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American Zionist Emergency Council, 1945.

THE HISTORIC EMERGENCY COUNCIL CONTROVERSY

Statement of Dr. Israel Goldstein

President of the Zionist Organization
of America

REPORTS concerning the American Zionist Emergency Council which have appeared currently in the press, and particularly the statements made by its former co-chairman and chairman of its Executive Committee, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, make necessary the issuance of this statement.

We feel it to be our duty to make available to Zionists of the country the essential facts which have led up to this controversy. Throughout this time, and under most difficult circumstances, the members representing the Zionist Organization of America in the Emergency Council have been guided solely by their reasoned judgment as to the best interests of our movement.

The Zionists of the country may be assured that there is no basis whatever to the contention that this is an issue of "maximal" as against "minimal" Zionism, or that this is a problem of an "aggressive" policy as against "timidity," "appeasement" and "backstairs diplomacy."

After the adoption by the Democratic and Republican parties of planks in their respective platforms concerning Palestine, and after the historic message sent to the convention of the Zionist Organization of America by President Roosevelt on October 15, 1944, the Emergency Council met on several occasions to consider what course it should adopt in regard to the resolutions then pending before the committees of the House and Senate of the Congress of the United States.

At a meeting on October 30, 1944, after thorough discussion, the Emergency Council decided *unanimously* NOT to press for the reporting out of the resolutions and for their passage, unless and until the preliminary approval of the executive branch of the Government shall have been secured. The events of last

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The developments following the request of Secretary of State Stettinius that action on the Palestine Resolution be deferred by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee precipitated a controversy in Zionist circles which has aroused bitter partisanship in the organized movement, and a serious uneasiness among those whose sympathies are with the movement, but whose information is limited.

One of the immediate and direct results of the controversy has been a change in the leadership of the American Zionist Emergency Council, formerly headed by Dr. Stephen S. Wise and Dr. Abba Silver as co-chairmen. Both simultaneously resigned their offices, and a new election followed, Dr. Wise thereby remaining as sole chairman.

Subsequently, the two statements printed herewith were issued by their respective authors. The editors of the Review look upon the controversy dealt with in these statements as a matter of prime importance to the present functioning, and, indeed, to the future well-being, of the entire Zionist movement in America. Great issues of policy are involved which need the understanding of all Zionists; for this reason both statements are printed in their entirety, so that such opinions as our readers may form shall be based at least on a knowledge of the positions adopted by both sides to the controversy.

The Editors

Statement of Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

I HAVE BEEN requested to comment on the statements issued by Dr. Israel Goldstein which purport to give the facts connected with the controversy which developed in the American Zionist Emergency Council. Dr. Goldstein's facts suffer from deft distortions, twists and significant omissions, which give a false and misleading account of what actually transpired.

(1) Dr. Goldstein states that at a meeting of the Emergency Council on October 30, it was unanimously decided not to press for the resolutions unless and until the preliminary approval of the Executive branch of the Government shall have been secured. No such decision was taken by the Emergency Council on October 30. In fact no decisions whatsoever were taken at that meeting. The minutes of the meeting quote me as saying: "We will not go ahead with the resolution without fully canvassing the situation. If the answer from the State Department is at all vague, I would not recommend proceeding with it." This precaution was suggested not out of a desire not to offend the State Department or the President, but in order to protect ourselves against the kind of surprise which was jumped on us last Spring. The Council wanted to make doubly sure before it moved; but no one really expected any opposition in view of all that had transpired in the preceding months.

At that same meeting I reported (and I quote from the minutes of the meeting) "that in anticipation of the reconsideration of the resolution when Congress reconvenes, the Emergency Council has been engaged in stimulating afresh the interest of the members of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. The local emergency committees in communities in which these members resided had been asked to approach them again and to bring them up to date on recent developments and to suggest that early action on the resolution, when Congress reconvenes, would

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be desirable. The results so far are gratifying."

Thus the Council, on October 30, was fully informed that continued activities in behalf of our resolution were going on and would continue in Washington and all over the country. It is false to suggest even by implication that the Emergency Council at its meeting on October 30 *ordered all of our activities in behalf of the resolution to be discontinued*. It merely directed that we explore the mind of the State Department on our resolution, and there was a consensus of opinion that if the State Department attitude was found to be negative, we would then not proceed with the resolutions. Until such time however activities in behalf of the resolution were not to be discontinued nor was word to go out that we were even considering a possible postponement.

Inquiries were accordingly made at the State Department, and at the meeting on November 21, Dr. Wise reported "that Mr. Stettinius had telephoned him and informed him that he had seen the President who urged that nothing be done about the bill at this time and that the matter be left in his hands a little while longer."

This, however, did not satisfy the members of the Emergency Council. Many felt that they *had made a mistake* in deciding to make inquiries at the State Department in the first place. We might have assumed that the withdrawal of the military objections, the party platforms which included Palestine planks and the statement of the President himself on October 15 were sufficient "green light" to go ahead.

At this meeting, and here again I quote from the minutes, "there followed a lengthy discussion, and it was finally decided *that efforts be made once more* to obtain clearance from the President through Senator Wagner, and perhaps others. It was agreed to leave it to Dr. Wise, Dr. Silver and Mr. Shulman to take the necessary action with regard to an approach to the President." There was no other action taken at this meeting.

In other words, the Emergency Council, upon second thought, was *not satisfied to have the resolution shelved just because the State Department and the President had indicated their objection to the resolution*. They were not content to

let it go at that. They wanted persuasive influence to be brought to bear upon the Administration to change its mind.

Dr. Wise strenuously objected to this line of procedure. He did not want the President "annoyed" by our insistence and our persuasion. He reluctantly yielded to the pressure of the Council and thereafter, far from using his energies vigorously to persuade the Secretary of State and the President, he seriously interfered with me in carrying out the clear mandate of the Council.

(2) Dr. Goldstein forgets to mention the fact which I made known to the Council that the day following the November 21 meeting, I wired Dr. Wise urging him to get in touch with Congressman Bloom to see the President. Dr. Wise never replied to this telegram.

(3) No one interested in the passage of the bill ever saw the President on the resolution at that time or since. He was out of Washington. All our information has come through Mr. Stettinius. The first and the only personal contact with Mr. Stettinius to carry out the wishes of the Council could not be made before December 4. It was made by Senator Wagner and myself. Senator Wagner was not in Washington before the preceding Tuesday and our appointment could not be made before the following Monday.

(4) But by December 4 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee *had already met and had considered our resolution*. In fact, at the request of Senator Taft, our Palestine Resolution was to have been considered by the Committee *on November 22*, but out of courtesy to Senator Wagner who was out of the city, the consideration of our resolution by the committee was postponed to November 29. I reported at the meeting of our Council on November 21 that such meeting of the Senate Committee had been scheduled for the next day, but had been postponed to the 29th.

Senator Taft requested consideration of the resolution on his own initiative. He was neither requested nor urged by me. Already on November 11 (please note the date) Senator Taft wrote me: "I have had to delay my return to Washington

Dr. Silver's Statement

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until Thursday, *but I hope we can proceed with the Palestine Resolution immediately*." He was one of the co-sponsors of the resolution. He had resented the postponement of the resolution last Spring. It was *he* who had kept after the military until he obtained the letter from Secretary of War Stimson withdrawing their objections. As soon as Congress reconvened, he began pressing for his resolution, just as we all did, including the delegates at the Convention of the ZOA at Atlantic City.

(5) Dr. Goldstein suggests that if I had not brought pressure on Congressman Bloom to take the matter up with his committee no action whatsoever would have been taken in Congress. I did not arrive in Washington until November 27. By that time a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as I indicated above, had already been set for November 29, and the Senate Committee was prepared to act favorably on our resolution at that meeting. It has been suggested that I should have asked the committee to defer action. Why? *This was certainly not my mission nor mandate in Washington*. I was there to see whether I could persuade the State Department and the President to withdraw their objections to the passage of the resolution. Failing in that, the Council would then have to decide what to do, since the first report of the President's disapproval did not close the matter as far as the Council was concerned. I have not yet had the opportunity to contact either the State Department or the President. I was not to see Mr. Stettinius until December 4. Until I had had the chance to persuade them and failed, I could not go, nor did the Council obligate me to go, to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and ask them, many of whom had been critical of the State Department's intervention and of the President's action last Spring, to postpone action on our Palestine Resolution for which the Jews of America had so persistently pressed up to the very last. We were not pressing for the resolution. The pressure came from the Senate Committee itself which was so much inter-

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ested in the Palestine Resolution that it met on four successive occasions to consider it and it insisted time and again on approving our resolution in spite of two personal appearances before it made by the Secretary of State and in spite of other pressure brought by the Administration against it. Even when the resolution was finally postponed as a result of the persistent pressure from the State Department and the President, two-thirds of the members of the Senate Committee signed a round robin in which they stated that they would have voted for the resolution were it not for this insistence of the State Department and the President.

Congressman Bloom had publicly announced right after the President's statement of October 15 that he would summon a meeting of his committee the day after Congress reconvened. He was eager to move forward. I called on him for the purpose of getting him to contact the President and State Department. He did not feel that the State Department had to be consulted about it. It was none of its business, he stated. Prior to my arrival in Washington, and in anticipation of the meeting of his committee, he had had printed as a House document, the Palestine endorsements made by the four hundred congressmen and senators which appeared in the volume, "America and Palestine," recently published by the Emergency Council. It was Congressman Bloom's own idea and all credit is due him for it. Congressman Bloom was somewhat concerned with the fact that he might be blamed if he moved forward and the resolution failed of passage in his committee. He wanted us to share in the responsibility for moving ahead. I reassured him on that score, and *at his request*, I wrote him a letter following our interview in which I backed him up. Congressman Bloom convoked his committee on November 29, the very day on which the Senate Committee met to consider our resolution. Bloom was undoubtedly encouraged to move forward rapidly by the fact that the Senate Committee had scheduled a meeting on November 29 and was expected to act favorably on the resolution.

(6) When we finally got to Stettinius on December 4—and here Dr. Goldstein's memory again conveniently fails him—we were shown, right at the out-

set, that fatal telegram of Dr. Wise which was dispatched without the knowledge of either Senator Wagner or myself and without any authorization from the Council on the very eve of our interview, a telegram which was calculated to nullify the effectiveness of our mission to the Secretary of State. This telegram which in so many words told the Secretary of State, and through him the President, that Dr. Wise and many of his associates would readily and without protest accept their decision with reference to the resolution, broke the back of the entire effort which the Council had

Dr. Silver's Statement

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resolved to make in order to change the mind of the State Department and of the President. Our only hope lay in persuading Mr. Stettinius, and through him, the President, that the entire Zionist Movement and the entire Jewish people of America were solidly united in demanding action on the resolution which had been hanging fire for over ten months, and that their hopes, which had been raised so high by all that had transpired during the year, would be dashed to the ground if it became known that the President insisted on a second deferment.

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THE ANCIENT MOUNTAIN JEWS OF RUSSIA

By ABRAM KHAVIN*

BURIED deep in the Caucasus, in the territory of the Daghestan Soviet Republic, there exists an ancient Jewish community of which comparatively little is known. Referred to usually as the "mountain Jews," these people have been living in the Caucasus for more than 2,000 years, and, according to legend, are descendants of the Israelites led into captivity by the Babylonian king, Nebuchadnezzar.

Recently, I had occasion to visit the Daghestan Republic, and there I met many of these mountain Jews. Although they look very much like their Moslem neighbors, they can be distinguished by their biblical names, such as Hannah, Leah, Rachel, Miriam.

Interestingly enough, although they have had little contact with European Jewry, they consider themselves an integral part of world Jewry and were eager for news of the life and culture of the Russian Jews in the European part of the U.S.S.R.

They showered me with questions about what has been happening to the Jews in the newly liberated territories. Leah Khandukayeva, a superintendent in the famous Buinaksk Cannery, said to me: "Although we speak different languages,

we consider ourselves to be flesh and blood of the Jewish people."

Discussing the present life of the mountain Jews, who lived in indescribable poverty and ignorance before the Revolution, she cited as an example a prosperous collective nearby, almost wholly composed of mountain Jews, and also the many Jews employed in the cannery, whose products are sought for throughout the Soviet Union. Up to ten or fifteen years ago few could be found in industry.

In the past quarter-century the mountain Jews have also developed their own intelligentsia, and Leah Khandukayeva mentioned the names of a number of her brethren in Buinaksk who are highly respected physicians, journalists and technical experts. With pride, she told me also how valorously her tribesmen were fighting on the various battlefronts.

In the last three years many Jews from Bessarabia, Odessa, the Crimea and other sections of Russia have come to Daghestan for refuge. Some of them settled in the town of Buinaksk and have proven a great asset to its industries. The refugees were welcomed by the people of all nationalities residing in the Caucasus, but a particularly warm reception was given them by the mountain Jews, who gladly shared their homes and food with them.

* *Through the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.*

Dr. Wise's telegram which was sent from Pittsburgh at the time of the sessions of the American Jewish Conference, and presumably with the knowledge of Dr. Goldstein, deliberately wrecked this effort and torpedoed the resolution.

(7) Dr. Goldstein has another serious lapse of memory. On December 5, he sent the following telegram to every member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "*We earnestly urge you report out favorably Palestine Resolution for adoption by present Congress. . . Your Committee's favorable action would be deeply appreciated as fulfillment President's magnificent message the Zionist Organization of America and overwhelming American opinion as expressed recently in both party platforms.*"

Why did Mr. Goldstein violate the "unanimous decision" of the Emergency Council in urging Senators to act on the resolution when he knew full well that no "green light" had been given? If Dr. Silver is guilty of a breach of discipline, what about Dr. Goldstein? But the gentleman was playing safe. If the resolution passed he would share in the credit. If it failed—why, he would see to it that the failure would all be blamed on Dr. Silver.

And having sent this telegram, why did he appear in Washington forty-eight hours later to urge the same Senators *not* to pass the resolution?

And having come to Washington to persuade the Senators not to pass the resolution, why did he permit himself to be persuaded by me *not* to carry out his mission? Instead, he and the other members of the committee went to Stettinius to tell him that the Zionists were *not* pressing for the resolution but that the pressure came from the Senate Committee itself (which, of course, was the truth). Is Dr. Goldstein unwilling ever to assume responsibility for what he does, or says, or writes? Is the fault always that of someone else?

(8) Dr. Goldstein again has a convenient lapse of memory when he fails to mention that at the Executive of the Emergency Council which met in Washington on Monday morning, December 11 (and which by the way was the only authorized meeting of the Emergency Council since the meeting on November 21—the other meetings of December 7 and 9 being rump meetings called by Dr.

Wise in contravention of the clear provisions of the constitution) it was agreed that *nothing be done to interfere with the passage of the resolution* on which the Foreign Affairs Committee was to act that very afternoon, but instead Mr. Stettinius should be asked to issue a statement that his appearance before the Senate Committee did not indicate a change of attitude on the part of the President. Nothing was to be said to Mr. Stettinius *about deferring the Palestine Resolution*. Dr. Wise and Dr. Goldstein concurred on this, and I joined in the delegation to Mr. Stettinius with that understanding and *only on that basis*.

(9) Dr. Goldstein stated that the resolution which was approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee was regarded by many Zionists here and especially in Palestine as a "watered-down" resolution

because the word "Jewish" was omitted before "Commonwealth" and the word "ultimately" was retained. How, then is one to account for the fact that the presidents of Hadassah, Mizrachi and the Poale Zion, as well as Mr. Lipsky of the Jewish Agency Executive, hailed the resolution in public statements? Dr. Wise told Congressman Bloom and me on the very day that it was voted that it was "a very good resolution." The Jewish press likewise welcomed it heartily, and the American Jewish Conference, meeting in Pittsburgh, acclaimed it.

It might be in point here to recall that at the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs—on February 8—Dr. Goldstein was asked by Congressman Schiffler: "You do not propose immediately to have a Commonwealth?" To

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LETTER FROM THE WAR FRONT TO THE HOME FRONT

This important and moving letter was sent to the Center Sisterhood by a former writer for PM, now with the Psychological Warfare Branch, Allied Force Headquarters.

By Leo J. Margolin

I WANT to extend to you and the members of the Sisterhood my heartfelt thanks for remembering me with a holiday package.

As a journalist I feel it is my duty to try and interpret for the folks back home the feelings of the American soldiers with whom I eat, sleep and work. I am more fortunate than the average soldier because my work takes me back at regular intervals to civilization, which, to the average soldier, means cooked meals, a real bed with white sheets, and different faces, preferably the faces of civilians—even Italian civilians.

The greatest fear of the soldier on the front is not death. We do not fear for the courage of our men. They don't want to die, but they are not afraid to die. Their biggest fear is that the people back home have forgotten them. That's why mail from home and packages—packages such as yours—are important, so terribly, terribly urgent.

You would think that war, even static war, is exciting enough for any human being. Yet, the biggest thrill any soldier can get is a letter and/or a package from home, or close to home. I have seen boys who have fought and killed the enemy for 56 hours at a stretch suddenly become rejuvenated at a letter from home, or a package which had something from home. What is in the package is of secondary importance; the momentous thing is that the package is a symbol to him that he has *not* been forgotten. Mail from home is the best morale builder in the army. So, although our women can't fight alongside their men, they can do the next best thing: remember their men, and never let their men feel that they've been forgotten for a single moment.

I am asked by my friends time and again when the war in Europe will be over. I can only tell you and the members of the Sisterhood this: please don't look for any miracles to end this war. The shooting in Europe will be over only when we have killed so many Germans that there won't be enough of them left to match our numbers. And that won't be for some time.

And so again my sincere thanks and my best regards to my friends in the Center.

which Dr. Goldstein replied: "No; we could not propose it as an immediate step, because we realize there would have to be a Jewish majority in the land before we could act for the implementation of a Commonwealth, and the achievement of a Jewish majority will undoubtedly take some time." (See p. 119 of the Hearings.)

(10) Dr. Goldstein is guilty of a distortion when he states that at the final meeting of the Emergency Council, where I announced my resignation, I asked to be made the sole leader in the Zionist movement in America with absolute unconditional power. "When this condition was not agreed on," states Dr. Goldstein, I "handed in my resignation." There is not a scintilla of truth in all this. I stated at the meeting that the present set-up of dual or multiple leadership in the Council has led to serious conflicts in the past and had culminated in the present crisis. I advised a re-organization of the Emergency Council with an eye towards the elimination of conflicting leadership and the centralization of authority. In connection with that, I read at great length a letter which I wrote to Dr. Wise in 1943 at the time when he and Dr. Weizmann asked me to take over the leadership of the political work of our movement. In that letter I stated that if Dr. Wise wished to continue as the active political leader of the movement, no one was thinking of supplanting him. I assumed that he wished to be relieved of it. "If now you feel that you wish to retain that office, not in an honorary but in an active capacity, I wish you would let me know definitely and in making my reply I will say that Dr. Wise is head of the political work of the Emergency Council and there is no need for drafting me or anyone else."

Dr. Wise knew exactly under what conditions I assumed the office at his and Dr. Weizmann's urging. The purpose was to eliminate the very unfortunate overlapping and cross-purposes in our political work which brought the Emergency Council to bankruptcy two years ago. My resignation, as everyone knows, was not prompted, as Dr. Goldstein asserts, by the refusal of the Emergency Council to accept my suggestions for re-organization. These suggestions were not even considered at the meeting and have not yet been acted upon. It was a motion

to request *all* the officers of the Emergency Council to resign, a motion which the Council refused to table, which called forth my resignation.

(11) Dr. Goldstein refers to a memorandum which Dr. Nahum Goldmann sent me purporting to be a report of what the Secretary of State had told him and Dr. Wise in reply to the request of the Council to issue the statement which is referred to above. I was a member of the committee which called upon Mr. Stettinius to request that statement. The reply of Mr. Stettinius was not given in writing to the Council, but orally to Dr. Goldmann and Dr. Wise who happened to be calling on the Secretary of State on another mission. Dr. Goldmann sent me the following memorandum a few days later:

"Mr. Stettinius called Dr. Wise and me into his room before meeting with the delegation. He told us that he had been in touch with the President about the statement which we had suggested he should issue. He said that the President was in a very bad mood because we had gone ahead with the Resolution and instead of acquiescing in his request to hold the matter up for the time being, had sought to bring pressure to bear through the Senate. He felt that the Zionists had lost confidence in him, and Mr. Stettinius said that in the circumstances it was difficult to discuss such questions with him at this time. It would not be possible for him (Mr. S.) to issue the letter suggested."

I was surprised and disturbed by this

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INSIDE NEWS OF ZIONISM

By BORIS SMOLAR

THE Wise-Silver conflict is causing a good deal of commotion not only in this country, but also in Palestine. Someone sent word to Palestine that the Silverites intend to organize a new Zionist party in America. The Jews in Palestine, although themselves split into altogether too many groups and parties, would not like to see the Zionist Organization of America broken up when American Zionists have to fulfill a mission of vital importance to Palestine's future.

It seems that there is, for the time being, no basis for fearing that the pro-Silver members of the ZOA will form a party of their own. But the possibility exists that they may insist upon calling an extraordinary convention of the ZOA to air their grievances. And it looks as if both sides are preparing to tour the country in order to present their viewpoints to the membership in the provincial cities.

It is assumed that the rift within the American Zionist movement will not end before Dr. Weizmann reaches the United States. It is expected that he will be here in March. Many leading Zionists consider him the only person able to restore unity.

It was quite a surprise to many to read that Chaim Greenberg, the much-respected Zionist-Laborite leader, was cho-

sen chairman of the executive of the Zionist Emergency Council, replacing Dr. Silver. The surprise was due to the fact that the Zionist-Laborite members of the Council were all for the re-election of Dr. Silver. Greenberg was the exception, and even submitted his resignation because he did not see eye to eye with the other members of his party in the Council. It was originally indicated that the post of chairman of the executive would be offered to Louis Lipsky.

* * *

Behind President Roosevelt's desire to personally handle the Palestine issue, without any action by Congress, is the President's hope that he may soon meet with Ibn Saud, the ruler of Saudi Arabia and strongest figure in the Arab world. President Roosevelt hopes that in a person-to-person talk with Ibn Saud he may succeed in convincing him of the necessity of compromising with the Zionist demands for Palestine. Once Ibn Saud is won over, any other Arab opposition would not matter.

In Washington it is pointed out that Palestine is definitely one of the territories whose fate will be considered not only by Britain, but by the Allies, and that no decision with regard to Palestine will be taken without consulting Jews and Arabs.

report for in my two previous contacts with Mr. Stettinius there was no indication whatsoever given that the President was in a very bad mood or that he felt that the Zionists had lost confidence in him. Dr. Goldmann did not treat that "information" as confidential. He conveyed this "information" to newspapermen in New York. A panic mood was being fostered among our Zionist leaders with the design—as later events showed—to bring about my resignation.

In preparation for my official report to the Emergency Council, which was to be given on December 20, and in order not to do any injustice either to the Secretary of State or to the President, I made inquiries as to whether this memorandum of Dr. Goldmann correctly represented what Mr. Stettinius had said, and whether perhaps he had been misquoted, or misunderstood.

I received a reply to the effect that Dr. Goldmann's memorandum "was not quite in accordance with the Secretary's record. The Secretary told Dr. Wise that he had been in touch with the President as he had offered to do regarding the statement which Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver had requested him to make. The reaction that Mr. Stettinius obtained was that the President felt that this group should have confidence in his handling of the matter and that it would not be appropriate for Mr. Stettinius to issue the statement. Mr. Stettinius asked Dr. Wise if he would be good enough to give this information to Dr. Silver."

This, of course, is a radically different version from that of Dr. Goldmann's. There is nothing here about the President being in a very bad mood, or feeling that the Zionists had lost confidence in him. But Rabbi Goldstein, far from being shocked at Dr. Goldmann's amazing misquotation of a most critical report and far from regarding it as something "scandalous," denounces rather my fact-finding inquiry as something "scandalous". . .

(12) There are many other things which this Rabbi chooses to forget. Already at the Zionist Convention in Atlantic City he and his little cabal were preparing the way for my elimination. The Resolutions Committee of the Convention had prepared a resolution which wholeheartedly endorsed my administration and called for a continuation of the dynamic and successful progress of the

Emergency Council "under the present leadership." At a subsequent meeting, Dr. Goldstein demanded the elimination of the words "under the present leadership." He made that request, he said, in the name of Dr. Wise with whom he had spoken by telephone in New York. I stated, of course, that as far as I was concerned, I intended to hold my office not a single day longer than the Emergency Council wished me to, and that, of course, I would agree to the elimination of the words "under the present leadership."

The ZOA Administration had a difficult time at the plenary session of the Convention to put through the resolution without the words, "under the present leadership." I personally had to step forward and beg the delegates to agree to the omission of those words. But I and my friends knew all along what was in the mind of Dr. Goldstein and his clique.

(13) Many will recall the fight which raged at the ZOA Convention in Atlantic City about my annual report which the administration was determined to schedule at the very end of the Convention when most of the delegates would have gone home, in order to make small change of it. Dr. Goldstein had to yield to the pressure from the delegates but the whole miserable affair was another result of the embittered and envenomed policy of undermining, belittling and discrediting which Dr. Goldstein and his friends had been carrying on throughout the year.

(14) The Rabbi has since carried out a successful purge of Silver adherents on the Executive of the ZOA and among the representatives of the ZOA on the Emergency Council. His efficiency in perfecting his political machine should be the envy of Tammany Hall.

(15) Dr. Goldstein has always resented the Emergency Council. He has regarded it as a competing institution with the ZOA and as interfering with his prerogatives as President of the ZOA. He has frequently complained that he is not being sent often enough to Washington on missions for the Emergency Council. He has been saddened by the fact that the successes of the Emergency Council have eclipsed his achievements as President of the ZOA, and have robbed him of the publicity which he so avidly craves.

HONOR ROLL

The following is an additional list of members, children and grandchildren of Center members serving with the United States armed forces. The list includes names received up to the time of going to press.

Canick, Moses Leon, Ensign
Schenkman, Harry, Capt.



The following is a list of promotions in rank:

Goldberg, Ephraim, T/5

Goldsmith, Philip, Sp. V.
3/cl P.O.

Horowitz, Nathaniel, Cpl.

Jaffe, Albert, Lt. J.G.

Koven, Leo, Capt.

Kugel, Joseph, Major

Lerner, Seymour D., S I/c

Lieberman, Alfred L., Cpl.

Rogoff, Aaron C., Sgt.

Shapiro, Edward, Sgt.

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STATEMENTS BY DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER AND DR. ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN ON THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE LED TO THE REORGANIZATION OF THE
AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL

Following are the salient points of statements issued at
press conferences in New York City by Dr. Israel Goldstein, President
of the Zionist Organization of America, and Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
who resigned as co-chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council
and as chairman of its Executive Committee. These statements present
both sides of the controversy.

. . . The Editor

STATEMENT BY DR. ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN

At the meetings of the American Zionist Emergency Council held October 30th and November 21st attended by the representatives of all the Zionist parties and by both Co-chairmen, there was a discussion as to the advisability of pressing for the immediate passage of our Palestine resolutions now pending before Congress.

All agreed that before pressing for the passage of the resolutions it was absolutely necessary to secure the assurance that the State Department would not interpose objections at this time. As a result of the unfortunate experience last March, it was felt that it would be unwise to risk another deferment which the State Department objections might cause. There was no dissent from this opinion on the part of any of the party representatives or either of the Co-chairmen. There was no discussion of "militancy" or "non-militancy," "appeasement," "timidity" or "back-stairs diplomacy." Everybody agreed that as a matter of common sense, we should not risk a second defeat. . .

Repeated efforts were made to secure the assent of the State Department in accordance with the unanimous decision of the Emergency Council. In response to these repeated efforts, we got the request "to leave the matter pending a little while longer."

On November 27th, six days after the above mentioned meeting of the Emergency Council at which a decision was reached, Dr. Silver, as Chairman of the Executive of the American Zionist Emergency Council, without the knowledge or authorization from that body and contrary to its decision wrote an official communication to Representative Sol Bloom, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in which he said:

"As Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council I urge prompt action on the Resolution." Mr. Bloom had demanded a written request from Dr. Silver in order to be sure that it was an official request.

Following the receipt of this communication, Mr. Bloom convened the House Foreign Affairs Committee and on November 30th a resolution was reported out favorably in which the word "Jewish" was omitted before "Commonwealth" and the word "ultimately" was retained.

To many Zionists here and especially in Palestine, this watered-down resolution, which Mr. Lessing Rosenwald found it possible to approve, was highly unsatisfactory. It was anything but "militant."

When the matter came subsequently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the President of the ZOA seeing that we had been dragged into this situation against the decision of the Emergency Council and deeming it necessary that at least the Senate Resolution should be a proper Zionist Resolution, sent a telegram to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which it was urged that the word "Jewish" be retained before "Commonwealth" and that the word "ultimately" be removed.

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The appearance of Secretary of State Stettinius before the Senate Committee and the statement which he issued brought about the deferment of the Palestine Resolution. . . .

An issue is now being raised of "bold political action" versus "timidity." This issue is a patent attempt to cover up the question of why an officer of the Emergency Council has acted contrary to its decisions in which he himself shared. Why was not the issue of "timidity" versus "boldness" presented at the meetings of the Emergency Council of October 30th and November 21st? Why were the voices which are now heard so stridently not raised at that time in favor of going forward in defiance of the State Department? Why did Dr. Silver say then that even if the answer of the State Department were vague, we should not go forward?

One redeeming circumstance of the entire unfortunate situation is that Dr. Wise, Chairman of the Emergency Council, by adhering to the decisions of that body, remains a friendly contact with the President and the State Department. To maintain this friendly contact is essential.

On December 19th, the ZOA Executive Committee by a vote of 17 to 4 adopted the following resolution:

"It is the sense of this meeting that on the basis of the facts as presented to us Dr. Wise's resignation as a protest against Dr. Silver's action in controvention of the decisions of the Emergency Council is justified. We believe that Dr. Wise's resignation from the leadership of the Zionist movement in America would most seriously injure the interests of the movement and therefore conditions must be created to enable Dr. Wise to continue as Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council."

We leave it to our representatives on the Emergency Council to act in accordance with these views. . . .

The entire set of circumstances is most regrettable. We do not underestimate Dr. Silver's important services to the Zionist movement during the past fourteen months and before. . . . This fine record, however, does not obscure the regrettable events of recent weeks and his responsibility for them.

So far as the ZOA co-operation with the Emergency Council is concerned, the record is clear. The ZOA has enabled the Emergency Council upon its reorganization to secure a budget of \$500,000 for the year which was no mean factor in the success of the work. The ZOA has turned over to the Emergency Council its leading people in the local communities for the public relations work. The ZOA leadership has rendered conspicuous service at the hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Committee last February and March and in the securing of the Palestine planks in the Democratic platform as well as the President's message. The leaders of the ZOA have fulfilled every assignment which has been given to them by the Emergency Council. The ZOA will continue to give the Emergency Council full co-operation. Its leaders and representatives, however, will retain the right to express honest and conscientious judgment on questions as they arise, abiding of course, by the will of the majority, (Continued on Page 3c)

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and will also continue to insist on discipline as the fundamental basis of any democratically organized constituency.

Where are we left now?

There is hope that in the next session of Congress, as the war draws closer to its end, the objections of the State Department may be withdrawn and the Palestine resolutions, in improved wording, may go through -- with virtual unanimity. There is also a possibility that President Roosevelt may himself find a way in consultation with the heads of other governments to give a sign of fulfillment of his pledge and that of the two parties in their platforms. In all this the goodwill of the President is essential.

What needs to be borne in mind by all of us Zionists is that as important as are the Congress resolutions it is even more important to secure practical help from our government and its allies in shaping the future of Palestine and in bringing immigrants into Palestine in the immediate future and preparing Palestine to absorb mass Jewish immigration after the war. If only a few ships could be provided to transport Jews in European lands who have certificates for Palestine! If only United Nations' funds might be made available for Palestine's development to serve the rehabilitation program of the thousands who will adopt it as their future home! Here the President's goodwill and friendship could be of crucial helpfulness -- in addition to his potential aid in securing the proclamation of a Jewish Commonwealth.

Before us Zionists there is a clear challenge. We shall not get very far by exhausting ourselves with internal dissensions. This will only give aid and comfort to our enemies. We must set our house in order and proceed with our work. It will be tragic if as a result of this agitation, our tempo of progress should be halted.

STATEMENT BY DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER

Dr. Goldstein states that at a meeting of the Emergency Council on October 30, it was unanimously decided not to press for the resolutions unless and until the preliminary approval of the Executive branch of the Government shall have been secured. No such decision was taken by the Emergency Council on October 30. In fact no decisions whatsoever were taken at that meeting. The minutes of the meeting quote me as saying: "We will not go ahead with the resolution without fully canvassing the situation. If the answer from the State Department is at all vague, I would not recommend proceeding with it." This precaution was suggested not out of a desire not to offend the State Department or the President, but in order to protect ourselves against the kind of surprise which was jumped on us last Spring. The Council wanted to make doubly sure before it moved; but no one really expected any opposition in view of all that had transpired in the preceding months.

At that same meeting I reported (and I quote from the minutes of the meeting) "that in anticipation of the reconsideration of the resolution when Congress reconvenes, the Emergency Council has been engaged in stimulating afresh the interest of the members of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. . . .

The Council, on October 30, was fully informed that continued activities in behalf of our resolution were going on and would continue in Washington and all over the country. It is false to suggest even by implication that the Emergency Council at its meeting on October 30 ordered all of our activities in behalf of the resolution to be discontinued. It merely directed that we explore the mind of the State Department on our resolution, and there was a consensus of opinion that if the State Department attitude was found to be negative, we would then not proceed with the resolutions. . . .

Inquiries were accordingly made at the State Department, and at the meeting on November 21. Dr. Wise reported "that Mr. Stettinius had telephoned him and informed him that he had seen the President who urged that nothing be done about the bill at this time and that the matter be left in his hands a little while longer." . . .

At this meeting, and here again I quote from the minutes, "there followed a lengthy discussion, and it was finally decided that efforts be made once more to obtain clearance from the President through Senator Wagner, and perhaps others. It was agreed to leave it to Dr. Wise, Dr. Silver and Mr. Shulman to take the necessary action with regard to an approach to the President." There was no other action taken at this meeting.

In other words, the Emergency Council, upon second thought, was not satisfied to have the resolution shelved just because the State Department and the President had indicated their objection to the resolution. They were not content to let it go at that. They wanted persuasive influence to be brought to bear upon the Administration to change its mind.

Dr. Wise strenuously objected to this line of procedure. He did not want the President "annoyed" by our insistence and our persuasion. . . .

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Dr. Goldstein forgets to mention the fact which I made known to the Council that the day following the November 21 meeting, I wired Dr. Wise urging him to get in touch with Congressman Bloom to see the President. Dr. Wise never replied to this telegram.

No one interested in the passage of the bill ever saw the President on the resolution at that time or since. He was out of Washington. All our information has come through Mr. Stettinius. The first and the only personal contact with Mr. Stettinius to carry out the wishes of the Council could not be made before December 4. It was made by Senator Wagner and myself. Senator Wagner was not in Washington before the preceding Tuesday and our appointment could not be made before the following Monday.

But by December 4 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had already met and had considered our resolution. In fact, the request of Senator Taft, our Palestine Resolution was to have been considered by the Committee on November 22, but out of courtesy to Senator Wagner who was out of the city, the consideration of our resolution by the committee was postponed to November 29. I reported at the meeting of our Council on November 21 that such meeting of the Senate Committee had been scheduled for the next day, but had been postponed to the 29th.

Senator Taft requested consideration of the resolution on his own initiative. He was neither requested nor urged by me. . . .

Dr. Goldstein suggests that if I had not brought pressure on Congressman Bloom to take the matter up with his committee no action whatsoever would have been taken in Congress. I did not arrive in Washington until November 27. By that time a meeting of the Senate Committee was prepared to act favorably on our resolution at that meeting. It has been suggested that I should have asked the committee to defer action. Why? This was certainly not my mission nor mandate in Washington. I was there to see whether I could persuade the State Department and the President to withdraw their objections to the passage of the resolution. . . . Until I had had the chance to persuade them and failed, I could not go, nor did the Council obligate me to go, to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and ask them, many of whom had been critical of the State Department's intervention and the President's action last Spring, to postpone action on our Palestine Resolution. . .

Congressman Bloom had publicly announced right after the President's statement of October 15 that he would summon a meeting of his committee the day after Congress reconvened. He was eager to move forward. I called on him for the purpose of getting him to contact the President and State Department. He did not feel that the State Department had to be consulted about it. It was none of its business, he stated. . . . Congressman Bloom was somewhat concerned with the fact that he might be blamed if he moved forward and the resolution failed of passage in his committee. He wanted us to share in the responsibility for moving ahead, I reassured him on that score, and at his request, I wrote him a letter following our interview in which I backed him up. Congressman Bloom convoked his committee on November 29, the very day on which the Senate

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Committee met to consider our resolution. Bloom was undoubtedly encouraged to move forward rapidly by the fact that the Senate Committee had scheduled a meeting on November 29 and was expected to act favorably on the resolution.

When we finally got to Stettinius on December 4 . . . we were shown, right at the outset, that fatal telegram of Dr. Wise which was dispatched without the knowledge of either Senator Wagner or myself and without any authorization from the Council on the very eve of our interview. . . which in so many words told the Secretary of State, and through him the President, that Dr. Wise and many of his associates would readily and without protest accept their decision with reference to the resolution

Dr. Goldstein . . . on December 5, sent the following telegram to every member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "We earnestly urge you report out favorably Palestine Resolution for adoption by present Congress. . . Your Committee's favorable action would be deeply appreciated as fulfillment President's magnificent message to Zionist Organization of America and overwhelming American opinion as expressed recently in both party platforms."

Why did Dr. Goldstein violate the "unanimous decision" of the Emergency Council in urging Senators to act on the resolution when he knew full well that no "green light" had been given? . . .

And having sent this telegram, why did he appear in Washington forty-eight hours later to urge the same Senators not to pass the resolution?

And having come to Washington to persuade the Senators not to pass the resolution, why did he permit himself to be persuaded by me not to carry out his mission? . . .

. . . At the Executive of the Emergency Council which met in Washington on Monday morning, December 11 it was agreed that nothing be done to interfere with the passage of the resolution on which the Foreign Affairs Committee was to act that very afternoon, but instead Mr. Stettinius should be asked to issue a statement that his appearance before the Senate Committee did not indicate a change of attitude on the part of the President. Nothing was to be said to Mr. Stettinius about deferring the Palestine Resolution. . . .

Dr. Goldstein stated that the resolution which was approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee was regarded by many Zionists here and especially in Palestine as a "watered-down" resolution because the word "Jewish" was omitted before "Commonwealth" and the word "ultimately" was retained. How, then, is one to account for the fact that the presidents of Hadassah, Mizrahi and the Poale Zion, as well as Mr. Lipsky of the Jewish Agency Executive, hailed the resolution in public statements? Dr. Wise told Congressman Bloom and me on the very day that it was voted that it was "a very good resolution." . . .

. . . Dr. Goldstein states that when I announced my resignation, I asked to be made the sole leader in the Zionist movement in America with absolute unconditional power. . . . I advised a re-organization of the Emergency Council (Continued on Page 7c)

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with an eye towards the elimination of conflicting leadership and the centralization of authority. In connection with that, I read at great length a letter which I wrote to Dr. Wise in 1943 at the time when he and Dr. Weizmann asked me to take over the leadership of the political work of our movement. In that letter I stated ... "If ... you feel that you wish to retain that office, not in an honorary but in an active capacity, I wish you would let me know definitely and in making my reply I will say that Dr. Wise is head of the political work of the Emergency Council and there is no need for drafting me or anyone else."

... My resignation, as everyone knows, was not prompted, as Dr. Goldstein asserts, by the refusal of the Emergency Council to accept my suggestions for re-organization.... It was a motion to request all the officers of the Emergency Council to resign, a motion which the Council refused to table, which called forth my resignation....

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