



Abba Hillel Silver Collection Digitization Project

Featuring collections from the Western Reserve Historical Society and
The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives

MS-4787: Abba Hillel Silver Papers, 1902-1989.

Series IV: Sermons, 1914-1963, undated.

Reel
162

Box
58

Folder
795

The Atlantic Pact, 1949.



THE ATLANTIC PACT

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

Sunday, April 10, 1949

Last Monday there transpired a momentous event in the city of Washington. The representatives of 12 nations assembled to sign a treaty which has come to be known as the North Atlantic Pact, a military alliance for mutual defense. Some acclaim this act and extol it as a great forward step towards international stability and peace, especially the spokesmen of the parties signatory to this pact. Others have denounced it as an act of war provocation and as undermining world security and peace. Everybody agrees that as far as our own country is concerned, this pact marks a radical departure away from the traditional American foreign policy towards a new policy of complete integration and total commitment in the political fortunes - in the conflicted political fortunes of the nations of Europe.

A long debate is developing over this pact, and inasmuch as the consequences of this pact lie in the future, it is clear that one cannot be dogmatic about it because one cannot be entirely sure of his conclusions. One can only use his best judgment in evaluating what has taken place and one can only share his thinking with his fellow citizens because it is an obligation of good citizenship.

But because of the heat that has been engendered and because of the rather bitter intolerance which has been rapidly developing, the expression of an independent judgment with reference to anything that has to do with Russia is becoming increasingly difficult in this free land of ours. As we become more and more committed to an expensive and expansive foreign policy which is dominated by one idea - that of checking Communism - we have been growing in this country progressively intolerant of any/criticism of any phase of this program. Those who have doubts and have the temerity to express themselves are in danger of being branded as "Reds" and of having their patriotism branded as suspect. It was not so very long ago that every American who was not an isolationist was branded as a dangerous internationalist and un-American. It was not so long ago when anyone who did not take literally the advice of George Washington was suspect as a loyal American citizen, and today it appears that every American who does not favor our entering into a military alliance with one-half of

the nations of Europe against the other half - I say today - such an American is endangered of being denounced as pro-Communist.

I call attention to this fact because I regard it as a very dangerous development on the American scene. Blinders are being pulled over American eyes and are as dangerous as an iron curtain.

Now, what is this North American Pact which has now been signed by 12 nations and which the Senate of the United States will begin to discuss in a few days? What is it? It is a treaty which provides a collective security arrangement among the nations of the North Atlantic area covering their territory in Europe and in North America and all the territory north of the Tropic of Cancer as well as all the occupation forces of these parties now in Europe. It provides for common defense in case any party is attacked, and it provides also for the maintenance and development of their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. In order to be able to resist armed attack, these 12 nations undertook to consult if the territorial integrity of any one of these parties is threatened and to consider any attack/ on one of the parties as an attack against all, and to take such individual and collective action as each party considers necessary. That last condition is rather vague. It was included, I suspect, in order to meet objections on the part of those who insist that the right to declare war in any instance belongs exclusively to the Congress of the United States. This provision, while it seems to say that each party shall consider whether it will use armed force in a given situation when one of the 12 is attacked, nevertheless seems to imply a definite commitment that an attack on one is an attack on the United States. But there is vagueness on this score. There is no clear indication in the treaty as to whether an internal revolution which may be interpreted as having been stimulated from outside may bring into operation the intervention of these signatory parties. There is a troublesome vagueness on that score, and unless it is cleared up, it may well mean that any time there is a revolution in any of these countries, the government may automatically call upon it

to help crush that revolution.

The heart of this treaty is found in Articles 3 and 5 which read:

The parties....by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

And Article 5:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them....will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

This pact provides for a council of defense which shall immediately implement Articles 3 and 5. The treaty is of unlimited duration. After 20 years any nation may withdraw, after one year's notice. After 10 years the parties may review the treaty for any desirable changes in the light of the international situation at that time. In the White Book on this subject issued by our State Department the following arguments are given in behalf of this pact:

World Wars I and II demonstrate that the security of the United States is directly related to the security of Western Europe and that the nations on both sides of the North Atlantic are bound together by a natural community of interests. The Atlantic Pact is a formal acknowledgment of this relationship and reflects their conviction that an armed attack can be prevented only by making clear in advance their determination collectively to resist such an attack if it should occur. Such a collective security arrangement is necessary, in the view of the United States, to protect the North Atlantic community and its own security.

By enabling its members to confront a potential aggressor with preponderant power - military, economic, and spiritual - the Atlantic Pact will help to restore the confidence and sense of security which are essential for full economic and political stability. Its political, psychological, and military values are each important and, in fact, inseparable. By reducing the chances of war, by increasing confidence and stability, and by providing the basis for effective collective defense should it be necessary, the Pact can aid materially in establishing in Western Europe the atmosphere necessary for economic recovery and bring closer the fuller life

which is possible in a cooperative world society adjusted to the peaceful uses of modern scientific and technical advances.

Now, the impression which it is sought to convey by the advocates of this Pact is, first of all, that this Pact is definitely within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, and secondly, that it is means of strengthening the United Nations. On the first point considerable doubt has been expressed from a purely legal point of view. This Pact is being represented as another regional arrangement which is permissible under Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations. This Article reads:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Now, the framers of the Charter at San Francisco four years ago took cognizance of the fact that there already existed certain regional systems. And the framers of the Charter of the United Nations sought to fit these regional systems and global into the collective/system which the United Nations was setting up. But while such regional arrangements are permissible under the Charter, it is stretching the idea quite a bit when the region contemplated is not an integrated geographic unit, but countries in both hemispheres, and in the case of Italy, not a country of the North Atlantic. And when this regional arrangement is aimed not at the settlement of regional issues, but at a potential enemy whose military aggressions could be a menace to world peace in Asia as much as in Europe. I say it is stretching the idea of a regional arrangement for mutual protection beyond what was contemplated by the framers of the Charter. Because against such a potential aggressor it was the global security system of the United Nations which was set up because it was realized that regional arrangements are inadequate to check the aggressor and to stop war.

Furthermore, under Article 52 it was clearly understood that only those states which are members of the United Nations can become members of any such regional arrangement, and neither Italy nor Portugal are members of the United Nations. And when it is represented that the Pact has its roots in the common heritage of the peoples living on both shores of the North Atlantic Ocean and who believe in the principles of democracy, one cannot help but inquire concerning the democracy of Portugal - a dictatorship which has suddenly been given the odor of sanctity of a democratic state. If it is necessary to include a dictatorship like Portugal in this Pact in order to build up an anti-Comunist bloc, how long will it be before Franco is included in such a pact? And why not? And if Franco, why not the revived Fascist Germany? One reads that the nationalists in Germany are again marching singing "Deutschland uber alles". How long before Germany is rearmed, and Franco as well? And was it not Hitler's slogan that the Western world must unite against the Soviet Union?

These thoughts come to one's mind and these questions must receive an answer.

It is also argued that under Article 51 nations have a right to self-defense. This article reads:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

But it is clear from this reading that this right of individual and collective self-defense comes into operation if an armed attack occurs. Such an attack has not occurred, nor is it being imminently threatened.

A few weeks ago there met in Cleveland the representatives of the great Protestant denomination in the United States. One meeting was addressed by John Foster Dulles, one of the men instrumental in framing the Charter at San Francisco. In addressing this body in Cleveland Mr. Dulles said:

I do not know of any responsible high officials, military or civilian, in this government or any other government, who believe that the Soviet state now plans conquest by open military aggression.

It can be assumed that the Soviet state would use the Red Army if its leaders felt that their homeland was imminently and seriously menaced. That is why, in our statement on Soviet-American relations made two and one half years ago, we said that the United States should not seek military bases so close to the Soviet Union as to carry an offensive threat that is disproportionate to defensive value. That is why our fellowship with the peoples of western Europe, and particularly Scandinavia, ought not to seem to bring United States military might directly to Russia's border.

But the Chief of Staff of our country, General Omar Bradley, a few days ago made the following statement on this very subject which contradicts the advice given by John Foster Dulles. He stated:

Strategically, the North Atlantic Pact would enable free nations of the Old World and the New to funnel the great strength of our New World to the ramparts of the Old, and thus challenge an enemy where he would transgress. At present the balance of military power is centered in the United States, 3000 miles from the heart of Europe.

It must be perfectly apparent to the people of the United States that we cannot count on friends in Western Europe if our strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with a promise of later liberation. Yet that is the only strategy that can prevail if the military balance of power in Europe is to be carried on the wings of our bombers and deposited in reserves this side of the ocean. It is a strategy that would produce nothing better than impotent and disillusioned Allies in the event of a war.

So that according to our Chief of Staff, what is contemplated under this Pact is to put our front lines right on the borders of the Soviet Union. But granted that this Pact is not in opposition to the letter of the Charter, granted that these criticisms are technical in nature, it is clearly in opposition to the whole spirit of the United Nations. Because what was the dominant idea which brought the United Nations into existence - the idea of a one world, not a divided world and not a balance of power between two groups of nations. It is the sheerest nonsense that this

Pact represents a triumph to the United Nations and adds strength to the United Nations. The most that can be said of it is that it represents a desperate necessity in view of a realization on the part of those who signed the Pact that the United Nations is incapable of giving them security. In fact, this is what is indicated in this White Paper:

The Atlantic Pact is designed to help bring about world conditions which will permit the United Nations to function as contemplated at the San Francisco conference. The expectation that the cooperation among the Great Powers pledged during the war and reflected in the Charter would be continued has not been realized. The most important of the peace settlements have not been agreed upon, and, largely because of Soviet obstruction and abuse of the veto, the United Nations has not yet become so fully effective in achieving collective security as had been hoped.

I should like to say a word about this. In the first place, there is nothing said here about getting around this question of the veto. The United States insisted on the veto at San Francisco, and in this regard it is only a matter of justice to say that this criticism of the Russians is not stating the whole story and is not doing justice to the facts of the situation. The Security Council is made up of 11 members. The 6 non-permanent members are elected every two years so that it happens time and again that the Slavic Bloc is represented by only two members, but the Western Block always has 9 members. In order to pass a motion at the Security Council, 7 votes are required. The Western Block can stop action at any time by abstaining from voting and thus, making it impossible for that motion to get 7 votes. If the Slavic Bloc wants to stop an act, it must do it by veto. What is contemplated in the Pact is a regional defense system, not a universal peace system.

When Mr. Evatt, President of the Assembly, opened the Assembly a few days ago, he made the following observation and a significant one. One senses in it a men speaking whose hopes have been blasted and whose heart is broken:

A comradeship was built up in those years of struggle, and we always hoped and believed that that comradeship would serve as the basis of the United Nations and of international cooperation. The Charter expressed the hope of all mankind for peace and the confidence of all mankind that we could achieve peace with justice if we had the support, the sincere and sustained support of all the leaders of the nations.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that great difficulties have arisen in the last few years and that there has often been suspicion and lack of cooperation. However, I want to make one statement which I think cannot be controverted and the truth of which is crystal clear: that these difficulties have not been caused by the United Nations.

The fact is that nearly all the difficulties of the United Nations have been caused by one factor: great-power disagreement outside the United Nations and completely independent of the United Nations.

The United Nations may be weak, but certainly this Pact will not strengthen it. This Pact will undermine its prestige and make it as meaningless a part of society as the League of Nations became. What one cannot understand - what I cannot understand - is simply this. If the United States is finally prepared and our people are finally ready to back up the government to arm half of Europe for a military alliance to give up the last vestige of isolationism, and that these tremendous commitments have sent our armies into Europe and our monies into Europe, why isn't our country prepared to do the same thing for the United Nations? The United Nations contemplates a military alliance. The Charter of the United Nations makes abundant provision for the use of armed force to back up the decisions of the United Nations. Under the Charter all the members undertook to make available to the Security Council on its call and in accordance with a special agreement, armed forces, and the members undertook to make available immediately their national air forces for combined international enforcement action. Why have we not made it a national policy of our government and the United Nations to bring about agreement on an international force under the control of the United Nations to be used in the prosecution of its peaceful purposes the world over? Why are we willing to back a partial United Nations with our armed forces and assume total financial responsibility

and are unwilling to share with the total world community in a military pact for security? I am afraid that we have been side-stepping the United Nations ever since we announced the so-called Truman Doctrine in relation to Greece, when Great Britain turned over its responsibility to the United States. Defending democracy is the responsibility of the United Nations - not of the United States. That is why it was created. We side-stepped the United Nations in the matter of Greece and the matter of the Marshall Plan. Relief to Europe should have been administered by the world community. And we are now side-stepping it in this new regional arrangement. We surrendered our isolationism at San Francisco in 1945 for world action, but we have now surrendered our isolationism and our freedom of action to a fractured United Nations for a balance of power in the world.

I do not know what the cost of all this will be. Already half of our national budget is being spent on our total establishment. Our war budget is staggering. Now we are asked to assume a continuous lend-lease to arm all nations of the world. That is to say, not only to uphold their economic life, but also to support their armies, navies and air forces. And hardly was the ink dry but 8 of the nations already sent their bill to Washington because it is clear that they cannot undertake military expansion without enough to maintain their economic life.

Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, Chief Economic Adviser of the administration stated a few days ago that this cost for the Atlantic Pact should be squeezed out of our national military budget. He was promptly rebuked and told that it was the intention of the administration to present an additional appropriation budget for this new armed program. I must say, by way of passing, that all these successive steps in the new American policy did not originate in the United States. The Truman Doctrine was certainly not an American contribution. It was a British contribution and put over in this country by Winston Churchill, an amazing salesman. And the Marshall Plan is really not a Marshall Plan - it is a Bevin plan.

Now this Atlantic Pact is the extension of the Brussels Pact of last year. At a meeting in Brussels they agreed upon a military alliance, and we were drawn into it, of course, to pay the bill. I must say that our intervention so far in the crusade to check Communism in Greece and China has not been very successful. I am afraid this is not the way. Anybody who claims omniscience in these subjects is simply building himself up to wishful thinking. I suspect that this Pact is a dangerous detour not malevolently intended. It will turn to a divided world. This is not the way to check Communism. It seems to me that the direction lies elsewhere. First, in strengthening the United Nations, building it up, building up not only its prestige but its military arm, making it a real business concern. It can be done, and unless it is done, the United Nations will be a dead institution before long. Secondly, the direction lies in coming to a quick understanding with the Soviet Union. They are not guiltless. It has committed many grave blunders. It has not been as cooperative as it might be. Its religious trials have been outrageous affairs and when one asks for an understanding with the Soviet Union, it is not because one is unaware of their shortcomings, but because we realize that we have to live in the same world, and they represent a considerable section of this world in which we have to live - not only live but work and trade and build together for the future of mankind. That it is possible, I think, may be drawn from the fact that we have lived with the Soviet Union in the same world for a quarter of a century and that we fought with the Soviet Union as an ally against a common enemy and we won the last World War, and we saved our own freedom by our alliance with them. It is clear that meetings and negotiations should be held with the chief spokesmen of both of these governments and all issues be discussed and some understanding reached if possible. All possibilities have not been explored on these outstanding issues, and particularly on the non-interference of the Soviet Union in the life of other nations. Otherwise, what looms for the world ahead is a period of economic dislocations, strikes and demonstrations, severe repressions, and growing political reaction.

Because the Soviet Union will be forced to consolidate its political powers and to stimulate revolutionary activities in order to unite the Western powers and they, in turn, will have to protect themselves through repressive measures which lead to political reaction.

Now the Dictator of the Soviet Union indicated that he was ready to sit down to talk with us. President Truman indicated he was ready to meet with him when he was frightened off. Why should we be afraid to have the two heads sit down and discuss these problems and see whether we cannot arrive at some modus vivendi in this world? I think the initiative is with us. We are the greatest country on earth today - we ought to lead in diplomatic ~~leadership~~ initiative - not follow the leadership of Bevin. We have nothing to fear from Russia. Even if the leaders of the Soviet Union should be thinking of war, they would not be prepared for a generation. The last war broke them. Their industrial potential in relation to ours is pitifully small and their leaders are no fools. Why should we not seek this moment once, twice, thrice to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union. That, in my humble judgment, is the way for American diplomacy. Once the understanding is reached, the United Nations will then be able to begin to function as it should be functioning because as Evatt said, it is this suspicion which is eating at the heart of the United Nations. Whether it will be done or not, only the future can tell.

This is the thought not of a man who knows all the answers and who is even 100% sure of his position. This is the thought I share with you, of a man who is trying to think his way through a very difficult subject and to think it through as an American and as a friend of humanity.

Text of Address by

Following is the text of the opening address before the United Nations General Assembly at Flushing Meadow yesterday by the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Assembly President:

I declare open the one hundred and eighty-eighth meeting of the General Assembly.

I am sure that the representatives here present will pardon me if, in opening this second part of the third session of the General Assembly, I refer to past events and also perhaps look forward.

It is nearly four years since the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt. That great wartime leader played an outstanding part in the creation and inspiration of the United Nations. His dominant thought throughout the long struggle was the thought of world peace and world justice. Those two great principles cannot be separated: we cannot have permanent peace, or a real peace, unless it is based on justice. That idea is basic to the United Nations Charter and to our organization.

Soon after the death of the great President in 1945, first Germany, and later Japan, surrendered. At San Francisco—and so many changes have taken place since San Francisco—the Charter was accepted by all the nations which had fought together in what was nothing less than a crusade against tyranny, and all those nations are represented here.

A Basis for Cooperation

A comradeship was built up in those years of struggle, and we always hoped and believed that that comradeship would serve as the basis of the United Nations and of international cooperation. The Charter expressed the hope of all mankind for peace and the confidence of all mankind that we could achieve peace with justice if we had the support, the sincere and sustained support, of all the leaders of the nations.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that great difficulties have arisen in the last few years and that there has often been suspicion and lack of cooperation. However, I want to make one statement which I think cannot be controverted and the truth of which is crystal clear: that these difficulties have not been caused by the United Nations.

All these difficulties would have been far greater without the United Nations, because the organization—whether we consider the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Social and Economic Council, or any of the other organs or specialized agencies—does serve as a meeting ground for constant, sustained, altruistic effort to solve problems through free discussion on the basis of the great principles set forth in the Charter.

The fact is that nearly all the

OFFICIALLY OPEN



Dr. Herbert V. Evatt (center)
With him on the platform are
Assistant to the Secretary General

difficulties of the United Nations have been caused by one factor: great-power disagreement outside the United Nations and completely independent of the United Nations.

I say, further—and I think we should remember this as we resume the task that was left unfinished at Paris—that, in the three years of its existence, the United Nations has had very many notable achievements to its credit. Let me give just one illustration: I know there will be differences of opinion from the point of view of the merits of the case, but it is undoubted that in the Palestine question the United Nations has pointed the way to a just and stable solution and has averted war in that region.

It is quite probable that, in the absence of the United Nations, a general war would have broken out. I cannot help thinking of the efforts of so many officers of the United Nations, the work of the Special Commission, the mediating efforts of the United Nations, the sacrifice of Count Bernadotte, and the great and highly successful work continued in his tradition by Dr. Ralph Bunche.

There are other examples: The problem of Iran and of Kashmir. Kashmir is a problem that is not thought of as much in the northern portion of the world or perhaps in Europe as it deserves to be. I am delighted to see here today a distinguished servant of the United States and the United Nations; a man who did such

piece of the Atlantic pact—the second year of the Marshall Plan.

The Atlantic Treaty

These are the Foreign Office heads who will take part in tomorrow's ceremony listed in the order in which their governments agreed to enter the North Atlantic Alliance:

Ernest Bevin, 68, Foreign Secretary of United Kingdom, Labor (Socialist) party.

Robert Schuman, 62, Foreign Minister of France, MRP (Popular Republican party).

Paul Henri Spaak, 50, Premier and Foreign Minister of Belgium, Socialist.

Dirk Uipko Stikker, 52, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, Freedom party.

Joseph Bech, 62, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Christian Socialist party.

Dean Gooderham Acheson, 55, United States Secretary of State, Democrat.

Lester Bowles Pearson, 51, Minister of External Affairs of Canada, Liberal.

Halvard Manthey Lange, 46, Foreign Minister of Norway, Labor.

Gustav Rasmussen, 53, Foreign Minister of Denmark, no political affiliation (Denmark has a Social Democratic Government).

Count Carlo Sforza, 75, Italian Foreign Minister, Republican.

Bjarni Benediktsson, 41, Foreign Minister of Iceland, Independent party.

Jose Caeiro da Matta, 64, Foreign Minister of Portugal, no political affiliation.

These men came to Washington for the final act of a sequence that had been more than a year in the making. The first major step was the signing of the Brussels pact on March 17, 1948, by Britain, France and the Benelux countries of a defensive and economic treaty.

Pact Area Widens

The Brussels concept spread. In Washington in early summer the United States and Canada opened negotiations with the Brussels powers for a broader defensive arrangement covering the community of nations fronting on the North Atlantic and its major approaches. The talks went on through the fall and early winter. One after another the other peoples of the North Atlantic region came in: The Norse, the Danes, the Italians, the Icelanders, the Portuguese. On March 18, the State Department released the text of the agreement.

The pact sets up a security area in the whole Atlantic basin north of the Tropic of Cancer, reaching to North Africa and Italy on the Mediterranean, Denmark on the Baltic and Norway on Russia's far northwestern border. It covers also the Western powers' occupation troops in Germany and Austria.

The meat of the pact is in Articles 3, 4 and 5. These are the key provisions:

Article 3. "The parties * * * by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Article 4. "The parties will con-



sult together whenever * * * the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened."

Article 5. "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them * * * will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Constitutional Question

What these terms imply has been a matter of study on both sides of the Atlantic. Critics of the pact charge that it carries an advance commitment for America to declare war in contravention of the Constitution, which reserves that power to Congress.

The State Department's view is different. Secretary Acheson explains that, in the first instance, the pact binds the Administration to put before Congress a program for helping Western Europe rearm; and that, in the second instance, the pact affirms American interest in North Atlantic security to the point, where necessary and as a matter of "faith and principle," of fighting an aggressor.

The pact's most important objective, according to the State Department, is the effect it would have upon a potential aggressor—i. e., Russia. The objective is to make it plain to the Kremlin that it cannot count on American neutrality in the event of an aggressive move in Europe. The Kremlin would have to take into account the likelihood that an attack by Russia would be met by American might. Thus, although the pact itself could not keep Soviet armies out of Western Europe, it would convince the Kremlin that any move in that direction would involve the risk of war with the United States—a risk which the Soviet leaders are thought reluctant to take.

Expanding U. S. Role

For the U. S. the pact opens a new vista in the broadening international horizon. Since the end of World War II these have been the major steps toward greater participation in world affairs taken by the American Administration with the support of Congress:

(1) *The United Nations.* In December, 1945, the Senate ratified American participation in the world peace organization, reversing the position

the U. S. War

(2)

the Se
can De
and ot
gard a
ican st
Americ

(3)

the Com
Recover
Western
and We
nomic a
ond yea
gram is
gress.

Ever
shape fo
pact—the
mounted
day's note
a formal e
the Russia
months. Y
tic pact Fo
rejected the

U. S.

Following
both sides on
(The Americ
a recent spee
and from a
Book; the F
from the Thu

Aim of Pact

purpose of the
the peace by
parties are pre
gether if any on
* * * This coun
make war again
says: "The pact
mon with the a
* * * On the co
an obviously ag
aimed against t

Legality of P

"Article 51 of
Charter recogn
Governments h
of individual
fense.' * * * [
coordinating t
right." Russi
say that such a
ter of the Un
only in case
against a me
tion; yet as is
members] are
armed attack."

Effect on U

"The Atlantic
to fit precisely
of the United N
* * * enhance t
ing peaceful sol

WS ITS SESSION



The New York Times

te of their
ur armed
adowed by
rations of
I have ac-
om the De-
comment
ry security
th Atlantic
ation..

stantly par-
a proposed
bate in the
I have no
n responsi-
of foreign

of our na-
the Presi-
and the peo-
es, the mil-
thing more
artner.

pact, with
s so closely
d strength
ble deserve
their ap-

Atlantic
as impor-
y as pos-
omb. Not
e nations
and com-
ed by ag-
and our
hat a na-
resist ag-
fighting
North At-
any ag-
tunity to
e by one,
especially
European
lie with-
stant and
ortant to
occupa-
carried its
s east of

agreement
balance of
a Atlantic
y furnish-
ready be-
very. It
world to
the dan-
most. It

that neither American food, nor American wealth, nor even American arms can—in themselves—save Europe from aggression. In the final analysis, Western Europe can be saved only by the Western Europeans. But to save themselves they must have the will and the means to resist. This will to resist is developed partly by possession of the means and partly by the assurance they would be adequately helped in sufficient time. Without these means and without these specific assurances of aid, any nation of Western Europe, if threatened by aggression, might fall the victim of despair. And that despair is worth a hundred divisions to an aggressor on the march. The North Atlantic pact and some military assistance will provide both an assurance of aid and the means to resist. Together they can produce a will resolute enough to fight and firm enough to forewarn aggressors.

Strategically, the North Atlantic pact would enable free nations of the Old World and the New to funnel the great strength of our New World to the ramparts of the Old, and thus challenge an enemy where he would transgress. At present the balance of military power is centered in the United States, three thousand miles from the heart of Europe.

It must be perfectly apparent to the people of the United States that we cannot count on friends in Western Europe if our strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with a promise of later liberation. Yet that is the only strategy that can prevail if the military balance of power in Europe is to be carried on the wings of our bombers and deposited in reserves this side of the ocean. It is a strategy that would produce nothing better than impotent and disillusioned Allies in the event of a war.

Unless plans for common defense of the existing free world provide for the security of Western Europe, these people cannot be expected to stake their lives on the common cause. As long as

the helplessness of Western Europe would invite military aggression, its increasing prosperity shall grow more tempting to the armies from the East. Not until we share our strength on a common defensive front, can we hope to replace this temptation with a read deterrent to war.

Without Western Europe, the New World would stand alone, an island of embattled freedom in a hostile and despotic world. Western Europe must count on us if it is to survive. And we must count on Western Europe if we are to endure.

Although the North Atlantic pact is an agreement on policy for our common defense, it is evident that policy without power is like law without enforcement. Anticipating this very vital corollary to moral commitment, the President, in his Inaugural Address, stated our position:

"I hope soon," he said, "to send to the Senate a treaty respecting the North Atlantic security plan."

"In addition, we will provide military advice and equipment to free nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security."

Bearing out this principle a military-assistance program is obviously an essential sequel to the pact.

I know of no other expenditure that can produce greater security at a more reasonable cost than investment in a timely defense of the borders of Western Europe.

There is no accounting system that can compute our profit and loss in a mutual security plan. The priceless profit that we can realize is the profit that comes in the prevention of war. And if we fail to prevent it, our losses will be obscured in blood.

Today the United Nations convened in General Assembly here in your city of New York. The North Atlantic Treaty strongly reinforces the lofty aims of the United Nations Charter. Instead of twelve separate and divided North Atlantic states, we now have in signatory form, within the community charter, a powerful and cohesive group of nations, united for their common defense, and joined together in concert for peace. Out of an assortment of anxious members we have created a resolute body of nations, better equipped to work for peace through United Nations.

If the neighborly association of nations concerned with their mutual welfare is offensive to the greater community of nations, how then can we hope to find the broader understanding that may someday bind us together in peace?

If to be resolute is to be hostile—then we shall have to endure the slanders of those who call us hostile. For their slanders are the expressions of angry resentment from jackals denied their plunder.

There was installed in Washington last week a new Secretary of Defense, entrusted by the President with the grave responsibilities of that position. On this Army Day, I pledge to him, as I did before to his predecessor, the integrity of the United States Army in its honest effort to speed the process of unification.

Because we recognize that the Army is no better than its role in a unified plan in defense of the nation, we have chosen as our theme for Army Day, 1949, a slogan which reads: "The United States Army—Part of the Team—for Security!"

And although tomorrow will mark the twenty-second year of an Army Day observance, I would happily propose we end it. For if in ridding ourselves of Army, Navy, and Air Force days—we could also rid ourselves of the competition they tend to kindle—then we might better join hands in a single National Security Day.

RIL 6, 1949.

of U.N. Assembly Session

done in
s. They
without
Universal
rights and
ention on
n a con-
the de-
ticed by
be held
w York,
United
her op-
nly to
toward
ervance
out the
and say
ss, that
ems on
hat the
day the
nterna-
a peace
te high-
through-
se prin-
izes the
nterna-
ould be
all the
he fifty-
d here
em has
er, and
pledged

to observe its principles faithfully.

This Charter and this organization are the primary instruments of international peace. The Charter provides, as you all know, that all other obligations which individual nations or groups of nations may accept must be subordinated to and must be in accordance with those set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. Every representative here, therefore, is pledged to the view that the United Nations is the supreme international body. It alone can give a common impetus and purpose to the efforts for peace made throughout the whole world.

Warns of Faint-Hearted

World-wide security, and surely that is our objective, can be found only in a world-wide organization, and so I ask you, as I have the right to ask of you as President, not to allow yourselves to be deflected from your purposes, deflected, perhaps, by the faint-hearted, perhaps by the cynical, perhaps by the mischievous. We have got to support, we are obliged to support, and we shall support the United Nations and its ideals. The phrase I should like to use is the phrase of President Truman, and

that is "unflinching support for the United Nations."

This support must be unflinching, and not casual, not intermittent, not lip-service. There must be unflinching, steady support for the United Nations and its objectives. That should be our watchword, and by so doing what we shall be trying to achieve is simply this: The heartfelt desires of the ordinary man and woman everywhere. What do they desire? Not very much; just peace and justice and decent standards of living, for themselves perhaps, but mainly for their children. Surely they have the right to that after two World Wars, and we have to help them to get it.

The governments of the world, therefore, must keep faith with their peoples. The League of Nations failed to prevent the second World War not by its own failure, but because certain governments in the world did not support the League. The peoples of the world certainly will support the leaders here today who strive to help the United Nations at all times, and who remember that their efforts must be devoted to the carrying into effect of three great objectives; firstly, international peace; secondly, international justice; and thirdly, international welfare.

S, SATURDAY, APRIL 9, 1949.

BRITISH PRAISE U. S. FOR REARMING PLAN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, April 8—The announcement that the United States Government would ask Congress for authority to rearm Western Europe had been confidently expected here for some months. Nevertheless it has evoked deep gratitude and praise on the part of official and diplomatic circles. The Times, London, will say tomorrow in a leading editorial:

"History knows no more dramatic chapter than the discovery by the United States in less than two years of its full stature and responsibility as a world power in peacetime."

The newspaper will declare that since General George C. Marshall, when he was Secretary of State, announced the European Recovery Program at Harvard twenty-two months ago American foreign policy has been "consistent and clear-sighted." Terming the contemplated Military Assistance Program complement of European Recovery Program The Times will describe the aim of the United States foreign policy as to set up "such a bulwark that there will be no aggression, while the arts of peace revive and flourish."

Official British quarters and diplomats here have carefully followed each stage of the protracted North Atlantic treaty discussions in Washington. To them today's announcement merely formalizes a situation that has been developing over prepared lines since last July when the United States Government discreetly and with a minimum of publicity sent Maj. Gen. A. Franklin Kibler and seven aides to attend as "observers" secret staff talks here of the Western Union alliance.

COVERT

Eu

Robber Slain by Crack Shot
VANCOUVER

Dulles Says Reds Don't Plan War

By FRANK STEWART, Religion Editor

"Under conditions now prevailing, Russia does not contemplate war as an instrument of national policy.

"During the three and one half years since fighting has stopped, our foreign policy has too largely been made by the military."

These were crisp assertions today by John Foster Dulles, U. S. delegate to the United Nations, in a keynote address before 400 Protestant leaders of the country at Hotel Cleveland.

Dulles spoke on "Leadership for Peace" at the opening meeting of a national study conference on "The Churches and World Order." The group, representing 35,000,000 Protestants, will be in session through Friday.

In the audience were many Protestant leaders of the United States such as Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam of the World Council of Churches; Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr of New York, eminent theologian; Bishop John S. Stamm, president of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America; Bishop William Scarlett of St. Louis, presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church, and Dr. Walter Van Kirk of New York, nationally-known radio speaker.

Charts Plan for Peace With U. S. as Leader

Dulles charted a plan for world peace in which he said the United States must assume responsibility of leadership. This, he declared, should involve:

PREPARATION to take some chances for peace.

POSITIVE and not purely negative action.

FELLOWSHIP and not mastery.

COMPASSIONATELY human attitude.

Discussing the possibility of war with the Soviet government, Dulles asserted: "I do not know any responsible high officials, military or civilian, in this government or any other government, who believe that the Soviet state now plans conquest by open military aggression.

"It can be assumed that the Soviet state would use the Red Army if its leaders felt that their homeland was imminently and seriously menaced. That is why, in our statement on Soviet-American relations made two and one half years ago, we said that the United States should not seek military bases so close to the Soviet Union as to carry an offensive threat that is disproportionate to defensive value.

Opposes Trying to Intimidate Russia

"That is why our fellowship with the peoples of western Europe, and particularly Scandinavia, ought not to seem to bring United States military might directly to Russia's border.

"War is neither useful nor inevitable, and whether or not it comes depends most of all on the quality of United States leadership. With all of the assets, moral and material, of which it now disposes, our leadership ought to be able to assure peace."

Dulles, an internationally known Presbyterian churchman, was forthright in his criticism of military leaders.

The
North Atlantic
Pact

COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
AND THE PRESERVATION
OF PEACE, SECURITY, AND
FREEDOM IN THE NORTH
ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Publication 3462
General Foreign Policy Series 7

Released March 1949

DIVISION OF PUBLICATIONS
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

A Treaty for Collective Defense

THE CONVERSATIONS begun in Washington in the summer of 1948 among representatives of the governments of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States have resulted in agreement on the specific terms of a treaty providing for a collective security arrangement among nations of the North Atlantic area. The text of this proposed treaty, commonly known as the North Atlantic Pact, is now released for public discussion. It is expected that the signing of the treaty will take place a few weeks hence.

The Pact has its roots in the common heritage and civilization of the peoples living on both shores of the North Atlantic Ocean. These peoples have ties not only of cultural background but of a common, ingrained faith in the dignity and worth of the individual, in the principles of democracy, and in the rule of law. Two world wars have taught them that their security is inextricably linked together, that an attack on any one of them is in effect an attack on all.

Developments in Europe since the ending of hostilities in 1945 have revealed the true dimensions of the task of restoring economic health and political stability to postwar Europe. At the same time these developments have demonstrated, in emergency after emergency, the identical security and economic interests shared by the democratic countries of the North Atlantic community. From the problems of immediate postwar relief to the economic crisis disclosed by the bitter winter of 1947, and from attempted Soviet intimidation of Greece and Turkey to the Communist overthrow of democracy in Czechoslovakia, each emergency has required practical action from the democratic nations. In turn, each action has created closer ties of cooperation and has emphasized the need for joint defense on a continuing and intimate basis. The purposes and proposed method of such a defense have now been made public in the text of the North Atlantic Pact.

Purposes and Objectives: The North Atlantic Pact is a brief and simple document. The powerful impact it can be expected to have on world affairs derives from three factors: (1) the stature and

strength of the states which have indicated their intentions of becoming members of the arrangement; (2) the precarious world security situation to which it will bring a corrective influence; and (3) the developing unity of the North Atlantic community, historically evident throughout more than a half century of increasing interdependence but here formally recognized for the first time.

The preamble of the Pact declares that :

"The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

"They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

"They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

"They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security."

Commitments Under the Pact: In the first article of the treaty the Parties specifically reaffirm their obligations under the Charter to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved, not only with each other but with any nation, by peaceful means and in such a manner that peace, security, and justice are not endangered and to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

In subsequent articles the Parties undertake the following commitments:

1. To strengthen their free institutions, promote conditions of stability and well-being, and encourage economic collaboration;

2. To maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack;

3. To consult if the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any one of the parties is threatened; and

4. To consider an armed attack on any one of the Parties as an attack against all and, consequently, to take such individual and collective action, including the use of armed force, as each Party considers necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

By entering into the North Atlantic Pact the United States would reaffirm its determination expressed in the United Nations Charter

to participate in "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression". It would undertake, in cooperation with the other Parties to the treaty, to maintain and develop adequate capacity to resist armed attack. By entering into this arrangement it would recognize the fact that any armed attack upon any nation party to the treaty would so threaten the national security of the United States as to be in effect an attack upon the United States.

Under the United States Constitution the Congress alone has the power to declare war. This constitutional question, however, does not present a real obstacle to the Pact. The United States certainly can obligate itself in advance to take such action, including the use of armed force, as it deems necessary to meet armed attack affecting its national security. The fact that the fulfilment of a treaty obligation—as far as a declaration of war is concerned—depends upon the action of Congress does not inhibit the United States from undertaking the commitment. It is believed that the spirit underlying the North Atlantic Pact, as well as its language, correctly expresses and makes clear the determination of the American people to resist such attack by whatever means may be necessary.

Armed Attack: Article 5 of the Pact comprises a solemn engagement that each Party will exercise honest and genuine judgment in determining what action is necessary for the restoration of peace when another Party has been attacked. The purpose of the Pact is to strengthen the peace by making clear that the Parties are prepared to do their utmost, individually or together, to maintain it and to act together if any one of them is attacked. The Parties to the Pact believe that they have the most to lose and the least to gain from another conflict. They are convinced that, while defeat may mean complete disaster, even the victor in a modern war loses more than it gains. They are convinced that war itself must be prevented. The North Atlantic Pact is their joint effort, in keeping with the spirit and obligations of the Charter of the United Nations, to insure peace and prevent war. It is an agreement among nations which have given clear proof that they do not wish war, that they wish only to live in peace and security, and that they will defend themselves when attacked.

The clear intention of the Parties to the Pact to take united action, coupled with the preparation of the means to do so, should remove the danger of miscalculation by any potential aggressor that he could succeed in overcoming them one by one. If a similar clear indication

of the firm intention of the free nations had been given early enough in the course of Nazi aggressions, the Axis Powers might well have stopped before they precipitated a war in 1939. Faced with sufficient firmness, potential aggressors have always paused. Firmness does not in itself provide solutions of the underlying problems, but it does increase the readiness of ambitious nations to seek solutions by negotiations rather than by force.

The North Atlantic Area: The mutual assistance provisions of article 5 of the North Atlantic Pact will apply to the territory of any of the Parties in Europe, North America, and the Algerian departments of France; and to the occupational forces of any Party in Europe, as well as to the Atlantic Ocean north of the Tropic of Cancer. It may be enlarged as other states become Parties to the agreement.

Membership in the Pact: The original signers of the Pact will be Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and also Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal if they wish to sign. In addition, the text of the proposed treaty provides that the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other "European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area" to become a Party to the Pact.

Various considerations make it impossible to contemplate all or part of Germany now becoming a member of the North Atlantic Pact. The question of Spain's participation in the Pact is a matter for decision by all the members, most of whom do not now consider that Spain should be included.

If any other European countries which do not become original signatories indicate an interest in the North Atlantic Pact, inviting them to accede would be a decision to be taken by the members as a group in conformity with article 10.

Organization: The Pact provides for the setting up of a council on which each of the Parties will be represented and directs that the council "shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time". The council itself is required to "set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5."

Duration of the Agreement: The North Atlantic Pact contains no time limit. It provides that after 10 years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties may review the treaty to determine whether any changes

would be desirable in the light of the international situation at the time and the progress made in developing, through the United Nations, methods of assuring international security on both a universal and a regional basis. It provides also that after 20 years any nation may withdraw from the treaty after giving one year's notice.

After signature, and ratification through the constitutional processes of the individual countries, instruments of ratification will be deposited with the United States Government. The treaty will come into force when the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have been deposited. For the other signatory states, and for those states which become Parties at a later date, the treaty will come into effect on the date of the deposit of their individual ratifications.

The Atlantic Pact and the United Nations

The Pact and the United Nations Charter: The Atlantic Pact is a collective self-defense arrangement among countries of the North Atlantic area who, while banding together to resist armed attack against any one of them, specifically reaffirm their obligations under the Charter to settle their disputes with any nations solely by peaceful means. It is aimed at coordinating the exercise of the right of self-defense specifically recognized in article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It is designed, therefore, to fit precisely into the framework of the United Nations and to assure practical efforts for maintaining peace and security in harmony with the Charter.

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter recognizes that the Member Governments have "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Such measures, however,

(6)

6

are to be reported immediately to the Security Council, and do not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council "to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

Article 5 of the Treaty specifically provides that measures taken by the Parties as a result of an armed attack on one of them shall immediately be reported to the Security Council and shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

The primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the Security Council. The obligations undertaken by the Parties to the Atlantic Pact do not affect their obligations under the Charter and are subject to present and future obligations with respect to actions taken by the United Nations "to maintain or restore international peace and security". Article 7 of the Pact explicitly states: "This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security." In other words, everything done by the Parties under the Treaty must be done in accordance with their obligations under the Charter, the provisions of which, wherever applicable, are paramount.

Comparison With the Rio Pact: While the North Atlantic Pact and the Rio Pact are both collective arrangements within the framework of the United Nations, they differ in certain respects. They are similar in that an armed attack against one of the Parties is to be considered an armed attack against all the Parties, and both provide for consultation in the event of any situation threatening the security of the Parties. The chief differences are these: (1) The Rio Pact contains voting provisions with respect to the decision of the organ of consultation, this organ being the Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics which have ratified the Pact, or the Governing Board of the Pan American Union which may act provisionally as an organ of consultation until a Meeting of Ministers can take place. The Atlantic Pact does not contain such voting requirements. (2) The Rio Pact specifies the measures which the organ of consultation may agree upon. Each party of the Atlantic Pact agrees to take "individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

(3) The Rio Pact has specific provision for procedures to be followed in the case of conflict between Parties to the Pact. The Atlantic Pact does not contain such a provision.

In contrast to both the Rio and Atlantic Pacts, the mutual assistance treaties the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has made with her satellites are bilateral in character and by their language are directed primarily against renewal of German aggression. The way in which these arrangements are related to the United Nations Charter is not clear. They contain no specific reference to article 51 of the Charter, and the connection with the United Nations is given in vague and generalized phrasing. The Bulgarian-U.S.S.R. treaty of March 18, 1948, for example, merely states that: "The present Treaty will be implemented in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization."

Added Strength to the United Nations: The Atlantic Pact is designed to help bring about world conditions which will permit the United Nations to function as contemplated at the San Francisco conference. The expectation that the cooperation among the Great Powers pledged during the war and reflected in the Charter would be continued has not been realized. The most important of the peace settlements have not been agreed upon, and, largely because of Soviet obstruction and abuse of the veto, the United Nations has not yet become so fully effective in achieving collective security as had been hoped. (6)

Since the signing of the Charter it has become progressively clearer that serious misconceptions prevail in the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Union concerning Western civilization and concerning what is possible and what is impossible in the relations between the Soviet Union and the world at large. A major contribution which the United Nations and which United States foreign policy can make is to dispel these misconceptions by means consistent with the Charter.

In the field of international relations efforts of the Western powers to reach agreements providing genuine solutions for many of the most important postwar problems have thus far proved fruitless because of Soviet intransigence. Nonetheless, the Parties to the North Atlantic Pact solemnly and specifically reaffirm their obligation under the Charter to settle any international dispute by peaceful means and in such a manner that peace, security, and justice are not endangered. In the Pact they pledge themselves anew to strive toward that end. (6)

The North Atlantic Pact speaks in clearly understandable language. It defines the security of the North Atlantic area and the consequences

of infringement upon that security. It should thereby enhance the likelihood of reaching peaceful solutions to pending problems by making clear the consequences of resort to force.

Under existing conditions the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter will be advanced exactly to the extent that the Pact may be able to strengthen the security of the peoples in the North Atlantic area. Its relation to the objectives of the United Nations Charter was summed up in these terms by Warren R. Austin, United States Ambassador to the United Nations:

"The North Atlantic pact provides most persuasive evidence that aggression is unwise and that peaceful collaboration is the course that should henceforth be adopted.

"Emphasis should be placed on the character of the action that is proposed. The aim is to discourage aggression by showing a firm determination to resist armed attack. Its character is defensive. Its object is peace. . . .

"The use of force provided for by this pact is of the same character as that provided for by the United Nations Charter; namely, to prevent war. It promises prompt resistance by interposing collective force against an aggressor nation.

"Conclusion of the North Atlantic pact would reduce the likelihood of war. It would increase the prospects of peace. It would help us turn to a major task of the United Nations—the substitution of pacific settlements for armed conflict."

The Atlantic Pact and United States Policies

President Truman's "Point Three": President Truman's Inaugural Address was both a statement of American principles and a program of action, a reaffirmation of the policies which have guided the United States in world affairs and a selection of the means to be used to make those policies most effective. The four major courses of action he

announced are dependent one upon the other and all of them depend upon the day-to-day execution of the whole body of United States foreign policy which expresses the character, the way of life and the intent of the American people. The principles which have led to the great actions of the United States in the past are those which now give power and moral substance to the cooperation the United States looks forward to establishing with the other countries of the North Atlantic area. The people of the United States, the President declared:

" . . . believe that all men have a right to equal justice under law and equal opportunity to share in the common good. We believe that all men have the right to freedom of thought and expression. . . .

"The American people desire, and are determined to work for, a world in which all nations and all peoples are free to govern themselves as they see fit and to achieve a decent and satisfying life. Above all else, our people desire, and are determined to work for, peace on earth—a just and lasting peace—based on genuine agreement freely arrived at by equals."

The third of the four major courses of United States action outlined by President Truman was directed squarely at a peace "based on genuine agreement freely arrived at by equals." Principle and method were tied clearly together.

" . . . we will strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression.

"We are now working out with a number of countries a joint agreement designed to strengthen the security of the North Atlantic area. Such an arrangement would take the form of a collective defense arrangement within the terms of the United Nations Charter.

"We have already established such a defense pact for the Western Hemisphere by the treaty of Rio de Janeiro.

"The primary purpose of these agreements is to provide unmistakable proof of the joint determination of the free countries to resist armed attack from any quarter. Each country participating in these arrangements must contribute all it can to the common defense.

"If we can make it sufficiently clear, in advance, that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur."

Cooperation for World Peace: The United States has vigorously supported the United Nations and the related agencies. In his Inaugural Address President Truman stated again the determination of the United States to continue to search for ways to strengthen their

authority and increase their effectiveness. This determination has led and will continue to lead to practical action—aid to the war devastated areas, aid to Greece and Turkey, the effort to secure agreement on the international control of atomic energy, the European Recovery Program, cooperation in establishing the Organization of American States, the proposal for a cooperative world program of technical assistance, and the joint action in protecting the security of the North Atlantic area. These actions are based on the assumption that each Member of the United Nations is obligated to observe in all of its relations with other countries the principles it pledged itself to support when it signed the Charter.

Security Arrangements: United States policy recognizes that the United Nations is not yet the perfected instrument of world security. The United Nations was founded on the premise of Great Power cooperation. Its structure is therefore such that, if any one Great Power is unwilling to cooperate, it can seriously impede efforts for peace within the organization. Soviet obstruction in the United Nations, with excessive use of the veto, and Soviet failure to live up to its obligations under the Charter have prompted Members which are active in support of the purposes and principles of the Charter to take steps to assure the freedom and independence of certain Members of the United Nations. The United States has taken part in some of these actions and has given support, both moral and material, to others. President Truman's message to Congress on March 17, 1948, referred specifically to the Brussels Pact:

" . . . This development deserves our full support. I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to do so."

This policy of support was given a broader context three months later when on June 11, 1948, the United States Senate, by an overwhelming vote, recommended:

"Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

"Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

"Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security."

World Wars I and II demonstrate that the security of the United States is directly related to the security of Western Europe and that the nations on both sides of the North Atlantic are bound together by a natural community of interests. The Atlantic Pact is a formal acknowledgment of this relationship and reflects their conviction that an armed attack can be prevented only by making clear in advance their determination collectively to resist such an attack if it should occur. Such a collective security arrangement is necessary, in the view of the United States, to protect the North Atlantic community and its own security.

By enabling its members to confront a potential aggressor with preponderant power—military, economic, and spiritual—the Atlantic Pact will help to restore the confidence and sense of security which are essential for full economic and political stability. Its political, psychological, and military values are each important and, in fact, inseparable. By reducing the chances of war, by increasing confidence and stability, and by providing the basis for effective collective defense should it be necessary, the Pact can aid materially in establishing in Western Europe the atmosphere necessary for economic recovery and bring closer the fuller life which is possible in a cooperative world society adjusted to the peaceful uses of modern scientific and technical advances.

The ability of freedom-loving peoples to preserve their independence, in the face of totalitarian threats, depends upon their determination to do so. That determination, in turn, depends upon the development of healthy political and economic life and a genuine sense of security. A belief in this power of self-determination led the United States to embark upon a policy of assisting Greece and Turkey through the Greek and Turkish Aid Program, and later, the European countries through the European Recovery Program. The United States is now contemplating entry into the North Atlantic Pact as a means of giving effective support in the area of collective security to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set forth in the Charter. If the American people approve this step, the government's objective will be the same as the one on which United States policies now converge, the restoration to international society of the conditions essential to the effective operation of the machinery of the United

Nations and the progressive attainment of the objectives stated in the United Nations Charter. In the words of President Truman:

"We are moving on with other nations to build an even stronger structure of international order and justice. We shall have as our partners countries which, no longer solely concerned with the problem of national survival, are now working to improve the standards of living of all their people.

"Slowly but surely we are weaving a world fabric of international security and growing prosperity."

The Atlantic Pact and the European Recovery Program

The North Atlantic Pact is a necessary complement to the broad economic coordination now proceeding under the European Recovery Program, but there is no formal connection between the Pact and the ERP since the latter includes countries which will not participate in the Pact.

7 In the view of the United States, the Pact and the ERP are both essential to the attainment of a peaceful, prosperous, and stable world. The economic recovery of Europe, the goal of the ERP, will be aided by the sense of increased security which the Pact will promote among these countries. On the other hand, a successful ERP is the essential foundation upon which the Pact, and the increased security to be expected from it, must rest.

✓ The Atlantic Pact and Military Assistance

A military assistance program is now being considered by the executive branch of the Government. This program, another measure for securing peace for the United States and other peace-loving nations,

envisages aid to the members of the Pact as well as other friendly states of the free world. As President Truman stated to the Congress in March 1947: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. . . . Totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." Since May 1947, military assistance has been provided to several countries under this policy.

While the North Atlantic Pact does not expressly commit the United States to furnish military assistance to the other Parties of the Pact, the decision to do so by the United States would be one way in which this nation could logically contribute to the mutual aid concept expressed in article 3 of the Pact. It is not intended, however, that one nation should carry on its shoulders the entire burden of maintenance of the security of the North Atlantic area. The United States is one of the contributors to this effort. The United States is fully aware that it does not have available unlimited supplies and that it is essential that its own armed forces be adequately equipped. Allocation of such military equipment as is available for transfer to other countries must be made in such a manner as will serve the over-all security interests of the United States.

In accordance with the principle of self-help and mutual aid, the other members of the Pact have already taken action to further the security of the North Atlantic area. Their efforts toward reestablishing sound economies are a vital provision of self-help in the security arrangements. The military budgets already carried by many of these countries, despite the tremendous load of economic recovery expenditures which they are undertaking, are an added expression of their intention of helping themselves and of not relying solely or even principally on United States assistance to maintain their own security and that of the North Atlantic area.

The Pact and European Integration

Economic and Political Cooperation: The North Atlantic Pact is made possible by the strides the Western nations of Europe have taken toward economic recovery and toward economic, political, and

military cooperation. The core of the economic recovery effort is the European Recovery Program and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), composed of the 16 countries receiving American aid through the United States Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). The 16 countries in the OEEC and represented on its Council are the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Western Germany also participates fully in the OEEC. The Charter of the OEEC pledges the continuing effort of these countries to increase production, modernize industry, stabilize their finances, and balance their accounts with the outside world in order to make their full contribution to world economic security. Lines of action to increase cooperation through 1952 have been prepared. Support and aid to this integration has also come from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, of which the United States is a member.

The progress toward economic cooperation has been paralleled by moves toward a closer political integration of Western Europe. The outstanding instance is the Brussels Pact signed on March 17, 1948. The Brussels Treaty System, or "Western Union" as it is sometimes called, originated in a speech delivered by British Foreign Secretary Bevin in the House of Commons on January 22, 1948. Mr. Bevin stated that the concept of the unity of Europe was accepted by most people, but that the question was whether it should be achieved by the domination of one great power using police-state methods or by mutual cooperation and assistance. He believed the time ripe for a consolidation of Western Europe and proposed the linking by treaty of the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) as the "nucleus of a Western European unit" which would include other countries of free Europe.

Military Cooperation: The Brussels treaty provides that the five member countries shall give "all military and other aid and assistance in their power" to a contracting state that is the object of armed attack in Europe. The Consultative Council set up by the treaty established a Permanent Military Committee of high ranking military experts and also arranged for periodic meetings of the Ministers of Defense of the member countries. The Permanent Military Committee was given the task of planning an integrated defense organization and a common defense policy which would coordinate the military forces and resources of the five countries. Since July 1948, United States military representatives have been participating in a nonmember status in the work of the committee.

In September 1948 the five Ministers of Defense approved an integrated military command organization headed by Viscount Montgomery, as chairman of the Commanders in Chief of the Western European Ground Forces, British Air Marshal Sir James Robb as Commander in Chief of the Air Forces, and French Vice-Admiral Robert Jaujard as naval "Flag Officer" of the Committee. In October 1948 the Consultative Council approved the common defense policy, based on the Brussels treaty objectives and on the United Nations Charter. The Permanent Military Committee is currently coordinating the military resources of the five countries in a supply program which is expected to reveal what the Brussels Pact countries can do for themselves and each other in this respect and the extent to which they may find it necessary to supplement their supplies with military equipment from the United States.

The Atlantic Pact and U. S. Security

Discussions of the security functions of the North Atlantic Pact by United States representatives have emphasized the following considerations: The security of the United States would again be seriously endangered if the entire European continent were once more to come under the domination of a power or an association of powers antagonistic to the United States. Continental Europe was lost to the Allied Powers in World War II before the United States became an active participant. It was regained at great risk and at an enormous loss of lives and expenditure of material and money. Today, the weakened condition in which the nations of Europe find themselves as a result of the destruction and privation of war has afforded a golden opportunity for a new aggressor. It is clear in this case—as it is clear, in retrospect, in the case of Nazi Germany—that dominance of the European continent, once attained and consolidated, could be the first step in a larger plan of attack on Great Britain and then on the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. The problems created by this possibility of progressive and sustained aggression are legitimately the concern of United States security planning. The maintenance of the freedom and independence of the countries of Western Europe is of pre-eminent im-

portance. It is believed essential to the security of the United States, therefore, that it consolidate the friendships and support which it now enjoys from free and friendly nations, and that thereafter it should seek through peaceful means to reduce the area within which any aggressor can effectively apply pressure.

The last two great wars have proved that a major conflict in Europe would inevitably involve the United States. The North Atlantic Pact, it was pointed out, is designed to give assurance that in the case of such a war there will be a coordinated defense in which the actual military strength and the military potential of all the members will be integrated into a common strategic plan. Article 4 provides that the Parties to the Pact shall consult when the territory, independence, or security of any of them is threatened; article 5 insures assistance to any Party subject to armed attack. The last war proved clearly that an aggressor nation can best achieve its results by picking off democratic countries one by one, dividing and splitting these countries through propaganda and other tactics so that they are incapable of coordinated defense. The essence of the North Atlantic Pact is that this is not to happen again with respect to the signatory countries.

These preventive and defensive actions have a vital significance for United States security, but they do not by any means overshadow the broad, constructive security actions which are enjoined by the Pact. The United States and its people believe that the most certain and effective security action open to any nation is a cooperative effort, through the United Nations and other avenues of negotiation, to eliminate war and the conditions which lead to war. This policy finds expression in article 2 of the North Atlantic Pact:

"The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1949