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Autobiography/memoirs, Book 2, first draft, 1963?.

SUGGESTED REVISIONS & INSERTS

BOOK II

Chapter AA

- Page 1 ✓ - pencilled revisions ✓
" " "
2 ✓ - Insert (see attached draft) Recast
3 ✓ - pencilled revisions
4 ✓ - " "
5 ✓ - " "
6 ✓ - " "
7 ✓ - " "

Chapter BB

- Page 6 ✓ - In referring to Senator Taft I suggest that you add reference to a statement he made urging that the Jewish State be set up at once while the Allied armies were in military control of the whole area.

- ✓ Page 7 - Re: Congressional hearing: Add mention of statements in opposition by spokesmen for the Arab position (like Prof. Hitti) and anti-Zionist Jews, namely Lessing Rosenwald.

- ✓ Page 10 - pencilled revisions
12 - " "

Chapter CC

- Page 1 ✓ - pencilled revisions
3 ✓ - " "
13 ✓ - " "
14 - Insert (see attached draft -2nd paragraph) Recast
and pencilled revision

Chapter DD

- Page 1 ✓ - Insert - Paragraph re: B.G. vs. Weizmann (see draft attached).
2 ✓ - pencilled revision
3 ✓ - Insert - Paragraph on Russia (see attached draft)
19 ✓ - pencilled revision
18 - " "

Chapter EE

- Page 3 ✓ - pencilled revisions
4 ✓ - " "
6 ✓ - " "
9 ✓ - " "

Chapter FF

- Page 14 - Insert (See attached draft)

BOOK II cont'd

Chapter HH

Page 31 - pencilled revision ✓

32 - insert

Chapter JJ

Page 11 - pencilled revisions ✓

12 - " "

13 - " "

14 - " "

15 - " "

Chapter KK

Page 1 - pencilled revision ✓

2 - inked "

3 - pencilled "

4 - " "

5 - " "

6 - " "

7 - " "

Note: Material in this chapter is repeated in Book III



BOOK TWO

1. THE AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL.
2. THE PALESTINE RESOLUTION IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.
3. THE PLANKS IN THE PLATFORMS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES.
4. THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE EMERGENCY COUNCIL.
5. TRUMAN, BEVIN AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY.
6. THE WORLD ZIONIST EXECUTIVE PROPOSES PARTITION. MY
MEETING WITH MR. BEVIN.
7. THE ZIONIST CONGRESS OF 1946.
8. MY APPEARANCE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS.
9. THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (UNSCOP).
THE MAJORITY REPORT RECOMMENDS PARTITION.
10. TENSE MONTHS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.
11. NOVEMBER 29, 1947 -- VICTORY.
12. WORDS SPOKEN AT A TESTIMONIAL.
13. THE BITTER REVERSAL -- THE STRUGGLE RENEWED.
14. MANEUVERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS.
15. TRUMAN AND THE REVERSAL.
16. THE STATE OF ISRAEL PROCLAIMED IN TEL-AVIV.

The establishment of the American Zionist Emergency Council dates back to the beginning of World War II. Late in August, 1939, the 21st Zionist Congress met in Geneva. Its work was conducted in the shadow of the impending catastrophe, and was indeed cut short by the sudden closing of the international frontiers and the need for delegates to return to their homes without delay.

The Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, as it was first called, was originally established with two purposes in view. The possibility was foreseen that, as a result of the war, the headquarters of the ^{World} Zionist Organization in Jerusalem might, by reason of invasion or otherwise, be completely cut off ~~from the rest of the movement~~. It was desirable, accordingly, that there should be in existence in America a body which could, if need be, assume the authority and the functions ^{and leadership of the movement} of Zionist leadership. It was further recognized that, whether America entered the war or not, the attitude of this country was likely to be of ^{extreme (critical)} decisive importance in determining the future of the Jewish National Home.

The first eventuality which the Executive had in mind in setting up the Emergency Committee was, happily, not realized. Despite periods of imminent danger, Palestine and the Yishuv remained safe during the war. Zionist communications by letter and cable with the rest of the Jewish world, outside Europe, though subject to various wartime difficulties and restrictions, were maintained without interruption. It was,

accordingly, on the second task -- that of directing and coordinating
Zionist public relations ^{and political efforts} ~~and policy~~ in America -- that the work of the
Emergency Committee was primarily concentrated. The specifically
American character of the Committee was emphasized in November,
1941, by a change in title to that of the American Emergency Committee
for Zionist affairs (later, in 1943, contracted to "American Zionist
Emergency Council".) The Council comprised representatives of the
Zionist Organization of America, Hadassah, Mizrachi and Poale Zion,
together with a number of leading American Zionists nominated ad personam.
The During the early months of its existence, the Emergency Council
functioned rather as an inter-party body for receiving reports and for
deciding on matters of common interest to the four constituent groups,
than as the initiator and director of an active program of political action
on the American scene. It was not till late in 1940 that a full-time
Secretary was appointed and that the Council acquired offices of its
own. The appointment, too, in January, 1941, of Dr. Emanuel Neumann
as Executive Officer in charge of a Department of Public Relations and
^Ppolitical ^Aaction, marked an important development in the work of the
Council.

The history of our Movement cannot be written without recurrent
reference to the significant contributions of ^{Dr.} Emanuel Neumann. In the
great and searching years between the two world wars and in the years
culminating in the establishment of the State of Israel, Neumann was an
inspired leader, guide and champion of ~~his people~~ ^{our} cause.

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Undeviatingly he stood by the political vision of Theodor Herzl and was its eloquent spokesman and defender in the national and international assemblies of our Movement. In the decisive years which led to the triumph of our ^{cause} ~~cause~~ in the United Nations, Neumann was among the key men who planned strategy and tactics both in Flushing Meadow and in Washington. He was the keen analyst, the sound scholar, the gifted draftsman of many of our vital statements and pronouncements.

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However, despite the fact that a number of important activities were initiated by the Council, it was clear that Zionist political and public relations work was not being carried forward on the American scene with the required scope and effectiveness. Dr. Neumann ^{himself} warned against the grave inadequacy of our work in a public statement in February, 1943.

9. The need for an ^{over-all} ~~over-all~~ program of action to activize the American Zionist masses of all parties, and for strong centralized direction was widely recognized by ^{other} ~~the~~ leaders of our Movement here and in Palestine.

Early in 1943, Dr. Weizmann, Louis Lipsky, and Dr. Stephen S. Wise urged me to assume the leadership of the Emergency Committee. ~~Three~~ ^{twice} I declined, knowing of the nucleus of opposition to me which existed within the Emergency Committee, which was centered in ^{a group of} ~~the~~ representatives of the Zionist Organization of America ^{at the time.}

✓ A number of friends including Dr. Neumann, Rabbi Irving Miller and ~~other~~ ^{others} friends finally persuaded me to defy this small group of ~~representatives~~ for the sake of the cause. In July of that year a group of one hundred leading American Zionists headed by Charles J. Rosenblum of Pittsburgh,

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launched a movement to draft me for the ^Dresidency of the Zionist Organization of America in order to ^{overcome the opposition.} rid the Council of the ZOA-representatives who were unfriendly. The draft movement gained such momentum that the ZOA Administration forces who were backing the candidate of ~~Dr. Israel Goldstein~~ offered a compromise whereby I would withdraw from the race for the ZOA presidency and leave the field to Dr. ^{Israel} Goldstein, and in turn, all would agree on my assuming active direction of the political work of the Emergency Committee. An agreement to that effect was signed on August 9, 1943 by Dr. Goldstein and myself, and by Dr. Wise, ^{the} ~~then~~ Chairman of the Emergency Committee.

To make sure as to what my role in the Emergency Committee would be, I wrote a letter to Dr. Wise on July 29, 1943, prior to the signing of the agreement:

"Both you and Dr. Weizmann approached me some months ago with the request to take over the direction of the political work of our Movement. You felt, as many of us have felt right along, that there has been an unfortunate confusion, in efficiency, over-lapping and cross-purposes in our political work and that the situation called for complete reorganization and above all, for centralization of authority. Both you and Dr. Weizmann, as well as Mr. Lipsky and others, asked me to take over this work. I demurred knowing of the determined opposition of some of the men who today control the administration of the ZOA. I told you that while I was willing to fight for

Zionism, I was not willing to start a fight with Zionists for the privilege of serving the cause. You appealed to me to take over the work on the ground that you, yourself, were heavily encumbered with many other responsibilities, and were tired....

"When you told me yesterday over the telephone that you have been persuaded to retain the chairmanship of the Zionist Emergency Committee, I was somewhat bewildered. If it was your intention to remain in that important post, neither I nor anyone else would have considered supplanting you. The office is yours by right of service and achievement in the Movement. But I assumed all along that you earnestly wished to be relieved of it. It was on the basis of that understanding that I participated in the discussions in the last few months looking towards a reorganization. If now you feel that you wish to retain that office not in an honorary, but in an active capacity, I wish you would let me know definitely, and in making my reply to the draft letter addressed to me, I will say that Dr. Wise is head of the political work of the Movement and there is no need for drafting me or anyone else, and that as far as the Presidency of the ZOA is concerned, I never sought that office, and I find opportunities for my Zionist services in other fields...."

Unfortunately, as soon as the reorganization of our Council began to show results and new life was infused into it, Dr. Wise apparently changed his mind and progressively during the years, began to assert the authority which was his before the reorganization. This proved embarrassing on more than one occasion.

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I subsequently encountered ^{jurisdictional} difficulties from yet another source.--

Dr. Nahum Goldmann was the director of a political bureau which the Jewish Agency had established in Washington prior to the reorganization of the Emergency Council and prior to my assumption of the direction of our political work in the United States. I had assumed that Dr. Goldmann would limit himself to transacting business with Latin-America and such other activities which did not fall within the scope of the Emergency Council. But this was not Dr. Goldmann's conception of his role. He conceived of himself as the independent head of a political bureau which had been established by the ~~creation~~ of the World Zionist Organization, subject to no American control and responsible only to Jerusalem, and he acted accordingly.

He made numerous independent approaches to officials of the American Government on matters which were within the province of the Emergency Council without the prior approval of that body. He would, on occasion, anticipate our visits to officials of the Government and cause us great embarrassment. ^{subjective} On occasion he would transmit to us ~~inaccurate~~ reports of his contacts. Two political agencies functioning at the same time in the same field was clearly impossible. One could not compromise with such a situation indefinitely.

The situation became so intolerable that I handed in my resignation to the Emergency Council in August, 1944. The Emergency Council refused to accept my resignation. Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Gen-Gurion cabled from Palestine asking me not to resign "at this most critical moment" and that they would do their utmost to expedite a settlement of the controversy.

After the Emergency Council adopted a resolution to which Dr. Goldmann assented, to the effect that "all approaches to the American Government or its officials on matters relating to the program of political activities of the American Zionist Emergency Council shall be undertaken by representatives of the Movement only with the prior approval of the Executive Committee of the Council and that in between meetings of the Executive, Dr. Wise, Dr. Goldmann, Louis Lipsky and I would consult regarding emergency matters previously undetermined", I withdrew my resignation. But adoption of the resolution did not settle the question of implementation, for Dr. Goldmann was most eager to be everywhere at all times....

It was evident at the time that I became Chairman of the Executive of the American Zionist Emergency Council in August, 1943, that the large and influential American Jewish Community would now have to assume the major responsibility for the conduct of our Movement, that it would have to be mobilized and alerted for the culminating political effort, now that the end of the war was approaching.

In our action we proceeded on three fundamental premises. First, that our cause was just, incontestably just. We could, therefore, tell our

story frankly to all men of good will in our country -- regardless of class, political party or religious affiliation. We could appeal to their sense of justice and their humanity. It should not be too difficult, we ^{believed}, to tell our story to the American people at a time when America was waging a war in behalf of human rights against the very Nazis who were seeking to exterminate our people and were driving hundreds of thousands of them out upon the broken highways of wandering and homelessness. We must first win the active support and sympathy of the American people if we were ever to persuade our government. In the Executive branch of our government, we were confronted with a State Department which harbored a sizeable core of active anti-Zionist officials, and with a President whose attitude remained continuously shrouded in an impenetrable charm. In our struggle we first had to win over the American people.

The second premise upon which we proceeded was that it was either now or never. The hour of decision was rapidly approaching. We had reached the critical cross-roads in our history. We, therefore, had to throw in everything we had, all of our power, all our resources, all our reserves. The potential political power of five million American Jews had to be activated and their collective strength employed. This was to be the crucial battle. There was nothing to lose now but our illusions. Hitler was brutally and systematically destroying European Jewry. England was waging war upon our defenseless refugees who were being turned away from the very

shores of Palestine to perish in the Strumas. Because of this chaos of terror and inhumanity, of concentration camps and gas chambers, an element of immediacy and of driving urgency had to inform all our activities. We simply must not lose the historic moment.

The third premise upon which we proceeded was that the American Jewish community had to be aroused to exert itself to the utmost, not merely for an increased number of certificates for refugees to be admitted into Palestine, but for a Jewish State. The root of our millennial tragedy was our national homelessness. There is but one solution for national homelessness. That is a national home.

Our refugees were not being taken care of and given asylum by the nations of the free world. There was no reason to suppose that it would be easier to achieve results for our people on a purely humanitarian appeal for rescue and asylum than on the political and national level.

The world had remained silent at the ruin and outrage of a whole people which beggared all human speech, which was beyond words, beyond tears, beyond all utterable woe. Here and there one heard a feeble protest! Here and there a gesture of sympathy! But no outburst of outraged humanity, no furious cry at the assassination of a whole people! Years of slaughter and assault at the hands of a government lost to all sense of shame or pity, which sacked and ravaged a thousand Jewish communities, burnt millions of men, women and children in horrible human crematoria and filled the highways of the earth with hordes of frightened, fleeing refugees, evoked

from the civilized world, from the democracies, from our own country, a few perfunctory acts of rescue which resulted in little more than nothing. A spiritual palsy seemed to have attacked the world, and the mildewed spirit of this mouldering age found all sorts of excuses for doing so little -- legal difficulties, transportation difficulties, immigration laws and what not. Nowhere was there evident a great moral exertion, nowhere an heroic enterprise of the challenged spirit of man surmounting all the quiddities ^{and} ~~of~~ technicalities and all the barriers of routine. And so myriads of our ~~precious~~ sons and daughters perished who might otherwise ^{have remained alive!} ~~have survived~~.

The story of the Evian and the Bermuda Conferences belongs to the shabby furniture of Heartbreak House of World War II, and our country was not without a full share of blame for their abject failure.

Did our country ^{did not} open its doors to rescue the trapped and doomed men, women and children? Did our country ^{did not offer them} ~~offer~~ even temporary asylum ~~to them~~ ~~in numbers commensurate with the enormity of the tragedy?~~ Was there no room for them? We found room in our spacious land for one hundred and fifty thousand Nazi war prisoners!....

When the horrors of Oswiecim, Treblinka and Maidanek became public knowledge, and the cry for ~~free ports~~ and temporary asylums was raised, an announcement was made by our government that it would permit a thousand refugees to enter our country for the duration of the war and that they would be kept in a detention camp until the end of the war.

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A thousand refugees -- and from areas in Europe where they were already safe! Little Sweden in one month gave refuge to almost the entire Jewish population of Denmark -- nine thousand souls -- and it did not put them in a detention camp!

We worked hard, many organizations worked hard, and made representations, but the bitter fact remained that the mountain labored and brought forth -- Oswego!....

It ~~is~~ ^{was} not that the people in Washington were hostile to us. They were friendly and kindly disposed. They understood the disaster which overtook our people. But they also knew that immigrants and refugees in large numbers were not wanted in the United States. Nor would they not be wanted anywhere after the war....

We were therefore resolved that
Our people ~~must~~ ^{should} not be deflected from their main objective -- a national homeland. It must not accept make-shift compromises under the *of realism, expediency or unity.*
spurious appeal ~~not to divide the household of Israel over the issue of a~~
~~sovereign Jewish State.~~

The major battle over this issue took place, as we indicated above, at the American Jewish Conference, which met in the summer of 1943. At this democratically elected body of American Jewry, comprised of Zionist¹ and non-Zionist², the principle issue was whether to adopt or reject a resolution favoring the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. After prolonged debate, the delegates voted almost unanimously in favor of

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the Jewish Commonwealth resolution. The Zionist Movement could now speak with authority to the American people and government in the name of the entire American Jewish community. Our campaign was, therefore, launched on the positive program of the Jewish Commonwealth.

We began to speak again in clear and unmistakable terms of a Jewish State, of a Jewish Commonwealth.

To win the support of the American people and government, the American Zionist Emergency Council launched a nation-wide public relations program. Able and dedicated men, some of them exceptionally gifted in their fields, were quickly marshalled into service. Harry L. Shapiro was appointed Executive Director -- and imaginative, efficient and thoroughly competent administrator and organizer. Harold P. Manson became Director of Information. He was a skillful public relations man, a gifted writer, with a fine Jewish background and thoroughly at home in Zionism and a student of the American political scene. Our Political Secretary was Arthur Lourie, presently the Ambassador of Israel to the Court of St. James. The head of our Washington Bureau at first was Dr. Leon Feuer of Toledo. He took a year's leave of absence from his congregation in Toledo to help us in our work. He was formerly associated with me in the Rabbinate of the Temple in Cleveland and is presently President of the Central Conference of American Rabbis. Later, Dr. Benjamin Akzin, now Professor of Law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, took over. *Assisting in our work in Washington was Eliezer Stone, a veteran in the Movement.*

Leo R. Sack, an experienced newspaper man became our Legislative Consultant. Our ~~able and inventive~~ Director of Special Events, conferences, rallies and mass-meetings, was Abe Tivim. Eliahu Ben-Horin, an author of note and an authority on Middle East affairs, became our Director of Cultural Relations. *Dr. J. B. Saks organized a research department which was later directed by Dr. Benjamin Schwadran. Morris Gornitzky joined the* Research Department. Blanche J. Shepard headed the Speakers' Bureau. *2* Sulamith Schwarz, *Nardi* now living in Israel, was our Director of Publications, and the scholarly and talented Yiddish writer, Arnold K. Israeli, took charge of our Yiddish Press Bureau. Our ~~very alert and active~~ Office Coordinator was Beatrice Cohen. From time to time, others ^{such as} like Hyman A. Schulson, and Adolph Hubbard were added to our staff.

This proved to be a remarkable team of devoted and enthusiastic workers and I felt happy and privileged to work with them. They contributed not only expert professional service, but many valuable ideas.

Headquarters were established in New York and Washington. Effective units, nearly three hundred, were organized in every principal city in the United States.

The Council also worked through two important non-Jewish groups. The American Palestine Committee which had been founded in 1941 by Dr. Emanuel Neumann, was under the [chairmanship of Senator Robert F. Wagner, a warm and consistent friend of the Movement. It was composed of leading Americans, distinguished in many walks of public life, who desired through its medium to signify their interest in the re-establishment of the Jewish National Home. The membership of the

Top of page covering the conference of the Council in New York

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American Palestine Committee ^{grew to exceed} exceeded fifteen thousand, including ^{many} ~~seventeen-state~~ Governors, ~~sixty-one~~ Senators and ~~one hundred and~~ ~~fifty~~ Congressmen, as well as many other well-known figures in the nation's civic and cultural life. ✓

The other non-Jewish group was the Christian Council on Palestine ^{organized through the efforts of Hamilton Steinberg and Rabbi Philip Bernstein at Dr. Neumann's invitation} which was headed by Dr. Henry A. Atkinson. It comprised a membership ^{The Christian Council} of twenty-four hundred leading clergymen ^{and church leaders}, representing all Christian denominations. It took an active part in informing church groups throughout the country and in enlisting their support for our cause.

Later, the two groups were merged into the American Christian Palestine Committee with Dr. Carl Hermann Voss as Chairman of its Executive Committee, and Dean Howard M. LeSourd, as Director.

The Christian Palestine Committee sponsored a lecture bureau which stimulated an interest in the Palestine question on the part of community, college, church and women's groups, as well as radio broadcasting stations throughout the country, and also provided these groups with effective lecturers.

Early in November, 1945, there took place in Washington an International Christian Conference on Palestine, which was attended by representatives of no less than thirty nations. Among a number of distinguished guests who came to America to attend the Conference were Mrs. Lorna Wingate, ~~and Senator Gonzalez Videla, President of the~~

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widow of the British General, Orde Charles Wingate, and Senator Gonzalez Videla, President of the Republic of Chile. As a result of the Conference, the "World Committee for Palestine" was established, with Sir Ellsworth Flavelle of Canada as Chairman. The World Committee for Palestine worked in close association with the American Christian Palestine Committee and concerned itself more particularly with the Latin-American countries and Canada. The World Committee arranged for Dr. Gustavo Gutierrez, a prominent Cuban personality, who had become keenly interested in the problem of the Jewish people and of Palestine, to tour the South American countries, where he established many important contacts.

Numerous conferences and literally thousands of meetings were arranged by the ^{Zionist} Emergency Council in all parts of the country. Mass demonstrations and open-air rallies which were attended by tens of thousands of people were addressed by leading American personalities.

At different times the ~~Zionist~~ Emergency Council was responsible for the holding, alone or with other bodies, of a number of great public meetings. The first of these demonstrations was that at Madison Square Garden, New York City, in July, 1941, in connection with the desperate plight of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe. A similar gathering which drew a huge audience was held on the eve of the effective date of the White Paper, while another noteworthy mass rally, attended by some

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sixty thousand people, took place in Lewisohn Stadium, New York, in April, 1945. Even this gathering was dwarfed, however, by a later open-air demonstration in Madison Square Park to protest British policy in Palestine, ^{attended by} ~~at which those present~~ totaled more than two hundred thousand ^{people}. Such meetings in New York were generally followed by similar great gatherings in leading cities throughout the country.

In a critical moment a march of thousands of Jewish war veterans converged on Washington. The Jewish war veterans, under the leadership of its National Commander, Julius Kline, were at all times most eager to help.

Throughout the country local delegations contacted their public officials, Governors, Congressmen and Senators. State legislatures were requested to adopt pro-Palestine resolutions which were then forwarded to Washington.

We enlisted the active support of key people in every walk of life, authors, journalists, columnists, educators, clergy, political leaders -- people who heretofore had not declared themselves ^{for} ~~in~~ our cause.

Organized American labor, too, made an important and positive contribution to the Zionist effort. Many labor leaders individually, as well as numerous trade unions placed themselves on record in support of Zionist aims. The American Jewish Trade Union Committee, headed by Mr. Max Zaritsky, was especially effective in obtaining adherence to the Zionist program of the federated trade union groups. In November, 1944, the National

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Convention of the American Federation of Labor unanimously approved the Palestine resolution which was submitted to the ~~Conference~~ ^{Congress}, and instructed its President, William Green, to use his good offices in behalf of the fulfillment of the purpose of the resolution. The Council of Industrial Organizations, at its National Convention, ^{did likewise.} ~~also placed itself on record in favor of the Palestine Resolution, which had been introduced in Congress for the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth.~~

I believed at first that it would not be too difficult to tell our story to the American people. But at times we found it very difficult. There were forces and organizations and newspapers who were determined to distort our position, and confuse the American people concerning ^{the nature of} our program and objectives. A case in point was the very influential newspaper "The New York Times".

"The New York Times" today and ever since the days just prior to the establishment of the State of Israel has been unexceptional in its news coverage of everything that concerns Israel and the Zionist Movement, and friendly in its editorial comments.

Thus, on the day when the Jews of Palestine proclaimed, in Tel-Aviv, the establishment of the State of Israel, the "New York Times" wrote editorially:

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"The Jews of Palestine have built a state. The chancelleries of the world may deplore, the gentlemen at Lake Success may debate, the Arab League may fulminate, but the impelling power of "the dream of generations" has created a government, inspired an army, and made a desert bloom. These achievements cannot be ignored or pushed aside. They can neither be rationalized out of existence to suit some academic policy nor warped to fit into some "ideal" solution of the Palestine problem. They exist, as the result of unflagging labor and unfailing courage, of the desperation of some who have known Hitler's tortures and the aspiration of many who have sought an ancient goal. The star which was imposed upon the Jew as a badge of shame is on the flag of Israel today, and the deep, powerful emotions mobilized around that symbol are now the most significant forces in Palestine.

"In recognizing Israel, President Truman has recognized an inescapable fact. However, oddly his act may fit into the curious pattern of American diplomacy in the Near East, this step was the only one which was consonant with American traditions and with the realities of the case. Since the United Nations, largely as the result of the insistence of the United States, has not asserted paramount authority over Palestine, this country is free to deal with Israel on its own terms; since, officially and unofficially, over the last thirty years, the United States had done much to make a Jewish State possible, it could not disavow its own work. And the declaration of Israel's independence must evoke a sympathetic response from a nation conscious of the shared spiritual heritage from which that declaration was

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drawn. Mr. Truman has given formal expression ^{to} the welcome Americans
extend to Israel, the dream made real."

This ^{friendly and positive} attitude, however, was altogether absent in the years which
preceded the establishment of the State.

The following exchange of letters in November, 1943, between
Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times and myself,
will illustrate my point:



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[Handwritten signature/initials]

THE NEW YORK TIMES
TIMES SQUARE

November 2, 1943

Dear Dr. Silver;

I presume that in the long history of Israel other leaders also permitted their fire to consume their judgment and that they, too, misrepresented those who did not see eye to eye with them.

I have read your recent attack upon me and The New York Times in the columns of that paper -- that is where one does read Zionist as well as other news -- and I am prompted to write you because I think you should have certain facts, all of which easily could have been obtained had the religious spirit of the Rabbi not been dominated by political considerations. But, since you won't seek the truth, I send it to you.

Up to twelve months ago, I was not an anti-Zionist. I have never approved of the conception of Jewish statehood, but I have classed myself solely as a non-Zionist, and made this distinction because I could not bring myself affirmatively to deny to any group, no matter what its common denominator, the right to seek a country of its own. And then last November I made a speech in Baltimore, in which I urged upon my fellow countrymen who were not of Jewish faith the need of exercising care before lending their names to the cause of a Jewish Army or extreme Zionist positions. I am enclosing a copy of that speech, which I read. I did not interpolate I urged this course because I knew that we were about to land in Africa and fight in a Moslem country (we did so a week after) and the lives of my countrymen and the cause of the United Nations were my sole concern.

You probably will not agree that agitation for a Jewish Army or a Jewish state makes trouble in Arab lands. That is your privilege. All I ask is the right to speak my mind without having a Zionist barrage of misrepresentation directed against me, for that is what happened; and, interestingly enough, the result was my conversion from a non to an anti-Zionist. I believe that it would be fundamentally bad judgment to entrust the responsibility of statehood to any group which so willfully perverts and distorts facts -- a group which seeks to destroy the character of individuals who differ with it, or the reputation of newspapers which report that which the group would rather have suppressed. I am opposed to Goebbels' tactics whether or not they are confined to Nazi Germany.

You are inaccurate when you associate me with the American Jewish Committee. I have never been a member of it, nor have I any influence upon its policies. If I had, the Committee would never have sent delegates to the American Jewish Conference, for it was obvious to me from the beginning that the Conference was a Zionist maneuver -- and I have no lack of respect for your political astuteness. Believing, as I do, that Judaism is a faith and a faith only, it was with real regret, that I tendered my resignation as a member of the Executive Committee of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations when they, too, agreed to send delegates to a strictly Jewish meeting gathered together for other than religious purposes.

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You don't know - and you couldn't have known without asking me - that I was originally associated with the American Council for Judaism. I helped prepare its statement and am entirely in sympathy with it. On the other hand, when they determined to release the statement during the period of the Conference I withdrew my support. I did this because I felt that the news at that time belonged to the Conference.

I suppose you find it difficult to comprehend that I am concerned with equity for Zionists as well as for others, or that The Times values its warranted reputation for objective reporting too much to stoop to your methods. But then I'm not a religious leader - merely a working newspaper man who takes pride in his own and his journal's integrity.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) Arthur Hays Sulzberger

Rev. Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
E. 105th St. and Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio

Enclosure

P.S. I am sending copies of this letter to several people and do not regard it as private.

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November 9, 1943

Mr. Arthur Hays Sulzberger
Publisher, The Times
Times Square
New York, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Sulzberger:

I would not reply to your intemperate letter of November 2nd but for the fact that you broadcast it. This compels me to reply in order to correct certain false impressions which your letter might create. I trust that you will send copies of my letter to the people to whom you addressed copies of yours.

1) I did not state in my address before the Hadassah Convention that you were a member of the American Jewish Committee and that you urged the withdrawal of the Committee from the American Jewish Conference. I traced the attitude of the American Jewish Committee since the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and showed that under the statesmanlike leadership of men of the type of Louis Marshall, Felix Warburg and Cyrus Adler, it had been possible to achieve friendly collaboration which culminated, in 1929, in the enlarged Jewish Agency when Zionists and non-Zionists together, and on the basis of equality, assumed responsibility and authority in the upbuilding of Palestine. This action, I stressed, was predicated upon the acceptance by all of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate which recognizes the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and their right to establish their national home there. I read at length the resolution which was unanimously adopted at Zurich on August 15, 1929, by the Council of the enlarged Jewish Agency in which it "rejoices that all Israel is united for the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home in Palestine and calls upon every Jew throughout the world to rally to the sacred cause". The resolution expressed "its appreciation to Great Britain for the issuance of the Balfour Declaration", and confidentially hoped "that the Mandatory will cooperate with the enlarged Agency in fully realizing the great aim set by the Declaration and the Mandate."

I then stated that there has been a sharp departure from the historic line of the American Jewish Committee in recent months, a definite break with the past, and that a new leadership has taken hold of that organization which represents not the earlier attitude of non-Zionists, but that of anti-Zionist bitter-enders in our country. Among these I mentioned Lessing Rosenwald, the chairman of the American Council for Judaism, Judge Proskauer, present head of the American Jewish Committee, and yourself, in your capacity as president and publisher of the "New York Times". I regret the fact that by bracketing your name with the other two who are members of the American Jewish Committee an impression was conveyed that you, too, belonged to it.

But wherein have you been wronged by such an unintentional identification? And why do you feel that I and other Zionists have "perverted and distorted" your position? Surely you approve the action of the American Jewish Committee in with-

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drawing from the Conference. You state in your letter that you would have urged the American Jewish Committee, in the first place, not to send delegates to the Conference because you were convinced that the Conference was a "Zionist Maneuver". You say that you resigned from the Executive Board of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations because that body did choose to send delegates to the Conference. Wherein, then, has your position been misrepresented? And why do you act the part of innocence abused?

2) You complain that Zionists are out to destroy your character because you differ from them. Actually you as an individual and your character do not interest the Zionists, nor the Jews of America, at all. No reference was made in my address to you or to your character. I mentioned you only in your capacity as president and publisher of the "Times", and my strictures were not against you personally, but against the "Times". I made certain definite charges against the "Times", none of which you take the trouble to answer in your letter. I will here enumerate them again so as not to permit you to shift the issue on to a plane where it does not belong.

3) The "New York Times" has not reported Zionist news impartially and objectively as befits a responsible newspaper. Your anti-Zionist bias has colored its news and determined its editorial policy. It is not a true statement of fact nor, for that matter, much of a tribute to the manner in which you arrive at fundamental conclusions, when you state that up to twelve months ago you were a non-Zionist but that as a result of the "barrage of misrepresentations" directed against you since your Baltimore speech in November 1942, you have become an anti-Zionist. You have a short memory, my dear Mr. Sulzberger. As far back as January of that year, nearly ten months before your Baltimore address, the "Times" published that well known editorial on the "Zionist Army" in which you attacked not only the movement to create a Jewish Army of Palestinian and stateless Jews, which your editorial in a very unfair and jaundiced manner called a "Zionist" army, just as on another occasion the "Times" coined the phrase the "Zionist" instead of the Jewish National Home, but the whole idea of the Jewish National Home. "The primary reason for the creation of a separate Zionist Army at this time would be of course to establish a Zionist state as one of the official war aims of the United Nations... But the wisdom of the Zionist objective has been questioned by many people including many who are themselves of the Jewish faith; and much misunderstanding may arise among people of other faiths if this objective comes to be regarded as an expression of the full hopes of Jews and of those who fight the wrongs done them. These hopes can not be achieved by the creation of a Zionist (sic!) state. They can be achieved only by the fulfillment of the Atlantic Charter, etc. etc."

This editorial, you will recall, aroused great resentment among the Jews of America and called forth an official statement of protest from the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs. It is therefore not accurate to state that the attacks made by Zionists on you, since your Baltimore address, have converted you from a non to an anti-Zionist. You and your newspaper have been anti-Zionist right along. In fact the "Times" was fighting Zionism back in 1917. The sole editorial reaction of the "Times" to the issuance of the historic Balfour Declaration was an expression in its columns on November 24, 1917 of a fear that the Zionist project might involve the possibility of a recurrence of anti-Semitism, and further that "multitudes of Orthodox Jews still cherish the belief that the return to Zion is to be preceded by the coming of Elijah, and among these there is either indifference to the proposed establishment of the Jewish state, or doubt as to the wisdom of the movement..." Under your piloting in recent years the hostility of the "Times" to the national aspirations of Israel in Palestine has been sharply intensified. You seem to have dowered the "Times" with a mission to fight Zionism.

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We Zionists can not all match your own unimpeachable integrity, but if your anti-Zionist position has any intellectual consistency at all, we must assume that even if all of us were like yourself, without blot or blemish, you and your paper would still be opposed to the Jewish National Home in Palestine because, as you state in another part of your letter, you believe that Judaism is a faith, and a faith only. It follows therefore that the Jewish people, or sect, should not seek any political or national solutions of its problems.

Your bitter reaction to criticism suggests that you are laboring under some strange delusion. You seem to think that attacks on Zionism and Zionists such as are made by the American Council for Judaism of which you are a member and with whose program you say you are in complete sympathy, constitute a legitimate exercise of free speech. It is perfectly proper to brand Zionism as inimical to the welfare of Jews everywhere, and as responsible for keeping Jewish refugees out of Palestine. It is perfectly proper to brand Zionists as guilty of a double allegiance. But to attack those who make such statements and to express indignation at such brazen falsehoods is, to use your own elegant phrase, "Goebbels' tactics". You would like immunity from criticism while indulging in criticism yourself to your heart's content.

A friend of yours in the American Council for Judaism, Mr. Lessing Rosenwald, recently took the same position which you take. He, too, is indignant at criticism levelled against him. Recently he came to Cleveland for a meeting of the American Council for Judaism, preceded by a flock of telegrams sent out from Philadelphia to many people in Cleveland inviting them to attend. The public press likewise carried the announcement of the meeting. The meeting was held and Mr. Rosenwald and his friends had their say. No one interfered with their right to utter their views. But because the Cleveland Jewish Community Council decided to utilize the occasion to express its own views on the American Council for Judaism and to inform the community concerning the composition, purpose and tactics of the Council, Mr. Rosenwald was moved to address a communication to the president of the Cleveland Jewish Community Council, since published by him, sharply criticizing that body for "having forgotten the right of free speech" and for putting itself in opposition to "one of the basic tenets of our Constitution"....

Free speech must be responsible speech, and no man should expect immunity from criticism if his opinions and utterances on vital Jewish issues are regarded as false and misleading. Those who are too thin-skinned should not enter the arena of public discussion and controversy or should not whisper when they are hurt.

4) Again and again the "Times" has transformed itself into a transmission belt for anti-Zionist propaganda. It never misses an opportunity to focus attention on the anti-Zionist viewpoint. Last May and June, the "Times" carried a series of articles by Cyrus L. Sulzberger. The evident purpose of these dispatches from Cairo, Baghdad and Ankara was to press for a crystallization of American policy in the Middle East when it could only be in the interest of the Arabs. Mr. Sulzberger was not here functioning as an objective reporter, but as a commentator seeking to affect policy in an anti-Zionist Direction. It was quite apparent that Mr. Sulzberger was collaborating for the issuance of that joint statement by Great Britain and the United States which would have done irreparable harm to Jewish life in Palestine as well as affecting unfavorably the status of the Jews in this country. In the "Times" of August 22, Mr. Sulzberger reported finally, and with ill-concealed disappointment, that the governments had refused to issue such a statement for which he had been so zealously plugging.

5) The series of stories which appeared in the "Times" beginning on July 30 and carried through to August 3, also from the pen of Cyrus L. Sulzberger, and

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[Handwritten signature]
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which carried such scare headlines as "Palestine Fears Deeds of Despair", "Palestine Faces Clash After War" and "Palestine Arabs Fear Loss of Land", was patently designed to create the impression that there was a state of terrible tension, verging on civil war, in Palestine and that therefore no changes should be made in the White Paper policy closing the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigration early next year, because such changes might endanger the security of the armies of the United Nations in the Near East. This, of course, was the official line taken by the Palestine Administration, which is determined at all costs to save the White Paper. "The Times", alone among the papers in the United States, lent itself lock, stock and barrel to this panic propaganda.

This series of articles also suggested that the overwhelming desire of the Jews of Palestine to assist in the prosecution of the war was motivated not by their wish to help destroy Hitlerism in the world, but by a cunning calculation to militarize the Jewish population of Palestine in preparation for the threatened conflict with the Arabs. These articles, you will recall, likewise elicited a formal protest from the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs.

6) In August and September of this year, there appeared the notorious series of articles in the "Times" on the arms trials in Jerusalem. The "Times" devoted an amazing amount of space to the routine trials of a few gun-runners in Palestine. It went to great lengths to present the anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish opinions of the British Major who transformed the trial into an anti-Zionist propaganda putsch and into a smear attack on the Jewish Agency. The "Times" correspondent, A. C. Sedgewick, took it upon himself to editorialize the news and to express judgment on Mr. Ben Gurion's criticism of the trials and his description of Major Verdin's address as "characteristic of the lowest type of anti-Semitism". Mr. Sedgewick opined that "many find it hard not to consider such a description exaggerated, especially when the Nazi excesses in Berlin and Warsaw are borne in mind", and further, "that there are many, too, who feel that any charge of anti-Semitism in its accepted sense is most noticeably incompatible with the military court proceedings against the Jewish defendants which are carried out with a scrupulousness and courtesy designed to preclude any such castigation."

But on November 3, the Jewish Council of Palestine felt constrained to call for a two-hour strike during which work in all Jewish enterprises throughout the country stopped, in order to protest the incitements and false accusations against the Jews of Palestine voiced by British military officials during the arms trials....

7) It has now become a commonplace in news about Zionism emanating from Palestine and appearing in the "Times" to find the word "extremist" employed as an adjective to describe the official policy of the Zionist Movement and the Jewish Agency. "Extremist" has an ugly connotation, and the trick now is to present the official and classic Zionist position which calls for the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration in letter and spirit, and the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as "extremist".

8) From the very beginning the "Times" became the mouthpiece of the American Council for Judaism. No other paper in the United States found it necessary to give that insignificant group the space and publicity which the "Times" gave it. It was the "Times" and only the "Times" which devoted so much space to the release of the American Council for Judaism during the week of the Conference. You stated that you did not approve of the release of that statement during the Conference. But the "Times" did give it a large and provocative display which no other paper in New York City, or in the country, found it necessary to do on the basis of objective reporting. Similarly, an examination of the "Times" coverage of the American Jewish Conference

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will disclose that an unusual effort was made to give prominent display to the viewpoint of the very small minority in the Conference which dissented from the Palestine resolution.

9) In the "Review of the Week" published on Sunday, September 5th, the "Times" conveyed an erroneous impression when it declared that speakers at the American Jewish Conference demanded the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine while neglecting to say that the Conference voted almost unanimously in favor of it. Continuing, the "Times" dismissed the American Jewish Conference with forty-two words and then gave twice that space to the position of the American Council for Judaism. The device is transparent. This insignificant handful of individuals is not only paralleled in importance with the Conference which represented every Jewish community and nearly every national Jewish organization in the United States, but is even rated above it.

It is clear, my dear Mr. Sulzberger, to any impartial observer, that the "Times" has been following a definite anti-Zionist policy. The Jews of America who are overwhelmingly in sympathy with Zionism, as the recent Conference clearly demonstrated, resent this fact, and are making their resentment audible and will continue to do so. Their criticism is due not to any hostility to you personally or to your paper. It is due entirely to the wrong and hurtful policy which your paper has been pursuing and which is calculated to do great harm to a cause which is dear to the hearts of our people all over the world, and which has now entered upon its historic hour of decision.

WRHS
Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Abba Hillel Silver

AHS:BX

The "New York Times" was not the only newspaper which was negative or hostile to our aspirations in the years before the establishment of the State. There were others, even Yiddish newspapers, like "The Jewish Daily Forward", a labor newspaper which carried on an unfriendly campaign against Zionism until the State was established. Following which, it reversed its policy completely and became an enthusiastic supporter and defender of the State of Israel. In its ^{zeal} ~~conv~~vert zeal to serve the interests of the labor party in Israel, it occasionally lent itself to violent personal attacks upon me....



Our main activity during the first part of the year 1944, was the introduction of Palestine Resolutions in Congress. Why did we do it? Many people, especially when it ^{appeared} ~~looked for a time~~ as though the resolutions would be defeated, criticized us for having dared to take such a dangerous step, fraught with such serious consequences. We did it because we were convinced that if our cause was ever to be placed on the national and international agenda, if the attention of the American people and of the world was ever to be drawn forcibly to our problem on the eve of the effective date of the White Paper, and if the official silence in Washington was ever to be broken, the most effective -- perhaps the only -- way in which it could be done, was by producing the discussion of our problem in the world's greatest forum of opinion -- the Congress of the United States. What happens there is news, national and international. In fact, the very discussion of a problem before such a forum is a political event.

The attitude of ^{our} ~~the~~ Government toward our cause up to that time could in fairness be characterized as one of ~~mere~~ benevolent neutrality or uninvolved benignancy. Our government was at all times kindly disposed, especially the Chief Executive, but it persisted in doing nothing about it. It was fashionable for public officials, from the highest to the lowest, both in the Legislative and the Executive branches of our government, to give warm endorsement to our Movement and it was generally assumed, even among many Zionists, that that was all that could really be expected from our government. This attitude persisted even after the White Paper of 1939 was issued by the British Government. Our government made no protest whatsoever against this unilateral and illegal

action of the British Government which clearly violated the Anglo-American Convention of 1924.

When the United States entered the World War, even the attitude of benevolent neutrality was abandoned. By 1942, the subject of Zionism had become taboo in Washington. I called the attention of the Zionists of America to this fact. In an address, which, as Chairman of the United Palestine Appeal, I delivered in Philadelphia on May¹, 1943, I stated: "Within the last few months, as if by concerted action, there has set in a very definite and noticeable withdrawal on the part of the official family from anything which might even remotely suggest a recognition or endorsement of the Jewish Homeland in Palestine ...

"One thing we must make clear to ourselves and to the world," I said. "We must not beguile ourselves or permit others to beguile us by empty words of sympathy, praise, or the denunciation of Hitler or Nazi persecutions. Everybody knows by now that Hitler is a bad man and that the massacre of two-million² Jews is horrible. If responsible government officials and men who possess political power and influence can bring us no greater balm or help at this time when a cataract of disaster has descended upon us, then we must respectfully advise them that we already have had enough of it. Such expressions of sympathy have turned stale and tasteless. The tragic problem of the Jewish people in the world today cannot be solved by chiefs of government or prominent officials sending us Rosh Hashanah greetings!"

The word had gone through Washington that during the duration of the war, the subject of Zionism should be avoided. On July 7, 1942, President Roosevelt sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State, in which he said: "The more I think of it the more I feel that we should say

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nothing about the Near East, or Palestine, or the Arabs at this time. If we pat either group on the back, we automatically stir up trouble at a critical moment." (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. 4, p. 543.) This became the official line -- a conspiracy of silence -- but Zionist leaders preferred to remain blithely unaware of it. The clamor of the Jews of the world to help save their doomed brothers in Europe by opening the doors of Palestine was deftly detoured into a number of phoney inter-governmental refugee conferences.

What the attitude of our government was throughout the fateful years of the war has been fully revealed in ~~the~~ ^{his} "Memoirs" ~~by~~ ^{of} Mr. Cordell Hull, who was Secretary of State up to the end of 1944.

"We were constantly being pressed ^{as he writes,} for action by the nearly five million Jews in the United States, while at the same time our representation in the Near Eastern Arab countries, plus our own military officials here, were informing us of the danger of antagonizing the sixty million Arabs there at a moment when their help in a strategic area of the war was so vital

"As I left office our policy toward Palestine was one of constantly being on the alert to prevent that explosive area from touching the match to the powder train of the Near East. We could not resolve the questions of the relationship of the Jews to the Arabs, the immigration of the Jews into Palestine, and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine since these were primarily the responsibility of the British. We had, however, made clear our interest in the solution of the Palestine question; we had induced the British to relax their decision to cut off Jewish immigration into Palestine, and we had made serious, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to bring the Arabs and Jews together for friendly discussion of their differences." (Memoirs, 1948, p. 1528 and p. 1537.)

When the White Paper of 1939 was released by the British government, the President, who strongly objected to it and had read the document "with interest and a good deal of dismay," and did not believe the British were wholly correct in saying that the framers of the Palestine Mandate "could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population of the country," nevertheless did not want his views communicated to the British government and so "we limited ourselves to a cable to Kennedy on May 23, 1939, instructing him to mention informally and orally to Foreign Secretary Halifax that disappointment here, especially in Zionist circles, over certain of the White Paper provisions was rather wide-spread, particularly over those that foreshadowed a marked reduction eventually in Jewish immigration into Palestine. A flood of protests was, in fact, pouring into the State Department." (*ibid.*, pp. 1530-31.)

On May 26, 1943, Mr. Hall sent to Cairo a message from the President for delivery to King Ibn Saud, who had inquired of the President whether he would be advised in advance of any steps of an affirmative character contemplated by the American government with respect to Palestine, ^{He} voicing ^{and} the President's appreciation of the King's helpful cooperation and sympathetic understanding, and expressed the thought that if a friendly understanding on Palestine should be reached by the interested Jews and Arabs through their own efforts before the end of the war, a development of that nature would be highly desirable. In any event, he assured the King that it was our government's view that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without fully consulting both Jews and Arabs. (*ibid.*, p. 1532.)

Both Mr. Churchill and the President were thinking of Ibn Saud

in terms of the "boss of bosses" of the Arab world, which, in fact, at the time, he appeared to be. Both thought at the time that they could induce Ibn Saud to work out with Dr. Weizmann a sane solution of the Palestine question. Even Dr. Weizmann was for a time excited over this prospect which Churchill confided to him. . . Five minutes direct conversation with Ibn Saud in 1945 set President Roosevelt straight on this score.

The thesis that there must be full consultation with both Arabs and Jews "continued to be our position throughout the remainder of my period in office", writes Mr. Hull. (ibid , p. 1535)

It was clear that a change had to be forced in this attitude in Washington if our cause was ever to have a chance. Our demands had to be placed on the agenda of the political thought and concern, not alone of the United States but of the world -- through some favorable action on the part of the Congress of the United States.

Our investigation indicated beyond any reasonable doubt that sentiment among the members of Congress was highly favorable to our cause. A nationwide poll, taken by our three hundred community-contact groups all over the country before we introduced the Resolution, made it clear that when and if the Resolution came to a vote it would pass by a very large majority. No bill was ever ushered into Congress under more favorable auspices. The introduction of the Wright-Compton Resolution in the House was preceded by enthusiastic statements of endorsement on the part of both the majority and minority leaders. Even more dramatic was the setting for the Senate Resolution, which was sponsored by Senators Wagner and Taft,

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Both of these distinguished Senators were loyal friends of our cause. Senator Wagner was a liberal Democratic Senator from New York, a champion of the rights of labor, and a pioneer in the field of social legislation. Senator Taft was a ^{conservative} ~~conservative~~ Republican Senator from Ohio. When I first met *him* ~~Senator Taft~~, he was not a Zionist. In fact, he knew very little about the problems which confronted the Jewish people generally. Some even charged him with being unfriendly. I found him eager to listen and to learn, and, when persuaded of the moral worth and justice of a cause, willing to go all out for it. He did not come from a state where the Jewish vote was considerable. He was a man of intellectual integrity, of a keen legal mind and of great sensitiveness, though he often appeared on the surface reserved and distant. He wanted to know more about our Movement. I supplied him with its classic texts and literature. He read them and we discussed them. He questioned me closely and it was only after he was completely satisfied in his own mind as to the soundness and urgency of our cause that he committed himself wholeheartedly to it. Thereafter, and for ten years he was our most helpful friend and advocate in the Congress of the United States. I shall forever be grateful for the privilege of having known him as a friend and for having received from him the wisest of counsel and the greatest of help in the work of establishing the State of Israel.

Moving speeches of support were delivered on the floor by the majority and minority leaders of the Senate when the resolution was introduced.

Hearings on our Resolution were held before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House for four days in the month of February. Leading American figures, Jews and Gentiles, pro-Zionists and anti-Zionists, testified. ⁽⁷²⁴⁾ I made the opening presentation in advocacy of the Resolution. Other representatives of our Movement, Dr. Stephen S. Wise, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Herman Shulman, Louis Lipsky, Dr. James Heller, and Dr. Emanuel Neumann followed. They presented our case forcibly and acquitted themselves with distinction. Everything looked good.

But in our optimism we had not counted on the State Department. Writes Mr. Cordell Hull:

"At the State Department we felt that the passage of these resolutions, although not binding on the Executive, might precipitate conflict in Palestine and other parts of the Arab world, endangering American troops and requiring the diversion of forces from European and other combat areas. It might prejudice or shatter pending negotiations with Ibn Saud for the construction of a pipeline across Saudi Arabia, which our military leaders felt was of utmost importance to our security. And it would stimulate other special interests to press for the introduction of similar resolutions regarding controversial territorial issues relating to areas such as Poland and Italy.

"The reaction in the Near East to the mere introduction of the resolutions had been, as we feared, sharply antagonistic. We received protests from the Governments of Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon, from King Ibn Saud and from Imam Yahya of Yemen. We assured them that the resolutions, even if passed, were not binding on the Executive. The President, on March 13th, renewed his previous assurances to the King that it was our Government's view that no decision should be reached

changing Palestine's status without full consultation with both Jews and Arabs. The Department sent assurances along the same line to the Egyptian Government and to Imam Yahya. . . .

"We were also considering what steps we could take to induce both Houses of Congress not to consider the resolutions. At my request, Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long met with a group of Senators in Senator Connally's office and orally expressed the Department's views. I had a memorandum drawn up which I intended to give the President to be sent to Congress. At that point, however, Secretary of War Stimson wrote a letter to Senator Connally in the latter's capacity as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Stimson forthrightly pointed out that the Senate resolution was a matter of deep military concern to the War Department since its passage, or even public hearings on it, would be apt to provoke dangerous repercussions in areas where we had many vital military interests. General Marshall testified in identical vein before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session. In consequence of the position taken by the State and War Departments, the resolutions were not then reported out of the Senate or House committees." (ibid., p. 1535.)

Together with a group of representatives of the Zionist Emergency Council, I was called in by the Foreign Relations Committee and informed of the attitude of the War Department. After a full and friendly discussion with us, the Senate Committee decided not to act on the Resolution for a fortnight in order to enable us to canvass the situation with the War Department. We did, but its negative position remained unchanged. Action on the Resolution was indefinitely deferred.

Following the deferment of action on our resolution, I stated at a special meeting of the Zionist Emergency Council, February 28, 1944, held in the city of Washington:

"The action of the military forms part of a pattern. First there had been the Cremieux decree, then the Hoskin's Report which had been fathered by the State Department for the sole purpose of putting a quietus on Zionist propaganda. The proposal for a joint British-American statement had followed and had been prevented only by Herculean action. The attitude of certain elements in the government had also been reflected in the efforts which were made to call off the American Jewish Conference on the ground of possible repercussions in the Near East. Finally, we sought to get Congress to speak, precisely because of the negative attitude of the Administration. We were now being silenced and the military situation was being unwarrantably used to achieve this end. We should not yield, because if we did so now we should have to yield all along the line. Whether the State Department or the War Department wants it or not we will have to carry on a most vigorous agitation in favor of our program. The public press must begin to ask why it is militarily dangerous to allow refugees to go to Palestine and why we should be sold down the river for the sake of oil."

The deferment of the Resolution made it more than ever imperative to get an expression of the views of our ^{President} ~~government~~ without delay, lest the postponement of action on the Resolution be exploited by our enemies, and the deadline set by the British White Paper -- March 31, 1944 -- when Jewish immigration into Palestine would practically cease, was fast approaching. We requested an appointment with the President. We were at first advised that the President would see us together with

representatives of other bodies such as the American Jewish Committee whose interests ^{or viewpoint} at the time did not at all coincide with ours. We declined and requested a meeting with the President by ourselves. It was finally granted and on March 9, 1944 Dr. Wise and I spent an hour with him. At the close of a very pleasant interview, the President authorized us to issue in his name the following statement:

"The President authorized us to say that the American government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939. The President is happy that the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees and that when future decisions are reached, full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish National Home, for which our government and the American people have always had the deepest sympathy and today more than ever, in view of the tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees."

This statement represented the first break for us over a period of many years. It was the first time that the American government publicly took a position on the Palestine question which was at variance with the British position.

Unfortunately, this declaration of the President was not followed up by any official representation to the British government, and, as if to indicate that the President's statement had not implied any new departure on the part of our government in its policy toward Palestine, a telegram was sent by the State Department with the approval of the President, to the heads of the Arab countries, renewing the assurances which had previously been given to them that no decision on Palestine would be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

"The apprehensions of the Arabs, however, were further aroused," writes Mr. Hull, "when the President gave two Jewish leaders, Dr. Stephen S. Wise and Dr. Abba H. Silver, an interview on March 9, 1943. The press reported the President as having authorized them to announce that 'when future decisions are reached full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish National Home', that this Government 'has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939', and that the President was 'happy that the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees.'"

"Two days later Minister Kirk in Cairo reported that he had received an inquiry from the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nahas Pasha, regarding this reportedly authorized statement. On March 14 I sent the President for his approval two proposed replies, one to Kirk in Cairo, the other to Minister Loy Henderson in Bagdad. The President approving, these went out to Kirk and Henderson, informing them that the Zionist leaders' statements had in fact been authorized by the President substantially as reported in the Near East. The Ministers were to point out that a Jewish National Home, rather than the Jewish commonwealth referred to in the Congressional resolutions, was mentioned in this statement and that, although the American Government, it was true, had never approved the White Paper, our Government, it was also true, had never taken a position relative to it. [sic.] Our Ministers were also to renew assurances that it was our Government's view that no decision changing Palestine's basic situation should be arrived at without full consultation with both Jews and Arabs."

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and frankly

Mr. Hull sums up the whole situation quite neatly:

"In general the President at times talked both ways to Zionists and Arabs, besieged as he was by each camp. Rabbi Wise and Silver believed that the President had made pledges to them. The State Department made no pledges." (ibid. p. 1536)

These assurances which he gave to the Arabs were of the essence of President Roosevelt's policy right along. He never deviated from it. He made an effort to persuade Ibn Saud, whom he received on board his cruiser in the Mediterranean in February, 1945, following the Yalta Conference, to relent on his all-out opposition to Zionism, but as he himself stated on his return to the United States: "He learned more about 'the Moslem problem, the Jewish problem, by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I could have learned in exchange of two or three dozen letters'."

An exchange of letters between King Ibn Saud and President Roosevelt did take place in March-April, 1945. It was made public on October 19, 1945, ~~six months~~ after the death of the President, ~~six-months~~ later. In his letter to Ibn Saud, President Roosevelt clearly states what his Palestine line had been right along -- a fact which the Zionists were either unaware of, or, in their political infatuation, refused to credit.

"Your Majesty will recall that on previous occasions I communicated to you the attitude of the American Government toward Palestine and made clear our desire that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

Your Majesty will also doubtless recall that during our recent conversation I assured you that I would take no action

in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of the Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people.

It gives me pleasure to renew to your Majesty the assurances which you have previously received regarding the attitude of my Government and my own as Chief Executive, with regard to the question of Palestine and inform you that the policy of the Government in this respect is not changed.

I desire also at this time to send you my best wishes for Your Majesty's continued good health and for the welfare of your people.

Your good friend

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT."



From Washington the scene of our political activities shifted, in the summer of 1944, to Chicago where the National Conventions of both political parties were held. 1944 was a national election year. While Congressional action on the Palestine Resolution was for the time being deferred, the Council did not suspend its activities, *or relax its efforts.* ✓

In June, 1944, the Republican Party adopted a forthright plank on Palestine pledging unequivocal support to the full Zionist program. Senator Taft, who was Chairman of the Committee on Platform, helped ~~me~~^{us} with the drafting of this plank. This was followed in July, 1944, by the Palestine plank in the platform of the Democratic Party, which put the party of the National Administration on record as follows:

"We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."

These planks represented an act unprecedented in American political history and served dramatically to give notice that the American people were overwhelmingly in sympathy with the aims of the Zionist Movement.

In persuading the leaders of both political parties to endorse our program, I stressed the absolute non-partisan character of our Movement. The Zionist Movement was committed to no political party. I had to stress this fact time and time again, with our own fellow Zionists, some of whom were head-over-heel partisans of one or another of the political parties, most of them Democratic zealots who stood in charmed adoration of President Roosevelt, who in their view could do no wrong. I tried to _____

convince them that the non-partisan character of our Movement was a political asset which we should scrupulously guard and preserve. ~~Our~~ *It* non-partisan-character was fully understood by the leaders of both political parties and because of it we were given hearty cooperation by both parties. Any other policy would, in the long run, prove disastrous.

Most of my difficulties with some of the Zionist leaders in the American Zionist Emergency Council, which finally led to my resignation in 1945, were over this very issue. Some of them even resented the fact that I had succeeded in getting the Republican Party to include a pro-Zionist plank in its platform. . .

As the election approached, ~~on October 15, 1944~~, President Roosevelt ^{on October 15, 1944} sent through Senator Wagner a message to the Convention of the Zionist Organization of America, meeting in Atlantic City, wherein he gave his support to the Commonwealth plank in the Democratic platform.

Actually the Emergency Council had not expected nor wanted a Convention message from the President. It had asked the White House to meet with its two co-chairmen for a serious talk about the Palestine situation. It was surprised to learn from a newspaper report that Dr. Wise had by himself seen the President. . . .

The Emergency Council angrily discussed this matter on October 12th,, and passed a resolution to the effect that "whenever any member of our group is on a mission representing the Zionist Movement he should refrain from injecting partisan politics into the matter. "

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who said, "Oh, don't talk about a Jewish Commonwealth; it is premature:

it is extreme; it will alienate friends; you will never get a hearing in

Washington." If, on the platform of the Waldorf-Astoria a year ago I would have arisen and said that within twelve months the President of the United States would himself come out and declare, "I am for a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth", they would have laughed me to scorn as a madman. We were the extremist Zionists then, the doctrinaires, the impractical people!...

"Well now the program of the extremists and the doctrinaires has become the accepted political position of the greatest power on earth... the United States of America. I speak of this because there is a lesson in it for us Zionists for the future. We may have such moments recurring time and again. Don't compromise on basic Jewish rights for the sake of expediency, for the sake of a spurious unity! Demand what our people is historically entitled to demand, all of it; insist on it; work for it, and wait!"

Despite these striking expressions of official support for the Zionist position, they were not reflected in action. There was always an unfortunate contradiction between American official pronouncements favoring the Jewish National Home and concrete action for their fulfillment.

Later that month, the military objection to the passage of the Congressional Resolution was withdrawn. We had waited impatiently for months before the gratifying news finally reached us in a letter which the Secretary of War Stimson sent to Senator Taft. _____

In the light of this withdrawal and in view of the planks which had been adopted by both the Democratic and Republican Parties, as well as the statement of October 15th of President Roosevelt, we felt confident that the road was now clear. It was decided to re-open the matter of the Congressional Resolution which had lain dormant since the previous March.

Before taking action in the matter, the reaction of the President and Secretary of State Stettinius was sought. But, instead of the expected concurrence of the Administration, vigorous opposition was again encountered. It is clear now, with the President's letter to Ibn Saud ^{known} before ^{publically}, why.

A violent controversy soon developed within the Emergency Council when the Administration's opposition to action on the Resolution was encountered. Some members of the Council thought it inadvisable to proceed with the matter because of the Administration's opposition. I took a different view of the situation. I felt that every effort should be made to induce the Administration to withdraw its opposition to the Resolution inasmuch as its opposition was diametrically opposed to the stand which had been taken publicly by President Roosevelt himself and his party. To wait for a "green light" from the White House or the State Department was futile. It would never come. The whole purpose of the Congressional Resolution was to influence and change the Administration's policy of inaction and to inform Great Britain and the world what the true sentiments of the American people, speaking through their chosen representatives in Congress, were.

Unfortunately, the proponents of these two opposing views adopted conflicting procedures in Washington. Thus, while I sought to make the voice of Congress heard, other Zionist leaders informed the State Department that they were not pressing for the Resolution. Thus Dr. Wise, on his own, sent a telegram to Secretary of State Stettinius, without my knowledge:

"In view of your meeting Monday with Senator Wagner, I wish to make my position and that of many associates unmistakably clear. We would, of course, all be happy if the Chief and you could see your way clear to give approval to the adoption of the Palestine Resolution in both Houses. Postponement likely to be misunderstood by public opinion which naturally cannot be informed concerning reasons for delay. If, however, Chief and you should still feel that some postponement for reasons already given, I, together with many associates, do not wish to have action taken contrary to your and President's recommendation. Situations should, under no circumstances, be permitted to arise in which Senate Committee would be informed of Chief's opinion communicated through you to us in confidence. In that case it would be best for Senate Committee to postpone action through the Session. This telegram is for you alone. Will telephone tomorrow afternoon at your convenience to learn about results in your talk with Bob (Senator Wagner)"

By the end of November, 1944, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the Resolution in a somewhat amended form. Late in November the Taft-Wagner Resolution came up for action in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where it was considered at three successive meetings. The

State Department and the President, however, remained adamant that the passage of the Resolution was inopportune -- "unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation". The matter came up for a vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 11, 1944. On this occasion, Mr. Stettinius made the last in a series of personal appearances before the Committee, and, in the name of the national Administration, argued against its passage. Such pressure from the Executive branch of the government made it impossible to pass the Resolution, and it was finally tabled by a bare majority ~~in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.~~

Following the tabling of the Palestine Resolution in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the far-reaching controversy within the Council culminated in my resignation as Chairman of the Executive Committee and Co-chairman of the Council.

The leader of the opposition to my policy was the Co-chairman of the Council, Dr. Wise. No one could question his loyalty to the Movement or fail to be impressed by his years of service to the Zionist cause. We two had worked closely together for many years. But Dr. Wise was also a ~~very~~ staunch Democrat and completely enchanted by the charm and personality of the President. He felt very close to him. Men said that Dr. Wise had influence in the White House -- that he was 'persona grata'. Dr. Wise would sing the President's praises on all occasions and would pronounce the name of Franklin Delano Roosevelt with such adoration as if he were offering incense and libation.

Thus, at the opening session of the American Jewish Conference on September 1, 1943, Dr. Wise declared:

" As a spokesman of the Conference at its opening hour, I choose to register my unchanged faith in the deep humanity of the present leader of free men in the world today, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. This body of delegated and widely representative American Jews, dedicated to the triumph of our Nation's cause, declares its deep and unchangeable confidence in the integrity and good-will of its Commander-in-Chief. "

There was nothing in the record of President Roosevelt up to that time, or later, to warrant such "deep and unchangeable confidence". He had done nothing for the Jewish people, for the refugees from Nazi persecution, or for the Jewish National Home. Undoubtedly he had good-will towards the Jewish people and deep sympathy for their suffering. But mere good-will in a supreme leader of the world at a time when a whole race was being exterminated, and the one door of escape and safety was being shut and bolted against them was clearly not enough.

My own position I ~~had given~~ ^{had been given} to the Zionists at their convention in Atlantic City in 1944, shortly after it had received the encouraging statement of the President that "If re-elected I shall help to bring about its (the Jewish Commonwealth) realization".

"With all my supreme admiration for the great personalities who are our friends, and for the significance of great personalities in the world crisis today, with my full admiration and full realization of these two facts, I still say to you what the psalmist said long ago: "Put not your trust in princes...."

Put not the future of our Movement in the sole keeping of individuals, however friendly, however great. Appeal to the masses of the people, ~~(correct--something-missing)~~ of the world! Talk to the whole of America. Make friends everywhere. Carry on an active education propaganda in your circle, within the sphere of your influence, among your own friends. That will be reflected in the higher political circles. That will guide them. That will sustain them when they come to make important decisions which may involve America's participation in the ultimate solution of the Palestine problem.

"We must build upon the broad and secure base of public sentiment, the approval of public opinion which in the final analysis determines the attitude and action of governments in a democratic society."

Dr. Wise tendered his resignation as Co-chairman of the Emergency Council on December 9th on the ground that he "cannot longer remain the Chairman of a body, one of the leading officers of which is guilty of deliberate, persistent, violations of its decisions, conduct which has inflicted great hurt upon our sacred cause".

Before his resignation was acted upon by the Emergency Council, a meeting was held by the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America on Tuesday evening, December 19th, in the presence of Dr. Wise. At this meeting, the Chairman, Dr. Goldstein, the President of the Zionist Organization of America, called upon me as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Emergency Council, to report on the general situation. I stated that I was not prepared to present a report since I expect to do so at the Emergency Council meeting which was scheduled for the following evening, after which I would feel free to discuss my report with the individual constituent organizations of the Council, including the Zionist Organization of America.

Dr. Goldstein then proceeded to discuss the situation anyhow. He was impatient to get a decision from the Executive of the Z. O. A., which would bind its representatives on the Council the following evening. As the discussion progressed, I told the Executive Committee that I still felt that it was my duty to present my report first to the Emergency Council and that it was pointless for me to remain any further since I could not participate in the discussion. I thereupon left the meeting.

The minutes of that meeting indicate that a prolonged discussion followed in which, urging immediate action without waiting for the meeting of the Emergency Council the following evening, were Dr. Goldstein, Judge Louis E. Levinthal, Herman Shulman, Maurice M. Boukstein and Rabbi Solomon Goldman. Most violent in his criticism was Dr. James G. Heller, who offered a resolution that "it is the sense of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America that the actions of Dr. Abba Hillel Silver in relation to the resolutions before the Congress of the United States were in contravention of the decisions of the Zionist Emergency Council, that the resignation of Dr. Wise was justified as a protest against these actions and that in the light of these facts and in the political interest of the Movement, it is our conviction that the services of Dr. Silver as Co-chairman of the Emergency Council and Chairman of its Executive Committee should not be continued".

Dr. Nahum Goldmann, member of the Jewish Agency, who attended as a guest, warned "that the continued use of such tactics as pursued by Dr. Silver which involved a fight against the President and his Administration, would lead to complete political disaster... What we are doing here is what the Revisionists have done for twenty years. It is exactly Revisionist tactics." Dr. Israel Goldstein delivered himself of the following revealing statement: "Is it not conceivable that a situation may exist which would make Dr. Silver's retirement advisable at the present juncture? The fact remains that he is persona non grata with the one man that more than any other we need for the solution of our problem, and that his position vis-a-vis the White House

has been much worse as a [~]result of the present events. Perhaps Dr. Silver might feel impelled, as a matter of Zionist responsibility, to come to his colleagues and say: "Gentlemen, this is the situation. If Mr. Dewey had been elected President of the United States it would have been proper for me to have the leadership, (I might say that Dr. Wise intimated that very thing to me) but under the circumstances now obtaining, I believe it is my duty not to be in the leadership and I shall work as a private in the ranks'."

P Dr. Emanuel Neumann, ~~Mr.~~ Jacob Fishman, ~~Mr.~~ Elihu Stone and Rabbi Irving Miller urged that no action be taken until I would have an opportunity to make my report to the Zionist Emergency Council. Nevertheless, a resolution was adopted to the effect that "It is the sense of this meeting that on the basis of the facts as presented to us tonight, that Dr. Wise's resignation as protest against Dr. Silver's action in contravention of the decisions of the Emergency Council was justified, we believe that Dr. Wise's resignation from the leadership of the American Zionist Emergency Council would most seriously injure the interests of the Movement and therefore conditions must be created to enable Dr. Wise to continue as Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council. We leave it to our representatives in the Emergency Council to act in accordance with these views". An amendment was offered to delete the words "as a protest against Dr. Silver's action in contravention of the decision of the Emergency Council". On a vote, the amendment was defeated.

It would not be long -- in fact, less than six months were to elapse -- before Dr. Israel Goldstein would state to another Executive meeting of the same body: "Many Zionists who feel that the Z. O. A. administration acted properly six months ago in the light of circumstances then obtaining and who believed that Dr. Silver had contravened the decisions of the Emergency Council, believe that after the passing of these months during which Dr. Silver was out of leadership, the whole situation needs to be re-evaluated. Our political situation is not improved; Dr. Silver is one of our strongest assets. He can render valuable service. He should be brought back. . . ."

At the Zionist Emergency Council the next evening, December 20th, after Dr. Wise gave the reasons for his resignation, I gave a full report of my activities in connection with the Palestine Resolution in Congress. A

Dr. Heller

motion was then made by ~~a representative of the Z. O. A.~~ to the effect that

"It was the sense of the Council that Dr. Silver had contravened its decisions."

This motion was tabled! Another motion was then made by a representative of the Z. O. A. that "a new election be held on December 27th, and in the meantime the officers of the Council be requested to tender their resignations in order that the Council be in a position to act". A motion to table this motion was defeated. At this point I stated that the failure to table this motion indicated a lack of confidence in me and I tendered my resignation. ~~No further action was taken since both Dr. Wise and I had resigned and the meeting was adjourned.~~

The Poale Zion (Labor Zionists) and the Mizrachi (Religious Zionists) were solidly on my side and they remained my loyal supporters throughout the long controversy. The Z. O. A. ^{led} in the opposition and they were joined by the representatives of the Hadassah.

Almost the entire staff wanted to resign with me. I would not have it. The work of the Zionist Emergency Council must not be disrupted. Only Harry L. Shapiro and Harold Manson insisted on tendering their resignations ^{at once}. When the American Zionist Policy Committee was organized shortly thereafter to bring about my return to the leadership of the Council and to fight for a program "in which timidity, appeasement and backstairs 'diplomacy' would have no place", they assumed full executive direction of its work.

The reaction of the Zionist public to what took place was to me both amazing and gratifying. From all parts of the country protests poured in, condemning the people who brought about my enforced resignation, ~~and calling for the restoration of unity within the Emergency Council.~~ The Zionist masses made their wishes unmistakably clear in resolutions, telegrams, letters and petitions -- all calling for my return and for my program of action.

The Jewish press of America particularly sprang to my defense, especially the Yiddish press, and a stream of editorials/ ^{and} articles by the most able and respected Jewish journalists -- Jacob Fishman, S. Dingol, M. Rivlin, Leon Crystal, David Pinski, and others -- soon appeared. Within a few days of my resignation, an editorial, typical of many which were to follow, appeared in "The Day":

"Under Rabbi Silver's leadership Zionism became an important issue in American politics, and the question of a Jewish Commonwealth became a subject with which the entire public sympathized fully.

"As a consequence, Dr. Silver became the most popular figure in Zionist circles, and it was generally acknowledged that a new star had arisen on the political horizon of Zionism in America... The time of hat-in-hand politics is over. Only an aggressive dynamic policy can lead to success and Rabbi Silver is clearly the man to be entrusted with such a policy... The Emergency Council must be re-organized. Outside influence and political misunderstandings must be set aside and Rabbi Silver must remain at his post to serve the best interests of Palestine and of the Jewish people."

Wrote Jacob Fishman:

"The twelve members of the American Zionist Emergency Council who voted Dr. Abba Hillel Silver out of the leadership of American Zionist political work have demonstrated that they have no desire to heal the dangerous breach in American Zionism. They have also slapped the face of Jewish public opinion, which has, in my opinion, manifested overwhelming opposition to the maneuver aimed at Dr. Silver.

"When one reads the pronouncement at the end of Dr. Israel Goldstein's statement to the effect that 'Zionism is a democratic movement', one feels like asking Dr. Goldstein: when did the Z. O. A. administration receive a mandate from the Zionist membership to carry on a political campaign

directed against Dr. Silver or to seek out his 'sins'? Quite the contrary -- at the Convention of the Zionist Organization of America in Atlantic City Dr. Silver's policies were approved unanimously; and the delegates understood already then that a behind-the-scenes campaign was being waged against him by the Z. O. A. administration...

"This affair will not be forgotten so soon by the Z. O. A. membership. The day of reckoning, when all those responsible for this maneuver will find themselves in Dr. Silver's present circumstances, will come. In my judgment this most recent development is convincing evidence that a "New Deal" in the leadership of the Z. O. A. is needed."

The eminent playwright David Pinski wrote in the "Jewish Morning Journal":

"When Dr. Silver accepted the chairmanship of the Council, expectations ran high everywhere. His subsequent achievements justified all the hopes pinned on him by the Zionist Movement. Under his competent and energetic leadership, the American Zionist Emergency Council really came to life and vigor. How can one account then for his sudden warfare against Dr. Silver and his forced resignation? The contention is that Dr. Silver pursued an aggressive and militant policy which called forth all this antagonism. He is accused of having behaved as if we Jews were really an important power, whereas the others felt that we could only plead

and beg^g and hope for mercy and charity. When it was hinted from 'on high' that we ought to postpone our requests for 'a little while', we should not have been insistent. We should have armed ourselves with patience and waited.

"Who is right? Wise or Silver? Which policy is the right one? Perseverance or weak-kneed yielding? Why not consult the sentiments of the Zionist masses, the voice of the people which is the voice of God? Do not the leaders of the American Zionist Organization have any faith in the rank and file of the membership? Is the Palestine Resolution their own private concern?"

The ~~mounting~~ protests increased in volume. Dr. Chaim Weizmann cabled an appeal both to me and Dr. Wise to do everything possible to resolve our differences. On March 26th, I received a letter from Dr. Wise inviting me to attend a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Emergency Council, to which I replied:

"My dear Dr. Wise:

"Permit me to thank you for your letter of March 21st. I appreciate the invitation which you convey to me to attend a meeting in the near future of the Executive Committee of the Emergency Council. I shall try to attend such a meeting although at the present moment I do not know when I will be in New York again. I only returned this morning from a week's stay in New York.

"I would be lacking in frankness if I were to leave you with the impression that my remaining a member of the Council in any way implies that I accept the present set-up of the Council as either a satisfactory or

permanent arrangement. Since my enforced resignation, the Council, to my best knowledge, has heard from numerous Zionist groups and leaders throughout the country calling for its re-organization. This has also been echoed with remarkable unanimity by the Jewish press.

"On February 21st, Dr. Weizmann cabled both to you and to me an urgent message to do everything humanly possible to resolve the difference and to remove the difficulties thus enabling all Zionists to combine for the urgent task which lies before us. Mr. Lipsky wrote to me on February 26th that he, as a member of the Jewish Agency, had been urged by Dr. Weizmann to make an earnest effort to reconcile the difference that had arisen. On March 2nd, I wrote to Mr. Lipsky that 'if Dr. Wise is now of the opinion that the re-organization of the Emergency Council which he precipitated by his resignation was ill-advised, and that the situation now calls for my return under conditions which will enable me to carry on the active political leadership of the Council, I shall be very pleased to meet with him at a time and place mutually agreeable'.

"I have not heard from you as to your intention. This, as I see it, and believe you will agree with me, is the real crux of the matter and not whether I attend one or another meeting of the Executive Council."

"With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

/s/ Abba Hillel Silver

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The situation in the Zionist ranks became such that on April first the Executive Committee of the Z. O. A. appointed a peace committee to explore the possibilities of resolving the controversy. On June 24th, the committee, under the chairmanship of Judge Louis E. Leventhal, brought in a report which was adopted. Another committee was then appointed to consult with the other three organizations of the Emergency Council and with me and Dr. Wise with a view of bringing about an all-around agreement.

I insisted upon a re-organization of the Emergency Council which would give my friends in the Council practical control and so insure that my policies would in the future not be thwarted again by a hostile combination within the Council.

When this was agreed to, and the report of the Committee was approved by the Emergency Council on July 12, 1945, I withdrew my resignation and resumed my position as Chairman of the Executive of the Zionist Emergency Council -- and together with Dr. Wise as Joint Chairman of the Council.

At the conclusion of the meeting I addressed the members of the council:

"I would like to say a word or two on this occasion. This is the first time in six months that I am with you and believe me that I was sad that I was away these six months. I am pleased that the unity we have all wished for has been re-established and that we will be able to proceed with our

mandates from the Jewish people now in ;wholehearted and strongest cooperation. I regard what has transpired not in any sense as a personal victory. These past six months have been a defeat for all of us and they have b een a defeat for our Movement in this country, and ~~we~~ we will have to work doubly hard to regain some of the ground we have lost.

" I do feel a sense of personal satisfaction at this moment and one of vindication. Beyond that, I have no feeling other than one of profound gratitude that we have found our way back to comradeship and the possibility for united action. I hope that we will all turn out backs on what took place in the last few months and that we will begin to think of ourselves not in terms of friends or foes, or as members of this group or that group, but in terms of comrades working in a common cause.,,

"This Movement has nothing to give me except the opportunity to work. It has nothing to give any of us except the large privilege of working for the cause of our people. If I sought personal glory, the soundest course for me at this time would have been to stay out of this Council, for by staying out, I was drawing heavy dividends for small investment, because all mistakes made here were redounding to my credit undeservedly. No loyal Zionist wants that sort of thing.

"I wish to have the opportunity, in cooperation with my Joint Chairman, Dr. Wise, and members of this Council, to work, and I ~~would~~ would ask that this work be not made difficult for me. There has been some damage done to the one who is now the Chairman of your Executive Committee. Some damage has been done in Washington to his reputation and his standing with

thing and it will have to be corrected. I am a tool of the Movement and could function best when the tool is permitted to retain strength. As you build me up, you build up the Movement. As you pull me down, you pull down the Movement. My effectiveness to the Movement depends upon what you say about me, and I hope that all of us will bear it in mind.

"The days ahead are difficult days and stormy days, I am afraid. We will have to do things which will demand of us the sacrifice of many of our subsidiary loyalties. We will have to have courage to act and not to buckle under when we reach a point of consummation....

"That is all that I should like to say at this time. I want to tell Dr. Wise, with whom I hope to work, that I am very happy that we are again finding ourselves in harness and working together. I hope that after all these things, which have happened we will come to understand each other a little better. I think we are both worth getting to know a little better. I am sure that as we get to know each other a little better, all the bogies which have been built up will vanish.

"I pledge the best that is in me, which is not good enough, for our Movement. I demand of you a similar pledge, with all that you have and all that you can give, of mind and heart, to this great cause, which has now entered ~~its~~ its final hour of decision. "

Dr. Wise responded:

"I have no desire to go back to the past. We had differences. They are now relegated to the limbo. We begin anew to work together.

"Dr. Silver used a phrase which I hope we will all bear in mind. I hope that the press will not begin tomorrow to speak of triumphs, the victories, the defeats.

We are going to work together. Dr. Silver, you pledged us your heartfelt services in every sense. Nobody in this room is foolish enough to deny that you have a great service to render, your ability, your ideals, your capacity for leadership. We want your leadership and we also want your comradeship. We ask for friendship. I pray to God that a year hence we may say that the great decision in favor of our people came a little sooner because the masses of American Zionists were united on this blessed night."

Three months later, on October 20, 1945, a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Emergency Council voted almost unanimously to proceed with the re-introduction of the Congress Resolutions-- even if it were not approved by the Chief Executive. By now the Roosevelt correspondence with Ibn Saud had been made public."

The Resolution was introduced on October 26, 1945, and was overwhelmingly adopted by the Senate on December 17th and by the House on the 19th.

Dr. Neumann was very active in the ^{last}~~first~~ days before its passage. I was in Palestine at the time.

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Senator Taft wrote me on December 19, 1945, that he was not entirely satisfied with the terms of the Resolution, but on the whole, he did not believe they will detract from the tremendous advantage of having Congress adopt it. This is how I felt about it, too. /



Commenting on the passage of the Palestine Resolution, Mr. Sumner Welles, in his book, "Where Are We Heading", writes:

"The position taken by the legislative branch of the Government was firm, tonic and enlightened as has often been the case in recent months. The Congress favored a foreign policy that was far more positive than that of the Executive, and far more likely to further a healthy world reconstruction."

At the annual convention of the Zionist Organization of America which ^(when) was held later that year, in Atlantic City, I was elected President of the organization by acclamation. The man who enthusiastically seconded my nomination was Dr. Stephen S. Wise....

~~The Convention meeting shortly after~~

Commenting on my election, the "Haaretz" of Palestine wrote on November 21st, "the election of Dr. Silver is both a personal victory and a vindication of his policy... Recent events have shown that our hope of obtaining anything by action behind the scenes and reliance on vague promises have not come true. Our new way therefore must be that of struggle and Dr. Silver's election proves that the Zionist Movement in America recognizes this fact, and is preparing itself for the struggle."

The Convention ⁱⁿ Meeting shortly after the publication of the ^{hostile} Bevin statement fully endorsed my program, declared relentless war on the Bevin policy and resolved that:

"The British Government, by usurping unto itself powers never granted by the Mandate, is driving the loyal Jewish population of Palestine into active resistance in defense of their rights and position. Their struggle is our own. We purpose to extend to them every assistance in our power. The Jewish people will fight with all the means at its command for its right to live. We recognize no legal barrier to the rights of Jews freely to settle in Palestine and rebuild a Jewish State."

Our historic struggle has entered a new phase. We authorize and direct our Administration to adopt new methods and to employ new measures adequate to meet the new situation. We solemnly dedicate ourselves to this struggle, and we count with confidence upon the support of millions of our fellow Americans. No effort shall be spared to achieve for our people liberty and security in Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. "

Following the Zionist Convention in Atlantic City, I went to Palestine on November 24, 1945, to attend the sessions of the World Zionist Executive and the Jewish Agency for Palestine. I was most warmly received everywhere. I visited the scenes of recent British military attacks at Givat Haim, Shefayim and Rishpon. I attended a great gathering in the Mograbi Theatre in Tel-Aviv on December 7th. I told the people: "This is only the first round of the struggle. Our fate will not be decided by Mr. Bevin, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry or the White Paper, but by the Jews of Palestine and those who wish to help them." ~~I broadcast a message on "Radio Jerusalem"~~
(See ~~"New Palestine"~~, Dec. 3)

DD

Earlier that year, in August, 1945, I attended the Zionist Conference in London. The war was now over and the leaders of the Movement gathered from all parts of the world to plan their future course. The delegates took stock of the appalling disaster which the war had brought upon European Jewry, of the millions destroyed, and the countless survivors of the holocaust who were homeless and were seeking a new home. The delegates were in an angry mood, because the gates of the Jewish National Home were not open to admit these helpless refugees. The Jews of Palestine were in open revolt against the mandatory government because of its closed-door policy and the government was employing brutal repressive measures against them.

The Conference re-affirmed the principles of the Biltmore program. It proclaimed its full endorsement of the request which the Jewish Agency had previously made to His Majesty's Government "that an immediate decision be announced to establish Palestine as a Jewish State". It called for the immediate abrogation of the White Paper. It asked the new Labor Government which had just then come into power for one hundred thousand immigration certificates. The delegates were greatly heartened by the fact that there was now a new government in Great Britain. The Labor Party, which was victorious in the elections, was known as a friend of Zionism. It had time and again passed strong pro-Zionist resolutions and had called for the abrogation of the White Paper.

I was a member of the committee, whose chairman was David Ben-Gurion, which called on the new Colonial Secretary, Mr. G.H. Hall, and presented

to him our program and our request. We were graciously received and were told that our request would be given prompt consideration.

But we were soon in for a shattering disillusionment. The Labor Government before long shockingly repudiated the position which the Labor Party had taken. It denied our request for one hundred thousand certificates. It announced no fundamental change in the White Paper policy of the former government. It would permit, for the time being, fifteen hundred immigrants a month to enter the country. It turned down the request which President Truman had made in a letter to the Prime Minister on August 31st for the admission of one hundred thousand refugees. The Attlee government was determined to preserve the same policy after the war which the Churchill government had pursued during the war on the ^{alleged grounds of} pretext of the war and the possible military dangers in the Near East. ✓

It was at this juncture that I fully realized the utter hopelessness of continuing our negotiations with Great Britain in the hope that it would see the error of its way, and would adopt a course of action in consonance with its obligations under the mandate. In consequence, I turned away from the Weizmann line of so-called "moderation". Moderation had yielded us nothing, except what we ourselves had built in Palestine in the face of constant British interference and harassment. Now that the war was over, there was no longer any fear of embarrassing an embattled nation fighting the enemies of all civilization -- the Nazis. There was now the stark reality of the hundreds

of thousands of their victims who were languishing in Displaced Persons' camps -- clamoring to be allowed to go to Palestine -- and the mandatory government unlawfully keeping them out. There must be a change! The Gordian knot had to be cut! I had followed Weizmann fairly consistently through the years, with the exception of the one brief Brandeis interlude, and our difference over the Peel Report which had proposed an unsatisfactory partition. I could follow him no longer.

I had come around to the position that Great Britain must give up the Mandate over Palestine and that the United Nations Organization should be asked to take up the Palestine problem. I had expressed this view publicly even before the Labor Party's betrayal. I was now firmly convinced of it.

On September 23rd, Dr. Wise and I issued a statement which declared that the Jewish people would resist to the bitter end the reported British decision to continue the White Paper policy. In order to give voice to the indignation of American Jewry at this betrayal, a demonstration was held at short notice at Madison Square Garden on September 30th, which was filled with a capacity audience of twenty-two thousand, together with a gathering outside of forty-five thousand more. Mass demonstrations were also held in many other large centers throughout the country.

On October 2nd, ten United States Senators of both parties denounced the decision of Great Britain on the floor of the Senate and on October 16th, seventeen Congressmen spoke in a similar vein on the floor of the House.

An emergency conference of Zionist leaders was called to meet in Washington to which one hundred and eighty cities sent representatives who then called on their Senators and Congressmen. The leaders of American labor, William Green and Philip Murray, sent strongly worded cables to Prime Minister Attlee. An "Open Letter to Mr. Attlee" appeared in forty newspapers in the United States. Thirty-three outstanding spokesmen of liberal pro-labor elements in the United States sent a cable to Prime Minister Clement Attlee in which they expressed their shock and indignation at the position taken by the Labor government.

Harry Truman was now President of the United States. President Roosevelt ^Q did on April 12, 1945.
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Truman's position on Zionism was not clear to us. He had favored the Senate Resolution calling for a Jewish Commonwealth when it was introduced in the Senate in December, 1944. But at that time he was not President.

Early in his presidency, he was advised by the State Department to follow the Roosevelt line on Palestine. In his "Memoirs", Truman writes:

"I had before me President Roosevelt's records and statements regarding Palestine. And the Secretary of State had sent me a special communication two days before, expressing the attitude and the thinking of the State Department on Palestine.

"It is very likely", this communication read, "that efforts will be made by some of the Zionist leaders to obtain from you at an early date some commitments in favor of the Zionist program which is pressing for unlimited

Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish state. As you are aware, the Government and people of the United States have every sympathy for the persecuted Jews of Europe and are doing all in their power to relieve their suffering. The question of Palestine is, however, a highly complex one and involves questions which go far beyond the plight of the Jews in Europe.

"There is continual tenseness in the situation in the Near East", the communication concluded, "largely as a result of the Palestine question, and as we have interests in that area which are vital to the United States, we feel that this whole subject is one that should be handled with the greatest care and with a view to the long-range interests of the country." ^{TP Truman} He resolved to follow the Roosevelt line (p. 68).

Prior to his departure for the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, he was requested to take up the matter of Palestine with the world leaders who would be there, especially with Prime Minister Attlee. Upon his return on August 16th, he was asked at a Press Conference whether anything about the Jewish National Home had been discussed at Potsdam. He replied that it was. When he was asked what the American view on Palestine was, he replied, "The American view on Palestine is, we want to let as many of the Jews into Palestine as it is possible to let into that country. Then the matter will have to be worked out diplomatically so that if a State can be set up there, they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis. I have no desire to send five hundred thousand [sic] American soldiers there to make peace in Palestine."

This was not reassuring. President Truman had evidently been impressed by what he had been told by the British at Potsdam concerning the dangers which would be involved in setting up a Jewish National Home in Palestine, although the war was now over and military reasons could no longer be adduced as an argument against it.

However, on August 31st of that year, President Truman wrote to Prime Minister Attlee requesting that one hundred thousand certificates for the immigration of Jewish refugees into Palestine be granted. The letter was a fine, human document. The President had read the report of Earl G. Harrison of the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees. The latter had made a personal investigation for the President of the condition of the Jewish survivors in Europe and he reported that for the Jewish survivors in the camps "Palestine is definitely and pre-eminently the first choice", and that any delay in the transfer of these unfortunate people to Palestine would result in misery and death.

This action of President Truman marked a welcome turning point, not to be sure in American policy on Palestine, but on the heretofore sustained policy of doing nothing to help Jews get into Palestine. Regardless of what his position on Zionism was, he was at least trying to do something concrete to help. He found it possible to maintain that the admission of one hundred thousand Jews did not call for prior consultation with the Arabs -- a thought which had never occurred to his predecessor. President Truman's letter marked a real step forward in the direction intervening actively in the

Palestine situation in order to put an end to what had developed into a dangerous stalemate.

However, in order to reassure the Arabs who bitterly criticized President Truman for making his request for the refugees, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes issued a statement on October 18th, in which he announced that the fundamental policy of the United States Government was that it "will not reach final conclusions with reference to any proposals that would change the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with Jewish and Arab Leaders". Secretary Byrnes further stated that this was the policy of the late President Roosevelt, and he made public the exchange of letters between Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud of March-April, 1945.

When this exchange of letters was made public along with the policy declaration of Secretary Byrnes, we asked for a meeting with Secretary Byrnes and on October 23rd we submitted a Memorandum to him in the name of the American Zionist Emergency Council, in which, among other things, we refuted the false allegations which were made by Ibn Saud about Zionism, and took issue with President Roosevelt's letter, particularly the right it accorded to the various Arab states to be consulted in the affairs of Palestine. In part, the Memorandum read:

"The exchange of correspondence between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud which has now been made public and the statement by the Secretary of State of October 18th raise issues of fundamental importance in regard to the implementation of American policy on Palestine.....

President Roosevelt's letter refers to assurances previously given to King Ibn Saud regarding the attitude of the United States with respect to the question of Palestine. The exact nature of these assurances is not disclosed, but it is respectfully submitted that whatever their tenor, they would not be valid if inconsistent with the publicly stated objectives of American policy or with the terms of the Palestine Mandate....

We feel constrained, at the same time, to make a frank statement of our views with regard to the course of action pursued by the Executive branch of the Government and the State Department in particular, over a period of years. Despite the unbroken chain of pro-Zionist acts, promises and pronouncements to which we have referred, the policy they express has not been translated into action. On the contrary, numerous acts and omissions have emboldened the Arab leaders to allege that the American Government was, in fact, withholding its support from the Zionist cause, and that the pronouncements made here from time to time were meant for home consumption. We have consistently disregarded these allegations as unwarranted aspersions upon the good faith and political integrity of our Government....."

Prime Minister Attlee did not accede to President Truman's request for a hundred thousand certificates. Instead, he suggested another investigation - a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to investigate the position of the Jews in Europe as well as the situation in Palestine. *We viewed*

It is only clearly another delaying device and an excuse *for* inaction. On October 30th, Dr. Wise and I submitted a statement to the President in which we said:

"Within the last seven years, three major intergovernmental Conferences and Committees, in addition to our own War Refugee Board appointed in 1944 and already dissolved, have sought to deal with the question of Jewish refugees and of Jewish immigration.....

Each of these efforts ended in dismal failure, stemming from the central assumption that the doors of Palestine, unlawfully barred to Jewish immigration by the British Government under the terms of its White Paper of 1939, must remain barred....

"We beg of you not to countenance further commissions and inquiries at a continued cost in human life and human misery, which can only ascertain facts already well known.

"What is urgently needed, is not another roving expedition or a further time-consuming investigation, but immediate concrete measures in conformity with a policy long established and clearly defined by valid international agreements. No inquiry can be acceptable which does not base itself on the internationally recognized right of the Jewish people to reconstitute their National Home in Palestine. For such an International Commission to set out upon its quest without reference to these basic legal and political considerations, is to embark upon a sea without chart or compass, without a point of departure or a port of destination.... It is evident that commissions are no substitute for action clearly indicated."

President Truman, however, yielded to Atee's counter-proposal for a joint Committee of Inquiry.

I urged that our Movement should ignore this Committee and should not appear before it. However, the World Zionist Executive decided to cooperate with it. It looked ^{hopefully} ~~happily~~ on the prospect of the United States government sharing, for the first time, the responsibility of finding a solution for the Palestine problem with Great Britain. When the Committee held its sessions

*including Dr. Wise
and Dr. Himmelfarb*

in Washington, representatives of the Zionist Emergency Council made a full presentation of the Zionist Case before it, since this was what the World Zionist Executive had agreed to. I refused to attend. I sensed that the enterprise would result in utter futility -- especially since Mr. Bevin had made it very clear that the real purpose of this Committee was to liquidate the Zionist Movement.

I was again branded by the "practical" men ⁱⁿ our Movement as a hot-headed extremist. Months later, an American member of the Committee of Inquiry, Mr. Bartley C. Crum, acknowledged at a great meeting in Madison Square Garden that I had been right in urging rejection of this committee and that I had correctly evaluated the political situation.

Mr. Sumner Welles, the former Under-Secretary of State, addressing the Maryland Christian Conference on Palestine on May 14, 1946, declared:

"The appointment of the Anglo-American Committee could scarcely have been expected to result in any practical or constructive accomplishment. Commission after commission had already been appointed in the past by British Governments to investigate the situation in Palestine and to recommend policy with regard thereto. There was no far-sighted member of the Executive or Legislative branches of the Government of the United States who had studied the problem of Palestine -- and as we all know, members of our Congress have gone to Palestine for that purpose -- who had not already reached a conclusion as to the nature of the solution which should be sought. Under such

conditions what could the appointment of this new commission really accomplish, other than to make it possible to postpone decisions? And these were months, as we so sadly know, when the pitiful survivors of the Nazi massacres, uprooted from their homes in every part of Europe, were still being compelled to live in intolerable conditions, in concentration camps, with no hope left to them except the possibility that they might be permitted to emigrate to Palestine, or to some other distant shores, and thus procure safety and the chance to make a fresh start in life...

" I know many of the American members of the Anglo-American Committee. I know that they are men of the highest character, of truly liberal convictions, who are incapable of framing or of signing a report in which they, themselves, do not believe. I do not question either their motives or their judgment. What I do question is the wisdom of our own Government in asking them at this time to assume these responsibilities. "

The Committee of Inquiry issued its Report at the end of April, 1946.

When we were apprised of its contents, it became unmistakably clear to us that while the Report had certain positive aspects, in particular a recommendation for the immediate transfer of one hundred thousand Jews from the Displaced Persons' camps to Palestine and the virtual abrogation of the White Paper, its long-term recommendations were not such as could command themselves to the Zionist Movement. In consequence of representations which

we made in Washington, the President, in releasing the text of the Report, issued a statement which drew an important distinction between the immediate and the long-term recommendations in the Report. He declared:

"I am very happy that the request which I made for the immediate admission of one hundred thousand Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed by the Committee of Inquiry. The transfer of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished with the greatest dispatch in addition to these immediate objectives, the report deals with many other questions of long range political policies and questions of international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement."

This was a sound and statesmanlike position to take. Unfortunately, here again the hand of the Chief Executive soon faltered. When Prime Minister Attlee took violent exception to his position, the President failed to follow through and our State Department announced that no immediate action would be taken in behalf of these hundred thousand without first acting on all the other recommendations of the Report. On May 20th, the State Department went through the motion of inviting Arab and Jewish representatives to present their views on the recommendations of the Committee, as if their views were not already fully known. Following this development, Dr. Wise and I met with Secretary of State Acheson and Loy Henderson in what turned out to be a very ^{stormy} ~~strong~~ session.

Under pressure of public opinion, the President then appointed on June 11th, a Cabinet Committee on Palestine, consisting of the Secretaries of State, War and the Treasury. In so doing, the President declared that

he was appointing this Committee to assist him in the "early consideration of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry", in view of the urgency of the solution of various problems relating to the Jews in Europe and Palestine. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin replied to this action of the President by a speech which he delivered at the British Labor Conference at Bournemouth on June 12th in which he hurled a slur against the Jews of New York and repeated the canard about the Zionists wishing to establish an exclusively racial state in Palestine. At a public protest meeting held in the city of New York on June 12th, 1946, I said:

infamous slur against the Jews of New York ~~and~~ repeated the canard about the Zionists wishing to establish an exclusively racial state in Palestine. At a public protest meeting held in the city of New York on June 12, 1946, I said:

"When Prime Minister Attlee rejected President Truman's humanitarian request that 100,000 refugee Jews be permitted to enter Palestine at once, he made a counter proposal that a Joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry should be appointed to investigate the situation. The members of the Committee were told by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, that their recommendations would be implemented forthwith if they would be unanimous. The Committee unanimously recommended that 100,000 certificates be authorized immediately for the admission into Palestine of Jews who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and that these certificates be awarded as far as possible in 1946.

The President of the United States declared that he was very happy that the request which he had made had been unanimously endorsed by the Committee. He urged that the transference of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished "with the greatest dispatch." But the British Government again welshed. Prime Minister Attlee called for the disarming of the Jews of Palestine as a prior condition, which condition the Committee had considered and rejected. He made other unwarranted conditions.

Mr. Bevin declared that "if we put 100,000 Jews into Palestine I would have to put another division of British troops there. I am not prepared to do it." This trumped-up military argument is again trotted out to justify another broken pledge. And this latest act is accompanied by Bevin's cheap slur on the American people and a coarse bit of anti-Semitic vulgarity reminiscent of the Nazis at their worst.

In view of this shocking record of broken pledges and the repeated violation of solemn obligations, American citizens have the right to turn to their representatives in the Congress of the United States, who are now discussing the granting of a loan to Great Britain, and inquire whether the Government of the United States can afford to make a loan to a Government whose pledged word seems to be worthless. They should also inquire whether American money, including that of the Jewish citizens of the United States who have given such superb evidence of their loyalty and patriotism during the war and whose sacrifices helped to save a collapsing British Empire, should be used

to back up a Government whose Foreign Minister has repeatedly given evidence of a virulent anti-Jewish bias.

We question very much whether Mr. Bevin represents the conscience and spirit of the British people but it is up to them to repudiate this maligner and cheap vulgarian, and to demand that someone who more truly represents them should occupy such an important post."

We were not, of course, opposed to the British loan. We felt, however, that action on it should be delayed until Great Britain had met her responsibilities toward Palestine and had revoked its illegal measures which were keeping hundreds of thousands of our unfortunate war-ravaged refugees from entering the country. The American Government had a clear directive from the Congress of the United States on the subject of the Jewish National Home. It would have been perfectly proper for our government to posit as a prior condition for the granting of a loan to Great Britain, the fulfillment on the part of Great Britain of her international obligations toward the Jewish National Home. Foreign loans are very frequently used by governments, including Great Britain, to achieve political objectives. This is neither improper nor unusual....

The great concern of the Administration and its feverish activity prior to the consideration of the loan in the House, indicated that the passage of the loan was definitely in doubt. Enough of our friends had rallied to our side in addition to those who were opposed to the loan on other grounds to make the postponement of action very likely. Had this happened, I was persuaded that the

government of Great Britain would have acted very quickly. But the unexpected action of Dr. Wise, who in clear disregard of understandings reached in his presence by the Emergency Council, came forth as the champion of the loan in the name of Americanism, demoralized and scattered our friends in Congress. He wrote a letter to Congressman Bloom which was read in the House: "There could be no doubt", wrote the reporter of the "New York Times", "that the statement of Rabbi Wise and other developments of the day strongly improved prospects for approval of the loan."

They could see no sense in voting against an Administration measure to help the Zionist cause when a Zionist leader himself stepped forth as its champion. It was shortly after this beau geste that the measures against the Jewish refugees coming to Haifa were intensified and their deportation to Cyprus began a few weeks after the passage of the British loan. This was Great Britain's grateful quid pro quo.

After another delay, American technical experts were sent to London to meet with British experts and to work out the logistics in connection with the transfer of the hundred thousand. This Committee completed its work, but again nothing happened. Finally, the Cabinet Committee dispatched to London its three deputy members to meet with the British, this time not to get the hundred thousand Jews moving into Palestine, but to work out the implementation of all the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry. Attlee and Bevin had won their point. The results of the labors of these deputy members was the well-known Grady-Morrison Federalization Plan. What the report

recommended was not a plan for implementing the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry, but an utterly new and radically different, substitute plan. It recommended a scheme of provincial autonomy for Palestine wherein the Jewish people would be restricted to an area of some fourteen hundred square miles. Jewish immigration would be permitted in that zone, up to its absorptive capacity which would be determined by the Mandatory power or trustee government. A mockery of self-government was outlined. Great Britain would remain the sole trustee with increased power over an indefinite period. Great Britain would also remain in absolute control of a large zone of its own. The American government was to win the cooperation of the Arabs to this plan by a bribe of three hundred million dollars.

The President was dissuaded at the very last moment, after heroic efforts were made by many friends of our Movement, Jews and non-Jews, from giving American approval to this scheme, so palpable, wrong-headed, unjust and so violative of the rights of the Jewish people. I characterized this scheme at the time as "a plan for the ghettoization of the Jews in their own homeland".

It was at this juncture, after the rejection of the Grady-Morrison plan by the American Government, that the Executive of the Jewish Agency, meeting in Paris, came forward with a partition proposal as a solution for the Palestine problem.

THE FINAL MONTHS OF 1946 and the early months of 1947 were to be the most decisive for our Movement. In December, 1946, the World Zionist Congress finally repudiated the Weizmann line and refused to follow his leadership any longer. In February, 1947, Bevin's policies collapsed. Following the failure of the London Conference, he was compelled to make an announcement in the House of Commons that Great Britain is referring the Palestine problem to the United Nations. Thus the man who had earlier declared that "he staked his reputation on solving the Palestine problem" and went about it in the clumsiest way conceivable, confessed in the House of Commons that "his efforts to solve the problem had been thwarted by a person named Earl Harrison, by certain New York Jews and by -- President Truman".

This decision of Ernest Bevin was the fortunate break-through for which our Movement had been waiting and it came most unexpectedly. In a sense, Bevin in his hostility proved to be the greatest benefactor of our Movement since Balfour.... We were now able to enter new and ampler dimensions. We could now face a world tribunal where our historic claims would be considered afresh, and the final arbiters would be not a confused and insensate Foreign Office, but the judgment and conscience of mankind. The political battleground now shifted from London to Washington which could now act more independently, and to Flushing and Lake Success.

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I attended the 22nd World Zionist Congress which convened in Basle in December, 1946. It was, perhaps, the most crucial in Zionist history. It was the first since the war ended and it met in the very city where the immortal Herzl, exactly fifty years before, had convoked the first Zionist Congress. Delegates from nearly all parts of the world, except from behind the Iron Curtain, were in attendance. 2.

The main issue was the question whether the Jewish Agency should send representatives to the London Conference which was to meet the following month and thus continue negotiations with the British Government in the face of all that had transpired and was even then transpiring in Palestine.

Those who were opposed to participation insisted that conditions in Palestine must first change, as well as the attitude of the Government, before the Agency could attend another conference which they felt was but another delaying device.

The debate, which lasted several days was prolonged and stormy. All the leaders of the Movement participated in it. All parties had their spokesmen. Each spoke with the deep earnestness which the occasion warranted and with the intensity of his convictions. Among the Americans, Dr. Wise spoke eloquently in defense of Dr. Weizmann's position, although many American delegates did not share his viewpoint. Dr. Wise was now a real "chassid" of Dr. Weizmann and heaped upon his praise and adulation even as at the Congress of 1931 he had demanded his instant resignation, and in 1921 and earlier, when his idol was Justice Brandeis. Dr. Emanuel Neumann called for new

men and new methods to lead the Zionist Movement and demanded the elimination of "Vichy defeatism in favor of the Dunkerque spirit". He spoke brilliantly with his customary clarity and logic. I spoke in criticism of the position which had been taken by the Executive on partition, and I explained my opposition to going to London. ✓

Ben Gurion, the Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, was somewhat ambiguous at the Congress. He and his Party approved of partition and favored participation in the London Conference, but he personally was unhappy over Weizmann's leadership. Accordingly, he sparred forensically....

Dr. Weizmann spoke at the opening of the Congress and again at the conclusion of the general debate.

I listened to his rebuttal at the conclusion of the debate with rapt attention. At time I was deeply moved by it. Dr. Weizmann threw his heart and soul into this speech. It was by way of an 'apologia pro vita sua'. The inner fire of the Weizmann of the earlier days was there, although he was now seventy-three. He reasoned, pleaded, scorned, and castigated his opponents with biting sarcasm -- the extremists, the unrealistic romanticists, the terrorists in Palestine. I came in for my share of reproof. "It is easy to live in Cleveland and tell the youth of Palestine to go shed their blood." Of course, the youth of Palestine had never waited upon my bidding or my approval....

The American delegation felt constrained to issue a statement later expressing its deep resentment "at the offensive remarks concerning American Zionism's support of Haganah and its resistance activities, coming as they did from one who must be fully aware that the Zionists of America were

repeatedly called upon by authoratative spokesmen of the Yishuv to give their utmost support to the responsible Jewish resistance movement in Palestine".

I stated my position at the Congress on the subject of resistance. "We believe in resistance to the illegal acts of the Mandatory power. The way to end resistance is to open the doors of Palestine."

Weizmann fought hard in his speech which was to be the peroration to his long and distinguished career. But for what? For a policy of continued cooperation with the British Government which had betrayed him and the Jewish people time and time again! How did his policy of moderation pay off? An historic cross-road had been reached and he -- the astute statesman -- was somehow unaware of it. He was the captive of his own "line" which he had followed faithfully all his life. He could see no other!

Dr. Weizmann remained pro-British in his political orientation, even when it had become clear to many of us that Great Britain had no intention to carry out the mandate either in letter or in spirit and that a new political orientation was called for. Not that Dr. Weizmann accepted tamely and submissively the progressive whittling away on the part of British governments of the clear terms of the mandates. Frequently he voiced his bitter criticism and his indignation at his own government in strong and courageous terms. And once, as in the case of the Passfield White Paper of 1930; which aimed at a suspension of Jewish immigration altogether and the introduction

strict restrictions upon land acquisition as well as the curtailment of the authority of the Jewish Agency, Dr. Weizmann in protest resigned his office as president of the Jewish Agency along with Felix Warburg who at that time was chairman of the Council of the ^{enlarged} ~~large~~ Jewish Agency.

But, Dr. Weizmann could not at any time envisage a full break with Great Britain.

Years later, Ben-Gurion was to write: "From the White Paper of 1939, until the U.N. decision in 1947, Dr. Weizmann was beset by a gnawing inner confusion and stress, and I believe that he failed to find his way."

At Basle, this inner confusion and stress were sadly in evidence.

I was appointed Chairman of the important Political Committee. ^{Dr. Weizmann headed the Political Committee or sub-committee} We met for five days and nights and finally hammered out a set of fifteen resolutions which I presented to the Congress plenum on the evening of December 23rd in an electric atmosphere of extreme tenseness.

The resolution confirming the principles of the Biltmore Declaration and calling for the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth was adopted. So was the resolution denouncing the 1939 White Paper and calling for continued resistance to its policies. A resolution which condemned terrorism,

murder, and the shedding of innocent blood as a means of political warfare was also adopted.

The critical resolutions upon which the fate of Weizmann's leadership depended was, of course, the one on participation in the London Conference. Dr. Weizmann had made it clear that he wanted the Congress to approve of participation and to give him a free hand to negotiate. The Political Committee had by a vote of twenty-two to sixteen adopted a resolution opposing participation. The resolution read: "The Congress resolves that in the existing circumstance, the Zionist Movement cannot participate in the London Conference. If a change should take place in the situation, the General Council of the Zionist Organization (The Actions Committee) shall consider the matter and decide whether to participate in the Conference or not."

A furious debate followed the introduction of this resolution. The minority parties introduced resolutions of their own. They were all voted down. Various parliamentary maneuvers were employed to defer action on the majority resolution of the Political Committee, to refer it to the incoming Executive, or to adopt a voting procedure which would keep the majority sentiment of the Congress against participation from effectively registering itself. All this proved unavailing.

The vote was finally taken -- 171 for the resolution and 154 against. Most of the General Zionists, the Mizrachi, the Revisionists and some independent labor delegates voted for it. Almost solidly against it were the Mapai, the Hadassah, and some General Zionists.

The Congress adjourned without electing a President or an Executive.

Dr. Weizmann, since his policy failed of approval, would not and could not be re-elected President, but the Congress elected no one in his place.

The Actions Committee, after the Congress ended, elected a coalition executive. David Ben-Gurion was made Chairman of the World Zionist

Executive with headquarters in Jerusalem. Two other sections were es-

tablished, one in London and the other in the United States. I was elected

Chairman of the Executive for the United States. Moshe Sharett remained

head of the political department of the Executive but stationed in the United

States. The other members of the American section were Dr. Emanuel

Neumann (General Zionists), Mrs. Rose Halprin (Hadassah), Hayim Greenberg (Laborites), and Rabbi Wolf Gold (Mizrachi).

The Partition emissary, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, who was responsible for my resignation from the Executive on August 4th, was shifted to London, but before long found his way back again to New York.

It was not long, of course, before the members on the newly elected Executive, who had favored participation, began a series of informal and private talks in London with the British Government, looking to a "change in the situation" which would make it possible for the Movement to participate in the London Conference. This was technically violative of the Congress resolution but could be justified on the basis of a broad construction of the resolution. I had little hope of their success.

In view of the exploratory talks which the Agency representatives were conducting in London in the hope of bringing about "a change in the situation", I thought it advisable upon my return from Basle to call upon the British Ambassador in Washington and our Secretary of State.

I reported to the Ambassador on what had taken place at the Congress and the reasons for the resolution which was adopted there. I told them that the resolution not to go to the London Conference was a conditional resolution predicated on existing conditions, and that if conditions would change, the movement would stand ready to go to the Conference. I pointed out that the next move was up to Great Britain. It could indicate a change in the situation either by word -- by promising to establish the Jewish State or by revoking the White Paper -- or by deed -- by starting to move the one hundred thousand refugees. The Ambassador believed the first unlikely since it would prevent the Arabs from coming into the Conference, but he thought well of the second suggestion and said that he would forward the idea to Foreign Secretary Bevin.

The interview with Secretary Byrnes was along similar lines and Mr. Byrnes appeared much impressed with the possibility of the second suggestion, that of moving the one hundred thousand refugees at once. He told me that he would request Lord Inverchapel to transmit to Mr. Bevin his own approval of this suggestion. A few days later I received word from Mr. Byrnes that this had been done:

"Dear Dr. Silver:

Referring to our recent conversation, I advised Ambassador Inverchapel of your views and requested that he communicate them to Mr. Bevin.

I asked the Ambassador to advise Mr. Bevin that I earnestly hoped that he could do something along the lines of your second suggestion, in order to make it possible for you and your associates to attend the conference. "

But nothing came of this intervention. Mr. Bevin, as was soon to be revealed, had other plans of his own.

The London Conference met on January 27, 1947. It was attended only by representatives of the Arab States and the Palestine Arabs, but there was a back-door contact between members of the Agency and the British Government. Actually, a series of five ^{long} meetings took place in the Colonial Office with the spokesmen of the British Government, its Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, its Colonial Secretary, Mr. Creech Jones, attended by their advisors and assistants. In addition, there were several private talks between single members of the Executive and one or another of the members of the British Cabinet.

The discussions led no-where. The British Government was unwilling to implement the Mandate, nor was it in favor of setting up a Jewish State even in a part of Palestine. Its proposals followed more or less the lines of the Grady-Morrison Plan, which Mr. Bevin insisted was "the Blair Plan."

The Arabs rejected the proposals of the British Government in toto on February 12th and the Agency on February 13th. Whereupon Mr. Bevin informed the House of Commons on February 18, 1947, that the Conference with the Arabs

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and the consultations with the Zionist Organization about the future of Palestine have come to an end without any prospect of reaching a settlement. "That being the case, the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations."

Upon my return from Basle, the members of the American Section of the Jewish Agency and I set about organizing the office of the Agency in New York ^{assembling} and engaging a staff of professional members. We were most fortunate in the men whom we were able to engage. (Add names.)

whose services became available. They included: ✓
Art Aubrey Eban; Eliezer Elster (Elath); Moshe Tov; Gideon Rufer (R. Hail); Dr. Jacob Robinson; Arthur Lowie; Kahane; Lionel Gelber and others.

In October 1947 - A Political Advisory Committee, appointed by the World Organization created in the United States to assist us in our work away to members who (add names) join us in our deliberations and to assist us in our efforts.

Now that the Palestine problem had been transferred to the United Nations, the bulk of our political work would have to be carried on by the *American* *Section of the Jewish Agency*. The *Agency* would have to prepare our Palestine case before the United Nations. The Emergency Council would be carrying on as heretofore our public relations work in the United States. There was little danger of overlapping since three of the four members of the Executive were also members of the Emergency Council and I was Chairman of both bodies. It was clear to all of us that the country which would play the decisive role in the forthcoming U.N. proceedings would be the United States. The work of the Council would, therefore, be as important as in the past. ~~We would have to convince our Administration that it should take the lead in support of our position in the United Nations in pursuance of the clearly expressed wishes of the American people.~~

Following the 22nd Congress, our Movement may be said to have faced four periods of uncertainty and struggle:

- 1) The period leading up to the London Conference, its collapse and Great Britain's referral of the issue to the United Nations,
- 2) The period of the United Nations study of the Palestine situation, the Report of UNSCOP, culminating in the approval by the United Nations of the Majority Report which *formed* ~~formed~~ an independent Jewish State, November 29, 1947;
- 3) The attempted reversal and the proclamation of the State of Israel in Tel-Aviv on May 14, 1948; and

- 4) The war of liberation and the signing of the Armistice with Egypt (Feb. 24, '49) and Syria (July 20, '49) and the admission of Israel to the United Nations (May 11, '49).

