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The Lessons of Korea, 1950.

THE LESSONS OF KOREA -

HAVE WE LEARNED THEM?

Sunday, October 8, 1950

I plan, dear friends, to devote the next few lectures to a discussion of the problems which this serious hour of crisis presents to every thoughtful person. In so doing, we shall all bear in mind, I am sure, that no one has all the answers to all of the questions.

~~And I am sure that no one has all the answers to all the questions.~~

It is clear that the crisis in which we find ourselves is a profound one, and is destined to be a prolonged one. This crisis, brought about by seeming irreconcilabilities between East and West, between what we choose to call the free world and the totalitarian world. We ought to realize that we have to think of these problems not in terms of months, but of years, even of decades of a generation or more. And what will be the end result of the conflicts which are developing, no one can foresee. I think the world will be very different from what it is now, and both our democratic societies and our totalitarian societies will be radically changed. Such changes are taking place even now, at this very moment, before our very eyes.

Our Western world has known such prolonged political-ideological conflicts before. The long and agonized period of the Crusades, the Protestant Reformation struggle with its attendant wars and upheavals, the struggle all through the 18th and the 19th century

for the Rights of Man symbolized by the French Revolution and its doctrines, and the American Revolution, the long and bloody conflict of Nationalism asserting itself in the modern world, particularly in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In each case the struggle was long and bitter; the issues were often confused; and the outcome was not at all what either the victor or the vanquished had expected. In each instance no final decision was ever reached, and after much blood-letting, much remained unsettled; many problems remained unresolved. Some of the basic issues of those struggles assumed later on other controversial forms and reappeared in different times on newer battlefields.

Some definite gain did accrue to mankind as a result of these struggles, and some definite losses. Fortunately, in most of the instances the gains outweighed the losses.

It is well to bear in mind that history seldom decides issues in a final and clear-cut manner as we would wish it to. It is well to remember that military victories however great seldom guarantee the causes for which these military victories were won. The two victorious World Wars in our own lifetime for freedom, democracy and peace should convince us of this unpalatable fact.

And so, as we move deeper and deeper into the uncertainties and tensions of our age of crisis, we ought to keep a few simple truths or facts - or try to keep them - constantly before us, to help us in our thinking, perhaps help us to find some piece-meal solutions here and there for the over-all problems for which there probably is no one simple solution.

In the first place, we ought to try not to be impatient. No quick relief from tension is in sight, for no quick solution is available. There are those who are impatient, who hope for some preventive war which would quickly and for all time settle this bothersome, troublesome problem of ours. Voices have been raised in our country for such a decisive, preventive war, but apart from the shocking immorality of a preventive war, it is a futile notion dictated by sheer impatience and by a vast ignorance of all that is likely to be involved in a war wherein half of the world will be pitted against the other half, a war which is likely to leave our world one vast heap of smoking carnage, a war of brutal attrition, devastation and exhaustion of everyone. It is

stupid and criminal to speak of a preventive war.

We ought to try not to be dogmatic in our economic and in our political thinking. We ought not to yield to the temptation of over-simplification. It is not all white on one side and all black on the other. What is good for us may not be good for other peoples. There are many types of democracy in the world, and there are already quite a variety of types of Communism in the world. We find it not impossible to get along with a Communist state like Yugoslavia. Why must it be impossible for us to get along with a Communist state like China, for example? We ought to remember that in poverty-stricken and in backward lands, such as those of the Far East, this thing which we call Communism takes on the character of a social revolution, the character of a struggle for land reform long overdue, and the demand of the long-suffering and long-exploited peasant masses of that world for freedom from abuse of the predatory and feudal undemocratic regimes under which they have lived and from foreign imperialism.

I came across the other day a rather revealing analysis of what has taken place in Korea from the pen of General Bonner Fellers, who was for quite a number of years and may still be on the staff of General McArthur. General Fellers makes this observation:

In combat against Red Asia, we would face troops as spirited and formidable as were the North Koreans.

The combat effectiveness of the North Korean Army in its advance on Pusan astonished military observers. It was well-equipped, well-trained, and well-led. Its morale was high. The Koreans had been given something to fight for; it was land.

In the Orient, ownership of land is a mark of rare distinction. If one owns even a tiny dab of land, it lifts him into an entirely different social and economic level. When the Reds took over in North Korea and China, large landed estates were, at least temporarily, divided among the tenants who had been farming them. The land owners, instead of being killed, were given small plots of their own land with the opportunity to work with their hands alongside their former tenants.

The North Korean lives in the present. He is not concerned with what is certain to be an ominous future. He hated Japanese occupation; he likes what has happened since. He fought for what appeared to be his new economic freedom.

There is reason to believe that all Asiatics under Red domination will fight as well as the North Koreans fought initially.

The democratic system and the capitalistic economic system of the Western world have been experienced by the Eastern world largely in terms of colonialism and exploitation. So the words have no particular appeal to them as they have to us. There is a vast social ferment going on in that ancient world of the submerged masses of mankind, and these explosive human forces cannot be contained or extinguished. They must be given their play.

And therefore, in my humble judgment, for us to attempt to intervene in every instance and in every land when a revolution breaks out tinged with Communism or a civil war in which one side is or may be called Communistic, is to commit ourselves not only to police the whole world, but also to sit on the top of a volcano. It is also to commit ourselves to defend every reactionary, incompetent and corrupt regime in the world, as well as to impose a uniform political and economic orthodoxy upon the world. And life is altogether too fluid today to permit such regimentation. There is too much of a ferment in the world, and neither we ourselves nor any grouping of powers in some new Holy Alliance can permanently erect and maintain dikes against these propulsive, revolutionary and onrushing social forces.

So I believe we ought to try not to be dogmatic, not to talk and think in terms of slogans, catch-words, and most especially not in terms of smear-words. There are forces around us in the world - economic reactionaries, professional militarists, religious organizations - who would like to panic and stampede us into an all-out and immediate military, global show-down with Communism. It would serve their interests, interests of power, profit or prestige. But these forces are not interested in democracy or freedom. They will certainly not serve the best interests of mankind.

In order to help save our people and ourselves from this dogmatism and from these attempts to panic our people to dangerous acts, we ought to try very hard to keep all channels of free thought open in our beloved country. We ought to be alerted and on guard against any attempt to stifle the exercise of free speech and of free thought in

this country. And that's our only salvation, and I am afraid that the trends in our country recently have been in the direction of terrorizing free Americans and to have rigid conformity and orthodoxy. We must guard ourselves against that. I shall have more to say on this matter in one of the future lectures.

And so at this grave hour of crisis we ought to try not to be impatient; we ought to try not to be dogmatic; and as Americans, we ought not to over-estimate our strength. We are not all-powerful! The brilliant victory of General McArthur at Inchon and Seoul has seemingly crowded out of our minds the dark and bitter thoughts of the heart-breaking three months' series of defeats and retreats which preceded it - defeats and retreats which were not at all anticipated and certainly not strategically planned. Men have a way of forgetting unpleasant experiences.

There was a real danger of our forces' being driven into the sea. And by whom? Not by the powerful armies of China or of the Soviet Union. By a relatively small army of one half of one of the smaller and less significant ~~armies~~ ^{states} in the Far East, a state which possessed no air force and no naval support. It is said that we were unprepared. Decidedly we were unprepared. But why? We spent during the last four years some fifty thousand million dollars in our military establishment, and yet we were unprepared to fight the paltry army of North Korea. Some of the military lobbies have a way of unloading responsibility upon the American public whenever things go wrong. Military set-backs are always due to a lack of adequate appropriations.

Well, that's not quite the case. The Congress of the United States has not been niggardly in its appropriations to our military establishment. Fifty billion dollars were voted in the last four years. And did these fifty billions buy for the American people? This is from the Congressional Record:

No new tanks, no new navy, no big guns; only \$1 and \$7 has gone to buy arms. Most of the money went for salaries, for supplies, for freight, for other services performed. Tax payers in four years of Cold War put up a record of \$50,000,000,000 for military defense. At that price more than twice the full cost of World War I. The American public was assured that it was buying security. It explains to a large degree why the United States now is setting out to meet the world armed largely only with World War II equipment and supported largely with wartime

plans and ships against a potential enemy that has 170 well-equipped and well-supported ~~additional~~ divisions.

We were not prepared in spite of our all-out preparedness to fight North Korea. Will we be better prepared next year to fight say, in Indo-China or Thibet or Iran or a dozen other places where Communism might erupt? Will we ever be prepared to leap-frog all over the globe to check Communist eruptions? And are we through in Korea? What if the North Koreans continue to fight, reenforced by Chinese aid? We will have a major war on our hands, and our occupation forces will be pinned down in that part of the world, and Western Europe will be open for Communist invasion.

I mention these things because these are ideas that are passing through all of our minds - fears, apprehensions. I mention these things so that the recent, gratifying, brilliant victory will not confound our thinking about the omnipotence of our arms. We are not all-powerful, and we cannot alone save the world from Communism. The Charter of the United Nations did not contemplate that the United States should police the whole world. The Charter of the United Nations contemplated collective action for collective security.

Be it remembered that we marched into Korea alone. We asked for United Nations approval of our military intervention after we had acted. And we acted alone not only in the case of Korea, concerning which the United Nations, after all, had expressed a judgment and was greatly involved in the situation, had studied the problem, had sent a Commission there to study the situation, but simultaneously we acted also in connection with Formosa. We ordered the 7th Fleet to the waters around Formosa without consulting the United Nations, and thereby, practically intervening in the Chinese Civil War. And we also pledged support to Indo-China. None of the other nations of the other democratic bloc didnot feel called upon to take such sudden and decisive action. We did. In fact, they were at first greatly bewildered by our action. Many Europeans - I happened to be in Europe at the time - were sceptical, many were critical, many were cynical, because they felt that they were not party to the decision which had been taken by the United

States. That is why the appeal of the United Nations for cooperation and support was so coolly received. Most of the nations responded merely with lip service, token aid, and to this day really, when you come to sum it all up, it is the Americans that are fighting in Korea. Practically no one else. We have already suffered some 30,000 casualties.

We have a great stake in the preservation of freedom and democracy in the world, and because we are the greatest and the wealthiest democracy in the world, we have the largest stake, but not the exclusive one by any means. We alone cannot save democracy and freedom in the world. We must not undertake commitments which are clearly beyond our powers to make good. We must not act alone, hoping that others will come along. They resent such involuntary involvement.

At the time that General McArthur visited Formosa and had that famous interview with Chiang Kai Shek, the friendly press in Europe - I'm not speaking now of the hostile press, the Communist press - the friendly press in Europe, the thoughtful press, was very critical of the action which had been taken by the United States. In the case of Formosa concerning which the nations of Europe were not consulted, the New Statesman and Nation of London had a big editorial on August 12th called "The Menace of General McArthur".

If war begins between China and the United States on the issue of Formosa, the aggressor will not be the Communists. Such a war, which could scarcely be confined to Asia, would be the doing of General McArthur, who is apparently making something like a private alliance with Chiang Kai-shek and the group of racketeers who surround him. In discussing military plans with Chiang Kai-shek, General McArthur is not in any way acting for the United Nations.

When McArthur allows Chiang-Kai-shek to talk of reconquering China with American help, we wonder whether the American people are now so completely the victims of war propaganda that they can be bamboozled into so wicked and disastrous an imperialist adventure. We cannot believe that the British Commonwealth will allow itself to be dragged by General McArthur into an "intervention" which would drive all the Asiatic peoples into the Communist camp.

There is a United Nations. It behooves us to channel all matters involving aggression through the United Nations! It behooves us to wait upon the decision of the United Nations! At its behest we shall act. At its behest we shall pool our own military contribution with that of other nations to check aggression! Let us move as part of a U.N. unit, not forcing the hand of the United Nations, not tying the United Nations as a tail to our kite!

To this end, a permanent U.N. force under U.N. military staff to police the world which was envisaged by the Charter, is clearly long overdue. Article 43 of the U.N. Charter states:

All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

This would give the United Nations the prestige and the authority which it requires, and what is to me all-important, it would protect our own government, our own State Department, from making decisions under the impact and stress of propaganda here at home. I cannot help thinking - I may be wrong in this - I share with you my thought in this matter - I cannot help thinking that if our administration had not been subjected to the vicious and sustained attacks upon it by the political opposition in this election year on the subject of its tolerance of Communism in government posts and its policy in China, which it branded as pro-Communist, - I say, I cannot help thinking that if, in this election year our State Department, our administration had not been subjected to this violent and ruthless smear campaign of being Communistically inclined, it would not have rushed into the Korean campaign so precipitously and so unprepared.

I cannot help thinking that if our government had recognized the de facto government of Communist China, as India had gone, Great Britain had done - for there is no other government in China today - if that had happened, that the clear line of our recent attitudes towards China were pointing to, a non-military solution of the Korean problem could have been had. But the administration was terrorized by a campaign of virulence, the like of which we had not experienced in our country for many years, a campaign symbolized by a name like McCarthy, a campaign culminating in the Communist-control bill which President Truman called, putting our government in the "thought-control business". And if that had not taken place this year, an election year, our government would not have reversed its policy so radically in the case of Korea, in the case of China, and the situation might have been entirely different.

In January of 1949 our government declared that Korea would not be defended by us because there was little that we could do there. In June 1950 we were marching in to Korea with our military forces. In July 1949 we had acknowledged publically that we were unable to do anything more for China. The situation was beyond us. In June 1950 we were sending our fleet to the waters of Formosa.

I started out by saying that things are not white or black although it is easier to think in such clear-cut terms. With reference to Korea, I came upon this article which appeared in our local Press a few days ago:

President Syngman Rhee of the Korean Republic was described today as "the United Nations' greatest liability in drawing plans for a united, peaceful and democratic Korea".

Rhee was accused of sabotaging previous efforts to unify the country "because he was afraid that his corrupt reactionaries would be defeated by a more liberal coalition".

These charges were made to me (writes this newspaper man, Ernie Hill of the Press-Chicago Daily News) by Stewart Meacham, former United States adviser to Lieut. Gen. John R. Hodge, commander of American occupation forces in Korea after the war.

Meacham, now a private citizen after spending a year as labor adviser to Gen. Hodge in Korea, declared that the United States and other free western nations suffered in Korea because the people believed we were behind Rhee's administration.

Meacham disclosed that Rhee and Gen. Hodge worked up a violent dislike for each other because of Rhee's arrogance and his refusal to introduce democratic ideas into his country when it was liberated after 50 years of Japanese rule.

"Gen. Hodge and the Russian military leaders would have gotten together on unifying the country in an election if Rhee had not made wholesale arrests of those he considered his enemies," said Meacham. "He created such intense hatreds that negotiations fell apart.

"Rhee apparently feared that he could not win a nation-wide election. So he sabotaged unification.

"After he won in the south, he frequently told his country in public speeches that they should prepare for the day the Americans leave when it would be possible to attack and conquer North Korea."

Meacham stated that Rhee was elected president because of political assassinations and intimidation that broke up a moderate liberal coalition.

"As in so many countries," Meacham said, "the choice was between the Communist extremists and Rhee's extreme reactionaries. Two moderate leaders, Lyuh Woon Hyung and Kimm Kuisic, were making progress toward creating a middle party party for the great majority of the people to support. Lyuh Woon Hyung was assassinated by a young terrorist. Kimm Kuisic believed he would be killed if he continued. So he quit and the liberal elements were forced to vote for the Rhee slate rather than the Communists."

I read this, not because I am prepared to underwrite all that is in this article - I have not had an opportunity to investigate the facts - but's clearly not all white or all black.

And as regards China, the position of our government a little over a year ago was very clear. In a letter of transmittal of all the documents concerning the U.S. relations with China dated July 30, 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote the following:

The reasons for the failures of the Chinese National Government appear in some detail in the attached record. They do not stem from any inadequacy of American aid. Our military observers on the spot have reported that the Nationalist armies did not lose a single battle during the crucial year of 1948 through lack of arms or ammunition. The fact that was that the decay which our observers had detected in Chungking early in the war had fatally sapped the powers of resistance of the Kuomintang. Its leaders had proved incapable of meeting the crisis confronting them, its

troops had lost the will to fight, and its Government had lost popular support. The Communists, on the other hand, through a ruthless discipline and fanatical zeal, attempted to sell themselves as guardians and liberators of the people. The Nationalist armies did not have to be defeated; they disintegrated. History has proved again and again that a regime without faith in itself and an army without morale cannot survive the test of battle.

And the Secretary of State proceeds to list the staggering amount of military aid which we gave Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalist government, and he concludes:

A realistic appraisal of conditions in China, past and present, leads to the conclusion that the only alternative open to the United States was full-scale intervention in behalf of a Government which had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people. Such intervention would have required the expenditure of even greater sums than have been fruitlessly spent thus far, the command of Nationalist armies by American officers, and the probable participation of American armed forces - land, sea, and air - in the resulting war. Intervention of such a scope and magnitude would have been resented by the mass of the Chinese people, would have diametrically reversed our historic policy, and would have been condemned by the American people.

That is true. That was true a year ago. It's true today, except that the American people have been propagandized largely by one of the political parties who believed that what happened in China was a simple case of a beautiful, formidable democratic government shamefully overthrown by the Communist conspiracy.

We abandoned this sound, realistic policy which had been advocated by General Marshall, by the State Department, President Truman under violent political attacks, so that we have up to now refused to vote in the United Nations to seat the legitimately appointed representatives of the legitimate de facto government of China, instead of which we have kept in the Security Council and the Assembly a ghost of a shadowy, non-existent regime to represent the four hundred millions of China. It is not yet too late for us to recognize China, to tie it to us, its historic friend, to win it away from Moscow, and thereby, to neutralize the influence of the Soviet Nation.

Well, the Assembly of the United Nations has now acted - and I believe it has acted wisely - in appointing a commission to try to liquidate the war in Korea as rapidly as possible and to work for a united, free, independent Korea and a government

democratically elected by all the people, peoples of the North and of the South, for the division in Korea between North and South is a purely artificial division. I hope that we shall be working for a negotiated peace and not the kind of a peace which Syngman Rhee is hoping for, a peace involving the total crushing of all forces opposed to him.

And so, if you ask me, what are some of the lessons which we might learn from Korea, I should be inclined to say first of all, not to act precipitously in any crisis - and there will be many developing in the world in the days to come - to act only through the United Nations, not automatically to equate our own interests with the interests of humanity, but to consult the world before we act - act collectively, contributing our full share, but only our full share, demanding others to do likewise, remembering in the days ahead not to be impatient, not to be dogmatic, not to over-extend ourselves, to over-estimate our powers.

Next Sunday morning I shall continue the discussion on the problems of this hour of crisis, speaking on the theme, "The Differences Between Democracy and Totalitarianism - How Real Are They".

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The Menace of General MacArthur

① If war begins between China and the United States on the issue of Formosa, the aggressor will not be the Communists. Such a war, which could scarcely be confined to Asia, would be the doing of General MacArthur, who is apparently making something like a private alliance with Chiang Kai-shek and the group of racketeers who surround him. In discussing military plans with Chiang Kai-shek, General MacArthur is not in any way acting for the United Nations. In seeming to countenance Chiang Kai-shek's naval and air blockade of China, in flat defiance of Mr. Truman's instructions, General MacArthur confirms the view that he is not a fit and proper person to be in charge of responsible military operations. It is beside the point for Mr. Harriman, on his return from Tokio, to deny that American policy in Formosa has changed; the fact is that Kuomintang bombing of China has recommenced. If America wishes to retain any right of leadership, she must at once put an end to Chiang's provocative actions.

So clear has the danger now become that even a paper as deeply concerned to avoid criticising America as the *Observer* has now bluntly and courageously pointed out that, whatever view may be taken of the legal position of Formosa, there can be no doubt that Mao Tse-tung would be justified in attacking the island if it is used as a base of military operations by Chiang Kai-shek. This is sufficiently obvious in London. In Asia, where opinion in this matter has an importance that in the long run must be the decisive factor, there is no country where it is not assumed that Mao must round off his revo-

lutionary victory by finally clearing out the rump of the Kuomintang from Formosa. American support of Chiang is very generally regarded as confirming every worst Communist allegation. Even in Washington the more thoughtful critics have long seen that Chiang's object in blockading China is not military, but rather to drag America into a new war against Mao. If he is allowed to succeed, what else are Chinese Communists to do except to sweep the French out of Indo-China, the British out of Malaya, and for that matter all Europeans off the Asiatic mainland?

The one Power to benefit if Chiang were to sink the world in this new blood bath, would be the Soviet Union, which would be presented with the double advantage that any chance of Mao's adopting a foreign policy independent of Moscow would be ended, and that America's attention and resources would be absorbed in the insoluble problems of Chinese conquest—leaving wide open to Soviet penetration more vulnerable areas in Europe and the Middle East.

The impression that this suicidal policy is seriously contemplated by some Republican imperialists is increased by the efforts of influential U.S. newspapers to reinstate the Kuomintang in public favour. The *New York Times* and *Time* magazine, for instance, even try to gloss over the appalling facts of Chiang Kai-shek's rule in Formosa. In fact, no post-war history makes such sickening reading. This beautiful island had been ruled efficiently, if severely, by the Japanese for the last fifty years. It was a show piece of Japanese administration. Naturally prosperous, it always grew a surplus

of food and had attained a standard of living and social welfare unapproached by any part of the Asiatic mainland. After the war, Chiang Kai-shek's troops, greeted with flowers and song by the Formosan people, first pillaged the island. Next came Kuomintang officials, who reduced the country to misery within a few months. They imported all the worst racketeers from China. Formosans were thrown out of all responsible posts; their places were taken by those who could best give or take bribes. When Formosans, under the leadership of their most trusted and reputable citizens, marched in thousands to protest, they were dispersed by armed police. The number of killed in the repression of these peaceable people remains uncertain. Experts who have inquired on the spot regard 5,000 as a low estimate. Since then, Chiang Kai-shek's followers have continued to prey on the country, adding, if possible, to their unpopularity by pressing into the Nationalist army tens of thousands of Formosans who may or may not, when the time comes, wish to fight for the people who have reduced their country to beggary.

When MacArthur allows Chiang Kai-shek to talk of reconquering China with American help, we wonder whether the American people are now so completely the victims of war propaganda that they can be bamboozled into so wicked and disastrous an imperialist adventure. We cannot believe that the British Commonwealth will allow itself to be dragged by General MacArthur into an "intervention" which would drive all the Asiatic peoples into the Communist camp.

✓ ②

France's Contribution

The French counterpart to the British rearmament programme has now been submitted to the United States in a memorandum which lays equal stress on the incompatibility of economic instability with security, and suggests that the programme cannot, or will not, be carried out unless France receives not merely direct financial help from America but mutual aid from the other European signatories to the Atlantic Pact. The provisional plan is that, given such assistance, the military budget should be raised from the £580 millions proposed for 1951 to an annual average of £666 millions over the next three years. It is estimated that this expenditure would enable the number of fully equipped French divisions to be increased from five to twenty.

The memorandum, however, makes it clear that France is in no mood to make this contribution unless her allies do more to build in Western Europe both ground and air forces adequate to provide a "deterrent" to the Soviet Union. More specific details of French proposals on these lines are promised later; but the idea seems to be that the Atlantic Treaty organisation should be strengthened by creating a supreme military command, a central planning body, and a financial pool out of which the defence expenditure by each of the member nations would in large part be met.

The Role of Germany

The movement towards rearmament of Western Germany is slow, but the direction is unmistakable. The Federal Chancellor seems unlikely to secure immediate Allied assent to his demand for a federal gendarmerie, but an increase in the strength of the police force in the Länder has been sanctioned, and in the American Zone a corps of 26,000 men—partly German, partly displaced persons—is being organised and armed for what are described as "guard duties." These measures, so far, are no more than a modest offset to the 50,000-strong *Bereitschaften* (said now to be armed with T.34 tanks) and the 200,000 lightly armed People's Police in the Eastern Zone. In the Defence debate, however, before Parliament adjourned, Mr. Shinwell appeared to suggest that the Government—presumably in consultation with France—is at least considering on what terms Germany might contribute to Western "security." Without German rearmament, which every sane person in Europe dreads, it would be interesting to know how M. Plevin imagines that his Western Union "defence force" of fifty divisions can be organised.

How Fast is Mobilisation?

As the situation in Korea deteriorated, and as panic buying created local shortages and forced up prices, the U.S. Congress tried to face the facts about mobilisation. Food prices have risen by more than four per cent. in the last month; the wholesale price index has risen by almost fifteen per cent.; and across the country commodity prices have been marked up, partly to take advantage of the rush to buy, partly for fear that price controls may be imposed.

The pressure on Congress for such controls is strong and increasing as foodstuff and other

prices creep up. The House last week passed a Bill providing for controls immediately prices rose by five per cent.—a move President Truman criticised as inviting such a rise. The President himself has asked for only partial mobilisation and controls, seeking, it seems, to avoid a head-on clash with the Republicans and anxious to avoid unpopular restrictions in an election year. This anxiety may have been baseless: the groundswell seems to have swept along opinion in Congress, especially since Mr. Baruch testified to the tortoise pace of controls in the last war and called for a drastic programme of mobilisation, including rationing, wage and price controls.

Mr. Truman, however, seems willing enough to be given adequate powers, provided it is left to his discretion to decide when they should come into force. He does not want to plunge into all-out mobilisation for a war which may prove local. The Republicans, too, have had second thoughts about giving the President drastic powers without some strings remaining in the hands of Congress. Certainly, there will be some check on instalment and mortgage credit, and the industrial programme for rearmament will keep in step with the calling of reserves and draftees. But, in spite of public sentiment, effective price controls may be held over for the time being.

Dollars for Franco

In April last year, General Franco's American sympathisers failed to "lobby through" a loan to Spain. This year, under the leadership of Senator McCarran, of Nevada, and over the protests of Senators Lehman and Morse, the Senate voted 65-15 to grant Spain \$100 millions, and reaffirmed the vote later last week. Apart from political pressure, in which the Catholic lobby played a large part, the Senators were undoubtedly influenced by the "availability" of Spanish bases in the event of war.

Both President Truman and Secretary Acheson criticised the Senate's decision, on the grounds that the money should not be handled through Marshall Plan channels without first consulting the European countries concerned with E.C.A. Both conceded that they had no objection to a loan arranged in the normal way through the Export-Import Bank—which turned down a Spanish application last year as a poor credit risk. But, if the House ratifies the Senate proposal, as seems likely, the President is unlikely to veto it. It has been attached to the omnibus appropriations measure, and the President must accept or reject this as a whole.

Agenda for Strasbourg

Events in the Far East have made their impact on Strasbourg. The Assembly, which last year was cribbed and confined in its debates by the Council of Ministers, is now being given a good deal more latitude. The politics of defence, a forbidding subject twelve months ago, forced itself on to the agenda on the first day; and discussion of the Schuman Plan (initiated by M. Schuman himself) is bound to raise another censored topic—the merits of inter-Governmental planning by O.E.E.C. as compared with supra-Governmental organisation.

On this subject it will be interesting to see

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the French reactions to the Tory proposals. The "Macmillan Plan", despite the fuss in the House of Commons, accepts all the Government's objections to M. Schuman's original proposals. It suggests that the Authority should be responsible to a Committee of Foreign Ministers of the participating countries, and that a national veto should be preserved—but not abused. A few weeks ago, similar suggestions, when put forward in negotiations by the Foreign Office, were dismissed by the French as tantamount to repudiation of the whole idea. But large concessions already made in Paris have now narrowed the gap between the French and British points of view.

The other subject which dominates this year's meeting is of course Germany, whose delegates are present for the first time. How far are the other nations prepared to go in integrating Western Germany into Western Union?

Prisoners in Iran

In our issue of July 29, Critic commented upon a letter he had received from sixteen political prisoners in Yazd. We have now been challenged by a correspondent, Mr. K. W. James, who says he has lived in Iran since 1945 and "has never heard of a single case of a person who could claim to be a 'leading' doctor, professor or poet being deported from Teheran." It is Mr. James who is misinformed. It may be that the best Anglo-Iranian circles are not fully informed about the systematic efforts of the Iranian authorities to repress all vocal critics of its policy. Among the prisoners at Yazd are:

Dr. Keyanouri, one of Iran's outstanding architects, and until recently Professor of Architecture at Teheran University;

Mr. Djavahari, a well-known writer, modern poet, journalist and teacher;

Dr. Yazdi, a first-class surgeon, Professor at Teheran University, Minister of Health in 1946.

Among others who have been imprisoned or sentenced to death in their absence are:—

Mr. Noushin—actor and producer, who founded the Ferdowsi Theatre and put on Persian translations of Western writers, including J. B. Priestley—sentenced to five years in jail, and deported to Shiraz;

Ehsan Tabari, authority on Persian literature, sentenced to death in his absence;

Dr. Keshavarz, Minister of Education in 1946 and a leading child specialist, sentenced to death in his absence;

Dr. Eray Eskandari, Minister of Commerce in 1946, sentenced to death in his absence and now in exile in Paris.

All these men were either arrested or disappeared after the attempt on the Shah's life in February, 1949, an attempt made by a Moslem fanatic. No charge of complicity in the attempt was made at their trials, but they were convicted for their part in organising the Tudeh Party in previous years—a party which was still legal in February, 1949. They were tried by military courts, constituted after their arrest; and their deportation was illegal because, in Iran, deportation is part of a sentence and must be announced at the trial. But nothing was said about deportation at their trials.

We have given the names of only a few of those under arrest or serving sentences. The list includes a number who had no connection at all with the Tudeh Party. Some, we are glad to hear, after protests in Iran and abroad, are being brought back to Teheran for a fresh trial.

THE LESSONS OF KOREA

By BONNER FELLERS

KOREA is of terrific moment to all Americans. It represents the first, epochal stand of the United Nations armed forces against the insidious, continuous encroachment of Communism upon free peoples.

After the President's fateful decision to intervene with ground forces, possibly no campaign was ever more brilliantly conceived and executed. Certainly never was there a more valiant fight against the enormous numerical superiority of a savage enemy. And this heroic action has given pause to Stalin. In endeavoring to spell out objectively the lessons from Korea, my only hope is that certain similar dangers now looming on the horizon may be avoided.

Valuable as well as dangerous conclusions may be drawn from the Korean front. The war there is a special war, almost entirely peculiar to Korea. We must keep in mind the fact that it is an unusual war if we are to profit by its lessons.

The same balance of forces, essential for success in Korea, would lead us to disaster against Russia.

When the President ordered our Army to support the South Koreans, we became involved in ground combat against the Red Forces from North Korea. Our forces are committed *at least* to the territorial restoration of the South Korean Republic.

The enemy has had neither air nor naval support. He is depending upon ground assault by vast masses of human beings willing to die and equipped only with normal infantry weapons. Our ground forces thus have the enormous advantage of unhampered support by our air and naval forces. With this balanced ground, sea and air team, unless Red Chinese or Russian Armies intervene, we shall soon crush the North Korean Reds between the jaws of General MacArthur's UN forces on the Seoul and South Korean fronts.

How would this same prescription for balanced forces, essential in Korea, succeed against Russia?

The Red Army, numerically, is immeasurably strong. Hitler hurled 220 crack divisions against it; he lost five million men dead or permanently disabled. Hitler's *Luftwaffe* controlled the air. His troops were well supplied, yet he failed utterly to kill off the Red Army.

In a war against Russia, should we follow our present intent to fight in Europe, our fleet and ground forces would have the full weight of the Red Air Force thrown against them until such time as the United Nations Forces could win the battle of the air. And with Russia's sixteen to twenty thousand land-based combat planes, winning the battle of the air would take considerable time and would be a costly assignment.

Meanwhile, our some fifty UN divisions, if we had that many in Europe, would be *chewed up* quickly by the Red Army if it started for Europe's Atlantic seaboard. In addition, our fleet and shipping would be subject to submarine attack. If the Russians have the new type torpedo

which seeks its target, our losses by sinking might be heavy.

Thus, it is obvious that in shaping the balanced force to meet Russia, we should avoid her enormous ground strength and build the best air force in the world. With air supremacy we know our bombers can destroy Russia's war potential. We would still need adequate ground and sea forces to support the air arm by holding strategically located bases. These bases, of course, must be located so that the full weight of the Red Army can not be thrown against them.

In combat against Red Asia, we would face troops as spirited and formidable as were the North Koreans.

The combat effectiveness of the North Korean Army in its advance on Pusan astonished military observers. It was well-equipped, well-trained, and well-led. Its morale was high. The Koreans had been given something to fight for; it was *land*.

In the Orient, ownership of land is a mark of rare distinction. If one owns even a tiny dab of land, it lifts him into an entirely different social and economic level. When the Reds took over in North Korea and China, large landed estates were, at least temporarily, divided among the tenants who had been farming them. The land owners, instead of being killed, were given small plots of their own land with the opportunity to work with their hands alongside their former tenants.

There was nothing especially magnanimous in this lifting of the masses at the expense of the "tops." The new Red governments had not the equipment to collectivize the land. Until Asia is industrialized, farm machinery can not be made available for collectivization. Consequently, farming must continue as in the past, by hand, by hoe, and an occasional beast of burden.

To date, the communization of Asia has not gone far beyond the stage of dividing the loot; so far the masses like it. Now the tenants *think* they own the land. They fail to realize that after it is collectivized, the communist governments will demand — as in Russia — some 80 per cent of the crop. It is this high tax which has turned the Russian peasants against collectivization.

~~But~~ the North Korean lives in the present. He is not now concerned with what is certain to be an ominous future. He hated Japanese occupation; he likes what has happened since. He fought for what appeared to be his new economic freedom.

There is reason to believe that all Asiatics under Red domination will fight as well as the North Koreans fought initially.

Koreans are not as ripe as are the Russians for psychological warfare.

General MacArthur is launching an intensive psychological campaign against the North Koreans. It has had considerable effect; it has induced many surrenders.

During combat, psychological warfare is a function of victory. As the tables begin to turn and the North Koreans meet adversity, we can expect it to induce mass surrender. But we have not convinced the North Koreans that communism is bad, because they now own land which they never owned before. The main task of disillusioning North Koreans or Red Chinese against communism cannot be accomplished until they see the real effects of communism. It will be some time before this can occur. In Russia, where communism has failed utterly, the people are ripe for a campaign of truth.

Operations which offer no decisive objective must be avoided.

Korea is not an essential element of our military strategy of the Pacific. If we were to move only to the 38th parallel, we would have no means of controlling events in the northern half of Korea. Should we clear all Korea of the Red menace, the threat from the north would tie up occupational forces of considerable size; and we would run the risk of becoming involved in war with Red China, or Russia, or both. In this case, our ground forces could not survive.

There is in Korea no target worthy of the steel of our strategic air force. The industrial plants which supply Red Korea are in Russia, immune to our air strikes.

A military victory can not be finally decisive because of the constant threat on the northern frontier. Although without a decisive military objective, there has already been a valuable by-product. The effect on the peoples of Asia has been electric. It has given them hope for the future.

We must never again permit ourselves to become engaged in any combat — anywhere — in which Stalin can decide the destiny of our forces.

The decision to intervene in Korea with ground forces placed us in an unenviable position. We were not ready.

As soon as General MacArthur built up sufficient UN ground forces behind our tiny perimeter about Pusan to enable him to hold, he undertook a most daring operation. He pared his Pusan holding forces to the bone; he pulled his last remaining occupational Division from Japan. With these, supported by the fleet and air force, he fashioned a highly mobile amphibious force, spearheaded by the Marines.

Under his personal supervision this force boldly stormed the Inchon peninsula and headed for Seoul. The objective was to cut off Red supplies flowing from the north, the bulk of which had to pass through Seoul.

The risk was enormous. Stalin, if he chose, could have poured 200,000 Red Chinese over the Manchurian border to bolster the Red Koreans. All the while Russia could maintain her neutrality.

Should Stalin have sent Chinese Red Forces to intervene — and he can still do so even after the North Korean resistance collapses — by sheer weight of man power alone, our UN forces could be destroyed or pushed off the peninsula.

This is a constant threat, not one which ends with a UN victory over the Red Korean forces.

Will Stalin elect to send vast reinforcements? The chances are he will not at this time.

For the first time since the cold war started Stalin has

been checkmated. Until now he struck and we reacted. Now General MacArthur has seized the initiative. Unless Stalin intervenes with Chinese Red Forces it is a mere matter of days until the Red Koreans south of Seoul must surrender or be destroyed.

General MacArthur is gifted with a genius for slaughtering his enemy and saving his own troops. In the Philippine campaign we buried more than 314,000 Japanese counted dead, while American casualties totaled slightly more than 60,000 dead, wounded, and missing.

The Red Koreans can find no comfort in the MacArthur record against Japan in the Philippines!

Nevertheless, in spite of this brilliant fighting, so long as UN forces occupy Korea, our Destiny lies in Stalin's hands.

He can lead us into war with Red China — or Russia.

He can permit us to win, then with the Red Chinese threat, pin down UN occupational forces for an indefinite period of time.

Stalin, like the god Setebos, as Caliban conceived him, can adopt either of these measures — "loving not, hating not, just choosing so!"

We can't stand more Koreans.

With one or two magnificent exceptions, the rather listless UN response with man power for Korea makes it clear that the bulk of the forces must come from the United States; we have — at the moment — already committed practically all our available combat units. Should our forces be required in other areas before the Korean war and occupation are resolved, we shall not have them.

For a long time, we have been participants in a war of nerves. Our first military operation in the containment policy has been so costly and trying that it is possible we may be goaded into war with Russia rather than accept a series of wars of the Korean type. Might not the certainty of Russia's producing the atomic bomb in quantity impel us to commit the unpardonable sin of launching a preventive war?

I am personally and unalterably opposed, as are nearly all Americans opposed, to preventive war. But there is sinister danger that we may be stampeded into one.

We shall face this certain danger of World War III until we abandon our present policy of depending principally on United States ground forces to contain communism.

War with Russia can still be avoided, but this will require a new type of leadership. It will require a new strategy based on prompt and overwhelming American air supremacy. The new strategy should include also a full scale psychological campaign to induce the enslaved Russian masses to demand a liberal government. These are the only two forces to which Stalin is vulnerable — Air Power and Truth projected through the Iron Curtain. We should exploit both these vulnerabilities to the limit.

We have tried to buy our way out of war with Russia with the Marshall Plan and other foreign aid. We have tried to bluff our way out by plans to arm our Allies and ourselves. We have tried to talk our way out in the United Nations. All these tries have failed. As matters now stand we are still headed toward war.

Now, if we are to avoid World War III, we must think our way out.