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Autobiography/memoirs, Book 2, 1963?.

It was about this time that a decision was reached by the Zionist bodies to invite me to become Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council. I accepted the invitation and for six years I occupied this key position in American Zionism.

The establishment of the American Zionist Emergency Council dates back to the beginning of World War II. Late in August, 1939, the 21st Zionist Congress met in Geneva. Its work was conducted in the shadow of the impending catastrophe, and was indeed cut short by the sudden closing of the international frontiers and the need for delegates to return to their homes without delay.

The Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, as it was first called, was originally established with two purposes in view. The possibility was foreseen that, as a result of the war, the headquarters of the World Zionist Organization in Jerusalem might, by reason of invasion or otherwise, be completely cut off. It was desirable, accordingly, that there should be in existence in America a body which could, if need be, assume the authority, functions and leadership of the Movement. It was further recognized that, whether America entered the war or not, the attitude of this country was likely to be of decisive importance in determining the future of the Jewish National Home.

The first eventuality ~~which the Executive had in mind in setting up the Emergency Committee~~ was, happily, not realized. Despite periods of imminent danger, ~~Palestine~~ and the Yishuv remained safe during the war. Zionist communications by letter and cable with the rest of the Jewish world, outside Europe, though subject to various wartime difficulties and restrictions, were maintained without interruption. It was,

accordingly, on the second task--that of directing and coordinating Zionist public relations and political effects in America--that the work of the Emergency Committee was primarily concentrated. The specifically American character of the Committee was emphasized in November, 1941, by a change in title to that of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist affairs (~~later~~ in 1943, contracted to "American Zionist Emergency Council".) The Council comprised representatives of the Zionist Organization of America, Hadassah, Mizrahi and Poale Zion, together with a number of leading American Zionists nominated ad personam.

During the early months of its existence, the Emergency Council functioned ~~rather~~ as an inter-party body for receiving reports and for deciding on matters of common interest ~~to the four constituent groups~~, ^{RATHER} than as ~~the~~ initiator and director of an active program of political action ~~on the American scene~~. It was not till late in 1940 that a full-time Secretary was appointed and that the Council acquired offices of its own. The appointment, too, in January, 1941, of Dr. Emanuel Neumann as Executive Officer in charge of a Department of Public Relations and Political Action, marked an important development in the work of the Council.

The history of our Movement cannot be written without recurrent reference to ~~the significant contributions of Dr.~~ Emanuel Neumann. In the great and searching years between the two world wars and in the years culminating in the establishment of the State of Israel, Neumann was an inspired leader, guide and champion of our cause.

1940 BECAME 1941, AND 1941, 1942 AND

THE COUNCIL ~~WAS~~ ^{DID NOT} SUCCEEDED ASSERTING ~~ITS~~ ^{EFFECTIVE} ~~LEADERSHIP~~

IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT ONLY AN AROUSED AND MILITANT AMERICAN JEWRY COULD PRODUCE ACTION WHICH MIGHT RESCUE THE REMNANTS OF EUROPEAN JEWRY AND SAVE THE JEWISH STATE, ^{BUT THE COUNCIL} ~~THE~~ ~~WAS~~ LACKED THE VOICE TO TELL EFFECTIVELY OF THE YISHUV'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR AND OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S UNBELLEVABLY CRUEL BARRING OF ALL REFUGEES FROM PALESTINE, ^{AND THE STRATEGY TO PRODUCE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S} UNFOLDING THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT VEILED FROM INDIFFERENCE TO OPPOSITION TO ZIONIST ASPIRATIONS, THIS WAS THE ERA OF ADMINISTRATION GREETINGS TO JEWISH CONVENTIONS — AND OF PIOUS SYMPATHY FOR THE FLIGHT OF EUROPEAN JEWRY — ~~AND~~ ^{AND} OF UNMITIGABLE INDICATION THAT THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSED TO DO NOTHING ABOUT THE JEWISH TRAGEDY.

BY EARLY 1943 IT WAS CLEAR THAT A MORE POLITICAL ~~WAS~~ TACTIC WAS REQUIRED. DR NEU MAN ISSUED A PUBLIC WARNING AND RESIGNED IN FEBRUARY, IN MAY — ON THE 2ND, I CHOSE THE PLATFORM OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR PALESTINE FOR A FRANK ^{APPROVAL} ~~STATEMENT~~!

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THE NEED FOR ^{A MORE AGGRESSIVE} ~~A MORE~~ PROGRAM WAS BROADLY FELT, IT WAS IN THESE MONTHS THAT WEIZMANN, LIPSNEY, AND WISE URGED ME TO ASSUME THE LEADERSHIP OF THE EMERGENCY COUNCIL. I TWICE DECLINED...

Undeviatingly he stood by the political vision of Theodor Herzl and was its eloquent spokesman and defender, ~~in the national and international assemblies of our Movement.~~ In the decisive years which ~~led to the triumph of our cause in the United Nations,~~ Neumann was among the key men who planned strategy and tactics both in Flushing Meadow and in Washington. He was ~~a~~ ^{an} keen analyst, the sound scholar, ^{AND} the gifted draftsman of many of our vital statements and pronouncements.

In the brief period of his association with the Emergency Council, Dr. Neumann initiated a number of significant activities including the organization of two highly important bodies; the American Palestine Committee and the Christian Council on Palestine. ~~He engaged in diplomatic activity in Washington and also established the Commission on Palestine Surveys to make an engineering study of the Lowdermilk plan for a "Jordan Valley Authority."~~ ^{Neumann} But he was acutely aware that Zionist public relations and political efforts were not being carried forward with the required scope, intensity and effectiveness. Deeply concerned over the grave inadequacies and the frustrating conditions prevailing in the Emergency Council, Dr. Neumann issued a public warning and resigned in February, 1943. His resignation helped to pave the way for a reappraisal and reorganization. The need for an aggressive over-all program of ~~action~~ to activate the American Zionist masses of all parties, and for strong centralized direction was widely recognized by other leaders of our Movement here and in Palestine. Early in 1943, Dr. Weizmann, Louis Lipsky, and Dr. Stephen S. Wise urged me to assume the leadership of the Emergency Committee. I twice declined, knowing of the nucleus of opposition to me which existed within the Emergency Committee, which was centered in a group of representatives of the Zionist Organization of America. ^{CP}

BACK GREEN
MISSING

Friends finally persuaded me to defy this small group for the sake of the cause. In July of ¹⁹⁴³ ~~that year~~ a group of one hundred leading American Zionists headed by Charles J. Rosenblum of Pittsburgh,

launched a movement to draft me for the Presidency of the Zionist Organization of America in order to overcome the opposition. The draft movement gained such momentum that the ZOA Administration ~~forces~~ offered a compromise whereby I would withdraw from the race for the ZOA presidency and leave the field to Dr. Israel Goldstein, and in turn, all would agree on my assuming ~~active~~ direction of the political work of the Emergency Committee. An agreement to that effect was signed on August 9, 1943 by Dr. Goldstein and myself and by Dr. Wise, the then Chairman of the Emergency Committee.

To make sure as to what my role in the Emergency Committee would be, I wrote ~~a letter~~ to Dr. Wise on July 29, 1943, prior to the signing of the agreement:

"Both you and Dr. Weizmann approached me some months ago with the request to take over the direction of the political work of our Movement. You felt, as many of us have right along, that there has been an unfortunate confusion, in efficiency, over-lapping and cross-purposes in our political work and that the situation called for complete reorganization and above all, for centralization of authority. Both you and Dr. Weizmann, as well as Mr. Lipsky and others, asked me to take over this work. I demurred knowing of the determined opposition of some of the men who today control the administration of the ZOA. I told you that while I was willing to fight for

Zionism, I was not willing to start a fight with Zionists for the privilege of serving the cause. You appealed to me to take over the work on the ground that you, yourself, were heavily encumbered with many other responsibilities, and were tired....

"When you told me yesterday over the telephone that you have been persuaded to retain the chairmanship of the Zionist Emergency Committee, I was somewhat bewildered. If it was your intention to remain in that important post, neither I nor anyone else would have considered supplanting you. The office is yours by right of service and achievement in the Movement. But I assumed all along that you earnestly wished to be relieved of it. It was on the basis of that understanding that I participated in the discussions in the last few months looking towards a reorganization. If now you feel that you wish to retain that office not in an honorary, but in an active capacity, I wish you would let me know definitely, and in making my reply to the draft letter addressed to me, I will say that Dr. Wise is head of the political work of the Movement and there is no need for drafting me or anyone else, and that as far as the Presidency of the ZOA is concerned, I never sought that office, and I find opportunities for my Zionist services in other fields...."

DR. WISE ASSURED ME HE HAD NO DESIRE TO CONTINUE.
Unfortunately, as soon as the reorganization of our Council began to

show results and new life was infused into it, Dr. Wise apparently changed his mind and progressively during the years, began to assert the authority which was his before the reorganization. This proved embarrassing on more than one occasion.

I subsequently encountered jurisdictional difficulties from yet another source. Dr. Nahum Goldmann was the director of a political bureau which the Jewish Agency had established in Washington prior to the reorganization of the Emergency Council and prior to my assumption of the direction of our political work in the United States. I had assumed that Dr. Goldmann would limit himself to transacting business with Latin-America and such other activities ^{AS WERE NOT} ~~which did not fall~~ within the scope of the Emergency Council. ~~But~~ this was not Dr. Goldmann's conception of his role. He conceived of himself as the independent head of a political bureau which had been established by the World Zionist Organization, subject to no American control and responsible only to Jerusalem, and he acted accordingly.

He made numerous independent approaches to officials of the American Government on matters which were within the province of the Emergency Council without the prior approval of that body. He would, on occasion, anticipate our visits to officials of the Government and cause us ^{MORE} ~~great~~ embarrassment. On occasion he would transmit to us subjective reports of his contacts. Two political agencies functioning at the same time in the same field was clearly impossible. One could not compromise with such a situation indefinitely.

The situation became so intolerable that I handed in my resignation to the Emergency Council in August, 1944. The Emergency Council refused to accept ^{it}, ~~my resignation~~. Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Ben-Gurion ^{cabled} ~~called~~ from Palestine asking me not to resign "at this most critical moment" and that they would do their utmost to expedite a settlement of the controversy.

After the Emergency Council adopted a resolution to which Dr. Goldmann assented, to the effect that "all approaches to the American Government or its officials on matters relating to the ~~program of~~ political activities of the American Zionist Emergency Council shall be undertaken by ~~representatives of the Movement~~ only with the prior approval of the Executive Committee of the Council, ^{AND THAT} ~~and that in~~ between meetings of the Executive, Dr. Wise, Dr. Goldmann, Louis Lipsky and I ^{WERE TO} ~~would~~ consult regarding emergency matters previously undetermined", I ~~withdrew~~ my resignation. But adoption of the resolution did not settle the question of implementation, for Dr. Goldman was most eager to be everywhere at all times.

It was evident at the time that I became Chairman of the Executive of the American Zionist Emergency Council in August, 1943, that the large and influential American Jewish Community would now have to assume the major responsibility for the future of our cause; that it would have to be mobilized and alerted for the culminating political effort, now that the end of the war was approaching.

In our action we proceeded on three fundamental premises. First, that our cause was just, incontestably just. It would have to make its major appeal to the conscience of man on the strength of its inherent rightness. We could, therefore, tell our

story frankly to all men of good will in our country -- regardless of class, political party or religious affiliation. We could appeal to their sense of justice and their humanity. It should not be too difficult, we ^felieved, to tell our story to the American people at a time when A_merica was waging a war in behalf of human rights against the very Nazis who were seeking to exterminate our people and were driving hundreds of thousands of them out upon the broken highways of wandering and homelessness. We must first win the active support and sympathy of the American people if we were ever to persuade our government. In the Executive branch of our government, we were confronted with a State Department which harbored a sizeable core of active anti-Zionist officials, and with a President whose attitude remained continuously shrouded in an impenetrable charm. In our struggle we first had to win over the American people.

The second premise upon which we proceeded was that it was either now ^W or never. The hour of decision was rapidly approaching. We had reached the critical cross-roads in our history. We, therefore, had to throw in everything we had, all of our power, all our resources, all our reserves. The potential political power of five million American Jews had to be activized and their collective strength employed. This was to be the crucial battle. There was nothing to lose now but our illusions. Hitler was brutally and systematically destroying European Jewry. England was waging war upon our defenseless refugees who were being turned away from the ~~very~~

shores of Palestine to perish in the Strumas. Because of this chaos of terror and inhumanity, of concentration camps and gas chambers, an element of immediacy and of driving urgency had to inform all our activities. We simply must not lose the historic moment.

In some quarters our zeal and desperate earnestness were interpreted and at times, even resented as organized pressure upon our government. But this could not be helped. We were not professional lobbyists for some profit-seeking corporation or the agents of some foreign state maneuvering for loans, concessions or subsidies. We were the spokesmen for a sorely tried and imperilled people, condemned to death but determined to live, whose one last hope of salvation was a National Home of their own, in whose up-building they had been hopefully engaged, but which was now being denied to them.

The third premise upon which we proceeded was that the American Jewish community had to be aroused to exert itself to the utmost, not merely for an increased number of certificates for refugees to be admitted into Palestine, but for a Jewish State. The root of our millennial tragedy was our national homelessness. There is but one solution for national homelessness. That is a national home.

Our refugees were not being taken care of and given asylum by the nations of the free world. There was no reason to suppose that it would be easier to achieve results for our people on a purely humanitarian appeal for rescue and asylum than on the political and national level.

The world had remained silent at the ruin and outrage of our people which beggared all human speech, which was beyond words, beyond tears, beyond all utterable woe. Here and there one heard a feeble protest! Here and there a gesture of sympathy! But no outburst of outraged humanity, no furious cry at the assassination of a whole people! Years of slaughter and assault at the hands of a government lost to all sense

of shame or pity, which sacked and ravaged a thousand Jewish communities, burnt millions of men, women and children in horrible human crematoria and filled the highways of the earth with hordes of frightened, fleeing refugees, evoked from the civilized world, from the democracies, from our own country, a few perfunctory acts of rescue which resulted in little more than nothing. A spiritual ^{palace} ~~palace~~ seemed to have attacked the world, and the mildewed spirit of this mouldering age found all sorts of excuses for doing so little--legal difficulties, transportation difficulties, immigration laws and what not. Nowhere was there evident a great moral exertion, nowhere an heroic enterprise of the challenged spirit of man surmounting all quiddities and technicalities and all the barriers of routine. And so myriads of our sons and daughters perished who might otherwise have remained alive!

The story of the do-nothing Evian and the Bermuda Refugee Conferences belongs to the shabby furniture of Heartbreak House of World War II. Our country was not without a full share of blame for their abject failure.

Our country did not open its doors to rescue the trapped and doomed men, women and children. Our country did not offer ~~them~~ even temporary asylum. Was there no room for them? We found room in our spacious land for one hundred and fifty thousand Nazi war prisoners!

When the horrors of Oswiecim, Treblinka and Maidanek became public knowledge, and the cry for temporary asylums was raised, an announcement was made by our government that it would permit a thousand refugees to enter our country for the duration of the war and that they would be kept in a detention camp until the end of the war.

A thousand refugees--and from areas in Europe where they were already safe!

Sweden in one month gave refuge to almost the entire Jewish population of Denmark--
nine thousand souls--and it did not put them in a detention camp!

We worked hard, many organizations worked hard, and made representations,
but the bitter fact remained that the mountain labored and brought forth--Oswego!..

It was not that the people in Washington were hostile to us. They were
friendly and kindly disposed. They understood the disaster which overtook our
people. But they also knew that immigrants and refugees in large numbers were not
wanted in the United States. ^{WE KNEW They WOULD} ~~Nor would they~~ not be wanted anywhere after the war...

We were therefore resolved that our people should not be deflected from
the main objective--a national homeland. It must not accept make-shift compromises under
the spurious appeal to realism, expediency or *unity*.

The major battle over this issue took place, as we indicated ^{HAVE} ~~above~~,
at the American Jewish Conference, which ^{HAD} met in the summer of 1943. ~~At this~~
~~democratically~~ ^{CONFERENCE} elected body of American Jewry the principle issue was whether to
adopt or reject a resolution favoring the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth
in Palestine. ~~After prolonged debate~~, the ~~delegates~~ ^{PASSAGE} voted almost unanimously in ~~favor~~ of

the Jewish Commonwealth resolution, The Zionist Movement could ~~now~~ speak with authority to the American people and government in the name of the entire American Jewish community. Our campaign was, therefore, launched on the positive program of the Jewish Commonwealth.

We began to speak again in clear and unmistakable terms of a Jewish State.

To win the support of the American people and government, the American Zionist Emergency Council launched a nation-wide public relations program. Able and dedicated men, some of them exceptionally gifted in their fields, were quickly marshalled into service. Harry L. Shapiro was appointed Executive Director--an imaginative, efficient and thoroughly competent administrator and organizer. Harold P. Manson became Director of Information. He was a skillful public relations man, a gifted writer, with a fine Jewish background and thoroughly at home in Zionism and a student of the American political scene. Political Secretary was Arthur Lourie, presently the Ambassador of Israel to the Court of St. James. The head of our Washington Bureau at first was Dr. Leon Feuer of Toledo. He took a year's leave of absence from his congregation ~~in Toledo~~ to help us in our work. ~~He was~~ formerly associated with me in the Rabbinate of the Temple in Cleveland and is presently President of the Central Conference of American Rabbis. Later, Dr. Benjamin Akzin, now Professor of Law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, took over. Assisting in our work in Washington was Elihu Stone of Boston, a veteran in the Movement.

Leo R. Sack, an experienced newspaper man, became our Legislative Consultant. The Director of Special Events was Abe Tuvim. Eliahu Ben-Horin, a writer of note and an authority on Middle-East Affairs, became Director of Cultural Relations. Dr. I. B. Berkson organized a Research Department which was later directed by Dr. Benjamin Schwadran. Marvin Lowenthal, the well-known author undertook the task of securing the cooperation of American writers and intellectual circles. Blanche J. Shepard headed the Speakers' Bureau. Shulamith Schwarz Nardi now living in Israel, became our Director of Publications. The talented Yiddish writer, Arnold K. Israeli, took charge of our Yiddish Press Bureau. From time to time, other men like Hyman A. Schulson and Adolphe Hubbard were added to our staff.

Our staff proved to be a remarkable team of devoted and enthusiastic workers and I felt happy and privileged to work with them. They contributed not only expert professional service, but many valuable ideas.

The members of the Emergency Council and the staff met regularly. Reports were received. Free and full discussion took place. Policies were formulated and specific actions were determined upon. From time to time emissaries from Palestine and guests from other countries visited us and they were welcomed to our meetings.

Headquarters were established in New York and Washington. Effective units, nearly three hundred, were organized in every principal city in the United States.

The Council also worked through two important non-Jewish groups. The American Palestine Committee ~~which had been founded in 1941 by Dr. Emanuel Neumann~~, was under the chairmanship of Senator Robert F. Wagner, a warm and consistent friend of the Movement. It was composed of leading Americans, distinguished in many walks of public life, who desired through its medium to signify their interest in the re-establishment of the Jewish National Home. The membership of the

American Palestine Committee grew to exceed fifteen thousand, including many Governors, Senators and Congressmen, as well as many other well-known figures in the nation's civic and cultural life.

The other non-Jewish group was the Christian Council on Palestine which was headed by Dr. Henry A. Atkinson. It comprised a membership of twenty-four hundred leading clergymen and church leaders, representing all Christian denominations. It took an active part in informing church groups throughout the country and in enlisting their support for our cause.

Later, the two groups were merged into the American Christian Palestine Committee with Dr. Carl Hermann Voss as Chairman of its Executive Committee, and Dean Howard M. LeSourd, as Director.

The Christian Palestine Committee sponsored a lecture bureau which stimulated an interest in the Palestine question on the part of community, college, church and women's groups, as well as radio broadcasting stations throughout the country, and also provided these groups with effective lecturers.

Early in November, 1945, there took place in Washington an International Christian Conference on Palestine, which was attended by representatives of no less than thirty nations. Among a number of distinguished guests who came to American to attend the Conference were Mrs. Lorna Wingate, widow of the British General, Orde Charles Wingate, and Senator Gonzalez Videla, President of the Republic of Chile. As a result of the Conference, the "World Committee for Palestine" was established, with Sir Ellsworth Flavelle of Canada as Chairman. The World Committee for Palestine worked in close association with the American Christian Palestine Committee and concerned itself more particularly with the Latin-

American countries and Canada. The World Committee arranged for Dr. Gustavo Gutierrez, a prominent Cuban personality, who had become keenly interested in the problem of the Jewish people and of Palestine, to tour the South American countries, where he established many important contacts.

Numerous conferences and literally thousands of meetings were arranged by the Zionist Emergency Council in all parts of the country. Mass demonstrations and open-air rallies which were attended by tens of thousands of people were addressed by leading personalities.

Throughout the country local delegations contacted their public officials, Governors, Congressmen and Senators. State legislatures were requested to adopt pro-Palestine resolutions which were then forwarded to Washington.

We enlisted the active support of key people in every walk of life, authors, journalists, columnists, educators, clergy, political leaders--people who heretofore had not declared themselves for our cause.

Organized American labor, too, made an important and positive contribution to the Zionist effort. Many labor leaders individually, as well as numerous trade unions placed themselves on record in support of Zionist aims. The American Jewish Trade Union Committee, headed by Mr. Max Zaritsky, was especially effective in obtaining adherence to the Zionist program of the federated trade union groups. In November, 1944, the National

Convention of the American Federation of Labor unanimously approved the Palestine resolution which was submitted to Congress, and instructed its President, William Green, to use his good offices in behalf of the fulfillment of the purpose of the resolution. The Council of Industrial Organizations, at its National Convention, did likewise.

I personally addressed numerous conventions and conferences, educational and religious bodies, in all parts of the country on the subject of the Jewish National Home and appealed for the support of all Americans. I spent hours on end explaining our cause to men who were in a position to help us.

I believed at first that it would not be too difficult to tell our story to the American people. But at times we found it very difficult. There were forces and organizations and newspapers who were determined to distort our position, and confuse the American people concerning the nature of our program and objectives. A case in point was the very influential newspaper "The New York Times".

"The New York Times", today and ever since the days just prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, has been unexceptional in its news coverage of everything that concerns Israel and the Zionist Movement and friendly in its editorial comments.

This friendly and positive attitude, however, was altogether absent in the years which preceded the establishment of the State.

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Envelope to NYT & Publisher
of ^{CT} ~~Amsterdam~~ ~~News~~
American ~~press~~ ~~League~~

Sept 1943

Took place

The following exchange of letters [^]in November, 1943, between
Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the "New York Times", and myself,
~~are a case in point.~~

November 2, 1943

Dear Dr. Silver:

I presume that in the long history of Israel other leaders also permitted their fire to consume their judgment and that they, too, misrepresented those who did not see eye to eye with them.

I have read your recent attack upon me and The New York Times in the columns of that paper--that is where one does read Zionist as well as other news--and I am prompted to write you because I think you should have certain facts, all of which easily could have been obtained had the religious spirit of the Rabbi not been dominated by political considerations. But, since you won't seek the truth, I send it to you.

Up to twelve months ago, I was not an anti-Zionist. I have never approved of the conception of Jewish statehood, but I have classed myself solely as a non-Zionist, and made this distinction because I could not bring myself affirmatively to deny to any group, no matter what its common denominator, the right to seek a country of its own. And then last November I made a speech in Baltimore, in which I urged upon my fellow countrymen who were not of Jewish faith the need of exercising care before lending their names to the cause of a Jewish Army or extreme Zionist positions. I am enclosing a copy of that speech, which I read. I did not interpolate. I urged this course because I knew that we were about to land in Africa and fight in a Moslem country (we did so a week after) and the lives of my countrymen and the cause of the United Nations were my sole concern.

You probably will not agree that agitation for a Jewish Army or a Jewish state makes trouble in Arab lands. That is your privilege. All I ask is the right to speak my mind without having a Zionist barrage of misrepresentation directed against me, for that is what happened; and, interestingly enough, the result was my conversion from a non to an anti-Zionist. I believe that it would be fundamentally bad judgment to entrust the responsibility of statehood to any group which so willfully perverts and distorts facts--a group which seeks to destroy the character of individuals who differ with it, or the reputation of newspapers which report that which the group would rather have suppressed. I am opposed to Goebbels' tactics whether or not they are confined to Nazi Germany.

You are inaccurate when you associate me with the American Jewish Committee. I have never been a member of it, nor have I any influence upon its policies. If I had, the Committee would never have sent delegates to the American Jewish Conference, for it was obvious to me from the beginning that the Conference was a Zionist maneuver--and I have no lack of respect for your political astuteness. Believing, as I do, that Judaism is a faith and a faith only, it was with real regret that I tendered my resignation as a member of the Executive Committee of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations when they, too, agreed to send delegates to a strictly Jewish meeting gathered together for other than religious purposes.

You don't know--you couldn't have known without asking me--that I was originally associated with the American Council for Judaism. I helped prepare its statement and am entirely in sympathy with it. On the other hand, when they determined to release the statement during the period of the Conference I withdrew my support. I did this because I felt that the news at that time belonged to the Conference.

I suppose you find it difficult to comprehend that I am concerned with equity for Zionists as well as for others, or that The Times values its warranted reputation for objective reporting too much to stoop to your methods. But then I'm not a religious leader--merely a working newspaper man who takes pride in his own and his journal's integrity.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) Arthur Hays Sulzberger

P.S. I am sending copies of this letter to several people and do not regard it as private.

November 9, 1943

My dear Mr. Sulzberger:

I would not reply to your intemperate letter of November 2nd but for the fact that you broadcast it. This compels me to reply in order to correct certain false impressions which your letter might create. I trust that you will send copies of my letter to the people to whom you addressed copies of yours.

1) I did not state in my address before the Hadassah Convention that you were a member of the American Jewish Committee and that you urged the withdrawal of the Committee from the American Jewish Conference. I traced the attitude of the American Jewish Committee since the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and showed that under the statesmanlike leadership of men of the type of Louis Marshall, Felix Warburg and Cyrus Adler, it had been possible to achieve friendly collaboration which culminated, in 1929, in the ~~lx~~ enlarged Jewish Agency when Zionists and non-Zionists together, and on the basis of equality, assumed responsibility and authority in the upbuilding of Palestine. This action, I stressed, was predicated upon the acceptance by all of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate which recognizes the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and their right to establish their national home there. I read at length the resolution which was unanimously adopted at Zurich on August 15, 1929, by the Council of the enlarged Jewish Agency in which it "rejoices that all Israel is united for the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home in Palestine and calls upon every Jew throughout the world to rally to the sacred cause". The resolution expressed "its appreciation to Great Britain for the issuance of the Balfour Declaration", and confidentially hoped "that the Mandatory will cooperate with the enlarged Agency in fully realizing the great aim set by the Declaration and the Mandate."

I then stated that there has been a sharp departure from the historic line of the American Jewish Committee in recent months, a definite break with the past, and that a new leadership has taken hold of that organization which represents not the earlier attitude of non-Zionists, but that of anti-Zionist bitter-enders in our country. Among these I mentioned Lessing Rosenwald, the chairman of the American Council for Judaism, Judge Proskauer, present head of the American Jewish Committee, and yourself, in your capacity as president and publisher of the "New York Times". I regret the fact that by bracketing your name with the other two who are members of the American Jewish Committee an impression was conveyed that you, too, belonged to it.

But wherein have you been wronged by such an unintentional identification? And why do you feel that I and other Zionists have "perverted and distorted" your position? Surely you approve the action of the American Jewish Committee in with-

November 9, 1943

drawing from the Conference. You state in your letter that you would have urged the American Jewish Committee, in the first place, not to send delegates to the Conference because you were convinced that the Conference was a "Zionist Maneuver". You say that you resigned from the Executive Board of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations because that body did choose to send delegates to the Conference. Wherein, then, has your position been misrepresented? And why do you act the part of innocence abused?

2) You complain that Zionists are out to destroy your character because you differ from them. Actually you as an individual and your character do not interest the Zionists, nor the Jews of America, at all. No reference was made in my address to you or to your character. I mentioned you only in your capacity as president and publisher of the "Times", and my strictures were not against you personally, but against the "Times". I made certain definite charges against the "Times", none of which you take the trouble to answer in your letter. I will here enumerate them again so as not to permit you to shift the issue on to a plane where it does not belong.

3) The "New York Times" has not reported Zionist news impartially and objectively as befits a responsible newspaper. Your anti-Zionist bias has colored its news and determined its editorial policy. It is not a true statement of fact nor, for that matter, much of a tribute to the manner in which you arrive at fundamental conclusions, when you state that up to twelve months ago you were a non-Zionist but that as a result of the "barrage of misrepresentations" directed against you since your Baltimore speech in November, 1942, you have become an anti-Zionist. You have a short memory, my dear Mr. Sulzberger. As far back as January of that year, nearly ten months before your Baltimore address, the "Times" published that well known editorial on the "Zionist Army" which attacked not only the movement to create a Jewish Army of Palestinian and stateless Jews, which your editorial in a very unfair and jaundiced manner called a "Zionist army," just as on another occasion the "Times" coined the phrase the "Zionist" instead of the Jewish National Home, but the whole idea of the Jewish National Home. "The primary reason for the creation of a separate Zionist Army at this time would be of course to establish a Zionist state as one of the official war aims of the United Nations... But the wisdom of the Zionist objective has been questioned by many people including many who are themselves of the Jewish faith; and much misunderstanding may arise among people of other faiths if this objective comes to be regarded as an expression of the full hopes of Jews and of those who fight the wrongs done them. These hopes can not be achieved by the creation of a Zionist (sic!) state. They can be achieved only by the fulfillment of the Atlantic Charter, etc, etc."

This editorial, you will recall, aroused great resentment among the Jews of America and called forth an official statement of protest from the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs. It is therefore not accurate to state that the attacks made by Zionists on you, since your Baltimore address, have converted you from a non to an anti-Zionist. You and your newspaper have been anti-Zionist right along. In fact the "Times" was fighting Zionism back in 1917. The sole editorial reaction of the "Times" to the issuance of the historic Balfour Declaration was an expression in its columns on November 24, 1917 of a fear that the Zionist project might involve the possibility of a recurrence of anti-Semitism, and further that "multitudes of Orthodox

Jews still cherish the belief that the return to Zion is to be preceded by the coming of Elijah, and among these there is either indifference to the proposed establishment of the Jewish state, or doubt as to the wisdom of the movement. "... Under your piloting in recent years the hostility of the "Times" to the national aspirations of Israel in Palestine has been sharply intensified. You seem to have dowered the "Times" with a mission to fight Zionism.

We Zionists can not all match your own unimpeachable integrity, but if your ^{ANTI} ~~anti~~-Zionist position has any intellectual consistency at all, we must assume that even if all of us were like yourself, without blot or blemish, you and your paper would still be opposed to the Jewish National Home in Palestine because, as you state in another part of your letter, you believe that Judaism is a faith, and a faith only. It follows therefore that the Jewish people, or sect, should not seek any political or national solutions of its problems.

Your bitter reaction to criticism suggests that you are laboring under some strange delusion. You seem to think that attacks on Zionism and Zionists such as are made by the American Council for Judaism of which you are a member and with whose program you say you are in complete sympathy, constitute a legitimate exercise of **free speech**. It is perfectly proper to brand Zionism as inimical to the welfare of Jews everywhere, and as responsible for keeping Jewish refugees out of Palestine. It is perfectly proper to brand Zionists as guilty of a double allegiance. But to attack those who make such statements and to express indignation at such brazen falsehoods is, to use your own elegant phrase, "Goebbels" tactics". You would like immunity from criticism while indulging in criticism yourself to your heart's content.

A friend of yours in the American Council for Judaism, Mr. Lessing Rosenwald, recently took the same position which you take. He, too, is indignant at criticism levelled against him. Recently he came to Cleveland for a meeting of the American Council for Judaism, preceded by a flock of telegrams sent out from Philadelphia to many people in Cleveland inviting them to attend. The public press likewise carried the announcement of the meeting. The meeting was held and Mr. Rosenwald and his friends had their say. No one interfered with their right to utter their views. But because the Cleveland Jewish Community Council decided to utilize the occasion to express its own views on the American Council for Judaism and to inform the community concerning the composition, purpose and tactics of the Council, Mr. Rosenwald was moved to address a communication to the president of the Cleveland Jewish Community Council, since published by him, sharply criticising that body for "having forgotten the right of free speech" and for putting itself in opposition to "one of the basic tenets of our Constitution"...

Free speech must be responsible speech, and no man should expect immunity from criticism if his opinions and utterances on vital Jewish issues are regarded as false and misleading. Those who are too thin-skinned should not enter the arena of public discussion and controversy or should not whimper when they are hurt.

4) Again and again the "Times" has transformed itself into a transmission belt for anti-Zionist propaganda. It never misses an opportunity to focus attention on the anti-Zionist viewpoint. Last May and June, the "Times" carried a series of articles by Cyrus L. Sulzberger. The evident purpose of these dispatches from Cairo

Baghdad and Ankara was to press for a crystallization of American policy in the Middle East when it could only be in the interest of the Arabs. Mr. Sulzberger was not here functioning as an objective reporter, but as a commentator seeking to affect policy in an anti-Zionist direction. It was quite apparent that Mr. Sulzberger was collaborating for the issuance of that joint statement by Great Britain and the United States which would have done irreparable harm to Jewish life in Palestine as well as affecting unfavorably the status of the Jews in this country. In the "Times" of August 22, Mr. Sulzberger reported finally, and with ill-concealed disappointment, that the governments had refused to issue such a statement for which he had been so zealously plugging

5) The series of stories which appeared in the "Times" beginning on July 30 and carried through to August 3, also from the pen of Cyrus L. Sulzberger, and which carried such scare headlines as "Palestine Fears Deeds of Despair", "Palestine Faces Clash After War" and "Palestine Arabs Fear Loss of Land", was patently designed to create the impression that there was a state of terrible tension, verging on civil war, in Palestine and that therefore no changes should be made in the White Paper policy closing the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigration early next year, because such changes might endanger the security of the armies of the United Nations in the Near East. This, of course, was the official line taken by the Palestine Administration, which is determined at all costs to save the White Paper. "The Times", alone among the papers in the United States, lent itself lock, stock and barrel to this panic propaganda.

This series of articles also suggested that the overwhelming desire of the Jews of Palestine to assist in the prosecution of the war was motivated not by their wish to help destroy Hitlerism in the world, but by a cunning calculation to militarize the Jewish population of Palestine in preparation for the threatened conflict with the Arabs. These articles, you will recall, likewise elicited a formal protest from the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs.

6) In August and September of this year, there appeared the notorious series of articles in the "Times" on the arms trials in Jerusalem. The "Times" devoted an amazing amount of space to the routine trials of a few gun-runners in Palestine. It went to great lengths to present the anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish opinions of the British Major who transformed the trial into an anti-Zionist propaganda putsch and into a smear attack on the Jewish Agency. The "Times" correspondent, A. C. Sedgewick, took it upon himself to editorialize the news and to express judgment on Mr. Ben Gurion's criticism of the trials and his description of Major Verdin's address as "characteristic of the lowest type of anti-Semitism". Mr. Sedgewick opined that "many find it hard not to consider such a description exaggerated, especially when the Nazi excesses in Berlin and Warsaw are borne in mind", and further, "that there are many, too, who feel that any charge of anti-Semitism in its accepted sense is most noticeably incompatible with the military court proceedings against the Jewish defendants which are carried out with a scrupulousness and courtesy designed to preclude any such castigation."

But on November 3, the Jewish Council of Palestine felt constrained to call for a two-hour strike during which work in all Jewish enterprises throughout the

country stopped, in order to protest the incitements and false accusations against the Jews of Palestine by British military officials during the arms trials....

7) It has now become a commonplace in news about Zionism emanating from Palestine and appearing in the "Times" to find the word "extremist" employed as an adjective to describe the official policy of the Zionist Movement and the Jewish Agency. "Extremist" has an ugly connotation, and the trick now is to present the official and classic Zionist position which calls for the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration in letter and spirit, and the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as "extremist".

8) From the very beginning the "Times" became the mouthpiece of the American Council for Judaism. No other paper in the United States found it necessary to give that insignificant group the space and publicity which the "Times" gave it. It was the "Times" and only the "Times" which devoted so much space to the release of the American Council for Judaism during the week of the Conference. You stated that you did not approve of the release of that statement during the Conference. But the "Times" did give it a large and provocative display which no other paper in New York City, or in the country, found it necessary to do on the basis of objective reporting. Similarly, an examination of the "Times" coverage of the American Jewish Conference will disclose that an unusual effort was made to give prominent display to the viewpoint of the very small minority in the Conference which dissented from the Palestine resolution.

9) In the "Review of the Week" published on Sunday, September 5th, the "Times" conveyed an erroneous impression when it declared that speakers at the American Jewish Conference demanded the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine while neglecting to say that the Conference voted almost unanimously in favor of it. Continuing, the "Times" dismissed the American Jewish Conference with forty-two words and then gave twice that space to the position of the American Council for Judaism. The device is transparent. This insignificant handful of individuals is not only paralleled in importance with the Conference which represented every Jewish community and nearly every national Jewish organization in the United States, but is even rated above it.

It is clear, my dear Mr. Sulzberger, to any impartial observer, that the "Times" has been following a definite anti-Zionist policy. The Jews of America who are overwhelmingly in sympathy with Zionism, as the recent Conference clearly demonstrated resent this fact, and are making their resentment audible and will continue to do so. Their criticism is due not to any hostility to you personally or to your paper. It is due entirely to the wrong and hurtful policy which your paper has been pursuing and which is calculated to do great harm to a cause which is dear to the hearts of our people all over the world, and which has now entered upon its historic hour of decision.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Abba Hillel Silver

~~AHS:DK~~

A few years after the exchange of these letters, in 1948,
~~Before the day when the Jews of Palestine proclaimed,~~
on the day when the Jews of Palestine proclaimed, in Tel-Aviv,

the establishment of the State of ISrael, the "New York Times" wrote editorially:

"The Jews of Palestine have built a state. The chancelleries of the world may deplore, the gentlemen at Lake Success may debate, the Arab League may fulminate, but the impelling power of "the dream of generations" has created a government, inspired an army, and made a desert bloom. These achievements cannot be ignored or pushed aside. They can neither be rationalized out of existence to suit some academic policy nor warped to fit into some "ideal" solution of the Palestine problem. They exist, as the result of unflagging labor and unfailing courage, of the desperation of some who have known Hitler's tortures and the aspiration of many who have sought an ancient goal. The star which was imposed upon the Jew as a badge of shame is on the flag of Israel today, and the deep, powerful emotions mobilized around that symbol are now the most significant forces in Palestine.

"In recognizing Israel, President Truman has recognized an inescapable fact. However oddly his act may fit into the curious pattern of American diplomacy in the Near East, this step was the only one which was consonant with American traditions and with the realities of the case. Since the United Nations, largely as the result of the insistence of the United States, has not asserted paramount authority over Palestine, this

country is free to deal with Israel on its own terms; since, officially and unofficially, over the last thirty years, the United States had done much to make a Jewish State possible, it could not disavow its own work. And the declaration of Israel's independence must evoke a sympathetic response from a nation conscious of the shared spiritual heritage from which that declaration was drawn. Mr. Truman has given formal expression to the welcome Americans extend to Israel."

So great is the power ~~and the mandate~~ of the Fait Accompli!

The "New York Times" was not the only newspaper which was negative or hostile to our aspirations in the years before the establishment of the State and which accepted the mandate of the fait accompli. There were others, even Yiddish newspapers, like "The Jewish Daily Forward", a labor newspaper which carried on an unfriendly campaign against Zionism until the State was established. Following which, it reversed its policy completely and became an enthusiastic supporter and defender of the State of Israel.

Our main activity during the first part of the year 1944, was the introduction of Palestine Resolution in Congress. Why did we do it? Many people, especially when it ~~looked for a time~~ ^{appeared} as though the resolutions would be defeated, criticized us for having dared to take such a dangerous step, fraught with such serious consequences. We did it because we were convinced that if our cause was ever to be placed on the national and international agenda, if the attention of the American people and of the world was ever to be drawn forcibly to our problem on the eve of the effective date of the White Paper, and if the official silence in Washington was ever to be broken, the most effective -- perhaps the only -- way in which it could be done, was by producing the discussion of our problem in the world's greatest forum of opinion -- the Congress of the United States. What happens there is news, national and international. In fact, the very discussion of a problem before such a forum is a political event.

The attitude of ^{our} ~~the~~ government toward our cause up to that time could in fairness be characterized as one of ~~mere~~ benevolent neutrality or uninvolved benignancy. Our government was at all times kindly disposed, especially the Chief Executive, but it persisted in doing nothing about it. It was fashionable for public officials, from the highest to the lowest, both in the Legislative and the Executive branches of our government, to give warm endorsement to our Movement and it was generally assumed, even among many Zionists, that that was all that could really be expected from our government. This attitude persisted even after the White Paper of 1939 was issued by the British Government. Our government made no protest whatsoever against this unilateral and illegal

action of the British Government which clearly violated the Anglo-American Convention of 1924.

When the United States entered the World War, even the attitude of benevolent neutrality was abandoned. By 1942, the subject of Zionism had become taboo in Washington. I called the attention of the Zionists of America to this fact. In an address, which, as Chairman of the United Palestine Appeal, I delivered in Philadelphia on May ², 1943, I stated: "Within the last few months, as if by concerted action, there has set in a very definite and noticeable withdrawal on the part of the official family from anything which might even remotely suggest a recognition or endorsement of the Jewish Homeland in Palestine ...

"One thing we must make clear to ourselves and to the world," I said. "We must not beguile ourselves or permit others to beguile us by empty words of sympathy, praise, or the denunciation of Hitler or Nazi persecutions. Everybody knows by now that Hitler is a bad man and that the massacre of ~~two~~ ^{2 1/2} million Jews is horrible. If responsible government officials and men who possess political power and influence can bring us no greater balm or help at this time when a cataract of disaster has descended upon us, then we must respectfully advise them that we already have had enough of it. Such expressions of sympathy have turned stale and tasteless. The tragic problem of the Jewish people in the world today cannot be solved by chiefs of government or prominent officials sending us Rosh Hashanah greetings!"

The word had gone through Washington that ~~during~~ ^{for} the duration of the war, the subject of Zionism should be avoided. On July 7, 1942, President Roosevelt sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State, in which he said: "The more I think of it the more I feel that we should say

nothing about the Near East, or Palestine, or the Arabs at this time. If we pat either group on the back, we automatically stir up trouble at a critical moment." (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. 4, p. 543.) This became the official line -- a conspiracy of silence -- but Zionist leaders preferred to remain blithely unaware of it. The clamor of the Jews of the world to help save their doomed brothers in Europe by opening the doors of Palestine was deftly detoured into a number of phoney inter-governmental refugee conferences.

What the attitude of our government was throughout the fateful years of the war has been fully revealed in ~~the~~ "Memoirs" ^{by} Mr. Cordell Hull, who was Secretary of State up to the end of 1944.

"We were constantly being pressed ^{as he writes,} for action by the nearly five million Jews in the United States, while at the same time our representation in the Near Eastern Arab countries, plus our own military officials here, were informing us of the danger of antagonizing the sixty million Arabs there at a moment when their help in a strategic area of the war was so vital . . .

"As I left office our policy toward Palestine was one of constantly being on the alert to prevent that explosive area from touching the match to the powder train of the Near East. We could not resolve the questions of the relationship of the Jews to the Arabs, the immigration of the Jews into Palestine, and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine since these were primarily the responsibility of the British. We had, however, made clear our interest in the solution of the Palestine question; we had induced the British to relax their decision to cut off Jewish immigration into Palestine, and we had made serious, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to bring the Arabs and Jews together for friendly discussion of their differences." (Memoirs, 1948, p. 1528 and p. 1537.)

When the White Paper of 1939 was released by the British government, the President, who strongly objected to it and had read the document "with interest and a good deal of dismay," and did not believe the British were wholly correct in saying that the framers of the Palestine Mandate "could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population of the country," nevertheless did not want his views communicated to the British government and so "we limited ourselves to a cable to Kennedy on May 23, 1939, instructing him to mention informally and orally to Foreign Secretary Halifax that disappointment here, especially in Zionist circles, over certain of the White Paper provisions was rather wide-spread, particularly over those that foreshadowed a marked reduction eventually in Jewish immigration into Palestine. A flood of protests was, in fact, pouring into the State Department." (ibid., pp. 1530-31.)

On May 26, 1943, Mr. Hull sent to Cairo a message from the President for delivery to King Ibn Saud, who had inquired of the President whether he would be advised in advance of any steps of an affirmative character contemplated by the American government with respect to Palestine. ^{He} ~~voicing~~ ^{ad} the President's appreciation of the King's helpful cooperation and sympathetic understanding, and expressed the thought that if a friendly understanding on Palestine should be reached by the interested Jews and Arabs through their own efforts before the end of the war, a development of that nature would be highly desirable. In any event, he assured the King that it was our government's view that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without fully consulting both Jews and Arabs. (ibid., p. 1532.)

Both Mr. Churchill and the President were thinking of Ibn Saud

in terms of the "boss of bosses" of the Arab world, which, in fact, at the time, he appeared to be. Both thought at the time that they could induce Ibn Saud to work out with Dr. Weizmann a sane solution of the Palestine question. Even Dr. Weizmann was for a time excited over this prospect which Churchill confided to him.... Five minutes direct conversation with Ibn Saud in 1945 set President Roosevelt straight on this score.

The thesis that there must be full consultation with both Arabs and Jews "continued to be our position throughout the remainder of my period in office", writes Mr. Hull. (ibid., p. 1535).

It was clear that a change had to be forced in this attitude in Washington if our cause was ever to have a chance. Our demands had to be placed on the agenda of the political thought and concern, not alone of the United States but of the world--through some favorable action on the part of the Congress of the United States. And the date of March, 1944 was fast approaching when the deadly provisions of the White Paper of 1939 would come into full force--stoppage of Jewish immigration into Palestine and the ~~protracted~~ ^{practiced} liquidation of the Jewish National Home.

Our investigation indicated beyond any reasonable doubt that sentiment among the members of Congress was highly favorable to our cause. A nationwide poll, taken by our three hundred community-contact groups all over the country before we introduced the Resolution, made it clear that when and if the Resolution came to a vote it would pass by a very large majority. No bill was ever ushered into Congress under more favorable auspices. The introduction of the Wright-Compton Resolution in the House was preceded by enthusiastic statements of endorsement on the part of both the majority and minority leaders. Even more dramatic was the setting for the Senate Resolution, which was sponsored by Senators Wagner and Taft.

Both of these distinguished Senators were loyal friends of our cause. Senator Wagner was a liberal Democratic Senator from New York, a champion of the rights of labor, and a pioneer in the field of social legislation. Senator Taft was a ^{senior} conservative Republican Senator from Ohio. When I first met *him* ~~Senator Taft~~, he was not a Zionist. In fact, he knew very little about the problems which confronted the Jewish people generally. Some even charged him with being unfriendly. I found him eager to listen and to learn, and, when persuaded of the moral worth and justice of a cause, willing to go all out for it. He did not come from a state where the Jewish vote was considerable. He was a man of intellectual integrity, of a keen legal mind and of great sensitiveness, though he often appeared on the surface reserved and distant. He wanted to know more about our Movement. I supplied him with its classic texts and literature. He read them and we discussed them. He questioned me closely and it was only after he was completely satisfied in his own mind as to the soundness and urgency of our cause that he committed himself wholeheartedly to it. Thereafter, and for ten years he was our most helpful friend and advocate in the Congress of the United States. I shall forever be grateful for the privilege of having known him as a friend and for having received from him the wisest of counsel and the greatest of help in the work of establishing the State of Israel.

Moving speeches of support were delivered on the floor by the majority and minority leaders of the Senate when the resolution was introduced.

The Resolution which was submitted on January 27, 1944, read as follows:

Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the United States on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved "that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine shall be adequately protected"; and

Whereas the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated the need for a Jewish homeland as a haven for the large numbers who have become homeless as a result of this persecution: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization, so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.

Hearings on our Resolution were held before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House for four days in the month of February. Leading American figures, Jews and Gentiles, pro-Zionists and anti-Zionists, testified. Prof. Hitti presented the Arab position and Lessing Rosenwald, the position of the anti-Zionist Jews. I made the opening presentation in advocacy of the Resolution. Other representatives of our Movement, Dr. Stephen S. Wise, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Herman Shulman, Louis Lipsky, Dr. James Heller, and Dr. Emanuel Neumann followed. They presented our case forcibly and acquitted themselves with distinction. Everything looked good.

But in our optimism we had not counted on the State Department. Writes Mr. Cordell Hull:

"At the State Department we felt that the passage of these resolutions, although not binding on the Executive, might precipitate conflict in Palestine and other parts of the Arab world, endangering American troops and requiring the diversion of forces from European and other combat areas. It might prejudice or shatter pending negotiations with Ibn Saud for the construction of a pipeline across Saudi Arabia, which our military leaders felt was of utmost importance to our security. And it would stimulate other special interests to press for the introduction of similar resolutions regarding controversial territorial issues relating to areas such as Poland and Italy.

"The reaction in the Near East to the mere introduction of the resolutions had been, as we feared, sharply antagonistic. We received protests from the Governments of Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon, from King Ibn Saud and from Imam Yahya of Yemen. We assured them that the resolutions, even if passed, were not binding on the Executive. The President, on March 13th, renewed his previous assurances to the King that it was our Government's view that no decision should be reached

changing Palestine's status without full consultation with both Jews and Arabs. The Department sent assurances along the same line to the Egyptian Government and to Imam Yahya....

"We were also considering what steps we could take to induce both Houses of Congress not to consider the resolutions. At my request, Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long met with a group of Senators in Senator Connally's office and orally expressed the Department's views. I had a memorandum drawn up which I intended to give the President to be sent to Congress. At that point, however, Secretary of War Stimson wrote a letter to Senator Connally in the latter's capacity as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Stimson forthrightly pointed out that the Senate resolution was a matter of deep military concern to the War Department since its passage, or even public hearings on it, would be apt to provoke dangerous repercussions in areas where we had many vital military interests. General Marshall testified in identical vein before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session. In consequence of the position taken by the State and War Departments, the resolutions were not then reported out of the Senate or House committees." (ibid., p. 1535)

Together with a group of representatives of the Zionist Emergency Council, I was called in by the Foreign Relations Committee and informed of the attitude of the War Department. After a full and friendly discussion with us, the Senate Committee decided not to act on the Resolution for a fortnight in order to enable us to canvass the situation with the War Department. We did, but its negative position remained unchanged. Action on the Resolution was indefinitely deferred.

In view of the objection of the military, the war being still on, we could ^{do nothing} ~~not~~ but silently acquiesce, although we did not see just how our Resolution would

endanger the war effort, of the Allies. As it turned out, the President and the State Department opposed our Resolution even after the War Department in October withdrew its objections...

The deferrment of the Resolution made it more than ever imperative to get an expression of the views of our President without delay, lest the postponement of action on the Resolution be exploited by our enemies, and the deadline set by the British White Paper--March 31, 1944--~~when Jewish immigration into Palestine would practically cease~~, was fast approaching. We requested an appointment with the President. We were at first advised that the President would see us together with

representatives of other bodies such as the American Jewish Committee whose interests ^{on viewpoint} at the time did not at all coincide with ours. We declined and requested a meeting with the President by ourselves. It was finally granted and on March 9, 1944 Dr. Wise and I spent an hour with him. At the close of a very pleasant interview, the President authorized us to issue in his name the following statement:

"The President authorized us to say that the American government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939. The President is happy that the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees and that when future decisions are reached, full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish National Home, for which our government and the American people have always had the deepest sympathy and today more than ever, in view of the tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees."

This statement represented the first break for us over a period of many years. It was the first time that the American government publicly took a position on the Palestine question which was at variance with the British position.

Unfortunately, this declaration of the President was not followed up by any official representation to the British government, and, as if to indicate that the President's statement had not implied any new departure on the part of our government in its policy toward Palestine, a telegram was sent by the State Department with the approval of the President, to the heads of the Arab countries, renewing the assurances which had previously been given to them that no decision on Palestine would be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

"The apprehensions of the Arabs, however, were further aroused," writes Mr. Hull, "when the President gave two Jewish leaders, Dr. Stephen S. Wise and Dr. Abba H. Silver, an interview on March 9, 1943. The press reported the President as having authorized them to announce that 'when future decisions are reached full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish National Home', that this Government 'has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939', and that the President was 'happy that the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees.'"

"Two days later Minister Kirk in Cairo reported that he had received an inquiry from the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nahas Pasha, regarding this reportedly authorized statement. On March 14 I sent the President for his approval two proposed replies, one to Kirk in Cairo, the other to Minister Loy Henderson in Bagdad. The President approving, these went out to Kirk and Henderson, informing them that the Zionist leaders' statements had in fact been authorized by the President substantially as reported in the Near East. The Ministers were to point out that a Jewish National Home, rather than the Jewish commonwealth referred to in the Congressional resolutions, was mentioned in this statement and that, although the American Government, it was true, had never approved the White Paper, our Government, it was also true, had never taken a position relative to it. [sic.] Our Ministers were also to renew assurances that it was our Government's view that no decision changing Palestine's basic situation should be arrived at without full consultation with both Jews and Arabs."

Mr. Hull sums up the whole situation quite neatly *and frankly:*

"In general the President at times talked both ways to Zionists and Arabs, besieged as he was by each camp. Rabbi Wise and Silver believed that the President had made pledges to them. The State Department made no pledges." (ibid. p. 1536)

These assurances which he gave to the Arabs were of the essence of President Roosevelt's policy right along. He never deviated from it. He made an effort to persuade Ibn Saud, whom he received on board his cruiser in the Mediterranean in February, 1945, following the Yalta Conference, to relent on his all-out opposition to Zionism, but as he himself stated on his return to the United States: "He learned more about 'the Moslem problem, the Jewish problem, by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I could have learned in exchange of two or three dozen letters'."

An exchange of letters between King Ibn Saud and President Roosevelt did take place in March-April, 1945. It was made public on October 19, 1945, *six months* after the death of the President, ~~six months later~~. In his letter to Ibn Saud, President Roosevelt clearly states what his Palestine line had been right along -- a fact which the Zionists were either unaware of, or, in their political infatuation, refused to credit.

"Your Majesty will recall that on previous occasions I communicated to you the attitude of the American Government toward Palestine and made clear our desire that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

Your Majesty will also doubtless recall that during our recent conversation I assured you that I would take no action

in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of the Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people.

It gives me pleasure to renew to your Majesty the assurances which you have previously received regarding the attitude of my Government and my own as Chief Executive, with regard to the question of Palestine and inform you that the policy of the Government in this respect is not changed.

I desire also at this time to send you my best wishes for Your Majesty's continued good health and for the welfare of your people.

Your good friend

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT."

From Washington the scene of our political activities shifted, in the summer of 1944, to Chicago where the National Conventions of both political parties were held. 1944 was a national election year. While Congressional action on the Palestine Resolution was for the time being deferred, the Council did not suspend its activities *or relax its efforts.*

In June, 1944, the Republican Party adopted a forthright plank on Palestine pledging unequivocal support to the full Zionist program. Senator Taft, who was Chairman of the Committee on Platform, helped ~~me~~^{us} with the drafting of this plank. This was followed in July, 1944, by the Palestine plank in the platform of the Democratic Party, which put the party of the National Administration on record as follows:

"We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."

These planks represented an act unprecedented in American political history and served dramatically to give notice that the American people were overwhelmingly in sympathy with the aims of the Zionist Movement.

In persuading the leaders of both political parties to endorse our program, I stressed the absolute non-partisan character of our Movement. The Zionist Movement was committed to no political party. I had to stress this fact time and time again, with our own fellow Zionists, some of whom were head-over-heel partisans of one or another of the political parties, most of them Democratic zealots who stood in charmed adoration of President Roosevelt, who in their view could do no wrong. I tried to _____

convince them that the non-partisan character of our Movement was a political asset which we should scrupulously guard and preserve. It was fully understood by the leaders of both political parties and because of it we were given hearty cooperation by both parties. Any other policy would, in the long run, prove disastrous.

Most of my difficulties with some of the Zionist leaders in the American Zionist Emergency Council, which finally led to my resignation in 1945, were over this very issue. Some of them even resented the fact that I had succeeded in getting the Republican Party to include a pro-Zionist plank in its platform....

As the election approached, President Roosevelt (on October 15, 1944 sent) through Senator Wagner a message to the Convention of the Zionist Organization of America, meeting in Atlantic City, wherein he gave his support to the Commonwealth plank in the Democratic platform.

Actually the Emergency Council had not expected nor wanted a Convention message from the President. It had asked the White House to meet with its two co-chairmen for a serious talk about the Palestine situation. It was surprised to learn from a newspaper report that Dr. Wise had by himself seen the President...

The Emergency Council angrily discussed this matter on October 12th, and passed a resolution to the effect that "whenever any member of our group is on a mission representing the Zionist Movement he should refrain from injecting partisan politics into the matter."

In view of the fact that what amounted to a pre-election statement had been secured from the President, a similar statement was solicited from the Republican nominee, Thomas Dewey, which he gladly sent to the Convention.

The message of the President which was conveyed to the Convention by Senator Wagner read:

"Please express my satisfaction that in accord with traditional American policy, and in keeping with the spirit of the Four Freedoms, the Democratic Party at its July convention this year included the following plank in its platform:

"We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy has to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."

"Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as possible. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if re-elected I shall help to bring about its realization."

We, of course, made the most of it.

Following the reading of President Roosevelt's message on the floor of the Convention, I took particular delight in saying to the delegates:

"You will recall a year ago at the American Jewish Conference there were timid souls, even among our own Zionist leaders, who said, 'Oh, don't talk about a Jewish Commonwealth; it is premature; it is extreme; it will alienate friends; you will never get a hearing in

Washington." If, on the platform of the Waldorf-Astoria a year ago I would have arisen and said that within twelve months the President of the United States would himself come out and declare, "I am for a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth", they would have laughed me to scorn as a madman. We were the extremist Zionists then, the doctrinaires, the impractical people!...

"Well now the program of the extremists and the doctrinaires has become the accepted political position of the greatest power on earth... the United States of America. I speak of this because there is a lesson in it for us Zionists for the future. We may have such moments recurring time and again. Don't compromise on basic Jewish rights for the sake of expediency, for the sake of a spurious unity! Demand what our people is historically entitled to ~~demand~~, all of it; insist on it; work for it, and wait!"

Despite these striking expressions of official support for the Zionist position, they were not reflected in action. There was always an unfortunate contradiction between American official pronouncements favoring the Jewish National Home and concrete action for their fulfillment.

Later that month, the military objection to the passage of the Congressional Resolution was withdrawn. We had waited impatiently for months before the gratifying news finally reached us in a letter which the Secretary of War Stimson sent to Senator Taft. _____

In the light of this withdrawal and in view of the planks which had been adopted by both the Democratic and Republican Parties, as well as the statement of October 15th of President Roosevelt, we felt confident that the road was now clear.

It was decided to re-open the matter of the Congressional Resolution which had lain dormant since the previous March. Before taking action in the matter, the reaction of the President and Secretary of State Stettinius was sought. But, instead of the expected concurrence of the Administration, vigorous opposition was again encountered. It is clear now, with the President's letter to Ibn Saud before us, why.

A violent controversy soon developed within the Emergency Council when the Administration's opposition to action on the Resolution was encountered. Some members of the Council thought it inadvisable to proceed with the matter because of the Administration's opposition. I took a different view of the situation. I felt that every effort should be made to induce the Administration to withdraw its opposition to the Resolution inasmuch as its opposition was diametrically opposed to the stand which had been taken publicly by President Roosevelt himself and his party. To wait for a "green light" from the White House or the State Department was futile. It would never come. The whole purpose of the Congressional Resolution was to influence and change the Administration's policy of inaction and to inform Great Britain and the world what the true sentiments of the American people, speaking through their chosen representatives in Congress, were. Our friends in Congress who had originally introduced the Resolution fully concurred in this, and were eager to re-introduce it now that the war was over, and the President had put himself on record as favoring the Jewish Commonwealth.

Unfortunately, the proponents of these two opposing views adopted conflicting procedures in Washington. Thus, while I sought to make the voice of Congress heard, other Zionist leaders informed the State Department that they were not pressing for the Resolution. Thus Dr. Wise, on his own, sent a telegram to Secretary of State Stettinius, without my knowledge:

"In view of your meeting Monday with Senator Wagner, I wish to make my position and that of many associates unmistakably clear. We would, of course, all be happy if the Chief and you could see your way clear to give approval to the adoption of the Palestine Resolution in both Houses. Postponement likely to be misunderstood by public opinion which naturally cannot be informed concerning reasons for delay. If, however, Chief and you should still feel that some postponement for reasons already given, I, together with many associates, do not wish to have action taken contrary to your and President's recommendation. Situations should, under no circumstances, be permitted to arise in which Senate Committee would be informed of Chief's opinion communicated through you to us in confidence. In that case it would be best for Senate Committee to postpone action through the Session. This telegram is for you alone. Will telephone tomorrow afternoon at your convenience to learn about results in your talk with Bob (Senator Wagner)"

By the end of November, 1944, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the Resolution in a somewhat amended form. Late in November the Taft-Wagner Resolution came up for action in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where it was considered at three successive meetings. The

State Department and the President, however, remained adamant that the passage of the Resolution was inopportune-- "Unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation". The matter came up for a vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 11, 1944. On this occasion, Mr. Stettinius made the last in a series of personal appearances before the Committee, and, in the name of the national Administration, argued against its passage. Such pressure from the Executive branch of the government made it impossible to pass the Resolution, and it was finally tabled by a bare majority in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Following the tabling of the Palestine Resolution in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the far-reaching controversy within the Council culminated in my resignation as Chairman of the Executive Committee and Co-chairman of the Council.

The leader of the opposition to my policy was the Co-chairman of the Council, Dr. Wise. No one could question his loyalty to the Movement or fail to be impressed by his years of service to the Zionist cause. We two had worked closely together for many years. But Dr. Wise was also a very staunch Democrat and completely enchanted by the charm and personality of the President. He felt very close to him. Men said that Dr. Wise had influence in the White House--that he was 'persona grata'. He never suspected that the Administration was perhaps using him. Dr. Wise would sing the President's praises on all occasions and would pronounce the name of Franklin Delano Roosevelt with such adoration as if he were offering incense and libation.

Thus, at the opening session of the American Jewish Conference on September 1, 1943, Dr. Wise declared:

Begin a
new
chapter
4

" As a spokesman of the Conference at its opening hour, I choose to register my unchanged faith in the deep humanity of the present leader of free men in the world today, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. This body of delegated and widely representative American Jews, dedicated to the triumph of our Nation's cause, declares its deep and unchangeable confidence in the integrity and good-will of its Commander-in-Chief. "

There was nothing in the record of President Roosevelt up to that time, or later, to warrant such "deep and unchangeable confidence". He had done nothing for the Jewish people, for the refugees from Nazi persecution, or for the Jewish National Home. Undoubtedly he had good-will towards the Jewish people and deep sympathy for their suffering. But mere good-will in a supreme leader of the world at a time when a whole race was being exterminated, and the one door of escape and safety was being shut and bolted against them was clearly not enough.

My own position ~~I had given~~ ^{had been given} to the Zionists at their convention in Atlantic City in 1944, shortly after it had received the encouraging statement of the President that "if re-elected I shall help to bring about its (the Jewish Commonwealth) realization".

"With all my supreme admiration for the great personalities who are our friends, and for the significance of great personalities in the world crisis today, with my full admiration and full realization of these two facts, I still say to you what the psalmist said long ago: "Put not your trust in princes...."

" Put not the future of our Movement in the sole keeping of individuals, however, friendly, however great. Appeal to the masses of the people. Talk to the whole of America. Make friends everywhere. Carry on an active education propaganda in your circle, within the sphere of your influence, among your own friends. That will be reflected in the higher political circles. That will guide them. That will sustain them when they come to make important decisions which may involve America's participation in the ultimate solution of the Palestine problem.

"We must build upon the broad and secure base of public sentiment, the approval of public opinion which in the final analysis determines the attitude and action of governments in a democratic society."

Dr. Wise tendered his resignation as Co-chairman of the Emergency Council on December 9th on the ground that he "cannot longer remain the Chairman of a body, one of the leading officers of which is guilty of deliberate, persistent, violations of its decisions, conduct which has inflicted great hurt upon our sacred cause." He did not specify the nature of the great hurt which had been inflicted...

Before his resignation was acted upon by the Emergency Council, a meeting was held by the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America on Tuesday evening, December 19th, in the presence of Dr. Wise. At this meeting, the Chairman, Dr. Goldstein, the President of the Zionist Organization of America, called upon me as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Emergency Council, to report on the general situation. I stated that I was not prepared to present a report since I expect to do so at the Emergency Council meeting which was scheduled for the following evening, after which I would feel free to discuss my report with the individual constituent organizations of the Council, including the Zionist Organization of America.

Dr. Goldstein then proceeded to discuss the situation anyhow. He was impatient to get a decision from the Executive of the Z. O. A., which would bind its representatives on the Council the following evening. As the discussion progressed, I told the Executive Committee that I still felt that it was my duty to present my report first to the Emergency Council and that it was pointless for me to remain any further since I could not participate in the discussion. I thereupon left the meeting.

The minutes of that meeting indicate that a prolonged discussion followed in which, urging immediate action without waiting for the meeting of the Emergency Council the following evening, were Dr. Goldstein, Judge Louis E. Levinthal, Herman Shulman, Maurice M. Boukstein and Rabbi Solomon Goldman. Most violent in his criticism was Dr. James G. Heller, who offered a resolution that "it is the sense of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America that the actions of Dr. Abba Hillel Silver in relation to the resolutions before the Congress of the United States were in contravention of the decisions of the Zionist Emergency Council, that the resignation of Dr. Wise was justified as a protest against these actions and that in the light of these facts and in the political interest of the Movement, it is our conviction that the services of Dr. Silver as Co-chairman of the Emergency Council and Chairman of its Executive Committee should not be continued".

Dr. Nahum Goldmann, member of the Jewish Agency, who attended as a guest, warned "that the continued use of such tactics as pursued by Dr. Silver which involved a fight against the President and his Administration, would lead to complete political disaster... What we are doing here is what the Revisionists have done for twenty years. It is exactly Revisionist tactics." Dr. Israel Goldstein delivered himself of the following revealing statement: "Is it not conceivable that a situation may exist which would make Dr. Silver's retirement advisable at the present juncture? The fact remains that he is persona non grata with the one man that more than any other we need for the solution of our problem, and that his position vis-a-vis the White House

has been much worse as a ²result of the present events. Perhaps Dr. Silver might feel impelled, as a matter of Zionist responsibility, to come to his colleagues and say: "Gentlemen, this is the situation. If Mr. Dewey had been elected President of the United States it would have been proper for me to have the leadership, (I might say that Dr. Wise intimated that very thing to me) but under the circumstances now obtaining, I believe it is my duty not to be in the leadership and I shall work as a private in the ranks'."

P Dr. Emanuel Neumann, ~~Mr.~~ Jacob Fishman, ~~Mr.~~ Elihu Stone and Rabbi Irving Miller urged that no action be taken until I would have an opportunity to make my report to the Zionist Emergency Council. Nevertheless, a resolution was adopted to the effect that "It is the sense of this meeting that on the basis of the facts as presented to us tonight, that Dr. Wise's resignation as protest against Dr. Silver's action in contravention of the decisions of the Emergency Council was justified, we believe that Dr. Wise's resignation from the leadership of the American Zionist Emergency Council would most seriously injure the interests of the Movement and therefore conditions must be created to enable Dr. Wise to continue as Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council. We leave it to our representatives in the Emergency Council to act in accordance with these views". An amendment was offered to delete the words "as a protest against Dr. Silver's action in contravention of the decision of the Emergency Council". On a vote, the amendment was defeated.

At the Zionist Emergency Council the next evening, December 20th, after Dr. Wise gave the reasons for his resignation, I gave a full report of my activities in connection with the Palestine Resolution in Congress. A motion was then made by Dr. Heller of the Z. O. A. to the effect that "It was the sense of the Council that Dr. Silver had contravened its decisions." This motion was tabled! Another motion was then made by a representative of the Z. O. A. that "a new election be held on December 27th, and in the meantime the officers of the Council be requested to tender their resignations in order that the Council be in a position to act". A motion to table this motion was defeated. At this point I stated that the failure to table this motion indicated a lack of confidence in me and I tendered my resignation.

The Poale Zion (Labor Zionists) and the Mizrachi (Religious Zionists) were solidly on my side and they remained my loyal supporters throughout the long controversy. The Z. O. A. representative led in the opposition and they were joined by the representatives of the Hadassah.

Almost the entire staff wanted to resign with me. I would not have it. The work of the Zionist Emergency Council must not be disrupted. Only Harry L. Shapiro and Harold Manson ~~tendered~~ their resignations at once.

Shortly thereafter a group of loyal adherents organized themselves as the American Zionist Policy Committee to bring about my return to the leadership of the Council and to fight for a program "in which timidity, appeasement and backstairs 'diplomacy' would have no place." This fighting committee was headed by Abraham Goodman, a veteran Zionist, as chairman. Dr. Neumann was its guiding spirit and chief spokesman on public platforms. Shapiro and Manson

were joined by two other staff members of the Emergency Council, Abraham Tuvim and Harry Steinberg. Together they assumed full executive direction of the work of the Zionist Policy Committee and its nationwide campaign of information on the vital issues involved in the controversy.

Inasmuch as the work which had to be done was still undone, I was personally determined to unseat the group which had forced my resignation. It was interfering with a program of action which I was confident would lead to the desired goal. ^{TP} The reaction of the Zionist public to what took place was to me both amazing and gratifying. From all parts of the country protests poured in, condemning the people who brought about my enforced resignation. The Zionist masses made their wishes unmistakably clear in resolutions, telegrams, letters and petitions--all calling for my return and for my program of action.

The Jewish press of America particularly sprang to my defense, especially the Yiddish press, and a stream of editorials and articles by the most able and respected Jewish journalists--Jacob Fishman, S. Dingol, M. Rivlin, Leon Crystal, David Pinski, and others--soon appeared. Within a few days of my resignation, an editorial, typical of many which were to follow, appeared in "The Day".

"Under Rabbi Silver's leadership Zionism became an important issue in American politics, and the question of a Jewish Commonwealth became a subject with which the entire public sympathized fully.

"As a consequence, Dr. Silver became the most popular figure in Zionist circles, and it was generally acknowledged that a new star had arisen on the political horizon of Zionism in America... The time of hat-in-hand politics is over. Only an aggressive dynamic policy can lead to success and Rabbi Silver is clearly the man to be entrusted with such a policy... The Emergency Council must be re-organized. Outside influence and political misunderstandings must be set aside and Rabbi Silver must remain at his post to serve the best interests of Palestine and of the Jewish people."

Wrote Jacob Fishman:

"The twelve members of the American Zionist Emergency Council who voted Dr. Abba Hillel Silver out of the leadership of American Zionist political work have demonstrated that they have no desire to heal the dangerous breach in American Zionis. They have also slapped the face of Jewish public opinion, which has, in my opinion, manifested overwhedming opposition to the maneuver aimed at Dr. Silver.

"When one reads the pronouncement at the end of Dr. Israel Goldstein's statement to the effect that 'Zionism is a democratic movement', one feels like asking Dr. Goldstein: when did the Z.O.A. administration receive a mandate from the Zionist membership to carry on a political campaign

directed against Dr. Silver or to seek out his 'sins'? Quite the contrary--at the Convention of the Zionist Organization of America in Atlantic City Dr. Silver's policies were approved unanimously; and the delegates understood already then that a behind-the-scenes campaign was being waged against him by the Z.O.A. administration....

The eminent playwright David Pinski wrote in the "Jewish Morning Journal":

"When Dr. Silver accepted the chairmanship of the Council, expectations ran high everywhere. His subsequent achievements justified all the hopes pinned on him by the Zionist Movement. Under his competent and energetic leadership, the American Zionist Emergency Council really came to life and vigor. How can one account then for his sudden warfare against Dr. Silver and his forced resignation? The contention is that Dr. Silver pursued an aggressive and militant policy which called forth all this antagonism. He is accused of having behaved as if we Jews were really an important power, whereas the others felt that we could only plead

and be^g and hope for mercy and charity. When it was hinted from 'on high' that we ought to postpone our requests for 'a little while', we should not have been insistent. We should have armed ourselves with patience and waited.

"Who is right? Wise or Silver? Which policy is the right one? Perseverance or weak-kneed yielding? Why not consult the sentiments of the Zionist masses, the voice of the people which is the voice of God? Do not the leaders of the American Zionist Organization have any faith in the rank and file of the membership? Is the Palestine Resolution their own private concern?"

The ~~mounting~~ protests increased in volume. Dr. Chaim Weizmann cabled an appeal both to me and Dr. Wise to do everything possible to resolve our differences. On March 26th, I received a letter from Dr. Wise inviting me to attend a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Emergency Council, to which I replied:

"My dear Dr. Wise:

"Permit me to thank you for your letter of March 21st. I appreciate the invitation which you convey to me to attend a meeting in the near future of the Executive Committee of the Emergency Council. I shall try to attend such a meeting although at the present moment I do not know when I will be in New York again. I only returned this morning from a week's stay in New York.

"I would be lacking in frankness if I were to leave you with the impression that my remaining a member of the Council in any way implies that I accept the present set-up of the Council as either a satisfactory or

permanent arrangement. Since my enforced resignation, the Council, to my best knowledge, has heard from numerous Zionist groups and leaders throughout the country calling for its re-organization. This has also been echoed with remarkable unanimity by the Jewish press.

"On February 21st, Dr. Weizmann cabled both to you and to me an urgent message to do everything humanly possible to resolve the difference and to remove the difficulties thus enabling all Zionists to combine for the urgent task which lies before us. Mr. Lipsky wrote to me on February 26th that he, as a member of the Jewish Agency, had been urged by Dr. Weizmann to make an earnest effort to reconcile the difference that had arisen. On March 2nd, I wrote to Mr. Lipsky that 'if Dr. Wise is now of the opinion that the reorganization of the Emergency Council which he precipitated by his resignation was ill-advised, and that the situation now calls for my return under conditions which will enable me to carry on the active political leadership of the Council, I shall be very pleased to meet with him at a time and place mutually agreeable'.

"I have not heard from you as to your intention. This, as I see it, and believe you will agree with me, is the real crux of the matter and not whether I attend one or another meeting of the Executive Council."

The situation in the Zionist ranks became such that on April first the Executive Committee of the Z. O. A. appointed a peace committee to explore the possibilities of resolving the controversy. On June 24th, the committee, ~~under~~ under the chairmanship of Judge Louis E. Leventhal, brought in a report which was adopted. Another committee was then appointed to consult with the other three organizations of the Emergency Council and with me and Dr. Wise with a view of bringing about an all-around agreement.

I insisted upon a re-organization of the Emergency Council which would give my friends in the Council practical control and so insure that my policies would in the future not be thwarted again by a hostile combination within the Council.

When this was agreed to, and the report of the Committee was approved by the Emergency Council on July 12, 1945, I withdrew my resignation and resumed my position as Chairman of the Executive of the Zionist Emergency Council ~~and together with Dr. Wise as Joint Chairman of~~ the Council.

At the conclusion of the meeting I addressed the members of the council:

"I would like to say a word or two on this occasion. This is the first time in six months that I am with you and believe me that I was sad that I was away these six months. I am pleased that the unity we have all wished for has been re-established and that we will be able to proceed with our

mandates from the Jewish people now in wholehearted and strongest cooperation. I regard what has transpired not in any sense as a personal victory. These past six months have been a defeat for all of us and they have been a defeat for our Movement in this country. We will have to work doubly hard to regain some of the ground we have lost.

"I do feel a sense of personal satisfaction at this moment and one of vindication. Beyond that, I have no feeling other than one of profound gratitude that we have found our way back to comradeship and the possibility for united action. I hope that we will all turn our backs on what took place in the last few months and that we will begin to think of ourselves not in terms of friends or foes, or as members of this group or that group, but in terms of comrades working in a common cause...

"I wish to have the opportunity, in cooperation with my Joint Chairman, Dr. Wise, and members of this Council, to work, and I would ask that this work be not made difficult for me. There has been some damage done to the one who is now the Chairman of your Executive Committee. Some damage has been done in Washington to his reputation and his standing with people with whom he will have to deal from now on. That was an unfortunate

thing and it will have to be corrected. I am a tool of the Movement and could function best when the tool is permitted to retain strength. As you build me up, you build up the Movement. As you pull me down, you pull down the Movement. My effectiveness to the Movement depends upon what you say about me, and I hope that all of us will bear it in mind.

"The days ahead are difficult days and stormy days, I am afraid. We will have to do things which will demand of us the sacrifice of many of our subsidiary loyalties. We will have to have courage to act and not to buckle under when we reach a point of consummation....

"That is all that I should like to say at this time. I want to tell Dr. Wise, with whom I hope to work, that I am very happy that we are again finding ourselves in harness and working together. I hope that after all these things, which have happened we will come to understand each other a little better. I think we are both worth getting to know a little better. I am sure that as we get to know each other a little better, all the bogies which have been built up will vanish.

"I pledge the best that is in me, which is not good enough, for our Movement. I demand of you a similar pledge, with all that you have and all that you can give, of mind and heart, to this great cause, which has now entered ~~xxx~~ its final hour of decision. "

Dr. Wise responded:

"I have no desire to go back to the past. We had differences. They are now relegated to the limbo. We begin anew to work together.

"Dr. Silver used a phrase which I hope we will all bear in mind. I hope that the press will not begin tomorrow to speak of triumphs, the victories, the defeats.

We are going to work together. Dr. Silver, you pledged us your heartfelt services in every sense. Nobody in this room is foolish enough to deny that you have a great service to render, your ability, your ideals, your capacity for leadership. We want your leadership and we also want your comradeship. We ask for friendship. I pray to God that a year hence we may say that the great decision in favor of our people came a little sooner because the masses of American Zionists were united on this blessed night."

Three months later, on October 20, 1945, a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Emergency Council voted almost unanimously to proceed with the re-introduction of the Congress Resolution -- even if it were not approved by the Chief Executive. By now the Roosevelt correspondence with Ibn Saud had been made public. "...

The Resolution was introduced on October 26, 1945, and was overwhelmingly adopted by the Senate on December 17th and by the House on the 19th.

Dr. Neumann was very active in the ^{last}~~few~~ days before its passage. I was in Palestine at the time.

Senator Taft wrote me on December 19, 1945, that he was not entirely satisfied with the terms of the Resolution--it had been watered down--but on the whole, he did not believe they will detract from the tremendous advantage of having Congress adopt it. This is how I felt about it, too.

Commenting on the passage of the Palestine Resolution, Mr. Sumner Welles, in his book, "Where Are We Heading", writes:

"The position taken by the legislative branch of the Government was firm, tonic and enlightened as has often been the case in recent months. The Congress favored a foreign policy that was far more positive than that of the Executive, and far more likely to further a healthy world reconstruction."

At the annual convention of the Zionist Organization of America which was held later that year in Atlantic City, I was elected President of the organization by acclamation. The man who enthusiastically seconded my nomination was Dr. Stephen S. Wise...

Commenting on my election, the "Haaretz" of Palestine wrote on November 21st: "The election of Dr. Silver is both a personal victory and a vindication of his policy... Recent events have shown that our hope of obtaining anything by action behind the scenes and reliance on vague promises have not come true. Our new way therefore must be that of struggle and Dr. Silver's election proves that the Zionist Movement in America recognizes this fact, and is preparing itself for the struggle."

Following the Zionist Convention in Atlantic City, I went to Palestine on November 24, 1945, to attend the sessions of the World Zionist Executive and the Jewish Agency for Palestine. I was most warmly received everywhere. I visited the scenes of recent British military attacks at Givat Haim, Shefayim and Rishpon. I attended a great gathering in the Mograbi Theatre in Tel-Aviv on December 7th. I told the people: "This is only the first round of the struggle."

Earlier that year, in August, 1945, I attended the Zionist Conference in London. The war was now over and the leaders of the Movement gathered from all parts of the world to plan their future course. The delegates took stock of the appalling disaster which the war had brought upon European Jewry, of the millions destroyed, and the countless survivors of the holocaust who were homeless and were seeking a new home. The delegates were in an angry mood, because the gates of the Jewish National Home were not open to admit these helpless refugees. The Jews of Palestine were in open revolt against the mandatory government because of its closed-door policy and the government was employing brutal repressive measures against them. A dramatic episode at one of the sessions revealed an open rift between the President of the World Zionist Organization and the Chairman of its Executive. A speech by Dr. Weizmann at the conclusion of the general debate was taken as an expression of his disbelief in the possibility of attaining the objective of a Jewish State. Ben Gurion strode angrily to the platform and declared that in making his statement, Dr. Weizmann did not speak for the Jewish People.

The Conference re-affirmed the principles of the Biltmore program. It proclaimed its full endorsement of the request which the Jewish Agency had previously made to His Majesty's Government "that an immediate decision be announced to establish Palestine as a Jewish State". It called for the immediate abrogation of the White Paper. It asked the new Labor Government which had just then come into power for one hundred thousand immigration certificates. The delegates were greatly heartened by the fact that there was now a new government in Great Britain. The Labor Party, which was victorious in the elections, was known as a friend of Zionism. It had time and again passed strong pro-Zionist resolutions and had called for the abrogation of the White Paper.

I was a member of the committee, whose chairman was David Ben-Gurion, which called on the new Colonial Secretary, Mr. G. H. Hall, and presented

to him our program and our request. We were graciously received and were told that our request would be given prompt consideration.

But we were soon in for a shattering disillusionment. The Labor Government before long shockingly repudiated the position which the Labor Party had taken. It denied our request for one hundred thousand certificates. It announced no fundamental change in the White Paper policy of the former government. It would permit, for the time being, fifteen hundred immigrants a month to enter the country. It turned down the request which President Truman had made in a letter to the Prime Minister on August 31st for the admission of one hundred thousand refugees. The Attlee government was determined to preserve the same policy after the war which the Churchill government had pursued during the war on the ~~pretex~~^{alleged ground} of the war and the possible military dangers in the Near East.

It was at this juncture that I fully realized the utter hopelessness of continuing our negotiations with Great Britain in the hope that it would see the error of its way, and would adopt a course of action in consonance with its obligations under the mandate. In consequence, I turned away from the Weizmann line of so-called "moderation". Moderation had yielded us nothing, except what we ourselves had built in Palestine in the face of constant British interference and harassment. Now that the war was over, there was no longer any fear of embarrassing an embattled nation fighting the enemies of all civilization -- the Nazis. There was now the stark reality of the hundreds

of thousands of their victims who were languishing in Displaced Persons' camps-- clamoring to be allowed to go to Palestine--and the mandatory government unlawfully keeping them out. There must be a change! The Gordian knot had to be cut! I had followed Weizmann fairly consistently through the years, with the exception of the one brief Brandeis interlude, and our difference over the Peer Report which had proposed an unsatisfactory partition. I could follow him no longer.

I had come around to the position that Great Britain must give up the Mandate over Palestine and that the United Nations Organization should be asked to take up the Palestine problem. I had expressed this view publicly even before the Labor Party's betrayal. I was now firmly convinced of it.

Upon my return from the London Zionist Conference we resumed the battle against the White Paper and Mr. Bevin.

In contemplating the possibility that the issue might be presented to the United Nations I had thought of addressing ourselves not only to the Western democracies, but also to Moscow. I had intimated as much publicly and was roundly attacked in a part of the Jewish press for entertaining such a thought. Subsequent events proved me right.

On September 23rd, Dr. Wise and I issued a statement which declared that the Jewish people would resist to the bitter end the reported British decision to continue the White Paper policy. In order to give voice to the indignation of American Jewry at this betrayal, a demonstration was held at short notice at Madison Square Garden on September 30th, which was filled with a capacity audience of twenty-two thousand, together with a gathering outside of forty-five thousand more. Mass demonstrations were also held in many other large centers throughout the country.

On October 2nd, ten United States Senators of both parties denounced the decision of Great Britain on the floor of the Senate and on October 16th, seventeen Congressmen spoke in a similar vein on the floor of the House. An emergency conference of Zionist leaders was called to meet in Washington to which one hundred and eighty cities sent representatives. These called on their Senators and Representatives in Congress. The leaders of American Labor, William Green and Philip Murray, sent strongly worded cables to Prime Minister Attlee. An "Open Letter to Mr. Attlee" appeared in forty newspapers in the United States. Outstanding spokesmen of liberal, pro-labor elements in the United States sent a cable to Prime Minister Clement Attlee in which they expressed their shock and indignation at the position taken by the Labor Government.

Harry Truman was now President of the United States. President Roosevelt had died on April 12, 1945.

Truman's position on Zionism was not clear to us. He had favored the Senate Resolution calling for a Jewish Commonwealth when it was introduced in the Senate in December, 1944. But at that time he was not President.

Early in his presidency, he was advised by the State Department to follow the Roosevelt line on Palestine. In his "Memoirs", Truman writes:

"I had before me President Roosevelt's records and statements regarding Palestine. And the Secretary of State had sent me a special communication two days before, expressing the attitude and the thinking of the State Department on Palestine.

"It is very likely", this communication read, "that efforts will be made by some of the Zionist leaders to obtain from you at an early date some commitments in favor of the Zionist program which is pressing for unlimited Jewish immigration

into Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish state. As you are aware, the Government and people of the United States have every sympathy for the persecuted Jews of Europe and are doing all in their power to relieve their suffering. The question of Palestine is, however, a highly complex one and involves questions which go far beyond the plight of the Jews in Europe.

"There is continual tenseness in the situation in the Near East", the communication concluded, "largely as a result of the Palestine question, and as we have interests in that area which are vital to the United States, we feel that this whole subject is one that should be handled with the greatest care and with a view to the long-range interests of the country.

Truman resolved to follow the Roosevelt line (p. 68).

Prior to his departure for the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, he was requested to take up the matter of Palestine with the world leaders who would be there, especially with Prime Minister Attlee. Upon his return on August 16th, he was asked at a Press Conference whether anything about the Jewish National Home had been discussed at Potsdam. He replied that it was. When he was asked what the American view on Palestine was, he replied, "The American view on Palestine is, we want to let as many of the Jews into Palestine as it is possible to let into that country. Then the matter will have to be worked out diplomatically so that if a State can be set up there, they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis. I have no desire to send five hundred thousand (sic!) American soldiers there to make peace in Palestine.

This was not reassuring. President Truman had evidently been impressed by what he had been told by the British at Potsdam concerning the dangers which would be involved in setting up a Jewish National Home in Palestine, although the war was now over and military reasons could no longer be adduced as an argument against it.

However, on August 31st of that year, President Truman wrote ^{a letter} to Prime Minister Attlee requesting that one hundred thousand certificates for the immigration of Jewish refugees into Palestine be granted. The letter was a fine, human document. The President had read the report of Earl G. Harrison of the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees. The latter had made a personal investigation for the President of the condition of the Jewish survivors in Europe and he reported that for the Jewish survivors in the camps "Palestine is definitely and pre-eminently the first choice", and that any delay in the transfer of these unfortunate people to Palestine would result in misery and death.

This action of President Truman marked a welcome turning point, not to be sure in American policy on Palestine, but on the heretofore sustained policy of doing nothing to help Jews get into Palestine. Regardless of what his position on Zionism was, he was at least trying to do something concrete to help. He found it possible to maintain that the admission of one hundred thousand Jews did not call for prior consultation with the Arabs -- a thought which had never occurred to his predecessor. President Truman's letter marked a real step forward in the direction ^{of} intervening actively in the

Palestine situation in order to put an end to what had developed into a dangerous stalemate.

However, in order to reassure the Arabs who ^{had} bitterly criticized President Truman for making his request for the refugees, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes issued a statement on October 18th, in which he announced that the fundamental policy of the United States Government was that it "will not reach final conclusions with reference to any proposals that would change the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with Jewish and Arab Leaders". Secretary Byrnes further stated that this was the policy of the late President Roosevelt, and he made public the exchange of letters between Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud of March-April, 1945.

When this exchange of letters was made public along with the policy declaration of Secretary Byrnes, we asked for a meeting with Secretary Byrnes and on October 23rd we submitted a Memorandum to him in the name of the American Zionist Emergency Council, in which, among other things, we refuted the false allegations which were made by Ibn Saud about Zionism, and took issue with President Roosevelt's letter, particularly the right it accorded to the various Arab states to be consulted in the affairs of Palestine. In part, ^{our} ~~the~~ Memorandum read:

"The exchange of correspondence between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud which has now been made public and the statement by the Secretary of State of October 18th raise issues of fundamental importance in regard to the implementation of American policy on Palestine.....

President Roosevelt's letter refers to assurances previously given to King Ibn Saud regarding the attitude of the United States with respect to the question of Palestine. The exact nature of these assurances is not disclosed, but it is respectfully submitted that whatever their tenor, they would not be valid if inconsistent with the publicly stated objectives of American policy or with the terms of the Palestine Mandate....

We feel constrained, at the same time, to make a frank statement of our views with regard to the course of action pursued by the Executive branch of the Government and the State Department in particular, over a period of years. Despite the unbroken chain of pro-Zionist ~~acts~~, promises and pronouncements to which we have referred, the policy they express has not been translated into action. On the contrary, numerous acts and omissions have emboldened the Arab leaders to allege that the American Government was, in fact, withholding its support from the Zionist cause, and that the pronouncements made here from time to time were meant for home consumption. We have consistently disregarded these allegations as unwarranted aspersions upon the good faith and political integrity of our Government....."

Prime Minister Attlee did not accede to President Truman's request for a hundred thousand certificates. Instead, he suggested another investigation - a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to investigate the position of the Jews in Europe as well as the situation in Palestine. ~~It was~~ *We viewed*

~~it is only~~ clearly another delaying device and an excuse ~~for~~ *for* inaction. On October 30th,

Dr. Wise and I submitted a statement to the President in which we said:

"Within the last seven years, three major intergovernmental Conferences and Committees, in addition to our own War Refugee Board appointed in 1944 and already dissolved, have sought to deal with the question of Jewish refugees and of Jewish immigration.....

Each of these efforts ended in dismal failure, stemming from the central assumption that the doors of Palestine, unlawfully barred to Jewish immigration by the British Government under the terms of its White Paper of 1939, must remain barred...

"We beg of you not to countenance further commissions and inquiries at a continued cost in human life and human misery, which can only ascertain facts already well known.

"What is urgently needed, is not another roving expedition or a further time-consuming investigation, but immediate concrete measures in conformity with a policy long established and clearly defined by valid international agreements. No inquiry can be acceptable which does not base itself on the internationally recognized right of the Jewish people to reconstitute their National Home in Palestine. For such an International Commission to set out upon its quest without reference to these basic legal and political considerations, is to embark upon a sea without chart or compass, without a point of departure or a port of destination.... It is evident that commissions are not a substitute for action clearly indicated."

President Truman, however, yielded to Attlee's counter-proposal for a joint Committee of Inquiry.

I urged that our Movement should ignore this Committee and not appear before it. However, the World Zionist Executive decided to cooperate with it. It looked hopefully on the prospect of the United States government sharing, for the first time, the responsibility of finding a solution for the Palestine problem with Great Britain. When the Committee held its sessions in Washington, representatives of the Zionist Emergency Council including Dr. Wise and Dr. Neumann made a full presentation of the Zionist Case before it, since this was what the World Zionist Executive had agreed to. I refused to attend. I sensed that the enterprise would result in utter futility--especially since Mr. Bevin had made it very clear that the real purpose of this Committee was to liquidate the Zionist Movement.

I was again branded by the "practical" men in our Movement as a hot-

headed extremist. Months later, an American member of the Committee of Inquiry, Mr. Bartley C. Crum, acknowledged at a public meeting in Madison Square Garden that I had been right in urging rejection of this Committee and that I had correctly evaluated the political situation.

Mr. Sumner Welles, the former Under-Secretary of State, addressing the Maryland Christian Conference on Palestine on May 14, 1946, declared:

"The appointment of the Anglo-American Committee could scarcely have been expected to result in any practical or constructive accomplishment. Commission after commission had already been appointed in the past by British Government to investigate the situation in Palestine and to recommend policy with regard thereto. There was no far-sighted member of the Executive or Legislative branches of the Government of the United States who had studied the problem of Palestine--and as we all know, members of our Congress have gone to Palestine for that purpose--who had not already reached a conclusion as to the nature of the solution which should be sought. Under such

conditions what could the appointment of this new commission really accomplish, other than to make it possible to postpone decisions? And these were months, as we so sadly know, when the pitiful survivors of the Nazi massacres, uprooted from their homes in every part of Europe, were still being compelled to live in intolerable conditions, in concentration camps, with no hope left to them except the possibility that they might be permitted to emigrate to Palestine, or to some other distant shores, and thus procure safety and the chance to make a fresh start in life...

" I know many of the American members of the Anglo-American Committee. I know that they are men of the highest character, of truly liberal convictions, who are incapable of framing or of signing a report in which they, themselves, do not believe. I do not question either their motives or their judgment. What I do question is the wisdom of our own Government in asking them at this time to assume these responsibilities. "

The Committee of Inquiry issued its Report at the end of April, 1946.

When we were apprised of its contents, it became unmistakably clear to us that while the Report had certain positive aspects, in particular a recommendation for the immediate transfer of one hundred thousand Jews from the Displaced Persons' camps to Palestine and the virtual abrogation of the White Paper, its long-term recommendations were not such as could command themselves to the Zionist Movement. In consequence of representations which

we made in Washington, the President, in releasing the text of the Report, issued a statement which drew an important distinction between the immediate and the long-term recommendations in the Report. He declared:

"I am very happy that the request which I made for the immediate admission of one hundred thousand Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed by the Committee of Inquiry. The transfer of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished with the greatest dispatch....in addition to these immediate objectives, the report deals with many other questions of long range political policies and questions of international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement."

This was a sound and statesmanlike position to take. But when Prime Minister Attlee took violent exception to his position, our State Department announced that no immediate action would be taken in behalf of the hundred thousand without first acting on all the other recommendations of the Report. On May 20th, the State Department went through the motion of inviting Arab and Jewish representatives to present their views on the recommendations of the Committee, as if their views were not already fully known. Following this development, Dr. Wise and I met with Secretary of State Acheson and Loy Henderson in what turned out to be a very stormy session. I charged both of them with acting contrary to the clear intentions of the President which they stoutly denied.

Under pressure of public opinion, the President then appointed on June 11th, a Cabinet Committee on Palestine, consisting of the Secretaries of State, War and the Treasury. In so doing, the President declared that

he was appointing this Committee to assist him in the "early consideration of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry", in view of the urgency of the solution of various problems relating to the Jews in Europe and Palestine. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin replied to this action of the President by a speech which he delivered at the British Labor Conference at Bournemouth on June 12th in which he hurled a slur against the Jews of New York and repeated the canard about the Zionists wishing to establish an exclusively racial state in Palestine. At a public protest meeting held in the city of New York on June 12th, 1946, I said:

"When Prime Minister Attlee rejected President Truman's humanitarian request that 100,000 refugee Jews be permitted to enter Palestine at once, he made a counter proposal that a Joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry should be appointed to investigate the situation. The members of the Committee were told by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, that their recommendations would be implemented forthwith if they would be unanimous. The Committee unanimously recommended that 100,000 certificates be authorized immediately for the admission into Palestine of Jews who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and that these certificates be awarded as far as possible in 1946.

The President of the United States declared that he was very happy that the request which he had made had been unanimously endorsed by the Committee. He urged that the transfer of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished "with the greatest dispatch." But the British Government again welshed. Prime Minister Attlee called for the disarming of the Jews of Palestine as a prior condition, which condition the Committee had considered and rejected. He made other unwarranted conditions.

Mr. Bevin declared that "if we put 100,000 Jews into Palestine I would have to put another division of British troops there. I am not prepared to do it." This trumped-up military argument is again trotted out to justify another broken pledge. And this latest act is accompanied by Bevin's cheap slur on the American people and a coarse bit of anti-Semitic vulgarity reminiscent of the Nazis at their worst.

In view of this shocking record of broken pledges and the repeated violation of solemn obligations, American citizens have the right to turn to their representatives in the Congress of the United States, who are now discussing the granting of a loan to Great Britain, and inquire whether the Government of the United States can afford to make a loan to a Government whose pledged word seems to be worthless. They should also inquire whether American money, including that of the Jewish citizens of the United States who have given such superb evidence of their loyalty and patriotism during the war and whose sacrifices helped to save a collapsing British Empire, should be used

to back up a Government whose Foreign Minister has repeatedly given evidence of a virulent anti-Jewish bias.

We question very much whether Mr. Bevin represents the conscience and spirit of the British people but it is up to them to repudiate this maligner and cheap vulgarian, and to demand that someone who more truly represents them should occupy such an important post. "

We were not, of course, opposed to the British loan. We felt, however, that action on it should be delayed until Great Britain had met her responsibilities toward Palestine and had revoked its illegal measures which were keeping hundreds of thousands of our unfortunate war-ravaged refugees from entering the country. The American Government had a clear directive from the Congress of the United States on the subject of the Jewish National Home. It would have been perfectly proper for our government to posit as a prior condition for the granting of a loan to Great Britain, the fulfillment on the part of Great Britain of her international obligations toward the Jewish National Home. Foreign loans are very frequently used by governments, including Great Britain, to achieve political objectives. This is neither improper nor unusual....

The great concern of the Administration and its feverish activity prior to the consideration of the loan in the House, indicated that the passage of the loan was definitely in doubt. Enough of our friends had rallied to our side in addition to those who were opposed to the loan on other grounds to make the postponement of action very likely. Had this happened, I was persuaded that the

government of Great Britain would have acted very quickly. But the unexpected action of Dr. Wise, who in clear disregard of understandings reached in his presence by the Emergency Council, came forth as the champion of the loan in the name of Americanism, demoralized and scattered our friends in Congress. He wrote a letter to Congressman Bloom which was read in the House: "There could be no doubt", wrote the reporter of the "New York Times", "that the statement of Rabbi Wise and other developments of the day strongly improved prospects for approval of the loan."

They could see no sense in voting against an Administration measure to help the Zionist cause when a Zionist leader himself stepped forth as its champion. It was shortly after this beau geste that the measures against the Jewish refugees coming to Haifa were intensified and their deportation to Cyprus began a few weeks after the passage of the British loan. This was Great Britain's grateful quid pro quo.

After another delay, American technical experts were sent to London to meet with British experts and to work out the logistics in connection with the transfer of the hundred thousand. This Committee completed its work, but again nothing happened. Finally, the Cabinet Committee dispatched to London its three deputy members to meet with the British, this time not to get the hundred thousand Jews moving into Palestine, but to work out the implementation of all the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry. Attlee and Bevin had won their point. The results of the labors of these deputy members was the well-known Grady-Morrison Federalization Plan. What the report

recommended was not a plan for implementing the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry, but an utterly new and radically different, substitute plan. It recommended a scheme of provincial autonomy for Palestine wherein the Jewish people would be restricted to an area of some fourteen hundred square miles. Jewish immigration would be permitted in that zone, up to its absorptive capacity which would be determined by the Mandatory power or trustee government. A mockery of self-government was outlined. Great Britain would remain the sole trustee with increased power over an indefinite period. Great Britain would also remain in absolute control of a large zone of its own. The American government was to win the cooperation of the Arabs to this plan by a bribe of three hundred million dollars.

The President was dissuaded at the very last moment, after heroic efforts were made by many friends of our Movement, Jews and non-Jews from giving American approval to this scheme, so palpably wrong-headed, unjust and so violative of the rights of the Jewish people. I characterized this scheme at this time as "a plan for the ghetto^{izing} of the Jews in their own homeland".

It was at this juncture, after the rejection of the Grady-Morrison plan by the American Government, that the Executive of the Jewish Agency, meeting in Paris, came forward with a partition proposal as a solution for the Palestine problem.

The Paris meeting of the Executive was held in a desperate hour for our Movement. Zionist leaders were imprisoned in Latrun, among them were Isaac Ben Zvi and Moshe Shertok. The British Army was taking brutal retaliatory measures against the Yishuv, and there was the danger of more serious clashes to follow. Always present was the tragic plight of fellow-Jews in the camps throughout Europe, pressing for remedial action. In view of all this, one can readily understand the eagerness for finding a quick solution, and the belief that the solution of partition would have wide support in England and the United States--and even among some Arabs, and would be quickly accepted.

I regarded this action of the World Zionist Executive as a serious blunder, a grave error in tactics, if in nothing else. It was not up to us to make partition proposals and they would get us nowhere. The Arabs would regard it as a sign of weakness on our part and would become even more intransigent, and the British government had already indicated in the Grady-Morrison Federalization Plan the kind of settlement which it favored--a settlement so far removed from Executive's own conception of partition, that it rejected the Grady-Morrison plan out of hand.

An emissary of the Jewish Agency, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, was dispatched by the Executive from its meeting in Paris, to sound out Washington, the members of the Cabinet Committee approved the proposals of the Jewish Agency. It was

not made clear by him, however, that our government did not accept them as government policy and did not transmit them to Great Britain as the proposals of the American Government. They were transmitted as the proposals of the Jewish Agency. The President of the United States, before very long, took occasion to point out specifically in a statement issued on August 16th that "although the President has been exchanging views with Prime Minister Attlee on the subject, this government has not presented any plan of its own for the solution of the problem of Palestine." The British Government drew the full implications from this statement of the President. It was not surprising therefore that all the efforts of the Executive of the Jewish Agency in the two months which followed to persuade the British Government to accept partition as a basis for negotiations, failed completely. All the negotiations resulted in nothing, and during these two months, the American Government acted as though it had done all that had been requested of it--it had transmitted the Agency proposals to London--and what more did the Jews want? It gave the impression of having washed its hands of the entire matter, even the subject of the hundred thousand refugees seemed to have been shelved.

The American Zionist Emergency Council again went into action in an intensified campaign. Our purpose was not to elicit another statement from the White House. Of these, the records showed that we have had quite a number. Nevertheless, the pressure of aroused and indignant public opinion was so great that on October 4th, the President did

issue a statement. It was a long statement of some fifteen hundred words in which he reviewed the Administration's efforts regarding Palestine -- a rather unconvincing record. The President strongly urged that in view of the postponement of the London Conference, which ^{1.} ~~Great~~ ^{Britain} had convoked to December 16th, "that substantial immigration into Palestine cannot await a solution to the Palestine problem and that it should begin at once. Preparations for this movement have already been made by this government and it is ready to lend its immediate assistance". This was an admirable statement and in making it, the President went back to the position which he took at the time of the publication of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. He separated the short-term recommendations from the long-term and demanded immediate action where action was immediately imperative.

With reference to the ultimate solution for Palestine, the President took note of the Jewish Agency's proposals to "solve the Palestine problem by means of the creation of a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine, instead of the whole of Palestine". It was his belief that a solution along these lines would command the support of public opinion in the United States. However, the President still did not commit the United States Government to the Agency proposals. "I cannot believe", he stated, "that the gap between the

proposals which have been put forward (the Grady-Morrison plan and the Agency plan) is too broad to be breached by men of reason and good-will. To such a solution our government could give its support. "

In other words, while the United States definitely refused to give its support to the Agency proposals, it was prepared to give its support to a compromise proposal as between partition, which was the Agency proposal, and the Grady-Morrison plan.

This statement which President Truman made on October 4, 1946, called forth a protest from King Ibn Saud who had, on previous occasions, complained to President Roosevelt. President Truman replied on October 28, 1946, in a ^{quite different} ~~very different~~ vein from ^{that} ~~those~~ of President Roosevelt's. In this letter he wrote:

"The Government and the people of the United States have given support to the concept of a Jewish national home in Palestine ever since the termination of the first World War, which resulted in the freeing of a large area of the Near East, including Palestine, and the establishment of a number of independent states which are now members of the United Nations. The United States, which contributed its blood and resources to the winning of that war, could not divest itself of a certain responsibility for the manner in which the freed territories were disposed of, or for the fate of the peoples liberated at that time. It took the position, to which it still adheres, that these peoples should be prepared for self-government and also that a national home for the

Jewish people should be established in Palestine. I am happy to note that most of the liberated peoples are now citizens of independent countries. The Jewish national home, however, has not as yet been fully developed.

"It is only natural, therefore, that this Government should favor at this time the entry into Palestine of considerable numbers of displaced Jews in Europe, not only that they may find shelter there but also that they may contribute their talents and energies to the upbuilding of the Jewish national home."

On December 7, 1946, just prior to the holding of the World Zionist Congress in Basle and by way of inducing the Zionist Congress to participate in the London Conference which the British Government had called, Secretary Byrnes announced that he had held several conferences with Mr. Bevin on the Palestine situation and has had an exchange of letters with him. Byrnes *wrote:* ~~had written:~~ "The Jewish leaders, with whom I have recently conferred, regardless of views formerly held by them, now regard the partition proposal as the most practical long-term solution. My opinion is that before agreeing to attend the Conference in January, they would want to be assured specifically that the partition proposal favored by them, would be fully considered by His Majesty's Government."

In his reply Mr. Bevin assured the Secretary of State that "all proposals made by the Arab, Jewish and British delegations at the Conference will be given equal status on the Conference agenda. His Majesty's Government do not regard themselves as committed in advance, to their own proposals.

Nor, of course, are they prepared to commit themselves in advance to any other proposals". He would go no further.

Secretary Byrnes also announced that the United States Government would have an observer at the London Conference, and he advised the Jews to attend it....

When Mr. Bevin was in New York City on November 20th, I saw him twice at the Waldorf-Astoria in the presence of the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel. I discussed the Palestine situation with him fully. The sum and substance of all that he would tell me was no different from what he later told Byrnes.

At the very outset Mr. Bevin showed me a "formula" dated September 14, 1946, sent to him by Nahum Goldmann, stating that the Jewish Agency would attend the London Conference to discuss the solution of the Palestine problem (no condition of ours ~~for~~ partition as a basis for discussion which was contained in Dr. Weizmann's letter to the Colonial Secretary of September 4 is mentioned). He asked me whether I knew about it. I told him that I did not. I knew only of the letter of Dr. Weizmann where a condition was clearly stated. I told him that no one had any authority to offer such a formula. I read to him the pertinent extracts from Dr. Chaim Weizmann's two letters to Mr. Hull.

I told him what the situation would be at the forthcoming Zionist Congress. Great Britain had not accepted the Anglo-American Commission report. Great Britain was unwilling to implement the full purpose of the mandate -- a Jewish National Home in the whole of Palestine. The Grady-Morison proposals were rejected by the American Government and by the Jewish Agency. The Agency in an effort to end what it regarded as a deadlock offered to make a great sacrifice by proposing the establishment of a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine, i.e. partition. Many of us thought that the decision of the Agency was most unwise; that such a sacrifice should never be demanded of the Jewish people since two-thirds of Palestine have already been cut away when Transjordan was set up as an Arab state, and that tactically it was a blunder to make such a proposal in its own name rather than wait to consider such a proposal when put forward as a compromise solution by Great Britain.

Nevertheless, if even this proposal which represents the irreducible minimum is not accepted in principle by Great Britain, there would be nothing left for the Zionist Congress to do but to repudiate the action which was taken by the Executive, reaffirm our full legal rights to Palestine and refuse to go to the London Conference. The situation would then remain in its present tragic stalemate, and conditions in Palestine would deteriorate. To this Bevin replied that Great Britain had very much an open mind on the subject of partition; that he is not prepared to give a definite answer, and that the Cabinet was considering it.

Bevin spoke of the disturbances in Palestine and of the Agency's connections with them. He mentioned Shertok. I pointed out to him how tragic it was that men of the noble type of Shertok were treated as enemies by Great Britain, and that the very people who most closely represent the social and economic philosophy of the British Labor Government are being singled out by that Government as enemies and criminals.

I mentioned the effort of the Hagana to pacify the country. Mr. Bevin stated that it is much better now. I reminded him that the Hagana and the Jewish Agency would not be able, by themselves, to achieve the pacification of the country as long as the Government continues its present policy of keeping the doors of Palestine closed.

Mr. Bevin spoke of the fears of the Arabs that the Jews would crowd into the country, that is, into the Jewish State after partition, and would overflow into the surrounding Arab country. I stated that the Arabs had no reason to complain of

crowding. They have 1,200,000 square miles of territory as against Palestine's 10,000. Their territory was under-populated. With proper agricultural and industrial development the territories of the Arab states could support a population ten times their present size. I reminded him that five Arab states had been established since the First World War, one carved out of Palestine. The promises made to them had been almost entirely fulfilled, and the promises made to the Jewish people had been entirely ignored. What did the Arabs do to earn their political independence, and how have the Jews been repaid for the great sacrifices which they made? Has the time not already come, and long since overdue, to fulfill the pledges made to the Jewish people?

I urged upon Mr. Bevin that a courageous statesmanship is now called for, and that he and his Government should take the initiative in breaking the log-jam. America is prepared to go along to give its fullest political and economic support. Mr. Bevin replied that he would very much like to have the United States take over the mandate, or the UN. As on the previous occasion I expressed serious doubts as to whether Great Britain really wished to have the United States or the UN take over the trusteeship. I read to Mr. Bevin the statement of the British Labor Party on Palestine made at its annual conference in December 1944. Mr. Bevin stated that it sounded like Harold Lasky. He himself, he stated, had never committed himself on the subject.

I stated to Mr. Bevin that in my judgment formal conferences will lead to no results unless there are preliminary understandings. Surely he did not want us to go through the motions if the prospect of a satisfactory settlement were not in sight. The Palestine subject is certainly not new. All proposals are very well known and have been for years. Few new arguments are likely to be presented. What is called for now is for Great Britain to make up its mind and to let us know.

Mr. Bevin stated that he would discuss the Palestine matter with Secretary Byrnes. He indicated further that his Government had been approached by Jewish leaders in London asking for the postponement of the London Conference. He said that as far as he is concerned he had no objection to postponement due to pressure of work in connection with UNO.

Mr. Bevin referred to Jews and Arabs as kindred people and that this might account for their fighting one another. I told him of the friendly relations which had existed between these people through many centuries when Jews, who fled from Christian persecution, found haven in Arab lands, and that these two peoples could be friends again as soon as the legitimate national aspirations of both are fully satisfied.

My own position on the subject of partition and my differences with the Executive of the World Zionist Organization I stated fully at the Z. O. A. Atlantic Convention, October 26, 1946.

"The action of the Executive of the Jewish Agency which was taken in Paris on August 5th to the effect that 'it is prepared to discuss a proposal for the establishment of a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine', must in the last analysis be judged by its results. Results so far have been entirely negative. The high hope which was entertained by the members of the Executive that their partition proposal, constituting as it did 'a supreme sacrifice in order to facilitate an immediate lasting settlement', to quote the words of Dr. Chaim Weizmann's letter to the British Colonial Secretary, would be quickly accepted and would help to clear up the dangerous political log-jam which had developed, did not materialize.

"I am inclined to believe that the action of the Executive was an error of judgment. It had not consulted the Actions Committee which alone had the authority to act for our Movement in the interimⁱⁿ between Congresses.

In the absence of any such action, there was but one binding policy to guide the Movement, ^{reaffirmed} the one which was ~~reapproved~~ as late as August, 1945 by the Zionist Conference in London. This policy was opposed to

partition. 'There can be no solution', stated the London Political Resolution, 'to the inseparable twin problems of the Jewish people and Palestine, except by constituting it, undivided and undiminished, as a Jewish State in accordance with the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration'.

"This policy, by the way, is still the only authentic and binding policy for the Zionist movement. There is no other, and there will be no other, until the World Zionist Congress alters or revises it. When and if it does, it will be binding upon everyone who recognizes and accepts its authority.

" We questioned the wisdom of the Executive of the Jewish Agency to make the radical decision which it did make and to proceed to act forthwith upon it in its contacts with governments, without first receiving approval of either the Smaller or Larger Actions Committee, not to speak of the Congress itself. Our movement was thus confronted with a fait accompli. The explanation which has been given that the situation called for the greatest speed has not been established by subsequent events. The Executive did move rapidly and precipitously but moved toward nothing. We are not unmindful of the sincere and honorable motives which moved the members of the Executive in Paris to make their decision. The tragic plight of European Jewry, the desperate position of the refugees and the mood of the beleaguered Yishuv, all undoubtedly were factors in the decision. Nevertheless, as events have demonstrated, their decision did not correct any of these tragic situations."

".... We felt that it would be a colossal political blunder for us to announce publicly that the Zionist movement proposes to sacrifice one-half of Palestine

in order to retain the other half. Once that is done, a partitioned Palestine becomes our maximal position, from which Governments may properly ask us in the name of reasonableness and compromise to recede still further.

This over, partition proposals would be still further whittled down.

"But if nothing was gained, something substantial was lost, I am afraid. A partitioned Palestine now represents our maximum Zionist demands, both in London and in Washington and in the Arab world. Our own government now suggests a still further compromise, not as between the Biltmore program and partition, but between partition and cantonization. From now on anyone who will go to Washington to talk with officials about a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth in the whole of Palestine -- and this, mind you, is still the official position of our movement -- will, I am afraid, be laughed out of court....

"We have not succeeded in achieving the Biltmore program, but we have also failed to achieve partition. Wherein then have the so-called pro-partisan moderates scored over the Biltmore extremists?

"If it is true that the present Government of Great Britain is unwilling to grant us statehood in even a part of Palestine, and the record of the present British Government is very clear on this subject, what point is there in making one grand gesture of renunciation after another and in publicly proclaiming our readiness for supreme sacrifices when our gestures are disdained and our sacrifices are contemned!

have these negotiations, I ask, yielded a single response of fairness and generosity on the part of the Government?

"How long can we follow ~~along~~ this road of renunciation and abnegation without tearing the heart out of our movement?

"Something else has been lost, I am afraid. In their eagerness to persuade the Governments of Great Britain and the United States to accept partition, the spokesmen of the Jewish Agency quite naturally praised their proposal as very reasonable and moderate. The impression accordingly was left with Governments and with the press of the world that those Zionists who remain loyal to the Biltmore plan, to the classic Zionist program, to the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, are unreasonable and extremists. It was not long before reports began to circulate through the press, some of them inspired I am afraid by some of our own people, reports emanating from Paris or London, to the effect that a sharp struggle exists in the Zionist movement between the moderates and the extremists, that the Jewish Agency represents the temperate and the moderate wing of the movement, and that certain Zionists, principally ~~the~~ Zionists of the United States, represent the extremists. Your president was singled out time and again as the spokesman of these intransigent extremists. My resignation from the Executive of the Jewish Agency *(over this issue)* was interpreted in the public press in this manner: 'If his resignation goes through, it will be regarded as a new sign of growing "moderate" influence in the Jewish Agency top ranks.' As recently as two weeks ago there appeared an inspired newspaper column in the Washington Post which quoted an anonymous administration source to the effect that the purpose of President Truman's statement of October 4th was to strengthen the influence of the so-called moderates in the Zionist Organization of America against the so-called extremists under Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver.

"Those Zionists all over the world who have been loyally following the classic Zionist line, have overnight become extremists. Even some Zionists are falling into this unsuspected trap and are accepting this piece of idiotic perversion....

"Dr. Nahum Goldmann may consider sixty percent of Palestine as a reasonable and moderate goal, but a spokesman of the Foreign Office in London, commenting on his moderate and reasonable proposal, stated that ' The Foreign Office has noted with interest a plan under which thirty percent of the population of Palestine would occupy sixty-five percent of the territory'. Dr. Goldmann himself is fearful that his moderate and reasonable plan will be regarded as extreme by the British Government, and he sees no other alternative but extreme violence against the British Government within a few weeks. So even the partition plan cannot be carried out without the threat of violence, and violence is not the counsel of moderation.

" I reject with contempt all those who unctuously and mendaciously suggest to Governments or to the public press that those Zionists who do not favor partition are dangerous extremists, and that partition must be accepted lest the movement fall into their hands. The Zionists who remain loyal to the classic Zionist Program, who demand that Great Britain fully and honorably discharge the obligations which it had assumed voluntarily as the Mandatory Government of Palestine, the Zionists who are not stampeded by the emergencies of the hour and who do not believe that either the Yishuv or the Jewish people are so weary and shaken as to be prepared to accept any settlement however cruelly unjust, these Zionists I maintain are not extremists. They are the proud and loyal followers of Herzl, Nordau and Ussishkin and of all the splendid men and women who by the sweat of their brows and blood of their hearts have in the last fifty years been building Eretz Israel. Courage, faith and persistence even under the most desperate conditions are not extremism, and defeatism is not to be confused with moderation.

"When proposals will be made to us by Governments which we will find truly reasonable and which will meet our fundamental needs and satisfy our national aspirations and our sense of justice, the whole movement will be prepared, I am sure, to give them every serious consideration. But such proposals have definitely not been made to us by anyone. So far they represent the wishful thinking of certain Zionists who have begun to act, in relation to the Zionists who disagree with them, as if partition were actually in the bag. Sound and just proposals are bound to be made to us sooner or later, if we do not lose our nerve, and if we are not misled by artful political manipulators who outsmart themselves.

"Until such time there is nothing else for us to do but to carry on as energetically and determinedly as heretofore, insisting upon our historic

and legal rights to Palestine, our rights under the Mandate. There are no other legal or political realities in the situation, at present. There are no partition proposals before the Zionist movement. It is along the line of our historic claims and legal rights to the whole of Palestine that we must continue our struggle--and unfortunately the whole of Palestine has now come to mean one-third of Palestine, for we have already been victimized by catastrophic partition in 1922 when Transjordan was torn away."

Shortly before I left for the World Zionist Congress in Basle, a spokesman for the Arab Office declared that Arab leaders would refuse to attend any more Palestinian Conferences with the British dealing with the partition of the Holy Land, and that Arab leaders would refuse to attend any meeting at which Zionists were present....

The final months of 1946 and the early months of 1947 were to be the most decisive for our Movement. In December, 1946, the World Zionist Congress finally repudiated the Weizmann line and refused to follow his leadership any longer. In February, 1947, Bevin's policies collapsed. Following the failure of the London Conference, he was compelled to make an announcement in the House of Commons that Great Britain ^{was} ~~is~~ referring the Palestine problem to the United Nations. Thus the man who had earlier ~~declared that "he"~~ "staked his reputation on solving the Palestine problem" and went about it in the clumsiest way conceivable, confessed in the House of Commons that "his efforts to solve the problem had been thwarted by a person named Earl Harrison, by certain New York Jews and by -- President Truman".

This decision of Ernest Bevin was the fortunate break-through for which our Movement had been waiting and it came most unexpectedly. In a sense, Bevin in his hostility proved to be the greatest benefactor of our Movement since Balfour.... We were now able to enter new and ampler dimensions. We could now face a world tribunal where our historic claims would be considered afresh, and the final arbiters would be not a confused and insensate Foreign Office, but the judgment and conscience of mankind. The political battleground now shifted from London to Washington which could now act more independently, and to Flushing and Lake Success.

I attended the 22nd World Zionist Congress which convened in Basle in December, 1946. It was, perhaps, the most crucial in Zionist history. It was the first since the war ended and it met in the very city where the immortal Herzl, fifty years before, had convoked the first Zionist Congress. Delegates from nearly all parts of the world, except from behind the Iron Curtain, were in attendance.

The main issue was the question whether the Jewish Agency should send representatives to the London Conference which was to meet the following month and thus continue negotiations with the British Government in the face of all that had transpired and was even then transpiring in Palestine.

Those who were opposed to participation insisted that conditions in Palestine must first change, as well as the attitude of the Government, before the Agency could attend another conference which they felt was but another delaying device.

The debate, which lasted several days was prolonged and stormy. All the leaders of the Movement participated in it. All parties had their spokesmen. Each spoke with the deep earnestness which the occasion warranted and with the intensity of his convictions. Among the Americans, ^{Stefan} ~~Dr.~~ Wise spoke eloquently in defense of ~~Dr.~~ Weizmann's position, although many American delegates did not share his viewpoint. ~~Dr.~~ Emanuel Neumann called for new men and new methods to lead the Zionist Movement and demanded the elimination of "Vichy defeatism in favor of the Dunkerque spirit". He ~~spoke brilliantly~~ with his ~~customary clarity and logic~~. ~~I spoke in criticism of the position which had been~~

I spoke twice at the Congress. In my second address I gave my reasons for criticizing the partition position which had been taken by the Executive -- the reasons which I stated in the previous chapter, and I explained my opposition to going to the London Conference.

I dwelt at considerable length on the importance of tactics.

In diplomatic, as in physical warfare, I said, battles are frequently won or lost by good or bad strategy.

Assuming that the Executive was right in its decision, was it tactically sound to proclaim to the world that we will accept partition? As soon as this was announced, partition became the Jewish solution, and therefore, unavailable as a compromise solution. There were many ways open to the Executive to learn whether ~~such a solution~~ ^{partition} would be favorably regarded by Great Britain or the United States. It required no formal action which was sure to become known to the world within twenty-four hours.

If, at least, the manoeuvre of the Executive had succeeded in getting Great Britain to accept partition as a basis for discussion at the London Conference, its advocates might be justified, but Great Britain has not accepted. Every effort in the past few months on the part, both of friends and foes, of partition to get Great Britain to accept the Agency proposal as a basis, failed. The United States, too, did not accept the Executive's proposal, nor did it succeed in persuading Great Britain to accept it.

Because the Executive had made a public offer of partition, it had to insist, in order to protect the Movement, upon an absolute condition, a sine qua non. It would not attend the London Conference unless its proposal of partition was accepted as the basis for discussion. Had the Executive not hastened to make any partition proposal to Great Britain and the United States, it could have considered the question of going or not going to the London Conference on its merits -- whether more could be gained by going than by staying away. If it had decided to go to the Conference, it would undoubtedly present to it the full Zionist program, even as the Arabs would present theirs. Perhaps out of the deliberations at the Conference some satisfactory compromise solution would then evolve. But this was no longer possible as soon as the Executive proposal became public, because this proposal represented its absolute 'irreducible minimum' beyond which the Movement could not go. How can one go to a Conference to negotiate on an 'irreducible minimum'?....

Ben Gurion, the Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, was somewhat ambiguous at the Congress. He and his Party approved of partition and favored participation in the London Conference, but he personally was unhappy over Weizmann's leadership, and differed with him sharply on the subject of resistance. Accordingly, he sparred forensically....

Dr. Weizmann spoke at the opening of the Congress and again at the conclusion of the general debate.

I listened to his rebuttal at the conclusion of the debate with rapt attention. At times I was deeply moved by it. Dr. Weizmann threw his heart and soul into this speech. It was by way of an 'apologia pro vita sua'. The inner fire of the Weizmann of the earlier days was there, although he was now seventy-three. He reasoned, pleaded, scorned, and castigated his opponents with biting sarcasm -- the extremists, the unrealistic romanticists, the terrorists and activists in Palestine. I came in for my share of reproof. "It is easy to live in Cleveland and tell the youth of Palestine to go shed their blood." Of course, the youth of Palestine had never waited upon my bidding or my approval....

The American delegation felt constrained to issue a statement later expressing its deep resentment "at the offensive remarks concerning American Zionism's support of Haganah and its resistance activities, coming as they did from one who must be fully aware that the Zionists of America were repeatedly called upon by authoritative spokesmen of the Yishuv to give their utmost support to the responsible Jewish resistance movement in Palestine".

I stated my position at the Congress on the subject of resistance. "We believe in resistance to the illegal acts of the Mandatory power. The way to end resistance is to open the doors of Palestine.

"We must, in every way, support the Yishuv in its struggle against the attempt of the Mandatory Government to liquidate the Jewish National Home.

By maximum financial and moral support, we must strengthen the Yishuv's power of resistance. The Yishuv must, in the last analysis, decide for itself the form and the timing of its resistance to British lawlessness in Palestine. But, whatever their decision -- we will stand by them. We must insure, regardless of cost, continued Jewish immigration into Palestine."

Weizmann fought hard in his speech which was to be the peroration to his long and distinguished career. But for what? For a policy of continued cooperation with the British Government which had betrayed him and the Jewish people time and time again! How did his policy of moderation pay off? An historic cross-road had been reached and he -- the astute statesman -- was somehow unaware of it. He was the captive of his own "line" which he had followed faithfully all his life. He could see no other!

Dr. Weizmann remained pro-British in his political orientation, even when it had become clear to many of us that Great Britain had no intention to carry out the mandate either in letter or in spirit and that a new political orientation was called for. Not that Dr. Weizmann accepted tamely and submissively the progressive whittling away on the part of British governments of the clear terms of the mandates. Frequently he voiced his bitter criticism and his indignation at his own government in strong and courageous terms. And one, as in the case of the Passfield White Paper of 1930, which aimed at a suspension of Jewish immigration altogether and the introduction

strict restrictions upon land acquisition as well as the curtailment of the authority of the Jewish Agency, Dr. Weizmann in protest resigned his office as president of the Jewish Agency along with Felix Warburg who at that time was chairman of the Council of the ~~large~~^{enlarged} Jewish Agency.

But, Dr. Weizmann could not at any time envisage a full break with Great Britain.

Years later, Ben-Gurion was to write: "From the White Paper of 1939, until the U.N. decision in 1947, Dr. Weizmann was beset by a gnawing inner confusion and stress, and I believe that he failed to find his way."

At Basle, this inner confusion and stress were sadly in evidence.

I was appointed Chairman of the important Political Committee. We met for five days and nights and finally hammered out a set of fifteen resolutions which I presented to the Congress plenum on the evening of December 23rd in an electric atmosphere of extreme tenseness.

The resolution confirming the principles of the Biltmore Declaration and calling for the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth was adopted. So was the resolution denouncing the 1939 White Paper and calling for continued resistance to its policies. A resolution which condemned terrorism,

murder, and the shedding of innocent blood as a means of political warfare was also adopted.

The critical resolutions upon which the fate of Weizmann's leadership depended was, ~~of course~~, the one on participation in the London Conference. Dr. Weizmann had made it clear that he wanted the Congress to approve of participation and to give him a free hand to negotiate. The Political Committee had by a vote of twenty-two to sixteen adopted a resolution opposing participation. The resolution read: "The Congress resolves that in the existing circumstance, the Zionist Movement cannot participate in the London Conference. If a change should take place in the situation, the General Council of the Zionist Organization (The Actions Committee) shall consider the matter and decide whether to participate in the Conference or not."

A furious debate followed the introduction of this resolution. The minority parties introduced resolutions of their own. They were all voted down. Various parliamentary maneuvers were employed to defer action on the majority resolution of the Political Committee, to refer it to the incoming Executive, or to adopt a voting procedure which would keep the majority sentiment of the Congress against participation from effectively registering itself. All this proved unavailing.

The vote was finally taken -- 171 for the resolution and 154 against. Most of the General Zionists, the Mizrachi, the Revisionists and some independent labor delegates voted for it. Almost solidly against it were the Mapai, the Hadassah, and some General Zionists.

Th Congress adjourned without electing a President or an Executive. Dr. Weizmann, since his policy failed of approval, would not and could not be re-elected President, but the Congress elected no one in his place. The Actions Committee, after the Congress ended, elected a coalition executive. David Ben-Gurion was made Chairman of the World Zionist Executive with headquarters in J_erusalem. Two other sections were established, one in London and the other in the United States. I was elected Chairman of the Executive for the United States. Moshe ^{Shertok}~~Sharett~~ remained head of the political department of the Executive but stationed in the United States. The other members of the American section were Dr. Emanuel Neumann (General Zionists), Mrs. Rose Halprin (Hadassah), Hayim Greenberg (Laborites), and Rabbi Wolf Gold (Mizrachi).

The Partition emissary, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, who was responsible for my resignation from the Executive on August 4th, was shifted to London, but before long found his way back again to New York.

It was not long, of course, before the members on the newly elected Executive, who had favored participation, began a series of informal and private talks in London with the British Government, looking to a "change in the situation" which would make it possible for the Movement to participate in the London Conference. This was technically violative of the Congress resolution but could be justified on the basis of a broad construction of the resolution. I had little hope of their success.

In view of the exploratory talks which the Agency representatives were conducting in London in the hope of bringing about "a change in the situation", I thought it advisable upon my return from Basle to call upon the British Ambassador in Washington and our Secretary of State.

I reported to the Ambassador on what had taken place at the Congress and the reasons for the resolution which was adopted there. I told them that the resolution not to go to the London Conference was a conditional resolution predicated on existing conditions, and that if conditions would change, the movement would stand ready to go to the Conference. I pointed out that the next move was up to Great Britain. It could indicate a change in the situation either by word -- by promising to establish the Jewish State or by revoking the White Paper -- or by deed -- by starting to move the one hundred thousand refugees. The Ambassador believed the first unlikely since it would prevent the Arabs from coming into the Conference, but he thought well of the second suggestion and said that he would forward the idea to Foreign Secretary Bevin.

The interview with Secretary Byrnes was along similar lines and Mr. Byrnes appeared much impressed with the possibility of the second suggestion, that of moving the one hundred thousand refugees at once. He told me that he would request Lord Inverchapel to transmit to Mr. Bevin his own approval of this suggestion. A few days later I received word from Mr. Byrnes that this had been done:

"Dear Dr. Silver:

Referring to our recent conversation, I advised Ambassador Inverchapel of your views and requested that he communicate them to Mr. Bevin.

I asked the Ambassador to advise Mr. Bevin that I earnestly hoped that he could do something along the lines of your second suggestion, in order to make it possible for you and your associates to attend the conference."

But nothing came of this intervention. Mr. Bevin, as was soon to be revealed, had other plans of his own.

The London Conference met on January 27, 1947. It was attended only by representatives of the Arab States and the Palestine Arabs, but there was a back-door contact between members of the Agency and the British Government. Actually, a series of five long meetings took place in the Colonial Office with the spokesmen of the British Government, its Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, its Colonial Secretary, Mr. Creech Jones, attended by their advisors and assistants. In addition, there were several private talks between single members of the Executive and one or another of the members of the British Cabinet.

The discussions led no-where. The British Government was unwilling to implement the Mandate, nor was it in favor of setting up a Jewish State even in a part of Palestine. Its proposals followed more or less the lines of the Grady-Morrison Plan which Mr. Bevin insisted was "the Bevin Plan"

The Arabs rejected the proposals of the British Government in toto on February 12th and the Agency on February 13th. Whereupon Mr. Bevin informed the House of Commons on February 18, 1947, that the Conference with the Arabs

and the consultations with the Zionist Organization about the future of Palestine have come to an end without any prospect of reaching a settlement.

"That being the case, the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations."

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While the negotiations in London were going on and just prior to Mr. Bevin's announcement, I had a conversation with Dean Acheson which followed a luncheon which I had a few days previously with Mr. Loy Henderson. I suggested to Dean Acheson that the American government should renew its representations to the British, reiterating its ~~own~~ previous stand. Mr. Acheson indicated that he felt that further representations at this time would not be helpful and might even be resented. I suggested to Dean Acheson that if the negotiations in London were in fact concluded and the matter would be referred to the United Nations, it was inevitable that there would be long delays and that in the meanwhile the intolerable situation in the D. P. camps would continue unchanged. Mr. Acheson indicated that he was sure that a change would have to be made by way of increasing the present immigration schedule, but he emphasized that the primary responsibility in regard to Palestine rested on Great Britain. He also indicated that ^{no} one on the "Hill" would favor our military intervention."

At the same time, I requested Senator Taft and Senator Vandenberg to contact the State Department and impress them with the urgency of pressing for the original request made by the President of the United States for one hundred thousand certificates to relieve the situation in the D. P. camps. Senator Taft wrote to General Marshall the following letter:

February 17, 1947

My dear General Marshall:

As you know, I have been interested for a long time in the Palestine problem. While I sympathize with the British difficulties, it seems to me they have not been pursuing either a reasonable or a consistent position. The last proposal made by the British Government does not seem to me to meet in any respect what I understand to be the official position of this Government. In the first place, it does not provide for the admission of a hundred thousand immigrants immediately to relieve the situation in German camps. Instead of that it postpones the whole matter because of Arab objection, until the United Nations meet six months from now. Furthermore, it provides for admission at the rate of only four thousand a month, so that it will be two and a half years before the American suggestion is really complied with.

In the second place, the proposal for partition is not a proposal for partition. Only a shadow of self-government is to be given in the Arab and Jewish areas, and the proposal seems to contemplate a federal state at some time in the future without saying who shall control that state. I have understood that the American Government approved the idea of a partition within a definite time, and complete autonomy for the Jewish territory.

Since the British proposal does not comply with the policy of the American Government in any way, I suggest that proper representation to that effect should be made to the British Government.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ ROBERT A. TAFT

From Senator Vandenburg I received the followed letter dated:

February 17, 1947

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
Cleveland, Ohio

My dear Dr. Silver:

This will acknowledge your note of February 12th.

It goes without saying that I share your disappointment regarding developments at London. On the other hand, perhaps it is just as well that this controversy should head toward the United Nations for settlement if there is no other way out. There must be a conclusion to it somewhere. I am frank to say, however, that I still prefer an immediate determination of the issue on the basis of a viable partition of Palestine.

Since our last talk upon the subject, I have found the occasion to re-emphasize this view to our own State Department and through it to the British Foreign Office.

Thanks for your last visit. You are always welcome.

With warm personal regards and best wishes,

Cordially and faithfully,

/s/ A. H. Vandenberg

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On March 26, 1947, I saw former President Herbert Hoover. I learned that he was leaving for Germany to make a study of the relief situation there. I requested him to visit the D. P. camps while in Germany and to talk with our people there. He was very understanding of the problem and he expressed the belief that Palestine was the proper solution for most of the D. P's.

Upon my return from Basle, the members of the American Section of the Jewish Agency and I set about organizing the office of the Agency in New York and assembling a staff of professional members. We were most fortunate in the men whose services became available. They included Aubrey Eban; Eliahu Epstein (Elath); Moshe Tov; Gideon Rufer (Rafael); Dr. Jacob ~~R~~obinson; Arthur Lourie; Kahane; Lionel Gelber, and others.

In October 1947, a Political Advisory Committee, appointed by the World Executive, arrived in the United States to join us in our deliberations and to assist us in our efforts.

Now that the Palestine problem had been transferred to the United Nations, the bulk of our political work would have to be carried on by the American Section of the Jewish Agency. This Agency would have to prepare our Palestine case before the United Nations. The Emergency Council would be carrying on as heretofore our public relations work in the United States. There was little danger of overlapping since three of the four members of the Executive were also members of the Emergency Council and I was Chairman of both bodies. It was clear to all of us that the country which would play the decisive role in the forthcoming U.N. proceedings would be the United States. The work of the Council would, therefore, be as important as in the past.

Following the 22nd Congress, our Movement may be said to have faced four periods of uncertainty and struggle:

- 1) The period leading up to the London Conference, its collapse and Great Britain's referral of the issue to the United Nations.
- 2) The period of the United Nations study of the Palestine situation, the Report of UNSCOP, culminating in the approval by the United Nations of the Majority Report which favored an independent

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Jewish State, November 29, 1947;

- 3) The attempted reversal and the proclamation of the State of Israel in Tel-Aviv on May 14, 1948; and
- 4) The war of liberation and the signing of the Armistice with Egypt (Feb. 24, '49) and Syria (July 20, '49) and the admission of Israel to the United Nations (May 11, '49).

On April 28, 1947, a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations opened at Flushing Meadows, New York to deal with the Palestine question which had been referred to it by Great Britain on April 2, 1947. On the merits of the referral itself, I issued a statement on May 5, 1947 in the name of the American Section of the Jewish Agency For Palestine and the American Zionist Emergency Council, in which we declared: "We are pleased that the question of Palestine is now to be reviewed by the United Nations. We did not ask for it, hoping that a solution could be reached without the long delay involved in another investigation and in protracted discussions which are so very costly both in terms of the political deterioration in Palestine and in the suffering of our refugees who are still languishing in the Displaced Persons camps of Europe.

"Great Britain asked for a special session of the United Nations after Mr. Bevin's political improvisations in this field, upon which he said he banked his political career, ended, as it was bound to, in total failure. We are pleased that Great Britain will no longer be the judge and jury in the case in which it is the accused."

Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil was elected President and Lester B. Pearson of Canada was elected Chairman of the Political and Security Committee (also known as the First Committee) in which most of the deliberations on this subject took place.

Many requests were submitted by non-governmental organizations who wished to be heard. A number of Jewish bodies likewise asked for this privilege. The motion to grant the Jewish Agency the privilege of the floor was made by Poland, backed by the Soviet Union. The

Assembly finally decided to grant hearings to only two bodies--the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

The First Committee proceeded to discuss the proposal to establish a Special Committee of Inquiry with broad powers "to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate any questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine and to submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine".

Mr. Jamal el Husseini was the spokesman for the Arab Higher Committee.

On May 8, I addressed the First Committee of the United Nations as the spokesman for the Jewish Agency. The evening before, I read the draft of my address to the Executive members of the Jewish Agency, and with minor suggestions, they approved of it enthusiastically. It was agreed that I was to make the general presentation of our case first and at a later stage, Mr. Shertok was to discuss in greater detail the Arab-Jewish problem. My appearance at the United Nations was an event unique in Jewish history, a moment rich in drama and in historic significance. The official representatives of fifty-five nations of the world were there, and I, as spokesman of the Jewish people, was addressing them, voicing the demands of the Jewish people for national recognition and for the right to re-establish their state in their ancestral home.

The proceedings were broadcast all over the world and millions listened in--the Jews of Palestine especially listened in. I had written my address under pressure--all of one night--for until the very last moment it was not certain whether I would speak or Mr. Ben-Gurion, General Chairman of the Jewish Agency, who was on his way, flying in from Palestine.

This is what I said:

"Mr. Chairman and Delegates to the United Nations:

"I should like to say at the outset that were Mr. David Ben-Gurion, Chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, here this morning, he would be making the statement for the Agency. Unfortunately, the arrival of Mr. Ben-Gurion has been delayed. He will be here tomorrow, and I hope that in the course of the deliberations he will have an opportunity to participate.

"Permit me to thank the Assembly of the United Nations for granting the Jewish Agency for Palestine a hearing on the question which is before this Committee. We are grateful for the opportunity to take counsel with you in the matter of constituting and instructing a special committee of this body which is to study the problem of Palestine and to bring in recommendations for the future government of that country. We trust that our participation in these deliberations will be helpful and will prove to be a contribution to the just solution of this grave international

~~the~~ problem which this international community is now earnestly seeking.

Such a successful solution will prove a blessing not only to Palestine and to all its inhabitants, to the Jewish people, to the cause of world peace; but it will also enhance the moral authority and prestige of this great organization for world justice and peace upon which so many high hopes of mankind now rest.

"We are pleased that the Palestine problem will now be reviewed by an international body and that the thought and conscience of mankind will now be brought to bear on a situation which, heretofore and for some years now, has been made extremely difficult by unilateral action and by decisions made presumably within the terms of a mandatory trust, but actually without the sanction or supervision of the international body which established that trust and which defined both its limits and its purposes. The administration of Palestine has, since the outbreak of the war, been conducted by the Mandatory Power as if it were vested with the sovereignty of Palestine, whereas it had assumed to administer that country of which it was not the sovereign, as a trustee for carrying out the purposes of the Mandate which clearly defined its rights and its obligations.

"The problem of Palestine is, of course, of paramount importance to the Jewish people, and that fact, I take it, motivated the General Assembly of the United Nations to extend an invitation to the Jewish Agency of Palestine to present its views. We thank all those who so warmly urged our admission for their good will and their gallant action. The Jewish Agency, you will recall, is recognized in the Mandate for Palestine as a public body authorized to speak and act on behalf of the Jewish people in and out of Palestine in matters affecting the establishment of the Jewish National Home. It is the only recognized public body in the Mandate. It is recognized as such, to quote Article 4, 'for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social, and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine and, subject always to the

control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.' Under Article 6 the Jewish Agency is entitled further to cooperate with the administration in encouraging 'close settlement by the Jews on the land'; and by Article 11 it is given a preferred status in respect to the construction and operation of public works and the development of the national resources of the country.

"The Jewish Agency, which we have the honor to represent, therefore speaks, no merely for the organized Jewish community of Palestine, the democratically elected National Council of Palestine Jews, who are today the pioneering vanguard in the building of the Jewish National Home; it speaks also for the Jewish people of the world who are devoted to this historic ideal, for it was charged, by the same Article 4 of the Mandate, 'to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.'

"I have spoken of 'the Jewish people' and 'the Jewish National Home.' In defining the terms of reference of the Committee of Inquiry which you are to appoint and in all the Committee's future investigations, these in my judgment should be regarded as key terms and basic concepts. They were the key terms and basic concepts of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate under which Palestine is, or should be, administered today. To proceed without relation to them would be to detour into a political wilderness so far as Palestine is concerned. To treat the Palestine problem as if it were one of merely reconciling the differences between two sections of the population presently inhabiting the country, or of finding a haven for a certain number of refugees and displaced persons, will only contribute to confusion. The Balfour Declaration which was issued by His Majesty's Government as 'a declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations', declares: 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.' The Mandate,

in its preamble, recognizes 'the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine' and 'the grounds for reconstituting'--I call your attention to the word 'reconstituting'--'their national home in that country.'

"These international commitments of a quarter of a century ago, which flowed from the recognition of historic rights and of present needs, and upon which so much has already been built in Palestine by the Jewish people, cannot now be erased. You cannot turn back the hands of the clock of history. Certainly the United Nations, guided by its great principle proclaimed in its Charter, 'to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained', can never sanction the violation of treaties and of international law. Having this and similar situations in mind, a specific provision, you will recall, was written into the chapter of the Charter of the United Nations which deals with territories which might become trusteeship territories, and which is, therefore, especially applicable to territories now under mandate. This is Article 80 of the Charter which reads:

Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements made under Articles 77, 79 and 81 placing each territory under the trusteeship system and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any people or the terms of existing international instruments to which members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

"It is the perspective of your Committee of Inquiry on the entire problem which, in our judgment, will prove decisive. It will give direction and will greatly expedite its work, and its conclusions will prove of constructive significance if it will keep the proper perspective always in view. A generation ago the international community of the world, of which the United Nations today is the political and spiritual heir, decreed that the Jewish people shall be given the right long denied and the opportunity to reconstitute their

national home in Palestine. That national home is still in the making. It has not yet been fully established. No international community has cancelled, or even questioned that right. The Mandatory Power which was entrusted with the obligation to safeguard the opportunity for the continuous growth and development of the Jewish National Home has unfortunately in recent years grievously interfered with and circumscribed it. That opportunity must now be fully restored.

"When will the Jewish National Home be an accomplished fact? The answer to that question may well be given by the man who was Prime Minister of Great Britain at the time when the Balfour Declaration was issued. I am quoting the testimony of Mr. Lloyd George given before the Palestine Royal Commission in 1937:

There could be no doubt as to what the Cabinet then had in their minds. It was not their idea that a Jewish state should be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty . . . On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them . . . and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth. The notion that Jewish immigration would have to be artificially restricted in order to insure that the Jews would be a permanent minority never entered into the heads of anyone engaged in framing the policy. That would have been regarded as unjust and as a fraud on the people to whom we were appealing.

"The same answer could also be given by Mr. Winston Churchill who was an important member of the Government which issued the Balfour Declaration; by General Smuts who was a member of the Imperial War Cabinet at that time, who foretold an increasing stream of Jewish immigration into Palestine and 'in generations to come a great Jewish State rising there once more'; by Lord Robert Cecil and by many others. American statesman shared this view of the Jewish National Home. Thus, President Wilson on March 3, 1919 stated: 'I am persuaded that the Allied Nations, with the fullest concurrence of our Government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations

of a Jewish Commonwealth.'

"That the Government of the United States does not consider the Jewish National Home is already established is clearly stated in the letter of President Truman to King Ibn-Saud of Saudi Arabia, dated October 29, 1946. He wrote:

The Government and people of the United States have given support to the concept of a Jewish National Home in Palestine ever since the termination of the first World War, which resulted in the freeing of a large area of the Near East, including Palestine, and the establishment of a number of independent states which are now members of the United Nations. The United States, which contributed its blood and resources to the winning of that war, could not divest itself of a certain responsibility for the manner in which the freed territories were disposed of, or for the fate of the peoples liberated at that time. It took the position, to which it still adheres, that these peoples should be prepared for self-government and also that a national home for the Jewish people should be established in Palestine. I am happy to note that most of the liberated peoples are now citizens of independent countries. The Jewish National Home, however, has not as yet been fully developed.

"It should, of course, be clear—that I regret that statements made by certain representatives in recent days have tended to confuse what should be clear—that when we speak of a Jewish State, we do not have in mind any racial state or theocratic state, but one which will be based upon full equality and rights for all inhabitants without distinction of religion or race, and without domination or subjugation.

"What we have in mind by the Jewish State is most succinctly stated in a resolution adopted in 1945 by the British Labor Party—which requested this special session of the United Nations. I am quoting:

Here we halted half-way, irresolutely, between conflicting policies. But there is surely neither hope nor meaning in a Jewish National Home unless we are prepared to let the Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority. There was a strong case for this before the war, and there is an irresistible case for it now.

"When your Committee of Inquiry will come to consider proposals for the future government of Palestine, this inescapable and irreducible factor—the

international obligation to insure the continuous development of the Jewish National Home--should be kept, in our judgment, constantly in mind.

"I believe that it would be extremely helpful to the Committee of Inquiry if the Mandatory Government would present the account of its stewardship of the Palestine Mandate to it, rather than wait for the next Assembly of the United Nations. It would assist the Committee in thinking through the problem and in arriving at helpful recommendations for the future government of Palestine. It is illogical, I fear, to ask of the Committee of Inquiry to consider the future government of Palestine without first making a thorough study of the present government to discover what was faulty in the present administration, what neglect and what deviations occurred to have brought about a condition so dangerous and explosive as to necessitate the convoking of a special session of the United Nations to deal with it.

"I believe that the Committee of Inquiry should most certainly visit Palestine. Written documents are important, but infinitely more instructive are the living documents, the visible testimony of creative effort and achievement. In Palestine they will see what the Jewish people, inspired by the hope of reconstituting their national home after the long, weary centuries of their homelessness, and relying upon the honor and the pledged word of the world community, has achieved in a few short years against great odds and seemingly insurmountable physical handicaps. The task was enormous--untrained hands, inadequate means, overwhelming difficulties. The land was stripped and poor--neglected through the centuries. And the period of building took place between two disastrous world wars when European Jewry was shattered and impoverished. Nevertheless, the record of pioneering achievement of the Jewish people in Palestine has received the acclaim of the entire world. And what was built there with social vision and high human idealism has proved a blessing, we believe, not only to the Jews of Palestine, but to the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities as well.

"That the return of the Jews to Palestine would prove a blessing, not only to themselves but also to their Arab neighbors, was envisaged by the Emir Feisal, who was a great leader of the Arab peoples at the Peace Conference following the first World War. On March 3, 1919, he wrote:

We Arabs . . . look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper. We will do our best, insofar as we are concerned, to help them through. We will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home . . . I look forward, and my people with me look forward, to a future in which we are mutually interested may once again take their places in the community of civilized peoples of the world.

"Your Committee of Inquiry will conclude, we are confident, that, if allowed to develop uninterruptedly, the standards of life which are being developed in Palestine, the concepts of social justice and the modern scientific methods will serve as a great stimulus to the rebirth and progress of the entire Near East with which Palestine and the destinies of the Jewish National Home are naturally bound up.

"Your Committee of Inquiry should also consider the potentialities of the country which, if properly developed, can, according to the expert testimony of those most qualified to speak on the subject, sustain a population much greater than the present one. Many more projects, which will result in great economic and social improvement not alone in Palestine but in all the neighboring countries, are awaiting development pending a satisfactory political solution.

"Your Committee of Inquiry should, while in Palestine, also look into the real—the fundamental—causes of the tragic unrest and violence which today mar the life of the Holy Land to which our Jewish pioneers came not with weapons, but with tools. They will inquire, I am sure, why a peace-loving community whose sole interest was in building a peaceful home and future for themselves and their children, is being driven to a pitch of resentment and tension and lamentably driving some of its members to actions which we all deplore. They

will ask themselves, I am sure, why shiploads of helpless Jewish refugees, men and women and children, who have been through all the hells of Nazi Europe, are being driven away from the shores of the Jewish National Home by a Mandatory Government which assumed as its prime obligation the facilitation of Jewish immigration into that country. They will also investigate, I hope, how the Mandatory Government is carrying out another of its obligations, which is to encourage close settlement of the Jews on the land. In actual practice it is today severely restricting free Jewish settlement to an area less than 6 per cent of that tiny country, and is enforcing today in the Jewish National Home, discriminatory racial laws which the Mandate, as well as the Charter of the United Nations, severely condemns.

"By way of digression, let it be said, if it need be said at all, that we are not engaged nor shall we be engaged in any criticism of condemnation of the people of the United Kingdom. We have no quarrel with them. On the contrary, we have the highest regard and admiration for that people and for its monumental contributions to democratic civilization. We shall never forget that it was the United Kingdom which, first among the nations, gave recognition to the national aspirations of the Jewish people. It is only a wrong and unjustifiable policy which contradicts and tends to defeat the far-visioned British statesmanship of earlier years, which we condemn.

"We hope most earnestly that the Committee of Inquiry will also visit the Displaced Persons' camps in Europe and see with their own eyes the appalling human tragedy which mankind is permitting to continue unabated two years--it is exactly two years today since V-E Day--after the close of a war in which the Jewish people was the greatest sufferer. While committees of investigation and study are reporting on their sad plight, and while inter-governmental discussions and negotiations are going on, these war-ravaged men and women are languishing in their misery, still waiting for salvation. They ask for the bread of escape and hope; they are given the stone of inquiries and investigations. Their morale

is slumping terribly. A spiritual deterioration, I am afraid, is setting in among them. It is only the hope that tomorrow--perhaps tomorrow--redemption may come, that keeps their spirits from breaking utterly.

"Most of them are deperately eager to go to the Jewish National Home. I hope that the conscience of mankind, speaking through you and through your Committee of Inquiry, will make it possible for these weary men and women to find peace at last and healing in the land of their fondest hopes, and that their liberation will not be delayed until the report of the Committee is finally made and the action of the Assembly is finally taken, but that pending ultimate decisions and implementations, these unfortunate people will be permitted forthwith to migrate in substantial numbers to Palestine.

"There is a desperate urgency about this tragic human problem, my friends, which brooks no delay. An immediate relaxation of the restrictive measures on immigration into Palestine and a return to the status which prevailed before the White Paper policy of 1939 was imposed, will not only be a boon to these suffering humans, but will greatly relieve the present menacing tensions in Palestine, will wash out much of the bitterness, and will enable the deliberations of your Committee of Inquiry and of the next Assembly to be carried on in a calmer spirit, in an atmosphere of moderation and good will. We are all eager for peace. We must all make a contribution to achieve it. But the decisive contribution can be made only by the Mandatory Government.

"I hope, Mr. Chairman, that I have not abused your patience and the patience of the representatives of the United Nations here assembled. Permit me to conclude with this observation: The Jewish people places great hope upon the outcome of the deliberations of this great body. It has faith in its collective sense of justice and fairness, and in the high ideals which inspire it. We are an ancient people and though we have often, on the long, hard road which we have travelled, been disillusioned, we have never been disheartened. We have never lost faith in the sovereignty and the ultimate triumph of great moral principles.

In these last tragic years when the whole household of Israel became one great hostelry of pain, we could not have builded what we did build had we not preserved our unshakeable trust in the victory of truth. It is in that strong faith and hope that we wish to cooperate with you in this task which you have undertaken.

"The Jewish people belongs in this society of nations. Surely the Jewish people is not less deserving than other people whose national freedom and independence have been established and whose representatives are now seated here. The Jewish people were your Allies in the war and joined their sacrifices to yours to achieve a common victory. The representatives of the Jewish people of Palestine should sit in your midst--the representatives of the people and of the land which gave to mankind spiritual and ethical values, inspiring human personalities, and sacred texts which are your treasured possessions. We hope that that people, now again rebuilding its national life in its ancient homeland, will be welcomed before long by you to this noble fellowship of the United Nations."

The address, from all accounts, made a fine impression. Many of the United Nations delegates crowded around me to congratulate me. Mr. Trygvie Lie thanked me for raising the tone of the discussion at the United Nations to such a high level. The head of the British delegation, Sir Alexander Cadogan, praised me for the fairness of my presentation. Messages poured in from all parts of the United States and from abroad, especially from Palestine. The Executive of the World Zionist Organization cabled cordial congratulations on "the excellent presentation of our case."

I was very pleased, but I knew that a good speech was not yet victory. Many months of hard work and uncertainty lay ahead.

A very surprising and welcome event at the session of the United Nations on May 14, 1947, was the speech of the Soviet delegate, Mr. Andrei Gromyko. He stated that the legitimate interests of both the Jewish and Arab peoples in Palestine could properly be protected only by the creation of an independent democratic Arab-Jewish State, but failing this solution, consideration should be given to the division of Palestine into two independent states--Jewish and Arab. In subsequent proceedings the Soviet Delegation turned out to be firm and consistent supporters of the case for a Jewish State. No doubt they had their own motives but we had every reason to appreciate their help and steadfastness throughout the proceedings.

The position of the United States Government was not yet declared. To a letter from twenty-nine members of Congress which was addressed to the Secretary of State George C. Marshall requesting the Administration to declare its policy with respect to Palestine, Secretary Marshall replied that it would be premature for the United States to outline its Palestine policy before the report of the Inquiry Committee ^{was} issued.

The Assembly appointed a special eleven-member Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to study the problem. The Committee spent three months on its investigation. It surveyed the situation in Palestine and in the Displaced Persons camps in Germany and Austria and made its report on August 31st, 1947. The Report contained eleven general principles which were unanimously agreed upon by the Committee and a Majority plan which proposed partition of the country into Jewish and Arab States in an economic union. The Minority plan recommended the creation of a federal state of Palestine, with two autonomous Arab and Jewish enclaves or states within the federal state.

The Arabs rejected both plans. The Zionist General Council (Actions Committee) which was meeting at the time of the publication of the Committee Report in Zurich, and which I attended, welcomed the Majority plan. I, too, voted in favor of it as a basis of negotiation. Here, finally, was a definite proposal which held the promise of a settlement, put forward by a responsible international body representing the United Nations. This was in keeping with the position which I had taken at the Basle Congress and the Convention of the Zionist Organization of America in 1946.

As long as there was no official proposal before the Zionist Movement, Zionists had no reason to discuss it, certainly not to propose it. At the Z. O. A. Convention in 1946, I said: "When proposals will be made to us at any time by Governments which we shall find truly reasonable and which will meet our fundamental needs and satisfy our national aspirations and our sense of justice, our Movement will be prepared, I am sure, to give them serious consideration. Sound and just proposals are bound to be made to us sooner or later if we do not lose our nerve and our perspective."

Here now was such a proposal.

On September 23, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to establish an Ad Hoc Committee, composed of all the member nations, to study and report on the UNSCOP recommendations. Dr. Herbert V. Evatt of Australia was elected Chairman. On September 29, Jamal el Husseini, in addressing this Committee, announced that the Arabs will not accept either Report and threatened to drench the soil of Palestine in blood if attempts were made to implement either of them. On October 2, I appeared before the Committee and gave the official Zionist reactions to the Committee's Report in considerable detail. The Report had been carefully examined and studied, as may well be imagined, by the Zionist Executive.. We had taken counsel with other Jewish organizations in the United States on the nature of our reply--the American Jewish Committee which had withdrawn from the American Jewish Conference over the issue of the Jewish Commonwealth now favored the Majority Report and Judge Proskauer was cooperating in obtaining American support for it, the Jewish Labor Committee, the American Jewish Conference, the American Jewish Congress, the Agudat Israel and other bodies. We gave our reasons for rejecting the Minority Report. As far as the Majority Report was concerned, I stated:

"As regards the Majority report, we wish to make the following observations. These proposals are those of the Committee. Needless to say, they are not the proposals of the Jewish Agency which, in fact, ~~were~~ were ruled out by the Committee. They do not represent satisfaction of the rights of the Jewish people. They are a serious attenuation of these rights. At the hearings of your Committee we fully

defined these rights and their justification. I will not here impose upon you by restating them.

"Partition clearly was never contemplated by the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate. It was intended that Palestine, the whole of Palestine, shall ultimately become a Jewish State... The Royal Commission of 1937 declared that 'the field in which the Jewish National Home was to be established was understood at the time of the Balfour Declaration to be the whole of historic Palestine.' That area has already been partitioned.

"The first partitioning of Palestine took place in 1922 when Transjordan, representing three-quarters of the original area of Palestine, was cut off and has since been set up by the British as an Arab kingdom. Thus, one Arab state has already been carved out of the area assigned to the Jewish National Home. It is now proposed to carve a second Arab state out of the remainder of the country. In other words, the Jewish National Home is now to be confined to less than one-eighth of the territory originally set aside for it.

"This is a sacrifice which the Jewish people should not be asked to make. The legitimate national aspirations of the Arab peoples have been fully satisfied..

"The Arabs possess today independent monarchies in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan, and independent republics in Syria and Lebanon. A population of 17,000,000 in Arab Asia occupies an area of 1,290,000 square miles, enormously rich in resources and potentialities. This area, which formerly belonged to the Ottoman Empire, and which, together with Egypt, was liberated by the Allied nations, includes all the centers which are primarily associated in history with Arab and Moslem traditions. Palestine, the historic home of the Jewish people, which the nations of the world after the last war declared to be the Jewish National Home, is, after the loss of Transjordan, only 10,000 square miles in extent, and it is now proposed, in the Majority report, further to reduce the area of the Jewish National Home by almost one-half.

"It is not our intention at this time to enter into a detailed discussion of the many territorial provisions in the proposals of the Majority report. But we feel constrained to point out at least two features which are open to most serious objections. The Majority report eliminates western Galilee—that is, most of Galilee—from the Jewish State. The Peel Commission included western Galilee in the Jewish State. For reasons which we shall endeavor to explain more fully at a later stage, we regard the proposed exclusion of western Galilee as an unjustified and a particularly grievous handicap to the development of the Jewish State.

"Under the terms of the Majority proposal, the City of Jerusalem is set up as a separate government unit. We would not question the propriety of placing the old city of Jerusalem, which contains the holy places, as well as the holy shrines, which may be outside the walls of the old city, in the custody of an international trustee. But outside the old city a modern new city has grown up which contains a compact Jewish section of approximately 90,000 inhabitants. This new city includes the central national, religious and educational institutions of the Jewish people of Palestine.

"Excluding all of Jerusalem from the Jewish State would be a particularly

severe blow. Jerusalem holds a unique place in Jewish life and religious traditions. It is the ancient capital of the Jewish nation and the symbol throughout the ages of Jewish nationhood. The undefeated resolve of our people to be reconstituted as a nation in the land of Isreal was epitomized in the solemn vow of the Psalmist and of the exiled people throughout the ages: 'If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning.' We strongly urged that the Jewish section of modern Jerusalem, outside the walls, be included in the Jewish State.

"There are other modifications which we will take up at a later stage of these discussions.

"To return to the basic solution of partition^t proposed by the Special Committee: it entails, as we have said, a very heavy sacrifice on the part of the Jewish people. But if such a sacrifice is made the inexorable condition of an immediate and final sol^tution, we would be prepared to assume the responsibility for recommending acquiescence to the supreme organs of our Movement, subject, of course, to further discussion of the constitution and territorial provisions which we assume will take place in the course of these sessions.

"We would be prepared to do so because the proposal makes possible the immediate re-establishment of the Jewish State, an ideal for which our people ceaselessly strove through the centuries, and because it ensures immediate and continuing Jewish immigration which, as events have demonstrated, is possible only under a Jewish State. We would do so also as our contribution to the solution of a grave^t international problem and as evidence of our willingness to join^t with the community of nations in an effort to bring peace at last to the troubled land which is precious to the heart of mankind...'

"We mean to be good neighbors, not only to the Arab State of Palestine, but to the Arab States throughout the Middle East. And certainly we mean scrupulously to respect the equal rights of the Arab population in the free

and democratic Jewish State. With the removal of political friction and bitterness which we hope will eventually result from the setting up of these two independent states, each people master in its own home, it should be possible to usher in an era of progress and regeneration which would be a boon to all the peoples in that important part of the world. What the Jewish people has already achieved in Palestine in a short time and in the face of enormous obstacles is indicative of what it hopes to do in the future along with, and in fullest cooperation with, all of its neighbors.

"Neighborliness, however, is a two-sided affair. Sincerely and without reservations, we bring the offer of peace and friendship. If it is met in the same spirit, rich and abundant blessings will redound to all. If not, we shall be compelled to do what any people must do under such circumstances, defend our rights to the utmost. We have builded a nation in Palestine. That nation now demands its independence. It will not be dislodged. Its national status will not be denied. We are asked to make an enormous sacrifice to attain that which, if uninterfered with, we would have attained long ago. In sadness, and most reluctantly, we are prepared to make this sacrifice. Beyond it we cannot, we will not go....

"The Jewish State when it is established, will respect the sovereignty of its neighbor states as fully as it will defend its own. The Jewish people in Palestine is prepared to defend itself. It is not impressed by idle threats. A people that has survived the accumulated fury of the centuries, faced powerful empires in a bitter battle for survival, and during the last war saw hundreds of thousands of its sons fighting for freedom in all the liberating armies of the Allied nations--while the head of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee was broadcasting Nazi propaganda from Berlin and congratulating Hitler on his African victories over the Allies--such a people will not be intimidated. Nor, we are confident, will this great international body which

is earnestly wrestling with this tremendously difficult problem and which is seeking a just and equitable solution, be terrorized into surrendering its high mandate., , ,

"The Jewish people in Palestine, I repeat, will be prepared to defend itself. It will welcome, of course, whatever support can properly be given to it by the United Nations or its members, pursuant to the decisions of the United Nations.

"In this connection we must take note of the announcement made by the representative of the United Kingdom that its forces may not be available to the United Nations during the transitional period, and may be subject to early withdrawal from Palestine. In that event, in order to avoid the creation of a dangerous vacuum which might affect public security, the Jewish people of Palestine will provide without delay the necessary effectives to maintain public security within their country.

"Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee: With this United Nations report we have reached one of the important crossroads of history. The course which will be followed will be fraught with destiny for all, the Jews, the Arabs and the United Nations. We hope that it will be a course of wisdom, justice, and courage. The Jewish people hopefully awaits the decision of this body.

"Twenty-five years ago a similar international organization recognized the historic claims of the Jewish people, sanctioned our program and set us firmly on the road of realization. We were not then regarded as intruders or invaders, not even by the foremost leaders and spokesmen of the Arab world, but as a people returning home after a long sad exile. The world approved and acclaimed the return of Israel to its ancient homeland. The statesmen of the world faced the tragic problem of Jewish national homelessness and they set about to solve it.

"The Jewish people was confirmed in its right to rebuild its national life in its historic home. It eagerly seized the long-hoped-for opportunity and

proceeded to rebuild that ancient land of Israel in a manner which evoked the admiration of the whole world. It has made the wilderness blossom as the rose. Surely this great international body, surveying this faithful and fruitful work, will wish to see that work continued, that undertaking advanced, that hope of the centuries consummated. It will be a noble achievement which will redound to the everlasting glory of this world organization. It will be a supreme act of international justice."

The months between the presentation of the UNSCOP Report towards the end of August and the final vote which was taken by the United Nations Assembly on November 29, 1947, were for us intense with activity, uncertainty, and anxiety. Everything depended on the attitude of the American government--and our government was slow to show its hand. From time to time rumors swept through the corridors of Lake Success that the United States government was vacillating, was abandoning its position on partition, or that the President had become unfriendly and indifferent. This was causing confusion in the ranks of our friends among the United Nations delegations. Our Zionist Executive in Jerusalem was also in the dark.

When the World Zionist Executive met in Geneva, Switzerland in the middle of August, I wanted to bring to it some authoritative information on the American attitude which would guide it in its deliberations. I asked my friend Herbert Bayard Swope, to sound out his friends who were close to the Administration about the situation. Mr. Swope was very helpful in our behalf. He had introduced me to Mr. Bernard Baruch with whom I conferred a few times at his home and persuaded him to use his great influence in Washington. He was glad to assist. He saw the President and Secretary Byrnes. When Winston Churchill visited the United States, Mr. Baruch introduced me to him and together we discussed the subject of Palestine. Mr. Churchill expressed his traditional interest and friendship for Zionism and the Jewish National Home--but of course, he was no longer Prime Minister...

Mr. Swope talked to Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson, who was the alternate United States Representative at the United Nations, who told him that policy would be formulated in the topmost echelon (the President and the Secretary of State) but that it had not been handed down yet. However, he added that he thought it would take enormous weight to force America into an oppositional attitude.

Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder volunteered to take up the matter which Mr. Swope brought to his attention, with the President. In a telegram to Mr. Swope, Secretary Snyder informed him that the

"President confirms the statement I made to you yesterday that he has made no change in his Palestine policies" (favoring partition).

I conveyed this information to the Executive meeting in Geneva. In the midst of its sessions the UNSCOP Report was made public, and the information which I conveyed to it helped it to formulate the position of *of* ~~for~~ our Movement on the Report.

It was not until September 17, 1947, that Secretary of State Marshall made a statement to the United Nations in which he said:

"While the final decision of this Assembly must properly await the detailed consideration of the report, the Government of the United States gives great weight not only to the recommendations which have met with the unanimous approval of the Special Committee but also to those which have been approved by the majority of that Committee."

While this ^{statement} was quite general, it was nevertheless a welcome declaration, the first official public declaration of our government on partition. It remained to be seen how this would be followed up. There were many forces at work to try to shift the American position somewhere between the Majority and the Minority Reports.

It was not until October 11, 1947 that Ambassador ^{Herchel} V. Johnson addressed the Ad Hoc Committee and declared that "The United States Delegation supports the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the ~~Majority~~ plan which provides for partition and ^{immigration}." He suggested that certain amendments and modifications would have to be made in the Majority plan, certain geographical modifications. Jaffa should be included in the Arab State. He probably also had in mind, without wording it, the entire Negev in the south of Palestine, which the State Department wanted transferred to the Arab state.

This declaration was publicly welcomed by ~~the~~ ^{SW} Emergency Council which, however, in view of Ambassador Johnson's reference to "certain geographical modifications" which will have to be made in the Majority plan, cautioned against this.

"The American Zionist Emergency Council, speaking on behalf of the entire organized Zionist movement in the United States, welcomes the statement of the Government of the United States on Palestine before the United Nations. We are pleased to note that the United States supports the Majority report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, that it has called for a solution at this session of the General Assembly, and has expressed willingness to participate in the implementation of the solution. The United States' reaffirmation of our country's historic connection with the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home and its warning against the threat or use of force against the implementation of the UN decision are most gratifying.

"We are hopeful that the United States' declaration will hasten an early and just decision. The American people and freedom-loving nations will, we are confident, be on the alert to prevent such modifications and whittling down of the area designated as the Jewish state as to render that state utterly unviable. Acceptance of the recommendations of the Majority report represents an enormous sacrifice on the part of the Jewish people. It cannot and must not be asked to sacrifice further."

Throughout the three tense months of the United Nations debate on Palestine ^{our people} ~~was~~ kept in touch with the members of the United States delegation to the United Nations and with the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and other public officials.

On October 6, 1947, twenty-three Governors joined in sending a telegram to President Truman in which they urged that the United States delegation to the General Assembly give full and vigorous support to the Majority Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Other Governors wrote independently to the President urging that the United States back the UNSCOP Majority Report.

The press of the country gave its hearty endorsement to the Majority Report. The Arabs were doing their utmost to create an impression of the imminence of war. They bombed the American consulate in Jerusalem. They were playing for a panic propaganda on the United Nations. Friends of ours, mostly newspaper men, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, Frank Buxton, George L. Cassidy, James G. MacDonald, Frank Gervasi, and others sent telegrams to leading newspaper editors and columnists exposing this military blackmail diplomacy.

A joint appeal was sent to the President and the Secretary of State by twenty-five of the most prominent Christian religious leaders in America, headed by Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr and Dr. Henry Atkinson.

The Synagogue Council of America, representing all shades of Judaism, asked the members of all congregations to write to the President

and they responded most eagerly. The response was unprecedented. The readiness of the rank and file of our people to be marshalled into action was truly remarkable.

The members of the American Section of the Jewish Agency and its professional staff were in constant touch with the United Nations delegations and their governments.

Especially active in advocating the Majority Report were two distinguished members of UNSCOP, Jorge Garcia-Granados of Guatemala, who was the Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States at the time of his appointment to UNSCOP, and Professor Enrique Redriguez Fabrigat of Uruguay. They were staunch, forthright, and effective.

On November 27, 1947, an impressive group of United States Senators sent a wire to the heads of all the delegations to the United Nations stating that world opinion stands behind partition, and urging them to vote for the Majority Report.

Much of this activity may perhaps appear to some to have been excessive or unnecessary, but we could not afford to take any chances. What took place a few months later when our government, under pressure from unfriendly sources, suddenly reversed itself and asked for a reconsideration of the United Nations partition resolution for which it had voted, confirmed for us the political wisdom of what we had done, and what we then had to do over again...

It was in consequence of the favorable attitude towards the Majority Report, which was so widely expressed by nearly every sector of American public opinion, that our government finally gave it the full measure of support which it required.

A purely formal declaration of its position was ostensibly not enough. Many member nations -- especially those of Latin America -- were waiting to see how earnest and determined the American Government was in its declaration.

At a meeting of the American section of the Jewish Agency held on October 13, 1947, it was agreed that Mr. Shertok should deliver the closing argument at the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. Beryl Locker of the Jerusalem Executive, who was in attendance, then suggested that Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who had not long before ^{then} arrived in the United States, should also be invited to address the Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations. It would be a personal tribute to him in the evening of his life. Shertok and Goldmann seconded the proposal. There was objection. The Zionist cause had been adequately represented at the United Nations by members of the Executive. The final hour was now in sight ~~and a~~ promising victory for us. ~~The Great Powers had already declared themselves.~~ The appearance of Dr. Weizmann at this stage would change nothing, but would only be exploited by his political followers as proof that he was called in at the last moment to save the situation. . . . Everyone waited for my reaction. Everyone recalled the friction which had developed between Dr. Weizmann and myself at the Zionist Congress the year before. I said:

"This matter came up, as you will recall, in Zurich, and it was then suggested, I think by Dr. Goldmann, that Dr. Weizmann as one of the leaders of our Movement should be invited to help along during the coming critical months in whatever way he could. This was shortly after Dr. Weizmann delivered his address in Basle, in which he spoke so bitterly about the "man from Cleveland". Within twenty-four hours after this suggestion was made the press of the world carried the news that the Executive had invited Dr. Weizmann to head the Delegation of the Executive to the U.N. Dr. Weizmann was to represent the Movement before the U.N., implying that only Dr. Weizmann would be adequate to the situation. During the last few weeks, a similar propaganda has been set in motion by Dr. Weizmann's partisans to the effect that while Dr. Silver represents the Jewish Agency at the U.N., the critical situation at the U.N. calls for the appearance of Dr. Weizmann. Now it is quite clear that as far as our cause at this present session of the U.N. is concerned, Dr. Weizmann will be coming in at the tail end of all that has transpired. The Great Powers have already declared themselves and Dr. Weizmann will not be able to make any significant contribution to the situation which is well in hand. Therefore, the question is whether this tribute should be paid to Dr. Weizmann and whether an invitation extended to him would be a gesture towards unity in our Movement. On these two grounds I say that Dr. Weizmann should be invited.

I feel that he is entitled to this recognition and that his appearance would indicate the joining of our forces and would so be interpreted. There is no reason why this should not be done. I know that this act will be deliberately interpreted by some that we had come up against a stone wall and had to call in Dr. Weizmann to save the situation. Nevertheless, although I realize the use to which this invitation will be made by those who are opppsed to us here and in Palestine, I will vote to invite Dr. Weizmann to speak along with Mr. Shertok at the conclusion of the debate.

My po|sition must have surprised Mr. Locker, Dr. Goldmann, and Shertok for they all thanked me for the position which I took."

When the Subcommittee which was appointed by the Ad Hoc Committee to consider in detail the partition plan recommended by UNSCOP, came to the question of boundaries, the United States proposed that the entire Negev should be transferred to the Arab State. This gave us considerable concern. Accordingly, on November 10, 1947, I wrote to Senator Warren R. Austin, Chairman of the United States delegation to the United Nations, whom I had known for several years and whose friendship I valued, the following letter:

"My dear Mr. Austin: I do not know whether I will be able to reach you this afternoon by telephone. I am, therefore, sending this urgent message to you by air mail.

"Definite progress seems to have been made in the Palestine question before the U.N. I was informed this morning that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R delegations have come to a fundamental agreement on the question of implementation, an issue which threatened for a time to defeat the entire project. There remains now but one serious stumbling block, and that is the apparent insistence of the U.S. delegation to make radical revisions in the boundaries of the Jewish state

as recommended by the UNSCOP Report. I have been informed that the U. S. delegation is insisting that the Negev -- the southern part of Palestine which was assigned to the Jewish state -- shall be added to the Arab state on the principle that the territories of the two states should be equalized. This was a principle which was considered and rejected by the United Nations Committee. It was recognized that room must be allowed for the influx of large numbers of refugees and future immigrants. It was also recognized that if this area, largely wilderness, is to have any chance of development, even to a degree, it is the Jewish state under the necessity of caring for large immigration which would undertake experiments in development. Added to that was the realization that one Arab state was already carved out of Palestine in 1922 and set up as an Arab state -- Trans-Jordan. The Palestine which was originally contemplated as the Jewish National Home was 40,000 square miles. After Trans-Jordan was set up as an independent territory, now a state, Palestine was reduced to 10,000 square miles. The UNSCOP Report reduced the Jewish National Home further to an area of about 6,000 square miles. The U. S. delegation now insists on reducing that area still further by about one-half.

"I do not know why the U. S. delegation, of all the delegations, should take this position. There are certain rectifications in the boundaries which are indicated and which can be adjusted on the basis of a quid pro quo, but our delegation seemingly has in mind radical reductions and substituting its own conception as to just boundary lines for those of the United Nations Committee.

"If the U. S. delegation insists upon this unwarranted whittling down of the area of the Jewish state, the Jewish Agency might be compelled reluctantly to reject the whole proposal. As you well know, the UNSCOP proposals for partition were violently resisted by large sections of our people.

"Our delegation seems also to be taking a negative attitude towards the

proposal approved by all the members of the subcommittee to limit the international zone of Jerusalem to the Old City within the walls which contains the sacred places of the three Faiths, and to add the modern City of Jerusalem which contains ninety-eight percent Jews to the Jewish State and the modern Arab section to the Arab state. Such an arrangement has worked out satisfactorily in the case of the Vatican City in relation to the City of Rome. The Old City, plus the sacred places outside of the city, such as those in Bethlehem and Nazareth, may well come under the control of an international regime.

"I do hope that you will use your fine leadership in the U.N. to take a position on the question of boundaries more in keeping with the letter and spirit of the UNSCOP Report, and facilitate action. It is not true that revisions of boundaries are required in order to insure a two-thirds vote in the Assembly. The justice of the boundaries has not been seriously questioned, and has not been an issue between those who favor and those who oppose partition as the solution.

"With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours, Abba Hillel Silver"

I wrote letters, in a similar vein, to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who had helped me time and again with his wife counsel and fine political insights and to the Minority Leader of the House, John W. McCormick, who was a loyal friend of our cause throughout. They both promised to help.

On November 18, 1947, I received the following letter from Senator Austin:

"Dear Dr. Silver: Thank you for your letter of November 10, concerning the boundaries of the proposed Jewish state, which has been carefully considered by the Members of our Delegation charged with this subject.

"I wish to assure you that the points you have raised have been, and will be, carefully considered by the United States Delegation.

"I am not sure that you have been kept fully informed concerning the views expressed by the United States Delegation regarding the frontier question, but in any case I can emphasize that this Delegation has no desire to insist on an unwarranted whittling down of the area of the proposed Jewish state."

Yours sincerely,
(signed) Warren R. Austin

We worked desperately hard until the very last moment--the Emergency Council in Washington and the Jewish Agency Executive among the United Nations delegations. Our colleagues in the Agency worked feverishly, each in the sphere assigned to him, the Soviet Bloc, the Catholic countries of Latin America, the British Dominions, Western Europe. Every avenue of support was thoroughly explored, every clue meticulously checked and pursued, the smallest or the remotest of nations was contacted and Jews everywhere eagerly cooperated.

On Saturday, November 29, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee proposing partition was finally presented to a plenary session of the Assembly for approval. I sat tense and alert and listened with deep repressed emotion to the fateful roll call. I strained my ears to catch the "Yes" or "No" of each delegation, especially of those whose final decision was uncertain. When France, which had earlier asked for a twenty-four hour delay in the hope that a compromise policy might be submitted, cast its vote in favor of the Majority Report, a burst of applause swept through the hall. The Report of the Committee, as is well known, was adopted by the necessary two-thirds majority--33 in favor, 10 against, 10 abstentions, with Siam absent. When the vote was announced, there was commotion in the hall, and in the corridors there were cheers and rejoicing. In the eyes of many there were tears of joy.

The decision was regarded as a turning point in the history of the United Nations which greatly enhanced its prestige, for the hope was universally held that the decision would lead to the settling of the difficult Palestine problem.

The press of the country hailed the decision. In the U.S. Senate man after man rose to express gratification over the action which was taken in the United Nations.

I sent a message of thanks to President Truman to whom on so many other occasions in the past I had been constrained to send messages of complaint, criticism or appeal:

"On this joyous occasion for the Jewish people throughout the world, when the age-old hopes of Israel have been endorsed by the United Nations, we send you, Mr. President, this heartfelt expression of our thanks for the great support which you have given our cause. On behalf of the entire organized Zionist movement of our country which is represented in the American Zionist Emergency Council, we express our profound gratitude for the leadership you have shown on the question of Palestine -- leadership which culminated in the United Nations' historic decision of Saturday, November 29. Your policy on Palestine, Mr. President, has also served to create a strong bond of friendship between the American people and the Jewish citizens of Palestine which, we are confident, will serve the best interests of both countries. You have won a place of distinction in Jewish history. May the years ahead find us all moving forward towards the better, freer world which is our common goal."

I also sent telegrams of thanks to many friends in the Congress of the United States who had given us invaluable assistance, to Senators Wagner, Taft, Vandenberg, Barkley, Brewster, Lodge and McGrath. Senator Wagner, in replying to my telegram, wrote: "Thank you for your very gracious and kind wire. The agreement by the United Nations Assembly to the partition of Palestine was truly the consummation of my dream. I am, indeed, a happy man." I sent messages to Congressmen McCormak,

Martin and others. I could not fail to include among those whom I wished to remember on this day, Sumner Welles, Thomas E. Dewey and Bartley C. Crum.

~~In own I was not in on the drafting~~

On this occasion, the American Zionist Emergency Council issued the following release:

"Today a milestone was reached in the history of the world. In endorsing the plan to set up separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine, the United Nations has ended two thousand years of national homelessness for the Jewish people. The deep emotion experienced by Jews throughout the world today cannot be conveyed in words, for all the hopes and aspirations of Jewry, growing out of centuries of persecution and humiliation, have been concentrated on this one day of fulfillment.

"On behalf of the entire organized Zionist movement in the United States, which it represents, the American Zionist Emergency Council wishes to share Jewry's profound joy at this moment with the millions of Americans of all races and creeds who have fought side by side with us during the past years to achieve this measure of justice. Without the wholehearted support of American public opinion, this great victory for humanity could not have been brought about. Throughout a long succession of crises and setbacks the American people have remained steadfast in their determination that Jewish national homelessness and persecution must cease.

"Our deep thanks go out to all of the Governments which voted today to set up independent Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. We are particularly

mindful of the great efforts devoted to the achievement of this decision by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union, to whom we convey our profound gratitude. We thank also the British Dominions, the European countries, and the Latin American nations who endorsed the creation of the Jewish State.

"The American Zionist Emergency Council is happy to call special attention to the role played by the Zionists of America during the past crucial, often heart-breaking years. The ceaseless efforts and devotion of the local Zionist Emergency Committees constituted a major factor in our political struggle. We send our thanks to the tireless workers of the Zionist rank and file who have reason to be proud of their accomplishments under the leadership of Dr. Abba Hillel Silver. The American Zionist Emergency Council takes particular pride in the fact that its

leader, Dr. Silver, has, in his capacity of Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, led our movement to victory in the United Nations. We express our gratitude for the able and effective work accomplished by Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, and by the leaders of the American Section, who have met the challenge of the past historic months and have achieved for the Jewish people new dignity and respect among the nations of the world.

"Difficult days may yet be ahead of us. We do not wish to minimize the dangers that may confront the Jewish State. We are confident, however, that the citizens of that State can defend their Statehood and that American Public opinion will remain constantly on the alert to safeguard it.

"We send our brotherly greetings to the stalwart citizens of the Jewish State in Palestine and to our less fortunate, but equally heroic, brethren in the Displaced Persons' camps of Europe and on Cyprus, who will soon become citizens of that State. Their suffering and patience has not been in vain.

"Long live the Jewish State!"

This statement, the Emergency Council released on its own. As can readily be seen I was not in on the drafting.

Two weeks later,

~~At the~~ At the meeting on December 11, following the United Nations' decision, I told the members of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Emergency Council that since our last meeting, ^{which was} held a considerable time ago due to the pressure of work in which all of us had been engaged, many great and important things had happened. The greatest of these was the decision taken on November 29th by the Assembly of the United Nations. We are still too close to the event to appraise it adequately. The immediate actions which led to the decision were too numerous and too involved to be reviewed at this meeting. But what took place in the United Nations represented the consummation of what we had striven to achieve all through these years: a realization of the basic program of the Zionist movement.

We did not get, as a result of the decision, all that we had hoped to get. A partitioned Palestine was not the objective of the Zionist movement; it certainly was never the objective towards which the American Zionist Emergency Council had striven. Nevertheless, it represented all that the authorities of our movement believed could be achieved at this time; it represented all that a committee representing the nations of the world was prepared to give us; and it represented for us two tremendous gains: Statehood, recognition of the Jewish nation as a nation on earth, and this marked the end of galuth for our people. With this comes the great opportunity for us to ingather all the dispersed of our people, those who need a new home and have been waiting for it so desperately, and the possibility in a very short time of emptying the DP camps of Europe and giving a home at last to hundreds of thousands of our people. The UN decision is, therefore, of incalculable significance for our people and ^{people and} ~~for the history of mankind.~~ ^I ~~(Dr. Silver)~~ expressed the belief that the Jewish people could build something very great in that little country, as it did a long time ago.

Many people of our own generation share the credit that goes with this achievement, as do the faithful generations which preceded ours. There is enough praise and credit and glory to go round for everyone. Credit is due to those who built the Yishuv in Palestine throughout the years, because without their

concrete achievements in setting up a de facto nation in Palestine, formal recognition probably would not have been forthcoming. But the immediate achievement is traceable to the work of the American Zionist Emergency Council. It is now clear that the UN decision would not have been taken but for the position which the American Government took, and this, in turn, was direct result of the organized activities of the Zionists of America. Our work throughout America--in building public opinion, in canalizing the mass sentiment towards Washington, in bringing it into play quickly and effectively--finally produced the historic American stand in the United Nations, which won the day for our cause...

I feel it proper to make these observations because we have just closed an historic chapter, and the Zionists of America should have a sense of deep satisfaction in the knowledge that their labors had proved decisive in the achievement of our victory.

A little more than a month after the United Nations' decision I left for Palestine. Prior to my departure, a beautiful testimonial dinner was tendered me at the Hotel Astor in New York City on Monday, December 29th. Many old friends and co-workers were there, many who had borne the brunt of the long, hard struggle.

In responding to the toasts which were offered on that occasion, I said:

It was just a month ago that the decision was taken in the Assembly of the United Nations. It has been a month of unprecedented exaltation for our people all over the world. Their spirits leaped up like a brilliant flame in the glad surprise of the long hoped for and never quite expected victory. Their parched and thirsty souls drank deep of the waters of salvation. The nations of the world had again vindicated our claim to national restoration. By an overwhelming vote -- only two Christian States dissenting -- they decreed that the Jewish State shall be re-established and set the date for its establishment for October 1948.

Thus the messianic drama of Israel which had been unfolding in many lands through long centuries of tragic acts and sorrowful scenes suddenly reached a triumphant climax in the dramatic setting of an international council chamber, where in an atmosphere of unspeakable tension, the nations voted, each in its turn, and when the vote was tallied, they had decreed the end of the Galut! We have rejoiced in the fulfillment of a prophecy that has come true: "When the Lord will bring back captive Zion, we shall be like dreamers! Then will our mouth be filled with laughter and our tongue with song."

Our tired hearts were refreshed and uplifted when we witnessed the fine championing of our cause of liberation by one noble country after another -- by the many countries of South and Central America, by the countries of Western Europe, by all the dominions of the British Commonwealth and by other countries of good will. We were deeply moved by the strong, unfaltering support which we received from the Soviet Union and from Poland and Czechoslovakia. And we were, of course, profoundly pleased and happy with the role ^{which} our own Government came to play in the final hour of decision. Especially gratifying was that rare phenomenon -- baffling

← and disturbing to all those who prescribe cold war as the remedy for an ailing and war-sick world and ^oprescribe all suggestions of amity and reconciliation -- which showed the two greatest world powers working in complete accord and unity of purpose to solve a grave international problem, and reaching a solution.

It ~~might~~ ^{should} be noted, in passing, that our frank joy in the decision of the United Nations, to re-establish the Jewish State was not prompted by an infatuation with the idea of nationalism as such, or by the idolatry of statehood. We are not chauvinists. Zionists have been denounced as secularists and political nationalists. Of course we are secularists insofar as we believe in the re-establishment of the Jewish State. But this does not exhaust the full content of our aspirations.

Israele's resolution through the centuries to rebuild its national life in its ancestral home was guided by sound instinct and inspired by the same prophetic idealism which twice beckoned our ancestors from exile to national restoration in Palestine. In both instances, at Sinai and by the rivers of Babylon, there stirred a deep, mystic conviction that only in a free national existence, could that which was best and unique in Jewish life find full scope and opportunity, and what was best and unique was always conceived of as transcending the moiety of political independence, or the customary compensations of national status and security. It reached beyond that to a vision of "new things, things kept in store, not hitherto known."..... to a redeemed humanity and a world order reconstructed after the pattern of the Kingdom of God.

I believe that this motif of authentic Jewish lineage has not been wanting in the humble and consecrated labors of the present-day nation-

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builders in Palestine, and I am convinced that Palestine will in the days to come become the workshop of our people's highest ideals and aspirations.

Our builders in Palestine will have much to endure and much to overcome, but they will assuredly match their hour. They have still to discover their political eyes. They are children of the crucible. They have come from the four corners of the earth and from all parts of the Galut, and the Galut leaves its mark on everyone. They hail from all cultural zones, and from all political backgrounds. They represent most diverse personal experiences and they must all be fused into an organic whole. They must learn unity in diversity and patience under stress, and the knack of subduing the voices of the partisan, the doctrinaire and the fanatic in the joyous tumult of building.

Our people will live in a land which is not a "fortress built by nature for herself against infection and the hand of war", as Shakespeare sang of England, but in a very open land whose borders are difficult to defend, and whose security must rest on the stout hearts, the political wisdom and the national discipline of its people. What they have gained with courage, they will have to keep with prudence.

But the spirit, the will and the capacity are there, and they will not be found wanting.

The Land of Israel will be small, made smaller by partition, but the people of Israel will make it great. The monumental contributions to civilization have been made by great peoples which inhabited little countries. Mind and creative endeavor will compensate for what our people has been forced reluctantly to relinquish. Generations to come, living in that land of challenge and renewal, will speak great words and do great

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deeds, and in the magnitude of their upsoaring, there will tower the majesty of that little land of revelation which, like some precious jeweled clasp, draws three continents together on the shore of the Western Sea. Not in opulence but in eminence will their destiny be fulfilled, and the elixir of their pride will be distilled not out of dominion or far-flung borders, but out of the faithful and skillful building of the good society.

But much remains to be done. November 29th was only the evening and the morning of the first day -- the day when light broke through the darkness of our world. Our great community, providentially spared for this hour, must now shoulder the vast economic burdens involved in the setting up of the Jewish State. Judging by the remarkable demonstration a few days ago at the conclave of the leaders of American Jewry in Atlantic City, our people are fully aware of their new responsibilities and are resolved to meet them. Whatever aid may come from other sources, the primary responsibility is ours.

We shall also have to stand on guard during the next critical period to see that no political conspiracy of evil-doers shall undo or harm the Jewish State, as its builders proceed to lay its foundations. The Jews of America, proud and loyal citizens of this great country who have demonstrated time and again in peace and in war their devotion and patriotism, will in the spirit of American democracy wish to assist this new free and democratic country which will rise on the shores of the Mediterranean, and which will embody those same great Biblical ideals of justice, brotherhood, and peace, which inspired the founding fathers of this Republic.

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I left for Palestine early in January, 1948, intending to stay there for at least four months. I returned sooner than I expected, for after three weeks the Zionist Executive requested me to return to the United States. There was need to mobilize sentiment in the United States to defeat what was clearly a conspiracy to frustrate the partition plan which had been adopted by the nations of the world on November 29, 1947 -- a conspiracy in which, it was feared, some members of the American Government were collaborating.

The problem of implementing the partition decision was ^{u/p} before the United Nations. The Arabs had refused to accept it. ~~Soon after the Assembly's decision.~~ The Prime Ministers of the Arab States met in Cairo, on December 17, 1947, and issued an official announcement that "the Arab Governments will take decisive measures which will guarantee the defeat of partition". On January 15, 1948, the Arab League representing seven governments, six of which were members of the United Nations, announced that it had recommended that the Arab nations should occupy the whole of Palestine with their regular armies when British troops leave the country. Several columns of troops actually crossed the frontier and were attacking Jewish settlements.

The Mandatory Power itself refused to cooperate in the implementation of

the United Nations' plan. It refused to arrange for a progressive transfer of authority. It delayed the Commission of Five which the United Nations ^{had} appointed to proceed to Palestine ~~in order~~ to implement the plan until two weeks prior to the termination of the Mandate on May 15, 1948. It refused to permit the formation of an armed militia to preserve order in the face of the disintegrating security situation in the country. The Commission simply could not operate and so informed the Security Council.

In the official circles of our own government revisionist tendencies appeared soon after the United Nations rendered its decision. Hardly ^{had} ~~was~~ the ink ^{dried} ~~dry~~ on the November 29th resolution when those who had been hostile to partition right along began a campaign to scuttle it. Foremost among government officials were the Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Loy Henderson, ~~Head~~ of the Division of Near and Middle Eastern Affairs. The position which they took was that the vote of the General Assembly for partition amounted merely to a recommendation, not a final decision of the United Nations and that American support of the recommendation was predicated upon the assumption that it would prove "just and workable." The editor of The Forrestal Diaries (The Viking Press, 1951) records:

"Next evening, January 29, Forrestal with some of his assistants met with Dean Rusk, Loy Henderson and others from State to discuss the problem. Henderson took the position that the vote of the General Assembly for partition amounted merely to a recommendation, not a final decision of the United Nations, and that support of the recommendation was predicated upon the assumption that it would prove 'just and workable.' Forrestal asked whether there was not already sufficient evidence 'to support a statement that unworkability of the proposed solution would justify a re-examination.' Henderson thought that there was." (ibid. p. 362)

Secretary Forrestal ^{drew up,} as part of his crusade against partition, ~~drew up~~ a paper on January 21, 1947, which he showed to his friends, in which he stated

that, "It is doubtful if there is any segment of our foreign relations of greater importance or of greater danger in its broad implications to the security of the United States than our relations in the Middle East. On these premises it would be 'stupid' to allow the situation to develop in such a way as either to do 'permanent injury to our relations with the Moslem world' or to end in a 'stumble into war.'"

Harry S. Truman in his Memoirs (1955) states, "Secretary Forrestal spoke to me repeatedly about the danger that hostile Arabs might deny us access to the petroleum treasures of their countries." (p. 162)

"Forrestal saw Lovett (Robert A. Lovett, Undersecretary of State) the same day, January 21, 1947, the Forrestal Diaries continued, and showed him this paper; Lovett 'agreed in general with the conclusions' and then produced a paper from his side which had just come 'from the Planning Staff of the State Department.' This, as Forrestal paraphrased it, concluded that the U.N. partition plan was 'not workable,' adding that the United States was under no commitment to support the plan if it could not be made to work without resorting to force; that it was against American interest to supply arms to the Jews while we were embargoing arms to the Arabs, or to accept unilateral responsibility for carrying out the U.N. decision, and that the United States should take steps as soon as possible to secure withdrawal of the partition proposal."

The clear and simple truth that there was no "peaceful" solution in sight, and, as Mr. Granados who was a member of UNSCOP pointed out that "the choice before us was never one between a solution leading toward disorder, and one leading toward peace; it was a choice between disorder leading toward a solution, and disorder without a solution"--they simply ignored or evaded in their resolve to sabotage the partition plan.

"The Department of States' specialists on the Near East were almost without exception unfriendly to the idea of a Jewish state." This is the testimony of Truman himself. " (Memoirs, p. 473).

Other individuals and forces in Washington ~~began to work~~ ^{were working} early for a reconsideration. Actively propagandizing for revision was Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins who had formerly been the head of the American Mission to the Near East and an active foe of Zionism. He wrote letters to the newspapers in which, on top of all the stock arguments which the advocates of revision were using, produced another ^a ~~fresh and contemporary~~ one--the threat of communism and the danger to the Marshall Plan! This was increasingly employed to discredit the plan. He stated:

"In the opinion of many leaders in the Middle East, the United States, by its vote for Palestine partition, has already undermined its own efforts to prevent the spread of Communist control beyond its present frontiers. It seems very clear to people, especially in Turkey, that in supporting partition we opened a back door for Communist infiltration through Palestine into the Arab world at the very time when we were spending millions of dollars to close the front doors through Turkey and Greece, and to a lesser degree through Iran. All countries bordering on Russia have been seriously shaken in their confidence in the continuity of any American support or in the consistency of any American policies or promises....

"Many Americans, including some of our highest Government officials who accepted the Zionist thesis that the Arabs would readily agree to partition, did not realize that the implementing of partition was certain to stop the flow of Middle East oil, which is counted on to supply at least 50 per cent of the Marshall Plan petroleum requirements of Western Europe. This fact, in turn, furnishes the clue to the real reason for Russian support of partition. It was Russia's expectation that in so voting she was increasing chaos in the Middle East and thus striking a most effective blow at ERP, which Russia is ^{not} ~~not~~ anxious to see fail."

It should be noted how skillfully the oil interests linked up their pro-Arab position with the interests of national security.

The first clear indication of a veering in the American position on partition came on February 24, 1947, when Ambassador Warren R. Austin introduced a resolution in the Security Council calling for the appointment of a Committee of five ~~permanent~~ members of the Council whose functions would be, inter alia, "to consider whether the situation with respect to Palestine constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and to report its conclusions as a matter of urgency to the Council." It also proposed that the Committee should "consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine concerning the implementation of the General Assembly recommendation." The purpose of this consultation was to "make every effort to get an agreement on the basis of the General Assembly recommendation for the underlying political difficulty."

This, to all intents and purposes, meant the re-opening of the whole question, as the Russian spokesman, Gromyko, was quick to point out.

The Palestine Commission had reported that without the assistance of an armed force it would be unable to carry out the tasks assigned it by the Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947, and referred to the Council the problem of providing that arm assistance. The United States representatives took the position that "the Charter of the United Nations does not empower the Security Council to enforce a political settlement whether it is pursuant to a recommendation of the General Assembly or of the Council itself!" Further, "the Council's action is devoted to keeping the peace and not to enforcing partition!"

Addressing the United Nations Security Council on February 27, 1948, Moshe Shertok, head of the political Department of the Jewish Agency, voiced our apprehension about this proposal:

"The purpose of the consultation, we must confess, is not clear and the proposal leaves us greatly bewildered. We fear that it may lead to new delays and complications which may jeopardize the implementation of the whole plan and further exacerbate the situation in Palestine. In the past, innumerable attempts were made by the Jewish Agency and some also by the Mandatory Government--each side, naturally acting according to its own lights--to explore the possibility of an agreed settlement of the Palestine problem. All of these efforts remained fruitless. It was as a result and at the end of this long, laborious and futile quest for an agreed solution that the question was eventually brought before the United Nations for final adjudication and the partition compromise was adopted by the Assembly as a way out of the difficulty. In recommending to

The British Parliament the submission of the question to the United Nations, representatives of the British Government themselves expressed their conviction, based on long experience, that a solution acceptable to both parties was outside the realm of practical politics."

He drew attention to the statement which Ambassador Hershel V. Johnson had made, in the name of our government, on November 26, 1947, prior to the formal vote which was taken by the Assembly on November 29th:

"Much has been said during the course of these debates on the desirability and necessity of presenting to the General Assembly a plan which would command the agreement of both the principal protagonists in this situation. I think there is no delegation here which does not know that no plan has ever been presented, either to this Assembly or to the Mandatory Government during its long years of tenure, or in any other place, which would meet with the acceptance of both the Arabs and the Jews. No such plan has ever been presented, and I do not believe that any such plan will ever be presented. If we are to effect through the United Nations a solution of this problem, it cannot be done without the use of the knife. Neither the Jews nor the Arabs will ever be completely satisfied with anything we do, and it is just as well to bear that in mind."

As regards the need for military assistance, Mr. Shertok declared:

"There is the problem of the enforcement of the Charter and of the prevention of aggression which is essentially a United Nations responsibility. We have never set the formation of an international force as an indispensable condition for the implementation of the plan. In view of the fact of outside aggression, an international force is clearly indicated. Yet if the international force is not established, we shall still be ready to discharge our responsibility but in that eventuality our need for assistance would be correspondingly greater. Whatever happens, however, and even if the worst comes to the worst, the Jews of Palestine will fight in defense of their lives and

of their political rights. Their spirit and their capacity have been revealed by the experience of the last few months."

It was not long before the new policy of our government which had ~~thus~~ been formulating for some time came into full view. On March 19, the United States requested that the Palestine Commission should suspend its work on partition and that a Special Assembly of the United Nations be called to establish a temporary trusteeship for Palestine pending an eventual political settlement. The explanation which was given for this sudden reversal was that the plan could not be implemented by ~~forceful~~ ^{peaceful} means and that a further opportunity should be given the interested parties to reach an agreement regarding the future government of Palestine.

On the very same day I addressed the members of the Security Council:

"I wish to take this opportunity to give the reaction of the Jewish Agency to the main recommendations contained in Mr. Austin's proposals.

"The proposal of the United States Government to suspend all efforts to implement the partition plan, approved by the United Nations General Assembly last November under the leadership of the United States, and to establish a temporary trusteeship for Palestine, is a shocking reversal of its position.

"Up to the last few days, the spokesman for the United States delegation has told the Security Council that the United States Government firmly stands by partition. Both the President of the United States and the Secretary of State have repeatedly within recent weeks maintained that the position of the United States on partition remained unaltered.

"We are at an utter loss to understand the reason for this amazing reversal which will bring confusion, is likely to lead to increased violence in Palestine and will incalculably hurt the prestige and authority of the United Nations for whose effectiveness the President of the United States pleaded again as recently as Wednesday last...

"It is clear that an attempt is being made to force a solution upon the Jewish people of Palestine which would diminish its sovereignty, territory and immigration such as was provided for in the partition plan. Otherwise no new proposals would now be made by the United States delegation looking towards a new solution. The United States knows full well that the Arabs have opposed and continue to oppose every solution which offers any satisfaction to the legitimate rights of the Jewish people in Palestine.

The Jewish Agency has repeatedly been under the necessity of stating that the partition plan represented the maximum sacrifice on the part of the Jewish people beyond which it cannot go. Any proposals calling for further sacrifices will have to be imposed upon the Jewish community of Palestine by force.

"We hope that the United Nations will not knowingly assume the role of the British Mandatory in an effort to carry out the kind of restrictive, crippling and discriminatory measures under which the country has been administered in recent years.

"We are under the obligation at this time to repeat what we stated at a meeting of the Security Council last week. The decision of the General Assembly remains valid for the Jewish people. We have accepted it and we are prepared to abide by it. If the United Nations Commission is unable to carry out the mandates which were assigned to it by the General Assembly, the Jewish people of Palestine will move forward in the spirit of that resolution and will do everything which will be dictated by considerations of national survival, as well as the considerations of justice and historic rights.

"It is with deep sorrow that we state that the world will not profit by the lesson which is now being read to it by the United States -- that a revision of an international judgment maturely arrived at after prolonged and objective investigation and discussion, can be extorted by threats and armed defiance. "

On this same day I opened the meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency by saying:

"It is clear that we have lost a major battle. It is also clear that we have not lost the war. Eretz-Israel is there and the Yishuv is there and the Jewish people is there and the resolve of the Jewish people to realize its

historic hope is undefeated and indefeasible. We will have to decide very calmly and deliberately what our next step should be in this fateful hour. We will have to be guided, of course, by what the Yishuv in Palestine wants to have done.

^{do not}
I ~~don't~~ know that it will do us much good here to express our disappointment and discouragement at the action of our government and the manner in which this action was finally taken.

"The first official notice we had of it was around three o'clock yesterday when Mr. Wilkins, speaking for Mr. Rusk, asked to see Mr. Shertok and gave him a piece of paper which contained the American proposal. He was told that America was taking the position in view of the situation in Palestine and in view of the international situation. This is the extent of the good-will cooperation which exists between our government and the Jewish Agency in the matter of Palestine.

"The decision of the United States to abandon partition has come as a terrible shock to the Jewish community in Palestine and to the D. P's in camps and to the Jewish people here. One of the problems which we have to consider is the problem of morale, which at a moment like this, is a very important one. What must be done to sustain the morale of Jewry? We shall also have to decide what position to take when the subject is discussed at the Security Council, on Wednesday. So far, what we have before us is a proposal by the U.S. government. This has not yet been acted upon by the Security Council. What representation shall we make to the Security Council on this proposal and if the Security Council calls a special meeting of the Assembly, what shall be our position in the special Assembly?

The reversal of the American government struck the Jewish world like a thunderclap. It was shocked and outraged. The reversal was bitterly resented and sharply criticized by men of good will everywhere. It was felt to be both unjust and profoundly humiliating. The American press attacked it almost with one voice. Characteristic of the reaction of many eminent figures throughout the world was that of Thomas Mann who declared: "This reversal, this undignified surrender to brazen Arab threats, is the most humiliating and shocking political event since the democracies betrayed Czechoslovakia in 1938."

The Former Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles declared: "The official explanations of the reversal of our policy in Palestine at least make two points wholly clear. There is no shadow of justification for this reversal; and the position which the United States now occupies is profoundly humiliating."

The reversal was greatly resented by the United Nations Secretary Trygve Lie who later threatened to resign if the reversal were sustained. Mrs. Roosevelt was so upset over the Administration's actions that she offered to resign as a delegate to the United Nations.

Jews throughout America observed a day of protest, prayer and intercession. More than a million messages were sent to President Truman assailing the Administration's reversal.

On Sunday, April 4, 1948, 50,000 ex-servicemen, many of them in uniform and all wearing their service caps, paraded in New York City to protest at the United States' about-face on Palestine. This meeting was called by the Jewish War Veterans of the United States. The sidewalks of Fifth Avenue were lined solidly by a group estimated by the police at 250,000. The streets surrounding the speaker's stand in Madison Square Park were packed so tightly that many of the parade

spectators could not crowd in.

I addressed this mass rally of indignant citizens:

"Time and again in the history of nations, yielding to a temporary expediency, has resulted in incalculable damage to long-range and fundamental purposes and functions. Let any American inquire today among the members of the United Nations, and he will learn to his great humiliating how badly the position of the United States has slumped as the result of its amazing reversal, which it has sought to justify by so much legalistic abracadabra and such fallacious arguments. It is not yet too late for our beloved country to undo the mischief for which certain officials in Washington are responsible. Neither the Congress of the United States nor the American people will approve of these machinations. Why should a little group of men be permitted to lead our great country into a morass of duplicity, undermining our prestige in the world, shaking the very foundations of the United Nations, and doing grievous wrong to a people which has been struggling to regain freedom and independence in its ancient homeland."

A special meeting of the Administrative Council of the Zionist Organization of America was called on March 19, 1947^{*} in New York City. Two hundred and fifty Zionist representatives from all parts of the country attended. In addressing them I stated:

"If the international trusteeship is established, I prophesy that Great Britain will be there, either alone or with one or two other countries. No matter what uniforms are worn, American, Chinese or French, the Jews will fight immigration barriers.

"If the trusteeship is anything like the White Paper, the American government will be forced into a position of fighting the Jews in Palestine. It is unthinkable; but I have seen many unthinkable things happen in this crazy world. However, by the time they think out the terms of this trusteeship the enthusiasm for the plan may cool off considerably.

"The logical thing to do is to proclaim the Jewish State. We are now waiting to hear from the Jewish people in Palestine; their earnest, considered judgment will be binding on us.

"We have lost a major battle, but we Zionists ought to be toughened to these blows. We have no other choice but to continue our fight. We will carry on with all the energy in our souls until the Jewish State is established--tomorrow!"

At the request of the Columbia Broadcasting System I delivered an address on March 31, 1947^g, to the American people in which I gave the reaction of our people to the startling reversal of the U.S. Government. In part I said:

"The United States Government has requested a Special Assembly of the United Nations to reconsider the Palestine problem. To what end? What can another Assembly do that the last Assembly failed to do? What new facts are available now that were not previously known? This problem and this little country of Palestine have been investigated by more commissions in recent years than any other problem or any other spot on the face of the globe.

"What new solutions can be pulled out of the bag? There are none, and the Palestine problem cannot be solved by postponements and procrastinations. That way lies continued strife and growing chaos....

"An international trusteeship will require as much force, if not more, to maintain itself as would the partition plan. Where is the force to come from? Is the United States prepared to send troops into Palestine to impose a trusteeship upon that country when it is unwilling to make such a contribution in troops toward a final and permanent settlement? Palestine has lived under a trusteeship (the British mandate) for twenty-five years. If, through this long period, a trusteeship has not been productive of any agreed solution for Palestine, why are we now to expect a solution to result from another and temporary, trusteeship?...

"Relying upon the collective judgment and authority of the United Nations, the Jewish people of Palestine has been moving forward in the spirit of that decision. It has notified the Security Council that it must oppose any proposal designed to prevent or postpone the establishment of the Jewish State, and that

it rejects any plan to set up a new trusteeship regime.

"It informed the Security Council that upon the termination of the mandatory administration, and not later than May 16 next, a Provisional Jewish Government will commence to function in Palestine. This decision of the organized Jewish Community of Palestine was taken after the most searching and serious deliberation. It may involve a measure of conflict after May 15. It still hopes that there may be no need for prolonged conflict in Palestine.

"The Jews of Palestine hope that the Arabs of Palestine will come to accept the United Nations decision and thereby put an end to the scourge of strife and bloodshed which can only do incalculable hurt to both peoples. But in the face of the mounting threats and the incursion of armed bands across the frontiers from neighboring Arab States bent on war, the Jewish people of Palestine is compelled to make all necessary preparations for self-defense.

"It asks that it be permitted to organize and equip its own militia. This is an elementary moral obligation of the United Nations in view of the decision which it took. It is likewise an elementary moral obligation on the part of those nations who have approved the plan, to remove all embargos on the shipment of arms to the Jewish people of Palestine who have accepted the decision, and to deny such arms to those who are violently resisting it.

"The Jews of Palestine wish first and foremost to defend themselves, but their hands must not be tied. They plead with the United Nations to remove all obstacles in the way of their self-defense. They are carrying out the purposes of the United Nations. They should not be penalized for doing so.

"They appeal to the United States, the greatest democracy on earth, whose people have, through the years, manifested deep understanding and sympathy for the historic right of the Jewish people to rebuild its national life in its ancient homeland, to desist from a course of action which is calculated to do them grievous wrong, prolong strife in the Holy Land and discredit the United

Nations as an instrumentality for solving grave international problems and making its decision stick. They appeal to the people and the Government of the United States to help them in their desperate struggle toward freedom and independence. "

On March 24, 1948, I submitted to the Security Council the Declaration which was made by the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Vaad Leumi:

"At this moment I have the honor to submit to the Security Council a statement which was adopted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the National Council of the Jews of Palestine, the Vaad Leumi, on March 23, 1948. This statement is as follows:

"The Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Vaad Leumi have learned with regret and astonishment of the attitude adopted by the United States representative in the Security Council concerning the United Nations decisions on Palestine.

"The Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi declare:

"1. The Jewish people and the Yishuv in Palestine will oppose any proposal designed to prevent or postpone the establishment of the Jewish State.

"2. We categorically reject any plan to set up a trusteeship regime for Palestine, even for a short period of time. A trusteeship would necessarily entail a denial of the Jewish right to national independence. It would leave Palestine under a foreign military regime.

"3. The failure and disintegration of the mandatory administration, the continuation of which was unanimously rejected by the United Nations, necessitates the early arrival in Palestine of the United Nations Palestine Commission. The Provisional Council of Government of the Jewish State should be recognized without delay by the United Nations Palestine Commission so that authority may be transferred to it as envisaged in the United Nations decisions.

"4. Upon the termination of the mandatory administration and not later than May 16 next, a Provisional Jewish Government will commence to function in cooperation with the representatives of the United Nations in Palestine. In the meantime, we shall do our utmost to minimize the chaos created by the present government, and we shall maintain, so far as lies in our power, the public services neglected by it.

"'5. The Jewish people extends the hand of peace to the Arab people and invites representatives of the Arab population of the Jewish State to take their rightful place in all its organs of government. The Jewish State will be glad to co-operate with the neighboring Arab States and to enter into permanent treaty relations with them to strengthen world peace and to advance the development of all the countries of the Near East.'"

A second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations opened ~~on~~ April 16, 1947. The United States submitted on April 20, 1947 to the First Committee its plan for a temporary trusteeship in the form of a working paper. An important general debate followed in which the spokesmen of many delegations took part.

On April 22, 1948, I addressed the Political Committee in the course of which I announced the determination of the Jews of Palestine to proclaim a Jewish state on the day following the termination of the Mandate.

"Mr. Chairman and Members of the Political Committee: I am profoundly grateful for the privilege which has been extended to the Jewish Agency for Palestine to participate in these discussions. I had the honor to represent the Jewish Agency for Palestine at the first Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations just a year ago. It was in high hope and confidence that we appeared before the Assembly at that time. We are frank to acknowledge to a sense of bewilderment which we experience today when we appear before the Second Special Session which is considering not the consummation of a work which was so nobly begun a year ago, but ominous proposals aimed at reversing a course of action which had been thoughtfully and courageously pursued.

"A variety of explanations have been given by those who are responsible for convoking this Special Assembly. An air of unreality pervades all these explanations. It is maintained that the past few months have demonstrated that the plan which was adopted last November could not be implemented by peaceful means and that, therefore, a new solution must be found. This argument has been fully met by spokesmen of several delegations who have expressed themselves here, notably by the very incisive and eloquent statement of the distinguished representatives of New Zealand. I have very little to add to what has already been said in this regard except to point out that the spokesman of the United States Delegation, Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson, in his first statement before the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, on October 10, 1947, declared that the problem of internal law and order during the transition period 'might require the establishment of a special constabulary police force recruited on

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a volunteer basis by the United Nations.' It was generally understood that some degree of force would be necessary in view of the repeated assertions by spokesmen of Arab countries that they would resist by violence any plan not to their liking which might be adopted by the United Nations. In spite of these repeated threats and in full realization of the possible consequences of their action the members of the United Nations overwhelmingly adopted the partition plan. They adopted it because they had come to realize that it was the most practical and feasible plan which could be worked out and which came closest to doing substantial justice to both peoples of Palestine. The Assembly assumed, as it had every right to assume under the terms of the Charter, that the Security Council would discharge its responsibilities and would utilize all its powers to prevent a breach of the peace and enable the authorized agencies of the United Nations to carry out their functions in the implementation of the Assembly resolution.

"It was further assumed that the Mandatory would, in the interim period, maintain law and order, more especially since it insisted that that responsibility belonged exclusively to the Mandatory Power until the termination of the Mandate.

"It was also assumed that, in accordance with the provisions of the plan, there would be established armed militias, recruited from the local populations, which would, in due course, take over responsibility for public security in their respective states.

"But the Security Council failed lamentably to carry out its responsibilities. It refused to determine that a breach of the peace existed in the country despite the report submitted to it by the United Nations Palestine Commission, which declared: 'Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the Resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein.' The Security Council

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walked away from its clear and bounden responsibility.

"The Mandatory Power not only refused to cooperate in the implementation of the scheme but failed utterly to discharge its elementary duty to maintain law and order in the country, a duty which it repeatedly refused to share. One need but read the report of the United Nations Palestine Commission submitted to this Assembly to realize the extent to which the refusal of the Mandatory Power to cooperate has obstructed the plan and has rendered the execution of the Commission's task so difficult.....

"Nor were the militias allowed to be established. The Jews of Palestine were prepared from the outset to provide the necessary manpower for the preservation of the public security and for the faithful execution of the decision of the United Nations. But every conceivable obstacle was placed in their way. Such forces as they had were denied legal status and indispensable equipment. Paradoxically, in their efforts to protect the population and to carry out the mandate of the United Nations, they were compelled to go underground.

"There is, therefore, no ground whatever for the assertion that the plan of partition had to be abandoned because it was unworkable or because it could not be peacefully implemented. The truth is that the agencies which were relied upon to ensure the security of the country either failed to cooperate or were prevented from cooperation.....

"Mr. Chairman, the basic facts in the situation are terrifyingly simple. The Arabs proceeded to carry out the threat which they had made at the sessions of the Assembly last November. They resorted to mob violence from within Palestine and organized invasion forces from without. In the face of these acts of violence and organized aggression to alter by force the decision of the United Nations, the Security Council faltered and retreated. ⁶Confronted by defiance, it capitulated.

"It is now proposed to adopt another plan, which seemingly would not meet with resistance on the part of the Arabs. In other words, it is now proposed

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that the United Nations as a whole shall capitulate. This is the real meaning of the new proposal to substitute trusteeship for partition. It is designed to appease violence and reward aggression. It sweeps aside all considerations of equity and law. It sacrifices the results of collective judgment and constructive statesmanship to terrorization. But for all this the world does not need a United Nations. This proposal summons before the bar of this high tribunal the victim of aggression and exacts from him a penalty for loyal compliance with its decision.

"All of us here, I am sure, must realize that this is not a new or unique experience in international affairs, an experience which has brought so much sorrow and calamity to our world. The distinguished representative of China must surely recall the year 1932 when the big powers prevented the League of Nations from taking collective action to defend his country against shameless and wanton aggression. He, and all of us, are aware of the tragic consequences, not alone for the League of Nations, but for the whole world, which resulted from that act of grave moral abdication.

"So also must our distinguished friend from Ethiopia recall the year 1936 when the head of his State, standing before the League of Nations, nobly but vainly appealed to the conscience of mankind to arrest the brutal aggression of and arrogant dictator bringing death and ruin to his country. Then, too, the great powers refused to permit effective sanctions to be imposed upon the aggressor, who, not long thereafter, helped to plunge the whole world into the abyss of war.

"Nor, I am sure, has anyone forgotten Munich!

"Is it not clear that this international community is now in danger of repeating the tragic mistakes of the past few years? Is it not evident that world-wide disillusionment, caused by such a moral defeat and bankruptcy of

principle, is even now corroding the foundations of this great institution upon which such high hopes of mankind are centered?

"Mr. Chairman, the Jewish Agency has submitted to the United Nations Palestine Commission and to the Security Council two memoranda on Acts of Arab Aggression. It is needless here to review the facts therein recounted. They are largely a matter of public knowledge. Suffice it to call attention to the summary statement of the Palestine Commission itself, which declared: 'Armed Arab bands from neighboring Arab States have infiltrated into the territory of Palestine and together with local Arab forces are defeating the purposes of the resolution by acts of violence.'

"Seated around this table are representatives of Arab States whose governments pledged themselves to observe the letter and the spirit of the Charter and who have, by their own admissions, called for violent resistance to the decision of the United Nations, armed and equipped bands of their nationals who proceeded to cross the frontiers into Palestine to carry death and destruction to the inhabitants of that country. They are at this very moment preparing for even large^{er} military action upon the termination of the mandate, if not sooner.

"This clearly is not merely non-acceptance of a General Assembly recommendation. This is brazen and contemptuous violation of the United Nations Charter, which calls upon its member states to refrain from the threat or the use of force in international relations.

"The representatives of these states, who have flaunted the United Nations, are here today counseling this international organization, whose authority and prestige they have trampled underfoot, to sanction their aggression and to reward their violence by repudiating a decision which had been overwhelmingly adopted and to substitute for it a solution which would be entirely acceptable to them. This indeed is an incredible spectacle--astounding, sinister, ominous.

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Undoubtedly the Arab States have been emboldened to embark upon this career of violence and aggression by the attitude of the Mandatory Power and by the temporizing and vacillation of other powers who have special interests in that part of the world. So far as the Mandatory Power is concerned, the measure of its responsibility for what has transpired in Palestine since November 29th is fully indicated in the report which was submitted by the United Nations Palestine Commission to this Assembly. We do not wish to enlarge upon the record or to engage in further recriminations. There is but one urgent request which we would address to the Mandatory on the eve of its departure from Palestine. It is a request, I am sure, in which the members of the United Nations would wish to join; that its departure from Palestine should be attended with a minimum of disorganization, and that it should not further contribute to the chaos and destruction to which that country is exposed. Above all, we request that it should not make available the means of aggression--arms and military equipment--to the aggressor states, and that it should remove the British led, trained and financed Arab Legion from Palestine and ensure its non-intervention in the affairs of Palestine in the future. Having been unwilling to implement the decision of the United Nations, it should at least refrain from abetting, however indirectly, the tragic conflict in the country.

"As to the new proposal for Palestine which has been suggested by the United States Delegation, we should like to make the following observations: It is too late in the day to impose a trusteeship on the ^epeople of Palestine. They have lived under the tutelage of trusteeship for a quarter of a century. They fretted under it. They now seek their independence. They are entitled to it. They will have it."

Where was President Truman in all this? It is inconceivable that he was unaware of what the United States delegation was proposing in the United Nations or that he disapproved of it. He had been too much involved in all the steps which had led up to the decision of November 29th to permit this radical move of reversal to be proposed by the American delegation without his knowledge and consent.

In fact, on March 20th, Secretary of State Marshall declared that he recommended to President Truman that the United States revise its position on Palestine and the President approved. On March 25th, President Truman himself at his press conference explained and justified the new American policy of putting aside the partition plan for the time being. This country, he stated vigorously supported the plan for partition with economic union but it had become clear that the partition plan could not be carried out at this time by peaceful means.

But all this was well known when the partition resolution was adopted...

The trusteeship proposal was not in his mind a rejection of partition, but rather "an effort to postpone its effective date until proper conditions for the establishment of self-government in the two parts might be established... The suggestion that the mandate be continued as a trusteeship under the United Nations was not a bad idea at the time. However, there were strong suspicions, voiced by many, that the diplomats thought of it as a way to prevent partition and the establishment of the Jewish homeland." (p. 163)

Only the diplomats?... Everyone who followed the issue knew it to be a way to prevent partition and to postpone the establishment of the Jewish State indefinitely!

Mr. Truman recounts a meeting which he had with Dr. Chaim Weizmann on March 18th. His personal friend Eddie Jacobson had interceded with him to see Dr. Weizmann. Here is the story of this meeting in Mr. Truman's own words:

"When Eddie left I gave instructions to have Dr. Weizmann come to the White House as soon as it could be arranged. However, the visit was to be entirely off the record. Dr. Weizmann, by my specific instructions, was to be brought in through the East Gate. There was to be no press coverage of his visit and no public announcement.

"Dr. Weizmann came on March 18, and we talked for almost three quarters of an hour. We talked about the possibilities of development in Palestine, about the scientific work that he and his assistants had done that would someday be translated into industrial activity in the Jewish state that he envisaged. He spoke of the need for land if the future immigrants were to be cared for, and he impressed on me the importance of the Negeb area in the south to any future Jewish state...

"I told him, as plainly as I could, why I had at first put off seeing him. He understood. I explained to him that the basis of my interest in the Jewish problem was and that my primary concern was to see justice done without bloodshed. And when he left my office I felt that he had reached a full understanding of my policy and that I know what it was he wanted. (p. 161)

"That this was so was shown the following day. That day our representative in the United Nations, Ambassador ^tA_hsin, announced to the Security Council that the United States Government would favor a temporary trusteeship for Palestine pending a ^fdecision on Palestine's permanent status. Some Zionist spokesmen branded this as a reversal of American policy. Dr. Weizmann, however, was one of the few prominent Zionists who did not choose this opportunity to castigate American policy. He knew, I am sure, what the direction of American policy really was. The following morning Judge Rosenman called to see me on another matter. As he was leaving, I asked him to see Dr. Weizmann and tell him that there was not and would not be any change in the long policy he and I had talked about. (p. 162)

One wonders whether in the three quarters of an hour of conversation President Truman took occasion to inform Dr. Weizmann that on the very next day March 19th, Ambassador Austin would announce in the Security Council the new American proposal for a temporary trusteeship, and whether Dr. Weizmann raised no objection to it!...

A week later on March 25, 1947, Dr. Weizmann issued a statement to the press in which he stated:

"Now some people suggest that the partition decision be shelved because it has not secured the agreement of all parties! Yet it was because the Mandatory Power itself constantly emphasized that the prospect of agreement was nonexistent that it submitted the question to the United Nations. . . . Whatever solution may be imposed will require enforcement. . . . I have spent many years laboring at this strenuous problem, and I know there is today no other practical solution, and none more likely to achieve stability in the long run--certainly not the Arab unitary state which the conscience of the world has rejected, or the so-called federal formula which is in fact nothing but an Arab state in another guise, or an impossible effort to impose trusteeship and arrest the progress of the Palestinian Jews toward their rightful independence."

And in a letter to the President on April 9, 1947 Dr. Weizmann wrote:

"The clock cannot be put back to the situation which existed before November 29. I would also draw attention to the psychological effects of promising Jewish independence in November and attempting to cancel it in March. . . ."

Dr. Weizmann recounts in his Trial and Error (p. 472) that on the occasion of his visit with the President on March 18, "the President was sympathetic personally, and still indicated a prior resolve to press forward with partition. I doubt, however, whether he was himself aware of the extent to which his own policy and purpose had been balked by subordinates in the State Department."

Was the President really taken in by his subordinates and was Weizmann taken in by the President?....

When the President reversed his policy a second time, two months later, and without warning recognized the State of Israel, eleven minutes after the State was proclaimed, he was surprised, he writes, at the fact that certain people were surprised.

"I was told that to some of the career men of the State Department this announcement came as a surprise. It should not have been if these men had faithfully supported my policy.

"The difficulty with many career officials in the government is that they regard themselves as the men who really make policy and run the government. They look upon the elected officials as just temporary occupants. Every President in our history has been faced with this problem -- how to prevent career men from circumventing presidential policy. Too often career men seek to impose their own views instead of carrying out the established policy of the administration".... (page 2)

But in what way did the career men circumvent his policy?.... In view of all the mutations can it be truly said that there was an established policy of the administration?

The "career men" may have pressured him to adopt their proposal for a temporary trusteeship which, astute student of national politics that he was, he soon realized to have been a colossal political blunder for him and his party and he set about rectifying it. But these "career men" certainly did not circumvent his policy....

We were all profoundly grateful to President Truman for recognizing the State of Israel, but to this day some of us are left wondering how much the aroused and indignant American public opinion which was voiced against his policy of reversal and how much the "pressure" of Zionist "extremists", of whom he complained so much, and the advice of the political leaders of his party had to do with the reversal of his reversal....

Consistency is only a minor virtue in the leader of a nation, nor are the factors which finally determine his action of lasting importance. Making the right decision in the decisive moment is the only true test of effective leadership. Mr. Truman made the right decision.

During the next few weeks, our friends inside and outside of Washington intensified their activities to persuade the President to abandon the Trusteeship plan which, merit quite apart, was not winning adequate support in the United Nations. They informed him of the fact that on May 15th the Jews of Palestine will, without fail, proclaim an independent Jewish State, and that there were important governments including the Soviet Union, which were prepared to give it recognition, once it is proclaimed. Would it not be tactically a blunder to permit, say, the Soviet Union to be the first to recognize the new Jewish State, especially in an election year! Partition in fact already existed in Palestine, the Chairman of the advance party of the Palestine Commission had reported, and that only legal recognition was missing. By the end of April, the Jewish forces had succeeded in relieving the besieged city of Jerusalem, in defeating the army of Fawzi el Kaukji in the Valley of Esdraelon and in capturing the cities of Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias and Safed. Practically the entire area which the United Nations had allotted to the Jews by the partition plan was in Jewish military control.

The State Department made last desperate efforts to keep the Jewish Agency from proceeding with the proclamation of the state. They pressed for a temporary postponement, a new "truce" conference. They offered to fly our representatives in the President's own plane to some designated spot in the Near East to meet with Arab representatives to work out a temporary trusteeship agreement. One heard threats and of reprisals which would be resorted to in case the Jewish Agency refused to yield. Some of the members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency were cooperating in this project. Dr. Nahum Goldmann acted as a willing intermediary and guide for the proposed journey into another trusteeship.

I knew all this to be a dangerous trap, disguised to postpone indefinitely the establishment of the Jewish State and, if accepted, would precipitate severe disturbances in the Yishuv. A meeting of the American Section of the Jewish Agency was held on May 10th. At this meeting I said:

"I will tell you what I think about this business. The American government is resolved not to have us proclaim the provisional Jewish Government on the fifteenth. They are very determined about it. The conversation that Shertok had with Marshall, Lovett and Rusk the day before yesterday clearly indicates that they do not want to see the Jewish State established. They do not want it established today or in ninety days because, in spite of the questions that were asked of them as to what would happen after ninety days, whether they would be prepared to recognize the Jewish State then, there was no answer. They want a postponement of the matter to the next Assembly and in the meantime, they will propose that both peoples should be asked not to proclaim their states. If such a resolution passes and we proclaim our state after its passing, it will be flying in the face of the U.N. Consequently, the question that has been in my mind is whether we should not proceed at once and proclaim the state before the U.N. acts. I cannot see that any action which would emanate now from the U.N. that would not be hostile to us. Therefore, proclaim the state now! Announce to the world that the Jews have established their state and that they are going ahead."

There had been prolonged debate and a good deal of tension on the question of accepting or rejecting the last-minute proposal of the State Department to delay the proclamation of the State until we and the Arab leaders worked out an agreement. The majority of my colleagues in the Agency supported my position. The proposal

of the State Department was voted down. Our friends in Israel were informed of our stand and were advised to proceed with their plans, without delay.

The proclamation of the State in Tel Aviv was actually made a day earlier than was contemplated on May 14th while the U.N. was still debating the American proposals.

A straw in the wind that the American Government might be considering another reversal in its position was the appointment on April 28th of Major-General John H. Hilldring as Special Assistant for Palestine Affairs to the Secretary of State. General Hilldring had been a loyal and understanding friend of our Movement right along.

By May 13th recognition was already "in the works".

On May 14th the State of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv. On the same day I addressed the United Nations and made the announcement:

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"At ten o'clock this morning the Jewish State was proclaimed in Palestine. The hour was advanced out of respect for the sanctity of the Jewish Sabbath. The statement--and I read only one sentence of that statement--is as follows:

We, the members of the National Council representing the Jewish people in Palestine and the Zionist movement of the world, meeting together in solemn assembly, by virtue of the natural and historic right of the Jewish people and of the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, hereby proclaim the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, to be called "Israel."

"Thus, what was envisag^aed in the resolution of the General Assembly, which was overwhelmingly adopted by the United Nations last November, has been, as far as the Jewish State is concern^ded, implemented. Thus, too, there has been consummated the age-old dream of Israel to be re-established as a free and independent people in its ancient homeland.

"The Jewish State is grateful to the United Nations for having placed the stamp of its approval, and the stamp of the approval of the world community, upon the historic claims of Israel, and for the efforts which it made, in the face of opposition, to achieve that which the Jewish people have accomplished. The Jewish State, in setting out upon its career, is conscious of the many grave problems, foreseen or unanticipated, with confront it. It prayerfully appeals, therefore, to all freedom-loving peoples, and especially to those who gave their fullest endorsement to the establishment of the Jewish State a few months ago, to give a full measure of their support and of their strengthening to ~~this~~^{this} newest republic established by this, the most ancient of peoples. The Jewish State will strive to^be worthy of the confidence which has been placed in it by the nations of the world, and will endeavor to realize, as far as it is humanly possible, those prophetic ideas of justice, brotherhood, peace and democracy which were first proclaimed by the people of Israel in that very land.

"The new Jewish State is being threatened--threatened by neighboring states, threatened with invasion. Invasion will mean war. The Jewish State will be compelled to defend itself. And the world community may be faced with a widening

and dangerous areas of conflict, which everyone deplores.

"It is not yet too late to avert such an eventuality. The Jewish State of Palestine seeks peace with all peoples, and will dedicate itself, under Providence, to the ways of peace and to the friendliest cooperation with all peace-loving peoples."

The next day, towards evening, while Mr. Philip C. Jessup of the American delegation was still arguing for the trusteeship proposal on the floor of the Assembly, a flash from Washington electrified the Assembly with the announcement that President Truman had extended de facto recognition to the State of Israel.

There was great rejoicing in all the habitations of our people.

Celebrations were held in every city in the land. Thousands of messages poured in from all corners of the earth. A telegram which especially moved me was from the Central Committee of the Deportees on the island of Cyprus. It read:

"Twenty-four thousand Maapilim (illegal immigrants) detained in Cyprus Camps extend greetings occasion Jewish State Day. After many years of wandering we are happy to have privilege of being first immigrants to enter Jewish State."

A victory celebration was held in Madison Square Garden on the evening of May 16, 1948. The hall was packed and tens of thousands of people stood outside in the rain listening to loud-speakers. On the platform were many leaders who had taken part in the historic struggle. Among the speakers were Senator Robert Taft, Governor Herbert Lehman and Dr. Emanuel Neumann.

Two months later, on July 19, 1948, my own community of Cleveland

tendered me a heart-warming Testimonial Dinner which was attended by Jews and non-Jews from all walks of life and from many parts of the country.