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American Zionist Emergency Council, analysis by AHS re: politics relating to Palestine resolution, including discussion of roles played by Dr. Stephen S. Wise, under-secretary of State Stettinius, President Roosevelt, and Senators Wagner, Taft and Connall, 1944.

At our meeting on October 30th and at a subsequent meeting, we discussed the Resolutions and agreed not to press ^{for} ~~the~~ action on them unless we got the green light from the State Department and from the President. This was done not out of ~~our~~ ^{an} desire not to offend the State Department or the President, but ~~instead~~ to protect ourselves against the kind of surprise which was jumped on us last spring. We wanted to make doubly sure before we moved. In the discussion that ~~did~~ ^{ed at the meetings} develop, some were of the opinion as to ^{who} ~~whether~~ ^{raised the question} we should proceed with the Resolution at all; some felt that the Resolution was no longer important since we had the President's statement of October 15th. Others felt that the re-opening of ~~the~~ discussion in Congress would give the opposition in Congress an opportunity to attack us. Some felt ^{that} we would have a better chance with the next Congress; some objected to the Resolution as it now reads because of the word "ultimately" and thought ^{that} ~~if~~ we could get a better resolution, perhaps a joint resolution in the next Congress. While ^{their opinion was expressed} ~~no formal action was taken on any of these~~, it ^{was} ~~was~~ the consensus of ~~opinion~~ ^{should} that we ~~would~~ ^{should} move ahead with the Resolution provided ^{the} ~~no objections developed from the State Department or with the President~~. ^{every one agreed}

P Accordingly Dr. Wise, Dr. Goldman, and I called on Stettinius on November 9th. We asked him for the green light on our Congressional Resolution in view of Secretary of War Stimson's letter removing the military objections, and in view of the party platforms and the President's own statement. Stettinius had no opinion of his own, but ^{that} ~~said~~ he would consult with the President. It is altogether false ^{as has been frequently} ~~to state or to suggest~~ ^{promised} that I or either of the other two members who called on Stettinius ~~told~~ him that we would not press for the Resolution if the State Department or the President registered objections. If any one gave such a promise, it was done before or after the interview and not by me.

On November 15th Stettinius telephoned to Wise who transmitted the information to a meeting of the Executive Committee and of the full Council on November 21st, that the President thought that we should not proceed with action on the Resolution and that the matter should be left with him for a little while longer.

^{Then followed} At this meeting a discussion ~~ensued~~. It was clear that the Council was not satisfied

definitely 2

that Stettinius' reply closed the matter. On the contrary, it was felt by quite a few that a mistake had been made in going to Stettinius in the first place to ask whether there was any objection. We should have assumed in view of all that had transpired - the party platforms, the President's statement, Stimson's letter - that the green light had in fact been given.

I argued at this meeting and so did others that a strong effort should be made to reach the President and to urge upon him to change his mind. ~~This~~ ^{His} opposition ^{would be} ~~had~~ been gravely misinterpreted and was unfair to our Cause.

Dr. Wise opposed such action. The President, he said, was leaving the country almost immediately. He was sure to take ^{up} the matter with Churchill. Furthermore, Congress would adjourn in a few days. He had been assured that our Resolution could not ~~have~~ ^{in any event} ~~been~~ acted upon in the closing days of ~~the~~ ^{this} Congress. In both of these matters, Dr. Wise was misinformed.

The Council agreed that ~~a~~ ^{should} strong effort be made to reach the President. Dr. Wise insisted that only Wagner should be seen to carry out this mission and suggested that he, ~~himself~~ and Mr. Shulman should contact Wagner. I as Chairman of the Executive Committee felt constrained ^{you will recall} to invite myself in ^{on that committee} and to state that there may be others who ~~could~~ ^{would} be asked to see the President. Dr. Wise violently objected to this and contemptuously referred to Senator Taft as not a very ~~right~~ ^{blatant} person to see the President. It was clear that Dr. Wise was yielding only to pressure and that if the matter ~~was~~ ^{were} left to him, no earnest effort would be made to urge the President to change his mind. Proofs soon began to multiply that this indeed was the case.

As of November 21st, therefore, our Council had agreed on two things: (a) not to press our Resolution until we got the green light, and (b) to try to persuade the President to change his mind and give us the green light. Unfortunately, the President was not in Washington and could not be reached. In fact he has not been directly contacted by any one of us or by any friend of our Resolution to this day. Everything has passed through the hands of Mr. Stettinius. Wagner tried to reach the President on Thanksgiving Day ~~I understand~~, but the President was no longer in Washington. Instead he talked to Stettinius

who gave him the same answer which we had previously received. It was not until December 2nd, eleven days after the meeting of our Committee, that Wagner wrote a personal letter to the President, a letter which I helped him draft, in which he explained the situation as he saw it and appealed to the President to withdraw his objections, and it was not until December 4th that he received the reply in the form of a letter to which I shall ^{allude} ~~refer~~ later on.

But by December 4th certain events connected with our Resolution had already taken place. Things had been set in motion without ^{any} ~~my~~ personal urging or prodding ^{on my part} as some have suggested. The gossip has been spread abroad that if I personally had not pressed for the Resolution in Washington when I arrived on November 27th, the Resolution would have remained quiescent. I did not go to Washington on November 27th to press for the Resolution. I went there to carry out the instruction of the Council to try to bring pressure ^{to} upon the President ~~to try to make him~~ change his mind. ^{you must remember that} The Council had begun to stimulate action in behalf of the reconsideration of our Resolution ^{early in} ~~during~~ the month of October. If you will consult the minutes of the October 30th meeting of the Council, ^{you will find that} I reported that "in anticipation of the reconsideration of the Resolution when Congress reconvenes, the Emergency Council has been engaged ~~in~~ stimulating afresh the ^{interest} of the members of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. The local emergency committees in the communities in which these members reside had been asked to approach them again and to bring them up to date on recent developments, and to suggest that early action on the Resolution when Congress reconvenes would be desirable. The results received so far are gratifying."

Before ~~the~~ election we requested our Community Contact people to interview every Congressman and Senator and to get them ^{to} pledged to vote for our Resolution as soon as Congress reconvenes. We sent to every Congressman and Senator our book ~~on~~ "America and Palestine" which contained the printed opinion of nearly four hundred members of the present House and Senate. The President's letter on October 15th was accompanied with the statement of Senator Wagner that ^{the way is now} ~~it~~ clears the way for Congressional action. The convention of the Z.O.A. called for speedy action on the Palestine Resolution. Congressman Blum announced on the heel of the President's statement, ^{So we may} ~~that he would have a~~ meeting of his Committee

on the day after Congress reconvenes.

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Nov. 15, 1945
Congressman and Senators
All this propaganda of ours was reflected in the Congress when it reconvened. They were waiting for action; they were expecting action, and good and sufficient reasons would have to be given, especially to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had been critical of the President's action in the spring, as to why ~~this~~ action, so consistently and persistently called for by the Jews of America, should now be deferred.

Congressman Blum was stopped from moving forward in his Committee by our request to delay action. Nevertheless he found himself ~~so~~ ^{hardly} pressed by fellow Congressmen ^{and} that he sent a long telegram to Dr. Wise containing an attack ~~which had been~~ ^{which} made on him by Congressman Celler for ⁱⁿ regards to the Resolution. Both Senators Wagner and Taft, who sponsored the Resolution, were eager to get action. With both of them it was a matter of honor. They were committed to these Resolutions and ~~indorsements~~ ^{indorsements} of these Resolutions were used favorably to them during the campaign ^{and} they wanted to discharge their obligations to the Jewish people.

You may recall that at the November 21st meeting I told you that Senator Taft had already taken up the matter with Connally, and that Connally had invited him to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee on the 22nd. In other words the Foreign Relations Committee was prepared to act favorably on our Resolution the day after we had decided to reach the President. Only out of courtesy to Senator Wagner, who was absent from Washington, was the meeting postponed to the following week, November 29th.

Congressman Blum knew of this contemplated meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee scheduled for Wednesday, the 22nd and postponed to the 29th. He did not wish the Senate Committee to get ahead of him. Prior to my coming to Washington, he had already arranged to have the Congressman's ~~indorsements~~ ^{indorsements} of the Palestine resolution, which appeared in our publication, "America and Palestine", reprinted as a special House document. ^{at government expense.} Accordingly he was very eager to have the Resolutions acted upon.

I arrived in Washington as I indicated, on the 27th in order to see what could be done to reach and explain things to the President. I had personally been unable to reach Senator Wagner by telephone. I had wired to Dr. Wise on November 22nd, the day after our meeting,

Editorials reached him from the Jewish press of New
York urging immediate action.

WRHS



to this effect "Because of strike here, could not reach you by telephone. Strongly urge you to contact Blum immediately and urge him to see the Chief and persuade him to give clearance to Resolutions Please inform me by telegram or telephone results of conversation with Blum." Dr. Wise never replied to this telegram of mine. My original feeling that he had no intention to do anything to help change the President's mind was confirmed. If anything could be done, it had to be done quickly for the days of Congress were running out, and it could best be done from base in Washington.

On the very day that I arrived, I went to see Congressman Blum to urge him to get in touch with the President. To my surprise, he told me that he had already made what to him were good and sufficient inquiries "down the hill" as he put it, presumably at the State Department. It should be remembered that Blum ^{hardly ever} never budges without consulting the State Department. We had frequently criticized him for being a subservient tool of the State Department. I was amazed to hear from him that what he had learned there was of such little influence with him, that he brushed it aside as of no moment. They had told him something about an item which had appeared in the "Times" as to the Vatican's attitude towards Palestine and something about the Arab's unfavorably reaction to the President's statement of October 15th. He quoted himself as having said to the person in the State Department, presumably Stettinius, that on October 15th the President had said so and so and you could get around that; that the Democratic Platform said so and so and you could get around that; ~~He did not need any other given light - he said~~ I am going forward with the Resolution. It is none of their business

anyhow. Military reasons are something else again. I had to submit to that. ^{Blum} ~~much, this is the Chairman of the Committee, a loyal member of the Administration~~ ^{repeatedly} If the responsible ~~head~~ ^{man} of the Foreign Affairs Committee, ^{on Wednesday, after my resignation was accepted} a loyal member of the Administration,

^{to whom Dr. Wise had} ^{in his mind} ^{permitted only speaking} tion, who knew all about the reported objections of the State Department and of the President, felt nevertheless free to move forward with our Resolutions. I certainly was not the man to dissuade him. I did not know at the time how determined and relentless was the President's opposition. Congressman Blum's ^{reactions} ~~statements~~ certainly gave one the definite impression that ^{the reasons} ~~they~~ were not so weighty that they could not be overcome. Blum was somewhat concerned with the ^{fact} that that he might be blamed if the Resolutions failed of passage in his Committee. ^{He wanted us to share in this possibility} I reassured him on that score. ^{at his request I wrote} ~~The responsibility was ours in first~~ ~~introducing the Resolutions. We were prepared to take the chance then; and we are prepared~~ ^{him a better following} ^{an interview in which I backed him up, and}

~~pared to take the chance now.~~

As you know favorable action did take place in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday, November 29th.

I tried to reach Senator Wagner from the day after our meeting on November 21st. I could not reach him. He was in seclusion and his secretary would not ^{tell} give me ^{his} xx whereabouts.

Wise and Shulman saw Wagner in Atlantic City on Sunday, November 26th. ^{Shulman reported} what they told

^{To me the conversation the next day by telephone to Washington}
~~Senator Wagner, I do not know, but~~ when I finally did get to see the Senator on Tuesday,

November 28th at dinner, he certainly had no plans of seeing the President to persuade him to remove his objections. But he was nevertheless determined to go into the meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ^{the next morning} and press for his Resolution.



that same
On Tuesday, Mr. Shulman telephoned Wagner's secretary in Washington *and*

gave ~~giving~~ him a long line of reasons why the Senator should use his efforts to postpone consideration of our resolutions by the Senate Committee. ~~Thus we~~ *We* were working at cross purposes -- Wise and Shulman pressing ~~on~~ Wagner to have his resolution shelved, and I, following the clear line indicated by the Council, urging the Senator to get in touch with the President to persuade him to withdraw his objection to the passage of the resolution. Wagner found himself the victim of two opposing forces pulling him in different directions. He was telephoned a

some ~~dozen~~ *or more* times by people in New York *all* speaking in the name of the Emergency Council *2400115*. He was baffled and confused. Toward the end he became actually sick, *and took to his bed*, and then I was informed that at the final meeting on Monday afternoon, December 11, when our resolution was shelved, Wagner hardly uttered fifteen words. This was unlike the earlier meetings when he spoke up vigorously for his resolution and where he announced that he would press for his resolution even if the President came out in a public declaration against it.

On Wednesday morning, November 29, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met to consider our resolution. This was the meeting that had been postponed from the week before because of Wagner's absence from the city. Senator Taft, who had been invited to attend the meeting out of courtesy as a sponsor of the resolution, made a strong plea in behalf of the resolution. He traced the history of the resolution -- how and why it was introduced, why action *had been* deferred on it in the Spring, because of the intervention of the War Department, how these objections had *been* removed, and finally how both political parties and both presidential candidates had *endorsed* ~~come out for~~ the Jewish Commonwealth. Upon request of one of the members, he explained in detail what the Zionist Movement *understood by* ~~conceived~~ the Jewish Commonwealth to be, and read the official statement issued by the Jewish Agency on the subject. He also *stated* ~~suggested~~ that the word "ultimately" has led to misundersanding, and Senator Vandenburg suggested *that* ~~therefore~~ the words "as soon as practicable" -- ~~these words~~ *the*

Should be substituted
~~being~~ the identical words used by the President in his statement on October 15.

During the friendly discussion which ensued, Senator Connally endeavored to establish that the State Department ^{had} ~~was~~ objection to action at this time. Whereupon some of the Senators expressed great indignation. How could the State Department object ~~in~~ in view of the record of the President's ^{own} endorsement six weeks ago? Some of the Senators insisted that the State Department was evidently speaking for the President, and ~~if that were so~~, the President was subjecting them to another shabby ^{similar} maneuver, to which they were subjected last Spring when the Senate was restrained from acting upon the resolutions, ^{Polyfune} ~~avowedly~~ because of military considerations, ^{and} ~~while~~ almost simultaneously, the President himself made a public statement to the Zionists which completely ignored the ~~request of the~~ ^{refused to} military. They ~~would not~~ ^{would not} be victimized a second time. If the State Department had any valid reasons for ~~deeming~~ ^{wanting} action, ^{after} Secretary of State Stettinius in person should come before the Committee and accept full responsibility, ~~for the delay~~. He should tell us why these resolutions should be ~~delayed~~. The Committee at first voted 9-6 to dispose of the resolution immediately. Subsequently, ^{and} as the result of Connally's ^{condemned} insistence, the Committee voted 11-5 to delay action for a week, with the understanding that ~~the~~ ^{Stettinius must} ~~personal appearance of Stettinius~~, and also with the instruction ~~that~~ ^{to} Senator Wagner should endeavor to see the President and ^{to} obtain from him a clarification of his reported opposition. After the Committee adjourned, the opinion was expressed ~~to me~~ ^{by Senator} by Senator Wagner and Senator Kupper and others, that the resolution would undoubtedly be approved at the next meeting of the Committee on Wednesday, December 6.

On Friday, December 1st, Wagner called the State Department to arrange for a conference with ^{Stettinius} ~~him~~ and myself. This conference was set for 12:30 P.M., Monday, December 4. In keeping with the directive of the Senate Committee, Wagner ^{also} decided to send a personal letter to the President. I drafted a memorandum for him which he might use in writing to the President. This letter was sent on Saturday, December 2nd. This was the first direct contact, although still not a personal

We wanted to persuade Stelbrink not to appear
before the Committee, and also, through him, to
~~send~~ the pass on to the President, our
feelings about his reported defection.



one, with the the President, by any friend on the resolution.

This was the state of affairs when I arrived in Pittsburgh ^{to attend} for the American Jewish Conference, on Saturday evening, December 2nd. The Senate Resolution was hanging fire, pending word from Stettinius and a reply from the President to Senator Wagner's letter. Senator Wagner and I were waiting for ~~our~~ our appointment with Stettinius Monday noon. The Senate Committee was determined to act and ^{had} made its determination very clear. ^{the Committee} It was not being pressed or prodded by me. ~~They~~ had reconsidered a motion which had been adopted to proceed immediately with the consideration of the resolution only at the persistence of its chairman who pleaded for a week's delay. The House Foreign Affairs Committee ^{already} had acted favorably. Its action had been warmly hailed by the Jewish press, and by the Jewish public and ~~might I say here~~, by most of the leaders of the Zionist parties,

It was my intention upon my arrival in Pittsburgh, on Saturday evening, ~~December 2nd~~, to call together the members of the so-called Interim Committee, which you will recall we had agreed was to act on our affairs between meetings of the ^{Emergency} Council, ^{that is} the two co-chairmen of the Council and the representatives of the Jewish Agency. To my amazement, I discovered upon my arrival that Dr. Israel Goldstein had during the day called a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America to discuss not only the resolution which ^{had been} was adopted by the House Committee, but all the other ^{everything else} involved and intricate matters connected with the pending resolutions. Dr. Goldstein knew full well that neither the Interim Committee nor the Council had as yet discussed the matter, ~~and that I was not in the city~~, and that I, ^{as} Executive Chairman of the Council, who was closest to the whole situation, was not in the city, ~~prepared~~ to give his committee information on the subject even if I were willing to overlook the fact that if there ^{was} is to be a report by me, it would first have to be given to the Emergency Council. When I arrived, I found the halls of the William-Penn buzzing with all kinds of rumors, ~~broken~~ fragments of information and misinformation ^{as well} and criticism of the resolution which had been ^{approved} adopted by the House

Committee. ~~To this day~~ I cannot understand what Zionist purpose Dr. Goldstein intended ~~intended~~ to serve by calling ^{such a} meeting, at such a time and ~~such a~~ place, where hundreds of delegates, many of them non-Zionists, were gathered not for a Zionist Convention but for the American Jewish Conference, and where nothing but mischief could result from hasty and ill-considered opinions expressed on insufficient and largely ^{inadequate} data. I suspect that the real motive ~~of it~~ on the part of Dr. Goldstein' was to ^{start} "run down" the resolution passed by the House, to spread the opinion among the delegates that the resolution was bad one, and to discredit, if possible, Dr. Silver whose name had been so closely identified with the resolution. ~~Dr. Goldstein had~~ ^{a campaign to} ~~let it be known at the Zionist Convention in Atlantic City that his purpose was~~ ^{Communist} ~~to deflate Dr. Silver -- a very commendable ambition for a Rabbi and a Zionist leader.~~ ~~And here was fine opportunity -- so he thought -- to do a bit of deflation.~~ The minds of some of the delegates were actually poisoned by this subtle propaganda. Fortunately the overwhelming majority welcomed and acclaimed the resolution as evidenced ^{by} the reception which it received when it was read twice, ~~both~~ by Mr. Kaufmann in his opening address, and by myself in my address on Sunday night.

The resolution as passed by the House is of course an excellent one. Were Churchill to announce tomorrow that England has resolved to open the doors of Palestine for the free entry of Jews and to grant them full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth, the Jewish people the world over would celebrate that day as a national holiday.

Dr. Wise when he telephoned Mr. Bloom on the day the resolution was passed, told him and me over the telephone that the resolution was ^{very} a good one, as ^{so} indeed it was. The excuse which Dr. Goldstein gave me, the next morning, for calling that meeting in my absence, was that he wanted to issue a statement and needed the guidance of his committee. ~~I told him that it was too late for a statement. I wanted also~~ ^{for a statement} ~~to tell him that the world was not waiting with baited breath/on the subject by a~~ ~~Dr. Israel Goldstein.~~

It was in such an atmosphere that I found myself when I arrived at the William Penn on Saturday night. I felt that ~~the~~ more discussion of our business, *at improvised meetings at the Colson* delicate and confidential as a good deal of it was, could only contribute ~~greater~~ *more* harm and confusion ~~at this particular time and place~~. I wanted, however, to report immediately to the Interim Committee, and I asked Mr. Shapiro to invite ~~them~~ *the members* to a meeting that very night although it was close to midnight. Mr. Shapiro reported that Dr. Wise was too tired, and that Dr. Goldmann was not yet in the city. I therefore requested Mr. Shapiro to call ~~the~~ meeting for Sunday morning. Mr. Joseph was invited to the meeting as a member of the Jewish Agency. I invited Mr. Shulman because he had been appointed, together with Dr. Wise and myself, to try to bring pressure on the President to change his mind. Mr. Lipsky and Dr. Goldmann were *in Chicago at* also present. But Dr. Wise, who had previously told Mr. Shapiro that he was coming to the meeting, did not come, and Dr. Goldmann finally stated that Dr. Wise refused to come because he wanted a meeting of the Emergency Council. I regarded that as an unwarranted rebuff and a high-handed attitude for one to assume, since he himself was so largely instrumental in working out the arrangement whereby, between meetings of the Emergency Council, the Interim Committee would consider the urgent business of the Council. *I felt that* He might have come to ~~receive~~ *hear* my report, and following that, *if* to have requested such a meeting. I should then have indicated to him why I regarded such a meeting at that particular time and place as undesirable. I gave the members of the Interim Committee all the facts. I told them of the meeting which Wagner and I were to have with Stettinius the next day. I told them of the letter that Wagner had sent to the President and that we were waiting for an answer. I told them of the attitude of the Senate Committee and how they were determined to move along with the resolutions. I corrected for them some of the wild rumors that had been spread among the Conference delegates. None of ~~them~~ *the present* suggested a meeting of the Emergency Council. In fact there was nothing that the Emergency Council could do. We were still following the position *defined* outlined by the Emergency Council.

on November 21 -- to try to persuade the President, although in the meantime action ^{taken} had come forth positively in the House, and tentatively in the Senate, which we could not control.

^{Although} Because I did not see the wisdom of calling a formal meeting of the Emergency Council in the setting of the American Jewish Conference, and in the atmosphere created by the meeting called by Dr. Goldstein, I nevertheless wanted to inform the leaders of all the parties of what was transpiring. Accordingly, during the whole of that Sunday, I met with leaders of the ZOA, Poale Zion and the Mizrachi. I had also ^{invited} asked Mrs. Epstein and Mrs. Halprin of the Hadassah to meet with me. Mrs. Epstein refused. She wanted a meeting of the Emergency Council. Mrs. Halprin, too, never came.

Dr. Wise then called an unauthorized ^{Council} and ~~rap~~ meeting, presumably of the ~~plenum~~, for Sunday evening. Our constitution clearly provides that no special meeting of the ^{Council} ~~plenum~~ can be called without three days notice. There are always good and sufficient reasons for ~~making~~ such constitutional provisions to protect ^{an} the organization against precipitous action and also against over-zealous officers who may pull off quick meetings when a ^{at} ~~given~~ ^{substantial} number of the members of the organization are unable to attend, ^{in order} ~~and~~. In a very high-handed manner, and against my express wishes, Dr. Wise proceeded to call ^{such a} ~~this~~ meeting. I, of course, refused to attend it. The meeting, as I suspected, resulted in nothing except that I met with the heads of the four parties to consider what should be done in case the President persisted in his opposition. I should have been happy to meet with the heads of the parties even though I should not have recognized their mandate from ^{an unauthorized Council meeting} ~~the plenum~~ which had no legal standing in my eyes, but I had to leave for Washington that very evening immediately after my report to the American Jewish Conference. As you will recall, I rushed from the platform to the train.

I arrived in Washington Monday morning and prepared myself for our interview with Stettinius. This was to be the decisive interview. This was the first personal interview which anyone of us had with Stettinius on this subject since our meeting

on November 9, nearly a month previously. If Wagner and I could persuade the Secretary of State that the President was making a colossal blunder in opposing the resolution, that his action would be seriously misinterpreted, that Congressmen and Senators on the Hill were talking of ^a double cross, ⁽¹⁾ and particularly that Senator Wagner ~~himself~~ would regard it as a grave personal embarrassment inasmuch as he had stated when he read the Presidential letter on October 15 that that clears the way for Congressional action -- more especially, if we could convey through Stettinius to the President that the entire Zionist movement and the ^{entire} whole Jewish people of America were ^{solidly} united in demanding action on this resolution which had now been hanging fire for over ten months, and that their hopes ^{which} had been raised high by all that ^{had} transpired ~~and~~ would ~~now~~ be dashed to the ground if it became known that the President insisted on a second deferrment -- we might succeed in changing the President's mind.

What was our shock and amazement when we arrived in Mr. Stettinius' office to be shown a telegram sent ~~to him~~ by Dr. Wise which in so many words stated that as far as he ~~is~~ concerned, if the President ^{worked to} can change his mind, well and good; if not, he stands by the President. This, of course, was the complete ^{give away} sell-out. This served notice that the Zionists of America would quickly reconcile themselves ^{to} with the

President's attitude if he persisted in opposing the resolutions, and that Dr. Wise, ^{with an eye to an American Jew} could be counted upon to defend ~~and to champion the President~~. Regardless of what we said from there on, our case was lost. Our back was broken. We proceeded, ^{of course} to make out our case as effectively as we could. Wagner pleaded that his honor was at stake, and the President was putting him on the spot with his ^{own} constituency. The President's position seemed altogether unreasonable. I, ~~of course~~, gave all the arguments at my command. I traced the history of the last ten months. I read to Stettinius the President's letter of October 15, of which he had heard, but which he had never read. He asked for a copy of it. He called in his secretary to be sure to obtain a copy of it immediately. Perhaps the President, he thought ^{not} had been made aware of it since the election. ^{This advice may not have reached his memory} The case, as I presented it, he was ~~from~~ ^{hard} enough to say, was unanswerable. He would immediately communicate with the President.

critical meeting with Stettinius

But I knew that our case was lost. I had seen that very morning, on my way to Stettinius, the ^{reply} letter which the President had ^{sent} written to Wagner. Only a strong, united, ~~determined~~ front on the part of Zionist and Jewish leadership, a show of strong resistance, ^{put} a determination on our part to demand what we were entitled to even from the President of the United States, might have persuaded the President.

send without my knowledge or that the Council, on the way are given
Dr. Wise's unauthorized telegram gave away our hand, exposed our nakedness, ^{revealed} showed out divisiveness and confusion of counsel, and made the President confident that he could move forward ^{unperturbed} on the line which he had decided on. It was Dr. ~~Stephen S.~~ Wise's unauthorized telegram, unknown to me, sent without my knowledge or consent, or without the knowledge or approval of the Zionist Emergency Council which defeated our resolution in the Congress of the United States. But Dr. Wise's grave responsibility for

defeating our resolutions ^{disclosure} does not rest entirely upon this tragic telegram, *as one shall see in a moment.*

Stettinius told Wagner and me that he would immediately transmit to the President what we had told him. One thing, he assured us ^{by disclosure} ~~of~~, *was* that he would *not* ^{will} never appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in person, nor would he send any representative. ~~I understand that he made the same statement to others.~~

But when the Senate Committee met on Wednesday, December 6, Stettinius did appear.

If there is anyone here that imagines that I had the power to call off the meeting on December 6, he is naive beyond words. ~~But~~ the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee has a mind and a ^{procedure} determination ^{led} of its own. It ~~was~~ resolved not to be trifled with ⁱⁿ on this matter. It should also be ^{recalled} ~~stated~~ that since the last ^{following}

meeting of the Committee on November 29, every member of the Foreign Relations

Committee received telegrams signed by Dr. Israel Goldstein for the ZOA, ^{from the Presidents} and by

^{and Mr. Murphy for the American Jewish Congress} the presidents of the Hadassah, the Mizrahi and the Poale Zion, each in its own

way urging favorable action on the resolution. The telegram of Dr. Goldstein, sent

on December 5, opened with the statement: "We earnestly urge you to report out

favorably the Palestine Resolution for adoption by the present Congress ^{not an idea}

Please bear these facts in mind — as of Tuesday, December 5, the Presidents of all the Zionist parties in the United States ~~xxx~~ were officially urging the

" Your own written favorable action would be
deeply appreciated as fulfillment of the students
unambiguous message to both Jewish
organization convention and other religious groups
as expressed recently in both party
platforms"



Senate Foreign Relations Committee to act, ~~and~~ not to defer action. This, in spite of the ^{of the Council} rump meeting held in Pittsburgh on Sunday evening, December 3.

At the meeting of the Committee on December 6, Stettinius was visibly embarrassed and ill at ease. He was hard-pressed by the Senators who asked very searching questions based on the record of the party platforms and on the statement of the President which Stettinius could not answer. All that he could say was that ^{He had plans of his own for the handling of the matter} the President was opposed to the measure. [^] Efforts were made by Senators to obtain the text of the letter which Senator Wagner had ~~2~~ received from the President, but Senator Wagner refused to disclose it, insisting that it was personal. Senator Clark read the President's October 15 statement, and asked Stettinius "if this is another Willkie campaign document issued before the election for the purpose of getting votes and not meaning what it said." What has occurred since the ~~the~~ issuance of that statement that has so clearly changed the situation, he asked. Mr. Stettinius was without any satisfactory answer. Senator LaFollette, of Wisconsin next went into action. He recalled that last Spring, the Senate was prohibited from acting because ~~alleged~~ military objections of the War Department, submitted through General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, but "two days later, the President issued his statement to Dr. Silver and Dr. Wise and he made us look like monkeys." ^{Q by New York Tribune} In the ~~meantime~~, Senator Wagner who had been badgered for several days in an effort to have him back track, ^{stood} ~~was standing~~ firm. He insisted that the Committee vote. The Committee was about to vote when some Senator, as a good will gesture, asked that the Committee delay its vote for two days, until Friday morning, December 8, to give the President one more opportunity to submit in writing, which would be made public, his reasons for requesting that the Senate should not vote on the resolutions.

It was on this understanding that the Committee adjourned. But as the Committee adjourned, Senator Wagner, in the presence of Stettinius, stated that regardless of the President's statement, if any, he would insist on a vote.

It was clear that the President would issue no public statement. It was also clear that only such a public statement ~~which~~ would persuade the Committee to

refrain from voting. The State Department and Mr. Connally, and perhaps also the President then bethought themselves of another way to achieve their ^{and} ~~purpose~~ -- the one last way open to them, and that was to get the Zionists themselves to withdraw their resolution under pressure from the President. The Zionists were to assume the role of collaborationists to defeat their own resolution. Someone got in touch with Dr. Wise on Wednesday. By Thursday morning, Senator Connally was informing Senator Taft that his resolution would not pass the Committee because Dr. Wise and the Zionists of New York would soon be heard from. On the afternoon of the same day, Stettinius telephoned Senator Wagner and asked him whether he had already heard from Dr. Wise and the Zionists in New York about withdrawing the resolution. I do not know what was said to Dr. Wise, when ~~the deal was made~~ ^{if you can call it a deal}, since the Zionists got absolutely nothing out of it. Dr. Wise did not take the trouble to apprise me of it. He had taken over, ignoring the fact that I was still the Chairman of the Executive, that I had ~~not~~ offered my resignation, nor had it been requested, and that as long as I remained Chairman, I was at least one of the responsible political heads of the Emergency Council.

As soon as the request was made of Dr. Wise, he ~~burned up his shoe leather~~ ^{lost no time} to comply with it. Without my knowledge or consent, he called a meeting, in fact two meetings, one Thursday afternoon, and one Thursday evening, both meetings illegally ~~summoned~~ ^{called} in violation of constitutional provisions. At these meetings it was voted, in so many words to request Wagner and Connally to ask deferment on their resolutions, and a committee was sent down to Washington on Friday morning, instructed to see that the resolutions were ~~not acted on~~ ^{acted on}. The Committee was instructed to see me before they went to the Capitol to persuade me to go along with them. Nothing was to be done until they had spoken to me. But by eight o'clock in the morning, Dr. Wise had already telephoned Senator Wagner again urging him ~~not~~ ^{ask for deferment} to ~~press for action on his~~ ^{ask for deferment} resolution. I tried to make it clear to the committee that it would be committing a colossal and tragic blunder if they would do what they had been sent down to do. We were not responsible for pressing the resolution. The Senate Committee was

pressing for it. We should not assume in the sight of the American public and our own fellow Jews and Zionists the unenviable role of coming to Washington officially to request the shelving of ~~our own~~ ^{partially and} resolution which we had spent nearly a year in urging the American people to ~~persuade Congress to adopt.~~ ^{and the American was} It is not our duty nor our responsibility to ask for deferrment. It is sufficient to indicate to Mr. Stettinius and through him to the President, ~~the fact that we are not responsible~~ ^{and has been} for pressing the resolution at this time, that the matter is out of our hands.

I furthermore told them that the Senate Committee was determined to act and nothing that they would say or do would refrain them. The resolution was not our private property. Many other groups and individuals were interested in ~~them~~ ^{it,} as well as the Senators themselves who had been urged by their constituencies to do what they regarded as a fine humanitarian act.

As a further ~~in order not to antagonize the President too much,~~ ^{in order not to antagonize the President too much,} I thought that perhaps some compromise could be worked out whereby an agreement could be reached with Stettinius that the House would act on the Resolution ^{since} ~~xxxxxxx~~ its Foreign Affairs Committee had already voted it out, and that this ~~may perhaps~~ ^{might} satisfy the Senators and that this might perhaps be explained to the Senators and that they ^{might} ~~may be persuaded to delay action as the Senate had not yet held hearings as the House had done.~~ ^{too.} As a compromise it was suggested that the Senate might vote the resolution out with the understanding that it would not come to the floor of the Senate for action.

The Committee which had come down to see me thought well of these suggestions and an appointment was made with Stettinius to see him immediately. They called on Stettinius. Stettinius informed them that as far as the House was concerned, he was in no position to say anything. As far as the suggestion with reference to action by the Senate Committee, and not by the Senate itself, he thought favorably of the idea, said that he would telephone Connally, and as I understand it, suggested that ~~he would go to the Capitol to see Connally.~~ ^{they should} But Senator Connally rejected the suggestion as cut of hand. He told them that was not the way the Committee did

its business. Connally was confident that he had the resolution on the skids, since there had been an agreement reached with Dr. Wise, and the very presence of the Committee indicated to him that his plan and that of the State Department was working out quite satisfactorily. Other members of the Senate Committee, which was in session while your committee was hovering outside its doors, were fully aware of what was going on. The Zionists were divided. The Jews themselves didn't know what they wanted after ~~badgering~~ ^{by your committee} and high-pressuring ~~us~~ to act in their behalf ^{for} their resolution.

Senator Wagner and Senator Connally were called out of the meeting to listen to proposals and counter-proposals and suggestions for dropping the whole matter while in the adjoining room Senators of the United States were waiting impatiently to act on our resolution. The Senators were standing by while your representatives were in the next room trying in a very befuddled and half-hearted manner to prevent action on the resolution. Your committee was actually invited by Connally to come into the meeting of the Committee and to tell them what they had told him and Senator Wagner. Fortunately they did not accept this invitation, ~~which would have been calamitous.~~

The Senate Committee finally got down to the business of considering our resolution. Stettinius, who was expected, did not come. Neither did he bring with him the requested formal statement in writing from the President. Instead of which a statement was read, the statement which was finally issued by the State Department the following Monday, stating that the State Department regarded action on our resolutions as undesirable because of the international situation. This made no impression on the Committee. Senator Connally proposed that the resolution be tabled. This was defeated 11-8. At this point, and before Senator Wagner could move for a direct vote on his resolution, Senator Vandenberg proposed a substitute. This substitute eliminated reference to the "Jewish people", but in other regards, it was an improvement over the original resolution. Because of all the delays and

"Jewish" Committee

the confusions which had taken place since the first meeting of the Committee on November 29, because of the intensive campaigning which Lessing Rosenwald and his group did among the Senators in the interim, and because ^{some} of the Senators had become convinced that the Zionist leaders themselves were divided, ^{it} their support of the Wagner-Taft Resolution ^{came to the fore} and some of them ^{col-}waivered and thought that a "water-down" resolution might be the easiest way out for everybody. Several Senators who had previously told Wagner that they would go down the line with him, switched over to the Vanderberg substitute.

^{the heads of the parties}
The telegram which Dr. Goldstein sent to the Senators asking that the word "Jewish" be ^{retained} ~~written~~ before "Commonwealth" had ^{I am afraid} the opposite effect. It served to

^{Anska} point out to the Senators the major point of conflict and disagreement and made them ^{The point had up to that time not been raised by any one but Senator} more wary of it. ^{could in (3A)} The Vanderberg substitute was carried 10-9. Because of the closeness

of the vote, it was agreed that Senator Vanderberg and Senator Wagner should meet together sometime before 2:30 Monday afternoon and ^{in the mean-time} see if they could ^{work out} ~~present~~ a phrasing of the resolution satisfactory to all.

^{which had come to Washington.}
I reported this action of the Committee to your Committee. I told them that it may ^{set} be possible to ~~agree~~ to a phrasing of the resolution which would be satisfactory to us. We ~~we~~ agreed that it would be desirable to call a meeting of the Executive of the Emergency Council in Washington ^{for} Monday morning prior to the final meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I requested Mr. Lourie to ~~summon~~ ^{call} such a meeting. ^P That same afternoon I met with Senator Vanderberg, who was not fully aware of all the implications of his substitute motion. He felt that the word "Jew" and "Jewish" appeared six times in the preamble and in the resolution, and that to him it appeared somewhat too provocative. ^{But by} He ~~had~~ agreed readily to the suggestion that the resolution should read "Resolved that the Senate re-affirm the action of Congress on June 30, 1922, and in conformity therewith, advises the President to use his good offices to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be open for free entry of Jews into that country and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that they may as soon as practicable reconstitute Palestine

I understand that similar telegrams were sent by the heads of the other parties. ^{Amos} The unfortunate thing about ^{then telegram was} this was that Dr. Goldstein ^{chance to work} made his telegram public, ^{this} which served notice ^{on the Jews as public} that the Zionists of America ^{had} were accepting the lying interpretation which Lessing Rosenwald had ^{read} on the resolution, as it was adopted ^{as a victory in the Council for Judaism} by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It was public acknowledging ^{went of a Zionist} defeat, when in reality it was not a ^{at all} defeat but a great victory for our cause. Lessing Rosenwald's group which had suffered one defeat after another during the ^{past} year, ^{and} for whom this action in Congress was to ^{be} the final and crushing defeat, naturally seized on the straw of the elimination of the word "Jewish" before Commonwealth ^{try to} to rehabilitate itself and to show to the world that it had ^{scored} a victory. The Zionists ^{through this president} by accepting Rosenwald's utterly perverted interpretation fell into a miserable trap. This move ^{is breaking into print with his telegram} of Goldstein, I am afraid was likewise motivated ^{at Le Shem Shemayim} by ^{by} ^{pure Zionist fear and ideation}.

as a free and democratic commonwealth." He asked me to inform Senator Wagner that this revision was entirely agreeable to him. *There was still the prospect that in the conference the word Jewish might be substituted for "they"*
~~This was evidently not agreeable to Dr. Wise and some of his friends. For~~

R That same afternoon I was called by Mr. Lourie who said that Dr. Wise wanted a meeting ^(either Saturday or Sunday ~~night~~ *evening*) to talk over the situation. I told Mr. Lourie that I had no objection if our friends wanted to talk over what had transpired.

I personally could not attend such a meeting as I had been away from my pulpit for two successive Sundays and must, out of deference to my own duties at the Temple, occupy my pulpit. *perhaps Mr. Lourie did not fully understand me, but this was*

taken to mean that I had consented to a ^{special} meeting of the ^{of the Council} plenum. *Why my consent was necessary I could not understand, because meetings had been called by Dr.*

Wise during the week not only without my consent, but in opposition to my clearly expressed wishes. *In any event, I passed on through Dr. Lourie's report Monday in Washington and I will then have the opportunity to participate in the deliberations.*

A meeting was accordingly held on Saturday night which I understand lasted ~~through the week~~ ^{to} hours of the morning. The upshot of it was nil. Attempts, I understand were made, to put through resolutions to repudiate ^{we as} my action. ~~to repudiate me. All that is of little importance.~~ *Actually no action was taken.*

On Monday morning, The Executive of the Zionist Emergency Council met ~~xxxxxx~~ under my chairmanship at the first formal and legal meeting since the last meeting of the Emergency Council on November 21st. At this meeting I gave ^{tentative} a report. I

persuaded the Council not to register any formal objection to the passage of the ~~our~~ resolution. I need not now re-state ^{the} all my reasons. *which I saw. The Council has agreed*
~~Instead, the committee resolved prior to the meeting, which opened late, because my train had been delayed for three hours, Dr. Wise had made an appointment with Stettinius to ask him to~~

issue a statement (a) that his appearance before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in opposition to ^{our} ~~the~~ resolution is in no wise to be construed as indicating that the State Department is not in accord with the line of clear

policy laid down by the President on October 15 and (b) (and here the original text is not before me) ^{that is} ~~(we agreed to the deferral of the resolutions with the~~

and, in so doing, reversed the decision taken at the
unauthorized meeting, the Council, Dec 7.



~~understanding that~~ the State Department ~~will~~ ^{would} raise no objections to ~~them~~ ^{it} when they ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~would~~ ^{would} be re-introduced in the next Congress. I strenuously opposed the second part and it was finally agreed to eliminate it. It was then suggested that I accompany Dr. Wise to the interview with Stettinius. Dr. Goldstein and Mr. Shulman joined the delegation. Mr. Stettinius thought favorable ^{suggested statement} of the ~~idea~~ and said that he would take it up with the President. Dr. Wise said that he would send him a corrected draft of the suggested statement. ~~(copy)~~

It was now ~~Monday~~ ^{scheduled} and an hour or two before the meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Committee met at 2:30. The version agreed on by Wagner and Vandenberg was presented, and while the committee was discussing it, Mr. Stettinius made a second appearance before it. He brought a personal plea from the President not to act on the resolutions. He read, too, a telegram which ~~had been~~ ^{had been} sent to the President ^{from a group of Moslem societies in} ~~and which was~~ ^{at a mass meeting of} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ Cairo ~~on November 19.~~ ^{on November 19.} A copy of this telegram Mr. Stettinius, at the request of the President, forwarded to Dr. Wise and ^{to} me on December 13. It had evidently made a great impression on the President, for echoes of it are found in his letter to Senator Wagner. ^(in which he says the telegram) ~~Stettinius~~ stated to the committee that the State Department will assume full responsibility for the deferment of action.

This had the effect of persuading some of the Senators, and a resolution to ~~postpone~~ ^{to} action for the time being was carried by a vote of 11-8. It is significant that in this vote of 11-8, the administration had to include two votes of absentee members, one ^{that} of Senator Glass, who has not been in the Senate for nearly two years.

^{How} ~~at~~ the members of the Committee actually felt about ~~it~~ ^{the whole business} is indicated by ~~the~~ ^a Round Robin which twelve of the Senators -- seven Democrats and 5 Republicans, ^{ing} ~~to~~ constitute two-thirds of the Senators who actually participated in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting, ^{the very next day} signed. This declaration read as follows:

"Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the request of the State Department, postponed action for the time being on the Palestine Resolution, we wish to record our own personal approval of the Resolution which calls for the free entry of Jews into Palestine and full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may as soon as practicable reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth."



What has transpired in Washington in the last few weeks points up again the consequences which flow from dual or multiple leadership in our Emergency Council. I am persuaded that had the conduct of our affairs been left in my hands and had the members of this body remained united behind me, we could have accomplished both objectives, persuaded the President to change his mind, and had the resolution adopted by the Congress of the United States. The cleavage and cross-currents in our ranks and the competitions for control and prestige led to serious crises in our Council before.

Last August I felt constrained to send in my resignation to this body. At that time it was the case of Dr. Goldmann carrying on independent political work, forestalling us and getting in our way. In October it was the case of Dr. Wise who acted again without the authority of the Emergency Council, in fact in clear counterintervention to the instruction of the Emergency Council which was that the ZOA should not request a message from the President for its Convention but that the contemplated interview with the President should be devoted to a serious discussion of Palestine, the threat of partition, etc. A request for an interview with the President had been made by Dr. Wise and myself. Dr. Wise on his own, and without my knowledge, arranged for a private interview with the President at which time he requested a statement to be read at the ZOA CONVENTION. As reported in the papers the following morning, the statement which he received from the President was a thoroughly bad one. It read that the President, as a candidate, gives his full support to the Democratic Party plank, with emphasis on the words "as a candidate", upon which the President insisted, as we learned later on. It was only by quick thinking and quick action that I obtained that very day a full endorsement of the Jewish Commonwealth and a promise to work for it if elected, from Governor Dewey, which forced the hand of the President and made him revise his position twice with Mr. Shulman and others spending close on to \$400. in telephonic communications with Senator Wagner and the White House to achieve the result. The letter to Senator Wagner which was

read at the Zionist Convention was no letter at all, but a composite of telegrams, copies of which you may be interested to see. This letter which was hailed and for purposes of our propaganda, it was most desirable to hail as a great political triumph, was nothing more than a pre-election promise wrested by force from an unwilling President. That his heart was not in it, that he would have preferred not to have issued it, is evidenced by his determined opposition six weeks later to have the Congress of the United States endorse the position which he publicly took on October 15th.

That entire episode was the product of unauthorized and independent action on the part of Dr. Wise and a few of his confidants. It was also secretive, as far as I was concerned. Dr. Wise informed me neither of his going to the White House, of what he was going to discuss with the President, nor after the meeting what he had discussed with the President. Dr. Wise to this day has not given an explanation to the Emergency Council of why he went in countervention to the Council's instruction, and what transpired, nor why he did not inform the Executive Chairman of what had transpired. At the meeting of our Executive on October 12th, some of you expressed your indignation at this procedure but not those who are today so much agitated at what they regard a contravention of a Council decision. There the matter rested. No action was taken.

A similar unfortunate situation which led to considerable embarrassment occurred in February of last year, when at the instruction of the Emergency Council as of January 13th, an appointment was requested with the President. Such an appointment was finally arranged for us for Wednesday, February 2nd. We were at that time greatly disturbed by reports which reached us from London of an imminent announcement of a new policy for Palestine based on partition. But Dr. Wise who had a lecture tour scheduled on the Pacific Coast, asked General Watson to postpone that interview to February 14th. This was done without my knowledge and without the knowledge of the Emergency Council, some of whose members greatly resented this fact.

Furthermore, while we were planning to see the President on Zionist affairs, Dr. Goldmann, with the knowledge of Dr. Wise, was negotiating with Judge Rosenman to have non-Zionists and members of the American Jewish Committee included in this appointment. On February 3rd, we received a letter from General Watson, Aide to the President, stating that the President "had agreed to receive on February 14th Dr. Wise, Dr. Silver, Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Monsky, Mr. Blaustein, Mr. Proskauer, Mr. Held." The letter went on to say "I understand this conference has been requested of the President in order to discuss the continuance of immigration into Palestine and the settlement of the refugees therein. Will you please notify me of your ability to attend at this time?"

The Council voted that we should not attend such a meeting and the meeting was finally called off to the embarrassment of every one. Working at cross-purposes, we had entangled ourselves in an unfavorable situation. We did not meet with the President until March 9th at a meeting which I requested, following the deferrment of action on our Resolution as the result of the intervention of the War Department. Thus, in practically every important activity of ours during the year, the duality or multiplicity of leadership resulted in confusion and frustration.

When I assumed the chairmanship of the Executive of this Council, and co-chairmanship with Dr. Wise of the full Council, it was with the clear understanding that the political leadership of the work of our Emergency Council would be vested with me. There could not have been any doubt about this thing in the mind of Dr. Wise for he had twice appealed to me in the presence of Dr. Weizmann, Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Lipsky and others to assume that leadership, because of the low state into which the political work of our Movement had fallen. I twice declined, knowing of the nucleus of opposition to me which existed within the Council. I was finally persuaded to defy this small group for the sake of the

cause, to assume the leadership. I made it very clear to Dr. Wise in a letter which I addressed to him on July 29, 1943, from which I am quoting:

"Frankly, my dear Dr. Wise, I am more concerned with your position in the matter than with Dr. Goldstein's. Both you and Dr. Weizmann approached me some months ago with the request to take over the direction of the political work of our Movement. You felt, as many of us have felt right along, that there has been an unfortunate confusion, in efficiency, over-lapping and cross-purposes in our political work and that the situation called for complete reorganization and above all for centralization of authority. Both you and Dr. Weizmann as well as Mr. Lipsky and others asked me to take over this work. I demurred knowing of the determined opposition of some of the men who today control the administration of the ZOA. I told you that while I was willing to fight for Zionism, I was not willing to start a fight with Zionists for the privilege of serving the cause. You appealed to me to take over the work on the ground that you yourself are heavily encumbered with many other responsibilities, and are tired. You offered me your loyal cooperation which I knew would be forthcoming, knowing the whole-hearted support which you had given me as chairman of the UPA, an office which you also asked me to take over from you...

"When you told me yesterday over the telephone that you have been persuaded to retain the chairmanship of the Zionist Emergency Committee, I was somewhat bewildered. If it was your intention to remain in that important post, neither I nor anyone else would have considered supplanting you. The office is yours by right of service and achievement in the Movement. But I assumed all along that you earnestly wished to be relieved of it. It was on the basis of that understanding that I participated in the discussions in the last few months looking towards a reorganization. If now you feel that you wish to retain that office not in an honorary, but in an active capacity, I wish you would let me know definitely, and in making my reply to the draft letter addressed to me, I

will say that Dr. Wise is head of the political emergency work of the Movement and there is no need for drafting me or anyone else, and that as far as the Presidency of the ZOA is concerned, I never sought that office, and I find opportunities for my Zionist services in other fields....

"I think the situation ought to be faced quite frankly, and attitudes should be most sharply defined or it will lead to increased confusion and bitterness which might culminate in another disastrous convention like that of Pittsburgh and Detroit."

So that when on August 9, 1943, Dr. Wise, Dr. Goldstein and I signed an agreement in Dr. Wise's study stating "that with the concurrence of all parties, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the United Palestine Appeal, for long one of the most distinguished figures in Zionism, will be summoned to leadership in the sphere of political affairs by becoming the co-Chairman with me of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, and assuming also the Chairmanship of its Executive Committee, the body responsible for the centralized direction of our political efforts", Dr. Wise knew fully what I meant by leadership. He understood fully that I would not assume the role of a vice-President to him or that he would retain the same authority in the political field which was his before he and others invited me to assume the political direction of our work.

Unfortunately, as soon as the reorganization of our Council began to show results and new life was infused into it, Dr. Wise changed his mind and progressively during the year, began to re-assert his primary position, and towards the end, to act as though I was a secondary and almost negligible officer. I have never accepted Dr. Wise's unilateral interpretation of his role and mine in this Council, and I do not now.

It is clear, however, that this body cannot any longer continue to operate on that basis or we will be going steadily from bad to worse.

I would suggest that a committee representing all parties be appointed to look into this situation closely, to make a careful study of our organizational structure with an eye to the and smoother functioning of our Council, and bring in a report for our consideration. This, I regard as of vital importance.



Suppose what had transpired in the last few weeks had not taken place. Suppose nothing had been done in connection with our Resolutions in the House and in the Senate. What would have happened? The Resolutions would have died in the present Congress. It is naive to assume that nobody would have made any inquiries as to why the Resolutions were not acted upon. The whole country had been stirred up to the very last days of the present Congress to demand and to expect action. As I indicated earlier, to the very last days telegrams and petitions were pouring into Washington, many of them from the hands of Zionist leaders, pressing for action. Some satisfactory explanation would have had to be given. What could we say? That we regarded the President's statement on October 15th and the political platforms as sufficient and there was no longer any need for the Resolutions? Then why in the world did we keep on pressing for the Resolutions after October 15th with the full knowledge and approval of the Zionist Emergency Council. Why did the ZOA Convention in Atlantic City, following the President's statement, ask for Congressional action? Why did we ask Congressmen and Senators all over the country to pledge themselves before election to vote for our Resolutions? No, that explanation would not hold water. We would then have to say that the State Department and the President had requested us to defer action and that we complied. This would have called forth the indignant inquiries as to why the State Department and the President asked for deferment; the same indignant inquiries which are now being made and on top of it the Zionist leadership would have been roundly condemned for having consented to such action.

Our enemies certainly would have made maximum capital of the situation. Congress, in spite of all the urging and prompting of the Zionists, refused to act. The Arabs would have hailed that as a great triumph, for they had appealed directly to Congress not to act on our Resolutions and Congress complied with their request. Anti-Zionists in the United States would have proceeded to make maximum capital of this major defeat.

But how do we stand now as the result of what has transpired in the last few weeks? There was no rejection of our Resolution by the Congress of the United States.



that." Bloom repeated much of this to Dr. Wise on Wednesday afternoon after the Resolution was acted upon favorably by the House Committee.

If the responsible Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I reasoned, a loyal member of the Administration who knew all about the reported objections of the State Department and of the President and one to whom Dr. Wise had previously spoken about deferrment, felt nevertheless free in his own mind to move forward with our Resolution, I certainly was not the man to dissuade him. I did not know at the time how determined was the President's opposition. Congressman Bloom's reaction certainly gave the definite impression that the reasons were not so weighty that they could not be overcome. As I saw my duty, it was not to initiate or to press for action while we were waiting for the green light. On the other hand, it was not my duty to check or to discourage action when Congressmen and Senators were pressing for it. I received no such direction from this body. It was not until Thursday, December 7th, that the Council at an irregular and unauthorized meeting voted definitely to ask Senators Wagner and Connally to shelve the Resolution, and even this decision failed of re-affirmation at another rump session of the Council on Saturday, December 9th, and was finally reversed by the action of the Executive Council on Monday morning, December 11th, in Washington.

Bloom was somewhat concerned with the fact that he might be blamed if the Resolution failed passage in his Committee after he took it up. He wanted us to back him up in his resolution to go forward and in sharing the responsibility. I reassured him on that score. At his request I wrote him a letter, following our interview, in which I backed him up.

As you know, favorable action did take place in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday, November 29th.

I tried to reach Senator Wagner from the day after our meeting on November 21st. I could not reach him. He was in seclusion and his secretary would not tell me his whereabouts. Wise and Shulman saw Wagner in Atlantic City on Sunday, November 26th. Shulman reported to me the conversation the next day by telephone to Washington. When I finally did get to see the Senator on Tuesday, November 28th, at dinner, he certainly had no plans of seeing the President to persuade him to remove his objections. But he was nevertheless determined to go into the meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the next morning and press for his Resolution.