



## Abba Hillel Silver Collection Digitization Project

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### **MS-4787: Abba Hillel Silver Papers, 1902-1989.**

Series IV: Sermons, 1914-1963, undated.

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Reflections on the Yalta documents, 1955.



REFLECTIONS ON THE YALTA DOCUMENTS

March 27, 1955

Ten years after the meeting of the Big Three at Yalta in the Crimea, the records of that Conference have been made public. An international furor has followed their publication. Considerable dissatisfaction has been expressed in Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and in the United States over the publication of these documents. The one surviving principal of that Conference, Sir Winston Churchill, has publicly vented his displeasure. It has been charged that the Yalta Papers which have been made public have been censored, that they are incomplete, that they do not tell all. It has also been charged that the publication is poorly timed, causing embarrassment to our friends and allies. Some politicians are inclined to make political capital out of these records, especially as they reveal the role which President Roosevelt played at that Conference, and the concessions which he is reputed to have made to Stalin.

I have no comments to make on these subsidiary issues, their timing, the motives, and the manner of release of these documents. That is quite unimportant. Official documents are supposed to be made public sooner or later. After all, the people are entitled to know sometime what their official representatives and spokesmen said and did in their name and on their behalf at important international conferences where decisions are made which affect their lives and their fortunes. Ten years is a long enough time to wait for such documents to be made public. In fact, it is a common practice of our state department to make public records of such conferences 10 or 15 years after the event.

I read through these published documents. I confess that I did not experience any particular shock or sense of outrage in reading them as some people seem to have experienced who did not read them. I found very little that might be called



conspiratorial in them - nothing was put over on the American people. There may have been in this or that regard poor judgment exercised by one or another of the conferees, or miscalculation. But this is all the easy wisdom of hind-sight - ten years later. The three leaders of the allies who met there for five days in February, 1945, on the eve of the great victory, came together in what was a spirit of friendliness and good will to work out certain international solutions for problems which were sure to arise with the coming of victory. They were also faced with certain military problems which called for immediate solution. It was not a cloak and dagger conference at all, a conference of dark intrigue or suspicion, where each of the conferees stealthily tried to outsmart the other or have no regard for the common good or the good of the world. It wasn't that kind of a conference at all. Here and there certain things were said in the absence of one or another of the conferees which seemed to be slightly critical of the other, but in the main these expressions did not affect the decisions taken at the conference. Issues were discussed by the Big Three and their military and political staffs amicably. There was substantial agreement on most things, give and take on others, and honest expressions of differences of opinion on still others. Some questions which could not be resolved at Yalta were left for subsequent negotiations and exchanges.

So I say, in reading these voluminous documents, I did not get any sense of shock or outrage at all. I did get a sense of sadness, a growing sense of sadness creeps in on one as one reads these documents. Not because of any evidences of duplicity or ineptness, but by the fact of the high hopes which were entertained by all those who took part in the Conference at Yalta - the high hopes for mankind have run into naught - by the clear insight and vision which was theirs at the time, which was subsequently clouded and distorted, and by the unity which prevailed there, a unity forged out of the blood and sacrifices of the war, which was tragically disrupted and broken soon after peace. It is what followed Yalta that is tragic - not what took place at Yalta.



It is easy to pick out here and there an off-the-cuff remark by Churchill or Stalin or Roosevelt made at some unguarded moment. It is easy to pick one of these side remarks and make a mountain out of a molehill. Thus Mr. Churchill is quoted as saying that he did not care much about the Poles. So what of it? Suppose he didn't care much about the Poles, but throughout that conference Churchill spoke up time and again in behalf of Poland and urged upon Stalin to be chivalrous and to make concessions to Poland, especially as regards the extension of Poland's eastern frontier. It is said that some uncomplimentary remarks of Churchill about France had been deleted from the public documents. What of it? What if he made those remarks? The fact is, that Churchill, throughout the Conference, stood up for France, insisting that France be given a zone in the occupied Germany after the war and an equal voice in the control commission for Germany, in spite of the fact that Stalin resisted that, saying that France had run out on the allies and had not made equal sacrifices with them. Chance remarks of President Roosevelt are being built up into some sensational causes. Roosevelt occasionally was caustic in his comment about the British - they want to have their cake and eat it, he said to Stalin one day. He expressed the thought that Britain ought to return Hong Kong to China. He too said of the Poles that they are a quarrelsome people - quarrelsome at home and abroad. But there was no connivance on his part to hurt either the British people or the Polish people.

It is said that President Roosevelt indulged himself in an uncomplimentary remark about the Jews and that had been deleted from the documents. At one of the sessions when the question came up about making certain concessions to Ibn Saud in return for some desired action on his part, President Roosevelt is reported to have said that there was only one concession that he thought he might offer, and that was to give Ibn Saud the six million Jews in the United States. The authenticity of this remark is questioned, but assuming that this unbecoming jest was made by him,



it in no way affected his friendly interests in the Jewish cause at this Conference. At one time he is quoted in the documents as having turned to Stalin and asked him whether he was a Zionist, saying that he, President Roosevelt, was a Zionist.

I am not endeavoring to excuse these off-the-cuff expressions of these important people, but too much should not be made of them. One must remember that a conference is very much in the nature of a kitchen where food is being prepared for the dining room. Not everything that is handled in the kitchen is served on the dining room table. A lot of it is disposed of - thrown out. In this connection of President Roosevelt asking Stalin about his attitude toward Zionism, Stalin's comments on another Jewish question might be quoted.

"Marshal Stalin said the Jewish problem was a very difficult one, that they had tried to establish a national home for the Jews in Birobidzhan but that they had only stayed there two or three years and then scattered to the cities. He said the Jews were natural traders but much had been accomplished by putting small groups in some agricultural areas.

"The President said he was a Zionist and asked if Marshal Stalin was one.

"Marshal Stalin said he was one in principle but he recognized the difficulty." This is very significant because it throws light on the attitude of the Soviet Union at the United Nations in 1947, an attitude which was very difficult for some of us to explain because at the United Nations it was the Soviet representative Gromyko who first, of all the nations, spoke up in behalf of the partition scheme and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, evidently reflecting the point of view of Stalin. As regards Birobidzhan, it might be said here, in the first place, no national home for the Jewish people was planned. It was to be a Jewish autonomous region which was to be open only to the Jews of the Soviet Union, not to the poor, homeless Jews of the world who needed a home at the time. This autonomous Jewish



region was created or established largely under the inspiration of Jewish communists in Russia as a sort of a counter-move to Zionism, hoping to win the sympathy of world Jewry away from Palestine to the Soviet Union, and neither the Jews of the Soviet Union, and certainly not the Jews of the world were interested in the creation of a Jewish autonomous region way out there in eastern Siberia on the borders of China. Though the project was, for a time, booned by skillful propaganda as something that was to turn out to be something epoch-making in Jewish history, it actually has fizzled out. It is reported today, though no accurate information is available, that it is now a region for slave-labor, under the administration of the Soviet secret police.

The most important problem which came up at Yalta had to do with the World Security Organization which was to follow the termination of the war. And here agreement was reached by the Big Three to call a conference to bring into existence the organization of the United Nations, and this conference was called not long after, you will remember, at San Francisco. The groundwork for the decisions at Yalta was made months before at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting, and certain questions which were not settled at Dumbarton Oaks were ironed out at Yalta, principally the question of the voting procedure in the Security Council and the question of the veto. So much has been made about the abuse by the Soviet Union of the veto that perhaps a word should be said that at Yalta there was absolutely no disagreement among the Big Three on the subject of the veto - they all agreed that the veto was vital and necessary to protect the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council - that is, the Big Three. I am quoting: "both the Prime Minister and Mr. Stettinius (England and the United States) pointed out that under the U. S. proposal the power of the world organization which was to be created could not be directed against any of the permanent members". At Yalta the Soviet asked also that all the sixteen republics of the Soviet Union should have membership in the U. N. They compromised



on two additional members - that of the Ukraine and White Russia. On all other matters related to the World Organization for international security and peace there was complete agreement, and it was there at Yalta that the United Nations was really founded.

Thus a great hope for mankind was kindled at Yalta, but that hope was predicated on one fact: on the abiding friendship of the three great powers. And they understood it full well at the time.

At a friendly dinner which was given on February 8th, the atmosphere, according to the account was most cordial, where the Big Three were toasting one another. Stalin said of Churchill and called him the "bravest governmental figure in the world," called him his "fighting friend and a brave man," and Churchill called Stalin the "mighty leader of a mighty country," and Stalin spoke of Roosevelt as "a man who, even though his country was not directly imperiled, had been the chief forger of the instruments which had led to the mobilization of the world against Hitler," and to which Roosevelt replied that he felt "the atmosphere of this dinner was that of a family, and it was in these words that he liked to characterize the relations that existed between our three countries - a family." It was at this dinner that Stalin made these significant observations: Stalin remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which was clear to everyone. He said the difficult task came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the Allies. He said he was confident that the present alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty to see that it would, and that our relations in peace time should be as strong as they had been in war.

But they weren't, as you know. They were to break disastrously soon after. Perhaps if President Roosevelt had lived - he died two months after Yalta - it might have been different, perhaps not. But the stark tragedy of the Yalta Conference



is not the Conference itself or the decisions which were arrived at, but what followed the allied victory.

There had also been clear vision at Yalta on one other subject, and total agreement. That was on Germany. There was scarcely any difference of opinion on what was to be done with Germany after her certain defeat. At the very first meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin soon after Roosevelt arrived at Yalta, "the President said that he had been very much struck by the extent of German destruction in the Crimea and therefore he was more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago. And he hoped that Marshal Stalin would again propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German Army.

Marshal Stalin replied that because of the honest blood shed in fighting the Germans, everyone was more bloodthirsty than they had been a year ago, adding that the destruction in the Crimea is nothing compared to that which occurred in the Ukraine. He said in the Crimea the Germans had been outflanked and had had little time to carry out planned destruction, whereas in the Ukraine they had done it with method and calculation. He said the Germans were savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the creative work of human beings. The President agreed with this."

At a later conference the subject of Germany came up and the question of German dismemberment. Not disarmament, but dismemberment. "The President then said that it seemed to him that they (meaning Churchill and Stalin) were both talking about the same thing, and what Marshal Stalin meant was should we not agree in principle here and now on the principle of dismemberment of Germany. He said personally, as stated by him at Tehran, that he was in favor of dismemberment of Germany...He added that he still thought the division of Germany into five states or seven states was a good idea. The Prime Minister interrupted to say "or less," to which the President agreed."

And so they were discussing the question of how to dismember Germany, not how to rearm Germany. Any one who would have brought up the subject of rearmament at Yalta would have been regarded as a mad man. And yet a few short years later our own



government began a most determined campaign to rearm Germany and to make it the veritable king-pin in the defense of the free world against Soviet aggression. And now France has been forced into line and has agreed to the rearmament of Germany, and before long the goose-step will again be heard on the military roads of Europe. A vision which was clear at Yalta and later on clear at Potsdam has become very much beclouded in the last few years.

President Roosevelt is charged with having made unnecessary concessions in the Pacific and the Far East to Stalin as price for the Soviet entering the war against Japan. It is argued that the President knew at the time of Yalta that our A-bomb would be ready in a few months, that there would be no need for an invasion by our forces of Japan, and that the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war in the Pacific was altogether unnecessary, in fact peace with Japan was actually declared, or rather Japan capitulated just a few short days after the Soviet entered the war in the Pacific. I for one cannot follow - I am not a military man, but I cannot follow this hind-sight wisdom of armchair strategists. President Roosevelt based his judgment on the best military advice available to him, and the best military advice that was available to him was that the war was likely to last in the Pacific some 18 months after Germany's defeat in the West, and he decided that it was his prerogative and his duty to make this great decision; he decided it was to the best interests of a speedy termination of the war in the Pacific and to the best interests of the United States to get Russia into the war. He was not interested in expanding Russian power in the Far East. Stalin was reluctant to enter the war in the Pacific. As he said, Japan was a country which gave Russia very little trouble. He could not justify, he said, to his own people, a sudden decision on the part of the Soviet to declare war upon Japan. He asked at the bargaining point that the conferees agree that following victory in the Pacific those territories which had been taken from Russia by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 be returned to the Soviet Union: Southern Sakhalin,



Port Arthur, the right to operate the Manchurian Railway, the status quo in Outer Mongolia, the Kuril Islands, to which President Roosevelt agreed; they both agreed that the concurrence of China, of Chang Kai Shek would be asked for this agreement. The concurrence of Chiang Kai-Shek was later asked and obtained for this agreement. I do not know how significant these concessions were, but they certainly in no way strengthened the cause of Communism in China. They did not give the Communists control over China or over the Pacific, and Chiang Kai-Shek was later on defeated not by these concessions made to Russia; he was defeated by the Chinese. Our government did everything in its power to save Chiang Kai-Shek; they tried to effect some kind of a working arrangement during the war between Chang Kai Shek and the Communists of China. They failed. Stalin was anxious at Yalta that such a compromise in the working arrangement be effected. I quote from the documents: "The President said that for some time we had been trying to keep China alive. Marshal Stalin expressed the opinion that China would remain alive. He added that they needed some new leaders around Chiang Kai-shek and although there were some good people in the Kuomintang he did not understand why they were not brought forward.

"The President said General Wedemeyer and the new Ambassador, General Hurley, were having much more success than their predecessors and had made more progress in bringing the Communists in the north together with the Chungking Government. He said the fault lay more with the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government than with the so-called Communists.

Marshal Stalin said he did not understand why they did not get together since they should have a united front against the Japanese. He thought that for this purpose Chiang Kai-shek should assume leadership. He recalled in this connection that some years ago there had been a united front and he did not understand why it had not been maintained."

The question of Poland occupied considerable time and the attention of the conferees. An effort was made to bring together the government in exile, the so-called



London government with the Lubline government. In fact, an effort was made to reach the representatives of these Polish groups by telephone to get them to come to Yalta to work out an agreement between them. That was not successful. They agreed on free elections to determine the permanent government for Poland. The decisions at Yalta were sound decisions. What followed were evil and unsound.

And so, my good friends, the release of the documents has clearly made possible an appraisal of what took place at Yalta. I am inclined to believe that what took place had the best interests of the world at heart. But the Big Powers fell apart after the war. Whether it was entirely Stalin's fault, whether Great Britain and the United States were partially responsible - this is not the moment to pass judgment. But they fell apart. Nearly all of the basic decisions reached - good decisions - at Yalta were rendered futile, as they saw in advance at Yalta - that unless the Big Three stood together, united, after the war, all their decisions were meaningless. Now, ten years after Yalta, having experienced one of the most catastrophic Cold Wars in our history, an effort is again being made to bring the great powers together. President Eisenhower favors it, Senator George of the opposition party has come out in favor of it, there is a strong sentiment for it in France and in England, and here, within the last day, Bulganin of the Soviet declared himself in favor of it. Perhaps now that the issue of the rearmament of Germany is out of the way - and let it be said that both as regards Germany and France, the people were persuaded to agree to rearmament on the promise that immediately after the pact was signed such a conference will be held - perhaps now it will be possible to hold an international conference and put an end to the cold war. If the cold war is permitted to go on indefinitely, it is bound to erupt into a shooting war. I believe that the statesmen of the world have been sobered up - sobered up not only by the events of the last few years, but by the A-bomb and the H-bomb. The people of the world are frightened at the prospect. I believe that the time is here for the great powers to get together, as they got together at Yalta, and if the spirit which will prevail will be one of give and take, of good will, they will arrive at sound decisions which we hope will not again be destroyed.



1. 10 yrs. after the meeting of R.S. Ch. at Yalta in the Crimea - the records (Reamon 8901)  
that Conf. have been made public.

An international forum has followed their publication - Dissab/paken  
expressed in G.D. - Soviet - and in U.S.

The one surviving principal, that Conf. Winston Churchill - has  
publicly vented his displeasure ~~and embarrassment~~. <sup>it is wanted by says</sup>

The Yalta papers, which have been made public, <sup>do not tell all. They</sup>  
~~have been so~~ incomplete - They have been castrated.

These <sup>refers to the papers</sup> publications has been fairly timed - <sup>it is wanted by others</sup> causing embarrassment  
to an ally. The Br. had objected to their release.

Some Republican politicians are making a try to make political  
capital out of the role of F.D.R. at this conference, and the  
concerns which he made to Stalin.

Pres. E. deprecated that - at his recent press conference.

2. I have no comments to make on these misleading stories -  
- the trinity - the motives the purpose the manner of their release.

Official documents are supposed to be made public some time  
sooner or later after the event.

After all the people are entitled to know, some times, what  
their official representatives thought and did in their name  
and on their behalf - at important conferences <sup>interpretations</sup> where decisions  
are made affecting their lives and fortunes. Ten years is a  
long enough time to wait - and the State Dept. - as a rule  
makes public such records 10 or 15 yrs. after the event.



3/ I read them the public documents; I confess that I ~~had~~ <sup>12</sup>  
~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> neither ~~checked~~ <sup>checked</sup> nor ~~destroyed~~ <sup>destroyed</sup>. I found nothing  
conspiratorial in them. <sup>nothing</sup> was put over on the American people.  
There may have been in this or that regard, poor judgment or  
and ~~poor~~ <sup>poor</sup> calculation; <sup>this</sup> is the <sup>error</sup> <sup>wisdom</sup> of hindsight - ten  
years later. The leaders of the Alliance who met them for 5 days  
in Feb. 1945 on the eve of ~~what~~ <sup>their</sup> victory - came together in  
what was clearly a spirit of frankness and good-will - to work  
out <sup>interim</sup> <sup>agreements</sup> <sup>for</sup> <sup>Japan</sup> which were new to arise with the coming of  
victory. They were also faced with military problems which called  
for immediate solution. It was not a desk and dapper  
conference of <sup>superior</sup> <sup>intellectuals</sup>, where each of the conference <sup>stealthily</sup>  
tried to outwarrant the other, and had no regard for the common  
good in the world. <sup>It was</sup> <sup>there</sup> <sup>discussed</sup> by  
the conference and their military and political staffs <sup>amicably</sup>.  
There was substantial agreement on most things, <sup>as</sup> <sup>and</sup>  
tab on others, and honest expressions of differences on others.  
Some points which could not be resolved were left  
for subsequent negotiations and exchanges.

4/ As I read these documents I ~~did~~ <sup>did</sup> ~~gather~~ <sup>gather</sup> ~~a~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~impression~~ <sup>impression</sup>  
by a man I had never before met at human complexity and ineptness  
~~but~~ - which I ~~found~~ <sup>found</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~pages~~ <sup>pages</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~document~~ <sup>document</sup>  
witness in which the high hopes ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~expressed~~ <sup>expressed</sup> by all the ~~parties~~ <sup>parties</sup>  
in the conference have ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> ~~into~~ <sup>into</sup> ~~naught~~ <sup>naught</sup> by the ~~man~~ <sup>man</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~document~~ <sup>document</sup>  
which ~~clear~~ <sup>clear</sup> ~~visions~~ <sup>visions</sup> ~~came~~ <sup>came</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~clouded~~ <sup>clouded</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~distorted~~ <sup>distorted</sup> ~~soon~~ <sup>soon</sup>  
after - and has a unity laid in the blood and trauma of  
war - was ~~tragic~~ <sup>tragic</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~disrupted~~ <sup>disrupted</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~peace~~ <sup>peace</sup>.



3

care typical

Unphosphorylated  
Unphosphorylated







Security Council - "Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Stettin pointed out that under the U.S. proposal the power of the world organization could not be directed against any of the permanent members."

Soviet asked that all 16 Soviet "republics" should have membership in UN - ~~It~~ Compromised on 2 additional members - Ukraine and Byelorussia.

8. Thus a great hope for mankind was kindled at Yalta  
But the hope was predeceased on the abiding friendships  
the 3 great powers -  
They understood it full well at Yalta. ~~(Jew)~~

At a Dinner - Eve. Feb 5 - atmosphere most cordial -  
when they were working in another  
Stalin calls Churchill - the bravest governmental figure  
Churchill called Stalin - in the world - "his fighting friend  
and a brave man"  
"the mighty leader of a mighty  
country"  
Stalin praised F.D.R. - "a man who even tho his  
country was not directly involved had  
been the chief forger of the instruments  
which had led to the mobilization of the  
world against Hitler"

Remark -

(Stalin - Jew)

"he felt the atmosphere at this dinner was that of a family, and it was in these words that he liked to characterize the relations that existed between the 3 countries"



9/ They were not to be as strong! They were to break disorderly (6  
soon after, perhaps if Roosevelt had lived - he died 21  
months after Yalta - it might have been different. Perhaps  
not! Who knows? But here is the stark tragedy of the  
Yalta Conference - is not the Conference - and its decisions  
which were arrived at - but what followed the Allied victory.

10/ They had clear vision at Yalta on one other subject.  
Germany - Scarcely any diff of opinion on what to do  
with Germany after its certain defeat. First meeting

① Just -

② at Malta - Stalin left + Truman then agreed Jan 4

next day - Feb. 5 - (Just)



11/ Certainly none, then thought / rearming / Germany.

Regarded as wast  
and yet - a few years later our part began a most determined  
campaign to rearm Germany - and was at the European  
Key-pin in the defense / the free world against Soviet aggression.  
To-day - Gorse - 5 help in the Pacific

12/ Roosevelt charged with making unnecessary concessions  
at Yalta to Stalin as price for Soviet coming into the  
war - against Japan. The Pres. knows at the time of Yalta  
It is argued - that the Pres. knows at the time of Yalta  
that our A-bomb would be ready by August 9 '45 - no involvement



(7)

Aug. 14 - 1945

- Return of Southern Sakhalin and Kurils; Pressure of Port  
 as base that is very  
 rather and Danger - Operating system as the transmission  
railways - States two in Antar Mongolia - and the Kurils and the returned - and

is no way they trust the case  
is not correct, ~~inquiries~~ ~~force~~ or Chinese  
Chang Kwei they are deflected by

(Date) -



Poland - Juden part - Juden part - Free elections -

(8)

a/. Repair the damage, the Jews -

My Paper Talks are now urged by Sen. Jozef -

after Army Bonn voted

Eisenhower - Belgium -





**ARGUMENTATION:** Unity of great power policy with respect to liberated and Axis satellite countries is highly desirable, and France should be included as one of the great powers for this purpose.

**3. Treatment of Germany.**

(a) Final agreement should be reached with respect to control machinery and zones of occupation. Announcement should be made of such agreement and of the earlier agreement on surrender terms.

(b) Boundaries: It is not expected that definitive, detailed commitments will have to be made at this time. However, if it proves necessary, our detailed position has been prepared and is available.

(c) Minorities: We should oppose, so far as possible, indiscriminate mass transfer of minorities with neighboring state. Transfers should be carried out gradually under international supervision.

(d) Long range economic policies: We should favor abolition of German self-sufficiency and its position of economic domination of Europe, elimination of certain key industries, prohibition of manufacture of arms and of all types of aircraft, and continuing control to achieve these aims.

**4. Poland.**

There is a lot of discussion about the characteristics of the Crimea.

The President said that he had been very much struck by the extent of German destruction in the Crimea and therefore he was more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago. And he hoped that Marshal Stalin would again propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German Army.

Marshal Stalin replied that because of the honest blood shed in fighting the Germans, everyone was more bloodthirsty than they had been a year ago, adding that the destruction in the Crimea is nothing compared to that which occurred in the Ukraine. He said in the Crimea the Germans had been outflanked and had had little time to carry out planned destruction, whereas in the Ukraine they had done it with method and calculation. He said the Germans were savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the creative work of human beings.

The President agreed with this.

The President replied that



\* \* \*

Marshal Stalin then said he thought more time was needed to consider and finish the business of the conference.

The President answered that he had three kings waiting for him in the Near East, including Ibn Saud.

Marshal Stalin said the Jewish problem was a very difficult one that they had tried to establish a national home for the Jews in Birobidzhan but that they had only stayed there two or three years and then scattered to the cities. He said the Jews were natural traders but much had been accomplished by putting small groups in some agricultural areas.

The President said he was a Zionist and asked if Marshal Stalin was one.

Marshal Stalin said he was one in principle but he recognized the difficulty.

During the course of the course of the conversation, Marshal Stalin remarked that the Soviet Government would never have signed a treaty with the Germans in 1939 had it not been for Munich and the Polish-German treaty of 1934.

Marshal Stalin



## : President Roosevelt with press sec

ng clear to everyone. He said the difficult task came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the Allies. He said he was confident that the present alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty to see that it would, and that our relations in peace time should be as strong as they had been in war.

The Prime Minister then said

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In a subsequent toast to the alliance between the three great powers, Marshal Stalin remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which was

## MEETING OF THE CO OF STAR

2

February 9, 1945

PRESENT

United States  
United Kingdom

Fleet Admiral Leahy  
Field Marshal Brooke  
General of the Army Marshall  
Marshal of the Royal Air  
Force Portal  
Fleet Admiral King  
Admiral of the Fleet Cunning-

Vic  
Ad  
Re  
Ma  
Ma  
Ca  
Co  
  
Br  
Ma  
Ca  
Br



the two were not directly connected.

Marshal Stalin replied that what he wished to find out here was whether or not it was the joint intention to dismember Germany or not. He said that at Tehran, when the question had been discussed, the President had proposed the division of Germany into five parts. The Prime Minister, after some hesitation, had suggested the division of Germany into two parts, with a separation of Prussia from the southern part of Germany. He said that he had associated himself with the views of the President, but the discussion at Tehran had only been an exchange of views. He added that at Moscow with the Prime Minister they had discussed the possibility of dividing Germany into two parts with Prussia on the one hand and Bavaria and Austria on the other, with the Ruhr and Westphalia under international control. He said that he thought that this plan was feasible but that no decision had been taken since the President was not there. He inquired whether the time had not come to make a decision on the dismemberment of Germany.

The Prime Minister stated that the British Government agreed in principle to dismemberment, but he felt that the actual method and a final decision as to the manner of dismemberment was too complicated to be done here in four or five days. He said it would require elaborate searchings by experienced statesmen on the historical, political, economic and sociological aspects of the problem and prolonged study by a subcommittee. He added that the informal talks at Tehran and Moscow had been very general in character and had not been intended to lay down any precise plan. In fact, he added, if he were asked to state here how Germany should be divided, he would not be in a position to answer, and for this reason he couldn't commit himself to any definite plan for the dismemberment of Germany. The Prime Minister said, however, that personally he felt that the isolation of Prussia and the elimination of her might from Germany would remove the arch-evil—the German war potential would be greatly diminished. He added that a south German state with perhaps a government in Vienna might indicate the line of great division of Germany. He said that we are agreed that Germany should lose certain territories conquered by the Red Army which would form part of the Polish settlement, but he

of Germany which could perhaps best be done at the second stage after unconditional surrender. He said that we reserve under these terms all rights over the lives, property and activities of the Germans.

Marshal Stalin said that he did not think that the question of dismemberment was an additional question, but one of the most important.

The Prime Minister replied that it was extremely important, but that it was not necessary to discuss it with the Germans but only among ourselves.

Marshal Stalin replied that he agreed with this view but felt a decision should be made now.

The Prime Minister replied that there was not sufficient time, as it was a problem that required careful study.

The President then said that it seemed to him that they were both talking about the same thing, and what Marshal Stalin meant was should we not agree in principle here and now on the principle of dismemberment of Germany. He said personally, as stated by him at Tehran, that he was in favor of dismemberment of Germany. He recalled that forty years ago, when he had been in Germany, the concept of the Reich had not really been known then, and any community dealt with the provincial government. For example, if in Bavaria you dealt with the Bavarian Government and if in Hesse-Darmstadt you dealt with that Government. In the last twenty years, however, everything has become centralized in Berlin. He added that he still thought the division of Germany into five states or seven states was a good idea.

The Prime Minister interrupted to say "or less," to which the President agreed.

The Prime Minister remarked that there was no need, in his opinion, to inform the Germans of our future policy—that they must surrender unconditionally and then await our decision. He said we are dealing with the fate of 80,000,000 people and that required more than eighty minutes to consider. He said it might not be fully determined until a month or so after our troops occupy Germany.

The President said he thought the Prime Minister was talking about the question of dismemberment. In his view he said he thought it would be a great mistake to have any public discussion of the dismemberment of Germany as he would certainly receive as many plans as there had been German states in the past. He suggested that the conference ask the three



Foreign Ministers should consider Article 12 of the surrender terms instrument in order to ascertain the best method of bringing in a reference to the intention to dismember Germany.

The President then said that the question of the French zone remained to be decided. He said that he had understood from Marshal Stalin that the French definitely did not wish to annex outright the German territory up to the Rhine.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was not the case, since during the visit of General de Gaulle the French had made it quite plain that they intended to annex permanently the territory up to the Rhine.

The Prime Minister said that he did not feel it possible to discuss possible frontiers as they were considering only the zones of temporary military occupation. He added that he was for giving the French a definite zone which could come out of the British and possibly the American zones and that all he sought here was that the Soviet Government would agree that the British and American Governments should have the right to work out with the French a zone of occupation. He added that this zone would not in any way affect the proposed Soviet zone.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether or not the granting of a zone to France would not serve as a precedent to other states.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the occupation of Germany might be a long one and that the British Government was not sure that it could bear the burden alone for an extended period and that the French might be able to be of real assistance in this matter.

Marshal Stalin said that if the French were given a zone, would not that change the tripartite control of Germany to a four-nation control.

The Prime Minister replied that the British Government expected that if France were given a zone they would of course participate in the control machinery, but that in regard to other nations that might assist in the occupation such as Belgium or Holland, there would be no question of a specific zone and thus no part in the participation of the control machinery.

Marshal Stalin stated that he thought it would bring up many complications if we should have four nations instead of three participating in the determination of German matters. He thought that some method might

Great Britain. He agreed that it would be inconvenient to a France to the present group major allies. But he felt that British public opinion would understand why France was being excluded from a problem which was of such direct concern to her. He observed that the destiny of great nations was not decided by the temporary state of their technical apparatus. He mentioned, however, that he had been against participation of France in the present conference, which he understood was the opinion of the President and had gathered he was also that of Marshal Stalin. He concluded by saying that must provide for France in the future to stand guard on the left hand of Germany, otherwise Great Britain might again be confronted with the specter of Germany at the channel ports.

Marshal Stalin repeated that he would not like to see France as a participant in the control machinery for Germany, though he had no objection to their being given a zone with the British and American zones.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the control commission will be an extraordinary body under the order of the Governments concerned and that there was no reason to fear that bad policy in regard to Germany would be made by this commission.

The President pointed out this point that France was in fact a full member of the European Advisory Commission which was the only Allied body apart from this conference which was considering the German problem.

The President said that he favored the acceptance of the French request for a zone, that he agreed with Marshal Stalin that France should take part in the control machinery, otherwise other nations would demand participation. He went on to say, for example, that as a result of the deliberate German destruction of the dikes that large sections of Dutch farm land had been inundated by salt water and that it would be necessary to give the Dutch farmers compensation for a temporary period from German territory. He said that he understood that it would be at least five years before the flooded lands would be suitable for cultivation. If this was done, and he personally felt that it should be done, the Dutch might well claim a voice in the control machinery for Germany.

Mr. Eden then pointed out that there was no question of any zones for any other power except France, but that France



Gaullie said he was going to find the troops when the President could find the ships, but the President added that up to the present he had been unable to find the ships.

## VI. Internal Conditions in China

The President said that for some time we had been trying to keep China alive.

Marshal Stalin expressed the opinion that China would remain alive. He added that they needed some new leaders around Chiang Kai-shek and although there were some good people in the Kuomintang he did not understand why they were not brought forward.

The President said General Wedemeyer and the new Ambassador, General Hurley, were having much more success than their predecessors and had made more progress in bringing the Communists in the north together with the Chungking Government. He said the fault lay more with the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government than with the so-called Communists.

Marshal Stalin said he did not understand why they did not get together since they should have a united front against the Japanese. He thought that for this purpose Chiang Kai-shek should assume leadership. He recalled in this connection that some years ago there had been a united front and he did not understand why it had not been maintained.

six South who felt the advice of Government in good stand he added, that helped us a war effort. frankly, this mistake and the Secretary brought up with a barrassing question he had sent letters to students of these schools asking them to decide the common had already done a declaration could any time, and others before long.

Marshal Stalin about Argentina.

The President are considering a United Nations Nations who had war effort.

Marshal Stalin love for Argentina that there was a in logic. He inquired the criteria (sic) of states and men in connection Turkey felt there were not really waged war ferred, and there we had wavered and being on the winning side.

The President repeated his idea that Associated Nations declared war should and he suggested that limit should be March.

Marshal Stalin



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anything that would hamper  
military operations.

The President proposed that  
the matter be referred to the  
foreign ministers for study, and  
this was agreed to.

The Prime Minister said there  
was one small matter he wished  
to bring up before adjournment,  
and that was the periodic meet-  
ing of foreign ministers every  
three months.

The President said he was in  
favor of this idea but he knew  
that Mr. Stettinius was very  
busy with some of the Latin  
American countries and he felt  
it would be best to say they  
would meet when necessary and  
not fix any definite period for  
the meetings.

The Prime Minister said he  
hoped that the first of these  
meetings could be in London, to  
which the President and Marshal  
Stalin agreed.

Marshal Stalin then said he  
had one small matter which he  
would like to bring up. He would  
like to know what is holding  
back the formation of a unified  
government in Yugoslavia. He  
would also like to know what  
was going on in Greece. He said  
he had no intention of criticizing  
British policy there but he  
would merely like to know what  
was going on.

The Prime Minister said that  
Greece would take a great deal  
of time to explain and he would  
reserve it for the next meeting.  
He said in regard to Yugoslavia  
that the King had been persuad-  
ed, or even forced, to agree to a  
regency. Subasic was leaving  
soon, if he had not left already,  
for Yugoslavia to appoint the