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Series IV: Sermons, 1914-1963, undated.

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The Recall of MacArthur - and what next?, 1951.



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THE RECALL OF MACARTHUR, AND WHAT NEXT?

April 22, 1951

This has been General Mac Arthur's week in the United States. General MacArthur returned after fourteen years of absence from his country as a conquering hero, and an enthusiastic and admiring people poured out in their millions from coast to coast to do him honor, to heap praise and adulation upon him, and every mark of esteem and affection has been shown him. This is as it should be. This soldier who is now closing his military career after having served his country faithfully for more than half a century, and served it with distinction and brilliance, is entitled to the gratitude and admiration of his countrymen. He led his country to victory in the Pacific during the last world war. He has been among the great military figures of our day. He performed well, with distinction, and successfully in the administration of Japan. It is altogether fitting and proper, then, that he should receive the acclaim and accolade of a grateful people.

His address before the joint meeting of Congress in which he pronounced his valedictory and in which he also outlined and defended his position which led to his dismissal, his address was an impressive and moving utterance, eloquent and free from rancor and partisanship, and it undoubtedly made a profound impression upon all who heard it. Underscoring the sincerity and non-partisan quality of his address was the earlier announcement which he made when he landed in San Francisco that he was definitely out of politics, that he would not consider any political office. His sole interest was the welfare of America.

Every patriotic American hopes that it will be given to General MacArthur, now relieved of his command - that it will be given him as a distinguished citizen to contribute out of his abundant knowledge and experience to the future thinking of his fellow-citizens on the grave and pressing issues which confront them. No longer bound by the inevitable restrictions which must be imposed upon military commanders



he will be free to express his opinions on the foreign policies of his government or upon any other issue without embarrassment to himself or to his government, and to have his opinions evaluated solely on their merits, and his opinions will carry then no other authority except that of their inherent logic and soundness.

I suspect, dear friends, that at least part of the remarkable demonstration for MacArthur was an implied criticism and disapproval and an evidence of the mounting impatience of the American people, not so much with the act of Mac Arthur's dismissal as with the confused and blundering and the improvisational character of the foreign policy of the present administration. Every American has been aware of the crisis of leadership in Washington. Americans have been catapulted within the year into a state of national emergency, though the character of this emergency has not been made clear to the people. They have been asked to assume in peace-time war-time restrictions and disciplines. Their sons have been drafted into the armed forces and their careers have been dislocated. The economic life of the American people is being threatened by an uncontrolled inflation. The wealth of the American people is being poured out all over the world to win friends and influence people, and yet, they are still in the dark as to what the foreign policy of our country really is.

What are we fighting for in Korea? If, as our government has stated time and again, the critical and the decisive area in which to resist possible Soviet aggression is Europe, why are we fighting in Korea? Why have we allowed ourselves to be caught in that trap, in that out-of-the-way corner of the world, where we have already committed a quarter of a million of our fighting men, where we have already suffered over 60,000 casualties, and where it is clear, judging by the testimony of the best military authorities, nothing can be hoped for but a stalemate. How long are we to stay on in Korea under conditions where a stalemate means suffering 1200 casualties per week? Are we to regard the defeat of the North Koreans and their being hurled back beyond the 28th Parallel as they have been sufficient evidence of victory, since their plan of invading South Korea has failed, and therefore, proceed to encourage



negotiations for the settlement of the peace, or are we to push on again through North Korea to the borders of Manchuria, as MacArthur once did when he led the American troops to the borders of Manchuria, hoping to bring them home by Christmas? What is our plan and why are not the American people informed of it? Do we plan to return Formosa to China, as we had pledged to do under the Malta agreement, or do we intend to hold it as part of what we call the natural defense line of our country in the Western Pacific, as Mac Arthur has been urging? Do we intend to hold Formosa, though it is clear that Formosa does not belong to us and never did, though we had publicly announced that it belonged to China and would be restored to China, and though we also announced not so long ago that Formosa was not ~~strategically~~ strategically important to us at all. Do we intend to come to an understanding with Red China, and there is no other government in China today. Do we intend to recognize China as Great Britain has done and as other nations have done, or do we intend to write it off as a possible neutral or as a possible friend or as a possible ally, and group it from here on within the Soviet Bloc of Russia and its satellites against whom we must prepare for an eventual, if unwelcome and unwanted war? Do we plan to resume political and military cooperation with Chiang kai Shek in his sanctuary on Formosa - Chiang kai Shek whom not so long ago our government branded as corrupt, incompetent, dictatorial, and whose own people drove him from China? If we do not intend to do that - and doing it would mean the perpetuation of civil war in China - if we do not intend to do that, then why are we sending military advisers and military supplies to Chiang kai Shek at the moment?

Are we against colonialism, as we have stated time and time again, as MacArthur repeated in his address the other day? Are we in favor of giving in to the imperial exploitation of the Asian peoples? If so, why are we backing with our arms at the moment the French in Indo-China. Are we for democracy against dictatorship, and is that our slogan and battle cry, and why have we been flirting and sending aid to one of the worst dictators in the world today, Franco in Spain?



Is peace around the corner, as we are frequently urged to believe by official pronouncements, or is war dangerously near, as we are as frequently urged to believe by similar official pronouncements emanating from the same sources? Are we to make our own country strong and secure against possible attack and aggression, or are we out on a global crusade to fight and defeat Communism all over the world wherever it rears its head? We have proclaimed both programs without equal ardor and often simultaneously.

The American people, my friends, patriotic, always ready to do that which is required of them to defend their beloved country and its free institutions, has now for a long time been kept in darkness or semi-darkness without real guidance and without real leadership, and they have been confused by our hesitant and fumbling and self-contradictory and bewildering foreign policy. And I suspect that the resentment which has resulted from this and the dissatisfaction of the American people express themselves as a part of this extraordinary acclaim which was given to General MacArthur. Of course, imbedded also in that demonstration was the political partisanship of certain Republicans who hope to use the MacArthur affair as a club with which to belabor the administration. The Republicans have no more clear, consistent and united opinion on foreign policy than has the present Democratic administration.

But the American people should not be misled into believing that in contrast to President Truman's lack of a clear-cut foreign policy, General MacArthur has such a positive, well-defined and well-reasoned policy. He has not! His judgment, even in military matters, is not infallible and has not been infallible, as was so fatefully demonstrated last November when he directed American troops to the borders of Manchuria and into one of the most disastrous defeats American armies ever suffered because he was sure and because his military intelligence assured him that the Chinese simply would not fight. Now, the Chinese had given ample warning to the world that it would fight if our armies approached the Manchurian border. Our Asian friends,



particularly India, likewise gave the world early warning of such an eventuality. MacArthur ignored them all; he knew better. He ignored the advice of the allies who urged our creating a neutral zone between our forces and Manchuria to avoid bringing the Chinese into the war. And when the Chinese struck, MacArthur expressed colossal amazement over the fact. This was a new war, he cried. Someone had taken him by surprise, and now that the Chinese did strike and did hurl our forces back in a disastrous retreat in Korea, because they were determined not to have hostile armies approach their critical power stations on the Yalu - now MacArthur would have us believe that we must adopt a new strategy, namely, the <sup>bombing</sup> ~~land~~ of Manchuria, the blockade of the coast of China, an economic blockade of China, and otherwise use our air and naval forces to ravage Chinese ports and cities, and the use of Chiang kai Shek's troops on Formosa in the hope that this will so weaken the Chinese nation of 400,000,000 of peoples, the most numerous nation in the world, that they will withdraw from the Korean war and thus, we shall score a complete victory in Korea. He, too, wants only a limited war. Everybody wants a limited war. It seems to escape us - the simple truth seems to escape us that we are not the sole judge as to whether a war should remain limited or not.

MacArthur would not dream of sending our ground troops into China. In his address the other day he stated, "No man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China." Nevertheless, he hopes to defeat China through bombing and blockade and the use of Chiang kai Shek's ghost army on Formosa, who would be helped by us to invade China and thereby open another front. This has been MacArthur's dream for a long time now. Last August, you will remember, before we suffered the terrible defeat in Korea, he had made a visit to Chiang kai Shek in Formosa and assured him of the great interest which the American government has in him and in his government.



Now these attacks upon China which General MacArthur~~xxx~~ is recommending would be tantamount to a declaration of war on China, that the Soviet Union which has a treaty of mutual defense with China might well be drawn into the war, and thereby, bring about the global war which nobody wants, which everybody fears, because nobody wants anything more than a limited war - does not seem to disturb the General very much. He dismissed this possibility in one sentence in his address the other day, in a statement that "the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our own moves." He was equally sure that China would not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. But China did, and we paid a frightful price for MacArthur's miscalculation!

The fact of the matter is, of course, that General MacArthur is undeterred by the prospect of a global war - not that he wants war. Not at all! But he is not undeterred by the prospect of it - a global war against Communism. We are equal to it, he believes. We can fight simultaneously both in the East and in the West - China as well as Russia and all of Russia's satellites. In fact, he stated in his address: "There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism."

Well, I am afraid - I am not a general, I am just a humble civilian, and I should not want to differ with the General on such matters, except that I do not believe in the infallibility even of Generals - I am afraid this is not defeatism. I am afraid that this is cold realism. Considering our showing in Korea after nine months of bloody fighting, we might well be more reserved in our expectations. We have had all that we can do to keep up our own end in the little country of Korea. In the second World War we did fight on two fronts - in the East and the in the West - but in the second World War we had Russia as an ally, and Russia broke the back of most of the German divisions at Stalingrad long before the Allies set foot on the continent of Europe. And in the second World War we had as an ally China. And in the second World War we had as allies the peoples of Western Europe who today do not want to fight on two fronts and who have made their position unmistakably clear in recent months. On



whom, then, does General MacArthur rely to to justify his exuberant confident? On Chiang kai Shek? In fact, the General seems to lay very little ~~wieh~~ weight upon the opinion and the judgment and the preferences of the Allies with whom we would have to fight a global war. In fact, in his entire address the other day there wasn't a single mention of the United Nations - an amazing thing - since he himself was the commanding general of the forces of these United Nations in Korea!

I am afraid that there is here a dangerous underestimation both of the strength of China and of Russia. We cannot defeat them any more than they can defeat us. In a war we and they can contribute to almost total devastation of the earth, but not to victory on either side. There are limits to our manpower, limits to our resources, limits to our budget. And if that is so - and I express only my judgment, if that is so, if we are not omnipotent, if we are not prepared to pour out our forces and sacrifice the lives of our young men endlessly, then we must not be thinking or talking in terms of a global war; we must be thinking and talking in terms of a global peace, which can only be had not through victory, but through negotiation and compromise, which is not appeasement, but only common sense. New efforts must be made now that we have driven the North Koreans out of South Korea, frustrated their attempts to conquer South Korea - we must now make every effort, using the good offices of friendly, neutral peoples of Asia, if necessary, to bring about a cease fire and to liquidate the Korean affair. Any prolonged stalemate will lead to the third World War. A limited war is only the prelude to an unlimited war. The North Koreans, judging by what we have been reading in the papers in recent days, seem to be ready to talk, not as they should, but they are eager at least to ~~begin~~ begin, to resume contacts and negotiations.

I believe that the Chinese government, too, has been sobered and the exaltation of the great victory of November is beginning to peter out, and the cost of a prolonged war in that part of the world is being brought on the Chinese politicians as well. This is the opportune moment. We lost so many in the last nine months. This is another



one of those moments, were an effort, a determined effort to be made for a peace conference, and every avenue should be explored before the contemplated major Chinese defensive is set in motion again, as is expected by military leaders in the next few weeks.

But whether MacArthur is right or wrong - and there may be an honest difference of opinion on that score - whether we should extend the conflict, as he urged, or whether we should confine the conflict, as is the present policy of the administration - I say, whether he is right or wrong, President was absolutely and completely right in dismissing him. He presumed to make policy, which is the sole function of the duly elected civilian authorities in our country. Under our Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and only the President. The same principle was enunciated earlier than in our Constitution in the Declaration of Rights of Virginia, which stated that "in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by the civil powers." When the general in the field acts or speaks as if he were superior to the President, you have in the making a military dictatorship. When a general is not in accord with his superiors, he has the privilege of resigning, and if he refuses to resign, there is only one avenue open for his superior, and that is to dismiss him.

General MacArthur forced a constitutional crisis upon the American people, and President Truman acted, rather belatedly, in the only way he could act - and I am confident that if MacArthur were President of the United States, he would have acted exactly as President Truman acted, only far more promptly and decisively.

Other Presidents of the United States have had trouble with their generals. President Lincoln, in the tragic days of the Civil War, had difficulties with generals who wanted to make policy for the American people. General McClellan, "Fighting Joe" Hooker - Lincoln got rid of them in quick order, not because they were bad generals, but because they were attempting to do that which under a democratic form of government dare not be done by generals in the field, or you have a divided country, wrecked and



torn apart.

President Truman had the problem of calling General MacArthur to order, you remember, last fall when MacArthur sent that famous message to the convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He compelled the General to withdraw that message, in which the General laid out a foreign policy for the American government. If President Truman had failed to act, he would have endangered our democratic system of government. He would have endangered further the whole grand alliance of the Atlantic nations which we have been fostering and trying to hold together, because those nations resented General MacArthur's intervention in foreign policy even more than the President of the United States did. They would not for long put up with it. They wouldn't tolerate in their own countries. And even the military men in the Pentagon and our own Joint Chief of Staff approved of his dismissal. Now they may have agreed with MacArthur's lines clear down the line, but that was not the line of the government, and it's not the business of military men to define policy for government, but only to execute it, so that General MacArthur's contention that the Chiefs of Staff agreed with him on his line has no bearing on the issue at all. He should have resigned his command, come to the country and urged the American people to adopt his line, but not to stay in the field as the Commander of the forces of the United States and of the United Nations and try to impose a line which was running contrary to the line and the instructions of his civilian superiors.

As you well know, I have been a consistent critic of President Truman's policy on Korea, and I have been sharply criticized for it. There are those who have jumped to the conclusion that the reason I have been criticizing President Truman is because I am greatly devoted to the Republicans. As you see, my position differs even more sharply from the position of the Republicans than it does of the present administration. When President Truman recalled General MacArthur, and I knew of the terrific criticism that would be heaped upon him as a result and the dark hours that he would be passing through as a result of doing that which I believed and many, many other



American citizens firmly believed he should have done - done earlier - I got in touch with one of my dear friends in Washington, who is the majority leader in the House of Representatives and told him that if he had an opportunity to speak to the President, to tell him that his enemy, Rabbi Silver, approves most heartily of what he has done. The next morning I had a telegram from Congressman McCormick in which he says: "I gave the President your message this morning which pleased him very much. The President asked me to extend to you his deep thanks. He was profoundly touched."

Well, I think other American citizens ought to take the trouble to have the President hear what they think of his action in this situation.

I conclude, dear friends, with this thought. I am glad that General MacArthur is in this country now, ~~xxxx~~ where he will be free to talk freely and to be as freely questioned and examined. I think he will contribute to a clarification of this difficult problem, for the debate will go on. I hope ultimately that as a result of this debate, there will emerge greater clarity and greater unity among our people. My own thought on this matter is - and I may be wrong - I am not omniscient - my own thought is that our administration under the present pressure, should not commit additional blunders in the Pacific which may fan the flames of the third World War. There can be no victory in Korea. The war in Korea must be ended and an honorable and negotiated peace is the only way out. A cease fire should be arranged. There should be the progressive withdrawal of all foreign armies from Korea, free elections should be arranged under the auspices of the United Nations for the United Korea, for the division of Korea is an unrealistic one and a dangerous one, following which China should be admitted to the United Nations, where it should have been admitted a long time ago, and Formosa should be restored to China where it rightfully belongs.

We are strong enough to take the initiative. There should be no thought of face-saving, false prestige. There should be thought only of liquidating a dangerous situation in a part of the world where our continued military intervention can do us and the cause of world peace no good. I hope that when the shouting is over and the emotionalism has spent itself and the American people, in their good common sense and



judgment settle down to face the realities of this problem, they will come to an approximation of some kind of a solution like the one I have been speaking about.





1/ This has been Gen. MacArthur's week in our country.  
He has returned, after 14 yrs. abroad for this country, as a conqueror - and an enthusiastic and admiring people, poured out, in its millions, from coast to coast to do him honor - to ~~break~~ frain and adulation upon him. Every mark of esteem and affection has been shown him.

2/ This is as it should be! This Hero who is now <sup>has</sup> 1/2 cent - with distinction closing his military career - and bulwark. He led his country to victory in the Pacific during the last world war. He has been among the great military figures of our country. He has performed well in Japan.  
It was altogether fitting and right that he should receive the acclaim and accolade of a grateful people.

3/ His address before the joint meeting of Congress in which he pronounced his voluntary and authoritative and defended his position which led to his dismissal, was an impassioned and moving utterance - ~~forthright~~ eloquent, ~~and~~ free from rancor and partisanship. It must have made a deep impression upon all who ~~listen~~ heard it.

4/ Underlying the sincerity and non-partisan quality of his address, was his earliest announcement in S.F. that he was definitely out of politics - and that he would not consider any political office. His sole interest was - the well-being <sup>& security</sup> of America.



5) Every <sup>free</sup> Amer. Soldier that it will be given to Gen. M. &  
~~now select~~ <sup>as a distinguished</sup> citizen, to contribute, out of his knowledge  
 and experience, to the thinking of his fellow-citizens on  
~~the~~ the past and pressing issues which confront them.  
 No longer bound by the unstable restraints <sup>which</sup> ~~imposed~~ <sup>upon</sup>  
 upon an ~~army~~ military commander, he will be free to  
 express his opinion on the major problems ~~of~~ <sup>his</sup>  
post, or upon any other issues, without embarrassment  
 to himself or to his post - and to have his opinions <sup>valued</sup>  
studied still on their merits, and <sup>as</sup> ~~conveyed~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~other~~ <sup>other</sup>  
 authority than that of their inherent superior democratic

6). I suspect that at least ~~a part~~<sup>the</sup> the remarkable ~~disproportionate~~<sup>and</sup> ~~of enthusiasm~~<sup>in</sup> war - was due an implied criticism and disapproval ~~not so much~~<sup>and growing impatience</sup> of the ~~compensational~~<sup>knowing</sup> policy of Mr. Truman. Every American has been witness of ~~leading~~<sup>leading</sup> in Washington - Americans have been asked to ~~be~~<sup>be</sup> catapulted into a state of national emergency; they have been asked to assume ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> war-time restrictions and deprivations; their sons are being drafted with the armed forces, and their careers dislocated; their ~~earnings~~<sup>income</sup> is being threatened by an uncontrolled inflation; their wealth is being poured out all over the world to win friends and influence people - and yet they see an ~~it~~<sup>it</sup> in the dark as to what the Am. foreign policy really is! ~~What~~<sup>What</sup> are we fighting for? Know ~~for~~<sup>if</sup> our govt. believe that the critical and decisive area to fight Soviet expansion is Europe?



Why have we allowed Trotsky to command 1/4 of us — 60000 — Stalin. How long are we to stay there — 1200

— Are we to regard the defeat — 38<sup>th</sup> significant victory push on — like Mao — Christians

— Do we plan to return Formosa — pledged — Red it as part of natural defense — Mao — does not belong strategically not worth the risk

— Do we intend to come to an understanding — Red China — recognize it (S.B.) — winding it off —

— Are we to resume pol. & military cooperation — China — branded — whose are people's — if not

— Are we against colonialism — looking forward — to do China?



Are we for democracy - then why are we flinching <sup>self</sup> ~~and~~ 9  
and asking France?

to place around the corner - as we are frequently  
summed to believe by special governments - as is  
most dangerously near as we are as frequently <sup>eyes</sup> ~~eyes~~  
to believe by the ~~same~~ similar special governments - even  
varying from the same source?

Are we out to make our own country strong and  
secure against attack and aggression <sup>all over the globe</sup> as we are out as  
a crusade to beat and destroy <sup>everywhere</sup> ~~everywhere~~ it uses it  
need. We have proclaimed both programs with equal order  
and of ten simultaneously.

The Am. people, <sup>pastors</sup> ~~pastors~~, <sup>do not</sup> ~~do not~~ ready to do what is  
required, them to defend their beloved country <sup>its</sup> ~~its~~ within  
have been left in the dark - without real guidance and  
leadership <sup>afterwards</sup> ~~afterwards~~ or have been confused by a <sup>confusing</sup> ~~confusing~~ hesitant,  
and self contradictory <sup>policy</sup> ~~policy~~.

2/ I suspect that <sup>the result of</sup> ~~the result of~~ the resentment and  
desire <sup>peers</sup> ~~peers~~ the Am. people, <sup>expressed</sup> ~~expressed~~ they a part  
the <sup>unprecedented</sup> ~~unprecedented~~ extraordinary acclaim <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~  
to war - <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>unprecedented</sup> ~~unprecedented~~ within - also <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>partisan</sup> ~~partisan~~  
shop of certain Republicans who help to as the Mex.  
affair as a club with which to belabor  
the administration. - The Republ. have here no more  
clear consistent, <sup>united</sup> ~~united~~ and in their foreign policy  
than have the admin. faces.



8/ But the Am. people shall not be misled into believing that (5)  
~~We~~ in contrast to Truman look 9 a do. out foreign policy  
We has a position, well-defined & well rounded one.  
Is that not!

① His judgment, even in military matters, is not  
unfallible - as well as fatally demonstrated last Nov -  
when he directed Am troops to the border, Mao - and  
with us, the most deserting defeat as armies ever  
refused - we, he was sure, that the Chinese would  
not start! The Chinese have given ample  
warning, that they would. An Asian Journal in Tokyo  
had warned seven early warning 7 such an eventual  
W. 10 warned them all - a circle as advice 7  
allies - neutral gov. Amoy? New York

② Now that the Chinese struck in K-dick-  
united not to have hostile armies approach them  
critical power - Stakes in the game - Mao-  
would have us adopt a new strategy and blockade  
the Coast 7 China other us on an air travel  
free to carry the Coast Chinese ports Takes -  
in the hope that they will so weaken their water  
7 400 un. - that they will withdraw from the K. War  
He, too, wants a limited war - as the us are the  
20 judg a to whether a war should remain limited  
a war - He would not draw 9 sending







defeatism" - I am afraid - not defeatism - cold realism ⑦  
condemning our showing in Korea - after 10 mo. of bloody fighting  
we might well be more reserved in our expectations

We have had all that we could do to keep up our end in Korea  
(a) In 2nd W. War - we fought on 2 fronts but Russia ally  
and so was China

(b) Allies - on whom we would have to rely - in event - was  
do not want to divide their effort - fight on 2 fronts  
unmistakably clear - on whom does Mao rely - to justify his  
stubborn Cheng Kai Shek - Lays little weight on their thinking!  
- No mention of UN

(c) I am afraid - understandable strong obj. Ch. Commun  
we cannot defeat them - they cannot defeat us - Dominate the  
earth - Limits to our manpower - resources - budget

(d) We want :: no think in time global war - global peace  
which can be had only through negotiation - compromise  
- which is not appeasement only cannot sway

(e) new efforts must be made - using 100 % of manpower  
known - to buy at least a cease-fire

(f) Any prolonged stalemate will lead to world war  
a limited war is a prelude to an unlimited war

(g) North Korean - seem to be ready to talk about China - Soviet  
a peace conference - should be seriously explored

- before the major Comm. offensive sets  
in - where all will be blowing 7 more extended conflict or collapse

9) But whether Mao is right or wrong - Truman can  
regret in dismissing him . He presumed



to make policy - ~~function~~ sole function of duly  
elected civilian authorities.

Under our Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, the U.S.

Chief of the Army and Navy, the U.S.

Same principle enumerated earlier in the Va. Declaration  
Rights: "in all cases the military should be under  
strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power."

When the General in the field acts as if he were superior to the President - you have <sup>the making of</sup> dictatorship - or he disrespects - resigns - or

were superior to the past  
status  
 when not in accord - resign - or he disavowed  
 as the Am. people

when out in action -

(a) We fired a ~~considerable~~ <sup>considerable</sup> number of rounds as the Am. people Truman acted, rather belatedly, in any way he could -

Was if President - would have acted no diff - and more promptly, I am sure

THE "Frighty Joe" Harkness

Mac - if President  
 more promptly, I am sure  
 Other Presidents (Lyndon B. Johnson, "Fighting Joe" McCarthy, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, Joe Biden, Kamala Harris)  
 (b) Had to release him before - lost Sept. Vietnam; Foreign Affairs  
 (b) If Tr. had paid to get (1) Endowed Ann.  
 during part (2) Endowed Grand Alliance - resented  
 with the Russians - Soviet Union

(b) If Tr. had passed to the  
 demand part (2) Eudayad Grand Alliance - resented  
 (c) Even the Military men in the Butayas - Joint Chuy  
 staff - approved - They may all have agreed - 'kin'  
 - not him part - not to make policy - but  
 execute it -



