolution, while it does not go as far as we should like, should not be turned down if we cannot get the "Commonwealth" resolution.

At 12:30 Monday noon, Mr. Dulles, who is political adviser to Mr. Dewey, telephoned me, evidently at the suggestion of Mr. Goldstein, to discuss with me the proposed revised resolution. He read it to me over the telephone, and what he read was another revision of the Taft resolution eliminating "unrestricted immigration" and substituting the word "constitute" for "reconstitute." He argued that no nation had unrestricted immigration and that if the Jews had a state of their own they would not accept such a principle. To meet his suggestion, I suggested that the sentence should read "in order to give refuge to millions of Jewish men, women and children" (instead of men, women and children).... "we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration" (instead of to unrestricted immigration.) He also announced for the first time the intention of the Resolutions Committee to include in the resolution a condemnation of the President because of his failure to insist that the mandatory of Palestine should carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration in its Mandate while he pretends to support them. I urged Mr. Dulles not to include that sentence as it was unnecessary and provocative. His reply was that that was not the concern of us, but of the Republican Party. This was not a resolution which the Zionists were adopting, but which the Republican Party was adopting and that it was their right to express themselves on the weaknesses of the present Administration if they so wished.

The draft of the resolution as submitted by Mr. Dulles over the telephone Monday morning is appended here as Exhibit G.

This was the situation as of Monday evening. The Resolutions Committee and the Drafting Committee met to the early hours of Tuesday morning. Towards the close of its long deliberations on the Platform, the Palestine plank came up for discussion and here strenuous opposition developed to the resolution at the hands of Senator Danaher of Conn. who was opposed to the "commonwealth" clause and also to our telling Great Britain what to do in a matter which really did not concern us. Senator Danaher was a problem to us in Washington. As a result of his objections, our plank was tabled, and as of Tuesday morning there was no resolution on Palestine to be included in the Platform. (This information was conveyed to us early Tuesday morning by Attorney General Goldstein.)

On Tuesday morning, the entire Resolutions Committee reconvened at ten o'clock. I got in touch with Mr. Brownell and apprised him of the situation. He said that he would get in touch immediately with their supporters on the Resolutions Committee. We telephoned about extensively to members of the Resolutions Committee whom we believed to be our friends. The situation lined itself up as follows: We could have a resolution such as was shown to us by Senator Taft passed, but this would exclude any reference to "commonwealth" and would endanger our position in Congress; or we could ask that no resolution at all on Palestine be introduced. In spite of the opposition which had developed, I felt that our position in the general political picture was strong, that the Republican Party leaders knew that it was worthwhile to consider the desires of the Jewish citizens of America. I therefore took the chance and the responsibility to notify Senator Taft that unless the term "commonwealth" were included in the resolution, I preferred that no resolution at all be adopted. I dictated a letter to him which I sent down with Mr. Leo Sack around 10:30 Tuesday morning. It is herewith appended as

Exhibit H.

At noon, I went down to the Hotel Stevens where the Resolutions Committee was in session. Shortly after I arrived, the Resolutions Committee adjourned its meeting. We were then apprised that our resolution came up for discussion, that Senator Danaher had opposed it, that Alfred Landon of Kansas, Miss Mary Donlon, Mr. McCaffer of New York and others spoke enthusiastically for it and that the Resolutions Committee approved of it and authorized the Drafting Committee to make the final revisions which would meet some of the objections raised.

At three o'clock, Senator Taft gave us the final draft of the resolution which is appended as Exhibit I.



EXHIBIT "A"

Draft of plank by Mr. Herman Shulman submitted to
Senator Taft.

In this most tragic hour for the Jewish people of Europe, of whom millions of innocent men, women and children have been brutally massacred by the Nazis, we favor the taking of immediate and effective measures to rescue those who still survive, and in accordance with the traditional American policy we call for the opening of the doors of Palestine to the free entry of Jews into that country and for the granting to them of full opportunity for colonization and settlement so that Palestine may be reconstituted as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth, in which all its inhabitants shall enjoy religious, cultural and civic equality, and in which the holy places, a heritage to mankind, will be fully safeguarded.

EXHIBIT "C"

Substitute draft prepared by Miss Mary Donlon

In order to give refuge to millions of Jewish people driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of the doors of Palestine to the entry of Jews into that country and for the granting to them of opportunity for colonization and settlement.



EXHIBIT "D"

Revised Draft By Senator Robert A. Taft - given to
Mr. Leo Sack on June 25, 1944

PALESTINE

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and land ownership and the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, all in accord with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of Congress adopted in 1922. We call on the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration contained in its Mandate.

EXHIBIT "E"

Dr. Silver's revised draft to Senator Taft
Submitted Monday morning, June 26

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and land ownership, so that the Jewish people may, in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of Congress adopted in 1922, reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth. We call on the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate.




EXHIBIT "F"

Letter sent by Dr. Silver to Senator Taft enclosing
revised draft.

June 26, 1944

Hon. Robert A. Taft
Stevens Hotel
Chicago, Ill.

My dear Senator Taft:

I am enclosing herewith the revised draft which I think meets the objections which have been raised, and at the same time does not do harm to the chances of the resolutions still pending in Congress. I am following closely the draft which you gave to Mr. Sack last night.

I am still of the opinion that the original draft which I sent you some time ago is the one which most adequately meets the situation and will arouse the greatest satisfaction among our people. However, use your own good judgment as to which of the two should be adopted.

I am profoundly grateful to you for your continued and loyal interest in this great cause.

Most cordially yours,

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

AHS:BP
Encs.

EXHIBIT "G"

Draft of Resolution submitted by Mr. Dulles to Dr. Silver
at 12:45 P.M. - June 26.

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that the Jewish people may, in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of the (Republican) Congress adopted in 1922, constitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth. We dondemn the failure of the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate while he pretends to support them.

EXHIBIT "H"

Letter sent by Dr. Silver to Senator Taft on June 27.

June 27, 1944

Hon. Robert A. Taft
Stevens Hotel
Chicago, Ill.

My dear Senator Taft:

I have been informed that there has developed in the drafting committee certain opposition to the inclusion of the term commonwealth.

I think it will be a serious mistake to drop the term, inasmuch as it would practically make the resolution valueless. It would also serve notice that the Republican Party has officially declared itself against the resolution which you introduced in the Senate and which is now pending, which resolution embodies the true aspirations of the Jewish people and the only practical solution for the salvation of several million of our oppressed people and for the age-old tragedy of Jewish national homelessness. The revised plank, therefore, far from being a welcome endorsement of Jewish aspirations would, indeed, be a whittling down and a repudiation.

I do not believe that the objection of one or two people ought to be sufficient to force a revision of the plank to which Governor Dewey and many of the foremost leaders of the Party have given their unqualified approval. If it is sufficient, then I would like to request that no plank on Palestine whatsoever be included in the platform. Against the present political background here and abroad, a plank which calls for less than a commonwealth is a defeat.

The American Jewish Conference, meeting last September in New York and representing organized American Jewry, voted almost unanimously for a Jewish commonwealth.

I send you my warmest greetings.

Most cordially yours,

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

AHS:BP

P.S. You may reach me at the above address (Plaza 1000) all morning.

A.H.S.

EXHIBIT "I"

Final draft of Palestine Resolution which was included in
the Republican Platform.

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the Resolution of a Republican Congress in 1922, Palestine may be constituted as a free and democratic Commonwealth. We condemn the failure of the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provision of the Balfour Declaration and ^{of} the Mandate while he pretends to support them.



הסוכנות היהודית לארץ ישראל

The Jewish Agency for Palestine

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

August 7, 1947

To: American Section of the Executive

FROM: Arthur Lourie

I am enclosing herewith copies of talks Major Comay had with
General Smuts, July 24, 1947, and Mr. Hofmeyr, July 31, 1947.

encls.