



Abba Hillel Silver Collection Digitization Project

Featuring collections from the Western Reserve Historical Society and
The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives

MS-4787: Abba Hillel Silver Papers, 1902-1989.

Series IV: Sermons, 1914-1963, undated.

Reel
154

Box
55

Folder
414

Why the world disarmament conference of Geneva will fail, 1932.

"WHY THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AT GENEVA WILL FAIL"

GIVEN BY

RABBI ABBA HILLEL SILVER
AT THE TEMPLE
SUNDAY, JAN. 31st, 1932

The subject which I announced as the theme of my discourse for this morning, "Why the Disarmament Conference at Geneva will Fail" is, of course, not inspired by the wish that it might, but by the fear that it will.

It is sad to contemplate the possible failure of this Disarmament Conference because it represents the first major effort on the part of the League of Nations as a body, to bring about concerted disarmament on the part of nations represented in the League. All other disarmament conferences that were held up to now were convoked by one or another of the great powers and were attended by a limited number of the nations. But this is the first disarmament conference convoked by the League itself.

Some sixty-three nations are participating and it will concern itself not merely with naval disarmament, as the previous conferences before the war concerned themselves, but with land disarmament as well.

A great deal of labor and thought has gone into the preparation for this Conference which is to open Tuesday next, in

Geneva. In fact for ten years the League has been preparing for it.

In December, 1925 a Preparatory Disarmament Commission was appointed which was to prepare the draft for the Disarmament Conference which was to be held. Since that time the Commission has had five or six sessions and much valuable data and information has been gathered. Many important committees were appointed during these years and finally in December, 1930 a Draft Convention was agreed upon which was and is to be submitted to this forthcoming disarmament Conference.

Now in a normal world, in a tranquilized world, this Conference would have more than a good chance and a large measure of success. The Conference as I indicated, has been well planned and well prepared for and even the present world-wide depression would have contributed helpfully to the success of it because the nations of the world are burdened to the breaking point with the cost of armament. The logic of the situation and the urgency of the hour would both have helped toward the successful outcome of the Conference and also the extensive world-wide education for peace which has been going on since the World War, the education for peace and disarmament, the around public opinion, the deflation of

war heroics have all brought into the minds of people a keener and a sharper sense of realization about war. And of course, there is still in the mouths of millions of people the bad, bloody taste of the World War. So that I say in a normal, quiet, tranquil world this Disarmament Conference would have a real chance.

But unfortunately the world in which we find ourselves in the beginning of 1932 is not a normal world. The mood of the world is the mood of the world of 1914. The international scene is one of bitter confusion and the international mind is distraught. Fears, hates and feverish anxieties will again be the unwelcome guests at the Conference table.

What is the world scene today? Briefly summarized England today is a torry nationalist government which is struggling desperately to regain the lost prestige of being the greatest world power, a government which has broken with a century-old British tradition and has joined the tariff-mad world by erecting tariff walls around England; a torry nationalist government which is again applying the method of ruthlessness and terrorism and subjugation in India.

This nationalist government does not want real disarmament and it has sent to the Geneva Conference men who represent the military class and the military outlook.

Across the Channel is France and it does not want disarmament unless it can first obtain security. And by security it means a solemn treaty with the United States that our government would come to its aid in an attack. France is afraid of a Germany, nursing revenge. France has been particularly made restive in the last year or two by the rising tide represented in the Hitler and Nazi movement, - a movement which if it comes into power, and it is likely to, will demand a Council of Reparation and a complete revision of the Treaty of Versailles upon which the whole structure of Europe now rests.

France today is mistress of the European Continent, armed to the peak, its coffers filled with gold. France does not want disarmament unless it can be guaranteed by a force, not by the League of Nations, but by the one power which France respects - the United States, a permanence of the status quo of Europe, which today, of course, is all to the good of France.

To the south of France is Italy. It wants naval parity with France which France is not ready to grant. And Italy, too, of course, harbors imperialistic ambition for becoming the first great power of the world.

Poland in the east fears the giant on the East - Russia and the giant on the west - Germany. She is fully aware that Germany

has not forgotten and is not likely to forget her lost provinces.

And so with Roumania, it too has a bad conscience.

Roumania lives in mortal fear of Russia and of the other nations whose territory and people it appropriated. A day of reckoning is coming and Roumania wants to be prepared when that day comes.

Russia, of course, is afraid of the capitalist world, afraid that some time the capitalist nations of Europe and perhaps the United States will unite to destroy Bolshevism. It wants to be prepared for that. Russia does offer complete disarmament as a solution to the problem at one of the meetings in Geneva, but of course, that was a diplomatic movement, nothing more. With all the nations of Europe disarmed, Russia becomes the foremost, the most formidable, by virtue of its numerical strength, nothing else. And so Russia exalts in her Red Army.

In the Far East, Japan is at war today. Japan wants a strong army and navy to complete her empire building in the Pacific.

The United States is not likely to contribute much to the forthcoming Conference. It will probably say that as far as land armies are concerned, America has a negligible military force, already reduced to a minimum and as far as its navy is concerned, it has

already invoked two naval conferences and has agreed to limit naval construction to a certain point.

So that nobody really wants disarmament except the masses of the world and they don't count, - at least they don't count yet.

Prof. Ferrero in a recent essay correctly states:

"No power will come to the Conference engrossed in the general problem of disarmament and preoccupied with the necessity of solving it loyally and completely in order to save the world; all the powers will be, above all, intent on finding and obtaining the approval of measures for disarmament which will limit more the forces of rival powers and limit less their own."

Germany today insists upon complete cancellation of reparations because of her inability to pay. The Allied nations retort by saying that there can be no cancellation of reparations without debt cancellations, a cancellation of their war debt to the United States. The United States speaking through its Senate and House of Representatives says that there will be no debt cancellation. And so across the Atlantic there have been hurling for some months now, charges, counter-charges, - charges of ingratitude, of selfishness, of playing the role of Shylock. And

in the meantime even private debts are not being paid. Credit is frozen and world trade is languishing. And in this atmosphere of hot tempers and bad blood the inclination is not to disarm. In such times nations look to their weapons and not away from them.

Europe at this time is a labyrinth of tariff walls, numerous states separated from each other by unsurmountable tariff walls which were constructed on the principle of political self-determination. That principle was carried over into the field of economics and each state wants to be economically independent, to become rich through industrialization, to foster its own industries and to build up a sufficient economic life. And each of these small units which was never meant to be self-sustaining is now attempting through the artificiality of trade barriers to industrialize itself without reference to people. And they can industrialize themselves only by constructing tariff walls against the industrial and more advanced nations of Europe or America. The stronger states do it likewise and behind these tariff walls they are nearly all bankrupt.

And this impoverishment of the people has created a mood of hunger and bitterness throughout the world. And in such a world nations do not disarm.

In passing it might be said that the United States is the most culpable offender in this regard. So that the tariff and the depression will prove great stumbling blocks in the way of disarmament.

Had the League of Nations increased its prestige in the last few years, and had 1931 been for the League a year of triumphant achievement, then these nations coming to the Conference might have felt a measure of security, of confidence, in the League and might have been encouraged to put aside some of their armaments. But 1931 proved a low water stage in League prestige. Its authority reached low ebb in the sino-Japanese conflict. The manner in which the voice of the League was ignored by one of the most powerful of the League signatories and the manner in which all the other members of the League shirked the authority of the League in this crisis, I say the manner in which the voice of the League was ignored, undermined the confidence and has shaken the people's hopes and made the people believe more so now than before, that their salvation and safety lies not in treaties, but in guns and armament.

This is no criticism of the League. The League is nothing more than a group of nations banded together for a common cause. If the nations do not consider the League and do not want to pursue those efforts then it becomes a misnomer and an unreality.

The conflict between China and Japan is a conflict between a backward people now awakened to a full national existence and seeking to extricate itself from those obligations which were forced upon it during its years of weakness, and another nation crowded, imperially ambitious, seeking rich, contiguous land for political and economic exploitation.

This conflict between China and Japan has been one of long standing and duration. China is weak in spite of its four hundred and seventy millions of people; Japan, strong with only sixty-four millions of people.

The nations of the world today are absorbed in their own economic disabilities and troubles. Japan has therefore seized this moment, as it did in 1915 when the European countries were engaged in war, to force upon China these demands. I say the Japanese seized upon this moment to achieve in China, by force, what she could not achieve otherwise.

The military class in Japan obtained control of the government. Their objective is to destroy ^{the} present nationalist government in China and to set up there a government favorable to Japan. Thereafter pretexes were soon discovered for seizing

one strategic center in China after another. Mukden first, then Chincow, Tsitsihar and now Shanghai, the greatest and richest port in China. But all this time, since September when the trouble began, the League has not been inactive. Four days after the capture of Mukden the Council of the League was convoked and a resolution adopted calling upon both China and Japan to withdraw their troops from the place of conflict, to give the League a breathing space. Both accepted. Whereupon the Japanese proceeded to bombard China.

On October 13th the League met again. This time reinforced by an additional representative of the United States government, because the United States has vast interests in the East.

At this conference where the nations seemed to show a united front, the Pact of Paris was invoked; that Pact by which all the nations resolved never to resort to war.

On Nov. 16th, following the meeting of the Council of the League, Japan went right ahead and when the Council met again in Nov. no troops had been withdrawn and strangely enough no United States representative was present, officially thereby giving the impression that our government had dropped down. It was playing a secret game

with Japan and not to get so excited about the possible position of China. The whole thing blew up and in order to save its face the Council of the League appointed a Commission of Inquiry. When you don't know what to do, appoint a commission.

And Japan proceeded to capture Chinchow and now she has taken Shanghai. And the League stands at least up to the present, a defeated, or in a sense, a discredited agency. And this has dampened the enthusiasm for disarmament. For no nation will disarm until it is assured a full security against coercion by some international power, empowered to give that assurance. And the League of Nations was to be this power. The League of Nations in such moments when its decisions are flaunted should use force of an economic nature, which is the most drastic kind of force, to put through its decisions. And it has failed so far and the failure has dampened the enthusiasm for disarmament throughout the world.

And this, my friends, this is the world in which the Conference will meet, a world of war, rivalry and fear. All the important nations coming to that Conference are entering the Conference chamber next Tuesday with unclean hands and bad consciences. All of them, including our own, have in spite of the memories of the World War and the lessons that might have been

learned from it, in spite of the establishment of a League of Nations, whereby nations pledged themselves not to resort to war but to submit their differences ^{to} ~~XX~~ mediation or arbitration, in spite of the existence of a World Court. In spite of the Locarno Treaty, whereby France and Germany vowed never to go to war again and Italy and England pledged themselves to come to their assistance; in spite of the Kellogg Peace Pact for the outlawry of war, in spite of three disarmament conferences held since the war, all the nations of the earth increased their armament since the war. All except defeated Germany, of course. And the six most powerful nations of the earth spent on their armaments in 1930, sixty-five percent more than in 1913.

Great Britain increased her expenditures for her army and navy 42%; France 30%; Italy, 44%; Russia, 30%, Japan 142%. Ah but the laugh is coming. The laugh is on us. The United States, 197%. The United States in 1913 spent \$244,000,000 and in 1930 \$727,000,000 on its army and navy and that is not counting the money spent for war pension or for old war accounts. For actually we spent two billion eight hundred million on our war machines, including pensions. That is to say 70% of our national budget was spent on war.

You hear a great deal said today about the appalling, increasing national expenditures. Well it is appalling. In the

last twenty years from 1911 to 1931 the population of the United States increased 34%. The wealth of this country increased 94%. Governmental expenditure increased 467% and largely through the war item for the expenditures ^{for} ~~of~~ non-military purposes actually declined in these years in proportion to the total national expenditures.

And here we are, peace-loving America, we who are so superior to these war-mad Europeans, we who lecture and scold these people across the sea for their attitudes toward one another, we spend more than any nation in the world on war.

And you might think that these six nations who are spending close on to three billions of dollars, a year, that they are wealthy and prosperous and rolling in money. They are 'mechula.' They are bankrupt all of them. They can't pay their honest debts. They live on borrowing which they don't repay. It is the masses who pay for these military machines.

And perhaps this is the one hope for some measure of success in the forthcoming Conference, which remains, the bankruptcy of the nations, their utter inability to carry on indefinitely at this pace. You can't drain the life-blood of a nation indefinitely and expect it to survive. Bankruptcy and revolution are the two ghosts which will

hover over the Conference table in Geneva, which might strike terror in the hearts of those present and urge them to a measure of sanity.

Of course at the heart of this entire problem of disarmament is the appalling measure of insincerity of disarmament on the part of the nations of the world. I came across recently a quotation which Lincoln Steffens included in his autobiography, which is a very incisive and very profound statement which Mr. Clemenceau made to President Wilson and to the other premiers at the peace conference back in 1919. Mr. Clemenceau was a realist. Most French statesmen are. He knew what he wanted. Mr. Clemenceau stated to Mr. Wilson and to the representatives of Great Britain and ~~to~~ the other great nations of the earth:

"We can make this a permanent peace; we can remove all the causes of war and set up no new causes of war. It is very important what ~~you~~ you say, what you have so long been saying, Mr. President. We have now the opportunity to make a peace that shall last forever. And you are sure you propose to seize this opportunity? We must give up our empires, and all hope of empire. You, Mr. Lloyd-George, you English, will have to come out of India, for example; we French shall have to come out of North Africa; and you Americans, Mr. President, you must get out of the Philippines and Porto Rico and leave Cuba alone and - Mexico."

"Oh, we can all go to them and other countries, but as tourists, traders, travelers; we cannot any more govern them or exploit or have the inside track of them. We cannot possess the keys to trade routes and spheres of influence. And, yes, we shall have to tear down our

tariff walls and open the whole world to free trade and traffic. Those are some of the costs of permanent peace; there are the sacrifices we, the dominant powers would have to make. It is very expensive, peace. We French are willing, but are you willing, to pay the price, all the costs of no more war in the world?"

Nobody was willing to pay the price. That's the story. There can't be permanent peace in the world, therefore, there can't be real peace as long as the nations cling to their special privileges and their imperialistic methods, their desire to exploit other peoples, weaker peoples. That puts one nation against the other, this struggle over booty.

Of course this is a counsel of perfection. And in this world of ours a counsel of perfection is never taken. It will not be taken next week in Geneva. The road is a long and hard road. Perhaps some day the world will have a new type of statesmanship backed by a new public opinion.

For the present, what can we do? We can just carry on. The citizens of each country, in their respective countries must try to do their best to curtail the expenditures for armament, to insist upon international policies which will make for good will rather than for

hostility and to educate the rising generation into an understanding of the real causes of war, why wars are made and who is interested in making war and in maintaining war machines.

The problem of war and peace will not be solved this year or next year. It will be solved as the problem of slavery was solved. It will be solved as feudalism, which finally was discredited. But it will take decades and generations to achieve it. When you and I and those who will follow us will come to the realization that world peace is a much more important problem for us here in America than say, the problem of Prohibition or even the problem of prosperity, then we will be approximating some action which will help to bring it about.

I say that the problem of war and peace is more important than the problem of prosperity. We labor and sweat and accumulate wealth in a nation and then a war comes along and destroys it and for decades thereafter the nation languishes in poverty.

The problem of war and peace is a problem of the twentieth century. I believe the twentieth century will solve it. This Conference which meets this week, is not the last conference it is the first. There will be many others, next year, in five years, in a decade, perhaps under a more definite consideration of war functions. But if we persist, honestly, humanely, about these problems some day our efforts will be crowned with success.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE ADDRESS

"WHY THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AT GENEVA WILL FAIL"

GIVEN BY

RABBI ABBA HILLEL SILVER
SUNDAY, JANUARY 31st, 1932

The forthcoming Disarmament Conference called together by the League of Nations is fortunately not its last but its first. Much should not be expected of a first effort especially under present conditions.

In a normal, tranquilized world this Conference, which has been carefully planned and prepared, would have had a good chance to succeed. The world-wide economic depression would have contributed to its success as well as the great amount of peace education which has been going on throughout the world since the World War.

But these are not normal, tranquil times. The mood of the world today is the mood of 1914. The international scene was never more confused and the international mind never more distraught. Fears, hates and anxieties will be the unwelcome guests at the Conference table. None of the great powers of the world really wants to disarm. They all want military advantages, cunning and diplomatic craft, rather than candor and moral mandates will determine the ultimate outcome of the Conference.

Nobody wants disarmament today except the masses of the earth and they don't count, at least not yet.

Had the League of Nations gained in prestige during the last few years and had 1931 been a year of creditable achievement, the nations would have been encouraged to put aside some of their armaments in an increasing sense of security. But the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1931, still raging, marked the low water stage in League prestige. The cynical manner in which its voice was ignored by one of the great nations signatory to the League covenant, as well as the manner in which the other important members shirked their manifest responsibilities and refused to rally promptly and determinately to the assistance of a weaker and unarmed member of the League, has gone a long way in confirming the traditional opinion of people that the security of a nation lies, in the last analysis, in guns and not in treaties. The dilatory and insincere efforts of the nations in the Sino-Japanese conflict have retarded the work of the League as well as the cause of international disarmament for a decade at least.

All the important powers including the United States are entering the Conference this week with unclean hands and bad consciences. In spite of the lessons of the World War, in spite of the League, the World Court, the Locarno Treaties and the Kellogg Peace Pact and in spite of three conferences for limitation of naval armament, the six greatest nations of the earth spent sixty-five percent more on their armies and navies in 1930 than in 1913. Our own country which normally assumes an attitude of superior righteousness to other nations, heads the list with an increase of one hundred and ninety-seven percent. We lead the way simultaneously in movements for the outlawry of war and in military preparedness for war.

The one ray of hope for the forthcoming Conference is the economic bankruptcy of the Western World. The nations simply can not carry on indefinitely on the present scale without soon facing complete economic and political disruption and revolution.

The most that can be expected of this Conference is an agreement that the nations will spend a little less on their military organizations than formerly.



waking hour to the study of it—in a radio-talk the other day pointed out that during the fifteen years 1915-30 there was *an actual decline in the proportion of the national expenditure for non-military purposes*, "although it is customary for critics of the government to give the impression that we have been unduly increasing the civic side of the budget." At the same time a corresponding increase in the proportion spent on account of war:

Since 1915 . . . the percentage of non-military expenditure has declined . . . today occupying only 30 per cent of our federal budget as against 40 per cent in 1915. It is our military, or protective expenditures that have increased, from 60 to 70 per cent. Out of a total federal budget of \$4,000,000,000 we spend about \$2,800,000,000 for direct and indirect military purposes—expenses of past wars and protection or insurance against future wars. . . . While military or protective functions have multiplied by six times our expenses since 1915, the non-military have increased by only four times.

And at that, the big new item in the non-military expense is attributable to prohibition, the charge described as "for law-enforcement" (with a big decrease of revenue from the liquor-tax to accentuate it): "It has gone from \$4,000,000 in 1915" (says Mr. Lawrence) "to \$45,000,000 in 1930." With

11

The Paris Conference failed to provide Europe with a viable system of peace and an adequate foundation of prosperity primarily because of the impossibility of reconciling the ethnic and economic circumstances of the continent with the principle of self-determination. . . . The inextricable intermingling of races made it inevitable that the rights of certain peoples should be subordinated. . . . The peoples whose frontiers had been mutilated and provinces partitioned now demanded the revision of the peace treaties, while those who had attained liberty, unity or security insisted upon the preservation of the status quo. . . . These three prescriptions, peace without responsibility [the United States] peace with security [France and her allies of the Little Entente, and Poland] and peace with revision [Germany and her allies] are irreconcilable. . . . As long as countries stick to their national conceptions, only deadlock can result.

There is nothing to suggest that the democracies of modern Europe are more capable of united action in the face of a common danger than were those of Ancient Greece in the presence of a common enemy.

In the light of such illuminating comment as this, consider our own relation with these things. The League of Nations, in the long run the only worth while result of the World War, went off at half-cock, to be sure, in the Manchurian business, serving upon Japan a notice, a command, a threat, which as everybody knew would not, could not, be made good. Yet Japan was scared; even its reactionary military authorities paused. Why? Because Japan was afraid of the United States; not of any military action, but of the moral force that would be arrayed against her if the United States should really

100,000 soldiers; reduce your army to the same figure"; France replies: "My soldiers are conscript soldiers with a short term of service; they are not of the same quality as yours. Therefore I have need of a greater number under arms, and I must have trained reserves on whom I can count in case of war to reënforce the standing army."

Professional vs. Conscript Armies

But Germany retorts: "This question of quality is a pretext behind which France hides her ambition to have a larger army in order to crush me. I have no trained reserves and France should not have any either."

"If I have no trained reserves," France replies, "it is France that will be disarmed, and not Germany. France would have nothing to offset the qualitative superiority of the German army."

"I have a professional army," Germany retorts, "because the treaty of peace imposed it on me. If a professional army is stronger than a conscript army, why, let France adopt it also. But she must reduce her army to 100,000 men, and without trained reserves."

"I cannot adopt the professional army, which was imposed on Germany not by me but by England," replies France. "For me that would be a revolution."

entertained agreement military expenditure of 1 billion further distributed already too large in which the that would be would appear more, barrin

But the government hoped for an interference is the difficulties multiple to understand really is. The frightful situation now finds itself not yet under ruined it and from its difficulties proceed in solving which all the In the beginning that the war with 1914 the present all that there structure of for the evil exist and d really lies-tions which tained in V ening to d world had the evil lies have long fact. It is the Conference mind of the it will aid p conclusion modern wo results sho portion to



3
 3
 matter much; in the United States the figure increased only 18 per cent, while the expenditure on war account increased 197 per cent. The table shows an average increase of approximately 37 per cent despite Germany's *decrease* of 63. Excluding Germany, the national defense expenditure of the other six powers was approximately 65 per cent over 1913. And it was the United States and Japan that chiefly lifted it. The figures speak for themselves:

	(In millions of dollars)		Percentage of increase or decrease	Index of wholesale prices: 1913 = 100
	1913	1930		
Great Britain..	375.1	535.0	+ 42	116
France	348.7	455.3	+ 30	105
Italy	179.1	258.9	+ 44	100
Japan	95.5	232.1	+142	131
Russia	447.7	579.4*	+ 30	185
United States.	244.6	727.7	+197	118
Total	1,690.7	2,788.4	+ 65	...
Germany	463.3	170.4	- 63	122
Total	2,154.0	2,958.8	+ 37	...

2
 *1929.

It's pretty ghastly, Uncle Sam, when you come to think of it. You're spending on account of wars old and new all and more than is paid to you in income tax, including that paid through corporations. You received on that account in 1929, for instance, considerably over \$2,330,000,000; you spent that

home from
their peoples
disarmament
eral increase
I do not
w, the situa-
much better
in 1924 or
om this point
ne conference
oint of view:
e states, espe-
an states, are
and 1925.

Disarmament

the question
ool is repre-
e Madariaga,
mament Sec-
sh Ambassa-
chool affirms
disarm until
world com-
oundation a
tions with
blems and
ould arise in
ational life.
esented by
hed French
ction of the
s of France.
sarmament
h "the or-
ommunity"
the summit

substance:
sarmament
the world
et us work
munity by
ment.

after the general German
1930, which showed what progress the
ultranationalist parties had made in
Germany. Today Europe, at least, has
again become an inextricable net of
hate, distrust and more or less hidden
rivalry. Italy distrusts France and
Jugo-Slavia; Jugo-Slavia distrusts Italy,
Albania and Bulgaria; France distrusts
Italy and Germany; Germany dis-
trusts France and Poland; Poland
distrusts Germany and Russia; Russia
detests and denounces as an irrecon-
cilable enemy the whole of the capital-
ist Occident.

It would be futile to seek to deter-
mine here to what extent this distrust
is justified. It exists; during the past
two years it has tended to grow worse
and to degenerate into real hatred; and
that is sufficient for it to be, whether
real or imaginary, the great obstacle
against which the efforts of the confer-
ence will clash. Why? It is not difficult
to guess. No power will come to the
conference engrossed in the general
problem of disarmament and preoccu-
pied with the necessity of solving it
loyally and completely in order to save
the world; all the powers will be, above
all, intent on finding and obtaining the
approval of measures for disarmament
which will limit more the forces of rival
powers and limit less their own. Be-
neath the surface of the Conference on
Disarmament there will be a veiled
and hidden struggle, but bitter and
tenacious, for supremacy in the re-
duced armaments, each power wishing
to reduce them in the way most favor-
able to itself and the most prejudicial
to the powers which it distrusts.

We shall see repeated at Geneva, but
on a much larger scale, and conse-
quently in a more dangerous manner,
what took place at the Washington and

become an affair of all humanity. Its implications are revolutionary. Clemenceau with sardonic humor put his fingers upon the exact spot. Lincoln Steffens in his immortal autobiography (which ought to be compulsory reading, not only in every school of journalism and every newspaper office but in every American home) tells the story of the French Tiger's challenge to President Wilson and the premiers, gathered in Paris:

We can make this a permanent peace; we can remove all the causes of war and set up no new causes of war. It is very important what you say, what you have so long been saying, Mr. President. We have now the opportunity to make a peace that shall last forever. . . . And you are sure you propose to seize this opportunity? . . . We must give up our empires, and all hope of empire. You, Mr. Lloyd-George, you English, will have to come out of India, for example; we French shall have to come out of North Africa; and you Americans, Mr. President, you must get out of the Philippines and Porto Rico and leave Cuba alone and—Mexico.

Oh, we can all go to them and other countries, but as tourists, traders, travelers; we cannot any more govern them or exploit or have the inside track of them. We cannot possess the keys to trade routes and spheres of influence. And, yes, we shall have to tear down our tariff walls and open the whole world to free trade and traffic. Those are some of the costs of permanent peace; there are the sacrifices we, the dominant powers would have to make. It is very expensive, peace. We French are willing, but are you willing, to pay the price, all the costs of no more war in the world?

They could not bear it—the price of peace. Not even Mr. . . . for all that he was author of the famous Fourteen

1. Not ^{Feb. 2.} ~~but~~ ^{Subject} ~~wish~~ ^{worried} that it might - fear that it will.

① Sad to contemplate. First major effort of League for disarmament. All other conferences were called not by League but by one or other of main powers ^{notably the U.S.} limited to a few nations, and always naval armaments. This is first - 63 nations -

② Long preparation. ^{10 years -} Dec. 1925 set up a Prepar. Commission to prepare for a Gen. Dis. Conf. - 6 sessions. Final session Dec. 9, 1930 - Draft Convention ^{on Treaty} adopted by 31 countries - for consideration by Dis. Conf. ^{Pres.} This Draft Treaty deals with methods of limitation. Conf. to supply them.

③ In a normal world, a tranquilized world, such a carefully planned + prepared Conf. would have good chance of success. ② Especially in a period of world-wide Econ. depression, when armament is breathing back of nations. ③ The logic as well as the urgency would argue well for a successful outcome. ④ Also the vast edu. peace education which has been going on since the world war, the around public opinion, the deploration of war heroics, the bad, bloody taste which last war left, the new routes -

2. But there are not normal, tranquil times. The mood, the world to-day is the mood of 1914. The intern. scene was never more confused & the intern. mind never more distraught. Fear-hates-panic anxieties - are again the unwelcomed guests at any Conf. table -

① Prof. Ferret thus sets up the hate-alignment of Europe (East)

desp. bent upon recapturing a lost prestige & world's greatest power
(2) England - Tary ~~last~~ ^{desp. bent upon recapturing a lost prestige & world's greatest power} Nat. Govt, which is for first time in
hist. erecting Tariff barriers, which contribute not a
little to inter. comp. + bad-blood, and which has re-
sumed a policy of nothing known & suggestion is
India - ^{official} ~~ff~~ ^{ff} England wants no real disarm.
She sent to Geneva - military men - April.

(3) France will not disarm without security.
She wants V.S. - (1) Afraid of a Germany seeking
revenge (2) Armed by the intense Nat. now
rampant in Germany and (3) demand for revision
of Versailles ^{+ left population} Treaty ^{Hitler - Nazis} Refused to enter last
World W. Conf. because Italy's demand for
name parity with France. (5) Fr. is
murderer, Cont. Europe - gold-puppet
states - Will not endanger her position
(4) Poland fears ^{the giant of the East} Russia, and the temp. disabled
grant of the West-Germans. St. has not forgotten
and is not likely to forget her lost provinces
(5) This holds true, Rumania which lives in
mortal fear, Russia, and the ~~second~~ ^{other} other
antennae nations ~~who~~ ^{to whose} territory &
Pop. she helped herself.

4 Italy want ~~to~~ name parity with France
and is dreaming of superstate glories

- ⑦ Russia - afraid of Capitalist world - Offers total disarmament - but her formidable - Her pride = Red Army.
- ⑧ Japan is engaged in war now - Wants army & navy to complete her Empire conquest in Asia.
- ⑨ U.S. is not likely to contribute much to League - Had done enough - Nationalist - slight backing - + Japan - boom. to build up to Treaty even -

3. Nobody wants dis - unity - except masses of earth - and they don't count - yet. In such a setting the Conf. must fail

① To quote Deans again (2.)

4. German demands cancellation of reparations, ^{on the basis, his inability to pay} Albeit = no repar. without debt cancellation - U.S. says - no debt cancellation. Changes - counter charges, rearmament, reparations, and Shylock - full ^{debts are asking Nazis. Credit in frozen!} the ^{would have in Germany} but debtors are bad debtors are back to their weapons - not away from them -

5. Europe is a labyrinth of tariff walls - Verdun, T. let lose a little indef. state in Europe - Each want to be econ. independent; to become rich than industrialization

to foster the infant industries tariff walls as erect.
The stays stabs do it likewise - Bohns then tariff
walls, they are reared all bankrupt - but the Econ.
barriers ^{you do not depend on the future & you have Econ. renew growth} keep food values alive - But America
is the most culpable sinners in this regard.

6. Had the League gained in prestige & authority in last few
years - 1934 ~~is~~ a year of triumph -
nations would have felt a measure of security
of protection which might have encouraged them
to put aside some of their fears - But 1931
~~was~~ ^{was} marked by the low water mark in League prestige.
Its authority dropped reached low ebb, and in
the Sino-Japanese conflict and the war in
which its voice was ignored by the great
nations signatory to the L. Covenant, as well as
the nations in which the other important members
shook their resp. under the Covenant - and refused
to do it - left all the power with the
clear impression that nat. security is not
to be with peace not with peace travels.

(1) No criticism of League -

(2) Chinese-Jap. conflict of interest of long standing.

Essentially conflict bet. an awakening China - demanding
full nat. indep. & resisting intrusion of foreign nations
into her pol. Econ. life - And a crowded, ambitious
empire - seeing Japan, reaching out for the rich
& fertile provinces of China, for her pol. Econ.

exploitation. ② China ^{- with 470 m} is weak. Japan ^{with 64 m} is strong, China ^{Lesson 372}
has been tormented by civil war in recent years. The
world relief / world is alarmed in this very desperate
econ. problem - Japan seized this moment - as
in 1915 ^(21 demands) - to settle by force certain issues which she
could not settle otherwise. The military class
in Japan ~~superintended~~ ^{then objecting} the govt control of the govt and of
the foreign policy. Thereafter pretext war was undertaken
for seizing strategic centers in China, after another.
First Mukden - on Sept. 18, - Chinchow, Tsitsihar,
and now Shanghai the most important port
of China.

① League not inactive. I had violated the conventions
+ agreements, as well as other agreements under the Tellur
Pact + 9-Power Treaty. China - a member of the League -
appealed to L. + invoked Article 11 of the L. Covenant.

① Sept. 22 - resolution - called for withdrawal of
troops from Zoo + conflict. Accepted - Japan
provided with a military camp. Brinkley
Churchman -

② Oct 13 - Council of L. met again - U.S. = Gilbert -
decided to reinforce the Paris Pact - and demanded
the withdrawal of J. troops within the railway
zone by Nov 16. - Japan went right ahead.
③ Nov. 16 - no troops withdrawn - no Am.
at Council Table - concerned to Japan -

Communism, Nazism - investigated - North America -

Japan goes ahead - China -

→ And now Shanghai -

→ League failed - Nations failed ^{France} had part.
interested in maintaining terr. integ. of China

Failure has dampened enthus. for U.N.

7- It is in such a world of war-rivalry-fear, that
rep. of 63 nations will not convene Tuesday next
to discuss disarmament.

① All the imp. powers, including the U.S., enter
Conf. with nuclear hands, and bad consciences.

In spite of lessons, World War, in spite of
League - planned Conf. - Franco - (Fr. Gov. - H. G. B.)
League of Nations, in spite of 3 Conf. for disarmament

6 All nations increased their expend. for armaments
in 1931
65% more than in 1913. (Read)

② U.S. = 197%. This does not include money
spent previous - and old war accounts. Actually
we spent not 700 m. but \$2,800 m. in 70 years
national budget - This is staggering. Our
pop. in 20 years bet 1911-1931 increased 34%.
Our wealth = 94% but net Gov. Exp. 467%
- largely due to war costs - for no exp. for non-military

purposes actually declared in proportion to our Total
nat. expenditure —

(b) Wary all nations as bankrupt —
Perhaps this is our hope for disavowment.
Nations simply can't go on, drawing their
top-blond & survive — 'Bankruptcy or
revolution must follow — ~~to~~ either tend
to contemplate —

8/ Perhaps — it is fear & this which will permeate
Confidence — to agree on some lines & minimum limitations.
— The other lesson — they will never learn — No nation can arm itself
against defeat.
At least 7 problem is a fundamental
dishonesty —

✓ Frederic Steffens — Americana (Date)

9/ Here is the core of it — But it is a council
of perfection! — Long road — will have to take
it —

(a) Need of a new State manliness — backed by
a new public opinion —

(b) Citizens & each, separate countries
must begin at home — More important >
Production and Prosperity —

(c) 20th Century —