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Taking stock of 1952, 1952.

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TAKING STOCK OF 1952

December 28, 1952

Human history is not measured in 12-month periods. Human history knows no such cycles as the revolving seasons of the natural year. It does not begin or end in any given calendar year. The waves of history run to various lengths, and the forces which drive them have no fixed terms or periods. And therefore, to isolate to given period of twelve months of a year, to study it has only a limited significance. Nevertheless, such a study against the background of preceding years may reveal certain trends, may show a certain progress or a certain reversal, and may, therefore, guide, our thinking and our actions in the coming year.

Our people, thank God, has been prosperous during the year now edning. Employment was at an all-time high. More 63 million of our people were gainfully employed and less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ million were unemployed. That's an all-time low. Our national income exceeded that of last year, which I believe was also an all-time high. It was last year some 278 billions of dollars. Many have attributed this prosperity to war production and to armament manufacturing, and they are, therefore, fearful lest a slowdown in our rearmament and military program may bring about a sharp economic recession. Only time will tell.

We have shared as a people our bounty with other nations, and we may be grateful for what we have ourselves enjoyed at the hands of providence and for what we have been privileged to share with other peoples.

During 1952 our people passed through a national election. It was a tense and at time, a very bitter election campaign. Months and millions were spent in presenting the issues and the candidates to the American people, perhaps too many months and perhaps too many millions. The traditional period set aside for electioneering in our country might profitably be shortened by mutual consent among the parties for anything can today be told in much less time to the American people because of the very quick methods of communication which we have today - the radio, the television, etc. Just as the gap between the time of election and the coming into office of the new administration might be profitably reduced by law - the interregnum between one administration

and another, which lasts more than two months, during which government inevitably slows down and becomes hesitant - it is all too long a period in the culm of the world of swift movement in which we live.

Nearly 60 million American citizens went to the polls and voted. They expressed their preferences uncoerced and unafraid, in true democratic fashion. And without the firing of a single shot, an administration twenty years in office was turned out and a new political party took over the reins of government. No purges - no executions - no firing squads. When the battle of the ballots was over, the vanquished congratulated the victors and the life of the American people went on as normally as before. New policies will undoubtedly be adopted under the new administration, new directions will be taken, there will be significant changes. This was the expressed wish of the majority of the American people. Under our democratic system of government, the majority rules. But the minority - and it was a very substantial minority - some 26 millions of American citizens - will not be liquidated or suppressed. It will be heard from continuously as a loyal opposition, and if the new administration fails to satisfy the majority of the American people four years hence, it, too, will be defeated and another party will come into office. This change, which amounts to a revolution without bloodshed, represents the genius of a free society and is incontestably, incomparably superior to those systems which must rely upon bloody revolution to bring about changes and improvements and which, when they are once established in power, can only maintain themselves in office through terror and liquidation and purges.

General Eisenhower was elected President of the United States, a world-renowned figure of extraordinary endowments and a record of great achievements. General Eisenhower will bring to his high and most exacting office, the most difficult, taxing and responsible office in the whole world - I say that he will bring to that office indisputable character, ability, patriotism. And the prayers of our entire nations, and for that matter, of the entire free world will go with him as he assumes office on January 20th next. No one should envy him that office, and no one should wish to make his grave

and burdensome tasks heavier by a single particle or a single grain of ill will.

American leadership in world affairs during the last year did not yield much gain. There has been little progress in the consolidation of the North Atlantic Treaty nations. The 14-member nations of NATO have resisted the quota which was assigned to each of them for a build-up in armament and agreed to last February at Lisbon. These nations now claim that their economic situation at home would not permit them to assume such crushing outlays for rearmament. General Ridgway called this slowdown unjustifiably dangerous, but evidently the Europeans are not as impressed with the imminence of the Russian danger as we are, or domestic economic needs and problems must claim priority for them over fast rearmament. The goals of NATO have been reduced, the tempo of the rearmament of the free world has been slowed down.

During 1952 the Korean War dragged on. The Korean armistice negotiations broke down. We find ourselves at the moment, as we have been for some many months now, at a dead stalemate in Korea, and our casualties there in dead and wounded are continuing. The recent efforts of the United Nations to evolve a formula which would end Korean hostilities resulted in failure. They broke down on the prisoner-of-war issue, on the repatriation of the prisoners of war. India brought in, you will recall, a compromise proposal which our country at first rejected out of hand, but later on, under prodding from Great Britain and Canada, accepted. But the Soviet Union turned it down. Russia was wrong in turning down a peace proposal which was overwhelmingly adopted by the members of the United Nations of which body she is a member. Unless she is determined to prolong the war in Korea indefinitely, believing that she has the United States in a trap there and that it is to her advantage to keep her in that trap - unless that is her intention, her action in rejecting the United Nations proposal is incomprehensible. This is not to say that the prisoner-of-war issue is an altogether one-sided one, and that justice and law are entirely on our side.

There is a Geneva convention which regulates this very matter, and in August 1949, a year before war broke out in Korea, 59 nations signed the Geneva convention which provided that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. There is not a word in this treaty about voluntary repatriation, and this ~~was~~ clause was adopted at the insistence of the Western powers, who wanted to avert in the future the sort of thing which happened after World War II, when Communist countries detained many prisoners on the ~~the~~ claim that they preferred to live in those Communist countries. In spite of this clause and this agreement, our commanders in the field invited North Koreans and Chinese to desert to our side with the promise that we would take care of them, and on this subject Walter Lippmann writes:

How could a State Department which negotiated the Geneva convention have failed to explain to the Pentagon the legal trap in which these deserting Chinese and North Koreans were caught? Once the legal situation was realized, the remedy was obvious: it was to open the trap and to let the prisoners out by treating them as refugees, for there is nothing in the convention which expressly forbids such a humane and sensible way of dealing with the problem. . . . But we proceeded to send their names to the enemy as prisoners of war, not stopping to think what this might mean to their families when the fighting ended. . . . An enormous blunder has been committed by our own officials. It is not the first of their great and critical blunders in the conduct of the war."

It appears, therefore, that this issue which is the stumbling block to every peace effort in Korea, cannot now be solved by the United Nations, where public debates and speech-making seem to have taken the place of negotiations, and the speakers have an eye to propaganda and face-saving, and where what should be measured, responsible and diplomatic speech has degenerated through Soviet example and provocation into vituperation and violent recriminations which would shame the brawlers of Billingsgate.

It is high time, my dear friends, to try a new approach, a conference at the highest level, a meeting between General Eisenhower and Marshall Stalin, to see whether a way cannot be found out of this dangerous morass, out of this dead-end into which the policies both of Moscow and of Washington in the last few years have led the world.

Before the November elections I ventured the suggestion that General Eisenhower, after he visits Korea, should also visit Moscow or invite Stalin to come to Washington or meet with him in some other place, some neutral ground, as it were, to discuss face to face the difficulties which exist between the two great nations, to explore all avenues of adjustment and settlement and to see whether the approaching overwhelming tragedy of a third world war cannot be averted. This would not be the first time that a President of the United States met with Stalin. Both President Roosevelt and President Truman met with him at Yalta or Teheran or at Potsdam.

Premier Stalin indicated last week that he is prepared to enter such a conference with General Eisenhower. James Reston of the New York Times submitted on December 18 four questions to Premier Stalin through the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and on December 24 these replies were received from Stalin.

Herewith are the replies of Premier J.V. Stalin to the questions you asked him in your letter of Dec. 18, 1952, addressed to me:

Q. - At the beginning of a new year and a new administration in the United States, is it still your conviction that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States can live peacefully in the coming years?

A. - I still believe that war between the United States of America and the Soviet Union cannot be considered inevitable, and that our countries can continue to live in peace.

Q. - Wherein lie the sources of present world contention in your judgment?

A. - Everywhere and in everything wherever the aggressive actions of the policy of the "cold war" against the Soviet Union find their expression.

Q. - Would you welcome diplomatic conversations with representatives of the new Eisenhower administration, looking toward the possibility of a meeting between yourself and General Eisenhower on easing world tensions?

A. - I regard this suggestion favorably.

Q. - Would you cooperate in any new diplomatic approach designed to bring about an end to the Korean war?

A. - I agree to cooperate because the U.S.S.R. is interested in ending the war in Korea.

Now, in my humble judgment here is a key which may open a new door to a fresh start, a new hope. I do not say that it will. I say that it may. And no opportunity should be overlooked, and no chance should be brushed aside. The world situation is too dangerous for any nation or group of nations to take a high and mighty attitude and intransigent attitude.

Of course, we need not take everything that Stalin says at par value. We need not be naive about it, nor need we abandon caution and circumspection. We are not dealing here with novices in diplomacy or with disinterested idealists. The record of Soviet diplomacy in the last few years, and more especially in the last decade, is there before us and our people have read it. It has been ruthless, brutally realistic, unabashed in its improvisation, in its reversals, in its sudden shifts and shuffles. But it should be remembered that such diplomacy is not altogether unique with the Soviet government. It is a feature of most diplomacy in all climes and in all ages. And whether we deal with the Soviet Union through customary diplomatic channels or directly through the heads of the two governments in conference with each other, this feature quality of their diplomacy will remain the same, and there will, of course, always remain the need for caution and for the testing and weighing of motives. But I am sure that our President-elect, General Eisenhower, if he meets with Stalin, will not be hoodwinked or outsmarted. He has had vast and maturing experience in international affairs - he is not a novice and will not fall into any booby-trap; nor will we slow down our security measures because of such negotiations or lower our guard. Why should we fear such a meeting which may - I do not say will - which may lead to a better understanding, to agreements in a spirit of give and take on a few basic propositions which will ease tensions, end conflict, restore the authority of the United Nations, and perhaps, at a later stage, lead to progressive limitation of armament.

General Eisenhower in the past has taken calculated risks to win victory in war. Why should he hesitate to take a calculated risk to win victory for peace! Some say this is a trap, "to divide the free world" and wreck our alliance, to delay the building up of our military strength and supply. But why? Why need it be? The free world is not that stupid. In fact, in my humble judgment the whole free world would applaud such a move on our part. Many of our friends in the free nations of the world have come to doubt and to question our peaceful intentions. By such an act we would dispel such doubts. We would make manifest our readiness to seize every opportunity, every occasion to achieve peace while remaining, of course, mindful all the time of the need of insuring security for the free world.

If such a meeting is successful, everyone would experience a sense of blessed relief. Much will have been gained for the cause of reconciliation and peace in the world. If it fails, why then the free world will know exactly what it faces; instead of slackening down its program for self-defense, it will accelerate it in view of the dreadful certainty which confronts it.

The public press has carried the news that Prime Minister Churchill is coming to the United States in the next few days for a conference with General Eisenhower. It may be assumed that among the important matters which they will discuss, this matter, too, will not be overlooked. It would be highly desirable if Winston Churchill joined General Eisenhower in such a conference with Stalin. Churchill previously indicated his desire for such a meeting.

The year 1952, dear friends, has witnessed continuing and growing nationalist upsurge and tensions in Asia and Africa, in Indo-China, Iran, Egypt and Morocco, and racial conflicts in South Africa. These are not passing incidents. These are not unrelated events. They belong to a universal and irrepressible movement for human liberation although here and there they take on forms and expressions of which we cannot approve. They belong to the wave of the future.

American leadership would do well to align itself in a friendly, helpful way with all these movements looking to the liberations of peoples, to their independence.

During the past year the State of Israel has faced up to great economic difficulties and a financial crisis which were ~~caused~~ caused by the heavy drains upon its limited resources of a large immigration of previous years which it had to absorb, and of a military budget for defense since no peace treaties have as yet been signed with the neighboring countries. During the year drastic measures were introduced to rationalize the economy of the infant state and to balance its foreign exchange budget. Immigration was sharply curtailed so that the immigrants already in the country might first be housed and made secure in livelihood. In spite of the ~~gave~~ economic difficulties of the infant country, marked progress was made in agricultural development, in irrigation, in the establishment of new industrial projects and in opening up new sources of raw material. And within the last few weeks a new government has come into existence in Israel, a coalition government which now for the first time includes the second largest party in Israel, that of the General Zionists, the center party, the party which has always favored private initiative and the encouragement of private investments in the country which has placed far more weight on that than on the socialist cooperative experiments. The new government will now definitely move to right of the center and will be assured of stability because it now controls an overwhelming vote in the Knesseth. This, I believe, augurs well for the new State.

An effort was made by the representatives of Israel in the United Nations to come to an understanding and a settlement with the neighboring Arab states through direct negotiations. This effort failed. The measure was favored in the Political Committee of the United Nations. It was voted down by the Arab bloc which was in this instance joined also by the Soviet bloc. There situation, therefore, in the Near East remains unchanged and tense, as heretofore.

The recent Communist trials in Prague, Czechoslovakia, took on a sharp anti-Zionist slant, some feared even an anti-Semitic slant. Of the 14 Communists who were tried, 11 were Jews and the Jews were accused of conspiring with Zionist organizations to carry on an espionage and subversive activities for the benefit of the United States, or as they put it, for the United States imperialists. The State of Israel was attacked in these trials, presumably because of its sympathies with the West, on the ground that it has transformed that country into an American military base. These Prague trials were in every way reminiscent of the Moscow purge trials of the thirties, especially as far as the confessions of the accused were concerned, and their self-incrimination, which Koestler's "Darkness at Noon" might help to explain.

What was new in these trials is the bitter denunciation of Zionism. Now, Communism, of course, was always unfriendly to Zionism which it regarded as a reactionary bourgeois movement in the olden days, too friendly to Great Britain. But in 1947 at the United Nations, the Soviet Union reversed its traditional policy. It adopted a new line. At the Assembly of the United Nations in May 1947, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, representing the Soviet Union, noted "the horrible sufferings of the Jewish people during World War II" and asserted that "the aspirations of an important part of the Jewish people are bound up with the question of Palestine and with the future structure of that country. This interest is comprehensible and fully justified." He declared that if the plan for a bi-national state in Palestine were unrealizable, his government would favor the division of Palestine into two independent and separate states, one Jewish and one Arab. The Soviet bloc was favorable throughout the long drawn-out negotiations which finally led up to the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948. It recognized the State of Israel and the following year it voted the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations.

This sharp reversal in its attitude was reflected in the Prague trials which, of course, are greatly to be deplored. The charges against the Zionists, charges of espionage and subversive activities, are preposterous, palpably false and ridiculous. Zionism has never been, in its long history, a movement of espionage or subversion. It has been a movement of national renaissance and freedom. It is the enemy of no state which is not an enemy to it. This was true four years ago, and Mr. Gromyko and his government fully understood the situation. It is true today.

The President of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, denied that the trials were anti-Semitic. Perhaps not. The official policy of the Soviet government has always been opposed to anti-Semitism and has looked upon anti-Semitism as counter-revolutionary. And we hope that it will continue to be so, but there are dangerous possibilities that an intense official propaganda against Zionism and the State of Israel and among the masses in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, might quickly take on the dangerous character of an anti-Semitic movement and might endanger the security of more than 3,000,000 Jews who still live in the Soviet Union and in the satellite countries. It is reported, though I do not know how reliably, that already there is an atmosphere of panic among the 30,000 Jews now living in Czechoslovakia. It is not too late for the responsible policy-makers of the Soviet Union to reconsider this new potentially dangerous line which they have adopted.

In summing up the year 1952, what can we say? I came across a little poem the other day ~~and~~ with which I should like to close.

He came to my desk with quivering lip -
The lesson was done.
"Dear Teacher, I want a new leaf," he said,
"I have spoiled this one."
I took the old leaf, stained and blotted,
And gave him a new one, all unspotted,
And into his sad eyes smiled:
"Do better now, my child!"

I went to the Throne with a quivering soul -
The old year was done.
"Dear Father, hast Thou a new leaf for me?
"I have spoiled this one."
He took the old leaf, stained and blotted,
And gave me a new one, all unspotted,
And into my sad heart smiled:
"Do better now, my child!"

God is giving us a new leaf, a new start and a new year. May we use it more wisely and prayerfully during the coming year.



1) Human history is not measured in 12-month periods. (1)
It knows no such cycles, as the revolving seasons of the natural year. ~~They~~ ^{It} does not begin or end with ^{within} a calendar year. The waves of history run to various lengths, and the forces which drive them have no fixed periods. To isolate \therefore a period of 12 months ^{a year -} and study it - has only a limited significance. Nevertheless such a study against the background of preceding years may reveal trends, progress or reversal, - and may guide our thought and action in the coming year.

2/ Our people have been prosperous during 1952. Employment was at an all time high - nearly 63 1/2 m. unemployed only 1.3 (less 1 1/2 m. unemployed - an all time low). The Nat. income ^{will} exceed last year - which was 278 b.

3/ Many have attributed this prosperity to war production and armament manufacturing. They are far from right - a slow-down in our armament & military program will bring about a disastrous econ. recession. Only time will tell.

We have shared our bounty with other nations - we may be grateful for what we have enjoyed at the hands of kind Providence - but for what we were indebted to them -

4/ We found there a nat. Elections in 1952. It was a success (2)
and at times better election campaigns. Months and months
were spent in presenting the issues and the candidates to the
Am. people - too many months and too many months -

The time for electioneering might well be ~~shortened~~ by
mutual consent - just as the gap bet. elections and the
coming into office, the new administration might be cut
by law. The interim - which lasts for more than 2 months
is too long during which ~~govt. is~~ ^{govt. is} ~~inoperative~~ ^{inoperative} - and becomes
understandably hesitant - ~~as voting is~~ ^{as voting is} ~~too long~~ ^{too long}. Too
many things happen in 2 mos. in this ~~period~~ ^{period} ~~anyway~~ ^{anyway} -
nearly 60 m. Am. citizens ~~wants to go~~ ^{wants to go} ~~and vote~~ ^{and vote}.
They expressed their preferences - uncovered and unexpressed -

in two democ. fashions. -
and without the firing go shot - an admin. 20 yrs in
office was turned out - and a new pol. party took
over the reins of govt.

No purges, no executions, no firing - & ~~grasses~~. When
the battle, the ballot was over - the vanquished
emphatically ~~congratulated~~ ^{congratulated} the victors - and the Am. people left
went on as normally as before. New policies will
be adopted, ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~under~~ ^{under} the new admin. - new
directions will be ~~followed~~ ^{followed} - there will be ~~significant~~ ^{significant}
changes. This was the expressed will, the majority - the
And, under our democ. form, govt - the majority rules.
But the minority - and it was a very substantial minority -
So Am. there - will not be legislatures as suppressed.
They will be heard from, as a loyal opposition.
And if the new admin. fails to satisfy the Am. people
in the next 4 yrs - it, too, will be ~~replaced~~ ^{replaced}.

(3)

5/ Jim ~~ES~~ was elected Pres., the U.S. - a ~~man~~ world-renowned
 type / extraordinary endowments and achievements. # just

He will bring to his high and most exacting office the most difficult, taxing and reprovable ^{whole} price in the land.

in depth ~~with~~
characters, ability and production.

And the progress of our entire nature - and the entire line
will go with him when he steps into glory
on Jan. 20th next.

No one should envy him that free - And no one
should wish to make his ^{grave} ~~tombstone~~ tomb any
heavier by a single particle; or ^{as I said} ~~rain~~ of ill-will.

6/. Am. leadership in world affairs during the last year did ~~not~~ not yield much fair there has been little progress in establishing the North Atlantic Treaty organization. The 14 member nations, Nato have visited the Euro ~~agreed to~~ ^{the loose-up} ~~to each~~ ^{in disarmament} ~~their econ. situation~~ ^{at home} ~~would not permit such ~~expanding~~ ^{crushing} outlays for armament.~~ Sen. A. A. A. called this slow-down ~~so~~ "unjustifiably dangerous". But evidently the Europeans are not

is impressed with the injustice, the Russian ~~that~~ ^{down} a one
are - or domestic, ^{severe} ~~pressures~~ ^{needs} ~~on~~ claim property war lost
rearmaments. The goals, goals have been ruined - the tempo
has been slowed down.

7/ The Korean blockade has dropped on. (The K. armistice they status
broke down.. We are at a dead state mate in Korea.. our
casualties there is dead and wounded are mounting continuing..
The U.S. to end a principle which would end
hostilities resulted in failure. ~~It~~ broke down on the
prisoner-of-war issue. India has in a compromise
proposal which the U.S. at first rejected out of hand and
later on under pressure from Great Britain and Canada
accepted. But the Soviet Union turned it down.

Russia was wrong in turning down a peace proposal
unanimously adopted by the members, the UN —, which
she is a member. Unless she is determined to prolong the
war in Korea, understanding that she has the U.S. in a trap
there — and it is to her advantage to keep her there instead —
her action in rejecting the UN proposal was is
in conflict —.

This is not to say that the POW issue is an
altogether an isolated one — and further and law all on our side.
(Just — Progress — Jan.)

8/. It appears that this issue — which is the stumbling
block to all peace efforts in K — cannot be solved

at U.R. - where ~~debates~~^{negotiations} and speech-making take the place of
negotiations - and ~~all parties~~^{all parties} are interested in having an eye
to propaganda and face-saving - and where, what should
be measured, respectful and diplomatic speech has degenerated
then Soviet examples and provocations into vituperation and
violent recriminations which would shame the
drawers of Kalliesgate -

9). It is high time to try a new approach ^(a conference)
at the highest level - a meeting bet. Gen. Eisen. & Stalin -
to see whether a way cannot be found out of the dangerous
mess - out of the dead-end street ^{into which} the
policy of Moscow and Moscow has ^{in fact} led the world.
Before the Nov. elections I ventured the suggestion that
Gen. Eis. - after he visits Korea - he should visit Moscow
or invite Stalin to come to Washington - or meet with
him ~~at some other place~~ elsewhere - to discuss how to face the
differences ^{which exist} between the two nations to explore avenues
of adjustment and settlement - and to see whether
the overwhelming majority of a 3rd world can avoid the

10). This would be the first time that a Pres. of the U.S.
met with Stalin - Both Pres. R. & Truman met with
Stalin - Yalta, Tehran, at Potsdam -

11). Marshal Stalin indicated last week that he is ^{prepared} to
enter such a conference with Pres. Gen. Eisenhower

James Reston - N.Y. Times - submitted 4 questions to Premier
Stalin on Dec. 18 then the Soviet Ambassador in the U.S.
~~under~~ On Dec. 24 - the Stalin's reply was received
Just

12/ Here is a key which may open a ^{new} door to a fresh
start - a new hope - a new promise
I do not say that it will. It may! And no
opportunity should be overlooked - no chance brushed
aside.

The world situation is too dangerous for any nation or group
of nations to take a high-and-mighty, ultra-nationalist
Attitude.

Q-comes, we need not talk everything that Stalin says
at face value. We need not be naive about it -
a abundant caution and circumspection.

We are not dealing with noises or diplomacy -
or with disinterested idealists. The record of
Soviet diplomacy in the last 3 decades, and now
esp. in last 10 yrs - is there before us - and our
people have read it. It has been rather brutally
realistic, unabashed in its improvisation ^{revelations} and sudden
shifts and shuffles.

Such diplomacy, it must be stated however, is not
altogether unique to the Soviet point.

14/ ~~If it succeeds~~ ~~Effort fails~~ - The Public Press has carried the news that Prime Minister Churchill is coming in the next few days for a Conference with E.S. - It may be assumed that among other important matters which they will discuss - this matter, too, will not be overlooked - It would be highly desirable that Winston Churchill join E.S. in such a Conf with Stalin - Churchill previously indicated his desire for such a meeting - ~~But whether together, or alone~~

15/ Year 1952 - has witnessed continuing and growing nationalistic uprisings and revolutions in Asia Africa - in Indo-China - Iran, Egypt, Morocco - and racial conflicts in S. Africa. There are not passing incidents, or isolated events - They belong to a universal and irrepressible movement of human liberation - ~~and we must do well to~~ albeit here and there they take on forms and expressions which we cannot apprehend - They belong to the wave of the future!

16/ ~~Israel~~ The State of Israel has faced up to great econ. difficulties ^{and pressing crises} during the past year, caused by the heavy drain upon its limited resources, of a large quarrying industry which it had to absorb - and a military budget due to the defence - since ~~there~~ no peace frontier has yet been signed with the neighbouring countries - Drastic measures have been introduced to rationalize its economy and to balance its present income budget. Immigration has been sharply curtailed until then already, as the country has been forced to do a

mean ^{in vegetation} ~~development~~ ^{new} ~~individual~~ ^{new} ~~private~~ ^{new} ~~and in doing up some saw~~ ^{new} ~~made~~. - A new East - (Sov. - East) - (Sov. - East) - (Sov. - East) Stability

An effort was made by Israel in the U.N. to come to a settlement with the neighboring Arab States thru direct negotiations. The effort failed. The measure was passed in the P.M. Council, U.N. - It was voted down by the Arab bloc which was joined by the Soviet bloc.

The situation in the Near East: remains tense and unchanged

17/ The recent trial in Czechoslovakia as an Anti-Soviet slant. - Some have even an Anti-Jew slant. of the 14 ~~of~~ cases who were tried - 11 were Jews - and these Jews were accused of ~~being~~ conspiring with Soviet agents - to carry on espionage and subversive activities for the benefit of the U.S. imperialists.

The State of Israel was attacked ~~for~~ presumably for its cooperation with the host for having transformed the country into an American military base.

These trials were in every way reminiscent of the Munich purge trials of 1934? - especially as far as the confessions of the accused were concerned and their self-incriminations. - which Koloski's "Darkness at Noon" may help to explain.

What was new - is the little denunciation of Zionism - Communism was, of course, always hostile to

20
movement, which it regarded as a bourgeois, reactionary
movement, too friendly to Great Britain.
But in 1947 - at the U.N. - ~~the Soviet Union~~ it adopted a new line -

At the Assembly, the U.N. on May 14 1947 - Gen.
Andreas Gromyko, representing the Soviet Union, ~~stated~~
noted "the horrible sufferings, the J. people during World War II
and asserted that "the aspirations of an independent part of the
J. people are bound up with the question, Palestine, and with
the future of the Jewish state - This interest is completely
and fully justified." He said that if the plan for a bi-
national state in Palestine were unacceptable - his part would
favor the division, Pal. into 2 ~~independent~~ ^{separate} states, one Jewish
and one Arab.

Soviet bloc was formally ~~thwarted~~ - the negotiations
which led to the ~~Declaration~~ ^{State of Israel} in
May 1948 - And ~~for~~ ^{seized} the ~~State~~ ^{State of Israel}
and the following year voted for its admission into U.N.

The sharp reversal ~~which~~ at its altitude which is
indicated in the Program for all is greatly to be deplored.
The charges are ~~preposterous~~ - ~~half-baked~~ ^{grossly false} ~~indications~~
Zionism is not a movement of ~~exploit~~ ^{exploit} ~~the Jewish~~
It is a movement of national ~~renaissance~~ ^{renaissance} & freedom.
It is the enemy of no state which is not hostile
to it. - That was true 4 yrs. ago. It is true to day -

Element Sothwell, the president, Geds. denies
that the trials were anti-semitic - Perhaps not!

The Soviet ~~policy~~ ^{speech} has always been opposed to ~~antisemitism~~ ^{anti-semitism} (2)
We hope that it will continue to be so - but
there are dangerous possibilities that an official
propaganda against Zionism and the State of Israel among
the masses behind the iron curtain might easily
fall on the ~~discredit~~ ^{discredit} our antisemitic movement - and might
enlarge the secret, the more than 3 m. Jews living
in the Soviet Union and its satellites. - It is reported that
I do not know how reliable, that there is already fear and panic among the 3000
18/5 ^{500,000} ~~to~~ ⁱⁿ ~~summing~~ ^{the} ~~up~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{year} - what shall we say? - A letter
from comes to mind - (last)



THE NEW LEAF

He came to my desk with quivering lip -
The lesson was done.
"Dear Teacher, I want a new leaf," he said,
"I have spoiled this one."
I took the old leaf, stained and blotted,
And gave him a new one, all unspotted,
And into his sad eyes smiled:
"Do better now, my child!"

I went to the Throne with a quivering soul -
The old year was done.
"Dear Father, hast Thou a new leaf for me?
"I have spoiled this one."
He took the old leaf, stained and blotted,
And gave me a new one, all unspotted,
And into my sad heart smiled:
"Do better now, my child!"



The Progressive

'Ye Shall Know the Truth and the Truth Shall Make You Free'

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The Test Ahead

THE CAROLERS have been stealing into our hearts again with the everlasting beauty of the Christmas songs. Their voices ring out in joyous celebration of peace and love and hope, and for a moment that vanishes too soon our hearts seem not so heavy-laden with war and hate and fear.

But Christmas is one day a year and its spirit lasts no longer. One week after Christmas is New Year's Day, traditionally a day for stock-taking of the year just gone and brave resolution for the year that lies ahead.

Looking back over 1952, the realist find his crumbs of comfort mostly in the negative fact that Korea and Indo-China did not flame into world war; that tensions in Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Malaya, Tunisia, Morocco, India, and Pakistan did not explode into armed conflict; and that, generally, the Cold War did not noticeably undergo a change in temperature for the worse.

On the affirmative side, there was a measure of gain, too—not much tangibly, as these things are reckoned, but in an area of such boundless potentiality that even a thimble-full is capable of firing the weary and cheering the cynical. It was in 1952 that we embarked on the first significant venture to give meaning and substance to Arnold J. Toynbee's wistful prophecy that "our age will be remembered not for its horrifying crimes or its astonishing inventions, but because it is the first age since the dawn of history in which mankind dared to believe it practicable to make the benefits of civilization available to the whole human race."

It was just a year ago—in Jan-

uary, 1952—that Prime Minister Nehru and Ambassador Bowles met in New Delhi to sign the first Point Four agreement between India and the United States. Their pact led to the creation of the Indo-American Development Fund, for which we have appropriated \$100,000,000 and the Indians twice as much. This isn't very much—in fact, an almost invisible fraction of one per cent of the wealth we are pouring into rearmament—but the returns may well be many times more rewarding and productive in the long run.

For the India fund is an investment in hope, a down-payment on a free society in the most strategic area on earth. The Community Development Program, dedicated to a village-to-village attack on poverty, disease, and illiteracy, strikes at the very roots of the hopelessness and frustration which drive the hungry and homeless to Communism.

"This is the revolution," Nehru told a great throng of Indian villagers who had come by foot and donkey and camel to celebrate the

launching of the first 55 community area projects. "This is not a revolution based on chaos and the breaking of heads, but on the sustained effort to eradicate poverty."

II

The hunger for a better life among the two-thirds of humanity who have known only fear and insecurity throughout the modern era is the central fact of life in our time. It has burst out of its shell of silent despair. It marches today as a revolutionary force surging southeastward from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and beyond.

It is the cunning exploitation of this hunger by the Communists that has driven us into making a modest contribution to the social and economic development of the underprivileged areas of the world. Rearmament and witch-hunting have claimed far more of our money and energy, although it must be clear by now that in the long run the appeal of Communism will not be exposed for the fraud it is by anything less than a greater and more appealing idea—a positive mobilization against poverty and hunger among the millions of underprivileged human beings who are today hunting for a more hopeful way of life.

Last summer, when he appeared before the drafters of the Republican platform, Walter Reuther said: "Until you understand the social phenomena of a deeply religious peasant who goes to high mass on Sunday morning and attends a Communist rally in the afternoon, you have missed understanding what makes the world go round."

The months just ahead will de-

Snowbound



Justus in The Minneapolis Star

termine how much or how little the Republicans understand about the revolutionary world in which they have been chosen to lead. The test will come, not on how high they maintain the level of rearmament for ourselves and our allies, but on what they do to breathe new life into the challenging concept of Point Four.

The Issue in Korea

THE NEW YEAR opens with the United Nations, custodian of the world's hopes for peace, fighting for its very life. Caught in a crossfire of Know-Nothing criticism by the Far Right in the United States and the crippling tactics of the Great Powers, the UN is experiencing what Ralph J. Bunche described as the "darkest days" of its turbulent career.

In a single month, Trygve Lie resigned as secretary-general after months of unspeakable abuse by the Soviets; Abraham Feller, general counsel, committed suicide in the face of relentless nagging by the McCarran Committee; top officials of UNESCO quit in protest against budget reduction; Britain and France served notice on the Assembly that Arab-Asian complaints of Great Power mis-rule in colonial areas was none of its business, and South Africa, taking its cue from the giants, blandly dismissed as "null and void" an Assembly resolution calling for an investigation of the race segregation policies of the Malan government.

Vastly more harmful than these setbacks, however, has been the failure of the UN to find a formula for peace in Korea. Its decisive action in resisting Red aggression in June, 1950, almost certainly saved the UN from the fatal paralysis that wrecked the League of Nations, but its subsequent failure to reach a give-and-take settlement is rapidly depleting the reserve of hope it built up two and a half years ago.

It is clear enough that the Soviet Union's harsh insistence on having things all her own way has repeatedly gutted the hope of agreement. What is less well known—given

the kind of press we have—is the fact that the United States has played a far from defensible role in the long and bitter negotiations.

If the Soviets have refused to budge in the interest of settlement, so have we. In violation of the true spirit of negotiation, we, much like the Russians, have coldly turned our backs on virtually every compromise proposed to the UN. We had become so accustomed to matching the Kremlin's "Nyet" with our "No" that we first rejected, automatically, the recent Indian proposal to settle what is popularly regarded as the one remaining roadblock to a truce—the prisoner-of-war (POW) issue. It was not until Britain and Canada and some of our other allies shamed us into taking a longer look at it and warned us that we were kicking away a chance to put the onus for rejection on the Russians that we reversed ourselves—only to have the Soviet Union pulverize the last hope by rejecting the plan.

We know of no simple formula for resolving the POW issue. It isn't so black-or-white as either we or the Russians pretend. Our officials and our press have sought to create the impression that we are legally and morally on unassailable ground when we refuse to send back to their homes Chinese and North Korean prisoners who say they do not want to return. But what are the facts?

On Aug. 12, 1949, almost a year before war broke out in Korea, 59 nations signed the Geneva Convention which provided, in Article 118, that "prisoners-of-war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities."

It was the Western Powers, not the Russians, who insisted on this provision because we were determined to prevent a recurrence of the situation which developed after World War II when the Communists detained many prisoners on the specious claim they preferred to live in the Soviet paradise.

As Walter Lippmann has pointed out, "There is not a word in the Treaty about voluntary repatri-

ation"—the principle on which we now insist in Korea. Although we were bound to exactly the opposite course by an agreement we had negotiated, our commanders in the field invited North Koreans and Chinese to desert to our side with the promise that we would take care of them.

"How," asks Lippmann, "could a State Department which negotiated the Geneva convention have failed to explain to the Pentagon the legal trap in which these deserting Chinese and North Koreans were caught? Once the legal situation was realized, the remedy was obvious: it was to open the trap and to let the prisoners out by treating them as refugees. For there is nothing in the convention which expressly forbids such a humane and sensible way of dealing [with the problem.] . . . But we proceeded to send their names to the enemy as POWs, not stopping to think what this might mean to their families when the fighting ended. . . . An enormous blunder has been committed by our own officials. It is not the first of their great and critical blunders in the conduct of the war."

II

Lippmann exposed another serious weakness in the American position when he wrote:

"Let us remember that any extension of the war, anywhere, in Asia or Europe, is almost certain to mean that there will be masses of prisoners in Communist hands. Let us remember how men 'confess' in Communist prisons. Could anything be more dangerous than to make it the law that if the detaining power can induce its prisoners to 'refuse' repatriation, they may never come home?"

Our official policy has been to ignore the fact that we are caught in a trap that is partly of our own making. Climbing to higher moral ground, we have argued that it would be an act of barbarism to return unwilling POW's whose names the Communists have. And so it would be. But it would seem to be just as indefensible to take so in-

as follows.

Herewith are the replies of Premier J. V. Stalin to the questions you asked him in your letter of Dec. 18, 1952, addressed to me:

Q.—At the beginning of a new year and a new Administration in the United States, is it still your conviction that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States can live peacefully in the coming years?

A.—I still believe that war between the United States of America and the Soviet Union cannot be considered inevitable, and that our countries can continue to live in peace.

Q.—Wherein lie the sources of present world contention, in your judgment?

A.—Everywhere and in everything wherever the aggressive actions of the policy of the "cold war" against the Soviet Union find their expression.

Q.—Would you welcome diplomatic conversations with representatives of the new Eisenhower Administration looking toward the possibility of a meeting between yourself and General Eisenhower on easing world tensions?

A.—I regard this suggestion favorably.

Q.—Would you cooperate in any new diplomatic approach designed to bring about an end to the Korean war?

A.—I agree to cooperate because the U. S. S. R. is interested in ending the war in Korea.

Sincerely,

G. ZARUBIN.

*Ambassador of the U. S. S. R.
in the U. S. A.*

Whether the encouragement of a