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Series VIII: Scrapbooks, 1902-1964, undated.

Sub-series C: Loose Material, 1938-1939, undated.

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Miscellaneous notes on Franklin D. Roosevelt administration and
its policies concerning Palestine, undated.

pathological
fear of Communism

MURRAY

Succeeded
Allen Dulles
in

1925-

Succeeded
Allen W.
Dulles

- 1- born Bardstown Ky, 1887, good ed. -Wittenberg College, AM Harvard, Columbia, Sorbonne. In WWI. Started with dept. 1925, Asst chief NEA 1927, special mission to NE 1929, Chief NE D 1929
Adviser on Pol. Relations, 1942 (amb. to Iran, '45-'46)
a-with shakeup of Dept. '44 became Director of Office of NE and African Affairs. Trained many younger officers for NE work
b-In charge of Persian desk, 1925-29
c- main task in WWII was to keep knowledge of French positions in N. Africa out of Axis hands
- 2-Took position even under Hoover, that it was our intention only to protect US rights in 1924 con.-any modification of status of Jews there not our business-can't be caught off our guard by Zionists on 1924 con. In 1932 wanted to handle Neumann with caution
Jews he wrote, are "mobile, vocal and influential"
- 3-in 1930s seems suspicious of Br.-want to stay on indefinitely in Pal. because of strategic importance of place, guarding Br. trade routes to the East. Early despatches show that he understood Arab fear of becoming engulfed. 1936- be cautious of American settlement and investment in Pal., BD did not contemplate Jewish state, only JNH with rights of others safeguarded. Wanted to tell London that Pal. is a Br. responsibility. 1936- Zionists trying to involve us in Peel Report, they misrepresent
- 4- Well informed on Jewish affairs, knew that considerable no. of Jews wanted partition, Wise outvoted at Zurich
a- even in 30s liked to play up non-Zionist Jews- spoke of small no of Jews here who were Zionists. As early as 1937 leaned toward Magnes. Was in Pal. in 1938. Early felt Jews better off by "quiet and reasonable discussion with the Dept."
Murray claimed to be a close friend of Sol Bloom
- 5- Chaim in book noted that Murray was anti + pro-Arab and that he influenced subordinates + colleagues
- 6 Jan '44 - Murray heads office of Eastern and African Affairs.
Merriman to ME. (office included Egypt, Greece, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Pal, Transjordan, S.A.
As early as 1943 E. Celler identified Murray as chief villain.

MURRAY -wartime

1940- again and again reminds Hull that US obligations do not include JNH. After 1919 no more interested in Pal. than in disposition of Cameroons etc.

impressed with argument that if the war is followed by another depression, there will be a large increase in A-S, need extra-territorial settlement

1941- sent around a chit on Pal. 1919-37, Br. favored Jews in Pal., result was Arab uprising. Br. Emp. has 100 mi. Moslems, they must be appeased. Quiet since WP. Arabs more suspicious of US because we do not have to reckon with Arabs. Zionists are minority here, but all Jews want Pal. as a refuge, but most feel commonwealth would make them less secure here

1941-42

~~Edith~~ memo from NE Affairs (prepared a stand on Zionism to be used if necessary)

(probably withdrawn) must settle with Zionists if you are to have peace in NE. Among uprooted, Pal. is 4th choice-behind US, LA etc. Land couldn't hold all that want to go there anyway. Zionists= small group of zealots, make it seem that US Jews want their platform. Jews have no cultural unity, are German, French etc. But city and nomad Arabs are unified. Many who press Zionism at State are aliens. As to solution want big Syrian state, with Zionist conclave with autonomy. But even so must cut off immigration have to save sorry remnant of Jews from the tragic fate that their enthusiasts have prepared for them

Murray was earliest to propose joint statement (July, 1942)

Dec. 4, 1942- at time of Philby plan broached by Chaim, Murray thought it unworkable. Thinks best plan is that of Magnes, modus vivendi

Murray wanted directive from FDR to OWI on how it should treat Zionism

1944- Murray plays up Russian opposition, prepared draft for FDR on Russian factor

1- in 1940 he circulated Lazard's opinions

MURRAY AND MAGNES

1- relationship probably goes back to 1938 when Murray saw M. in Pal (M. was US citizen, in Pal. since 1925) Can only have peace by agreement with Arabs based on conciliation and compromise. Because of higher intelligence and demand for unlimited immigration, Jews must take initiative. Applauds idea that Magnes was in correspondence with Nuri Pasha (former PM of Iraq) and even Grand Mufti

a-Magnes thought settlement should keep Jewish percentage at 40% for 10 yrs, would mean addition of 10,000 Jews each year

b-affinity for Magnes again shows up in 1942. M's down to earth proposals worthy of serious consideration. Murray thinks that if Magnes is in a minority in Pal., conservative Jews in America who are in majority, agree with him. Murray thinks this majority are unorganized and relatively inarticulate

c- In 1942 Murray circulated an article by Magnes in the dept., maximalist aspirations of both groups are irreconcilable, Magnes vs. commonwealth. But consul -gen in Jerusalem, reporting formation of new Ichud (union) party in 1942, noted that immigration is the rock on which bi-nat. breaks.

*a Dec 9 '42 at time of Philby plan
Murray thought it unworkable-
wanted modus vivendi along lines
proposed by Magnes*

*e 1944 again stresses Magnes, otherwise
extremists will gain control*

Stettinius

- 1- successful in business, great administrative skill, career in Gen. Motors, chmn of Bd. of US Steel. After 1939 in gov't jobs
Hopkins got him into Lend-Lease, Helped re-organize dept. U-Sec. 1943, Sec'y 11/27/44 with Grew as U-Sec
- 2-Ed recognized his limitations, was to be a two-way messenger between Dept. and White House. Walter Johnson calls him honest, energetic, idealistic
- 3- Relations with Zionists good at first, gave repeated assurances that Zionists could count on him and urged pressure direct on FDR
Admitted NE (inc. Murray) filled with anti people. Promised to answer personally inquiries of Zionists
- 4-Began stalling in 1944, Wise and Silver tried to prod him, Ed reported to FDR that they were attempting to attribute more to him than ~~may~~^{he} said
Wrote them to dampen their enthusiasm- because of mil situation have to postpone decision on Pal. at least till fall



Welles (became U-Sec. 1937, resigned 1943)

1- tradition has come down that he was our friend, but

a- In 1943 notified Steve Early that UPA is associated with UJA (fund-raising instrument in US of Jewish Agency)-because of feeling of Arabs in countries where our troops are located, have to beware of official support of Zionism-Is drafting a letter emphasizing general humanitarian work of affiliated ass'ns of UPA

b-SW had doubts about eco. capacity of Pal, thought of supplementary, not substitute areas- Colombia, Angola, Madagascar

c-often tried to quiet Zionist agitation, might defeat quiet negotiations that were necessary for a solution

2- Schechtman said he was considered great friend, understanding and sympathetic (Abramov). But after he promised Neumann & Wise to keep them informed, he explained to Murray that he did it to avoid friction between US Zionists and GB

3- at times, SW was provoked by incessant pro-Arab despatches of Kirk from Cairo and upbraided him. Zionists feared (1941) secret agreement between G-B Arabs, SW promised no agreement without telling Zionist leaders, also we would not agree to any plan without their knowing it. When confronted by Murray, SW explained that he wanted to lessen pressure on GB (see 2 this page, but Zionists thought this pledge meant great progress.

4- As U-Sec., SW was chief administrator- loyal, hard-working fair. Unlike many bureaucrats wants job done. But Agar in 1940 thought him too cautious and too much an admirer of Br. diplomacy

X - another source says this is 4/8/43 - message to Pal. Foundation Fund to settle refugees there - S.W. pointed out controversial nature of immigration question

1) But in his books SW praised partition as the most significant contribution made towards settlement of Pal. question before 1939

2) In time for Decision (1944) he wanted the Arabs to be given promises actually made by GB in 1915. Likes Arab Federation as it would stabilize area, but in return the Arabs must consent to JNH.

a- In 1946 favoured bi-nationalism, impressed by Magnes. Pale. to be part of large Arab Fed. with autonomy



Felt U.N. would have to supervise it for a long time.
3. Chaim W. said - Welles wanted to concretize
Philby's plan, with US helping financially.

FDR and Pal-

1- maintained continuous interest in question, was sensitive to Jewish pressure. Really had no solution, but characteristically tried many suggestions.

a- ideas- 1942 Ibn Saud to become "boss of bosses" and to get generous aid, 1943 turned to favorite panacea trusteeship by 3 great faiths, at one time toyed with idea of federal union between Pal. and neighboring Arab states

b- according to Sol Goldman in 1939 FDR was toying with idea of transfer of several hundred thousand Arabs from Pal. to Iraq; thought of fund of \$300 mi. to be paid for by US, GB and Jews (*picked it up from Jews*)

2- conflicting pressures made for gyrations in policy. Pub. op.

was aroused by genocide and conditioned by Zionists, this was pro so was Congress, but State and War were worried about Arabs and oil

3 FDR both an emotional idealist and pragmatist; result "widely contradictory movements"

4- did not have the time, especially during the war to study the problem

5-very revealing letter to Endicott Peabody just after return from Teheran- horrified at barrenness and poverty of ME, we can help those countries (and mentions Pal. among others) in years to come if we don't revert to the ostrich policy

6- interview with Chaim. June 11, 1943, said that he heard Jewish colonization is only profitable because deficit is made up from abroad

7- always flirted with idea of trading help to underdeveloped Arabs for Jewish Pal.

8 Welles said FDR once said him if impose continued, UN would have to create Commonwealth & protect it but even here he did not use to Welles Jewish Commonwealth, but Commonwealth in Pal.

7-sympathetic personally toward Jewish aspirations, but tempered his own predilections ~~from~~ by concern for overall war effort. Conflict between personal sympathy and reasons of state made him lean at times to both sides

8-probably had not made a final choice by 1945, but procrastination is understandable if you realize tremendous maze of problems which weighed on his shoulders

9-was first US Pres. to seek a final solution in Pal, but his characteristic desire to please all made him suspect on both sides

a-slowly realized that the puzzle was too complex for an easy

solution. By death had not reached a conclusion, but had conceded American stake in final outcome (this put him a long way from 1933)

10 1939 FDR was considering
Iraq Plan - remove 2 to 300,000
Arabs from Pal. to Iraq - would
cost \$300 mi - Br - Fr - '13,

US '13, would Jewry '13.

FDR chose figure of 300,000 Arabs
because he estimated that many
entered Pal since B.D.

~~had~~ promised Sal Goldman he
would talk to Heric about it
by phone as soon as he was "somewhat
relieved" from other problems

11-Repeatedly promised American Zionists
that he would stand by them -
but they would just have to have
patience

12 Jan 23 '45 to Wise voiced fears about
Russian opposition, fear of Arabs that
Jew Pal. would abort hereafter.

According to Wagner, FDR said to him
once "We are now getting a second
bite at the cherry. That bite must
put an end once and for all to
the homelessness of the Jewish people"



13- Morgenthau not a Zionist (Blum) but had given generously to Jewish causes. Joint Distribution Comm. was trying to get Jews elsewhere. Henry knew of Br. reluctance to agitate Arabs, and how unyielding Congress was on immigration.

a-he explored other possibilities with FDR. Nov. 1938 went to White House, got a letter-US acquire Br. and Fr. Guinea in return for war debts, settle Jews there. FDR was unimpressed, unhealthy climate. But FDR liked Cameroons-wonderful high lands, table lands, wonderful grass- has been explored and is ready for settlers. (Henry had geographers explore idea, but found cost would be prohibitive, potentialities for eco. development poor b-Evian found no place. Mid-1939, FDR said Br. politics make Pal. impossible. FDR had talked to Pres. elect of Paraguay, was even ready to call it Roosevelt Plan, FDR wanted Henry to give him list of thousand wealthiest Jews in US and FDR would tell each how much to give. Henry said: Mr. Pres., before you talk about money you have to have a plan"

14 Schechtman says FDR always for practical settlement by direct negotiations even though he knew of repeated failures

15 Wells said that FDR believed that Arabs would yield because of self-interest. This was classical Zionist argument that colonization helped Arabs - but says Schechtman, men not always ruled by logic. Arabs didn't want to become a minority even in a prosperous country. Felt strength of Arab opposition overestimated, but couldn't expect Arabs in advance to renounce their opposition for expected benefits

Hull said by 1943 F.D.R.
was drawn to powerful
personality of Ibn Saud
& looked forward eagerly to
making his personal acquaintance.

But even Welles in 1944 wanted
Magness plan (Pal. to be port of
big Arab fed) & flirted with
ethno-territorialism as supplementary,
not substitute for Pal.



Last plans of FDR

- 1- now convinced no solution could be found thru king. On way back from Yalta told Ed that if nature took its course there would be bloodshed-some new formula, yet undiscovered, would have to be found

a. - felt he must confer with Cong. leaders
+ work out a plan.

- 2 WSC told Commons Jan 27 that although no solution was reached he has hopes of settlement when war was over.

- 3 - March 16th, FDR told Wore that there was no alternative to turning matter over to UN after it was established. This confirms Wells' contention that FDR planned to create a Jewish Commonwealth & protect it till it could protect itself

Explanation of Saud 1945

- 1- Wise said at the time that FDR attached too much importance to some supersubtlecounsellors in State and Col. OFF. who exaggerated importance of most picturesque and conspicuous Arab leader
- 2- Halperin & Oler - FDR learned from King that Arabs would fight - that is what he meant when he told Cong. that he learned more in 5 minutes than he could have learned in 24 or 36 letters
- 3- Welles said too much was made of meeting by "malicious representation" FDR always meant to parley in such a way as to get Jews a homeland, letter of April 5th written when FDR was unable to devote much time to his duties, it was prepared for him
- 4- Hopkins said FDR was over-impressed by king, but Arabs embroidered tale-king would never rest till all his sons were killed in defense, FDR swore he wouldn't help Jews get Pal., but Manuel says meeting fortified Arab sentiment vs. Zionism as no other event had since WP
- 5- Before he died, FDR told Baruch that of all the men he had ever talked he got the least satisfaction from this iron-willed Arab monarch

mat

Publication 1945

1. made public in Oct '45 - at first HST
denied pledges, but Arabs said they
would publish if he would not
So State found letter of April 5th
a. B. also threatened to publish,
So ^{State} confirmed promises to Arabs
& also published letter from Ping
in which he quoted the Bible to
show that Joshua was a war criminal
2. in press conf of Sept. 26, '45, HST said
there were no letters



AFTER YALTA

- 1- Wise wrote him March 5th- would be less than frank if he did not say they were disappointed at March 1st speech-no mention of tragedy which has overwhelmed Jews, no hope or comfort for them, only passing allusion in Ibn Saud comment. Wants to see him, FDR wired back making it March 15th
- 2- At conf, FDR re-affirmed support for free and democratic commonwealth, Made his position clear in Oct., has not changed his mind and will try to achieve it at earliest possible moment
- 3- Wise later said of March 15 ? interview, told him how he had tried to bring home to ^{the} leaders what miracles Jews had performed and how this progress could help entire region. At his death, said Wise was planning another effective approach
- 4- Even Schechtman admits that in his last days, FDR was looking for new course. In last interview he admitted to Wise failure at Yalta "as far as our Zionist cause is concerned"
- 5- to reassure Jews, on March 16'45, FDR authorized Wise to say that he made his position on Zionism clear in Oct. and he shall continue to do all in his power to bring about realization. Nothing has changed
- 6- Statement to Congress (Gaddis Smith) was "typical Roosevelt flippancy"
7. FDR told Wise (March 16) that big since had decided to give Pal. to the Jews + immigration must continue
- 8- not only were promises made to Saud, April 5th, but similar promises sent to Iraq, Yemen, Syria

9-

king wrote FDR March 10th- FDR replied April 5th- is mindful of recent conversation, has given Pal. deep thought, will make no basic decisions without full consultation, will take no hostile acts vs. Arabs (King was upset by March 16th interview with Wise)

10- probably at Yalta (Halperin & Oder) Beg 3
Decided on Jewish Pal. in due time.
but WSC. Decided against formal
abrogation of WP. "Things are done
differently in England"



Feb. 14, 1945
Great Bitter Lake
at Suez

- 1- took 4 hrs, king not interested in benefits that might accrue from Jewish immigration. Said Arabs would rather die than yield, also said that too much western contact would be bad for his people

a-FDR again promised no action without consultation

- 2- a week before FDR died he renewed promise by letter: 1- no decision on immigration or Commonwealth without consultation, 2- would take no action hostile to Arabs.

- 3- meeting with Saud aboard QUINCY in Great Bitter Lake (Suez)

King infirm, FDR gave him a wheelchair. Grace Tully says he was much impressed by strong character and statesmanlike approach of king, a man who had long fascinated him

a- Eddy was interpreter

King invited by telegram, travelled 800 miles from Jidda, pitched tent on deck, slaughtered sheep, then

(taken to warm - traveling sample)

- 4 Sen. Edwin Johnson said that even Fuller was better authority on Jewish matters than was Saud.

- 5 WSC warned him at Yalta that it was useless; but FDR wanted to convince him that something must be done for 10's of thousands homeless Jews (Elliott R)

- 6- king said there are 50 UN countries, Pal. has already taken more than its share.

- 7- Ed said FDR ad-libbed in March 1945 report was anxious to justify trip -

8 - King took quota of harem along
meeting was Feb 15 - freshly slaughtered
lamb because he knew nothing of
refrigeration. King brought on
Assistant Murphy
King said you Germany is the Jew.
What injury have you done to
Jews of Europe.



*Crusader
mentally*

1- impetus to keep subject taboo during war came from GB. McCoomack said so in Cong. 1945. Said we knew that this cost Jewish lives but had to go along to further war effort

2- Eden FM, said May 29, '41 Arabs had made great strides since last war, now want unity, England will help achieve it (Mansion House address)

a- but Eden avoided ticklish question of its relation to Pal.

3- Kirk says enforcement of WP did not stem from anti-Semitism, but this "cruel ban" was imposed because they had to have stability in ME to supply Russia which was resisting the arch-enemy of Jewry and world civilization *Supply question*

4- sort of parted ways with GB in 1943 in ME. US favored greater protection of Jewish interests, Eden wanted a regional org. to unite 7 Arab states (GB would dominate it), GB could use it for defensive purposes and to protect her oil. Looked after 1943 that GB was searching for a Pal. solution along Arab lines- but movement for Arab unity never got very far

a- In Sept '43 Br. War Cabinet revived partition but by this time Agency was opposed. By Oct. 1944, GB despaired at getting Arab support for partition

b- Eden kept pressing why should Arabs support UN if its victory meant a Jewish state? Felt they couldn't go back on WP without losing Arabs and letting USSR grab ME

8- Dec. 1944 Br. War Cabinet decides on a plan-partition, Jewish state to be part of larger federation, int. body enforce minority rights WSC favored it, would announce it after the war

but afraid of Arabs and in 1944 watered this down, Jews to have less than Arab pop. in new Pal. state. Kept playing with idea until after the war

9- war had shown that if GB wanted to remain a great power, she had to keep the empire. Felt Arab unity would stabilize ME and insure Br. primacy there. As victory loomed, Arabs became more interested.

In 1943 Eden hinted Arabs would have to take initiative toward unity.

By 1945, League of Arab states

- 1-GB intensely involved in region, had to keep lines of communication open. This led to a strong affinity for Arabs, their history and culture
- 2- Col. Off. vs. Zionism since days when it opposed Uganda scheme.
Supporters of Zionism were in For. Off.
- 3- Br/ saw they were exhausted, liquidation of most of empire inevitable.
But could remain a great power if they could salvage something in ME which in turn would insure oil reserves and make it possible to hold on to Africa. Wanted Pal. to replace Egypt as basin of Suez. Would be especially important if Russia would come into ME.
(explains why both parties acted same way in re Pal.)*
- 4- were faced with bad dilemma after news of genocide began to come in (1942)
To give in to Zionists might put Arab world against them, Hitler might win or at least they thought so. To retain immigration curbs was inhuman
We re not oblivious to humanitarian considerations
a- also had to fear India which had 90 mi. Moslems
- 5- Pal. was eastern outpost guarding Suez, start of land routes to India
and the east, stopping point on air routes to India, terminus of pipeline
from oil wells of Iraq to tankers at Haifa
- 6-One school of Britishers attributed all trouble in Egypt, India etc. to JNH. Arabs knew it and made the most of it. Br. understand Arab better, a native, but Jew is difficult, critical, didn't fit into Col. Office's plans for Nigeria or Iraq

US- GB relations over Pal. WARTIME

- 1- In Aug. '41, Welles assured Zionists that it was unlikely that GB would change staus quo during war without prior consultation- if such changes were in the offing, he would let Zionists know

Churchill

1- member of Lloyd George's cabinet

1937- partition- calls partition "counsel of despair", thought partition means end of Jewish dream-if they can't dwell together now, how could they in a fragmented country?-predicted outcome will lead to Br. evacuation

2-WP- "another Munich" "a plain breach of solemn obligation"

3- told Chaim in 1942 that his thoughts were with him and that his plans would work out in the end.

4- In 1941, told Winant that BD was still policy of GB and that it would be taken ^{into} account in future decisions

5- 1943 Chaim complained to FDR that WSC doesn't like to see him because he has very little to tell me now. This was in an answer to question if he had seen WSC

1943- WSC wrote Col Secy that he doesn't regard WP as the fixed policy of GB, just have been forced due to the exigencies of war to carry on predecessor's policies.

Dec. 9

1943-saw Chaim, told him there must be a change, question was only now or after the war

6 Nov. 4'44-Chaim saw WSC at Chequers, spoke of partition, giving Negev to the Jews. But did say decision would have to await victory and later (Feb. 25'45 he told Commons that.

Also told Chaim he wanted US in on matter, that there were many anti-Zionist Tories and at times he had to fight alone

WSC at this interview that Lord Moyne had changed and he should see him in Cairo, but before this could happen, Moyne was assassinated by Stern group. This led WSC to say in Commons that if our dreams for Zionism have to end in the smoke of assassin's pistol, might have to re-think his whole stand

7- WSC, says Hurewitz, was friendly, but realized that continued support of Zionism would endanger war effort

8- In 1946, WSC said in Commons he was always a friend, but Jews tried to stretch what GB promised them too far; has felt that England with the Arab albatross had to carry too much

9- told Silver in 1944 that he considered himself her of

Balfour; would res. Yankee before he moves vs his enemies.
in G 13

of the burden, while US sat on sidelines and criticized "with all the freedom of perfect detachment and irresponsibility"

Blum concludes that impetus came from WSC which influenced FDR to avoid showdown during the war in order to keep the ME quiet

But WSC allowed his subordinates to speak repeatedly of how the tortured & trampled Nations would be reconstituted after the war, but nothing as to the "one people who have suffered more than all the others combined"

Jews retained faith in WSC & in Parliament - vent wrath on Mandates & Cal off.

Ben Gurion pointed out in 1947 that bureaucracy was hardly under any control - if complaints arise in Parliament, reply is prepared by very men concerned

WSC said in 1946 that he always wanted the US in on it "Share & share alike" If they could agree on a solution, they could make it work. Fact they were receiving a maximum of advice & a min of assistance, from US.

HALIFAX(in US,1941-46)

1- high Anglo-Catholic, had been Viceroy of India where he was harsh on pol. offenders. Munich appeasers. As late as Sept. 2'39 thought a deal could be made with AH. But almost became PM in 1940, obtained "unique moral eminence" *Appeaser*

a. succeeded Lord Lothian, late in 1940, like him belonged to Cliveden set In 1941 (Jan) FDR went to Annapolis to meet him, drove him in his own car to the Br. embassy

b-Halifax was close friend of Lippmann, but never, said WL, could understand US politics. Very much shocked by death of Lord Moyne

2- Was FM in 1939, attended 1939 talks. Chaim says that he always treated him well but that in 1939 he urged Jews to give up all rights. Chaim said he was always soft on Germany. Felt that Jews had very few friends in the world, but GB was one



Elections of 1944

1-GOP-convention held first, better position as out-called for Open door, Pal. reconstituted as "a free and democratic commonwealth"

condemned failure of FDR to get mandatory to carry out BD

a- Dewy tried to rectify this mistake by interpreting it as a Jewish commonwealth (after FDR's letter - complaint by AHS)

2- Democrats incorporated Biltmore, FDR sent the letter to Wagner, which was really a promise to find ways and means of implementing the platform. Said to be strongest statement ever made on subject by a Pres. This was first election to mention Pal. in platform

3-State regarded even GOP plank as "irresponsible and unconstructive"

4- Silver did his best to remain neutral, thought movement should not be tied to one pol. party. Silver had gotten at Dewy thru Attny Gen. Nathaniel Goldstein

5- FDR Oct. 15th to Wagner who was to attend ZoA con. Calls attention to Dem. plank- unrestricted immigration, establishment of Jewish commonwealth, will find ways and means as soon as practicable-knows sentiment of Amer. people and if re-elected will try to bring about its realization. Silver called it a historic day

6- both parties met at Chicago, Toft Chmn of Platform Com.

7- all hailed FDR but Reconstruction - pledge indefinite, open to misconstruction.

M.E. now safe, why not action now?
Why did he put in "if re-elected" -
Why not now?

Reaction to campaign pledges of '44

1- Murray to ED, Oct. 27

a- wants ED to talk to Pres. immediately. Until now gave no such assurances, contrary to two assurances to king in '43. Early in '44 FDR told State to tell NEE gov'ts no decision without consultation

will make it hard to maintain our philanthropic and educational interests in ME, jeopardize oil interests in SA. GB will welcome it because Arabs will turn to them, Russia will want it as a lever

2-lots of reports come in about complaints and demonstrations in Arab world. Henerson roared from Iraq-say it will lead to bloodshed and chaos, US doing it for internal pol. reasons. Demands no statements that will change balance in Pal. or upset ME. In Jerusalem, Arab Chamber of Commerce cancelled appointment with US Eco, Mission

3-Hull cautioned Pres.-wanted both parties to restrain themselves

Arabs accuse FDR of going beyond mandate and BD



Eve of Yalta YALTA

- 1- 1/11/45 FDR wrote Landis asking him for a memo for use at Yalta, possibilities of Jews and king coming together
- 2- Wagner briefed him before he left, FDR said he would try to implement promise of Oct. 15th
- 3- many wires to White House urging him to take up Pal. question at Yalta 2900 postal cards "Please make the Democratic Platform pledge a thing of substance rather than an empty gesture"
- 4- At this time, if Welles can be believed, FDR was intrigued with irrigating Arabian deserts, wanted to persuade Syria, Lebanon, Jordan to join in the program Thought he could fulfill Jewish aspirations and bring eco. benefits to Arabs, but must have been terribly disappointed at what king said
- 5- FDR had seen FDR Jan. 22. Pres was seeking information on sore points, Pal's eco. potential, position of USSR, fear of Jewish expansionism (FDR said Arabs would crowd into a Jewish state), talk of a Jordan Valley Authority.

Memo prepared for Pal. question of Yalta, but no record exists of use
Memo says dept.'s aim is to forestall action in NE that would jeopardize war efforts and US interests. Need positive policy, now however and Yalta is place to begin it. Recalls promises to Arabs, that Soviets are vs. Jewish state. must act in concert with Soviets. If you can get 3 major powers to agree on Pal., this might be basis for agreement at an int. conf. after the war. If US at Yalta can work out some agreement, might check pressure groups. Want temp. policy on part of GB to cover time between when WP quotas will be exhausted and a permanent settlement can be worked out

- 6- Ed wrote FDR Dec. 13'44- despite campaign promises on both sides, must remember promises to Arabs who regard them as as solemn an agreement as At. Charter. Lists events and complaints coming in from NE, demonstrations, boycotts. If concessions to Zionists continue will jeopardize US trade there, oil concessions in SA But all this was rehash of what Murray was feeding him
- 7- Nov. 9'44 Zionist leaders asked that Pres. take Pal. expert along
- 8- Murray stresses that OWI has uncovered great anti-Zionist feeling - not confined to pal. leaders, but also great among business classes.
! I have no evidence that it was taken up at Yalta'

9- Ed. wrote Dec. 22 (came from Murray)
submitted to War and Navy who approved.

must cement our influence with SA, or some other nation will move in,
need friendship for oil's ^Sake to supplement New World reserves, that land
now held by our nationals need military airfields there to fly to Pacific
theater. Will cost about \$43 mi. till SA gets solvent thru pilgrims
and oil royalties



Hoskins- general

Father was Dr. Franklin E.
Hoskins, distinguished missionary
geographer!

1- Breck Long said 1944, that H's views were very positive and didn't necessarily mirror those of State

2- Hoskins was Arab expert, friend of Berle. Hoskins, b. in Beirut, was cotton goods merchant, son of missionary parents, said to be a Syrian nationalist.

3- spent winter of '42-'43 in ME, then circulated "The Present Situation in the Near East" to some congressmen. was anti-French, anti-Zionist

In 1943, was ex-assst to Asst. Secy Berle.
Was scheduled to meet GHJ in 1944

4- Claim in book says Hoskins was no friend, but less hostile than others.

At first thought something could be done if Zionists would moderate their demands (even talked of bringing in 1/2 mi. to Pal.), but stiffened

after he saw king, repeated bribe charge

5- in 1941 ^{Hoskins} ~~Hoskins~~ was with Dir. of Foreign Activity Correlation. Sent to NY to see Syrian. organization



Hoskins' memo of April 20, 1943 (circulated by Zionists by '44)

1- based on trip to ME, Nov. '42- March '43. Mainly based on interviews with dip. & mil. representatives (Amer. Br. Free Fr.), Arab leaders, missionairies, educational leaders. Doesn't mention having interviewed Jewish leaders.

a- main thesis that Zionism has become a major issue and unless the Arabs were re-assured there would be armed conflict. His interviews with Arabs set up by Amer. U. where his parents taught said Pal. over-populated

2- Oct '42 FDR insisted on mission to ME to assist UN by capitalizing on Arab friendship. GB agreed to Hoskins and another officer. Spent 3½ mos. Hull says they did interview Jewish leaders

a- Hoskins report April 20, 1943

danger of fighting immediate, would lead to massacre of Jews in other Moslem countries. Arabs feel Jews arming, have not kept informal truce. Arabs fear Jewish expansionism beyond Pal.

Ike has reported Arab tensions. Jew. state could be imposed only by force. Wants all out help to refugees, but this should not be confused with Pal question

b-suggests joint statement

c-as% to postwar sol., Hoskins wants a bi-nat'l state within the proposed Levantine Fed. This would unite Lebanon, Syria, and Pal. as they were before 1914. Also suggests Cirenaica, now virtually uninhabited for some Jews, but put anoth ½ mi. Jews in Pal., which would mean parity with Arabs, N. Cirenaica could taken another ½ mi.

1-idea quickly outlea

Hoskins, Jan. 23 '43

1-just returned from Arab ME, conflict may break out before end of war, certainly thereafter. Jewish confidence in state (which will cause conflict) based on their confidence in US support

- a- Arab afraid of fait accompli which will hand Pal. to Jews, notion confirmed by Arab propaganda. Suggests joint statement. Pal. has 1 mi. Arabs. Wants visit of moderate Arabs like Emir Abdullah who know that you also can't dislodge ½ mi. Pal. Jews
- b- stresses moderate Jews like Magnes, Szold who want bi-national state. If US backs either extremist group it would commit our troops

2- Hull reported he read Hoskins' report with interest, but time not appropriate for visit of moderate Jews and Arabs. Suggests visit of one of king's sons, such a visit might accomplish some of Hoskins' aims



Hoskins' mission to see king

- 1- July 23, '43- to tell king Pal. is complex problem, US wants to postpone until after war decision on territorial and boundary questions. Would he see Chaim or some other Jewish leader?
FDR's first choice is voluntary agreement
- 2- Hoskins reported from Cairo Aug. 31, '43
a-saw king daily for a week, didn't have to use interpreter.
couldn't deliver Pal., even if for an instant he considered it,
Chaim in 1939 had impugned his honor, bribe to guaranteed by
FDR. King's views had been broadcast by interview with LIFE,
king got flood of letters and telegrams from whole Moslem
world. Absolutely no hope of getting king to help solve
problem
- 3-Sept. 27, '43, Hoskins saw FDR, latter indignant that his name
was brought into it. Only possible basis was that some time back FDR
had suggested to Wise that Jews buy land outside of Pal. and
assist Arabs to settle there.
Hoskins added that many European Jews will want to stay there
if assured security and property. State could be established
only by force
as told him king was honest, patriotic, religious, realizes his
limitations as a ruler, likes FDR and Americans. Hoskins said it
would be a mistake for US to take over all responsibility in
ME, or to evade ALL of it. We should become an important jr.
partner. Will not be easy, but we can work out a constructive
ME policy if people are informed of Arab side. SA important for
oil in US hands, postwar air/routes, postwar market. Must
think of 50 mi. Arabs plus 200 mi. additional Moslems. Is
convinced that Arabs would welcome assurance from US about Pal.
Afraid of being faced with some new BD which would set up Jew.
state. 1 mi. Arabs in Pal., would be backed by 49 mi. other Arabs
that is why you have to freeze status quo for duration
Zionist thefts of arms from Br. have convinced Arabs they must
strike soon. ALL AMERICANS must realize that if we commit US to
force in that area what we will face, because only force will bring
about Jewish Pal.

Memo to
Pres left
at interview
Sept 27

WRHS

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

Hoskins, Dec. 1943

- 1- saw FDR, Ede. 14, presented "Highlights Regarding Pal", based on 2 trips to ME and one to London, had travelled over 7 mos. seeking information on Pal. issue. Saw increased tension on both sides, no hope of settlement. Arabs more afraid of Jews now than in 1937. Reported that in GB War Cabinet is uncertain and indecisive. Speaks of pressures here and in GB, necessity of reaching a decision, to clarify position of our dip. representatives in ME
 - a- decide to have conferences with War and Navy to agree on some policy, then get to Br. for joint policy. Wants joint statement to prevent blowup, postpone definite decision until after victory



- 1- led mission to ME 1943, stressed in his report necessity of US-GB leaders to find a solution
- 2- Hurley came back suspicious of Br. imperialism, ready to outbid it for Arab support. Is Harry Sinclair's lawyer and "ash. lobbyist, thinks Arabian oil too important to be left to the mercy of local conflict., inference being that you had to liquidate Jewish ambitions
- 3- Hurley report of May 5'43, had been sent as personal emissary of FDR to survey ME situation.
 - a- says most emphasis not on war or peace, but over commonwealth Jews divided, but Zionists want Pal., "probably Transjordan", transfer of population to Iraq, eco. leadership of entire region
 - b- most European Jews want to return to Europe after the war. In other countries of ME, Jews view Zionist program with alarm and dismay
 - c- Arabs not anti-Jewish, no serious opposition to JNH, but to Jewish majority. If granted state, Jewish influence with great powers would lead to more imperialism, this would hamper Arab. ind. Likes compromise idea of Nuri Pasha- hurry ind. of Pal., establish Arab. Fed. to include Pal. with Br. as protectors, gives Jews autonomy where they have majority, but curb Jewish immigration
 - d- Arabs feel US, not GB behind state idea. Saw Ben Gurion who said US is obligated to establish state
 - e- If you buy the Zionist idea, said Hurley, (a minority has right to reclaim territory taken by force) you would have to dissolve Br. Empire, give back Mexican cession. (said anti-Zionists pointed this out) Hurley is certain GB opposes Jewish state, despite rumors of what WSC has said
 - f- Hurley refuses to assess merits of case, London no longer able to act, US must make up its mind on a Jewish state and share the responsibility for this decision.

Saudi Arabia-wartime

1- began having relations in 1940, 1941 Kirk of Egypt also accredited to SA

1941- king needed cash to make up for pilgrims. After hesitation because SA was in Br. sphere, gave him \$10 credit (owing mostly to oil. By eve of PH. were thinking of lend-lease, before war was over gave king more than GB. really extended lend-lease only in 1943, before war was over gave him \$45 mi., besides a goodly share of the \$51 mi. given by GB

2-came to believe, in Murray's words, that king was the outstanding Arab

a-State proposed draft to king May 3'41 (not sure that it was sent) asks for peace in ME, knows that he is troubled by Zionism, but WP has done much to ease complaints of Arabs. Is willing to help ease his financial burdens. Even thought of him as possibly protecting Jews of Yishuv, State prods FDR to get king on our side

a-State felt that SA was the one Moslem country that was not a source of anxiety, could stabilize region

b-1942 began sending irrigation and ag. experts. Our reports said that king was less fanatical than others on Zionism, and even Chaim thought so

3- crucial year was 1943 -War & Navy wanted more oil concessions, aircraft landing rights, diplomats on scene reported that Zionism was the great obstacle. Throughout year afraid of domestic oil reserves U boats sinking tankers, began to ~~take~~ ^{take} lively interest in Arabian oil

a- king used concern to bring up Pal. question in spring, '43-had refrained so far because he didn't want to increase tensions, wanted (April 30) definite assurance that Wash. wouldn't act without informing him in advance. FDR replied, urged understanding with Jews, but promised no decision altering basic situation without consultation with both parties (shows influence of Hoskins and Hurley missions)

Schechtman points out this was tant amount to saying nothing would be done. Hall still thought it Br. responsibility

b-midsummer '43, king invited to come to Wash., eventually led to visit of two sons-held series of conferences on eco. aid, (State asked Zionists to desist during visit) accepted with condition that princes not discuss Pal.
c- Oct. 26'43 we sent a secret cable to SA, stating that we sympathize with Arab aspirations- probably sent to offset broadcasts of Mufti, but led Arabs to believe we might scuttle
BD

In 1943, king was interviewed by LIFE reporter, hinted that he wanted 1938 letter published, probably wrote 1943 letter with wide distribution in mind

4- 1944

asst
a-first ~~appointment~~ to SA was Col. Wm. A. Eddy,
former college pres, Arabist,
sent to Jidda Ja. 1944 to acquaint himself with needs of
SA, promote better relations (later in Friends of ME)

b-obvious that we were vying with GB for postwar influence and concessions



Early relations with SA (to 1939)

- 1- We took more notice of him after he helped negotiate 1936 strike, he sort of felt responsible after that for Pal. Arabs
- 2- King wrote long letter to FDR in late 1938, Arab rights to Pal, you can't give back to any nation what it once had, this would create chaos, Wilson and self-determination. There can only be peace in Pal. if Arabs get their rights -claim US never heard Arab case.
 - a- FDR replied, stating US off-hands policy. Welles told FDR this was first letter from an Arab chief of State about Pal. Welles and FDR relied on State's statement of Oct. 14'38



Saudi-background

US-
east of Miss

- 1- Saud was 1st king. Not a minor state, equal to US east of Miss. Located at one of world's crossroads. Held Holy Cities of Mecca & Medina, held some of world's greatest oil reserves
- 2- Only US and GB involved here,. Ibn Saud started out as tribal chieftain. After 1914 (aged 34) defeated all rivals, gained control over scattered population. Rise supported by Br. who gave him pol. advice and money. But turned later to US for eco. aid. In 1932, became first king-maintained order, protected pilgrims, but rejected new ways in machinery, diet, clothes, sanitation. Known to subjects as Abdul Aziz- 6ft. 4, stiff kneed, useless finger, blind in one eye - looked like a figure out of Arabian Nights. His ancestors started Wahhabi movement (fiercely puritanical), wanted to restore old-time religion
- 3- country poor in resources except oil, lived on pilgrims. Saud had 37 living sons, 125 wives, but no queen, allied himself by marriages (like Queen Victoria) to tribes of peninsula
- 4- Had been King of Hejaz ^{the} and Nejd, proclaimed king of SA in Great Mosque of Mecca, 1932. Valued Br. aid, but suspicious of Br. intentions, believed understanding with US would help ward off Br. imperialism.
- 5- SA became important to us because of oil, postwar air routes, and potential market for hard goods. Exported dates and tobacco.

ME strategic factor

1- besides oil, central location of ME "astride communications by land, sea, and especially air" made Arab east almost as important to US as to GB

2-bound to seek after the war landing rights for commercial planes because "no global, all-weather air route could omit the region"

a-also, if we were to assume our share in maintaining world peace, had to keep peace in Arab east

3- central factor of policy was opposition to Br. and Fr. imp.

If ME fell, could be "dreaded juncture" of German-Jap forces, Axis would get unlimited oil, could stop our southern supply route to USSR

see a- we felt that Br. imperialism played into hands of Axis, but we had "unique moral prestige" to counteract it. Hull in 1942 laid our goodwill there to a century of US missionary, ed, and philanthropic efforts untarnished by material motives or interests

4- geographically a vital land, sea and air bridge connecting Europe, Asia and Africa-cross roads of world at time when geopolitics was important

Hausknecht
lay at heart of Allied communications center, one of decisive battle grounds of WW II, athwart lifeline of supplies to USSR

Suez Canal and shipping lines eastward to India and southward around Cape included not only richest oil deposits in world, but also was the most important single geographical area of the war (Cyrus Sulzberger 1942)

5- Countries from Euphrates to Nile weak & under populated, but great geographic importance - Suez gateway to Far East & China, even one of the approaches to the Pacific & so important to US

US and ME: general

1- we were last major power to intervene, relatively uninterested before 1914. Eco. and humanitarian interests increased between the wars, but there was still little direct involvement

2- to 1939, just scattered oil concessions
American universities at Cairo + Beirut

3- before 1939, with exception of Syria + Lebanon, considered Br. sphere.

4- need air bases + landing rights after war, US. air lines will encircle globe.

5- a month before P.H., Huef noted that countries of ME that once seemed remote, now have important repercussions on our plans.

6- before P.H., U.S. military wanted GB to marshal all her power to win battle of Atlantic. They felt that GB was vulnerable in ME. FDR wanted Br. to fight axis wherever their soldiers could be found. Wanted direct help to ME before P.H.

US in ME after PH

- 1-suddenly found itself deeply enmeshed. In 1942 took joint responsibility with GB for ME Supply Center
- 2-Set up Persian Gulf Command to supervise lend-lease to USSR
- 3- No US combat troops in ME itself, but US had sunk millions into air and military bases, hospitals and supply depots. OWI had local branches in each country, cooperating with Br. Ministry of Information to counteract Axis propaganda
- 4- during war we established mil. missions in Egypt, Iran and Iraq
a-in a no. of states US advisers helped re-organize local police, public works, administration
- 4-Lend-lease was a powerful factor which penetrated with ease into oldest areas of Br. and Fr. imperialism
- 5- at time of PH still minute interests compared to those of GB.
- 6- Lend Lease for Africa & ME, March '41 - March '43 \$1593 mi
enough to make us a practically ind. agent in this area.
- 7- after joint Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in 1942 est. Persian Gulf Command which took large share of our lend-lease to USSR
- 8 1943-44 Jas M. Landon established in ME as Dir. of Amer. Eco. Operations

US in ME after PH

- 9- ME Supply Center began by Br. in 1942, became joint in '42 to meet acute food and non-military needs. Has aided Arabs a great deal
- 10- American advisers sent to 3 ME countries hitherto thought in Br. sphere

11- We had to make sure our non-combatant personnel would not be affected by upset of stability

12. We helped maintain stability in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt & Turkey. became so invaluable we couldn't shy away from pol. question any more.



OIL FACTOR: BACKGROUND

(1960 column & Co)

- 1- contained about 2/3rd of world's supply. Br. began digging in Persia @ 1900, but we didn't know of tremendous reserves until 1930s or even later
- 2- Because of great rise in our consumption we feared depletion, Europe could no longer rely on New World
- 1958 a- estimated in 1944 we had only 14 years supply
b- we had long been told our reserves were scanty - very greatly disturbed during WW II - looked like Texas & O kls. fields were playing out
- 3- De Novo has shown that WWI showed petrol indispensable for ships, tanks, planes - even a basic ingredient in TNT
oil could mark difference between victory and defeat
a- by 1919 Br. turning out only 5% of world's oil, but held 50% of estimated reserves
b- eventually State began to back US cos. seeking entry into ME
- 4- oil was most important attraction of US to ME. Outside of New World, most reserves were in Moslem lands, many of these people either had just gotten or were about to get their ind. and they looked to us
- 5- One of first to be interested in SA was Chas. C. Crane, got an engineer named Karl Twitchell to survey oil fields of SA 1925
Found not safety first, but Allah first there, no plane could look down on Mecca. SA reserves too great to estimate, meant that not since Mohammed has Arabia meant so much to the world.
a- Ibn Saud said he decided on US concession after he learned about Wilson and US history - was sure we wouldn't try to mind HIS business

Crane in SA.

OIL FACTOR

as early as 1937 there is indication that oil cos. were worried about Zionism. They found a ready ear in personnel of State, for men at the ME desks had often worked previously for oil interests

a-ARAMCO had a powerful lobby during the war

b-Till '41 CASCO was giving money to king, then persuaded US to take over, at first rejected by State as it was Br. sphere, but changed later, partly because Ickes wanted to build a pipeline Arabia to Med., partly because we needed the oil in war and to keep the peace after the war

c- by 1946 US cos. were producing 200,000 barrels a day?, 1/4 set aside for navy.

d- Saud desperately needed money in '41, oil cos. warned State that he would be loyal only so long as his interests warranted it.

1-Hull and FDR were suspicious of Br., gave king money to ^{we can} ~~warn~~ him from GB

e-In 1944 Forrester (navy) told Hull that we had inadequate reserves. Maybe new reserves will be found, there may be a breakthrough on synthetic oil, but navy can't afford to err on side of optimism. Wanted State to pursue policy that would insure US ME oil, especially in SA

f- evidently from the evidence, FDR was sold on idea that we had to have equal access to oil in all parts of the world

2- Secret conf. Feb. 5, 1944, Breck Long and Senate FR Comm

Dept. sympathetic to JNH, but had to go cautiously. Much discussion of oil. Came while res. were pending, all agreed ME oil was of paramount necessity

3-1944, Ickes was bent on building pipeline, SA- Med. across 3 or 4 countries. We had to get their consent

Breck
2/5/44

US HOLDINGS

- 1- originally GB dominated MR oil reserves, we got some oil lands in Iraq, entire concession of SA and Bahrein, later in Kuwait and Iran. SA concession was thru SOC of Cal, later ARAMCO, began digging 1938, 1939 built pipeline to Persian Gulf

a-cost of production less in ME and this was an additional attraction

MOST IMPORTANT were ARAMCO IN SA, GULF in Kuwait, SOC NJ and SOCONY VACUUM in Iraq

- 2- no gusher in SA until '38

*Proven reserves of Aramco 6-7 mi barrels,
potential reserves of 40 mi*

- 3- King granted Arabian-American Oil Co.
(owned jointly by SOC (Cal) & Texaco

in 1933, more concession 1939.



NATURE OF FDR

1- Manuel notes he was given to "wildly contradictory movements" was both a pragmatist and emotional idealist

2- Bailey

FDR was filled with infectuous confidence, genial warmth, buoyancy, "captivating personal magnetism". ^{Would} first-name callers, it was said that his ~~charming~~ ^{charming} smile could "charm birds out of trees"

Sent people away so spellbound that they forgot what they came for.

But it was a fault that he hated to disappoint people, or injure their feelings. Good listener, nodded, said "fine, fine", but it only meant he understood point they were making-often did the opposite which lead to charges of double-dealing. At times was an easy mark, but could be utterly ruthless when the occasion demanded it.

3- a very complicated man, from these inner complexities sprang many of the apparent contradictions in his actions.

4- His affability masked "a reticence that few men were able to penetrate". No one, even Hopkins fully shared his thoughts, no one who knew him was ever able to discover the processes by which he made up his mind. Like sort of an ordered chaos, "jealous of his prerogatives" "Lines of power that stopped short of his own person received no clear definition" Sort of divided and ruled

a- no written records of high decision making-heard advice and often followed it, but decisions were his own

"master of superb political artistry" and "brilliant improvisation"

FDR- weak points

1- Nevins- flashes of insincerity, often given to telling different stories about same subject to different men. Was willing, upon occasion, to sacrifice principle for expediency. Eleanor said he believed in Loyalist cause in Spain but refused to champion it for pol. reasons

a-His character lacked the symmetry, harmony and weight of a GW, TJ or AL

FDR-nature-222

Nevins

5- man of action rather than thought, unflinching optimist, having conquered a prostrating illness and horrible physical handicap, felt an inner faith in man's power to conquer anything.

a-was humane, had genuine concern for the friendless and unfortunate, greatest humanitarian since AL. Frances P. thought his own illness gave him compassion for the afflicted and underprivileged.

6-in foreign affairs liked imagination, boldness, ingenuity, liked ^apragmatic experimentation-willing to scrap a theory as soon as it collided with a brute fact. Liked things that would work, was prone to obliterate old failures with new plans

Reasons for Russian interest in ME

1- picked up after 1943, regarded Turkey & Iran in their security zone, had ^{had} once had great bonds with Arab east and were trying to restore them. Relaxed during war ban against religious bonds with patriarchs, reo-organized Russ. Orth. Church, 1943. After 20 yr. interruption, allowed Soviet pilgrims to go to Mecca

2- largely landlocked, were looking for warm water outlet, became use to such a port during war.

3- Before 1914, Russia had protected her missionary communities in Palestine.

Russian factor

1- almost half survivors in E. Europe went to parts of Europe sure to come under Soviet control. Many others went to Soviet hinterlands.

a- would they be permitted to go to Pal.? Would official ban on Zionism be lifted?

2- Zionists hoped Russians would change their mind; courted Maisky during his 1943 visit to Pal., tried to convince him of their socialism

a- Yishuv had many who were Russian born and considered its literature part of their cultural heritage, kibbutzim builders had been influenced by same forces that caused Russ. Rev.

Russian statements on Pal.

- 1- Till end of war remained silent on political questions- never gave any public hint on future of Pal. The mystery of Soviet intentions aroused hopes and fears among both groups
- 2- if US was too hard on Arabs, they might turn to USSR, British wanted to create a cordon sanitaire to hem the Russians in
- 3R.L. Buell wrote Steinhardt in 1944 that Russians consider Zionism an agent of Br. imperialism and counter-revolutionary
a-but Buell mentions that a leading Soviet diplomat in 1943 said there might be a change- Zionists are at loggerheads with GB, said Russians had more in common with advanced and progressive Jews of Pal. than with backward Arabs
- 3- in 1943, Chaim spoke in Russian to Maisky ^{9 van} (Jewish - just published memoirs)
- 4- Wise to FDR 1/24/45 FDR had mentioned Russian opposition to Wise, Wise says Benes^A talked about Zionism with Stalin in Moscow.
Joe said he wouldn't oppose commonwealth if US-GB were for it.
- 5- 1944 Murray wrote Ed. that he learns from Ankara embassy that Soviets are vs. Jewish state- we are weakening ourselves with Arabs, Soviets will ~~will~~ oppose Zionism and this will have an "electric effect" on Arabs. Murray says very facts that Arabs so outnumber Jews in ME will dictate Soviet policy
- 6- Dec. '44 Harriman to Ed., knows little more than dept. about Soviet Pal. policy.-press is silent, which means gov't thinks it is premature to discuss it, but probably newly created posts in Arab world are circulating anti-Zionist policy to break down suspicions of Communism and attract Arab world-probably don't want to come out vs US*GB while war is on, but will surely use our pro-Jewish stand against us, would probably favor Arab union if Soviets can control them (Murray had asked Harriman for information, Nov. 4'44
- 7-Nov. 10, Ed talked to FDR about subject, and suggested that FDR speak to Ave. FDR wanted memo on subject, sent Dec 4th after careful preparation
- 8- Nov. 4th, Henderson wrote Murray from Iraq. FM deeply concerned about Soviet influence-at proper time will let Arabs know who their friends are If we persist in our pro-Zionist stand, Iraq will become a Soviet puppet

2 Russia

9- State did submit memo on Pal. for use at Yalta, but never used. Soviets
Yalta, not used vs. Jewish state, can't allow Soviets to take advantage of US-GB,
Allies should make no plans for Pal. without Soviet consent

10- Jan 22 '45 FDR brought up to
Wise Russian proposition, Wise
qualified himself that Russians were
not opposed to Commonwealth if
US + GB could agree on it

11 Just before Yalta State warned FDR
repeatedly of new interest of Soviets
in NE, can't let them capitalize
on friendship of 50 mi Arabs.

Also brief prepared for Yalta on Palestine
(never used) repeated these
warnings but said agreement
on Pal. must include all 3
major powers.

12 From Iraq, Loy Henderson warned
11/4/44 that at proper time,
USSR would let Arabs know who is
their friend. If we persist in pro-
Zionist stand, Iran will become
Russian puppet

US + White Paper 1939

- 1- R. Walton Moore wrote memo
(found in FDR Papers) 5/26/39

Can protest only on moral grounds, no
legal involvement. Br. can change
their policy, we can't insist on
fulfillment of JNH, can do nothing
as long as American rights are not
jeopardized

- 2- Dikren pointed out it came just when so
many lives were in jeopardy.
But protests more vs. State than
FDR

- 3- State had been silent for 5 mos., now replied to many telegrams
etc. Art. VII did not empower us to prevent change in mandate,
all we could do is to refuse to recognize validity of
application to American interests unless we assented. But
real concern was not those interests but closing gates
to Hitler's victims-and it was exactly this aspect of the
problem which State avoided

White Paper, 1943

- 1- combined legal and illegal immigration declined sharply during the war
- a- in 1943 only a little more than half legal quota came in, but at Bermuda Conf. of 1943 GB extended expiration date of 3/31/44 indefinitely
 - b- every attempt to get it changed led to statement of GB that exigencies of war required it to remain in force. While millions were being killed, only 10-12 thousand came in each year

2- In fall of 1943, great pressure on FDR to intercede, SILVER BLITZ

a- to letters from prominent people, FDR spoke of difficulties, complex problems, but he was giving the matter careful thought

b- Hull made a lot of efforts to get deadline removed. Intervened with Halifax. Hull thought he got Br. to reconsider deadline, but actually they had made up their minds to do so in Nov. '43
(to admit 34,000 after deadline to fill quota)

c- Zionists had to make up their mind about a hard line, FDR said he didn't have WSC in his pocket

3- Meanwhile, Silver blitz started, would mobilize US Jewry, present moral case to American people. Even A J Council for abrogat^{ion} because it discriminated vs. Jews. AZEE started blitz in Oct. '43, established local committees, sent delegations to Wash., cultivated local bosses, worked on legislatures and city councils. Idea was to create grass roots sentiment, bought radio time with Ed. Robinson, Eddie Cantor etc. 60,000 signed petition in South Bend

Palestine Speaks

4- Hull saw Halifax, Dec. 13 '43

a. Hull demands opportunity to say something public on WP.

Silver took over Aug. '43, re-organized AZEC, WP was first major
project. Got governors of 40 states to petition FDR
deluge of letters and telegrams

Petition for free entry with ultimate
aim of state signed by 1500 professors
from 180 institutions, later added
1700 more -



White Paper, 1944

1- FDR spoke out March 9, 1944. First pol. pronouncement of any major power since war began. Suggests US interest in disposition of Pal.

a-March 9th, FDR authorized Silver & Wise to say that US has never approved WP, was made after Arab protests, Silver said it meant we were not tied up with Br. Col. policy

(Halifax angry wanted to answer anti-Br. slanders (that GB was preventing Jews from escaping) but WSC ruled against it)

b-FDR press conf. 3/28/44 took up statement, tried to switch talk to what he had done about refugees-existing avenues of escape thru Balkans and Spain

2-ISOLATIONIST enemies of FDR spoke up vs GB. Fish claimed he was a

Zionist in 1922, Br. action is in defiance of mandate,

B.C. Clark-Br. no more right than we have to be in Pal. except under mandate. Says we do have right under 1924 con. to refuse changes, Robert R. Reynolds agreed. Clare Booth Luce, GB has betrayed Jews of Germany and Pal.

