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Some more observations on the coming elections, 1952.

SOME MORE OBSERVATIONS ON THE COMING ELECTIONS

November 2, 1952

In a few days now, dear friends, the tumult and the shouting of this campaign will be over; a new President of the United States will have been elected; a new Congress, a new State and municipal officials, certain bond issues will have been approved or not approved, certain constitutional amendments will be voted or voted down; and our world will settle down to its quiet, normal pace. The radio and television will be restored to its legitimate owners; newspaper headlines will resume reporting sensational crimes instead of sensational political speeches; our streets will be cleared of the banners and the handbills and the dodgers and the confetti; campaign buttons will have been either put aside or thrown aside, as the case may be; and on Wednesday morning we shall all awake with a sharp awareness that we have to go back to work, earn a living in order to pay our bills and our taxes, regardless of who is elected.

Those who know the difference between the Ashkenazi and the Sephardic pronunciation will appreciate the story told of a Jewish refugee who came to Israel finally after years of wandering about all over Europe, and as he landed upon the shores of the new State of Israel, he said, "Thank God, thank God. From now on, no more tsouris; from now on, nothing but tsaros."

It has been an exciting civil war during the last few months, but a civil war not with bullets, but ballots. That is the glory and the miracle of our democracy. We can change our public officials, if we wish; we can throw out one party and bring in another party in control of our government, if we choose; we can decide upon this or that issue as we wish without firing a shot; and when it is all over and the vote is in, the loser facilitates the winner, the ranks are closed, and the American people is one people, indivisible, carries on and marches on.

We sometimes grow weary, as I have grown weary, of this protracted campaign which lasts all too long and exhausts both the speakers and the listeners, the candidates and the voters needlessly, I might say, and it is well to remember in the midst of all

these unpleasant noises and fulminations that this is the open forum of a democracy. It is the apparatus and the technique of a free people to determine, to insure its freedom, to keep the reins of government in its own hands. There is no other way. Campaigns may be a little shorter and candidates may be a little more restrained in their utterances - and they should be from the President of the United States down - but after all, it is free and full expression of one's political views and preferences and are the very essence of a democracy. The only other alternative is that of dictatorship where you have only terror and submission and silence.

I want to recapitulate briefly some of the things which I said last Sunday morning in giving my observations on the present political campaign so that it will be tied up with what I am going to say this morning. I suggested that in my judgment there is little real difference between the two party programs and platforms, and that is why so much stress and emphasis is being laid on unessentials in this campaign and on the things only distantly related to the real issues. I suggested that in a two-party system, as ours, fortunately, we have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that there will be in both parties certain candidates of whom we cannot entirely approve. It is inevitable. And we cannot really expect the standard bearer of either party, who is called upon to keep his party united and lead them to victory, to begin to screen and to purge and to select one candidate from another. That is to disrupt the unity of his party on the eve of an election. I suggested that there were reactionaries in both parties and undesirable candidates. The question which the American voter will have to decide on this coming Tuesday is whether in his judgment the individuals of whom he does not approve are of such weight within the given party that they may determine the policies of the party, and again, whether the candidate at the head of the party, the Presidential candidate, is of sufficient independence and courage that he will be able to drop these undesirable individuals and carry on according to his program, his will. And on that score I indicated last Sunday morning that certainly on both candidates, the Republican and the Democratic, the American people have reason to congratulate themselves

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and the Democratic, who are clearly men of independent judgment, of courage, of leadership. They will lead their party. They did not seek the nominations; they were sought out, and both by their records have given evidence of integrity, of leadership, of purpose.

I indicated furthermore that as far as domestic issues are concerned, there is really very little difference between the two parties. Here and there a difference of emphasis, a nuance, naturally. I discussed the attitude of both parties to the Taft-Hartley law, for example, and indicated that both realized that there are changes to be made in it. One suggests that these changes be made by amendment, and the other, by complete re-writing of the law. On the subject of corruption, both candidates have indicated that there is much that needs to be done to clean up our national life. The Democratic candidate for the Presidency has spoken of the mess in Washington because the Republicans have spoken continuously of that subject. What the voters will have to decide is which candidate and which party can be trusted to make a more thorough job in doing what both parties, I believe, feel needs to be done. ✓

Both parties are in favor of tax reduction, of increased social security, of ~~more~~ price support of the farmers, help to farm cooperatives and to small business. There are certain differences naturally. The Democratic party favors, by and large, the continuation of price and rent controls, while the Republicans would like to do away with all of them. The Republicans favor state control of tidelands oil; the Democratic party is opposed to state ownership. The Democratic party would see a continuation of such projects as the T.V.A.; the Republicans would like to see more local and state control and administration and ultimate ownership of these projects.

This, I suggested, is a legitimate tug of war between two parties who are not to be characterized as reactionary on the one side and radical on the other, but rather as conservative, if you will, and liberal. It is a question of tempo more than anything else. Both are in favor of progress. Both would like to have greater security

for themselves, their families, the children of America. One would like to move forward a little more deliberately and slowly, without haste, and not to throw too much control of our national life in a centralized, bureaucratic government; the other party does not seem to be afraid of such a large-scale and rapid governmental assistance to the economic and social life of the country.

I am inclined to believe, too - and this brings me to the new issues - that there is very little basic difference between the two parties on the subject of foreign policy. Both parties are opposed to Communism here and abroad; both ^{are} in favor of collective security; both are in favor of continuing our alliances with foreign nations for the sake of making ourselves and democracy secure in the world; both are in favor of strengthening the United Nations.

I say that both parties are opposed to Communism, and what freedom-loving American is not opposed to Communism? Certainly, Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson, Governor Stevenson are wholeheartedly opposed to Communism. There have been under-cover Communists in certain departments of our government, and there are, as there are in every government on earth today - and it is the business of government to weed them out. Our administration has been rather slow at first in the process of rooting out these Communists from government offices. They had to be prodded by Congress. The administration feared at first that all this criticism was aimed to embarrass it, and as such, it refused to move as energetically as it might have at first. Thus, the President erred in calling all that agitation for the removing of Communists from government positions as a red herring. Secretary of State Acheson erred when, by implication at least, he came to the defense of Alger Hiss. But to attack the Democratic Presidential candidate, Governor Stevenson, for having made a deposition in the trial of Alger Hiss, stating that to his best knowledge, his character was good, is patently unfair. Many people, both Republicans and Democrats, were taken in. Many friends, acquaintances of Mr. Hiss

were taken in by this very clever spy. From that one should not jump to the conclusion that these men are, therefore, friendly to Communism.

In the process of exposing Communism and ^{subversive} ~~subversive~~ elements in our governments, there has unfortunately developed a dangerous trend in American life, which has come to be known as McCarthyism. It is the overshadowing inquisition which has come into American life. It consists of making wild and unsubstantiated charges which are tantamount to character assassination against all people of whose political views you do not approve, of those men and women, for example, who in the early days were associated with organizations which were dedicated to friendship with the Soviet Union at a time when the Soviet Union was our military ally in the last war, and when the government of our country did its utmost to create good will for the Soviet Union among the American citizens. It consists of trying to damn those people and smear them as Communists who favored a foreign policy with reference to China which our own government advocated at the time. You will recall the White Paper, which the Secretary of State Acheson issued in 1949 and which he said that the defeat of Nationalist China at the hands of the Communists was to be attributed to the corruption, the graft of the clique, the regime of Chang-kai-Shek himself, that the American government intends hereafter to withhold aid from Chang-kai-Shek. But these people who followed this guidance of our own State Department have been persecuted as Communists, and a witch-hunting has developed in our country, unfortunately, which spilled over into other areas of our national life - the academic world, where men and women are being asked to take special loyalty oaths, where an atmosphere of intimidation which endangers freedom, is being created.

I listened the other night, as many of you, too, must have listened, to the speech of Senator McCarthy in which he announced beforehand he was going to expose Governor Stevenson, present evidence to prove his close association with Communism and his leaning toward friendship with Communists, and by implication, being a Communist himself.

I listened to it very carefully and read it again the following morning in print, and I must say that there wasn't enough substance in that speech to roll into a pinch of snuff. Senator McCarthy showed that there were certain people around Governor Stevenson - his manager and those who helped him write his speeches - who had been members of the organization, Americans for Democratic Action, and that in McCarthy's eyes was enough to brand a person as a Communist. Actually, this organization is not Communist; it is anti-Communist. It is liberal, it is very progressive, but by no stretch of the imagination is it a Communist organization. And because these people who helped Governor Stevenson in his campaign were members of that organization and because one of them, he discovered, was a non-religious person and another one had criticized the F.B.I., therefore, by technique of imputing guilt through association, Governor Stevenson himself is guilty of pro-Communism.

This is the same technique which, you will recall, President Truman used against General Eisenhower, which I felt called upon to criticize. It is a dangerous technique. By that process you can tear this country apart.

I do not believe that the Republican Party has done enough during this campaign to set the mind of the American people at ease on that subject. General Eisenhower himself, when he visited the state of Senator McCarthy, stated that he did not approve of McCarthy's method. That wasn't quite strong enough. A few days ago in Chicago, in an address delivered by General Eisenhower in Chicago, he put his position more clearly, which is really the position of every patriotic American. He stated:

There has been considerable concern, and rightfully so, about methods to be used in rooting Communism out of our government. There are those who believe that any means are justified by the end of rooting out Communism. There are those who believe that the preservation of democracy and the preservation of the soul of freedom in this country can and must be accomplished with decency and fairness and due process of law. I belong to this second school.

The most crucial issue in this campaign, as I suspected long ago, came to be Korea. For a time both parties ignored Korea. Korea, which links us up with the whole issue of our administration's foreign policy in recent years. And it seems to me that it is on this issue that the administration is most vulnerable. The war in Korea which began as a police action in June 1950, is now in its third year. The long, drawn-out armistice negotiations which began in July 1951 have dragged on for more than fifteen months, have now broken down completely, and as you read in the columns of your newspapers, bitter and severe fighting is again going on. The casualties have mounted to over 120,000 and they are recorded at the rate of more than 1,000 a week. In Korea we seem to be in a bloody stalemate, an impasse. We are told that we cannot go forward for fear of precipitating a third world war; we cannot go backward for fear of losing face; and we have to stay in this dreadful stalemate seemingly indefinitely until something happens.

The administration has assumed no blame for the situation. And Governor Stevenson has vigorously defended the administration's position, as he has the entire foreign policy of the administration. By going into Korea, we prevented a third world war - that is the argument. We checked the spread of Communism in the Far East. Korea represents a great victory in our fight for peace, declared Governor Stevenson.

General Eisenhower, to use his own words, said:

The biggest fact about the Korean war is this. It was never inevitable. It was never inescapable. No fantastic fiat of history decreed that little South Korea, in the summer of 1950, would fatally tempt Communist aggressors as their easiest victim. No demonic destiny decreed that America had to be bled this way in order to keep South Korea free and to keep freedom itself self-respecting. There is a Korean war and we are fighting it for the simplest of reasons, because free leadership failed to check and to turn back Communist ambition before it savagely attacked us. The Korean war more, perhaps, than any other war in history simply and swiftly followed the collapse of our political defenses. There is no other reason than this. We failed to reason and outwit the totalitarian mind.

The argument of General Eisenhower and the Republican party is that we withdrew our forces from Korea in 1949, that in January 1950 Acheson announced to the world that Korea was outside the United States perimeter of defense in the Pacific, and in so many words, told the world that the United States has no intention of ever defending Korea. But in June 1950, when the North Koreans invaded South Korea, we sent our troops into Korea and began this war which has led nowhere.

General Eisenhower claims that with the administration helpless, seemingly helpless, he, as President, if elected, would like to have a hand in trying to get us out of this mess. He said that he would make a personal visit to Korea, take a fresh look, reexamine the whole situation, arrange for the training of more South Korean troops. In a population of 20,000,000 to take the place of American troops at the front lines, and if the war is to continue to supply the South Koreans troops with adequate arms and keep our own troops in reserve.

Now, the American voter next Tuesday will decide, among other things they are called upon to decide, whether they are satisfied to let things rest in the same hands as heretofore, hoping for something to happen, or whether they want a new leadership to make a fresh start, regardless how uncertain the outcome might be.

Now, on the subject of Korea I have my own point of view/^{of}which I am afraid neither Governor Stevenson nor General Eisenhower would entirely approve. And I expressed this point of view time and again in this pulpit and elsewhere. I am of the opinion that neither Governor Stevenson nor General Eisenhower has in this campaign really faced squarely the real issue, the great issue, the unescapable issue of our age which is confronting the American people and confronting the whole world, namely - how to work out an arrangement with the Soviet Union so that both the East and the West could live in the same world without continuing the psychological disasters of the cold war and without continuing the growing financial disasters of competitive armaments which

is draining the life-blood of the nations of the earth.

Korea, my dear friends, is only part of the picture. Behind Korea is China, and behind China is the Soviet Union. There will be peace in Korea if we can work out a working peace, a working arrangements, a "modus vivendi" with Moscow. But neither party in this campaign was willing to discuss this basic problem because both were competing for votes on the basis of their all-out anti-Communism, and I am afraid that quite unconsciously both parties are still dancing to the tune of McCarthy.

But whoever is elected - Eisenhower or Stevenson - will immediately be confronted with this problem. It is inescapable - it is inevitable - it touches everything in our lives, including our domestic economy. I am glad that General Eisenhower said that he will personally visit Korea if he is elected President. I wish that if he is elected, he will also go to Moscow. Governor Stevenson is right when he said that the Korean solution is in Moscow. I wish, too, that Governor Stevenson, if elected, would go to Korea and to Moscow, or invite Stalin here or meet with him in some neutral territory. But for goodness sake, meet! Break through this impasse! Much can be accomplished by face to face meeting of the heads of the two great powers on earth today. Why are we afraid of such conferences? Why do we shun them. What have we to lose? There is so much to gain!

My own attitude on Korea must be well known to you. I have spoken of it frequently. With many people it has not been a popular point of view at the time, but I see that generals are coming to talk that way today, statesmen. In my address of December of 1950, shortly after the Korean War began, delivered here in The Temple and printed at the request of friends, I stated:

The American people do not make our foreign policy. They did not send our armies unprepared into Korea. They were not consulted as to whether we should go into Korea. According to our Constitution, Congress and Congress alone has the power to declare war and make peace. The Congress of the United States was not consulted about sending our troops into Korea. President Truman alone decided this grave issue by the simple device of calling this intervention not a war, but a police action. This police action has already cost our people (at that time) 40,000 casualties. (Today tragically enough it is three times that number.)

Our allies likewise were not consulted. In his speech last Friday evening, the President said that we must work with a sense of real partnership and common purpose with the other free nations who need our help as we need theirs. These partners were ignored when President Truman ordered our troops into Korea. The question is, why?

The United Nations, too, were not consulted. It is the prime responsibility of the United Nations, not of the United States, to resist aggression in the world. It was only after President Truman launched our military effort in Korea that the United States asked for the approval of the United Nations. This is not the procedure outlined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Why did not our government wait for clear directives from the United Nations in the matter of Korea? Why did not our government ascertain before we moved in who else was going along and to what extent and with how many troops? Why did we not learn of the widespread reluctance of the other free nations of the world to become involved in Korea, as was later evidenced by the rather slim and purely token participation on the part of only a few of these nations? Why did we not learn about this widespread reluctance before we committed ourselves to what has proved to be one of the most costly and disastrous enterprises in all the military history of the United States? Why?

The strong suspicion entertained by many Americans that the Korean move was inspired by domestic political considerations connected with an approaching fall election has not been satisfactorily resolved. The administration had for some time, prior to last June, (which was in 1950) been attacked and badgered, especially by the Republican opposition, with charges of Communist sympathies, with responsibility for the victory of the Communists in China and the defeat of Chiang-Kai-Shek, and with widespread infiltration of Communists in the State Department and other government departments. For weeks on end, before the Tydings Committee of the Senate, wild charges were made by irresponsible political gentry and by publicity seekers of the type of Senator McCarthy. The administration found itself on the defensive, with an important Congressional election approaching. The invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans last June offered a tempting opportunity to demonstrate to the country that the administration was all-out anti-Communist, and that it was ready to strike at Communism wherever it raised its ugly head. It must have been assumed that the undertaking would be in the nature of a small-scale police action, that it would be brief and not too costly, and that the North Koreans would take to their heels as soon as they saw the American soliders coming. . . . The administration reversed its former line and permitted itself to be swayed by domestic political considerations and to be intimidated by the rantings of ex-Communists, ex-isolationists, pro-Fascists, and cranks of all kinds, and maneuvered itself and the American people into the disastrous Korean adventure.

Did our State Department know that China would enter the war? If it did, what preparations did it make to meet it? Why was the American people lulled into a false sense of security by inspired spokesmen who in so many words assured them that China would not fight? If our State Department did not know whether China would enter the war, why did it take the dangerous gamble to move our forces beyond the 38th Parallel? Why did it choose to ignore the clear declaration of the Chinese Foreign Minister and of Nehru of India, who warned the American people that if we crossed the 38th Parallel, China would come into the war? Why did we move beyond the 38th Parallel? Why are we asking for a cease fire now when the Chinese and North Korean armies are advancing across the 38th Parallel? Why did we not ask for it when we had reached the 38th Parallel? Why did we reject the proposal of a neutral zone between Korea and Manchuria, which was favored by our allies?

These mistakes, these blunders, these failures, military and political, are not to be charged to the American people, although the American people, of course, will in the final analysis, pay the entire cost. These are the responsibilities and failures of the government and of the administration and of those outside the government and in the opposition party who provoked the government to hasty action, and of those in government who succumbed to the provocation, who fondly believed that an easy-going victory against the Communists in Korea would be a strong political weapon in their hands against the opposition in an approaching election.

I think this position on Korea, which has now come to be accepted by many, many thoughtful Americans, might well lead us to ask ourselves whether this other position which many Americans - myself - took on the subject, on the whole subject of Soviet-American relationship, should not be reexamined, as I hope they will be after the election.

Last April, I believe, I addressed in this city a convention of the American College of Physicians, and I discussed with them what I regarded then and regard now as the most important issue before the American people and before the world - namely, the issue of American-Soviet relationships. And I said then, and I submit to you that the time has come, whether under the leadership of Stevenson or under the leadership of Eisenhower - it makes no difference - to reexamine our entire policy, which in the last seven years has led us to the condition in which we find ourselves today. In this address, I stated the following:

Regardless of how powerful we become militarily, we shall still have to settle all our differences with Russia in one of two ways: war, which is unthinkable, which everyone agrees would result only in a bloody stalemate on a global scale; or negotiation - the way of give and take, the way of statesmanship in which skillful and inspired diplomacy are perhaps more effective than any assumed preponderance of power which can only be established in actual combat on the battlefield.

In order to build up strength and check-mate the aggression of the Soviet Union, we have been attracting to our democratic front dictators of the type of Franco and Tito, and we have made a re-armed Western Germany the keystone of our entire scheme of European defense.

And I regard that as the most disastrous act of our foreign policy of our administration. We, who had denounced the Germans for being militaristic, we who know how militaristic they are, we who know how pro-Nazi many of them still are, we who denounced their militarism, we who stripped them of all military power after the war, we who agreed that they should never be permitted to rearm, are now insisting - insisting - that they should rearm. Thus, Germany has already scored a substantial victory without turning a finger, and she will continue to play off the United States against Russia, with the aid of both, to rise to power again. This, you will recall, is the earlier successful technique of Hitler.

We have as much as brushed aside the latest proposal of the Soviet for a meeting to discuss a German peace treaty. This did not strengthen our position either in Germany or elsewhere. We have also ignored the recent statement of Stalin in which he ~~reiterated~~ reiterated his belief that the co-existence of capitalism and Communism is possible in the world, and that a meeting of the heads of the great powers to settle the main issues between them would be beneficial. We feel that the Russians are insincere. But when can we be sure of their sincerity? All important international agreements in the past have had to surmount suspicions of insincerity and double-dealing. . . . One need not be credulous or gullible in negotiation, nor abandon a precautionary skepticism.

One need not lower his guard when you enter negotiations.

On the other hand, one cannot indefinitely postpone negotiations on the ground that the other party is not free from diplomatic guile.

We seem to have settled into a routine of negativism, waiting for 1953 or 1954, when we hope we shall be strong enough to deal with the Soviet Union successfully. It may not turn out that way at all. Even our Allies are becoming restive under the crushing military

burdens which this scheme imposes upon their people.

It is, of course, important that we be strong militarily, and that we do not lower our guard. In the kind of a world in which we live, defenselessness is an invitation to aggression. But military strength alone will not improve the dangerous international situation of our day. We must learn to rely more on inspired statesmanship and on moral leadership and less on force.

War is not inevitable. Neither we nor the Soviet wants war. Neither has anything to gain from it. Both, whether as victor or vanquished, would be the terrible loser in such a war.

Ways must be found and can be found for a tolerable (not a perfect) "modus vivendi", a way of coexistence which, while never quite free from tensions and strains, will yet give the world a chance to breathe freely again and go about the real business of living. Ideologies cannot be adjusted by compromise, (you cannot adjust the ideology of Communism with the ideology of democracy) but political problems of coexistence can be adjusted.

In the 16th and 17th centuries it was universally held that Catholicism and Protestantism could not live together in the same world. One or the other had to go. The stakes were enormous - far greater than those at stake in the East-West struggle today; for not only were the fortunes of this world involved, but also those of the next world. The ideologies of Catholicism and Protestantism could not be reconciled (have not been reconciled to this day) - and so the struggle passed from the realm of ideas and propaganda to the battlefield. Europe was drenched in blood. The wars of religion lasted for a hundred years and destroyed towns and cities and whole provinces (almost two-thirds of Europe was devastated) until the inevitable truth dawned upon man that a way had to be found for Catholicism and Protestantism - and other religious minority sects - to live together in the same world without sacrificing their particular loyalties and dogmas. A compromise of toleration was finally agreed upon, and Europe was able to move forward again once this frightful road-block was removed. Out of this religious toleration which was achieved, there flowed also political liberties to the peoples of Western Europe.

Now, my good friends, there is no escaping this. You can't shout it down, you can't smear it out.

Our age will have to find a formula of toleration which will enable the many evolving and the fluid forms of capitalism and socialism to work out their destinies in the one world in which we live. They may be irreconcilable in theory.

You can quote verse and passage from this book of Lenin and that book of Marx and that book of Stalin, just as you can quote from Democratic statesmen to indicate that the theories are irreconcilable, but they need not be in practice.

America must lead in finding the way (because we are stronger than the Soviet Union). The way is not that of a global armament race which will impoverish the people of the earth - ourselves included - (and our resources are not inexhaustible, especially when we have to rearm half the world) - and end as all such races end, in the catastrophe of war. It is time to change over onto a new course. The way is rather that of giving urgent leadership in the United Nations to a program of speedy and balanced reduction of armament (for which the United Nations was primarily established).

This new way will put us in a position to render through the United Nations more extensive and constructive aid to the backward peoples of the world, and to cooperate with them in achieving necessary agrarian and social reforms which will set them firmly on the road to a free and happier life. (That's how we want to win the war in the world - in the world for freedom.) The ultimate defense of democracy in the world lies not in superior armor or in the atomic bomb (which Russia, too, has today) but in raising the standard of living of the masses of the earth whose misery and wrongs are receptive soil for all kinds of doctrines of violent revolution and for all types of economic deceptions (and messianic adventures). While Communism breeds in other places beside poverty, certainly it never overlooks these natural seed-beds. . . .

This is the kind of leadership to which the world will respond, leadership which does not wait on the occasion but makes it, which is prepared to take calculated risks for peace, which is eager for negotiation and conference to settle all issues which endanger the peace of the world - a leadership which exerts sincere and unremitting pressure for limitation of armaments and the lifting of the crushing military burdens from the backs of the peoples of the earth - a leadership which aggressively plans for world-wide cooperation to help and guide the backward and the impoverished peoples to higher levels of agricultural and industrial development, of well-being, of health, of education - a leadership which seeks the liberation of all dominated, colonial peoples and extends friendly help to them in adjusting themselves to their new way of life (not which gives aid to colonial empires to crush these peoples into submission) - a leadership which is not dictation, which is not imposed by our wealth and power, which is not enmeshed and hampered by commitments to the imperial interests of colonial empires and which flows naturally from the headwaters of our great liberal traditions and history - (that kind of leadership) is sure to rekindle the hopes of the world.

And I am hoping and praying that this kind of leadership will be given to us in the next four years, whether Governor Stevenson is elected President or General Eisenhower. I have heard a good deal of talk about "it is time for a change", meaning a change merely in political party. That doesn't interest me at all. It is a time for a real change in direction, in the things which matter to the very life core of the

American people and of the world.

Let us then hope and pray, dear friends, that whatever party's leader is chosen to preside over the destinies of our people, in whose hands will lie the safety of our people and the wellbeing of ourselves and of the world, will have the spirit of God rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and of might, the spirit of knowledge and the fear of God. Amen.



1/ In a few days now campaign - New President - Congress (1)
State - Bond issues - Constitut. Amends - Our world
will settle down

Radio + T.V. will be returned - ^{- Cid Cason - J. Edgar Hoover - Arthur Godfrey} Newspapers Headlines - Sensat.
Streets will be cleared - Campaign buttons - All awake -
^{average 9} have to go to work - bills - taxes regardless
(X B B)

2/ Exciting Civil War - not with bullets - Glorious miracle
We can change - officers - parties - times - from a ship
The loser probabls - ranks are closed - Am. people - idea
comes on marches on

3/ Too protracted - But in midst - unpleasant noise fulmination
- not lose sight - really important - Free Form, Deen
- Free expression - very essence - at times absurd
Technique - Alternative - dictatorship - only learn - Submission
and silence.

4/ - Reconciliation ① little real diff - never explains -
② 2 party system - reconcile - cannot afford
standard bearer - screen - purge - Reckless
in both - Investing
- Reason to congratulate
③ Taft-Hartley - Corruption - Tax-reductions
Social Security - Pier - Support for farmers - Farm
Cooperatives - Small Business
④ Same diff - Pue - Kent Cuckles; Tidelands Oil
- JVA. -

5/ Leg. to make tug 7 war - Tempo - centralization

6/ Inclined to believe no basic diff. Foreign policy

① Communism ② Collective Security ③ U.N.

They are both opposed to Communism - What freedom - long answer

Certainly Tr-Acheson - Stevens - There have been .. understand
Bus. of govt to root them out - Slow - methodical - aimed

Pres. send red-baiting - Acheson - Alger Hiss

But to attack Gov. St - patently unfair - Murray of Hiss

Refusal to Den - taken in

6A In process of exposing - dangerous trends - overshadowing
inquisition - McCathens - Consists - World, unsubstantiated charges
tantamount to character assassination - ag. men in public life
associated - as in Japan - policy - China is keeping with evidence
Chang - Kai Shek - and withheld

① Witch-hunting - spilled over - other areas - academia
life - loyalty oaths - atmosphere of intimidation
endanger Academic Freedom

7/ Excluded in - present evidence - not enough substance to set
into a process of snuff - Managers & Writers - Americans
for "Democr. Action" - non-religious - entire F.B.I.

- Did not like their views - Unimpressed - any one
who associates with them has pro-Comm. bias

This belongs to insinuating guilt by association - Truman -
Eisenhower - is used to discredit Gov. St

① I don't believe Republican Party has done enough
② Gen. Eisenhower - not doing enough - done

that he spoke was purely on the subject the the right to
in Chicago. (Jawahar)

8/ The most crucial issue - as I suspected Korea. which
links up with the whole issue of our Admin. Foreign Policy
is recent past. It is on this issue that the Admin. is most

vulnerable
① The war - began as a public order June 25-1950 - in the third year

② The long drawn out armistice negotiations ~~at~~ ^{begin at} Kaesong to

Panmunjon ~~from~~ July 10-1951 - 15 months - bitter
draw - severe fighting

③ Casualties - 1000 a week - 7,120,000 -

④ At impasse - bloody stalemate - cannot go forward - backward

⑤ Admin. assumes no blame for the situation - and Govt. of S.K.
has ~~to defend~~ repeatedly defended the Admin. position - as
to how to prepare policy generally :-

① the going into K. we prevented a 3rd world war.
We checked the spread of Comm. in the Far East.
"It represented a great Victory in our fight for peace"

② Gen. E. maintains that to use his own words (Jawahar)

He charges ③ The Admin. with draw all forces from K. - by June 1949.

④ In Jan. 1950 - Acheson issued a public statement that
K. was outside the U.S. perimeter, defense in Pacific.
Saying telling Comm. that U.S. - would not defend K.

⑤ In June 1950 - Comm. invades S.K. - and - U.S.
said troops into K. to defend it.

Training, and S. K. troops - in a general way to
take the place of Am. troops at front line - to supply
them with weapons, armor - & keep Am. troops in reserve -

10) Voters will decide - whether they are satisfied with the things that are in the same hands - ~~whether~~ hoping for something to happen - or whether they want a new leadership to make a fresh start - regardless how uncertain the ~~outcome~~ ^{outcome} might be -

11). I ~~have~~ am of the opinion that neither Sov. It. nor J. E. I.
have in this campaign posed squarely the ~~great~~ ^{good} ~~issue~~ ^{how to work}
of our age - confronting the Am. people -
out an arrangement with the Soviet Union - so that
the E. W. can live in same world - without ~~creating~~ ^{confronting}
the Jewish disaster & the cold war - & the ~~problem~~ ^{problem could}
disaster & ~~confronting~~ ^{arrangement} for the rest of the
world - which is drawing the life blood of the nations & the world.

(a) K. is only part of the picture. Richards K. is China - Richard
China is the Great Vortex. There will be peace in K - if
we can build out a working place - a "modern vortex" with
Worse.

(b) I suppose that neither party was willing to discuss this lower problem in this campaign, but ~~that~~ ^{and} were competing for votes on basis their all-out anti-Castro stance.

into unearrably both parties were still dancing to the ~~same~~ we lastly them.

(c) But whoever is elected - will immediately be confronted with this problem: It is inexorable - inevitable - and touches everything - including our domestic security.

(d) I am glad that for E- will ^{personally} go to K- I wish, that, if elected he will also go to Moscow - Par. St. is right that the key to the K. solution is in Moscow - I wish, too, that Par. St. if elected, would go to K- & Moscow!

~~for the~~ On invite Moscow spokesmen later - a meet on neutral territory by rough face-to-face

(e) Much ~~can~~ be accomplished by face-to-face conferences. Why do we shun them?

12). My ^{own} attitude on K. must be well-known to you - I am opposed / it more than ever in the past - but popular -

In my address - "A Letter to Mr. Truman" - Dec 17-1950 - 2 3/4 yrs ago - I said (quote). It is old conflict to know that - there for later - these views - in an way, or another - as expressed by so many statesmen, generals, and armed - figures.

13). Perhaps they will come, before long to share my views on Amer. Soviet relations.

Last April - "American College, Physicians" - her as Chairman (Kubler) - (Just)

14/ Let us ~~not~~ hope & pray that whatever party ~~leader~~ ^{is chosen} to ~~provide~~ ^{provide} the ~~decision~~ ^{in which power rests the safety & independence of the} ~~our~~ ^{the} ~~best~~ ^{best} ~~last~~ ^{last} ~~will~~ ^{will} ~~be~~ ^{be} the spirit, the ~~last~~ ^{not} them - the spirit, as ~~dear~~ ^{dear} and understanding - the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and the peace, the ~~best~~ ^{best} -

